

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Leonard Hawley to Lawrence Butler, Glyn Davies, Donna Dejban et al. Subject: RE: Blair Meeting Package -- complete (almost...) (5 pages)	01/31/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Breand Kinser-Kidane to Jeffery DeLaurentis. Subject: Secret. (7 pages)	02/02/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/30/1998-02/02/1998]

2006-1363-F
vz5650

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/30/98 3:10:22 PM
FROM Bouchard, Joseph F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Draft Input for SRB for ABC Lunch [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Farrar, Jay C.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Thanks, Jay.

Joe Bouchard

-----Original Message-----

From: Farrar,

Jay C.

Sent: Friday, January 30, 1998 3:08 PM

To: Bouchard, Joseph

F.

Subject: RE: Draft Input for SRB for ABC Lunch [UNCLASSIFIED]

From

my perspective, and having worked this issue at the Joint Staff (legislative strategy), this makes sense. I fear that Helms may try to use it as a hostage to the CTBT and ABM treaties, but we'll have to deal with that if it happens.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bouchard,

Joseph F.

Sent: Friday, January 30, 1998 1:17 PM

To: Baker, James

E.; Bell, Robert G.; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs

Subject: Draft

Input for SRB for ABC Lunch [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Secretary

Cohen has proposed ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as a topic for Monday's ABC (less C, maybe with a substitute). I owe Rob Malley talking points by COB today. Please review and clear/comment on the following proposed points for SRB. Thank you.

BEGIN

POINTS

Summary

There are important national security, economic and environmental grounds for ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; and an interagency consensus that the Administration should attempt to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification in 1998. Secretary Cohen will seek agreement from you and Secretary Albright on a legislative strategy that emphasizes national security grounds for ratifying the treaty and gives DoD the lead in the ratification effort. I recommend that you support that strategy with the qualification that efforts to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification in 1998 must not conflict with other urgent treaty ratification efforts, such as NATO enlargement and CTBT .

Background

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed in 1982. Need for the Convention arose from the breakdown of customary international law as more and more nations unilaterally declared ever larger territorial seas and other claims over ocean resources. Unfortunately, Part XI of the Convention on deep seabed mining contained provisions to which several industrialized nations, including the U.S., objected. In 1994 an Agreement on Implementation of PART XI was signed that eliminated the objectionable provisions on deep seabed mining. On October 7, 1994, President Clinton submitted the Convention and the Seabed Mining Agreement to the Senate for advise and consent to ratification. The SFRC held an initial round of hearings on the Convention and Agreement, but no action has been taken by the SFRC on them since 1994. PDD-36 set ratification of the Convention as the Administration's top ocean policy objective.

There are critically important national security, economic and environmental grounds for ratifying the treaty, and pressure is growing within and outside the U.S. government to ratify the Convention. DoD is leading the effort within the Administration due to the strategic importance of the Convention in ensuring freedom of navigation and limiting territorial waters claims. To illustrate, Oman recently challenged the right of U.S. Navy warships to transit the Strait of Hormuz under the provisions of international strait passage (which exempts warships from restrictions they otherwise would have to observe in territorial waters) on the grounds that the U.S. has not ratified the Convention. Although that particular challenge is not a serious problem, DoD and the Navy believe that it illustrates the type of challenges U.S. forces will face increasingly often in the years ahead if we do not ratify the Convention.

There

are two specific arguments for ratifying the convention in 1998 rather than later: (1) the United States will lose its provisional seat on the International Seabed Authority if it has not ratified the treaty by October 31; and (2) 1998 is the UN Year of the Ocean and on January 28 the President proclaimed 1998 the Year of the Ocean. Ratifying the Convention would be by far the most significant action the U.S. could take to recognize the Year of the Oceans.

The Global

Environmental Affairs IWG's Sub-Group on Oceans (established by PDD-36) is coordinating ratification efforts. Efforts that have been taken this year to support ratification of the Convention include:

* Since

November 1997, DOD and Navy briefers (including CNO and key highly-regarded

retired admirals) have briefed Helms' Chief of Staff (Bud Nance), the staffs of key Republican Senators (Lott, Stevens, Lugar, McCain, Warner) and Senate Democrats' staffs. All went very well.

* On

November 14, SECDEF signed a letter to Sen. Helms urging ratification on national security grounds.

* Feedback from the DOD/Navy briefings

indicated there is a lot of confusion over the 1994 Agreement and whether or not we are satisfied that it corrected the deep seabed mining problems. In December 1997, a joint State/NOAA/Navy briefing team began a series of briefings to staffs of key Senators and Committees (Energy, Commerce, SASC) on national security and economic reasons for ratification, making the point that the deep seabed mining provisions were fixed by the 1994 agreement. That series of briefings is still in progress, focusing on the staffs of Republican Senators. Feedback has been very positive.

* State and DOD prepared a legislative strategy

that was approved by the Sub-Group on Oceans. It focuses attention on convincing Sen. Helms to support the Convention on national security grounds, giving DOD the lead in the ratification effort. Other departments and agencies play a supporting role, covering other key Senators and committees (the Commerce, Environment and Energy committees, in particular).

* White House involvement in the ratification effort

is deliberately kept low key to avoid conflict with other urgent treaty ratification efforts and because it will be easier to sell Senator Helms on the Convention without a White House role initially. At the right moment in the next couple of months, a letter from Mr. Berger to Senator Helms endorsing Secretary Cohen's letter would be helpful.

* The draft legislative strategy sets June 1998 as the goal for gaining Senate advice and consent to ratification. This deadline is driven by (a) completing the effort before election campaigning reaches full swing, and (b) trying to achieve ratification prior to the U.S. National Day at the Expo in Lisbon on June 14 (the theme

of the Expo is the UN Year of the Ocean and U.S. Ocean efforts will be the theme on U.S. National Day).

Points to be Made

* The NSC supports the ratification effort being coordinated by the Sub-Group on Ocean Policy, but with the important qualification that efforts to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification in 1998 must not conflict with other urgent treaty ratification efforts, such as NATO enlargement and CTBT .

* The NSC supports the legislative strategy of focusing on the national security grounds for ratification and on correcting the lingering misperceptions on deep seabed mining.

END
POINTS

Joe Bouchard

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/30/98 4:02:45 PM
FROM Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Draft Input for SRB for ABC Lunch [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Rudman, Mara E.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Mara, this is fine. It hits all the pertinent points of why we need to ratify this in 98. I believe the strategy of letting dod take the lead is exactly right as well.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bouchard,
Joseph F.
Sent: Friday, January 30, 1998 1:17 PM
To: Baker, James
E.; Bell, Robert G.; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Subject: Draft
Input for SRB for ABC Lunch [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Secretary

Cohen has proposed ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as a topic for Monday's ABC (less C, maybe with a substitute). I owe Rob Malley talking points by COB today. Please review and clear/comment on the following proposed points for SRB. Thank you.

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Summary

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The UN Convention

on the Law of the Sea was signed in 1982. Need for the Convention arose from the breakdown of customary international law as more and more nations unilaterally declared ever larger territorial seas and other claims over ocean resources. Unfortunately, Part XI of the Convention on deep seabed mining contained provisions to which several industrialized nations, including the U.S., objected. In 1994 an Agreement on Implementation of PART XI was signed that eliminated the objectionable provisions on deep seabed mining. On October 7, 1994, President Clinton submitted the Convention and the Seabed Mining Agreement to the Senate for advise and consent to ratification. The SFRC held an initial round of hearings on the Convention and Agreement, but no action has been taken by the SFRC on them since 1994. PDD-36 set ratification of the Convention as the Administration's top ocean policy objective.

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Points to be Made

* The

NSC supports the ratification effort being coordinated by the Sub-Group on Ocean Policy, but with the important qualification that efforts to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification in 1998 must not conflict with other urgent treaty ratification efforts, such as NATO enlargement and CTBT.

* The NSC supports the legislative strategy

of focusing on the national security grounds for ratification and

on correcting the lingering misperceptions on deep seabed mining.

END
POINTS

Joe Bouchard

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/30/98 4:38:02 PM
FROM Bouchard, Joseph F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Draft Input for SRB for ABC Lunch [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Baker, James E.

CARBON_COPY Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Sparks, John E.
Bell, Robert G.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Rudman, Mara E.

TEXT_BODY Thanks, Jamie. Excellent comments, all of which I'll incorporate.
I am only aware of UNCLOS being behind NATO, CTBT and the ABM agreements.
Others, like fast track or Kyoto, I don't know. Although I have not heard UNCLOS ratification mentioned as part of the President's legacy, it would certainly be consistent with the statement he made when he submitted it to the Senate in 1994. I'll be bold and include it. Thanks again.

Joe Bouchard

-----Original Message-----

From: Baker,
James E.
Sent: Friday, January 30, 1998 3:53 PM
To: Bouchard,
Joseph F.; Bell, Robert G.; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Cc: @LEGAL
- Legal Advisor
Subject: RE: Draft Input for SRB for ABC Lunch [UNCLASSIFIED]

Excellent
note. Three comments.

(1) Move Points to be Made immediately after summary so that if Sandy is pressed for time etc. he can take quick look at get the bottom line.

(2) Last sentence of summary gives illustrative examples of treaties that are a higher priority, e.g., NATO, CTBT. I think it would be more useful to say "specifically" rather than "such as" otherwise the reader is left without a clear impression where LOS fits in. Is it also behind the Bilateral Investment Treaty with Latvia, or just NATO, CTBT and maybe ABM/MOU? In all seriousness, would be good to state just where on the list it sits. This will help us and legislative (along with agencies) better allocate finite resources and political capital.

(3) One comment that is not made in this good document is that ratification of the LOS would be a significant Presidential legacy to national security and to the rule of law on the high seas. There is a sniff of this in background section in reference to the Year of the Oceans. But I think this warrants special mention in the summary section or at least in the last sentence of first background paragraph.

Thanks.

-----Original

Message-----

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Sent: Friday, January 30,
1998 1:17 PM

To: Baker, James E.; Bell, Robert G.; @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs

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grounds for ratifying the treaty and gives DoD the lead in the ratification effort. I recommend that you support that strategy with the qualification that efforts to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification in 1998 must not conflict with other urgent treaty ratification efforts, such as NATO enlargement and CTBT .

Background

The UN Convention

on the Law of the Sea was signed in 1982. Need for the Convention arose from the breakdown of customary international law as more and more nations unilaterally declared ever larger territorial seas and other claims over ocean resources. Unfortunately, Part XI of the Convention on deep seabed mining contained provisions to which several industrialized nations, including the U.S., objected. In 1994 an Agreement on Implementation of PART XI was signed that eliminated the objectionable provisions on deep seabed mining. On October 7, 1994, President Clinton submitted the Convention and the Seabed Mining Agreement to the Senate for advise and consent to ratification. The SFRC held an initial round of hearings on the Convention and Agreement, but no action has been taken by the SFRC on them since 1994. PDD-36 set ratification of the Convention as the Administration's top ocean policy objective.

There are critically important national security, economic and environmental grounds for ratifying the treaty, and pressure is growing within and outside the U.S. government to ratify the Convention. DoD is leading the effort within the Administration due to the strategic importance of the Convention in ensuring freedom of navigation and limiting territorial waters claims. To illustrate, Oman recently challenged the right of U.S. Navy warships to transit the Strait of Hormuz under the provisions of international strait passage (which exempts warships from restrictions they otherwise would have to observe in territorial waters) on the grounds that the U.S. has not ratified the Convention. Although that particular challenge is not a serious problem, DoD and the Navy believe that it illustrates the type of challenges U.S. forces will face increasingly often in the years ahead if we do not ratify the Convention.

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Points to be Made

* The

NSC supports the ratification effort being coordinated by the Sub-Group on Ocean Policy, but with the important qualification that efforts to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification in 1998 must not conflict with other urgent treaty ratification efforts, such as NATO

enlargement and CTBT .

* The NSC supports the legislative strategy of focusing on the national security grounds for ratification and on correcting the lingering misperceptions on deep seabed mining.

END
POINTS

Joe Bouchard

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/30/98 4:57:33 PM
FROM Bouchard, Joseph F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Talking Points On Law of the Sea for ABC Lunch [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Seaton, James B.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Rice, Edward A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Sparks, John E.
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TEXT_BODY**Summary**

There are important national security, economic and environmental grounds for ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; and an interagency consensus that the Administration should attempt to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification in 1998. Ratification of the Convention would be a significant Presidential legacy to national security and to the rule of law on the high seas. Secretary Cohen will seek agreement from you and Secretary Albright on a legislative strategy that emphasizes national security grounds for ratifying the treaty and gives DoD the lead in the ratification effort. I recommend that you support that strategy with the qualification that efforts to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification in 1998 must not conflict with other urgent treaty ratification efforts.

**Points
to be Made**

- * The NSC supports the ratification effort being coordinated by the Sub-Group on Ocean Policy, but with the important qualification that efforts to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification in 1998 must not conflict with higher priority treaty ratification efforts, specifically, NATO enlargement, CTBT and the ABM agreements.

- * The NSC supports the legislative strategy of focusing on the national security grounds for ratification and on correcting the lingering misperceptions on deep seabed mining.

Background

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed in 1982. Need for the Convention arose from the breakdown of customary international law as more and more nations unilaterally declared ever larger territorial seas and other claims over ocean resources. Unfortunately, Part XI of the Convention on deep seabed mining contained provisions to which several industrialized nations, including the U.S., objected. In 1994 an Agreement on Implementation of PART XI was signed that eliminated the objectionable provisions on deep seabed mining. On October 7, 1994, President Clinton submitted the Convention and the Seabed Mining Agreement to the Senate for advise and consent to ratification. The SFRC held an initial round of hearings on the Convention and Agreement, but no action has been taken by the SFRC on them since 1994. PDD-36 set ratification of the Convention as the Administration's top ocean policy objective. Given that it was President Clinton who submitted the Convention to the Senate after it had languished

for twelve years, it is entirely appropriate that ratification of the Convention be a legacy of his Presidency.

There are critically important national security, economic and environmental grounds for ratifying the treaty, and pressure is growing within and outside the U.S. government to ratify the Convention. DoD is leading the effort within the Administration due to the strategic importance of the Convention in ensuring freedom of navigation and limiting territorial waters claims. To illustrate, Oman recently challenged the right of U.S. Navy warships to transit the Strait of Hormuz under the provisions of international strait passage (which exempts warships from restrictions they otherwise would have to observe in territorial waters) on the grounds that the U.S. has not ratified the Convention. Although that particular challenge is not a serious problem, DoD and the Navy believe that it illustrates the type of challenges U.S. forces will face increasingly often in the years ahead if we do not ratify the Convention.

There are two specific arguments for ratifying the convention in 1998 rather than later: First, the United States will lose its provisional seat on the International Seabed Authority if it has not ratified the treaty by October 31. That would have serious long term negative consequences for U.S. competitiveness in the seabed mining industry. Second, 1998 is the UN Year of the Ocean and on January 28 the President proclaimed 1998 the Year of the Ocean. Ratifying the Convention would be by far the most significant action the U.S. could take to recognize the Year of the Oceans.

The Global Environmental Affairs IWG's Sub-Group on Oceans (established by PDD-36) is coordinating ratification efforts. Efforts that have been taken this year to support ratification of the Convention include:

- * Since November 1997, DOD and Navy briefers (including CNO and key highly-regarded retired admirals) have briefed Helms' Chief of Staff (Bud Nance), the staffs of key Republican Senators (Lott, Stevens, Lugar, McCain, Warner) and Senate Democrats' staffs. All went very well. Nance told the retired Navy admirals who met with him that he is willing to support ratification of the convention, but does not think that he alone can persuade Senator Helms to move it forward.
- * On November 14, SECDEF signed a letter to Sen. Helms urging ratification on national security grounds.
- * Feedback from the DOD/Navy briefings indicated there is a lot of confusion over the 1994 Agreement and whether or not we are satisfied that it corrected the deep seabed mining problems. In December 1997, a joint State/NOAA/Navy briefing team began a series of briefings to staffs of key Senators and Committees (Energy,

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Joe Bouchard

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/30/98 7:46:03 PM
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT JANUARY 30 NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS PRESS GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Babcock, Douglas W.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Evans, Peter O.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, Joanne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Roberts, Michael W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Woolston, Ann E.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY****TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT**

jan30gui.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

January 30, 1998

Human Rights Reports

Russia-Iran Missile Cooperation

Iranian message to U.S. via Arafat

Iran/Id al-Fitr

Iraq

MEPP/MKA Trip

UK/Blair

Northern Ireland

Cuba/Food and Medicine

SOTU/Foreign Policy

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

January 30, 1998

* Today, the Department of State will release its annual report on human rights practices around the world.

* This report draws on a wide variety of sources of information in an effort to provide Congress, the American public, and people around the world with the most accurate, balanced and impartial view possible of the human rights situation in every country of the world (all 194 of them).

* It is the most comprehensive and detailed report of its kind and is a ongoing symbol of our commitment to maintaining human rights as a cornerstone of U.S.

foreign policy.

- * The report helps to ensure that human rights concerns are taken into account in all U.S. relationships and serves as a neutral yardstick by which we can evaluate human rights progress or the lack thereof in every country of the world.
- * This year's report notes that, while there were a number of improvements in human rights in 1997, there continue to be a number of serious problems as well.
- * We refer you to the Department of State for further details about this report.

RUSSIA-IRAN MISSILE COOPERATION

January 27, 1998

Q: Can you comment on the significance of the Russian statement last week on new export controls?

A: We have been officially informed by the Russian government that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on January 22 signed a decree substantially tightening Russia's export control process, putting into place new authority to stop transfers of the full range of goods and services to programs of weapons of mass destruction and foreign missile programs. This decree is now in force.

We do not yet have the text and understand it is being processed administratively in Moscow, and will be published shortly.

For some time U.S. and Russian officials have been discussing such broad legal authority, which is widely employed by many other countries and known as "catch-all" authority. Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed it at length on the phone last Saturday, in the context of our shared interest in preventing proliferation.

We will carefully review the text of the decree when it is published. We welcome this step by the Russian government to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, this is part of our joint efforts to prevent the transfer of missile technology to Iran.

IRAN: IRANIAN MESSAGE TO U.S. VIA ARAFAT
January 30, 1998

Q: Can you confirm that Chairman Arafat brought President Clinton a message from Iranian President Khatami, as reported in today's Los Angeles Times? If there was such a message, are you responding to it?

A: As is our usual practice, I am not going to get into the detail of reported diplomatic exchanges

Q: By not saying "no," are you implicitly confirming the existence of such a message?

A: I have nothing further for you on this.

Q: OK, but what is your stance on Khatami's proposals for non-governmental exchanges between the two countries? Are you responding to him? The President has said he wants to increase exchanges between Americans and Iranians. What are you doing to make this happen?

A: The President has said that he hoped we will have more exchanges between our two peoples.

We are looking at ways to facilitate that.

Q: Any comment on Arafat's statement that Pres. Khatami wants to restore full diplomatic relations with the U.S.?

A: We have not seen the actual text of Chairman Arafat's remarks on which the newspaper story is based.

But let me say more generally that, as the President stated, we hope that we can again have good relations with Iran soon.

We have real differences with the Iranian government because of some Iranian actions. (WMD, support of terrorism, violent opposition to the MEPP)

We believe the best way for our two countries to overcome the differences between our countries is through a government-to-government dialogue.

We have heard some encouraging statements out of Tehran. We hope they are followed by positive changes in actions.

We are prepared to respond appropriately to such changes.

IRAN/ID AL-FITR MESSAGE

January 29, 1998

* Yes, the message has more to say regarding Iran than in past years' Id messages.

* That message is in keeping with our response to Khatami's press conference and the January interview with CNN:

-- The President recognizes and appreciates the new tone of Khatami's public comments, and has repeatedly noted that the USG and American people do not have differences with the Iranian people;

-- We of course need to see changes in the GOI's deeds, not just words;

* Our message is meant, during the important time of the Id, to convey our views to the people of Iran.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 29, 1998

**VIDEOTAPED REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
ON THE OCCASION OF ID AL-FITR**

THE PRESIDENT: On behalf of all Americans, I want to extend my personal greetings to the entire Muslim community in the United States and around the world as you celebrate the Id al-Fitr.

This week marks the end of the holy month of Ramadan. It's a time for rejoicing and celebration, a time of family and community. It is also a time for reflection and for recommitting ourselves to the values of tolerance, mutual respect, and understanding. In a world where many Muslims suffer the terrible consequences of war, poverty, and unrest, we must renew our efforts to resolve conflicts and remove the causes of strife.

The United States is determined to do all it can to bring a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace to the Middle East. As I told Chairman Arafat, Palestinians should be allowed to realize their aspirations to live as a free people and Israelis should be able to live in security, recognized by all their neighbors. Our goal is to help the people of the region end this age-old conflict and to give their children the future of hope and promise they deserve.

Today, our sympathies are with the people of Algeria and Afghanistan, who have endured too much suffering. And we pray that a time of healing will soon come for them. We are also deeply concerned by the hardships that afflict the people of Iraq, and we will continue working within the United Nations so that they receive the food and medicine they need.

To the people of Iran, I would like to say that the United States regrets the estrangement of our two nations. Iran is an important country with a rich and

ancient cultural heritage of which Iranians are justifiably proud. We have real differences with some Iranian policies, but I believe these are not insurmountable. I hope that we have more exchanges between our peoples and that the day will soon come when we can enjoy once again good relations with Iran.

Let me say to the Muslims of South Asia, I look forward to visiting your region later this year and to deepening the bonds between the United States and the peoples of the Subcontinent.

On this occasion, let us rekindle our commitment to the cause of peace among all the peoples of the earth. If we are dedicated in our belief and constant in our labor, we can build a better future -- one of cooperation, understanding, and compassion -- for ourselves and for generations to come.

As the new moon ushers in this holy celebration, let me say to all who follow the faith of Islam: As-Salaamu alaykum. May peace be with you and may God grant you health and prosperity, now and in the years ahead.

END

IRAQ

January 30, 1998

DAILY IRAQ GUIDANCE

TODAY'S PRESS COVERAGE/MESSAGE POINTS/HARD Q'S AND A'S

JANUARY 30, 1998

I. TODAY'S PRESS COVERAGE:

Albright says in Paris that U.S. has all but exhausted diplomatic options. UNSG will ask for large increase in oil-for-food program. France and U.S. agree that "all options are open." France would not condemn the U.S. if military force is used. President rallies support for strike, talking to PM Chretien and the

CINCS. (NYT6; WP1; USA4; LAT1; WT1, 14)

Russian Foreign Minister Primakov continues to insist that diplomatic methods must be applied. (Madrid press conference, 1/30)

II. TODAY'S PRESS AVAILABILITIES

(committed or tentative)

POTUS

- * Nothing scheduled

NSA

- * Daily journalist roundtable

SecState

- * Talbott on Human Rights Report (12:30 p.m.)

SecDef

- * Post Testimony Pool Spray
 - * Sat a.m. Secretary Cohen does print and broadcast roundtables marking first year as SecDef.
- Iraq expected to be primary subject, particularly in broadcast segment.

USUN

- * Nothing Scheduled -- traveling

III. GENERAL MESSAGE POINTS

- * Saddam cannot be allowed to defy the will of the international community and have unfettered opportunity to develop weapons of mass destruction.

- * No decision has been made concerning the use of force, but it is clear that the diplomatic string is running out.

- * Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD

- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

IV. HARD Q'S AND A'S

What will be purpose of the use of force/what targets/how can you eliminate WMD through a bombing campaign/won't the use of force simply guarantee that the inspectors are thrown out and Saddam will have won?

- * No decision has been made with respect to the use of force, but the President has made clear that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop and use WMD.

- * Not going to comment on the possibility or nature of military targets. Can say however that whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD

- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

- * UNSCOM inspectors have achieved remarkable results; have always said that the best outcome is for the inspectors to be able to carry out their work. But as a practical matter, Saddam has now put their mission to an end. Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD, by restoring the inspectors or whatever other steps may be necessary if the inspectors cannot carry out their work.

- * Meanwhile, we will insist that sanctions remain so long as he refuses to comply; sanctions are important tool in depriving him of the resources to develop and use WMD and threaten his neighbors.

- * Should the use of force be necessary, our objective would be to diminish substantially Iraq's WMD capability and its ability to project force and threaten its neighbors.

What are you planning to do after a military strike has taken place, assuming one does?

- * We don't discuss the specifics of our military operations and planning, but let me be clear on our objective - Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop WMD

* Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise, will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

Isn't the diplomatic string running out/Are there any other options left/What is the purpose of the Albright trip?

* The President has made clear that Saddam cannot be allowed to defy the will of the international community and have unfettered opportunity to develop weapons of mass destruction.

* No decision has been made concerning the use of force,. The window is closing -- but it is not yet shut. Ambassador Butler has made clear that under the current circumstances he cannot carry out his mandate. That is unacceptable.

* Secretary Albright is meeting with counterparts from the UK, France and Russia and with our friends in the region. Ambassador Richardson will also be consulting with other members of the Security Council in Europe, Africa and Latin America. Secretary Cohen may also be traveling to the region next week. They will explain our views of the situation and discuss next steps.

* The President is also discussing the situation with key world leaders. He has spoken to Blair, Chretien and Kohl, and expects to talk with President Chirac in the coming days. PM Blair will be coming to Washington next week on a long-planned state visit.

What diplomatic options are left? Do you plan to introduce/support another resolution in the Council? Would you consider additional sanctions? What are you waiting for?

* The international community has spoken clearly and unanimously that Saddam must respect the Security Council Resolutions and allow the inspectors to do their work unimpeded. We are now focusing on the discussions that Secretary Albright will be conducting in the coming days. We have no plans to introduce a

resolution. We believe existing Council resolutions give us all the authority we need to take whatever action we deem necessary.

While Vedrine appears to be no longer ruling out the use of force, Primakov is still emphasizing Russian insistence that diplomatic methods be applied - are you encouraged by your progress with the French, discouraged by apparent lack of progress with the Russians?

* Reference to Albright's successful meeting w/Vedrine and also reference meeting w/Primakov

* We all share the same objective: to thwart Iraq's efforts to develop WMD or threaten its neighbors. The international community is united in its view that it Saddam must give the inspectors the access they need to do the job. As the President said, we are determined that he not be free to develop weapons of mass destruction unhindered.

* Vedrine's and Primakov's statements should speak for themselves.

* Skeptical that more additional diplomatic efforts will work. But while window closing, not yet closed.

Many prominent foreign policy experts have called on you to change your policy from one of containment to one of getting rid of Saddam/can you ever be confident you've gotten rid of WMD while Saddam is still there?

* Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD and threaten his neighbors; we have said that we look forward to the day when Iraq has new leadership that would allow it join the family of nations. Desert Storm demonstrates that it would take hundreds of thousands of ground troops to remove the current leadership by force; our current policy - preventing Saddam from threatening the region -- serves the objectives and interests of the US, our friends and the international community at an acceptable level of risk.

Will the Gulf States allow you to base/bomb?

* We are in close touch. Believe we have the necessary level of cooperation/not

going to get into operational details of how we might use our forces.

Is the Administration in synch/ is the Pentagon out ahead on the use of force?

* The President's advisors - civilian and military - are in firm agreement/meeting daily to guide the work. Meeting regularly with the President and Vice President.

Isn't Saddam tying the hands of military planners by placing women and children in or near likely targets and forcing you to choose between key targets and inflicting heavy "collateral damage" that world community would not accept?

* Not going to comment on any possible targets. We don't telegraph our punches.

* But Saddam's use of "human shields" is further proof of his utter contempt and disregard for his own people.

Isn't Netanyahu's position/stalemate in peace process harming your ability to assemble a coalition.

* We pursue peace process because its in the interest of the US, Israel, the Palestinians and Israel's neighbors. Stalemate in peace process something we're trying to overcome/but doesn't diminish danger to region posed by Saddam's pursuit of WMD

Do you support another Primakov mission to negotiate with Saddam?

* Posuvalyuk is already in Baghdad - what is important is that Saddam gets the clear and unequivocal message that he must comply with Security Council Resolutions and allow the inspectors the access they need.

Do you have a deadline?

* No deadline, but it is clear that the diplomatic string is running out. Sec Albright, Amb Richardson, and Secretary Cohen will be discussing next steps with Security Council members and friends in the region in the coming week.

Butler allegations/BW warheads on missiles.

* Not going to comment/leave it to Butler to characterize UNSCOM's findings.

Phyllis Oakley and others say that we really don't know the nature of Iraq's WMD capability - how can we draw up military options without this information?

That's why it is so important for UNSCOM to be able to do its job unfettered.

What do you make of Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Said El-Sahaf's statement that Iraq is considering asking the International Court of Justice to complain about U.S. military threats?

* The International Court of Justice only has jurisdiction to hear a suit by one government against another where both sides have in some manner consented to have the court hear a case. The United States has not consented to ICJ jurisdiction here.

* This is just another attempt to divert attention from the real issue, with is Iraq's duty to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction and to comply immediately with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

* The United States has a lot of respect for the International Court of Justice, but this is not an appropriate case to go to the Court.

Do you Support Expansion of 986?

* U.S. proposed 986 to begin with. Have consistently said we'd like to find ways to make it work better. Also exempted food and medicine from sanctions regime.

* Saddam opposed 986 and its predecessor. He's the one using people as political pawn and devoting his nation's resources not to caring for Iraqis but to build WMD and lavish palaces.

* We have not yet seen the Secretary General's recommendations and will look at the specifics of his recommendations when we receive them.

UNITED KINGDOM: BLAIR

January 27, 1998

POTUS Call with Prime Minister Blair

The President spoke this morning with Prime Minister Tony Blair between 10:30 and 10:41 a.m. They touched on the following subjects:

* IRAQ: They agreed the developments are serious, that there is a common determination to see UNSC resolutions respected, and that they need to stay closely coordinated.

* MIDDLE EAST PEACE: The President reviewed his recent meetings with PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat.

* NORTHERN IRELAND: The PM reviewed where they are in the All-Party Talks.

IF ASKED: Did the POTUS personal situation come up?

* It was briefly mentioned. The PM expressed his personal support for the President.

Q: What can you tell us of Tony Blair's visit to Washington?

A: The British Prime Minister has accepted the President's invitation to come for an Official visit February 4-7. The arrival ceremony will take place on February 5, with meetings afterwards. The President and the First Lady will host the official dinner for the Blairs that night. Other details of the visit are being worked out.

We anticipate that the full range of bilateral and global issues will be discussed during the visit, which will be especially valuable for us as London holds the chair of both the G-8 and the Presidency of the European Union. We

will certainly look forward to hearing from the Prime Minister how the Northern Ireland peace talks are progressing after yesterday's developments in Belfast.

NORTHERN IRELAND
January 26, 1998

Q: Your reaction to the UDP's withdrawal from the Northern Ireland talks today in London?

A: First and foremost, I want to emphasize our support for the Mitchell Principles of non-violence which govern the Northern Ireland talks. We emphatically condemn the recent attacks on the peace process which have taken the form of killings of random individuals, mostly Catholics. This violence is unacceptable and the culprits must be brought to justice.

Active renunciation of violence by all the parties is the best course forward for resolving the conflict there. Regarding the UDP decision today, under the rules set up for the conduct of the talks it is up to the parties and the governments to make decisions regarding participation. We have supported an inclusive and democratic process for the talks. Gary McMichael has made important, constructive contributions to this political process. We call on all loyalist paramilitaries to halt the killings and create the conditions that will permit the UDP to be at the table so that all can contribute to the creation of a sustainable peace for the people of Northern Ireland.

Q: What's your reaction to the IRA statement rejecting the "heads of agreement" paper introduced at the Belfast peace talks?

A: This framework document, proposed jointly by the Irish and British Governments is designed to move forward the substantive peace negotiations, and we have welcomed it. Those at the table must now decide how to use the structure provided by that paper to negotiate the content and shape of a full and lasting agreement.

Most importantly, we note that the IRA cease-fire of July 20 is being maintained, and we expect it to continue, along with the Loyalist cease-fire. There is, and will be, no tolerance for the violence perpetrated by extremists, nor for a return to violence by those abiding by the cease-fires.

Much has been accomplished since the talks began, but much hard work remains. The people of Northern Ireland deserve nothing less than a lasting peace, justice, equality, prosperity and better future for their children. We continue to encourage all parties to work toward that goal.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
January 29, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Bloody Sunday Inquiry

We welcome the British Government's announcement today establishing an official commission to make an independent inquiry into the circumstances of Bloody Sunday, the terrible tragedy that took place 26 years ago. This is an important, and timely, initiative to come to terms with the past and help the people of Northern Ireland look to the future and reconciliation as they negotiate the terms of an agreement for a lasting peace in that troubled land.

#

CUBA/FOOD AND MEDICINE

January 30, 1998

Humanitarian Relief Initiative Announced by the Cuban American National Foundation

Context: Yesterday, the Cuban American Foundation (PAC-Cuban American National Foundation) issued a statement outlining a humanitarian relief initiative for Cuba. The statement lists several "non-negotiable" principles for any program developed. Senator Helms endorsed the initiative the same day. Helms' office has drafted legislation based on the CANF initiative ("Cuban Assistance and Relief (CARE) Act 1998") that has not been announced. The draft legislation would authorize delivery of donated medicine and food as well as PL-480 food aid with certain conditions. The Administration has not developed a position on the CANF initiative nor on the draft legislation. There are other legislative initiatives and one headed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to lift restrictions on food and medicine to Cuba. We have not developed positions on any of these measures. Following the Pope's visit, we want to stress U.S. government interest in reaching out to the Cuban people and strengthening civil society

Q: What is the Administration's view of the Cuba humanitarian relief initiative announced yesterday by the Cuban American Foundation and endorsed by Senator Helms?

A: We have seen the statement issued by the Cuban American Foundation outlining an initiative to provide greater humanitarian assistance directly to the Cuban people.

We have also seen a statement from Senator Helms endorsing this proposal.

We prefer to withhold any comment on the proposal until we see further details.

The U.S. continues to believe that maintaining pressure on the Cuban government through our embargo is fundamental to encouraging fundamental, systemic change.

At the same time, strengthening Cuban civil society through increased information flows and humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people is a key factor in our ongoing efforts to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

STATE OF THE UNION: FOREIGN POLICY

January 27, 1998

- * In the 1997 State of the Union, President Clinton set an ambitious agenda to keep American leadership strong -- and to make sure we enter the 21st century as the world's leading force for security, peace, freedom and prosperity.
- * Over the past year, we have made progress on the President's agenda -- building an undivided, peaceful Europe... forging an Asia Pacific community... opening the new economy to American goods and services... remaining an unrelenting force for peace and freedom... moving strongly against new security threats... giving ourselves the tools we need to get the job done (strong military, better funded diplomacy.)
- * Now, with a strong foundation in place, we are poised to move forward, seizing the opportunities and meeting the challenges of a new era. To meet these challenges, we are adapting old institutions to new demands... forging strong partnerships to meet common challenges... modernizing the instruments of our influence, military and diplomatic. Through this new security strategy, we are helping to write international rules for the 21st century, protecting those who join, isolating those who do not.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

- * NATO ENLARGEMENT: Europe's stability and America's security closely linked. President's call for enlarging the NATO alliance strengthen alliance's core mission of collective defense and helps meet new threats such as regional instability. Enlargement furthers other US objectives: encouraging states in the region to settle border and ethnic disputes with neighbors, strengthen civilian

control of their militaries, and increase tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities. NATO's enlargement, combined the Partnership for Peace program, NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO-Ukraine partnership help erase the outdated Cold War divisions and build, for the first time, an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe.

* **SECURING THE PEACE IN BOSNIA:** U.S. has abiding interest in peace and stability in Bosnia and a compelling interest in implementation of the Dayton peace accords. After 46 months of worst war in Europe since WWII, 24 months of implementing peace have helped put Bosnia on path to lasting peace and stability. Progress on implementation possible because of prudent military support. Can now see point where civil implementation and peace can be self-sustaining -- but Bosnia's fragile peace still needs support of American and allied troops when current NATO mission ends in June President still must approve detailed action plan being prepared by NATO military authorities after full review of all options. President will insist action plan have achievable mission tied to clear benchmarks, not a deadline. Force must be able to protect itself. U.S. must retain command. European allies must shoulder full share of responsibility. Costs must be manageable. Plan must have substantial support of Congress, U.S. public.

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

* **IRAQ WMD PROGRAM:** President emphasized that Iraq's efforts to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are unacceptable. UN inspectors have done remarkable job, destroying more of Iraq WMD potential than was destroyed during Gulf War itself. But Saddam now refusing to allow inspectors to complete mission. All options are on the table to make sure Iraq does not pursue WMD program with impunity and threaten international community.

* **BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:** President announced tonight that the United States would lead the effort to erect stronger international barriers against the proliferation and use of biological weapons. Under the new initiative, the United States will seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by requiring nations that have joined the BWC to submit annual declarations about facilities and activities that could be used for BW purposes and agree to a tough international inspection system including both voluntary and mandatory

inspections.

* **COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY:** President's call for Senate ratification of the CTBT will allow America to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent while constraining the proliferation of nuclear material and technology to rogue states' weapons programs. CTBT will improve America's ability to detect and deter nuclear explosive testing. CTBT's global network of sensors will strengthen America's ability to monitor nuclear explosive testing across the globe, as well as deter any nation from believing it can conduct a nuclear explosive test undetected by the international community.

LEVERAGING OUR POWER AND INFLUENCE

* **US ARREARS TO THE UNITED NATIONS:** The President also highlighted need for prompt action on the payment of U.S. arrears to the United Nations. Failure to pay undermines US ability to reform UN and hinders our leadership of that organization at very time UN is working to prevent Iraq from threatening neighbors and world with weapons of mass destruction. Also need to give the International Monetary Fund capacity to help prevent global financial crises. Now, more than ever, our security at home and our interests abroad demand that America meet our international obligations, sharpen the tools to improve the stability of the world economy, and increase our leverage in international organizations.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/30/98 8:23:02 PM
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO

Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bandler, Donald K.
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Barnett, Cheryl E.
Battenfield, Pat A.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bell, Robert G.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boone, Sherman G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.

Braden, Susan R.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie .
Brooks, Jennifer M.
Brown, Keim C.
Bryan, Dave L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busby, Scott W.
Busick, Paul E.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Campanella, Anthony
Caravelli, John M.
Chastain, George M.
Clark, Bronya H.
Clarke, Richard A.
Collier, Dorothy A.
Cooper, James B.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Courtney, William H.
Covey, James P.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Crowley, Philip J.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dean, Susan W.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Dejban, Donna D.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
DeRosa, Mary B.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dollar, Carolyn J.

Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Dymond, John C.
Edwards, Joan K.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Farrar, Jay C.
Ficklin, John W.
Figueredo, Orlando
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Fooks, Michael D.
Ford, Robert G.
Fort, Jane B.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Fung, Mark T.
Gagnon, James M.
George, Christopher L.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Gray, Wendy E.
Greer, Jason H.
Gregory, Susan J.
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hawley, Leonard R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Hendricks, Lori A.

Heyl, Phillip J.
Higgins, David B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hillman, Thomas W.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Jansen, Christian P.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kiernan, Gerald P.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Klein, Brian P.
Knepper, Charlotte
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Lawson, Chappell H.
Leary, William H.
Leavy, David C.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marsh, Thomas S
Marshall, Betty A.
Marty, Joseph H.
Matera, Michael A.

Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McClellan, Christina L.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Metzl, Jamie F.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Naplan, Steven J.
Neil, M. Elise
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Pascual, Carlos E.
Payne, Raymond H.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Porter, Pete
Prendergast, John P.
Prise, Edith M.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rathke, Jeffrey D.
Rice, Edward A.
Rice, Sean P.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Rinaldi, Steven M.
Roach, Darren S.
Rosa, Frederick M.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Roundtree, Beverly
Rubin, Eric S.
Rudman, Mara E.

Ryu, Rexion Y.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sandalow, David B.
Sanders, Robin R.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schrader, Joel M.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sherman, David J.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, James A.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Soubers, Richard R.
Sparks, John E.
Starks, Tali T.
Storey, Sharon V.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Todd, Gwennyth E.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Unrue, Michael
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J. (Val)
Ward, JoAnn
Wechsler, William F.
Widmer, Edward L.
Williams, Mary C.
Wilson, Joseph C.
Witkowsky, Anne A.

Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Joseph (Larry)
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD TO @ PRESS by 10:00 a.m. Monday, February 2. Thanks and have a good weekend!

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

jan30gui.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

January 30, 1998

Japan/Civil Aviation Agreement

Human Rights Reports

Russia-Iran Missile Cooperation

Iranian message to U.S. via Arafat

Iran/Id al-Fitr

Iraq

MEPP/MKA Trip

UK/Blair

Northern Ireland

Cuba/Food and Medicine

SOTU/Foreign Policy

U.S.-JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT

January 30, 1998

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 30, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

U.S. - Japan Civil Aviation Agreement

I am pleased that the United States has reached a landmark agreement with Japan that will dramatically increase air service between our countries. This agreement will expand a \$10 billion market that services nearly 12 million passengers and carries well over 1 billion pounds of cargo each year. It will allow more U.S. cities to have direct service to Japan, and give U.S. airlines extensive new rights to fly into and beyond Japan. This increased competition means more choices for American business travelers and tourists alike.

Like our agreements on telecommunications and financial services, this aviation agreement reflects my policy of opening the world's markets in areas where American companies are most competitive. In aviation alone, we have already concluded far-reaching agreements with Germany, Canada, and twenty other nations. Along with today's agreement, these pacts are moving international aviation into a twenty-first century where consumer needs, not governments, will determine where and how often passenger and cargo planes travel.

I want to thank Secretaries Albright and Slater, and the negotiators at the Departments of State and Transportation for their sustained efforts in reaching this historic agreement.

#

US-JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT FACT SHEET

JAPAN IS A MARKET OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES.

* The U.S.-Japan civil aviation relationship is one the world's largest, accounting annually for 12 billion passengers, over 1 billion tons of cargo and \$10 billion in revenue in 1996.

* Japan occupies a strategic geographical position, serving as a gateway to Asia. Greater access to this market unlocks many of the best growth opportunities of the future.

THE AGREEMENT SUBSTANTIALLY EXPANDS MARKET ACCESS OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. CARRIERS.

* More Access to Japan: Established carriers (United, Northwest, Federal Express) gain essentially unlimited access to Japan's market. They gain full rights to offer service between any points in the U.S. to any points in Japan, without any restriction on frequency or capacity. Other passenger airlines (Delta, Continental and American, with two others to follow) will be permitted to triple their access to this market. Weekly flights can increase from 46 to 136, a total of 4,600 additional flights per year. Until now, this type of airline had very limited or no access to this vital market. Charter flights will increase in two years from 400 flights per year to 600, rising eventually to 800. Passengers will have more choices in air travel.

* More Access to Asia: The agreement expands flights through Japan to other

Asian markets. Established carriers will be entitled to fly beyond Japan without any limitation on frequencies, resolving a longstanding dispute in favor of liberalization. Non-incumbent all-cargo carriers (UPS, Polar Air Cargo) gain valuable new opportunities to transport cargo beyond Japan, helping U.S. business ship more goods to Asia. One additional all-cargo carrier will be able to enter the market in four years.

* Global Networks: For the first time, U.S. carriers serving Japan will be able to codeshare (e.g., two carriers offer different legs of the trip under one ticket) with Japanese, American or third country carriers. The U.S. has been a pioneer in codesharing, which permits it to use cooperative marketing arrangements to expand their international networks. Codesharing also will permit U.S. non-incumbent carriers to develop service beyond Japan, to other Asian destinations.

* Future Market Opening: Talks begin in three years toward full liberalization. "Safety net" provisions ensure liberalization continues, even if no new agreement is reached. For example, non-incumbent combination carriers gain the right to operate up to 35 additional weekly round-trip flights, even if no later agreement is reached.

THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS ARE SUBSTANTIAL.

* Based on calculations of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, we estimate the agreement will provide the following cumulative benefits over four years:

- * U.S. passengers will enjoy gains of about \$1.2 billion;
- * U.S. carriers will enjoy additional revenue of about \$4 billion;
- * U.S. exports of aviation services will enjoy a net increase of almost \$4 billion (in each year, the U.S. trade surplus in this sector will be almost \$1 billion higher than it otherwise would be).

* Other benefits are important. Enhanced service stimulates business and tourism. Restaurants, hotels, convention industries and others all stand to gain. American workers and America's cities will share in the benefits as local economies grow.

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

January 30, 1998

- * Today, the Department of State will release its annual report on human rights practices around the world.
- * This report draws on a wide variety of sources of information in an effort to provide Congress, the American public, and people around the world with the most accurate, balanced and impartial view possible of the human rights situation in every country of the world (all 194 of them).
- * It is the most comprehensive and detailed report of its kind and is a ongoing symbol of our commitment to maintaining human rights as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.
- * The report helps to ensure that human rights concerns are taken into account in all U.S. relationships and serves as a neutral yardstick by which we can evaluate human rights progress or the lack thereof in every country of the world.
- * This year's report notes that, while there were a number of improvements in human rights in 1997, there continue to be a number of serious problems as well.
- * We refer you to the Department of State for further details about this report.

RUSSIA-IRAN MISSILE COOPERATION

January 27, 1998

Q: Can you comment on the significance of the Russian statement last week on new export controls?

A: We have been officially informed by the Russian government that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on January 22 signed a decree substantially tightening Russia's export control process, putting into place new authority to stop transfers of the full range of goods and services to programs of weapons of mass destruction and foreign missile programs. This decree is now in force.

We do not yet have the text and understand it is being processed administratively in Moscow, and will be published shortly.

For some time U.S. and Russian officials have been discussing such broad legal authority, which is widely employed by many other countries and known as "catch-all" authority. Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed it at length on the phone last Saturday, in the context of our shared interest in preventing proliferation.

We will carefully review the text of the decree when it is published. We welcome this step by the Russian government to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, this is part of our joint efforts to prevent the transfer of missile technology to Iran.

IRAN: IRANIAN MESSAGE TO U.S. VIA ARAFAT
January 30, 1998

Q: Can you confirm that Chairman Arafat brought President Clinton a message from Iranian President Khatami, as reported in today's Los Angeles Times? If there was such a message, are you responding to it?

A: As is our usual practice, I am not going to get into the detail of reported diplomatic exchanges

Q: By not saying "no," are you implicitly confirming the existence of such a message?

A: I have nothing further for you on this.

Q: OK, but what is your stance on Khatami's proposals for non-governmental exchanges between the two countries? Are you responding to him? The President has said he wants to increase exchanges between Americans and Iranians. What are you doing to make this happen?

A: The President has said that he hoped we will have more exchanges between our two peoples.

We are looking at ways to facilitate that.

Q: Any comment on Arafat's statement that Pres. Khatami wants to restore full diplomatic relations with the U.S.?

A: We have not seen the actual text of Chairman Arafat's remarks on which the newspaper story is based.

But let me say more generally that, as the President stated, we hope that we can again have good relations with Iran soon.

We have real differences with the Iranian government because of some Iranian actions. (WMD, support of terrorism, violent opposition to the MEPP)

We believe the best way for our two countries to overcome the differences between our countries is through a government-to-government dialogue.

We have heard some encouraging statements out of Tehran. We hope they are followed by positive changes in actions.

We are prepared to respond appropriately to such changes.

IRAN/ID AL-FITR MESSAGE
January 29, 1998

* Yes, the message has more to say regarding Iran than in past years' Id messages.

* That message is in keeping with our response to Khatami's press conference and the January interview with CNN:

-- The President recognizes and appreciates the new tone of Khatami's public comments, and has repeatedly noted that the USG and American people do not have differences with the Iranian people;

-- We of course need to see changes in the GOI's deeds, not just words;

* Our message is meant, during the important time of the Id, to convey our views to the people of Iran.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 29, 1998

VIDEOTAPED REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE OCCASION OF ID AL-FITR

THE PRESIDENT: On behalf of all Americans, I want to extend my personal greetings to the entire Muslim community in the United States and around the world as you celebrate the Id al-Fitr.

This week marks the end of the holy month of Ramadan. It's a time for rejoicing and celebration, a time of family and community. It is also a time for reflection and for recommitting ourselves to the values of tolerance, mutual respect, and understanding. In a world where many Muslims suffer the terrible consequences of war, poverty, and unrest, we must renew our efforts to resolve conflicts and remove the causes of strife.

The United States is determined to do all it can to bring a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace to the Middle East. As I told Chairman Arafat, Palestinians should be allowed to realize their aspirations to live as a free people and Israelis should be able to live in security, recognized by all their neighbors. Our goal is to help the people of the region end this age-old conflict and to give their children the future of hope and promise they deserve.

Today, our sympathies are with the people of Algeria and Afghanistan, who have endured too much suffering. And we pray that a time of healing will soon come for them. We are also deeply concerned by the hardships that afflict the people of Iraq, and we will continue working within the United Nations so that they receive the food and medicine they need.

To the people of Iran, I would like to say that the United States regrets the estrangement of our two nations. Iran is an important country with a rich and ancient cultural heritage of which Iranians are justifiably proud. We have real differences with some Iranian policies, but I believe these are not insurmountable. I hope that we have more exchanges between our peoples and that the day will soon come when we can enjoy once again good relations with Iran.

Let me say to the Muslims of South Asia, I look forward to visiting your region later this year and to deepening the bonds between the United States and the peoples of the Subcontinent.

On this occasion, let us rekindle our commitment to the cause of peace among all the peoples of the earth. If we are dedicated in our belief and constant in our labor, we can build a better future -- one of cooperation, understanding, and compassion -- for ourselves and for generations to come.

As the new moon ushers in this holy celebration, let me say to all who follow the faith of Islam: As-Salaamu alaykum. May peace be with you and may God grant you health and prosperity, now and in the years ahead.

END

IRAQ

January 30, 1998

DAILY IRAQ GUIDANCE

TODAY'S PRESS COVERAGE/MESSAGE POINTS/HARD Q'S AND A'S

JANUARY 30, 1998

I. TODAY'S PRESS COVERAGE:

Albright says in Paris that U.S. has all but exhausted diplomatic options. UNSG will ask for large increase in oil-for-food program. France and U.S. agree that "all options are open." France would not condemn the U.S. if military force is used. President rallies support for strike, talking to PM Chretien and the CINCs. (NYT6; WP1; USA4; LAT1; WT1, 14)

Russian Foreign Minister Primakov continues to insist that diplomatic methods must be applied. (Madrid press conference, 1/30)

II. TODAY'S PRESS AVAILABILITIES

(committed or tentative)

POTUS

* Nothing scheduled

NSA

* Daily journalist roundtable

SecState

* Talbott on Human Rights Report (12:30 p.m.)

SecDef

* Post Testimony Pool Spray

* Sat a.m. Secretary Cohen does print and broadcast roundtables marking first year as SecDef.

Iraq expected to be primary subject, particularly in broadcast segment.

USUN

* Nothing Scheduled -- traveling

III. GENERAL MESSAGE POINTS

* Saddam cannot be allowed to defy the will of the international community and have unfettered opportunity to develop weapons of mass destruction.

* No decision has been made concerning the use of force, but it is clear that the diplomatic string is running out.

* Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:

* thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD

* limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

IV. HARD Q'S AND A'S

What will be purpose of the use of force/what targets/how can you eliminate WMD through a bombing campaign/won't the use of force simply guarantee that the inspectors are thrown out and Saddam will have won?

* No decision has been made with respect to the use of force, but the President has made clear that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop and use WMD.

* Not going to comment on the possibility or nature of military targets. Can say however that whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:

* thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD

* limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

* UNSCOM inspectors have achieved remarkable results; have always said that the best outcome is for the inspectors to be able to carry out their work. But as a practical matter, Saddam has now put their mission to an end. Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD, by restoring the inspectors or whatever

other steps may be necessary if the inspectors cannot carry out their work.

- * Meanwhile, we will insist that sanctions remain so long as he refuses to comply; sanctions are important tool in depriving him of the resources to develop and use WMD and threaten his neighbors.

- * Should the use of force be necessary, our objective would be to diminish substantially Iraq's WMD capability and its ability to project force and threaten its neighbors.

What are you planning to do after a military strike has taken place, assuming one does?

- * We don't discuss the specifics of our military operations and planning, but let me be clear on our objective - Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop WMD

- * Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise, will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD

- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

Isn't the diplomatic string running out/Are there any other options left/What is the purpose of the Albright trip?

- * The President has made clear that Saddam cannot be allowed to defy the will of the international community and have unfettered opportunity to develop weapons of mass destruction.

- * No decision has been made concerning the use of force,. The window is closing -- but it is not yet shut. Ambassador Butler has made clear that under the current circumstances he cannot carry out his mandate. That is unacceptable.

- * Secretary Albright is meeting with counterparts from the UK, France and Russia and with our friends in the region. Ambassador Richardson will also be consulting with other members of the Security Council in Europe, Africa and Latin America. Secretary Cohen may also be traveling to the region next week. They

will explain our views of the situation and discuss next steps.

* The President is also discussing the situation with key world leaders. He has spoken to Blair, Chretien and Kohl, and expects to talk with President Chirac in the coming days. PM Blair will be coming to Washington next week on a long-planned state visit.

What diplomatic options are left? Do you plan to introduce/support another resolution in the Council? Would you consider additional sanctions? What are you waiting for?

* The international community has spoken clearly and unanimously that Saddam must respect the Security Council Resolutions and allow the inspectors to do their work unimpeded. We are now focusing on the discussions that Secretary Albright will be conducting in the coming days. We have no plans to introduce a resolution. We believe existing Council resolutions give us all the authority we need to take whatever action we deem necessary.

While Vedrine appears to be no longer ruling out the use of force, Primakov is still emphasizing Russian insistence that diplomatic methods be applied - are you encouraged by your progress with the French, discouraged by apparent lack of progress with the Russians?

* Reference to Albright's successful meeting w/Vedrine and also reference meeting w/Primakov

* We all share the same objective: to thwart Iraq's efforts to develop WMD or threaten its neighbors. The international community is united in its view that it Saddam must give the inspectors the access they need to do the job. As the President said, we are determined that he not be free to develop weapons of mass destruction unhindered.

* Vedrine's and Primakov's statements should speak for themselves.

* Skeptical that more additional diplomatic efforts will work. But while window closing, not yet closed.

Many prominent foreign policy experts have called on you to change your policy from one of containment to one of getting rid of Saddam/can you ever be confident you've gotten rid of WMD while Saddam is still there?

* Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD and threaten his neighbors; we have said that we look forward to the day when Iraq has new leadership that would allow it join the family of nations. Desert Storm demonstrates that it would take hundreds of thousands of ground troops to remove the current leadership by force; our current policy - preventing Saddam from threatening the region -- serves the objectives and interests of the US, our friends and the international community at an acceptable level of risk.

Will the Gulf States allow you to base/bomb?

* We are in close touch. Believe we have the necessary level of cooperation/not going to get into operational details of how we might use our forces.

Is the Administration in synch/ is the Pentagon out ahead on the use of force?

* The President's advisors - civilian and military - are in firm agreement/meeting daily to guide the work. Meeting regularly with the President and Vice President.

Isn't Saddam tying the hands of military planners by placing women and children in or near likely targets and forcing you to choose between key targets and inflicting heavy "collateral damage" that world community would not accept?

* Not going to comment on any possible targets. We don't telegraph our punches.

* But Saddam's use of "human shields" is further proof of his utter contempt and disregard for his own people.

Isn't Netanyahu's position/stalemate in peace process harming your ability to assemble a coalition.

* We pursue peace process because its in the interest of the US, Israel, the Palestinians and Israel's neighbors. Stalemate in peace process something we're

trying to overcome/but doesn't diminish danger to region posed by Saddam's pursuit of WMD

Do you support another Primakov mission to negotiate with Saddam?

* Posuvalyuk is already in Baghdad - what is important is that Saddam gets the clear and unequivocal message that he must comply with Security Council Resolutions and allow the inspectors the access they need.

Do you have a deadline?

* No deadline, but it is clear that the diplomatic string is running out. Sec Albright, Amb Richardson, and Secretary Cohen will be discussing next steps with Security Council members and friends in the region in the coming week.

Butler allegations/BW warheads on missiles.

* Not going to comment/leave it to Butler to characterize UNSCOM's findings.

Phyllis Oakley and others say that we really don't know the nature of Iraq's WMD capability - how can we draw up military options without this information?

That's why it is so important for UNSCOM to be able to do its job unfettered.

What do you make of Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Said El-Sahaf's statement that Iraq is considering asking the International Court of Justice to complain about U.S. military threats?

* The International Court of Justice only has jurisdiction to hear a suit by one government against another where both sides have in some manner consented to have the court hear a case. The United States has not consented to ICJ jurisdiction here.

* This is just another attempt to divert attention from the real issue, with is Iraq's duty to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction and to comply immediately with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

* The United States has a lot of respect for the International Court of Justice, but this is not an appropriate case to go to the Court.

Do you Support Expansion of 986?

* U.S. proposed 986 to begin with. Have consistently said we'd like to find ways to make it work better. Also exempted food and medicine from sanctions regime.

* Saddam opposed 986 and its predecessor. He's the one using people as political pawn and devoting his nation's resources not to caring for Iraqis but to build WMD and lavish palaces.

* We have not yet seen the Secretary General's recommendations and will look at the specifics of his recommendations when we receive them.

UNITED KINGDOM: BLAIR
January 27, 1998

POTUS Call with Prime Minister Blair

The President spoke this morning with Prime Minister Tony Blair between 10:30 and 10:41 a.m. They touched on the following subjects:

* IRAQ: They agreed the developments are serious, that there is a common determination to see UNSC resolutions respected, and that they need to stay closely coordinated.

* MIDDLE EAST PEACE: The President reviewed his recent meetings with PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat.

* NORTHERN IRELAND: The PM reviewed where they are in the All-Party Talks.

IF ASKED: Did the POTUS personal situation come up?

* It was briefly mentioned. The PM expressed his personal support for the President.

Q: What can you tell us of Tony Blair's visit to Washington?

A: The British Prime Minister has accepted the President's invitation to come for an Official visit February 4-7. The arrival ceremony will take place on February 5, with meetings afterwards. The President and the First Lady will host the official dinner for the Blairs that night. Other details of the visit are being worked out.

We anticipate that the full range of bilateral and global issues will be discussed during the visit, which will be especially valuable for us as London holds the chair of both the G-8 and the Presidency of the European Union. We will certainly look forward to hearing from the Prime Minister how the Northern Ireland peace talks are progressing after yesterday's developments in Belfast.

NORTHERN IRELAND

January 26, 1998

Q: Your reaction to the UDP's withdrawal from the Northern Ireland talks today in London?

A: First and foremost, I want to emphasize our support for the Mitchell Principles of non-violence which govern the Northern Ireland talks. We emphatically condemn the recent attacks on the peace process which have taken the form of killings of random individuals, mostly Catholics. This violence is unacceptable and the culprits must be brought to justice.

Active renunciation of violence by all the parties is the best course forward for resolving the conflict there. Regarding the UDP decision today, under the rules set up for the conduct of the talks it is up to the parties and the

governments to make decisions regarding participation. We have supported an inclusive and democratic process for the talks. Gary McMichael has made important, constructive contributions to this political process. We call on all loyalist paramilitaries to halt the killings and create the conditions that will permit the UDP to be at the table so that all can contribute to the creation of a sustainable peace for the people of Northern Ireland.

Q: What's your reaction to the IRA statement rejecting the "heads of agreement" paper introduced at the Belfast peace talks?

A: This framework document, proposed jointly by the Irish and British Governments is designed to move forward the substantive peace negotiations, and we have welcomed it. Those at the table must now decide how to use the structure provided by that paper to negotiate the content and shape of a full and lasting agreement.

Most importantly, we note that the IRA cease-fire of July 20 is being maintained, and we expect it to continue, along with the Loyalist cease-fire. There is, and will be, no tolerance for the violence perpetrated by extremists, nor for a return to violence by those abiding by the cease-fires.

Much has been accomplished since the talks began, but much hard work remains. The people of Northern Ireland deserve nothing less than a lasting peace, justice, equality, prosperity and better future for their children. We continue to encourage all parties to work toward that goal.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
January 29, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Bloody Sunday Inquiry

We welcome the British Government's announcement today establishing an official commission to make an independent inquiry into the circumstances of Bloody Sunday, the terrible tragedy that took place 26 years ago. This is an important, and timely, initiative to come to terms with the past and help the people of Northern Ireland look to the future and reconciliation as they negotiate the terms of an agreement for a lasting peace in that troubled land.

#

CUBA/FOOD AND MEDICINE

January 30, 1998

Humanitarian Relief Initiative Announced by the Cuban American National Foundation

Context: Yesterday, the Cuban American Foundation (PAC-Cuban American National Foundation) issued a statement outlining a humanitarian relief initiative for Cuba. The statement lists several "non-negotiable" principles for any program developed. Senator Helms endorsed the initiative the same day. Helms' office has drafted legislation based on the CANF initiative ("Cuban Assistance and Relief (CARE) Act 1998") that has not been announced. The draft legislation would authorize delivery of donated medicine and food as well as PL-480 food aid with certain conditions. The Administration has not developed a position on the CANF initiative nor on the draft legislation. There are other legislative initiatives and one headed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to lift restrictions on food and medicine to Cuba. We have not developed positions on any of these measures. Following the Pope's visit, we want to stress U.S. government interest in reaching out to the Cuban people and strengthening civil society

Q: What is the Administration's view of the Cuba humanitarian relief initiative announced yesterday by the Cuban American Foundation and endorsed by Senator Helms?

A: We have seen the statement issued by the Cuban American Foundation outlining an initiative to provide greater humanitarian assistance directly to the Cuban people.

We have also seen a statement from Senator Helms endorsing this proposal.

We prefer to withhold any comment on the proposal until we see further details.

The U.S. continues to believe that maintaining pressure on the Cuban government through our embargo is fundamental to encouraging fundamental, systemic change.

At the same time, strengthening Cuban civil society through increased information flows and humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people is a key factor in our ongoing efforts to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

STATE OF THE UNION: FOREIGN POLICY

January 27, 1998

* In the 1997 State of the Union, President Clinton set an ambitious agenda to keep American leadership strong -- and to make sure we enter the 21st century as the world's leading force for security, peace, freedom and prosperity.

* Over the past year, we have made progress on the President's agenda -- building an undivided, peaceful Europe... forging an Asia Pacific community... opening the new economy to American goods and services... remaining an unrelenting force for peace and freedom... moving strongly against new security threats... giving ourselves the tools we need to get the job done (strong military, better funded diplomacy.)

* Now, with a strong foundation in place, we are poised to move forward, seizing the opportunities and meeting the challenges of a new era. To meet these challenges, we are adapting old institutions to new demands... forging strong partnerships to meet common challenges... modernizing the instruments of our influence, military and diplomatic. Through this new security strategy, we are helping to write international rules for the 21st century, protecting those who join, isolating those who do not.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

* NATO ENLARGEMENT: Europe's stability and America's security closely linked. President's call for enlarging the NATO alliance strengthen alliance's core mission of collective defense and helps meet new threats such as regional instability. Enlargement furthers other US objectives: encouraging states in the region to settle border and ethnic disputes with neighbors, strengthen civilian control of their militaries, and increase tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities. NATO's enlargement, combined the Partnership for Peace program, NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO-Ukraine partnership help erase the outdated Cold War divisions and build, for the first time, an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe.

* SECURING THE PEACE IN BOSNIA: U.S. has abiding interest in peace and stability in Bosnia and a compelling interest in implementation of the Dayton peace accords. After 46 months of worst war in Europe since WWII, 24 months of implementing peace have helped put Bosnia on path to lasting peace and stability. Progress on implementation possible because of prudent military support. Can now see point where civil implementation and peace can be self-sustaining -- but Bosnia's fragile peace still needs support of American and allied troops when current NATO mission ends in June President still must approve detailed action plan being prepared by NATO military authorities after full review of all options. President will insist action plan have achievable mission tied to clear benchmarks, not a deadline. Force must be able to protect itself. U.S. must retain command. European allies must shoulder full share of responsibility. Costs must be manageable. Plan must have substantial support of Congress, U.S. public.

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

* **IRAQ WMD PROGRAM:** President emphasized that Iraq's efforts to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are unacceptable. UN inspectors have done remarkable job, destroying more of Iraq WMD potential than was destroyed during Gulf War itself. But Saddam now refusing to allow inspectors to complete mission. All options are on the table to make sure Iraq does not pursue WMD program with impunity and threaten international community.

* **BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:** President announced tonight that the United States would lead the effort to erect stronger international barriers against the proliferation and use of biological weapons. Under the new initiative, the United States will seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by requiring nations that have joined the BWC to submit annual declarations about facilities and activities that could be used for BW purposes and agree to a tough international inspection system including both voluntary and mandatory inspections.

* **COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY:** President's call for Senate ratification of the CTBT will allow America to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent while constraining the proliferation of nuclear material and technology to rogue states' weapons programs. CTBT will improve America's ability to detect and deter nuclear explosive testing. CTBT's global network of sensors will strengthen America's ability to monitor nuclear explosive testing across the globe, as well as deter any nation from believing it can conduct a nuclear explosive test undetected by the international community.

LEVERAGING OUR POWER AND INFLUENCE

* **US ARREARS TO THE UNITED NATIONS:** The President also highlighted need for prompt action on the payment of U.S. arrears to the United Nations. Failure to pay undermines US ability to reform UN and hinders our leadership of that organization at very time UN is working to prevent Iraq from threatening neighbors and world with weapons of mass destruction. Also need to give the International Monetary Fund capacity to help prevent global financial crises. Now, more than ever, our security at home and our interests abroad demand that America meet our international obligations, sharpen the tools to improve the stability of the world economy, and increase our leverage in international

organizations.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Leonard Hawley to Lawrence Butler, Glyn Davies, Donna Dejbani et al. Subject: RE: Blair Meeting Package -- complete (almost...) (5 pages)	01/31/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/30/1998-02/02/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5650

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Breand Kinser-Kidane to Jeffery DeLaurentis. Subject: Secret. (7 pages)	02/02/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/30/1998-02/02/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5650

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/2/98 12:08:30 PM
FROM Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Feb. 2 Guidance Package [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY****TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT**

feb2gui.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

February 2, 1998

Iraq/MKA Trip

Clinton-Yeltsin Call

Nuclear Weapons

Japan/Civil Aviation Agreement

Human Rights Reports

Iranian message to U.S. via Arafat

UK/Blair

Northern Ireland

Cuba/Food and Medicine

SOTU/Foreign Policy

IRAQ

February 2, 1998

DAILY IRAQ GUIDANCE

TODAY'S PRESS COVERAGE/MESSAGE POINTS/HARD Q'S AND A'S

FEBRUARY 2, 1998

I. TODAY'S PRESS COVERAGE:

Kuwaitis still want revenge. Emir assures MKA of support for military action. Russia, France and Turkey spearhead diplomatic effort to avoid military clash. Israel asks for advance warning of U.S. attack against Iraq. Balloonists drift across Iraqi no-fly zone before entering Iran. Annan proposes \$5.2B in oil sales for Iraq under oil for food program. (NYT10; WP13, 14, 15)

II. TODAY'S PRESS AVAILABILITIES

(committed or tentative)

POTUS

Foreign Leader Call (9:15 am EDT)

Budget Submission (10:20 am EDT)

NSA

No press planned

SecState

Press Conference with Crown Prince Abdullah (8 am EDT)

Joint Press Avail with Bahraini Foreign Minister (1 pm EDT)

SecDef

DoD Budget Rollout (10:30 am EDT)

USUN

En route Nairobi (No press planned)

III. GENERAL MESSAGE POINTS

- * Saddam cannot be allowed to defy the will of the international community and have unfettered opportunity to develop weapons of mass destruction.

- * No decision has been made concerning the use of force, but it is clear that the diplomatic string is running out.

- * Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD

- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

IV. HARD Q'S AND A'S

SecGen Annan is proposing an increase in Iraqi oil sales to \$5.2 - more than twice the current limit. Do you support this degree of expansion of 986?

- * We will look very closely at the specific details of Secretary General's recommendations.

- * The U.S. understands that the Iraqi people are suffering under the Saddam Hussein regime. We do not wish to see Iraqi people sick and hungry because Saddam Hussein sees food and medicine as his lowest priorities. The President, our

government, and the U.S. people have no quarrel with the Iraqi people.

- * UN sanctions ALWAYS permitted Iraq to purchase food and medicine. U.S. proposed the original oil-for-food deal and fought for it for five years, against Iraqi opposition. We proposed 986 to do the same thing. Have consistently said we'd like to find ways to make it work better..

- * Saddam opposed 986 and its predecessor. He's the one using people as political pawn and devoting his nation's resources not to caring for Iraqis but to build WMD and lavish palaces. The Secretary General's report clearly states that Iraq is responsible for the delays in implementing 986 up to this point.

Israel has asked the US to give it warning if we strike Iraq - will we do this?

- * Won't get into details of possible military operations.

Has the US asked Israel to forswear retaliation in the event of an Iraqi strike against Israel?

- * I won't discuss hypotheticals.

What will be purpose of the use of force/what targets/how can you eliminate WMD through a bombing campaign/won't the use of force simply guarantee that the inspectors are thrown out and Saddam will have won?

- * No decision has been made with respect to the use of force, but the President has made clear that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop and use WMD.

- * Not going to comment on the possibility or nature of military targets. Can say however that whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

- * UNSCOM inspectors have achieved remarkable results; have always said that the best outcome is for the inspectors to be able to carry out their work. But as a

practical matter, Saddam has now put their mission to an end. Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD, by restoring the inspectors or whatever other steps may be necessary if the inspectors cannot carry out their work.

- * Meanwhile, we will insist that sanctions remain so long as he refuses to comply; sanctions are important tool in depriving him of the resources to develop and use WMD and threaten his neighbors.

- * Should the use of force be necessary, our objective would be to diminish substantially Iraq's WMD capability and its ability to project force and threaten its neighbors.

What are you planning to do after a military strike has taken place, assuming one does?

- * We don't discuss the specifics of our military operations and planning, but let me be clear on our objective - Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop WMD

- * Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise, will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

Isn't the diplomatic string running out/Are there any other options left/What is the purpose of the Albright trip?

- * The President has made clear that Saddam cannot be allowed to defy the will of the international community and have unfettered opportunity to develop weapons of mass destruction.

- * No decision has been made concerning the use of force,. The window is closing -- but it is not yet shut. Ambassador Butler has made clear that under the current circumstances he cannot carry out his mandate. That is unacceptable.

- * Secretary Albright has been meeting with counterparts from the UK, France and Russia and with our friends in the region. Ambassador Richardson will also be

consulting with other members of the Security Council in Europe, Africa and Latin America. Secretary Cohen is traveling to the region this week. They will explain our views of the situation and discuss next steps.

* The President is also discussing the situation with key world leaders. He has spoken to Blair, Chirac, Chretien and Kohl. PM Blair will be coming to Washington this week on a long-planned state visit.

What diplomatic options are left? Do you plan to introduce/support another resolution in the Council? Would you consider additional sanctions? What are you waiting for?

* The international community has spoken clearly and unanimously that Saddam must respect the Security Council Resolutions and allow the inspectors to do their work unimpeded. We are now focusing on the discussions that Secretary Albright will be conducting in the coming days. We have no plans to introduce a resolution. We believe existing Council resolutions give us all the authority we need to take whatever action we deem necessary.

While Vedrine appears to be no longer ruling out the use of force, Primakov is still emphasizing Russian insistence that diplomatic methods be applied - are you encouraged by your progress with the French, discouraged by apparent lack of progress with the Russians?

* Reference to Albright's successful meeting w/Vedrine and also reference meeting w/Primakov

* We all share the same objective: to thwart Iraq's efforts to develop WMD or threaten its neighbors. The international community is united in its view that it Saddam must give the inspectors the access they need to do the job. As the President said, we are determined that he not be free to develop weapons of mass destruction unhindered.

* Vedrine's and Primakov's statements should speak for themselves.

* Skeptical that more additional diplomatic efforts will work. But while window closing, not yet closed.

Many prominent foreign policy experts have called on you to change your policy from one of containment to one of getting rid of Saddam/can you ever be confident you've gotten rid of WMD while Saddam is still there?

* Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD and threaten his neighbors; we have said that we look forward to the day when Iraq has new leadership that would allow it join the family of nations. Desert Storm demonstrates that it would take hundreds of thousands of ground troops to remove the current leadership by force; our current policy - preventing Saddam from threatening the region -- serves the objectives and interests of the US, our friends and the international community at an acceptable level of risk.

Will the Gulf States allow you to base/bomb?

* We are in close touch. Believe we have the necessary level of cooperation/not going to get into operational details of how we might use our forces.

Is the Administration in synch/ is the Pentagon out ahead on the use of force?

* The President's advisors - civilian and military - are in firm agreement/meeting daily to guide the work. Meeting regularly with the President and Vice President.

Isn't Saddam tying the hands of military planners by placing women and children in or near likely targets and forcing you to choose between key targets and inflicting heavy "collateral damage" that world community would not accept?

* Not going to comment on any possible targets. We don't telegraph our punches.

* But Saddam's use of "human shields" is further proof of his utter contempt and disregard for his own people.

Isn't Netanyahu's position/stalemate in peace process harming your ability to assemble a coalition.

* We pursue peace process because its in the interest of the US, Israel, the

Palestinians and Israel's neighbors. Stalemate in peace process something we're trying to overcome/but doesn't diminish danger to region posed by Saddam's pursuit of WMD

Do you support another Primakov mission to negotiate with Saddam?

* Posuvalyuk has been in Baghdad - what is important is that Saddam gets the clear and unequivocal message that he must comply with Security Council Resolutions and allow the inspectors the access they need.

Do you have a deadline?

* No deadline, but it is clear that the diplomatic string is running out. Sec Albright, Amb Richardson, and Secretary Cohen are discussing next steps with Security Council members and friends in the region this week.

Butler allegations/BW warheads on missiles.

* Not going to comment/leave it to Butler to characterize UNSCOM's findings.

Phyllis Oakley and others say that we really don't know the nature of Iraq's WMD capability - how can we draw up military options without this information?

That's why it is so important for UNSCOM to be able to do its job unfettered.

What do you make of Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Said El-Sahaf's statement that Iraq is considering asking the International Court of Justice to complain about U.S. military threats?

* The International Court of Justice only has jurisdiction to hear a suit by one government against another where both sides have in some manner consented to have the court hear a case. The United States has not consented to ICJ jurisdiction here.

* This is just another attempt to divert attention from the real issue, with is Iraq's duty to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction and to comply immediately with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

* The United States has a lot of respect for the International Court of Justice, but this is not an appropriate case to go to the Court.

CLINTON-YELTSIN CALL

February 2, 1998

* President Clinton called President Yeltsin today. The leaders spoke by phone from 9:31 am to 9:51 am EST.

* The Presidents primarily discussed the serious situation regarding Iraq's non-compliance with UNSC mandates.

* President Clinton stressed the need for unity among UNSC members, agreed with Yeltsin on the desirability of a diplomatic solution, but said Saddam's continued defiance and refusal to allow adequate UNSCOM inspections were unacceptable.

* The two leaders agreed to stay in close touch on this issue.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

February 2, 1998

What is your reaction to the "Statement on nuclear weapons by international civilian leaders calling for further steps on nuclear disarmament" released by Lee Butler, the former head of U.S. Strategic Command?

* Lifting the threat of nuclear weapons destruction and limiting their dangerous spread has been and remains at the top of the Administration's foreign policy agenda.

* Over the past five years, we have accomplished a great deal: the detargeting of U.S. and Russian missiles; the entry into force of the START I Treaty; the

complete denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan; the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; Senate ratification of the START II Treaty; and the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

* We are working with the Russian government to achieve Russian ratification of START II, after which we are committed to negotiate further reductions in START III.

* At the same time, while we go forward with this process, we must retain our nuclear deterrent.

* With respect to the question of elimination, the President has said that the United States looks forward to a new century "in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated."

* And while we may differ over some of the specific recommendations made in the Statement by Civilian Leaders, we certainly agree there remains a continuing American and global interest in a deliberate process to further reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear dangers.

U.S.-JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT
January 30, 1998

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
January 30, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

U.S. - Japan Civil Aviation Agreement

I am pleased that the United States has reached a landmark agreement with Japan that will dramatically increase air service between our countries. This agreement will expand a \$10 billion market that services nearly 12 million passengers and carries well over 1 billion pounds of cargo each year. It will allow more U.S. cities to have direct service to Japan, and give U.S. airlines extensive new rights to fly into and beyond Japan. This increased competition means more choices for American business travelers and tourists alike.

Like our agreements on telecommunications and financial services, this aviation agreement reflects my policy of opening the world's markets in areas where American companies are most competitive. In aviation alone, we have already concluded far-reaching agreements with Germany, Canada, and twenty other nations. Along with today's agreement, these pacts are moving international aviation into a twenty-first century where consumer needs, not governments, will determine where and how often passenger and cargo planes travel.

I want to thank Secretaries Albright and Slater, and the negotiators at the Departments of State and Transportation for their sustained efforts in reaching this historic agreement.

###

US-JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT FACT SHEET

JAPAN IS A MARKET OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES.

* The U.S.-Japan civil aviation relationship is one the world's largest, accounting annually for 12 billion passengers, over 1 billion tons of cargo and \$10 billion in revenue in 1996.

* Japan occupies a strategic geographical position, serving as a gateway to Asia.

Greater access to this market unlocks many of the best growth opportunities of the future.

THE AGREEMENT SUBSTANTIALLY EXPANDS MARKET ACCESS OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. CARRIERS.

* **More Access to Japan:** Established carriers (United, Northwest, Federal Express) gain essentially unlimited access to Japan's market. They gain full rights to offer service between any points in the U.S. to any points in Japan, without any restriction on frequency or capacity. Other passenger airlines (Delta, Continental and American, with two others to follow) will be permitted to triple their access to this market. Weekly flights can increase from 46 to 136, a total of 4,600 additional flights per year. Until now, this type of airline had very limited or no access to this vital market. Charter flights will increase in two years from 400 flights per year to 600, rising eventually to 800. Passengers will have more choices in air travel.

* **More Access to Asia:** The agreement expands flights through Japan to other Asian markets. Established carriers will be entitled to fly beyond Japan without any limitation on frequencies, resolving a longstanding dispute in favor of liberalization. Non-incumbent all-cargo carriers (UPS, Polar Air Cargo) gain valuable new opportunities to transport cargo beyond Japan, helping U.S. business ship more goods to Asia. One additional all-cargo carrier will be able to enter the market in four years.

* **Global Networks:** For the first time, U.S. carriers serving Japan will be able to codeshare (e.g., two carriers offer different legs of the trip under one ticket) with Japanese, American or third country carriers. The U.S. has been a pioneer in codesharing, which permits it to use cooperative marketing arrangements to expand their international networks. Codesharing also will permit U.S. non-incumbent carriers to develop service beyond Japan, to other Asian destinations.

* **Future Market Opening:** Talks begin in three years toward full liberalization. "Safety net" provisions ensure liberalization continues, even if no new agreement is reached. For example, non-incumbent combination carriers gain the right to operate up to 35 additional weekly round-trip flights, even if no later agreement

is reached.

THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS ARE SUBSTANTIAL.

* Based on calculations of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, we estimate the agreement will provide the following cumulative benefits over four years:

- * U.S. passengers will enjoy gains of about \$1.2 billion;
- * U.S. carriers will enjoy additional revenue of about \$4 billion;
- * U.S. exports of aviation services will enjoy a net increase of almost \$4 billion (in each year, the U.S. trade surplus in this sector will be almost \$1 billion higher than it otherwise would be).

* Other benefits are important. Enhanced service stimulates business and tourism. Restaurants, hotels, convention industries and others all stand to gain. American workers and America's cities will share in the benefits as local economies grow.

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

January 30, 1998

* Today, the Department of State will release its annual report on human rights practices around the world.

* This report draws on a wide variety of sources of information in an effort to provide Congress, the American public, and people around the world with the most accurate, balanced and impartial view possible of the human rights situation in every country of the world (all 194 of them).

* It is the most comprehensive and detailed report of its kind and is a ongoing symbol of our commitment to maintaining human rights as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.

* The report helps to ensure that human rights concerns are taken into account in all U.S. relationships and serves as a neutral yardstick by which we can evaluate

human rights progress or the lack thereof in every country of the world.

* This year's report notes that, while there were a number of improvements in human rights in 1997, there continue to be a number of serious problems as well.

* We refer you to the Department of State for further details about this report.

IRAN: IRANIAN MESSAGE TO U.S. VIA ARAFAT

January 30, 1998

Q: Can you confirm that Chairman Arafat brought President Clinton a message from Iranian President Khatami, as reported in today's Los Angeles Times? If there was such a message, are you responding to it?

A: As is our usual practice, I am not going to get into the detail of reported diplomatic exchanges

Q: By not saying "no," are you implicitly confirming the existence of such a message?

A: I have nothing further for you on this.

Q: OK, but what is your stance on Khatami's proposals for non-governmental exchanges between the two countries? Are you responding to him? The President has said he wants to increase exchanges between Americans and Iranians. What are you doing to make this happen?

A: The President has said that he hoped we will have more exchanges between our two peoples.

We are looking at ways to facilitate that.

Q: Any comment on Arafat's statement that Pres. Khatami wants to restore full diplomatic relations with the U.S.?

A: We have not seen the actual text of Chairman Arafat's remarks on which the newspaper story is based.

But let me say more generally that, as the President stated, we hope that we can again have good relations with Iran soon.

We have real differences with the Iranian government because of some Iranian actions. (WMD, support of terrorism, violent opposition to the MEPP)

We believe the best way for our two countries to overcome the differences between our countries is through a government-to-government dialogue.

We have heard some encouraging statements out of Tehran. We hope they are followed by positive changes in actions.

We are prepared to respond appropriately to such changes.

UNITED KINGDOM: BLAIR

January 27, 1998

POTUS Call with Prime Minister Blair

The President spoke this morning with Prime Minister Tony Blair between 10:30 and 10:41 a.m. They touched on the following subjects:

* IRAQ: They agreed the developments are serious, that there is a common determination to see UNSC resolutions respected, and that they need to stay closely coordinated.

* MIDDLE EAST PEACE: The President reviewed his recent meetings with PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat.

* NORTHERN IRELAND: The PM reviewed where they are in the All-Party Talks.

IF ASKED: Did the POTUS personal situation come up?

* It was briefly mentioned. The PM expressed his personal support for the President.

Q: What can you tell us of Tony Blair's visit to Washington?

A: The British Prime Minister has accepted the President's invitation to come for an Official visit February 4-7. The arrival ceremony will take place on February 5, with meetings afterwards. The President and the First Lady will host the official dinner for the Blairs that night. Other details of the visit are being worked out.

We anticipate that the full range of bilateral and global issues will be discussed during the visit, which will be especially valuable for us as London holds the chair of both the G-8 and the Presidency of the European Union. We will certainly look forward to hearing from the Prime Minister how the Northern Ireland peace talks are progressing after yesterday's developments in Belfast.

NORTHERN IRELAND

January 26, 1998

Q: Your reaction to the UDP's withdrawal from the Northern Ireland talks today in London?

A: First and foremost, I want to emphasize our support for the Mitchell Principles of non-violence which govern the Northern Ireland talks. We emphatically condemn the recent attacks on the peace process which have taken the form of killings of random individuals, mostly Catholics. This violence is unacceptable and the culprits must be brought to justice.

Active renunciation of violence by all the parties is the best course forward for resolving the conflict there. Regarding the UDP decision today, under the rules set up for the conduct of the talks it is up to the parties and the governments to make decisions regarding participation. We have supported an inclusive and democratic process for the talks. Gary McMichael has made important, constructive contributions to this political process. We call on all loyalist paramilitaries to halt the killings and create the conditions that will permit the UDP to be at the table so that all can contribute to the creation of a sustainable peace for the people of Northern Ireland.

Q: What's your reaction to the IRA statement rejecting the "heads of agreement" paper introduced at the Belfast peace talks?

A: This framework document, proposed jointly by the Irish and British Governments is designed to move forward the substantive peace negotiations, and we have welcomed it. Those at the table must now decide how to use the structure provided by that paper to negotiate the content and shape of a full and lasting agreement.

Most importantly, we note that the IRA cease-fire of July 20 is being maintained, and we expect it to continue, along with the Loyalist cease-fire. There is, and will be, no tolerance for the violence perpetrated by extremists, nor for a return to violence by those abiding by the cease-fires.

Much has been accomplished since the talks began, but much hard work remains. The people of Northern Ireland deserve nothing less than a lasting peace, justice, equality, prosperity and better future for their children. We continue to encourage all parties to work toward that goal.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
January 29, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Bloody Sunday Inquiry

We welcome the British Government's announcement today establishing an official commission to make an independent inquiry into the circumstances of Bloody Sunday, the terrible tragedy that took place 26 years ago. This is an important, and timely, initiative to come to terms with the past and help the people of Northern Ireland look to the future and reconciliation as they negotiate the terms of an agreement for a lasting peace in that troubled land.

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CUBA/FOOD AND MEDICINE January 30, 1998

Humanitarian Relief Initiative Announced by the Cuban American National Foundation

Context: Yesterday, the Cuban American Foundation (PAC-Cuban American National Foundation) issued a statement outlining a humanitarian relief initiative for Cuba. The statement lists several "non-negotiable" principles for any program developed. Senator Helms endorsed the initiative the same day. Helms' office has drafted legislation based on the CANF initiative ("Cuban Assistance and Relief (CARE) Act 1998") that has not been announced. The draft legislation would authorize delivery of donated medicine and food as well as PL-480 food aid with certain conditions. The Administration has not developed a position on the CANF initiative nor on the draft legislation. There are other legislative initiatives and one headed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to lift restrictions

on food and medicine to Cuba. We have not developed positions on any of these measures. Following the Pope's visit, we want to stress U.S. government interest in reaching out to the Cuban people and strengthening civil society

Q: What is the Administration's view of the Cuba humanitarian relief initiative announced yesterday by the Cuban American Foundation and endorsed by Senator Helms?

A: We have seen the statement issued by the Cuban American Foundation outlining an initiative to provide greater humanitarian assistance directly to the Cuban people.

We have also seen a statement from Senator Helms endorsing this proposal.

We prefer to withhold any comment on the proposal until we see further details.

The U.S. continues to believe that maintaining pressure on the Cuban government through our embargo is fundamental to encouraging fundamental, systemic change.

At the same time, strengthening Cuban civil society through increased information flows and humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people is a key factor in our ongoing efforts to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

STATE OF THE UNION: FOREIGN POLICY

January 27, 1998

* In the 1997 State of the Union, President Clinton set an ambitious agenda to keep American leadership strong -- and to make sure we enter the 21st century as the world's leading force for security, peace, freedom and prosperity.

* Over the past year, we have made progress on the President's agenda -- building an undivided, peaceful Europe... forging an Asia Pacific community... opening the new economy to American goods and services... remaining an unrelenting force for

peace and freedom... moving strongly against new security threats... giving ourselves the tools we need to get the job done (strong military, better funded diplomacy.)

* Now, with a strong foundation in place, we are poised to move forward, seizing the opportunities and meeting the challenges of a new era. To meet these challenges, we are adapting old institutions to new demands... forging strong partnerships to meet common challenges... modernizing the instruments of our influence, military and diplomatic. Through this new security strategy, we are helping to write international rules for the 21st century, protecting those who join, isolating those who do not.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

* NATO ENLARGEMENT: Europe's stability and America's security closely linked. President's call for enlarging the NATO alliance strengthen alliance's core mission of collective defense and helps meet new threats such as regional instability. Enlargement furthers other US objectives: encouraging states in the region to settle border and ethnic disputes with neighbors, strengthen civilian control of their militaries, and increase tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities. NATO's enlargement, combined the Partnership for Peace program, NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO-Ukraine partnership help erase the outdated Cold War divisions and build, for the first time, an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe.

* SECURING THE PEACE IN BOSNIA: U.S. has abiding interest in peace and stability in Bosnia and a compelling interest in implementation of the Dayton peace accords. After 46 months of worst war in Europe since WWII, 24 months of implementing peace have helped put Bosnia on path to lasting peace and stability. Progress on implementation possible because of prudent military support. Can now see point where civil implementation and peace can be self-sustaining -- but Bosnia's fragile peace still needs support of American and allied troops when current NATO mission ends in June President still must approve detailed action plan being prepared by NATO military authorities after full review of all options. President will insist action plan have achievable mission tied to clear benchmarks, not a deadline. Force must be able to protect itself. U.S. must retain command. European allies must shoulder full share of responsibility.

Costs must be manageable. Plan must have substantial support of Congress, U.S. public.

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

* **IRAQ WMD PROGRAM:** President emphasized that Iraq's efforts to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are unacceptable. UN inspectors have done remarkable job, destroying more of Iraq WMD potential than was destroyed during Gulf War itself. But Saddam now refusing to allow inspectors to complete mission. All options are on the table to make sure Iraq does not pursue WMD program with impunity and threaten international community.

* **BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:** President announced tonight that the United States would lead the effort to erect stronger international barriers against the proliferation and use of biological weapons. Under the new initiative, the United States will seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by requiring nations that have joined the BWC to submit annual declarations about facilities and activities that could be used for BW purposes and agree to a tough international inspection system including both voluntary and mandatory inspections.

* **COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY:** President's call for Senate ratification of the CTBT will allow America to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent while constraining the proliferation of nuclear material and technology to rogue states' weapons programs. CTBT will improve America's ability to detect and deter nuclear explosive testing. CTBT's global network of sensors will strengthen America's ability to monitor nuclear explosive testing across the globe, as well as deter any nation from believing it can conduct a nuclear explosive test undetected by the international community.

LEVERAGING OUR POWER AND INFLUENCE

* **US ARREARS TO THE UNITED NATIONS:** The President also highlighted need for prompt action on the payment of U.S. arrears to the United Nations. Failure to pay undermines US ability to reform UN and hinders our leadership of that organization at very time UN is working to prevent Iraq from threatening neighbors and world with weapons of mass destruction. Also need to give the

International Monetary Fund capacity to help prevent global financial crises
Now, more than ever, our security at home and our interests abroad demand that
America meet our international obligations, sharpen the tools to improve the
stability of the world economy, and increase our leverage in international
organizations.