

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Jennifer Poole to Brenda Hilliard, Marc Hurwitz, and M. Kay Joshi et al. Subject: FW: Memo to POTUS: Bosnia after SFOR (7385) (14 pages)	11/01/1997	P1/b(1)
002. email	James Covey to Betty Marshall. Subject: Briefing Frank Raines on Tomorrow's Meeting. (12 pages)	11/03/1997	P1/b(1)
003. email	James Covey to Kevin Cosgriff, Glyn Davies, Nicole Elkon et al. Subject: POTUS + Congress (7385). (11 pages)	11/03/1997	P1/b(1)
004. email	M. Kay Joshi to Donald Bandler, James Covey, John Dowling et al. Subject: Bosnia Meeting Pkgs 7385 and 7488. (20 pages)	11/03/1997	P1/b(1)
005. email	Kathleen Cooper to Kristen Cicio, Glyn Davies, Mary K. Freiderich et al. Subject: Pts. For Kofi Annan Call. (3 pages)	11/15/1997	P1/b(1)
006. email	Jennifer Poole to Kevin Cosgriff, Lyle Harrison, Peter Huggins, et al. Subject: Final Version of Phone Call Package Mubarak and Annan. (8 pages)	11/15/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Spet 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/01/1997-11/15/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5647

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/3/97 12:56:51 PM
FROM Hofmann, Karl W.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 11/03/1997
DECLASSIFYON 11/03/2007
SUBJECT Haiti briefer [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Bendick, Gordon L.
 Burrell, Christina L.
 Davis, William K.
 McCormick, Keith P.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By VR NARA, Date 2/7/2014
 2006-1363-1(3)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Will, still would love to have your insights at the (unfinished) end of the briefing memo. Your overall reactions welcome too.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Haiti Berger Briefer.doc

October XX, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JAMES F. DOBBINS

FROM: KARL HOFMANN

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Congressional Leaders on Haiti

You will meet with Senators Graham and DeWine and
 Representatives Conyers,
 Gillman, Goss, Hamilton and Rangel to discuss Haiti, November 4 at
 5:30 pm.

We are moving ahead on post-November planning for Haiti and it is
 essential we
 bring key Members of Congress along with us. This meeting will be

useful in reviewing the current political situation, including Madeleine Albright's and Tony Lake's recent trips; laying out our thinking on CIVPOL extension; previewing our decisions on U.S. troop presence; explaining our long-term gameplan for Haitian development; and responding to criticism on the range of Congressional concerns (progress on political killings, release of documents we seized in the intervention, etc).

The thin bipartisan consensus on our need to stay engaged in Haiti is fraying over frustration with mulish political behavior and Haiti's eternally bad economic situation. In fact, just as UNTMIH is about to end and just when Haiti Fatigue is setting in amongst even committed Members of Congress, we find ourselves at a crossroads that will require renewed, not diminished effort on our part. The withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force on November 30 leaves a political/security vacuum that we can fill partly with CIVPOL, partly by maintaining the U.S. military's civic action projects, and partly by continuing our contingency readiness exercise deployments. We are also exploring the untested and controversial concept of an on-call multinational force under UN auspices that would periodically exercise in Haiti and demonstrate the international community's continued interest. All of these measures will require considerable diplomatic lifting, tough decisions at home, and identifying resources where we have too few. Your interlocutors should understand our views on these issues.

There is some good news. The Haitian National Police continues to grow in professionalism and enjoys a generally positive image among a security-starved public. Amidst the ongoing crisis, Preval and Parliament pushed through the first of nine major privatizations, with a consortium of Continental Grain/Seaboard bidding \$9 for Haiti's parastatal flourmill - the largest

U.S.
investment in Haiti in three years. Preval and Madeleine signed a
maritime
agreement that will facilitate our counternarcotics operations in
Haitian waters,
in cooperation with the fledgling Haitian Coast Guard. And Tony lake
helped move
all sides forward out of the months-long political impasse.

Political Crisis - Albright, Lake Trips

You can describe these recent visits as part of our larger scheme to
keep the
pressure for compromise on Haiti's political leaders, which apparently
is paying
off. The Congress played an important role here too; Conyers has led
two
delegations in the past several months, and bipartisan staff delegations
have
traveled as well to urge a resolution to the crisis. Preval vacillated
between
seeking a global solution (incorporating answers to complaints from
OPL about the
flawed April 6 elections and suspect Provisional Electoral Council
(CEP),
designation of a new prime minister, and increased social spending to
cushion
structural adjustment), and a more narrow one, focussed simply on the
elections
impasse. Tony was able to nudge Preval, OPL and Aristide toward a
narrow
elections-only solution that nonetheless involved compromise and
trade-offs:
replacement of some of the CEP, with an explicit acknowledgement
that first round
elections are subject to review by the new CEP acting on
recommendations from a
commission of eminent jurists.

Madeleine's visit was more focussed on the need for Preval to clearly
signal that
he wants the international community to stay engaged after November
30,
specifically with regard to training the Haitian National Police.
Responding to
her pressure, Preval sent a letter to the UN October 29 requesting the
continuation of CIVPOL; the UN Secretariat is now circulating its
report on
post-November activities that includes continued CIVPOL. We
meanwhile primed

other likely contributors (Canada, France) to sustain an armed, uniformed CIVPOL mission through 1998, and now must work with the UN to bring this about.

CIVPOL in More Detail

Members will be anxious about continuing CIVPOL on at least three grounds.

First, doesn't extending it signal we'll never disengage from Haiti?

Second,

how can we put our CIVPOL contingent in harm's way without UN military backup?

Third, how can we set this international precedent of CIVPOL without a

peacekeeping force to go with it?

CIVPOL and the HNP are in fact the institutions where the international

community's efforts are paying the biggest and earliest dividends, and we simply

cannot afford to walk away from this investment now. While there have been a few

infamous incidents of political violence over the past few years, politically-oriented murders have dropped from over a thousand per year before

our intervention to only a handful since - a great accomplishment by any measure.

Members of Congress undoubtedly will focus on this handful of cases, but

political violence has largely vanished. Criminal violence, on the other hand,

is a large and growing problem, with spillover effect on the investment climate

and general sense of public insecurity. CIVPOL, in particular the U.S.

contingent of primarily Haitian-Americans from NYPD, offers invaluable

on-the-street mentoring assistance to the HNP and helps limit human rights abuses

by the still-young force.

As for CIVPOL in the absence of a military back-up force, our concept calls for a

credible CIVPOL self-defense unit to be part of the extended mission.

By this we

mean a civilian police SWAT-type team, possibly working in conjunction with the

HNP's own SWAT team. Our concept is not yet finalized with the UN and other

donors, so we should not brief details to Members. But we are exploring using a combination of Argentine paramilitary units and state police from Arizona, who have responded with potential interest to Treasury Under Secretary Ray Kelly's call for help. The CIVPOL self-defense unit will be an in extremis force to extract CIVPOL officers from trouble if need be, nothing more. Since there has never once been a case of such extraction being required in the last three years, the self-defense unit, particularly the American contingent, probably will spend the bulk of its time training the HNP SWAT team. It will not provide support to the regime in case of serious threat. The Intelligence Community assesses the threat CIVPOL and other international representatives will face post-November as low.

Extending CIVPOL without a military back-up will be a new concept for the UN: a Security Council-approved peacekeeping mission, without troops. Haiti is not the only situation where we face such a requirement; our response to this situation now will be precedent-setting for other conflict areas where our interest lies primarily in strengthening rule-of-law and overall stability, not separating combatants. In fact, Global is currently working with State to explore another CIVPOL-only mission in Eastern Slavonia after the UNTAES mandate expires in mid-January.

U.S. Troops

Obviously we are not in a position to prejudge the outcome of principals-level discussions on whether we will maintain our Support Group troops in Haiti, but Members should know we are considering this. Their mission (civic action, humanitarian activities) remains valid and widely-appreciated. Certain Haitian politicians are milking the "foreign forces out" issue for political capital, but

public sentiment is broadly in favor of or indifferent to the U.S. troop presence (around 400 people). Practically speaking, Camp Fairwinds at Port-au-Prince airport and the presence on the streets of our vehicles and engineering teams sends a subtle but highly potent message of continued U.S. (and specifically U.S. military) interest and engagement. Preval told Madeleine that he values the continued presence of our forces, and that he wants only that they undertake larger, more visible public works projects, such as roads. In addition to our on-the-ground forces, we periodically deploy small units to Haiti for training through contingency readiness exercises (CREs). The next Haiti CRE is planned for November 12-20 and will include approximately 140 soldiers.

Bill Swing argues strongly against any decision that would have the effect of closing down Camp Fairwinds, even if in favor of regular deployments for training. The impression of permanence provides a tremendous calming effect in Haiti, even as it riles the Pentagon and many on the Hill. JCS have indicated that, if given the mission to sustain humanitarian/civic action activities in Haiti with continuous presence, U.S. troop levels could double to 800-900, with the difference comprising organic force protection units. According to this reasoning, the "situational awareness" and general security impact of the 1,200 departing UN troops will have to be compensated for through a larger U.S. footprint.

Without going into these details, we should signal to Members that the U.S. troop presence in Haiti remains appreciated and effective, and that we are considering the merits of their staying into 1998.

Long-Term Gameplan

We can answer criticism that we have no better plan than to anchor U.S. troops

forever in Haiti, with the fact that we have successfully multilateralized foreign assistance to Haiti and are working to improve economic and social conditions even as the political situation has been stuck. Haiti's long-term security will come ultimately through a better development trajectory, we know, and we are positioning ourselves to help bring that about. In the judicial sector, we have finally relaunched training for magistrates and are looking to expand our aid through ICITAP. We are providing expert advice on steps to improve Haiti's essential economic/commercial infrastructure (e.g., ports). Working with the multilateral development banks, we are mapping out for Haitian legislators the per-district benefits of Preval's economic reform program and the importance of taking the decisions needed to unblock over \$100 million in aid. In the context of FY-99 budget deliberations, we are contemplating ways to have an even greater impact on Haiti's terrific family planning and environmental needs. Point is, we do not see Haiti only through the prism of short-term security needs, although our longer-term development actions will be in jeopardy without the modest investment in security we continue to see as necessary.

Your Interlocutors' Perspectives

Senator Helms' October 23 broadside on Haiti is attached. It reflects the right's well-known criticisms of our Haiti policy. You can respond to a few key points that will be of interest to your interlocutors: Preval has formally requested an extension of CIVPOL, and we have specific commitments of interest to participate from Canada, France and Argentina. We have taken no decisions on whether U.S. troops will remain in Haiti beyond November 30, but we are actively considering a continuing presence that maintains the popular and important humanitarian/civic action programs U.S. forces have undertaken. We

are pleased
that, with Tony Lake's help, Peval and OPL's Pierre Charles have
agreed on steps
to resolve the political impasse and get Haiti's government functioning
again.
State will be responding to Helms' detailed questions in kind.

Senator Graham has the Floridian's perspective on Haiti: are we doing
enough to
preclude another migration crisis, with its attendant impact on South
Florida?

Senator DeWine recently authored language (in the State
authorization bill) that
would impose harsh new requirements on the Secretary of State and
Attorney
General to refuse entry to Haitians "credibly alleged" to have been
involved in
political killings. Congressman Conyers twice led delegations to Haiti
this
summer; in addition to pushing Aristide to take steps to unblock the
political
stalemate lest Haiti lose its remaining U.S. friends, Conyers has been
very
interested in economic development issues and will be pleased that
Madeleine
announced an additional \$2 million in population funding when she
was there.
Conyers also champions our release of unredacted documents seized
by U.S. forces
from right wing elements during the intervention. Our position is that
we will
happily release these to the GOH, but not without the names of U.S.
persons
redacted.

Rangel, Gillman, Hamilton and Goss.....

Cocurrence by: Will Wechsler, Will Davis

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL XXXX~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Karl Hofmann
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/23/07
Derived From: multiple

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Haiti Berger TPs.doc
Haiti - Talking Points

Introduction

- * Appreciate this chance to review where we are and where we're headed. Salute you for seeking this meeting. Want to frankly share our views, hear yours, and seek your support.
- * Haiti remains a work in progress, but there are encouraging signs of momentum that indicate our investment is paying off.
- * Preval has announced compromise steps to unblock the electoral impasse. He has designated a new prime minister after consulting with the parliamentary leadership. The Haitian National Police continues to strengthen its capabilities and professionalism. The first privatizations are now underway.
- * These steps are all overdue or long in coming, but they are definitely positive. We see our strong national interest in maintaining this momentum and in keeping Haitian democracy and development moving forward.
- * We want to work with the Congress in this task, and particularly those of you who have invested the time and energy to know the Haiti situation well.

Political Crisis - Albright, Lake Trips

- * Secretary Albright's October 17 trip to Haiti was important to establishing the basis for movement on the political impasse. She was characteristically frank with Haitian politicians, including Preval, about the need to make progress. International community's patience not endless.
- * She also expressed to Preval our strong view that the Haitian

National Police

need further mentoring. Preval agreed, and subsequently wrote Koffi Anan to request an extension of the UN CIVPOL police advisory mission in Haiti.

* After her visit, the President asked Tony Lake to visit Haiti again, make doubly clear the need for political progress, and explore possible compromise elements from all sides.

* Tony found Preval already focussed on a compromise proposal involving replacement of the majority of the Provisional Electoral Council and appointment of a special judicial panel to review the conduct of the disputed first round of elections last April.

* OPL's Gerard Pierre Charles met with Tony several times and committed himself to the outline Preval has adopted. Tony also spoke with former President Aristide, who did not express opposition to this plan.

* So we can be pleased that Preval has finally acted to try and resolve the political impasse created with former Prime Minister Rosny Smarth resigned, in a fashion that addresses the concerns of all main political movements.

* We strongly supported these developments. They represent a basis to move forward toward a second round of elections and, ultimately, a functioning government again.

* As for the first round elections, the shortcomings and flaws will be the work of the panel of jurists and the newly reconstituted Electoral Council.

* Preval has taken advantage of this breakthrough to nominate a new prime minister, Herve Denis, who was culture minister under PM Robert Malval prior to Aristide's return. It is unclear how his nomination will proceed through parliament, which as you know rejected Preval's last nominee. In this case,

though, Preval consulted with the parliamentary leaders first.

* Much of this progress could be undone by the narrow-mindedness of Haitian democratic politics. Preval's plan to resolve the electoral impasse is remarkably complex and might be unstrung at any of a number of critical junctures. But this is progress nonetheless.

* I think the efforts of a number of you were also key in making clear to all sides in Haiti the importance of progress, and embracing national interest rather than partisan advantage.

* Congressman Conyers' recent trips have been very positive in this regard, as have the bipartisan staff delegations travelling over the spring and summer months.

CIVPOL Extension

* Want to return to this issue, which we see as crucial to continued stability.

* With the UNTMIH troops withdrawing on November 30, the Haitian National Police become the primary security force in-country. They are stronger by the month but still not ready to assume this task alone.

* The UNCIVPOL mission and our own ICITAP training program have accomplished a great deal in professionalizing the HNP, but much more remains to be done.

* We agree with Preval's decision to request an extension of CIVPOL beyond November 30, we are actively planning to sustain our own presence as part of CIVPOL, and we are lobbying intensely to help line up continued international support for this.

* This will require a UN Security Council resolution that will extend armed, uniformed CIVPOL for, perhaps, another year in Haiti as an assessed

peacekeeping
operation. We will support this.

* The situation in Haiti is not characterized by widespread political violence or threats to the government. Our own Intelligence Community assessments of the threat of targeted political violence against our 50-man CIVPOL contingent, or any other representative of the international community, is low.

* Crime, however, is a real problem. This is the job of the HNP, and the international community can help it do it.

* We are discussing with our traditional partners on Haiti - Canada, France, Argentina - steps we can take to ensure that the CIVPOL force remaining in Haiti, about 200 mentors, is afforded the appropriate back up in case of emergency. We envision a self-defense unit, comprising a small international police unit with special capabilities, working with the increasingly effective HNP SWAT team.

* It's important to recall that CIVPOL officers have never required emergency back up or extraction assistance in the last three years.

* For a very modest investment in terms of manpower and resources, the international community can help assure Haitian stability and security for the next critical period, perhaps one year, before the HNP comes fully on-line as a credible institution.

U.S. Troops

* We have not yet taken any decisions regarding U.S. troops in Haiti beyond November 30.

* As you know, our 400-500 personnel there now are engaged exclusively in humanitarian and civic action exercises aimed at improving Haiti's public infrastructure and in extending basic amenities such as health care to a wider

segment of the population.

* This mission is widely appreciated. There is some political capital being made of the presence of "foreign forces" in Haiti by certain members of parliament, but Preval and others have confirmed our own analysis: this sentiment is not directed at U.S. troops and their good works.

* At the same time, our forces in Haiti, whether the on-the-ground U.S. Support Group which manages the civic action effort, or the occasional Contingency Readiness Exercises that deploy troops to Haiti as part of our own preparedness, transmit a powerful message of U.S. engagement. We have to think carefully before altering that message.

* Our next Contingency Readiness Exercise, involving 140 soldiers, will take place later this month.

* Whatever our footprint in Haiti - continued on-the-ground presence or simply periodic deployments for training - ours is not a mission of securing the Preval government or maintaining order in Haiti. Our presence may accomplish this incidentally, but that's not our mission.

Long-Term Gameplan

* Haiti's progress toward lasting stability and security must ultimately come through economic recovery, jobs and growth. Haitians must appreciate that democracy has a meaningful and positive impact on their lives. We're working to help bring this about.

* I've asked Brian Atwood to consider how we can do more to help improve agricultural production, raise rural incomes, meet unmet family planning needs and strengthen local governance in Haiti, in the context of our FY99 budget.

* We are also now working again on judicial training, using the

resources and expertise of ICITAP, and in coordination with other important donors in this field, such as the French.

* We're providing technical assistance to the Haitian effort to improve the basic infrastructure for business: ports, airports, shipping facilities, telecommunications.

* The progress toward privatization and the unblocking of the political impasse will help here too, as parliament can get back to its job of voting the specific steps needed to unblock over \$100 million in foreign aid.

* We're considering other steps we might be able to take to encourage stronger performance in the formal sector. Passing legislation to bring Caribbean Basin countries into parity with NAFTA in terms of the access they enjoy to the U.S. market is an important step in this regard; the Administration strongly supports the efforts underway now to bring NAFTA Parity into law.

Conclusion

* In sum, we see a Haiti finally on the move again, but with terrific challenges ahead. With modest continued applications of interest and engagement by the international community, and by the U.S. bilaterally, we can help Haiti sustain its progress and prevent a relapse into the instability that forced us to act in 1994.

* We have successfully multilateralized our efforts in Haiti over the past several years, first through UNSMIH and then through UNTMIH, which are now drawing to a close. But the job isn't finished, and we must be prepared to maintain the effort that has helped Haiti end widespread political violence, plant the seeds of rule of law, reform and restructure the economy, and provide a context of hope.

* We want to work with you to bring this about.

3

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/3/97 2:55:04 PM
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT October 31 State Department Press Briefing [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Witkowsky, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY Busby, Scott W.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Letts, Kelly J.
Malley, Robert
Ragan, Richard F.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Seaton, James B.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gray, Wendy E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Leavy, David C.
Naplan, Steven J.
Widmer, Edward L.
Crowley, Philip J.
Johnson, David T.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY Anne -- Per your request. NW

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT state1031.doc

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

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Friday, October 31, 1997

Briefer: James P. Rubin

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB # 157

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1997 1:10 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: We have a lot to get through today. I'm sorry for being perceived as

rushing through. We do have another announcement today about a personnel issue.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has designated Mr. Gregory B. Craig as

Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. This responsibility will be in addition

to his continuing role as Director of Policy Planning. Consistent with our

overall objective of promoting the protection of human rights in China, as the

Department's Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, Mr. Craig's focus will be to

advance this objective in Tibet, and to preserve the unique religious, cultural

and linguistic heritage of Tibetans. A central objective will also be to promote

substantive dialogue between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or his

representatives.

Questions?

QUESTION: Did you consult with Senator Helms on this appointment?

MR. RUBIN: Yes

QUESTION: Is he satisfied?

MR. RUBIN: You'll have to ask him for his views. But he is fully aware of this appointment, yes.

QUESTION: Also on that. Yesterday, in his speech in Washington President Jiang compared the Chinese takeover of Tibet to the liberation of black slaves in this country. Do you have any comment, reaction or ideas about that?

MR. RUBIN: Well, without getting into an historical debate with the president of another country, we obviously don't see it that way. As Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, Greg Craig will obviously have a lot of work to do in explaining the differences between the United States and what may or may not have gone on in Tibet in the past.

QUESTION: Does Mr. Craig have any special expertise in this, in his background?

Or is this just someone that the Secretary has confidence enough in to make the appointment?

MR. RUBIN: Well, in two respects - first of all, the Secretary wanted someone who reported directly to her and who could apply a broad policy perspective to the issue. He is, in his current capacity, in contact with the Chinese on a regular basis on a number of matters. So this was a way to make sure that the person doing this job was part of the diplomatic game.

Greg, I also know, was Chairman of the International Human Rights Law Group when he was in the private sector. So he has a lot of experience in bringing to bear the rule of law and international human rights law to problems such as those the people of Tibet face.

QUESTION: What specifically will Greg Craig be doing? I mean, is it mainly a dialogue sort of activity? Or are there some things that can be done, outside of the context?

MR. RUBIN: Well, he will seek to advance our overall human rights objectives with respect to Tibet. He will seek, in particular, to advance our policy objective, to preserve the unique religious, cultural and linguistic heritage of Tibetans.

He will also promote substantive dialogue between the Chinese

Government and the
Dalai Lama or his representatives.

The US believes that this dialogue should begin as soon as possible.

There are a

lot of staffing issues that need to be determined still on a question like
this.

But he will be a coordinator of policy objectives in this area, and as
appropriate, could involve travel abroad. He will certainly be
interested in

speaking with Tibetans in the United States and abroad and in traveling
to Tibet.

QUESTION: He will - you're saying he will go to Tibet?

MR. RUBIN: I could try it again, but --

QUESTION: No, I just wanted to clarify.

MR. RUBIN: Certainly, he will be interested in speaking with
Tibetans in the

United States and abroad and in traveling to Tibet. Any more on this
subject?

QUESTION: Land mines, can I ask a question?

MR. RUBIN: I hope I know the answer since all the experts have left
the room.

Yes.

QUESTION: Okay. Two quick questions. One is, some of the
countries like China,

Iran, Finland, Russia - in these countries, the land mines are still being

manufactured and exported. Is the United States going to take any
initiative? If

so, what, that is, for stopping these countries to manufacture, as well
as the

export of land mines? That is one question.

And the second question is, do you have any time frame with which
all these mines

will be - the demining process will be completed? I understand even
in Cambodia,

they say Cambodia itself will take at least 300 years with the present
technology

we have to demine all these mines there?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, the answer to your two questions - your first, it is
our hope

that many of the countries that are part of the problem - and like some
of the

countries you mentioned, that is the countries that produce and export
land mines

that are directly related to the problems around the world where little
children

are getting their legs blown off and others are suffering from this
danger, that

those countries that are part of the problem like the ones you
mentioned, will

stop the export of their weapons and will join the work that's going on in

Geneva.

Ideally, we'd like them to be able to sign the Ottawa Agreement. So the more

countries that agree to not produce or export these mines -- and especially those

whose mines are the cause of the problem, like the countries that you mentioned

-- we would very much want them to join the international regimes and stop

manufacturing and producing land mines that don't have the protective devices

that some of ours do.

Secondly, the specific initiative - and I would urge you to take a look at your

fact sheet - spells out the year 2010 as the objective for cleaning up the land

mine problems around the world. That is 12 years from now - 12 and a half years

from now -- and that is the goal. That is why it's called the 2010 Initiative.

QUESTION: On Iraq, could you talk a little bit about what is happening today?

What the back and forth is? And what specifically Iraq must do in order for this

crisis to be over, be concluded?

MR. RUBIN: First of all, as far as what is going on today, the Security Council

is going to hear later this afternoon from Ambassador Butler, who is the Chairman

of the Special Commission. He will lay out exactly what is going on the ground;

exactly what risks he believes his personnel face; exactly what plans he has for

future inspections; and exactly what his recommendations would be.

At that point,

the Council would be in a position to react.

It is our view that what Iraq needs to do is make clear that it does not intend

to put at risk any American or any other personnel from the UN Special

Commission, and make clear that they intend to comply with the requirements of

the Special Commission and that they are not going to try and pick and choose who

in the Special Commission they intend to deal with or whose safety they intend to

protect. Once Iraq has made clear that it will return to a mode of cooperation

with UNSCOM, rather than confrontation with the United Nations, then this crisis will be eased.

QUESTION: Sort of a technical question on that point. Does Iraq not have the leeway as a sovereign nation to choose which - for all intents and purposes -

diplomats or foreign officials are allowed into its territory?

MR. RUBIN: I'm sure Iraq believes it has certain privileges under international conventions to choose who can and can't come into its country as a diplomat.

That's not the issue here. The issue is, if Iraq wants to comply with the United

Nations, it has to comply and accept the United Nations' rules as to who is part

of the UN delegation.

If they want to say not to the United Nations, then they can continue to say that

Americans are not welcome. If they want to say yes to the United Nations, then

they are accepting the UN rules about who the UN hires to do the job that the UN

is trying to do, which, let's remember, is designed specifically to make it

possible for sanctions to be removed.

So Iraq cannot pick and choose what nationality UN inspectors are.

QUESTION: American officials keep saying, reiterating that all options are open,

including Secretary of Defense Cohen a few minutes ago - all options are open.

However, the Russian Government has already decreed this morning they will not

support any military action against Iraq.

MR. RUBIN: It's always very tricky to quote the Russian Government's official

statements. We believe that the Security Council authority exists for very firm

action by the international community in this case. It's not a surprise to us

that the Russian Government, like us, would prefer that we don't get to a point

where any stiffer measures are needed. Certainly we hope that Iraq gets the

message - the united message of the world, the international community, the

Russian Government, the French Government - about the importance of complying

with the UN and accepting the UN's rules of the game and not trying to change

those rules of the game mid-stream.

If Iraq gets that message, the question of next steps will become moot.

But

there's no question that in the past we have seen Iraq turn around, and we hope

that they are wise enough to do so in this case.

QUESTION: Do you see any cause and effect between the Iraqi discrimination

against American inspectors and the four abstentions in the vote last week?

MR. RUBIN: It's long been our view - and it's very hard to get into the mind of

Saddam Hussein and to try to assert what exactly his thinking was on any one

issue, since he's made so many miscalculations in the past -- It's long been our

view that Iraq responds most clearly and most positively to a unanimous Security

Council. The more unanimous the Council, the more clear the message, the less

likely Saddam Hussein is to misunderstand and miscalculate. But he is the only

one who can answer the question of why he would shoot himself in the foot again.

QUESTION: Jamie, to put the question again that I asked of the Secretary this

morning. How long does Saddam Hussein have to turn around on this?

MR. RUBIN: Ambassador Butler, who will be in New York, will report about what his

inspectors' plans are, when the next inspection is planned, what the next

activities of UNSCOM are that he would normally have taken, in the absence of

this intervention. Then you can begin to assess what timeframes Iraq has in which

to permit UNSCOM to do its job.

Let's just say, hypothetically, that they wanted to do an inspection some number

of days down the road, and that they were not going to accept Iraq's rules that

those inspections could not be conducted with Americans present.

That would be a

day in which if they failed to change their policy, that inspection would not

take place; and UNSCOM would not be able to do its job. Then we would have to see

what the next steps were.

So there are on-the-ground operational issues of what UNSCOM's next steps are. As

far as we're concerned, the Council has said that he should change course immediately.

QUESTION: New subject?

MR. RUBIN: Any more on Iraq? Okay, yes.

QUESTION: Is that a new subject?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: The same question I asked the Secretary on talks between Israel and Syria here in Washington?

MR. RUBIN: I would urge you to be more specific about the report you're referring

to, and it might help me answer the question. If the question is, are there

secret Israeli-Syrian military talks going on in the United States, is that true?

-- my answer is no.

QUESTION: Okay, well, why don't you take out the word military?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of discussions of secret Israeli-Syrian talks of that kind.

QUESTION: Take out the word secret.

MR. RUBIN: All right, now we're going to play 25 questions.

QUESTION: No, we're not. I would be easier if you guys 'fessed up' and told us

what Dennis Ross, who's a rather furtive fellow is up to, because we always -

and, frankly, if these talks are so sensitive they have to be held in secret, or

semi-secret, you wonder what value an agreement might be if it's so - if you're

so nervous about it you have to hang around in dark alleys --

MR. RUBIN: Let me try to answer the question.

QUESTION: Look, it's not unusual for foreign governments to have their

representatives in Washington talk to each other. It's a little bit more if the

United States is assisting in this, or providing some input. Are the US and Syria

and Israel, in any informal, back-channel way, trying to find a way to get

something going on the Golan Heights?

MR. RUBIN: What happens here often is that people hear about things that in one

context would seem quite normal and in another seem like a big secret. It should

not come as a surprise to any of you, or any people in the world, that we have

been trying to get the Israeli-Syrian track restarted. The Secretary of State

went to Damascus and met with the Syrian leader precisely for that purpose.

From time to time, Ambassador Ross has met with Israelis, and he has met with

Syrians with the specific goal of trying to see whether we can find a formula to

restart those talks. That should not come as a surprise, and that certainly has taken place.

QUESTION: Here? In this area?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to give you a 365-day-a-year schedule for Ambassador

Ross. What I am telling you is that he has met with Israeli officials in recent

times, often, in recent months. He's met with Syrian officials from time to time

in his work. During the course of those discussions, of course, he is seeing

whether there is something we can do to promote the chance of the Israeli-Syrian

track being revived.

What happens here is there is often a hyped-up version that comes out in

different publications, and then people think there is some big secret. One of

the other issues that might help you understand this is we have had a continuous

exchange of views with the Israeli military on a variety of issues pertaining to

security. At the moment, an Israeli military delegation is here, preparing for

the annual Joint Assistance Planning Group, which will be held next week. The

delegation is also preparing for the visit of Minister of Defense Mordechai,

which will take place next week.

Those discussions will cover a wide range of bilateral and security issues and

from time to time also deal with the issues of Israeli security as it relates to

the pursuit of peace; namely what Israeli security needs might exist in the

context of an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement, or a further progress in the

Israeli-Palestinian track.

QUESTION: That's helpful. We weren't - I wasn't - nobody was asking for a

365-day. Dennis Ross goes to the Middle East sometimes --

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: -- by himself, with his group, sometimes with the

Secretary of State,
and naturally enough he holds talks there.

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: What is intriguing here - and you seem to be very
concerned how it's
cast in the story, whether it looks super secret or surreptitious, you
know --

MR. RUBIN: No, I'm not concerned.

QUESTION: We're just asking if --

MR. RUBIN: Excuse me. I'm not concerned about how it's in the
story. I'm trying
to make sure that it's accurate. That's what I'm trying to do.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	James Covey to Betty Marshall. Subject: Briefing Frank Raines on Tomorrow's Meeting. (12 pages)	11/03/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Spet 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/01/1997-11/15/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5647

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	James Covey to Kevin Cosgriff, Glyn Davies, Nicole Elkon et al. Subject: POTUS + Congress (7385). (11 pages)	11/03/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Spet 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

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2006-1363-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	M. Kay Joshi to Donald Bandler, James Covey, John Dowling et al. Subject: Bosnia Meeting Pkgs 7385 and 7488. (20 pages)	11/03/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Spet 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/01/1997-11/15/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5647

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	Kathleen Cooper to Kristen Cicio, Glyn Davies, Mary K. Freiderich et al. Subject: Pts. For Kofi Annan Call. (3 pages)	11/15/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Spet 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/01/1997-11/15/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5647

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/6/97 10:11:36 AM
FROM Davies, Glyn T.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Sen Helms request for POTUS photo-op [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Davis, William K.
McCormick, Keith P.
Rudman, Mara E.

CARBON_COPY Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Quinn, Mary E.
Rice, Edward A.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.

TEXT_BODY Keith/Will: Our task is clear, given SRB reaction below. 1st, have intell expedite vetting. Have you checked with EUROPE Directorate and GLOBAL on these people? At same time, please do an SP on this photo op, from Berger and Hilley, and send it over. Helms should be included in group you propose to have photo with POTUS. We will engineer process so that Sandy and no one else makes call to Helms with date/time for photo once SP is approved (pls coordinate that with WH Leg). Need this one quick as schedule is rapidly filling to capacity. NLT than today COB, pls. Thanks, Glyn

-----Original

Message-----

From: Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Sent: Wednesday, November 05, 1997 11:29 PM
To: Davies, Glyn T.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @KERRICK
Subject: RE:
Sen Helms request for POTUS photo-op [UNCLASSIFIED]

Mr. Berger
has read your e-mail and has responded:

Glyn -- Thanks for your
initiative, but the very reason I asked about this was to personally
do favor for Helms, for precisely the chit he's given to Keith McCormack!
Any suggestions on how I can get back into this frame?

-----Original

Message-----

From: Davies, Glyn T.
Sent: Wednesday, November 05, 1997 1:20 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @KERRICK
Subject: FW:
Sen Helms request for POTUS photo-op [UNCLASSIFIED]

FYI. Please
share with Sandy and Jim.

-----Original Message-----

From: Joshi,
M. Kay
Sent: Wednesday, November 05, 1997 12:12 PM
To: @EXECSEC
- Executive Secretary
Subject: FW: Sen Helms request for POTUS
photo-op [UNCLASSIFIED]

FYI.

-----Original Message-----

From: McCormick,
Keith P.
Sent: Wednesday, November 05, 1997 12:10 PM
To: Joshi,
M. Kay
Cc: @EUROPE - European Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Subject: Sen
Helms request for POTUS photo-op [UNCLASSIFIED]

We called

Helms' staff to ask for citizenship and other info on Ambassadors Marullo and Awad. The senator himself returned the call to say that Count Marullo is Italian, not accredited; Awad is accredited to UN (but not US) representing Order of Malta; and Andrew Bertie is British subject. Mrs. Awad, whom Helms would like included in the photo-op, is a U.S. citizen who also holds Egyptian citizenship.

According to Helms, it is Bertie who is Prince Grand Master of the order, not Marullo as the punctuation of his letter seems to imply. Since this would appear to make a difference, Gwenth Todd is checking.

Helms would be pleased to accompany the group to a photo-op and told us not to hesitate to ask him for a favor in return, a matter of some interest to us in Legislative.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Jennifer Poole to Kevin Cosgriff, Lyle Harrison, Peter Huggins, et al. Subject: Final Version of Phone Call Package Mubarak and Annan. (8 pages)	11/15/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Spet 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/01/1997-11/15/1997]

2006-1363-F
vz5647

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2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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