

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Malcolm Lee to John Norris. Subject: RE: Civ Air (9 pages)	01/26/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Jeffery DeLaurentis to Mary DeRosa. Subject: Draft Cuba Paper on Possible Administration initiatives. (8 pages)	01/27/1998	P1/b(1)
003. email	Jeffery DeLaurentis to Mara Rudman. Subject: Cuba: Draft Paper on Options in Aftermath of Papal Visit. (7 pages)	01/27/1998	P1/b(1)
004. email	Jeffery DeLaurentis to Michael Orofino. Subject: Revised Cuba Paper. (7 pages)	01/27/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/23/1998-01/27/1998]

2006-1363-F
 vz5649

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/23/98 9:45:20 AM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Helms Letter PG [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY Andreassen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Seaton, James B.
Witkowsky, Anne A.

TEXT_BODY**TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT**

Letter from Senator Helms on CTBT.doc
Letter from Senator Helms on CTBT, ABM and Kyoto

Q: What is your reaction to the January 21 letter from Senator Helms stating the Senate will not take up the CTBT until it has disposed of both the ABM agreements and Kyoto treaty?

A:

* We believe it is essential the U.S. Senate take the lead in ratifying the CTBT this year, so that the Treaty can enter into force at the earliest possible date.

* This Treaty is the result of over four decades of bipartisan diplomacy, and has the overwhelming support of the American public.

* We expect to discuss this further with the Senator and the Republican leadership in the days ahead.

Q: What about the linkage to Kyoto and ABM?

A:

* The Administration has made clear that it will not transmit the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate until subsequent agreements are reached with developing countries.

* With respect to the ABM agreements that were signed just four months ago, we have already said we will transmit these agreements, along with the START II protocol signed last September, to the Senate for advice and consent once Russia has ratified the START II Treaty.

* In the interim, the Administration is working hard to complete the associated letters and analysis that will accompany the ABM/START agreements when they are transmitted to the Senate. Expect this process will not be concluded for some time.

* [Optional]. It is, however, ironic that Senator Helms is charging the Administration with delaying the transmission of agreements that were concluded within the past four months, when he has yet to schedule even the first hearing on a Treaty that was signed by the President in September of 1996.

Q: What about Senator Helm's observation that the Treaty is unlikely to enter into force for a decade or more?

A:

* The issue here is one of leadership. During the CWC debate, Senator Helms argued we should not join CWC until all other countries of concern were a party to the Treaty.

* The Senate rejected that argument then, and with good reason: U.S.

ratification of the CWC facilitated ratification by Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran.

* Now, Senator Helms is arguing we should not lead until other key states have signed. Similar to our experience with the CWC, we believe U.S. ratification of the CTBT will encourage signature and ratification by other states.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/23/98 6:53:33 PM

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT JANUARY 23 NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS PRESS GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Babcock, Douglas W.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Evans, Peter O.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, Joanne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Roberts, Michael W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Woolston, Ann E.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT jan23gui.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

January 23, 1998

Helms Letter on CTBT/ABM/Kyoto

Russia-Iran Missile Cooperation

MEPP

Palestinian Authority

Algeria

Iraq

Iran

Khobar Bombing

China-Taiwan Talks

Indonesia/Asia Economic Turmoil

Vietnam

China Certification

UK/Blair

Northern Ireland

Bosnia

Cuba/Flotilla

Cuba/U.S. Contacts with Vatican

Space Control Policies

LETTER FROM SENATOR HELMS ON CTBT, ABM AND KYOTO
January 23, 1998

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This Treaty is the result of over four decades of bipartisan diplomacy, and has the overwhelming support of the American public.

We expect to discuss this further with the Senator and the Republican leadership in the days ahead.

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A: The issue here is one of leadership. During the CWC debate, Senator Helms argued we should not join CWC until all other countries of concern were a party to the Treaty.

The Senate rejected that argument then, and with good reason: U.S. ratification of the CWC facilitated ratification by Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran.

Now, Senator Helms is arguing we should not lead until other key states have signed. Similar to our experience with the CWC, we believe U.S. ratification of the CTBT will encourage signature and ratification by other states.

RUSSIA-IRAN MISSILE COOPERATION January 23, 1998

Q: Can you comment on the significance of the Russian statement yesterday on new export controls?

A: We have been officially informed by the Russian government that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin yesterday signed a decree substantially tightening Russia's export control process, putting into place new authority to stop transfers of the full range of goods and services to programs of weapons of mass destruction and foreign missile programs. This decree is now in force.

We do not yet have the text and understand it is being processed administratively in Moscow, and will be published shortly.

For some time U.S. and Russian officials have been discussing such broad legal authority, which is widely employed by many other countries and known as "catch-all" authority. Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin discussed it at length on the phone last Saturday, in the context of our shared interest in preventing proliferation.

We will carefully review the text of the decree when it is published. We welcome this step by the Russian government to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, this is part of our joint efforts to prevent the transfer of missile technology to Iran.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

January 23, 1998

Q: What did the President discuss with Chairman Arafat last night?

A: As he did with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the President asked the Chairman to take home the ideas they had discussed for further consideration.

We assumed from the beginning that both parties would need some time to absorb our ideas.

Q: Was counter-terrorism a major topic of discussion?

A: With both the Chairman and the Prime Minister, the President emphasized the obligation of both parties to meet all of their obligations under their agreements with each other.

In the Palestinian case, this means particularly greater effort on its security obligations.

The President welcomed the letter regarding the Palestinian Covenant presented by Arafat. The letter says that changes in the Covenant will be reflected in an official publication of the Charter. We consider this to be an important step in completing the process of revising the Covenant.

Q: What is the next step? Will Madeleine Albright meet with Arafat and Netanyahu?

A: I refer you back to what Secretary Albright told you yesterday: we may indeed seek a trilateral meeting at some point, but that decision has not yet been made. We also need some time, after Chairman Arafat departs today, to consider what we've heard from both the Chairman and the Prime Minister.

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: PLO COMPLIANCE WITH OSLO
January 22, 1998

Q: When did you send the PLOCCA report to Congress? Were you late? If so, why?

A: The latest report was sent to Congress on December 23, 1997.

It covered events through November 20, 1997.

Q: When is the next report due? Will you meet that deadline?

A: We are currently looking into what is required.

Q: What is the USG's current assessment of Palestinian compliance with the Oslo Accords?

A: I am not going to get into a legal analysis of this issue.

I will, however, discuss two prominent compliance issues on which we are now working with the parties: security and the PLO covenant.

As we have said before, we have seen some positive steps in PA efforts to prevent terror and to cooperate practically with Israel.

But more needs to be done. Fighting terror is an ongoing process which must be

pursued comprehensively and systematically, 24 hours a day. Security is the first element of the four-part agenda and is a major issue in our current discussions with Chairman Arafat.

We will continue to monitor closely and carefully PLO and PA actions and statements with regard to their commitments to fight terror.

Regarding the removal from the PLO covenant of references to the destruction of the State of Israel, this is an issue of great importance.

The Palestinian National Council amended the charter in April 1996, canceling the articles inconsistent with its commitments to Israel.

The government of Israel, at the time, welcomed this step.

(If appropriate in light of President's meeting with Arafat):

Many people have questioned which exact clauses were amended by the PNC decision.

President Clinton received from Chairman Arafat a letter which, for the first time, identifies all the articles annulled by the PNC's April 1996 action.

The letter also says that these changes will be reflected in an official publication of the charter.

It also emphasizes the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to live in peace and security and the PLO's commitment to live in peace side-by-side with Israel.

We welcome this clarification and believe it addresses the concerns about the ambiguity of the PNC's decision.

Q: Does this fulfill the requirements of the note for the record?

A: It is certainly an important step towards completing the process of revising the charter.

The parties need to discuss these differences directly with one another.

ALGERIA

January 22, 1998

Q: Do we support the Algerian government mobilizing citizens in armed self defense groups to combat terrorism?

A: We have seen the report regarding the government of Algeria's plans to arm additional civilians in self defense groups to gradually replace the Algerian army in protecting the civilian population.

The Algerian government has a responsibility to protect its civilians and to do so in ways which respect law and human rights. That is a basic standard.

The U.S. will continue to monitor the situation, as we assume the EU and the rest of the international community will. The international community deserves a high level of openness and public information.

In our view, long-lasting peace and stability in Algeria requires fighting terror and moving forward to broaden the political process to include all Algerians who reject violence, in order to promote national reconciliation. There must also be meaningful economic reform.

If pressed:

We note the government of Algeria cited 23,536 as the figure for civilians and security personnel killed since 1992. The international community has the figure closer to 70,000.

IRAQ

January 23, 1998

Q: What is your reaction to the Butler Report?

A: Chairman Butler's report to the Council today was disturbing. Iraq remains in non-compliance with its obligations under UNSC resolutions.

There is no question that Iraq continues to refuse to provide full, unfettered access to UNSCOM inspectors. This is a serious violation of Iraq's obligations, and in defiance of multiple UNSC presidential statements and resolutions.

Now that we have heard Butler's report, we will be consulting closely in the Council, and with our allies and friends to determine appropriate next steps.

We are not ruling out any options. Iraq must respect the will of the international community by complying with its clear obligations.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What about Cook's comments on Iraq building two warheads a week with Anthrax?

A: We understand the Foreign Secretary was referring to what Iraq could theoretically produce if there was no UNSCOM oversight. We share his concern which is why we have been insistent that UNSCOM do its job without any restrictions.

Q: Response to Iraqi's desire to freeze discussion of access to presidential sites until April?

Background: We understand that Iraq told Butler that it wanted to suspend and discussion of access to presidential sites until after a series of three "technical evaluation meetings." (These discussions, with outside experts selected by UNSCOM, were offered by Butler in December to review Iraq's declarations: the first is early February, the last in April) After these, Iraq

could judge whether UNSCOM was showing any progress toward giving Iraq a clean bill of health. As Executive Chairman Butler told the Iraqis, "your announcement of a freezing flies in the face of Security Council decisions."

A: As we have stated many times before, the issue here is Iraqi compliance. Iraq is required to provide full, unfettered access to sites and information in accordance with UNSCOM's inspections. Iraq has never done so.

Given what we know of the Iraqi proposal, it appears to be a violation of UNSCR 1137, which demanded "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access" to areas and items UNSCOM wishes to inspect.

It would also appear to be another case of Iraq mistakenly believing that it can dictate how UNSCOM operates. That is wrong.

Before we assess our response, we want to hear Butler's report this Friday to the UNSC to better understand his discussions in Baghdad.

Q: What will the Security Council/US do next?

A: Butler plans to brief the Security Council on Friday. It would be premature to speculate on what actions might be taken until after he has had the opportunity to report fully on his visit. We are not ruling out any options at this point.

Q: What about Saddam Hussein's threat to cease cooperation with UNSCOM after six months if UNSCOM has not completed its work?

A: That would be a mistake.

Q: What is your response to the letter to the President from the fifty-four Catholic bishops urging him to work to end the U.N. embargo against Iraq?

Background: The letter claims that the embargo has killed more than a million Iraqis. The Bishops outlined their "profound moral concerns" about the U.S.-led sanctions.

A: The President did receive such a letter.

The letter addresses serious issues, and the President will read it carefully. He appreciates the thought and compassion that the American bishops bring to this issue.

He and Secretary Albright have said repeatedly that the USG is very concerned about the plight of the Iraqi people under their current leader.

We have always held that the Iraqi people's suffering was caused by the Iraqi governments decision to not comply with the international community's demand that Iraq give up its weapons programs. This was a justified demand placed on an aggressive regime that began a war with a neighbor for purely selfish reasons and was proven to be willing to use the most heinous forms of weapons against its opponents.

We always understood the need to protect the Iraqi population under sanctions. There was from the beginning of sanctions an exception in the sanctions that allowed the importation of food and medicine. To ensure that Iraq had sufficient funds, the USG pressed a oil-for-food proposal as early as mid-1991.

Iraq repeatedly rejected that effort, choosing instead to build palaces and lavish resources on those close to the leadership. These facts are undisputed. These acts, in the face of the humanitarian need of the Iraqi government, have to be judged as immoral.

Iraq finally accepted the more recent oil-for-food effort, UNSCR 986. There have been delays in implementation, but with the exception of a very few bureaucratic glitches, the principal reason for difficulties in getting assistance to the Iraqi people are a direct result of bad choices by Iraq.

IRAN
January 21, 1998

Q: What's your reaction to Khamenei's rejection of talks and relations with the US and to Khatami's apparent U-turn in his rhetoric? Who's running the show in Tehran?

A: We continue to follow the statements of senior Iranian officials closely. We welcome statements indicating greater tolerance and openness. But the final analysis will be determined by what Iran does and not what it says.

We are prepared to respond appropriately if there are such changes.

We believe that the best way to deal with some of the outstanding issues between our two countries would be to engage in a government-to-government dialogue.

Meanwhile, we are also looking at the possibility of enhanced people-to-people contacts.

Q: Will you speak directly to the Iranian people the way Khatami did to the American people?

A: I've spoken on several occasions about my feelings of respect for the Iranian people, and our attitude toward the recent statements of President Khatami. I am sure there will be occasions to address these issues in the future as well.

Q: What about easing visa restrictions on Iranians? Will you do so?

A: All visas to Iranian nationals are issued in accordance with the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality act, and related regulations, including name check requirements.

We issued over 25,000 visas for Iranians to visit the US in FY 1996, not an insignificant number.

Q: Khatami suggested cultural and academic exchanges between our two countries. Do you agree this is something we should do?

A: As you know there are no restrictions on passports to Iran, but we're taking a look at some of these kinds of exchanges, we'll review it.

Q: Have you sent a message to Tehran? Did your Secretary of State send a letter to Khatami just after his election?

A: I am confident that our readiness for government-to-government talks with all issues on the table are well known in Tehran.

I'm not going to discuss what does or does not transpire in diplomatic channels.

Q: Are you prepared to change your containment policy toward Iran, as so many foreign policy experts recommend?

A: Our policy is based on protecting America and its friends from the threat posed by Iran's behavior, and to promote a change in Iran's behavior.

There is now no disagreement in the international community - none - that exceptional steps must be taken to prevent Iran's getting long range missiles and weapons of mass destruction. This has led to serious prohibitions by other countries on weapons-related trade with Iran. The latest example was the Chinese decision to stop its nuclear cooperation with Iran.

There is also a clear and widely shared view among our allies of the threat posed by Iranian support for terrorism. This has led to significant information sharing and other cooperation with our allies on the Iranian terrorism threat.

Under our policy of containment we have always said we are prepared for a dialogue with the Iranian government in which we could discuss all the issues of concern to each side.

Q: Do you believe it's worth risking our sound relationship with our friends and allies (France, Russia, etc) to continue to contain Iran?

A: Our objective is to work with our friends and allies to change Iran's behavior. We have had some success in doing so because our allies and we agree on this threat.

Q: What is the status of the Administration's consideration of ILSA

sanctionability in connection with the involvement of Total, Gazprom, and Petronas in the South Pars gas field project in Iran?

A: We are continuing to review the facts of the case and the implications under ILSA. Lawyers at the State Department are actively reviewing the applications of the law and we will act in accordance with the law.

At this point, no decisions have been made. The imposition of sanctions remains a real possibility.

Q: Are we reviewing Iranian asset claims in the U.S. as a gesture?

A: No.

KHOBAR BOMBING

January 23, 1998

Q: What is your reaction to the INS ruling involving Sayegh?

A: We are committed to enforcing our laws against terrorists. This is a step in that direction.

Q: What about the Khobar investigation?

A: We continue to pursue aggressively all avenues of investigation relating to the Khobar Towers bombing. No conclusions have been reached.

IF PRESSED:

Q: Did the Saudis fail to cooperate on Sayegh and Khobar?

A: We continue to work with the Saudi Government.

Q: What happens next with Sayegh?

A: I would refer you to the Department of Justice and FBI.

(If pressed) There will be subsequent proceedings to determine which country Sayegh will be removed to. Until that time he will remain in INS custody.

Q: Are we not sending him to Saudi Arabia out of concern that he will be mistreated?

A: As I have noted, there has been no determination made as to where Sayegh will be sent. There are a number of possibilities.

CHINA-TAIWAN TALKS

January 21, 1998

Q: China seems ready to begin talks with Taiwan, but the Taiwanese are skeptical because China won't give up on insisting that Taiwan submit to the "one China" principle. Where do you stand on this?

A: We have a strong interest in assuring that differences between the PRC and Taiwan are resolved peacefully - so we strongly support the earliest possible resumption of cross-Strait dialogue between them. It's up to them to decide the terms and circumstances.

INDONESIA/ASIA ECONOMIC TURMOIL

January 21, 1998

Q: Aren't critics right when they allege that these IMF programs are bailing out rich investors and corrupt governments?

A: If these efforts were directed at bailing out investors, we would not spend a penny on them. This is about Main Street not Wall Street and the central aim of these programs is to help these economies restore growth and market confidence as quickly as possible, not to bail them or foreign investors out.

But the countries we are talking about are our consumers-who will buy fewer of our products leading to fewer American jobs if this crisis continues; they are our competitors who will surely sell cheaper goods in the United States market if, as a result of continued instability, their currencies keep getting cheaper; and they are our security partners that, if threatened by instability and unrest, will mean trouble down the road in the region of the world where we have fought three wars this century.

The centerpiece of these efforts is reform commitments undertaken by the affected governments themselves -- to restructure and clean up the banking system, improve governance and fight corruption and open markets.

For those countries that have demonstrated resolve in implementing a reform program, the IMF stands ready to extend financial support to provide a breathing space while the reforms take effect. But it is important to underscore that no resources will be made available to countries that are not actively grappling with their problems.

Q: What is your assessment of the financial situation in Asia? Are you concerned it might spiral out of control?

A: Several economies in the region are experiencing serious financial and economic difficulties. The Asia-Pacific region is important to us; we have substantial economic and security interests in seeing a return of confidence and stability as soon as possible. That is why we support international efforts to help these economies adjust.

The centerpiece of these efforts is implementation of reform commitments adopted by the affected governments. Vigorous implementation of these commitments offers the best prospects for restoring investor confidence.

Q: What's your assessment of the impact of the Asian economic crisis on America's economy?

A: The fundamentals of the American economy are exceptionally good. Growth is strong, wages are rising, private investment is booming, inflation is low, the federal deficit is on track to be eliminated, and unemployment last year hit its lowest level in 24 years.

And there is every indication that U.S. economic prospects remain strong. A week and a half ago, we learned that the economy added another 370,000 new jobs, bringing the total number of jobs created since the President took office to 14.3 million.

At the same time, the world economy is increasingly interconnected, and restoring confidence and stability in Asia is very much in our long-term economic and national security interests. That is why the United States has been at the center of the international effort to reestablish stability and confidence in the region as soon as possible.

Q: Aren't you concerned that bailing out investors now will create a moral hazard problem that will encourage people to make bad investments knowing that the government will come to their rescue no matter what happens?

A: Our immediate priority must be to ensure the stability of the international financial system. But as we look to the future, we need to put in place mechanisms that prevent future financial crises by discouraging risky investment behavior. For that reason, we will continue working with other major countries to make sure that architecture of the international financial institutions evolve to make it as modern as the marketplace itself.

Q: Are you going to push for both the New Arrangement to Borrow and the increase in the IMF quota when Congress returns?

A: It is important that the IMF have the resources it needs to help countries that are ready to take action to put their economies on a sounder financial footing. Restoring confidence and stability in Asia is very much in America's economic and security interests, and the IMF is playing a critical role in the

effort to restore confidence.

Q: Why doesn't the administration push to attach labor and environmental conditions to the IMF packages for countries?

A: We have sought to strengthen labor and environmental protections in both the IMF and the World Bank programs, and we will continue to do pursue those important goals. We have urged these countries to undertake major structural reforms to restore investor confidence and stability.

Restoring stability will, in turn, create a better climate for countries to adopt effective protection for labor and the environment.

Q: Isn't Soeharto the real problem in Indonesia?

A: Under President Soeharto's leadership, Indonesia has enjoyed a period of remarkable economic achievement. He's also provided real leadership in the development of ASEAN and in APEC.

President Soeharto signed a Letter of Intent with the IMF that contains a number of commitments to advance economic reform. We have welcomed Indonesia's agreement to these constructive steps.

I have been in close personal touch with President Soeharto, underscoring the importance of vigorous and sustained implementation of the reform commitments it is undertaking in conjunction with its IMF program, because this offers the best prospect for restoring financial confidence and economic stability. Summers went to Indonesia to affirm that message.

Let's remember that Indonesia is a country with underlying economic strengths that can provide a foundation for renewed economic growth.

Q: But how will you judge whether Indonesia is carrying through on its policy commitments?

A: The IMF has the first line of responsibility for evaluating compliance with IMF programs. The IMF team is in constant contact with the Indonesian authorities

to suggest ways that policy implementation can be strengthened.

In addition, we are in regular contact both with the IMF team and the Indonesian authorities.

Q: Is the U.S. concerned about the stability of the Soeharto government? Do you believe Soeharto should step down?

A: Indonesia is experiencing financial difficulties that the IMF program is designed to address. Vigorous and sustained implementation of the reforms agreed by Indonesia in conjunction with their IMF program offers the best prospects for restoring confidence.

Under President Soeharto's leadership, Indonesia has enjoyed a period of remarkable economic achievement. And President Soeharto has provided real leadership in the development of ASEAN and in the region.

A presidential election is scheduled for March. The question of whether or not President Soeharto should seek re-election is a matter for him to decide, and the choice of Indonesia's leadership is a matter for the Indonesian people.

JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER FOR VIETNAM

January 14, 1998

Q: Senator Kerry said in Vietnam that the President will waive trade restrictions with Vietnam early next month. Is he right?

A: As we mentioned last month, the Administration is consulting with Congress on the question of waiving the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.

The issuance of a Jackson-Vanik waiver depends on a finding that the Vietnamese

government permits free emigration by its people. In 1997, we saw additional progress on freedom of emigration particularly for Vietnamese eligible for the Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Refugees (ROVR) program. We will continue to evaluate whether the Vietnamese are fulfilling their commitment to permit eligible applicants to gain access to this and other emigration programs.

CHINA NUCLEAR CERTIFICATION

January 15, 1998

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

For Immediate Release January 15, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

China Nuclear Certification

On January 12, the President signed the formal certifications and reports required by U.S. law to implement the U.S.-China Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. These certifications and reports have been submitted to Congress. China has met the nuclear nonproliferation requirements and conditions necessary under U.S. law to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation with U.S. industry. This agreement serves U.S. national security and economic interests, and demonstrates that the Administration's policy of engaging China is achieving concrete results. We will continue to work with the Chinese government to strengthen our cooperation on other arms control and nonproliferation issues.

#

UNITED KINGDOM: BLAIR VISIT

January 13, 1998

Q: What can you tell us of Tony Blair's visit to Washington?

A: The British Prime Minister has accepted the President's invitation to come for an Official visit February 4-7. The arrival ceremony will take place on February 5, with meetings afterwards. The President and the First Lady will host the official dinner for the Blairs that night. Other details of the visit are being worked out.

We anticipate that the full range of bilateral and global issues will be discussed during the visit, which will be especially valuable for us as London holds the chair of both the G-8 and the Presidency of the European Union. We will certainly look forward to hearing from the Prime Minister how the Northern Ireland peace talks are progressing after yesterday's developments in Belfast.

NORTHERN IRELAND

January 22, 1998

Q: What's your reaction to the IRA statement rejecting the "heads of agreement" paper introduced at the Belfast peace talks?

A: This framework document, proposed jointly by the Irish and British Governments is designed to move forward the substantive peace negotiations, and we have welcomed it. Those at the table must now decide how to use the structure provided by that paper to negotiate the content and shape of a full and lasting

agreement.

Most importantly, we note that the IRA cease-fire of July 20 is being maintained, and we expect it to continue, along with the Loyalist cease-fire. There is, and will be, no tolerance for the violence perpetrated by extremists, nor for a return to violence by those abiding by the cease-fires.

Much has been accomplished since the talks began, but much hard work remains. The people of Northern Ireland deserve nothing less than a lasting peace, justice, equality, prosperity and better future for their children. We continue to encourage all parties to work toward that goal.

Q: Your reaction to the continued killings, this time another Catholic, in Northern Ireland?

A: Eight people on both sides of the dispute have lost their lives in senseless acts of violence since December 27. The President condemns these, and every attack on the people and peace of Northern Ireland. He calls on the people there to reject violence, deny support to those who practice it and break the vicious cycle of killing. Now is not the time to surrender to a minority opposed to peace and democracy.

BOSNIA
January 22, 1998

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
January 22, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Apprehension of Indicted War Criminal Goran Jelusic

I welcome the news that Goran Jelusic has been detained by SFOR forces, led by American units, in the Republika Srpska city of Bijelina. He is now being transported to The Hague for trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Jelusic was indicted by the Tribunal in 1995 for 56 counts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The SFOR forces acted according to their rules of engagement, which authorize the apprehension of indicted war criminals when encountered in the course of their duties. This was the third such apprehension by SFOR forces, following actions last July and December that resulted in the capture of four indictees and the death of a fifth.

I congratulate the SFOR troops who participated in this effort. The United States continues to support fully the work of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. Jelusic will be the 23rd of 78 indictees brought to The Hague for trial. It is important to recall that most of these were delivered in the last seven months by the parties themselves. We intend to sustain political and economic pressure to assure continued compliance with the Dayton Accords.

We must continue this progress. Today, I call again on all parties to the Dayton Accords to fulfill their obligations to bring all indicted war criminals to justice. Carrying out these commitments is essential for advancing the work of reconciliation in Bosnia.

#

On Strobel Article

Q: Has the foreign policy team agreed on 7,000 troops in new force?

A: No decisions have been made on the size or mission of the new force. These decisions will only be made after we review a detailed action plan being prepared by NATO military authorities that considers several options. All NATO allies must agree to details of mission -- including objectives, force size and duration. Plan now due to be considered by NATO Ambassadors in early February.

Plan must have substantial support of Congress, U.S. public. Consultations to date substantive and productive. Will continue as plan is developed.

Prime Minister Dodik/Republika Srpska Assembly

- * The election of Prime Minister Dodik in Republika Srpska is a victory over the politics of hate and division.
- * The Bosnian Serb Assembly elections in November broke the monopoly over the government held by Karadzic's SDS party since before the war. The election of Dodik represents a further and very significant set-back for the Pale hard-liners.
- * Many Bosnian Serbs are clearly fed up with Pale Serbs' corruption and obstruction of Dayton which denies a peace dividend to ordinary Bosnian Serbs.
- * We expect the new Bosnian Serb government to get on with the business of implementing Dayton and thereby begin to bring the fruits of peace to the Bosnian Serb people.

Srebrenica

- * We condemn the hostility and violence organized and directed against OSCE officials and elected Municipal officials in Srebrenica.

Paramilitary Police Force

- * Reforming and retraining local police so they can take responsibility for public security in Bosnia will be necessary before implementation can continue without a significant military presence.
- * Since it will be some time before local police are up to the job, we believe consideration should be given to creating an international paramilitary police

capability that can help support the mission now and provide stepping stone so that NATO combat forces can reduce later on.

* No decisions have been made. We expect this issue to be part of our ongoing dialogue with the Congress and our allies on Bosnia.

Post-SFOR

* U.S. has abiding interest in peace and stability in Bosnia and Europe and thus compelling interest in implementation of Dayton -- best hope for lasting peace and stability:

* We have made much progress - ending the fighting, rebuilding the economy, creating cooperative institutions, even on refugees and war criminals. We are changing the conditions that made Bosnia powder keg and putting it on path to lasting peace and stability.

* Full implementation of the peace and reconciliation will take a long time. We are closer to the point where civil implementation and peace process can continue without a large military presence. Not there yet. Must ensure Army, Police and Media in legitimate hands; make greater progress on refugee returns and war criminals, get to point where genuine power sharing is taking place.

* Despite major accomplishments, cannot expect civil implementation to maintain progress (let alone current pace) without international military support after June 1998. After consultations with national security and military advisers, NATO allies, Congress, President now convinced follow-on NATO force necessary when SFOR ends. Has decided that -- in principle -- as leader of NATO, U.S. should take part in force.

* President still must approve detailed action plan being prepared by NATO military authorities after full review of all options. All NATO allies must agree to details of mission -- including objectives, force size and duration. Plan now due to be considered by NATO Ambassadors in early February.

* Criteria for U.S. Participation. President will insist action plan meet these

broad criteria:

- * Achievable mission tied to clear benchmarks, not a deadline.
- * Force must be able to protect itself.
- * U.S. must retain command.
- * European allies must shoulder full share of responsibility.
- * Costs must be manageable.

* Plan must have substantial support of Congress, U.S. public. Consultations to date substantive and productive. Will continue as plan is developed.

If asked about timing of decisions/consultations with Congress:

* Normal NATO planning process underway to develop options for follow-on force. Plan due to be considered by NATO Ambassadors in early February. Allows sufficient time for complete and measured review of options. All NATO allies must agree to details of mission -- including objectives, force size and duration. President must approve final NATO plan.

* Plan must have substantial support of Congress, U.S. public. Consultations to date substantive and productive. Will continue dialogue with Congress at each step as plan is developed.

European Role

* The issue of the size and complexion of the force will be looked at by NATO. But remember that Europe and our other partners already providing 3 times as many SFOR troops as U.S. ... 5 times as much economic assistance... 9 times as many international police... and have taken in 10 times as many refugees.

* Nonetheless, Europe can and should do more and more but cannot do it alone but as we have seen before in this tragic conflict, building a lasting peace in Bosnia requires U.S. leadership and a sustained commitment on our part not to walk away.

Dayton Can't Work/Partition

- * Partition may seem to some to be an easy way out but it flies in the face of both justice and reality and leads towards war not peace.
- * Partitioning the country along ethnic lines would simply reward the horrible ethnic cleansing and aggression of the war. Refugees would be unable to return home; people would see return to war as only option to regain their lands.
- * Partition would create an inherently unstable region with one state becoming three rump states surrounded by hostile forces. It would turn the peace process into a volatile cease-fire with the international community trapped between parties with no incentive to resolve their differences.
- * Bosnians can and have lived together in peace. Look at the history: Most of Bosnia's long history reflects inter-communal amity, with mixed marriages, communities, and families. This was best symbolized by the Sarajevo Olympics in 1984.

War Criminals

- * We put intense pressure on the Parties, who bear first responsibility under Dayton for bringing war criminals to justice. Recent surrender of 10 Croat indictees shows that pressure can work.
- * SFOR also detains indictees it encounters if commanders deems risk acceptable, as in Prijedor and in Vitez. NATO just beginning to look at post-SFOR options, but do not expect this part of mission would be changed.
- * 22 indictees have been delivered to The Hague. We are determined to see all brought before the Tribunal in The Hague.
- * We are prepared to consider a full range of options to support the Tribunal.

Planning to Arrest Karadzic?

* Those who are responsible for causing the war should be brought to justice and since Dayton we have pushed at every level of contact that the issue of war criminals is central to finally putting this conflict behind us.

* All indicted war criminals remain subject to apprehension. None should feel secure or immune.

* But the effort to rebuild the lives of the Bosnian people must go forward and not be held hostage to any one issue.

Are you taking sides? Has the mission changed?

* We are for the active, consistent implementation of Dayton. That doesn't mean just trying to just defuse disputes between those who want to cooperate with Dayton and those who won't. It means supporting those who support Dayton and resisting those who are undermining it.

* It means standing up to those who attempt to provoke SFOR or who try to break down the secure environment which SFOR must help maintain under Dayton.

* We intend to play our part squarely and resolutely. The parties will decide for themselves which side they are on -- and whether they will get the active support of the allies and the international community, or be made to bear consequences.

Concern about Kosovo

* We urge all parties in Kosovo to take steps to reduce tensions. We join our European allies in pressing President Milosevic to open a dialogue with the Kosovar Albanian leadership and respect human rights in Kosovo.

* Special Representative Bob Gelbard raised these concerns in his meeting with President Milosevic in his meeting January 15.

* As an important first step in reducing tensions, Milosevic should implement the Kosovo education agreement immediately and without conditions, including at the University level.

CUBA: FLOTILLA
January 23, 1998

Background (for briefer only): The Democracy Movement, led by Ramon Saul Sanchez, is planning another "flotilla" protest in the Florida Straits -- "a flotilla of prayers for the unity of the Cuban nation and the release all political prisoners." The flotilla will be done in two stages. First, 10-15 boats are scheduled to sail tonight so they may reach a spot in international waters 12 1/2 miles off the coast of Cuba early Saturday. Thirteen civilian planes piloted by Democracy Movement volunteers will take off at 8:00 a.m. on Saturday. The group will conduct a ceremony at approximately 10:00 a.m. DM leaders continue to talk of a "stage two" where some people will attempt to make unauthorized entries into Cuban territorial seas and airspace "to exercise the right of all Cubans to return to their homeland." So far, the event has attracted little attention and the weather forecast is not favorable. State released a statement on this January 13. Detailed questions should be referred to State or Coast Guard.

Q: What is the Administration doing in preparation for flotilla activities planned for January 24?

A: We understand that the Miami-based "Democracy Movement" group is planning a flotilla of private boats and accompanying aircraft that will travel to a position in international waters and airspace across from Havana.

We have reiterated our long-standing position that we recognize and support the right of participants to engage in peaceful protests in international waters and airspace. At the same time, we have informed flotilla organizers that persons who enter Cuban territory, territorial sea or airspace without authorization from

the Cuban government may be in violation of U.S. and international law, and place themselves and others in serious danger. We have further advised flotilla participants that the USG intends to fully implement existing U.S. laws and regulations in order to avoid any unnecessary risks to all concerned and to avert a threatened disturbance of international relations.

The "Emergency Cease and Desist Order and Notice of Enforcement Policy" issued by FAA in 1996 remains in effect and warns pilots of enforcement actions for unauthorized entry into Cuban airspace to the maximum extent permitted by law. The Presidential Proclamation of a National Emergency announced in March 1996 giving the Coast Guard emergency authority to regulate, inspect, and take strong enforcement action against vessels which violate Cuban territorial waters has been continued. Pilots were briefed on the applicable FAA regulations and international law concerning the operation of civil aircraft within the flight information region of another country.

We have told the Cuban Government that we expect it to show the utmost discretion and restraint in handling any unauthorized entry into its territory, territorial sea, or airspace and to act in accordance with international law and principles and to assure the safety of lives at sea and aboard any aircraft.

The United States Coast Guard and Federal Aviation Administration have issued notices reinforcing the dangers involved.

Q: What did the Administration tell the Cuban Government on the subject of the January 24 flotilla?

A: The United States Government, via diplomatic notes delivered to the GOC both in Washington and Havana, informed the GOC of the avowed peaceful intentions of the organizers and of actions taken by the Administration to discourage unauthorized entry of boats or planes into Cuban territorial sea or airspace.

The USG underscored to the Cuban government its obligation, and our expectation, that it will exercise, in accordance with international legal principles concerning the use of force, the law of the sea, and international civil aviation law, the utmost discretion and restraint and to assure the safety of lives at sea and aboard any aircraft.

Q: How will the USG respond if flotilla participants violate Cuban territorial seas or airspace?

A: The Democracy Movement has stated publicly that boats and aircraft participating in the January 24 flotilla will remain in international waters and airspace. We have no reason to believe otherwise.

Q: What about reports of others who plan to enter Cuba without authorization?

A: We have reiterated to flotilla organizers our strong support of the right to engage in peaceful protests against the Castro regime in international waters and airspace off Cuban shores. At the same time, the State Department has advised of the serious risks involved in making unauthorized entries into Cuban waters or airspace. The State Department has talked directly with the organizers to express our support of the Democracy Movement's goals of promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba and, at the same time, to express our strong concerns for the safety of any flotilla participant who tries to enter Cuban waters without authorization.

Again, we have further advised flotilla participants that the USG intends to fully implement existing U.S. laws and regulations in order to avoid any unnecessary risks to all concerned and to avert a threatened disturbance of international relations.

CUBA: U.S. CONTACTS WITH VATICAN
January 22, 1998

U.S. Contacts with the Vatican on the Papal Visit

Q: Has the Administration communicated with the Vatican on the visit, and if so, what did you say?

A: We routinely consult with the Vatican on foreign policy issues of mutual

interest, and in anticipation of Papal travel, and did so on this occasion. We conveyed our support for the visit and expressed the hope that it might lead to change and improvements in religious and others freedoms.

Q: Will President Clinton take up Castro's invitation to visit Cuba. If not, why not?

A: The President has no plans to visit Cuba. We have a diplomatic exchange with the Cuban regime. We have a diplomatic mission there; they have one here. If Castro is prepared to open his media to a debate on human rights, democracy and free enterprise, that would be a positive development. It would also be helpful if he were to stop jamming Radio and TV Marti.

We hope he will listen carefully and respond positively to the Pope's anticipated appeal for greater religious and other freedoms. If Castro moved meaningfully on these issues, the President has already said he would respond appropriately.

Q: "If the Pope, why not the United States?" The Pope's anti-communist credentials are impeccable, yet he is calling for an end to the embargo on food and medicine. Is he wrong? What purpose is served by denying Cubans basic humanitarian goods?

A: U.S. policy toward Cuba is to promote the peaceful transition to democracy in the only country in this hemisphere that does not enjoy it.

We believe that the best way to further this goal is to maintain economic pressure, depriving government of resources it wants to prop up its repressive regime, while reaching out and supporting the Cuban people in its efforts to build an independent civil society.

Important to recognize that fundamental reason for economic deprivation in Cuba is not embargo - it is failed policy of regime that has stuck to an economic system rejected almost everywhere else.

In fact, we permit U.S. firms to export medicines, medical supplies and equipment to Cuba, provided appropriate arrangements are in place to prevent the

government from diverting them from intended use. U.S. citizens are also permitted to make humanitarian donations. Overall, we have licensed more than two billion dollars worth of donations of all types of humanitarian assistance, including over \$227 million in medicines and medical supplies since 1992.

We are continually looking for means to support the Cuban people more effectively.

In addition, as President has emphasized, we would respond appropriately to any meaningful gesture by Cuban government to open up.

Q: "If Iran (or China), why not Cuba?" You have invited the Iranian government to engage in authorized, government-to-government channels - and that's with a government that engages in terrorism, is developing WMDs, is pursuing a policy of violent opposition to the peace process, not to speak of its human rights record. You also engage with China, a country with a deplorable human rights record. Why not engage with Cuba?

A: In each instance, whether it is China, Iran or Cuba, our policy is guided by how best we believe we can promote our objectives.

In the case of China, for example, the United States has many important national interests - peace in the Korean peninsula, nonproliferation, Asian stability - that are advanced and influenced by our policy of engagement.

In the case of Cuba, in contrast, Castro has held his country in a time warp for 40 years. We have one fundamental issue with its government - the persistent denial of basic freedoms to its citizens. We have consistently said that to the Cuban government; so far its response has been to maintain, and in some respects aggravate, its repressive policies.

Issue is not whether we will talk to Cuban government. Indeed, we already have a diplomatic dialogue. We have accredited diplomats in Havana and they here in Washington. The channels exist - what is lacking is any indication that the Cuban government is prepared to take the steps taken by every other country in the hemisphere.

Q: How does the U.S. view the Pope's visit? What do you think can be accomplished?

A: The U.S. Government views Pope John Paul II's visit as a potentially important, positive event in bringing to the Cuban people a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. We hope the visit will have some lasting effect for the people of Cuba. I am not going to speculate beyond that.

Q: What is the U.S. doing in response to U.S. travelers wanting to see the Pope?

A: We are trying to be supportive of the visit -- facilitating religious travel of those going to participate in the Pope's visit, within existing law and regulations, by expediting licensing of travel, shipment of humanitarian goods and monetary donations from the Catholic Church here to the Church in Cuba.

We have licensed several direct flights to take pilgrims to Cuba and to deliver humanitarian assistance to support the visit.

Q: Can we expect any changes in U.S. policy as a result of the Papal Visit? Doesn't it present some opportunities to pull U.S. policy out of a time warp?

A: U.S. policy toward Cuba is to promote the peaceful transition to democracy in the only country in this hemisphere that does not enjoy it.

The Administration continues to believe that the best policy to promote such a transition in Cuba is to maintain economic pressure, to develop a concerted multilateral effort and to provide support to the Cuban people in developing civil society.

The President has repeatedly made clear that the U.S. would be prepared to respond reciprocally if the Cuban government demonstrated a willingness to open up politically, show more support for democracy and human rights.

Q: What about the concessions Castro has already made to support the Pope's visit?

A: Religious freedom is one of a number of fundamental human rights. We believe

Castro should move more meaningfully on all of these, but certainly an enduring expansion of religious freedom, and of the ability of the Catholic Church and other denominations to carry on their mission, would be a significant development.

President Castro invited the Pope to visit Cuba in November 1996 after agreement was reached on some of the issues important to open space for the Church to carry out its religious activities in Cuba and to prepare for the visit.

The Cuban government has permitted open air masses, some media coverage of the Pope's visit, door-to-door canvassing by the Church, and has promised to assist with transportation of the public to the masses. Christmas was officially recognized (on a one-time basis) as a holiday for the first time. Visas have been issued to additional priests to enter Cuba.

Restrictions on the Church remain. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the Church to have full access to the media, or to broadcast to the Cuban people in their entirety the Pope's masses. Neither is it clear that the concessions which Castro has made to secure the papal visit will endure lastingly beyond that event.

In the broader political context, the Cuban government has carried out over the past two years a process of political retrenchment, including a major crackdown on human rights activists, and has circumscribed the limited economic reforms which had been initiated several years ago.

Q: If Castro extends religious liberty, would the Administration respond by loosening the embargo?

A: We would like to see the Pope's visit lead to meaningful change in Cuba, and will respond accordingly.

Q: What is your response to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other groups urging change in the embargo?

A: Maintaining economic pressure on the Government of Cuba is one aspect of a multifaceted approach which includes a U.S.-led effort to develop multilateral

pressure to promote democracy and human rights. At the same time, we are committed to reaching out to the Cuban people to encourage development of civil society and by providing humanitarian assistance.

Q: What about the charge that the embargo of food and medicine to Cuba is hurting the Cuban people?

A: The United States, in accordance with the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, permits U.S. firms to export medicines, medical supplies and equipment to Cuba, provided appropriate end use monitoring arrangements are in place. U.S. citizens are also permitted to make humanitarian donations. We have licensed donations of over \$227 million in medicines and medical supplies since 1992. Over one billion dollars worth of donations of all types of humanitarian assistance have been licensed.

Q: You seem to be saying then that the embargo does not make a difference? Why have it?

A: The embargo is designed to maintain economic pressure on the government and it certainly has that effect. It is not designed to starve people and does not have that effect. It is not a blockade. Cuba is free to import these commodities from other countries and does so.

RETIRED FLAG OFFICERS LETTER ON SPACE CONTROL POLICIES January 16, 1998

* The President's 1997 National Security Strategy Report, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997), stressed our commitment to maintaining American leadership in space. It pointed out that "uninhibited access to and use of space is essential for preserving peace and protecting U.S. national security as well as civil and commercial interests." Further, the strategy report noted that "our space policy objectives include deterring threats to our interest in space and defeating hostile efforts against U.S. space assets if deterrence

fails."

* In the April 1997 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Secretary Cohen noted that "space system negation to counter the ground- or space-based elements of an adversary's space systems or its data linkages could be accomplished by various methods." Similarly, last October when the President exercised his line item veto authority on the Clementine II, KE-ASAT and Military Space Plane, Robert Bell (Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control) noted our confidence that "alternatives [to the programs cancelled] exist to negate or disrupt" efforts by "potential adversaries such as North Korea or Iraq which could try to employ space-based assets against our forces in a possible war."

* Finally, the suggestion in the letter that the United States has agreed to negotiating a ban on ASAT weapons is false.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Malcolm Lee to John Norris. Subject: RE: Civ Air (9 pages)	01/26/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[01/23/1998-01/27/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5649

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Jeffery DeLaurentis to Mary DeRosa. Subject: Draft Cuba Paper on Possible Administration initiatives. (8 pages)	01/27/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Jeffery DeLaurentis to Mara Rudman. Subject: Cuba: Draft Paper on Options in Aftermath of Papal Visit. (7 pages)	01/27/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	Jeffery DeLaurentis to Michael Orofini. Subject: Revised Cuba Paper. (7 pages)	01/27/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/27/98 6:18:35 PM
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT JANUARY 27 NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS PRESS
GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Babcock, Douglas W.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Davidson, Leslie K.
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NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

January 27, 1998

SOTU/Foreign Policy

Russia-Iran Missile Cooperation

Iraq

MEPP

Israel

Algeria

UK/Blair

Northern Ireland

Cuba/CARE

Cuba/Flotilla

Cuba/Papal Visit to Cuba

STATE OF THE UNION: FOREIGN POLICY

January 27, 1998

* In the 1997 State of the Union, President Clinton set an ambitious agenda to keep American leadership strong -- and to make sure we enter the 21st century as the world's leading force for security, peace, freedom and prosperity.

* Over the past year, we have made progress on the President's agenda -- building an undivided, peaceful Europe... forging an Asia Pacific community... opening the new economy to American goods and services... remaining an unrelenting force for peace and freedom... moving strongly against new security threats... giving ourselves the tools we need to get the job done (strong military, better funded diplomacy.)

* Now, with a strong foundation in place, we are poised to move forward, seizing the opportunities and meeting the challenges of a new era. To meet these challenges, we are adapting old institutions to new demands... forging strong partnerships to meet common challenges... modernizing the instruments of our influence, military and diplomatic. Through this new security strategy, we are helping to write international rules for the 21st century, protecting those who join, isolating those who do not.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

* **NATO ENLARGEMENT:** Europe's stability and America's security closely linked.

President's call for enlarging the NATO alliance strengthen alliance's core

mission of collective defense and helps meet new threats such as regional

instability. Enlargement furthers other US objectives: encouraging states in the

region to settle border and ethnic disputes with neighbors, strengthen civilian

control of their militaries, and increase tolerance for ethnic and religious

minorities. NATO's enlargement, combined the Partnership for Peace program,

NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO-Ukraine partnership help erase the outdated Cold

War divisions and build, for the first time, an undivided, democratic, and

peaceful Europe.

* **SECURING THE PEACE IN BOSNIA:** U.S. has abiding interest in peace and stability

in Bosnia and a compelling interest in implementation of the Dayton peace

accords. After 46 months of worst war in Europe since WWII, 24 months of

implementing peace have helped put Bosnia on path to lasting peace and stability.

Progress on implementation possible because of prudent military support. Can

now see point where civil implementation and peace can be self-sustaining -- but

Bosnia's fragile peace still needs support of American and allied troops when

current NATO mission ends in June President still must approve detailed action

plan being prepared by NATO military authorities after full review of all

options. President will insist action plan have achievable mission tied to

clear benchmarks, not a deadline. Force must be able to protect itself. U.S.

must retain command. European allies must shoulder full share of responsibility.

Costs must be manageable. Plan must have substantial support of Congress, U.S.

public.

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

* **IRAQ WMD PROGRAM:** President emphasized that Iraq's efforts to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are unacceptable. UN inspectors have done remarkable job, destroying more of Iraq WMD potential than was destroyed during Gulf War itself. But Saddam now refusing to allow inspectors to complete mission. All options are on the table to make sure Iraq does not pursue WMD program with impunity and threaten international community.

* **BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:** President announced tonight that the United States would lead the effort to erect stronger international barriers against the proliferation and use of biological weapons. Under the new initiative, the United States will seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by requiring nations that have joined the BWC to submit annual declarations about facilities and activities that could be used for BW purposes and agree to a tough international inspection system including both voluntary and mandatory inspections.

* **COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY:** President's call for Senate ratification of the CTBT will allow America to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent while constraining the proliferation of nuclear material and technology to rogue states' weapons programs. CTBT will improve America's ability to detect and deter nuclear explosive testing. CTBT's global network of sensors will strengthen America's ability to monitor nuclear explosive testing across the globe, as well as deter any nation from believing it can conduct a nuclear explosive test undetected by the international community.

LEVERAGING OUR POWER AND INFLUENCE

* **US ARREARS TO THE UNITED NATIONS:** The President also highlighted need for prompt action on the payment of U.S. arrears to the United Nations.

Failure to
pay undermines US ability to reform UN and hinders our leadership
of that
organization at very time UN is working to prevent Iraq from
threatening
neighbors and world with weapons of mass destruction. Also need to
give the
International Monetary Fund capacity to help prevent global financial
crises
Now, more than ever, our security at home and our interests abroad
demand that
America meet our international obligations, sharpen the tools to
improve the
stability of the world economy, and increase our leverage in
international
organizations.

RUSSIA-IRAN MISSILE COOPERATION

January 27, 1998

Q: Can you comment on the significance of the Russian statement last
week on new
export controls?

A: We have been officially informed by the Russian government that
Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin on January 22 signed a decree substantially tightening
Russia's
export control process, putting into place new authority to stop
transfers of the
full range of goods and services to programs of weapons of mass
destruction and
foreign missile programs. This decree is now in force.

We do not yet have the text and understand it is being processed
administratively in Moscow, and will be published shortly.

For some time U.S. and Russian officials have been discussing such
broad legal
authority, which is widely employed by many other countries and
known as
"catch-all" authority. Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin discussed it at length on the phone last Saturday, in the
context of
our shared interest in preventing proliferation.

We will carefully review the text of the decree when it is published.
We
welcome this step by the Russian government to prevent the
proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, this is
part of our
joint efforts to prevent the transfer of missile technology to Iran.

IRAQ
January 26, 1998

Talking Points on Saturday's Meeting

* Chairman Butler has concluded that under present circumstances, UNSCOM cannot carry out its mandate. This is a serious matter.

* Over the next several days, we will be in close consultations with other members of the Security Council and partners in the Gulf region. The President, Secretary Albright and other senior National Security advisors will be in contact with allies over the next few days.

* We are determined that Saddam Hussein not be permitted to pursue with impunity programs of weapons of mass destruction. All options remain on the table.

Q: What is the current situation in Iraq?

A: Chairman Butler has concluded that under present circumstances, UNSCOM cannot carry out its mandate. This is a serious matter.

Q: What are the next steps in US Iraq policy?

A: Over the next several days, we will be in close consultations with other members of the Security Council and partners in the Gulf region. The President, Secretary Albright and other senior National Security advisors will be in contact

with allies over the next few days.

We are determined that Saddam Hussein not be permitted to pursue with impunity programs of weapons of mass destruction. All options remain on the table.

Q: What about an ultimatum?

A: We are currently undertaking intensive consultations with allies and UNSC members.

After those consultations take place will we decide on the best way to proceed.

Q: Is the USG now prepared to use force against Iraq?

A: As the President made clear last week the situation as it currently stands cannot last forever. No options have been ruled out.

Q: What about the report of planned 3-4 day bombing blitz?

A: I am not going to get drawn into any discussion of military contingencies.

Q: It is very clear how that the use of force is clearly being considered. What are the goals of any possible attack -- punishment, seeking compliance, overthrowing the Iraqi regime?

A: Not going to comment on military operations, however, our objective regarding Iraq continues to be thwart its capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

We seek Iraqi compliance with the will of the international community as expressed through seven years of Security Council resolutions.

Iraq must understand that the international community cannot and will not tolerate its continued flouting of international will and its continued pursuit of programs of WMD.

Q: Will you seek another UNSC resolution?

A: We are currently in consultations with UNSC member states on how best to proceed.

Q: Will you seek "material breach"? Do you need to? What is the British position?

A: We have made clear that we believe that we already have the authority for a military strike should such an option be chosen.

As for the position of other UNSC members, you will have to ask them.

Q: What is your view of the travel by Russian Deputy FM Posuvalyuk to Baghdad to try to resolve the crisis?

A: All diplomatic efforts must be focused on one goal - full compliance with the resolution. The messenger is not the important issue, the message is: Compliance pure and simple.

MEPP: USG TRAVEL; ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN SECURITY COOPERATION;
PLO COVENANT
January 27, 1998

Q: Any news on travel by the Secretary or SMEC Ross to follow up on last week's meetings with PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat?

A: (REFER TO STATEMENT)

Q: Can you confirm that the Palestinian Authority provided the information which led to Israel's arrest of two Hamas members reportedly on their way to conduct a terrorist bombing?

A: WE Do not have the facts of the case.

Q: What is you reaction to Chairman Arafat's call for an Arab summit

to discuss
the peace process?

A: We have no reaction. Holding an Arab summit is an Arab matter.

Q: PM Netanyahu says he would consider a phased second redeployment. Chairman Arafat reportedly rejected that the redeployment come in phases. But you said yesterday both sides agreed with you. Who's right here?

A: Let me correct the premise of your question.

One of the concepts we raised during the meetings with PM Netanyahu and chairman Arafat was a parallel approach of steps the Israelis would take to implement their commitments on further redeployment and the Palestinians would take to implement their commitments on security.

The parties understand that and were prepared to discuss the details of this approach.

Q: What's your reaction to PM Netanyahu's statement yesterday that the Oslo Accords do not negate our rights to construct new settlements or to continue building in Jerusalem?

A: It has been our practice not to get into public interpretations of agreements.

I will offer our own position on the general issue of settlement activity, which has long been clear.

Settlement activity is unhelpful to creating the climate necessary to making progress in the peace process. It undermines the trust and confidence required for such progress.

Q: Is settlement activity part of the time out for which you have called?

A: Yes.

Q: PM Netanyahu said that Arafat's letter to the President did not

remove PLO

Covenant language on the armed struggle. What's your view?

A: The Israelis have not explained their thoughts on this to us.

Chairman Arafat's letter appears to address all the issues the government of Israel had previously identified as being of concern to it.

ISRAEL

January 27, 1998

ISRAEL: IS USG DISCUSSING AID REDUCTION PLAN?

Q: Is Israeli Finance Minister Neeman in Washington to discuss reductions in US aid to Israel? With whom is he meeting? Whose initiative was it? Do you support such a reduction plan?

A: Finance Minister Neeman is meeting with Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Eizenstat today.

Minister Neeman and US Eizenstat are regular interlocutors on economic relations between our two countries. This is a routine meeting given their respective areas of responsibility.

We welcome Minister Neeman and look forward to hearing what he has to say.

I am not going to discuss meetings before they have occurred.

IF PRESSED ONLY

Q: But are they talking about US foreign aid?

A: I Have nothing to add.

ISRAEL: U.S. - ISRAELI CRIME TREATY

Q: What are the details of the U.S. - Israeli treaty signed yesterday to fight international organized crime?

(NOTE TO BRIEFER: Netanyahu signed in his capacity as acting Foreign Minister)

A: On January 26, 1998, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Edward S. Walker, Jr. and Prime Minister Netanyahu signed a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty in Jerusalem. Negotiations began in 1994 and concluded a few months ago.

A: The treaty provides a formal governmental mechanism for the provision of evidence and other forms of law enforcement assistance for criminal investigations and proceedings. Amb. Walker noted "this treaty will better enable our governments to cooperate on combating transnational organized crime and provide a clear channel between the U.S. Attorney General and the Israeli ministry of Justice to administer its provisions. The forms of assistance provided for under this treaty include serving documents, executing requests for searches and seizures, transferring persons in custody for testimony or other purposes, taking testimony of witnesses in both the requested and requesting states, providing documents and records, and assisting in forfeiture of assets. The treaty covers any offense that is criminalized in the country requesting the assistance.

The treaty does not include provisions on extradition, which are governed by the 1963 U.S.-Israeli extradition treaty.

The Treaty will now need to be approved under the constitutional processes of both governments. For the U.S., this will mean transmitting the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. For Israel, we understand this means approval by the Israeli Knesset and government.

ALGERIA: REACTION TO EUROPEAN UNION REPORT
January 27, 1998

Q: Have we received a copy of the European Union Mission's findings?

A: The U.S. has received a copy of the EU report regarding its mission to Algeria. The U.S. agrees with, and supports the EU's call for "greater transparency" on behalf of the government of Algeria and unhindered access for international organizations, NGO's, the media, and a visit by representatives of the UN.

The U.S. notes and regrets that the offers of humanitarian assistance from the EU have not been accepted.

The U.S. reaffirms its condemnation of these brutal killings and will continue its consultations with the EU and the Government of Algeria, in the hopes that these massacres will end.

UNITED KINGDOM: BLAIR
January 27, 1998

POTUS Call with Prime Minister Blair

The President spoke this morning with Prime Minister Tony Blair between 10:30 and 10:41 a.m. They touched on the following subjects:

* IRAQ: They agreed the developments are serious, that there is a common determination to see UNSC resolutions respected, and that they need to stay closely coordinated.

* MIDDLE EAST PEACE: The President reviewed his recent meetings with PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat.

* NORTHERN IRELAND: The PM reviewed where they are in the All-Party Talks.

IF ASKED: Did the POTUS personal situation come up?

* It was briefly mentioned. The PM expressed his personal support for the President.

Q: What can you tell us of Tony Blair's visit to Washington?

A: The British Prime Minister has accepted the President's invitation to come for an Official visit February 4-7. The arrival ceremony will take place on February 5, with meetings afterwards. The President and the First Lady will host the official dinner for the Blairs that night. Other details of the visit are being worked out.

We anticipate that the full range of bilateral and global issues will be discussed during the visit, which will be especially valuable for us as London holds the chair of both the G-8 and the Presidency of the European Union. We will certainly look forward to hearing from the Prime Minister how the Northern Ireland peace talks are progressing after yesterday's developments in Belfast.

NORTHERN IRELAND

January 26, 1998

Q: Your reaction to the UDP's withdrawal from the Northern Ireland talks today in London?

A: First and foremost, I want to emphasize our support for the Mitchell Principles of non-violence which govern the Northern Ireland talks. We emphatically condemn the recent attacks on the peace process which have taken the form of killings of random individuals, mostly Catholics. This violence is unacceptable and the culprits must be brought to justice.

Active renunciation of violence by all the parties is the best course forward for resolving the conflict there. Regarding the UDP decision today, under the rules set up for the conduct of the talks it is up to the parties and the governments to make decisions regarding participation. We have supported an inclusive and democratic process for the talks. Gary McMichael has made important, constructive contributions to this political process. We call on all loyalist paramilitaries to halt the killings and create the conditions that will permit the UDP to be at the table so that all can contribute to the creation of a sustainable peace for the people of Northern Ireland.

Q: What's your reaction to the IRA statement rejecting the "heads of agreement" paper introduced at the Belfast peace talks?

A: This framework document, proposed jointly by the Irish and British Governments is designed to move forward the substantive peace negotiations, and we have welcomed it. Those at the table must now decide how to use the structure provided by that paper to negotiate the content and shape of a full and lasting agreement.

Most importantly, we note that the IRA cease-fire of July 20 is being maintained, and we expect it to continue, along with the Loyalist cease-fire.

There is, and will be, no tolerance for the violence perpetrated by extremists, nor for a return to violence by those abiding by the cease-fires.

Much has been accomplished since the talks began, but much hard work remains.

The people of Northern Ireland deserve nothing less than a lasting peace, justice, equality, prosperity and better future for their children. We continue to encourage all parties to work toward that goal.

Background: We understand that Senator Helms may soon announce a bill called the Cuban Assistance and Relief (CARE) Act 1998 which, we believe, would authorize delivery of donated medicine and food as well as Title II of U.S. Public Law 480 "Food for Peace" for needy Cubans. The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) developed the concept; we have only seen an outline of the proposal and have no further details. We will need to see the draft legislation before developing a position. For now, following the Pope's visit, we want to stress U.S. government interest in reaching out to the Cuban people and strengthening civil society.

This is a separate initiative from the recent announcement by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that it had formed a coalition urging the lifting the embargo on food and medical sales to Cuba. During yesterday's briefing at State, Jamie Rubin responded to a question about the U.S. Chamber of Commerce initiative by using unclear guidance for the Helms initiative. The result is that The Los Angeles Times is reporting today that the Administration will consider supporting legislation to alter the embargo on food and medicine.

Q: Is the U.S. considering easing embargo restrictions on food and medicine?

A: Strengthening Cuban civil society through increased information flows and humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people is a key factor in our ongoing efforts to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

We have seen press accounts (Boston Globe) that members of Congress and other organizations are discussing the possibility of providing greater humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people. We look forward to consulting with interested members on these issues when Congress returns.

CUBA/FLOTILLA BY CUBAN EXILES

January 26, 1998

Background (for briefer only): An interagency group monitored flotilla events

Friday night (boats departed Marathon around 11:00 p.m.) and Saturday (the

protest ceremony was held from 11:15 a.m. to noon). All proceeded without

incident with the two participating vessels (some 40 passengers including press)

and eight aircraft staying in international waters and airspace.

Separately,

Democracy Movement (DM) leader Ramon Sanchez managed to elude U.S. authorities

and to depart for Cuba via boat sometime late Friday or early Saturday morning.

Without revealing his location, Sanchez stayed in contact with the U.S. press,

reporting that he was approaching Cuba. The Coast Guard searched the Florida

Straits Friday night and all day Saturday. Late Saturday, DM reps revealed that

Sanchez' boat had experienced mechanical problems early on.

Sanchez wished to

return to the U.S. but with assurances that he would not be arrested. A lengthy

exchange ensued with U.S. law enforcement authorities in Miami. In the end, DM

reps returned a tired and sunburned Sanchez to Miami Sunday afternoon where he

held a brief press conference to explain what had happened. It is unclear what,

if any, effect Sanchez's failed attempt to enter Cuba will have on future

Democracy Movement activities.

Q: What can you tell us about Saturday's flotilla? Did Democracy Movement

members carry through with plans to enter Cuba without permission?

A: Saturday's flotilla proceeded without incident with two vessels carrying some

40 passengers (including press) and eight aircraft participating in the event.

The boats and planes remained in international waters and airspace at

all times.

Separately, Democracy Movement leader Ramon Sanchez departed the U.S. by boat sometime early Saturday morning in an attempt to return to Cuba. (Sanchez had not met U.S. requirements for travel in the form of an Treasury/OFAC license or Coast Guard permit nor GOC permission to enter Cuba.) His boat apparently had mechanical problems shortly after his departure, forcing Sanchez to return to the U.S. Sunday afternoon.

Q: Will the U.S. law enforcement authorities take any action against DM leader Ramon Sanchez?

A: U.S. authorities are still gathering all information on weekend events. We are unable to comment further until this review is completed.

CUBA/PAPAL VISIT TO CUBA January 26, 1998

Background: Pope John Paul II concluded his five-day visit to Cuba with a mass in Havana's Revolution Square attended by hundreds of thousands and Fidel Castro. The Pope's homily, which was interrupted repeatedly by applause and cheers from the crowd, was a forceful and direct call for freedom, human rights, and reconciliation for the people of Cuba. He stressed Cubans' right to participate directly in deciding their fate and their right to free association. He warned against allowing atheism to become a religion and reiterated his concern over unbridled capitalism and neo-liberalism. Sunday's homily was the culmination of the Pope's message of support and hope to the Cuban people. He had been building up to it through each of his three sermons, beginning with a call for religious freedom on Thursday in Santa Clara and respect for human rights in Santiago de Cuba, where he also asked for the release of all political prisoners.

Q: What is the Administration's assessment of the Pope's visit to Cuba? Did it meet your expectations?

A: Pope John Paul II's visit to Cuba was an inspiring and joyful event for the Cuban people. He spoke to and for the Catholic faithful who have suffered under a system that denied their right to worship freely. He also addressed his message of hope and freedom to millions of Cuban citizens who do not practice Catholicism but share in the desire for a better life and change in the policies that deny their fundamental freedoms.

The Pope specifically called for freedom of religion, of association, and of expression. He stressed the right of the people of Cuba to participate fully in shaping their government. He focused on the plight of political prisoners - "those who are isolated, persecuted, imprisoned for various offenses or for reasons of conscience." The Pope's message clearly called for the fundamental freedoms and human rights of the Cuban people to be respected by the Cuban government.

We hope that the Castro government will heed the Pope's call for freedom for the Cuban people and for Cuba to open up to the world.

Q: What is your reaction to the Pope's condemnation of the U.S. embargo on Cuba?

A: We understand and respect the Pope's views opposing the use of economic sanctions in Cuba and elsewhere. However, the Cuban embargo is a matter of U.S. law and enjoys strong bipartisan support.

Q: As a result of the Pope's visit will the U.S. change its policy toward Cuba?

A: The objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba is to promote a peaceful

democratic
transition on the island. This policy has had consistent, bipartisan
support
since inception.

As the President and other senior officials have made clear, the United
States
is prepared to respond reciprocally if the Cuban government
undertakes
fundamental, systemic change toward democracy and respect for
human rights.

We hope that the Pope's visit will serve as the catalyst for the Cuban
government to engage in a process of change and democratic
transition.

Q: Will the Cuban government release political prisoners? How
many?

A: On January 22, Vatican spokesman Joaquin Navarro Valls said that
a list
containing the names of an undisclosed number of prisoners was
transmitted to
Cuban Vice President Carlos Lage, in the Pope's name by Cardinal
Sodano. The
Pope also called for the release of all political prisoners on Saturday in

Santiago de Cuba and again in Havana yesterday.

We have no information regarding the Cuban government's response.
We hope that
the Cuban government will heed the Pope's call and release all
political
prisoners.