

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	William Wechsler to Kenneth Baldwin, Rand Beers, Richard Clarke et al. Subject: Action Memorandum to the President. (7 pages)	09/10/1997	P1/b(1)
002. email	Eric Schwartz to Richard Ragan. Subject: FW: Action Memorandum to the President. (7 pages)	09/12/1997	P1/b(1)
003. email	Cathy Millison to William Wechsler. Subject: PC Paper. (15 pages)	09/17/1997	P1/b(1)
004. email	William Wechsler to Leonard Hawley. Subject: FW: PC Paper. (16 pages)	09/17/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/10/1997-09/19/1997]

2006-1363-F
vz5645

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/11/97 12:54:16 PM
FROM Hofmann, Karl W.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT SRB-POTUS [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Davis, William K.
McCormick, Keith P.

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY Christine, I only got this far, but you're welcome to it.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT ActMem to POTUS re Snowe.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Snowe: Your Nomination of
Governor Weld as
Ambassador to Mexico

Purpose

To respond to Senator Snowe's letter asking that you state clearly your policy toward Mexico and thereby advance Governor Weld's nomination.

Background

Senator Olympia Snowe has written you (Tab B) to express her

support for your
nomination of Governor Weld, and to urge you to communicate
clearly your policies
toward Mexico that he could help implement.

Senator Snowe asks that you communicate directly with Senator
Helms. Instead,
your proposed response to her invites her to share with other Members
of Congress
the main elements of your policy -- continued progress against drugs,
strengthening of our trade relationship for mutual prosperity, and
support for
Mexico's democratization - as well as the highlights of our
counternarcotics
cooperation with Mexico. Your draft response notes that the Congress
will
shortly receive a report detailing our counternarcotics progress and
challenges
with Mexico, that ONDCP Director McCaffrey is now finalizing.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the draft response to Senator Snowe at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Response to Senator Snowe
tab B Incoming Correspondence

2

6113

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
Mr. McLarty

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/15/97 3:55:02 PM
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT September 15 McCurry Press Briefing [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J.
Johnson, David T.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gray, Wendy E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Leavy, David C.
Naplan, Steven J.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Press Briefing
September 15 McCurry Press Briefing

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

mike0915.doc
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 15, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING
BY MIKE MCCURRY

The Briefing Room

2:24 P.M. EDT

MR. MCCURRY: Other subjects in a moment. Let me read a statement
behalf of

the President -- from the President. He says, with great disappointment I accepted Governor Bill Weld's decision today to withdraw as my nominee for ambassador to Mexico. He would have been a superb ambassador to Mexico.

The American people have not been well served during this process for several reasons. First, they have lost the opportunity of being represented in one of our most important ambassadorial positions by this outstanding public servant. Second, because Governor Weld was denied his right to a fair hearing, the American people lost their right to judge his qualifications for themselves. Third, they were denied a voice in this issue because their representatives in the United States Senate were prevented from voting on the nomination. Finally, at a time when we had been making strides towards a bipartisan

policy, the treatment that my nominee received reflected a divisiveness that does not well serve the American people.

Our relations with Mexico are critical to our national security and to our economy. I will now work to find a replacement for Governor Weld who will meet the same high standards he would have set.

So ends the statement from the President. Helen, in answer to your question, we have not designated a new nominee; there will be some time before we can do so, and in many senses, our review process is back at the starting point now.

Q What has this episode done to President Clinton's relationship with Secretary Helms?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we certainly tried those relationships, but at the same time, we, throughout this process, have said that while we were fighting for Governor Weld, we hoped that we were fighting fair and square. And we hope the Chairman will recognize that and we can continue to do the business that we need to do together as a country to advance America's interests in the world.

Q Does the White House agree with Governor Weld's caustic assessment of Secretary Helms?

MR. MCCURRY: The President expressed himself on his sense of Secretary Helms' conduct himself the other day, and I don't want to offer a contrary viewpoint to that which the President offered.

Q Mike, kind of on the same issue, the Governor said that part of the reason

that he was leaving is because he didn't want to rupture the relationship between the administration and the Republican leadership in the Senate. And yet else can Trent Lott, for example, view this in-your-face approach that the Governor took today, to the degree of even saying that Lott's just carrying water for Jesse?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not sure I understand the question or what was in face about what the Governor decided to do today. I think he decided to act in the best interest of the country he has served and would have served well, and did so knowing that there are many important issues that a Republican Congress and a Democratic President are going to have to work together on.

I think if there was any threat, it was the one that, as the President said the other day, was explicitly made by the Chairman.

Q Mike, given the state of relations between the United States and Mexico, does the President feel that it will be better to have a career diplomat or a political appointee as ambassador?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not going to speculate on who the President at this might turn to for what is arguably one of the most important ambassadorial postings that we have anywhere in the world, but it will be someone of high caliber, someone who respects the importance of the relationship, and someone who can bring dignity to the mutual search for answers to the problems that we work on with the government of Mexico.

Q Mike, given that even if the battle had been fought and even if he had and were confirmed somehow, the cost would have been very high -- given that there was any sense of relief here at the White House that he made this decision that it's all over now?

MR. MCCURRY: I think the predominant sense here was that Governor Weld was someone that we were all standing with the President fighting for, and a lot of us probably relished that fight coming up, but at the same time, we knew there could possibly be consequences. And I think the Governor, in a very courageous way, assessed those and did what he thought was the right thing to do.

Q Mike, Senator Helms has practically said publicly that he will expedite hearing on the nomination of the next ambassador to Mexico. It is tradition

the White House always clears new appointments with the Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee. Will you do that this time?

MR. MCCURRY: We will continue the process of consultation that's necessary to achieve confirmation for important postings. It's been a long time since Ambassador Jones left Mexico City and I think it's important for us now to locate and vet a candidate, but, as you all know, ambassadorial nominees, like nominees, will need to be screened. That will be a process that will take time and it is important to our bilateral relationship that we find an effective representative and get on with business.

Q Secretary Rubin and Trade Representative Barshefsky will be testifying at Capitol Hill Wednesday. Do you think you'll have fast track legislation?

MR. MCCURRY: I wouldn't rule that out. Let's finish up on this subject. I've got some other housekeeping matters.

Q Will the President think twice before reaching across the aisle to suggest an appointment?

MR. MCCURRY: I think he will continue to search for the formulae that will allow us to have a bipartisan foreign policy. We, in reality, have to have that because we have a Republican Congress. But I think the President believes this nation throughout its history has been well served when Republican Democrats set aside bipartisan differences as we advance all of America's interest beyond our borders. And he certainly will not rule out looking for the right person, be it a Republican or a Democrat.

Q Mike, what would you say of the interpretation that many will come to that this was a major victory for Senator Helms over the President and he has even gained a greater sway now?

MR. MCCURRY: That you all are in the business of interpreting, not I, and you make that judgment we will have to live with that verdict. But I think there are other issues where we will look to work in common endeavor with the chairman.

There will be other issues where we will sometimes be in disagreement. I hope we can prevail, as we believe we would have prevailed in this instance if a majority had been allowed to express its view.

Q Mike, does this episode mean that Senator Helms is at least a co-partner

the President in running American foreign policy?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has the role that the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee historically has. And the President has the role that's suggested by the U.S. Constitution.

Q Are there any regrets here in the White House, in hindsight, about the that were taken by Governor Weld in fighting this fight?

MR. MCCURRY: No. He was fighting in some respects, as he has just said, for his reputation and for his nomination in the court of public opinion. And it's a different kind of fight than the one that normally occurs in the cloistered, marbled halls of Washington. But that's the nature of this fight and the nature of this nomination.

Q There was apparently some discussion in early August as to whether Governor Weld would like to go to India or some place else.

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not aware -- maybe you know of some serious conversation. I think the conversations the President had with Governor Weld were almost exclusively confined to what a good posting Mexico would be for him and Governor's enthusiasm about being sent to Mexico City.

Q So there was no discussion of any other place?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not aware that that was a serious consideration by the President.

Q Was there any concern within the White House, perhaps of the Vice President, that in elevating Weld's fight here it's given him a new rival?

MR. MCCURRY: I haven't heard -- being in most of the meetings that I've been here with the nominee at the White House, I haven't heard that consideration raised once.

Q Mike, to what extent do the political types on the staff -- to what extent do they take pleasure over the moderate versus conservative wedge or split that was driven by this nomination. And to what extent was that a factor, a motivating factor in this from the start?

MR. MCCURRY: I think the smarter people in politics around here know that that's a hard thing to measure and they probably didn't make any judgment

way or another.

Q Did Governor Weld make a wise decision today?

MR. MCCURRY: I think he did. He made a decision in the interest of his country and one that he's just told you about. I think you can't go wrong when you do what you think is best.

Q Any reason why the President decided not to join the Governor at this statement?

MR. MCCURRY: We haven't routinely done that, and the President was he interrupted his schedule that he was pursuing in order to see Governor Weld and I think the Governor and the President were satisfied that this was the right way to proceed.

Q Mike, is the President disappointed about the lack of public outcry about what happened in the Senate last Friday?

MR. MCCURRY: I think the President realistically wonders whether most Americans have really followed this matter as closely as maybe we have here in Washington. (Laughter.)

Q Was it Weld's decision alone, or were there suggestions from the White House that maybe it was time to reconsider the whole thing?

MR. MCCURRY: His decision alone. To my knowledge, the only one at the White House that knew he was even thinking of this course of action was Mr. Lott who had a telephone conversation with the Governor very late last night. I at least knew that he was thinking about or wanted to think about it overnight, and the first we knew about it here was this morning just after 9:30 a.m. when the Governor called Mr. Podesta to pass on that news and it was very shortly communicated to the President after that. You can attest to the fact that I caught a little unawares this morning myself.

Q Can you give any insight on the telephone conversation between the President and Senator Lott on Saturday?

MR. MCCURRY: I would prefer to keep the substantive detail of that p
To
my knowledge, the subject of appointing Governor Weld during the rec
not a
subject of the call.

Q How long was the meeting today between the President and Mr. Welc

MR. MCCURRY: It was relatively brief, but the President had spent som
earlier at least reviewing the Governor's intention with his staff and they
what was both kind of a courtesy call, a thank-you, and an opportunity f
Governor to formally communicate his decision a short while ago -- ma
15
minutes.

Q Mike, after the discussion with Mr. Podesta about Governor Weld's d
to
withdraw, did you or Mr. Podesta or somebody like that make the offer
use
of this room to make this announcement? It's rather unusual to have som
come here.

MR. MCCURRY: It is unusual, but I think a number of us here felt it w
appropriate, given the strong support the White House has had throughc
nomination fight, for it to end here where, obviously, it began.

Q I suppose this means that you are not going to appoint anyone as a
replacement
who would possibly rub Senator Helms the wrong way.

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I wouldn't rule that out. We have serious policy
disagreements with Chairman Helms and we will continue to have serio
policy
disagreements, and Senator Helms will no doubt continue from time to t
oppose nominations the President sends. But we certainly hope that we
achieve a working relationship in which the Senate can fulfill its constit
duty, and the President, as he says, is clearly disappointed that has not
happened in this case.

Q Mike, was the Mexican government advised before the announcemen
made
public he was withdrawing his nomination?

MR. MCCURRY: I'll have to check. I doubt that, this being an internal
of deliberation within our government, but we will of course proceed wi
respectful communications, government to government, as we proceed f
here, and
at the proper point, secure agreement from the government of Mexico as

search
for a new ambassador-designate.

Q Helms was upset that there was never any discussion with him prior to announcement of Weld back when, that he said in the past the usual practice would be to run a couple of names by him and get his feedback. Any intention that in the future?

MR. MCCURRY: There are close consultations that we have with his staff to understand correctly from his staff, Chairman Helms does not routinely with or participate in discussions with ambassadorial designates, but at the same time this was clearly from the beginning and by the Chairman's own statement an unusual nomination.

Q Are you going to run the next possible name by him or his staff --

MR. MCCURRY: We will, as I said, respectfully continue to consult on foreign policy and will continue to handle nominations in a way that we hope will secure their confirmation.

Q Governor Weld said he wasn't going to kiss rings or other parts. Don't find it somewhat degrading that you are in the position of having to assume

position with the Chairman? (Laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: I don't think I'm going to bend over and answer that question.
(Laughter.)

Q More seriously phrasing that question, doesn't this encourage Senator Helms in exercising a sort of one-man veto on other important items before the administration?

MR. MCCURRY: I suspect there will be some price paid on that side of the aisle for the way in which this nomination was received and considered in the Senate, and I think the reflection it makes on the Republican Majority in the Senate might make something that would cause the Senate Leadership to think about pursuing this type of action.

Q A quick follow-up. Senator Helms said before the nomination that he did not

give a hearing if Governor Weld was nominated and that he advised the House to nominate somebody else. Will the White House clear the next Mexican nomination with Senator Helms before --

MR. MCCURRY: I think we've been through that about three or four times now. Anything else on this?

Q I don't want to beat a dead horse on this either, but 24 hours ago the White House seemed solidly behind a nominee determined to get --

MR. MCCURRY: We were until 9:30 a.m. this morning.

Q Yes, and in 24 hours that's turned around completely on all sides. Can you give us any type of what happened in the last 24 hours?

MR. MCCURRY: Yes, the guy decided to withdraw. Okay, let's go on. go on to other subjects?

Q That's a fair question.

MR. MCCURRY: He just told you he decided this morning and notified about 9:30 this morning --

Q Did something new develop that we're unaware of that convinced him it was going to be as damaging as he said it was? Because everything he stated out last week.

MR. MCCURRY: Not according to the answer he already gave you on that.

Q Fast track, Mike, can we go on?

MR. MCCURRY: Let me do a couple of other things; we'll move on to other subjects. First of all, I've, thanks to the Washington Times, learned that there are some concerns about some of you about what happens if you're about to be incinerated down in your working quarters and whether or not you'd be able to make a quick exit from this wonderful room in time as it undergoes construction in and around the complex. It's obvious that you can always use the back door; it's obvious that we would do everything we could in an emergency to make the back door sliding door open and it normally during working hours is open. But the powers that be have also decided that during the period of the construction here we will

unlocked the colonnade entrance over here. That's to be used for your emergency purposes, no change in the ground rules around here about when you don't use that door. But if any of you were worried about what might happen if a fire breaks out, that will be an exit and you can go seek refuge in the Rose Garden -- (laughter) -- if you think it's any less warm out there.

We will keep that open from roughly 7:00 in the morning until we wrap the end of the day, and normally it will be open until 7:00 p.m., that's when we do the lockup around here.

Q Fast track, Mike?

MR. MCCURRY: One more thing. I didn't get a chance to do this last week but I wanted to pay a compliment to the General Services Administration for good work on a promise. You don't always in this government get a promise and have people work hard and get the job done. But they told us that during the course of the President's three-week vacation that they would be able to renovate this space, make it look nice, paint it, freshen it up, do all the construction necessary to accommodate the new member of the network pool downstairs. And, by God, they did it and I just wanted to pay tribute to Don Plummer, the White House Building Manager, and his team at the General Services Administration.

We had a particularly good working relationship with Mike Costic and Tom Herr, who really were the ones that worked with us day in and day out, with your representatives on the Correspondents Association. I think a lot of planning and hard work went into making this period of construction and renovation work.

And, while most of you weren't here, I at one point thought it was a little bit hairy about whether they were going to get it done or not, and they did a great and superhuman job in order to get the work done. And thanks to them and thanks also to Mike Malone and his staff at the White House Administration Office.

Q It looks the same to me.

MR. MCCURRY: Good. But it looks a lot better to me, if you want to know the truth.

Fast track. I think the President has been working with his advisors and

advisors have been working hard to incorporate some of the suggestions we've heard from members of Congress. They've been addressing themselves best to fashion the legislation that would give the President the extension of negotiation authority that he needs to carry out trade negotiations that all Presidents have used in one way or another for the last 60 years to advance America's economic interests overseas. And I would suspect, perhaps, as sometime later this week, we might be able to say more about what specifics would be contained in legislation.

Q When do you intend to send it up to Congress?

MR. MCCURRY: Perhaps as early as later this week.

Q The President is calling it fast track, I noticed today.

MR. MCCURRY: Oh, I think he's -- it's called colloquially fast track -- I think most Americans know what that is, but it is the negotiating authority. Congresses give Presidents so that they can get agreements that might have to be ratified by the Senate.

Q Mike, can you also give us a sense of whether you think the President will make his comments on the tobacco deal before he leaves later this week?

MR. MCCURRY: I would put down a couple of quarters on the proposition that he might. Maybe I could say, almost, would. But I wasn't supposed to box. But I would --

Q Wednesday?

MR. MCCURRY: I can't play that card.

Q Wednesday?

MR. MCCURRY: We're running out of days in the week, I think. By Thursday we're gone, so we've got -- tomorrow is Tuesday, then we've got Wednesday.

Q Lots of free time Wednesday.

MR. MCCURRY: I suspect he might do that sometime between Tuesday and Thursday.
(Laughter.)

Q Mike, on the tobacco subject. How important does the President feel it

there be legislation this year to enact what the industry and the lawyers
with -- with some revisions, perhaps, that he'd like to see strengthening
effort to stop children from smoking?

MR. MCCURRY: I think the President believes that we need to make
measurable
progress towards his public health goal this year. You could do that either
codifying some of the elements of this recent discussion through legislation
be considered by Congress, or you could continue to move ahead in the
the
federal regulatory process that the President has advanced. The advantage
legislation, of course, is not subject to protracted litigation, so it would be
preferable. But we'd have to realistically judge what this Congressional
calendar will allow between now and the end of the year. It might be entirely
possible to begin moving the ball down the field with the notion that the
line would not be out there this year but, one way or another, the President
intends to make progress to protect this nation's kids from the dangers of
tobacco addiction.

Q And what are his biggest concerns about the deal that was struck a few
months
ago?

MR. MCCURRY: The impact on children, the impact on children and the
impact on
children.

Q Mike, if the new American proposal that was submitted over the week
the
Oslo Conference on banning land mines were not to be adopted by the end of
this
week, would the U.S. position be to still try and get into the game with the
Ottawa process until the signing of the treaty in December. In other words,
walk away at the end of this week?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we have said all along that you can simultaneously
pursue
both the conference on disarmament discussions and the Ottawa process.
We
recently said that we would attempt to pursue both simultaneously, and
give some preference to advancing the objectives that have been placed
forward in
Ottawa. But as a practical matter, we will continue to pursue our interest in
ban on anti-personnel land mines subject to the exclusions that are necessary
for
the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, given the
responsibilities that we have in certain places in the world, and we'll just
to wait and see what happens. Our negotiators have put forward a response
the

kind of proposal that was made, as you know, and we'll see how the neg goes on that in coming days.

Q Since Albright's visit to the Middle East, Netanyahu has condemned t takeover of a home -- settlers took over a home -- and also Netanyahu se changed his tune on settlement policy. Do you credit Albright with that And what's your reaction to it?

MR. MCCURRY: All I can report to you is that the Secretary, of course issues like settlements policy. She spoke to them publicly in her speech the students at Tel Aviv. She raised the question of revenues and the ret revenues that rightfully can be collected by the Palestinian Authority, a the Prime Minister has also addressed today. I think the Secretary and h

have briefed at greater detail on the substance of her dialogue, but certai these points were made and were made very strongly and made, I might very candidly and persuasively by the Secretary. So hopefully, they did have effect.

Q Do you think that they did, though, considering what he --

MR. MCCURRY: The government of Israel and the office of the Prime Minister is the only one that can really answer that question for you. Yes.

Q Could you comment on the suggestions that Paula Jones' advisor is m that she is being singled out by the IRS?

MR. MCCURRY: Only to say it's only the IRS that can answer that que We don't do tax audits here. We have never conducted or talked about or do audits here, and we would be -- I think I told some of you earlier today - certifiably insane if we did so. So this is not the place to ask. Go ask the Treasury.

Q Just to follow up, you're saying that it's not possible that any member White House staff had any hand in promoting that investigation?

MR. MCCURRY: I just, again, would say, it's inconceivable to me. I ha there are 1,500 people who work here, and I haven't asked every single them, but no one in any position of authority would ever allow that to h here, because if they did, they would be looking for work pretty quickly goes without saying, I think. I think everyone here knows the history of previous White Houses where that happened, and everyone knows what

episode it was in our history. Yes, Karen?

Q Has the White House made efforts to find out from the IRS how the

investigation was --

MR. MCCURRY: We -- hands off. We don't even call the IRS to find out they do those sorts of things -- literally. I mean, the White House Counsel's C assured me today that there was no reason for concern here about it. But I'd say we do dumb things from time to time, but we are not certifiably c So, don't imagine for a minute we did. Yes?

Q Did the Latin American summit have to be rescheduled to accommodate Chelsea's Spring Break?

MR. MCCURRY: I have not checked on that question, and if it would, probably would figure out some diplomatic reason why that was not the only reason. Yes. That's it for the day. Thank you. See you tomorrow.

END

2:48 P.M. EDT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003. email	Cathy Millison to William Wechsler. Subject: PC Paper. (15 pages)	09/17/1997	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/10/1997-09/19/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5645

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	William Wechsler to Leonard Hawley. Subject: FW: PC Paper. (16 pages)	09/17/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/10/1997-09/19/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5645

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/19/97 9:38:44 AM
FROM Friedrich, Mary K.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Pillars [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Malley, Robert

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY****TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT**

planning pillars.doc
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP ABROAD

**BUILDING BLOCKS OF PILLAR
DESCRIPTION****TIMELINE****BENEFITS**

(e.g. Who does this help?

How does it help them?)

COSTS/FEASIBILITY

(e.g. What does it take to achieve? Who pays (\$ or capital)? What is
the

likelihood it will occur?)

POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

UNDIVIDED EUROPE**UNDIVIDED EUROPE****UNDIVIDED EUROPE****UNDIVIDED****EUROPE****UNDIVIDED****EUROPE****UNDIVIDED****EUROPE****NATO Enlargement Ratification**

Secure Senate ratification for admitting Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO.

Implement strategy on second group(s) of invitees

Introduce legislation early 1998; seek ratification by March-April.
First new members admitted Spring 1999 NATO summit in Washington.
Review timing for second group in 1999, possibly invite others to begin accession talks.

Strengthens NATO to meet core mission of self-defense and to take on new missions like peacekeeping.
Helps lock in gains of democracy, free markets in Central Europe and promotes stability in part of world that sparked two world wars.
Ratification likely but not assured.
NATO direct costs are \$9 to 12 billion for '97 through '09. US share is

estimated at \$1.5 to 2 billion or \$200 million per year for the next 13 years.
Allies pay about 50%; new members about 35%.
Additional costs of \$8 to 10 billion for Allies and \$10 to \$13 billion for new members for certain national force enhancements.
Will require serious effort by the President to convince individual Senators and to rally support from American people.

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

NATO Adaptation and Enhancing Cooperation/Integration

Continue internal NATO adaptation (command structure; Spanish, French integration expand Euro role.)
 Strengthen Partnership for Peace/EAPC; develop NATO-Russia & NATO-Ukraine partnerships.
 Strengthen integration of the Baltics and Southeastern Europe
 Now through NATO ministerial in December, 1997.

Through 1998

Through 1998
 Adaptation strengthens NATO's ability to meet core mission of self defense and new missions like peacekeeping.
 Outreach promotes integration and stability throughout Europe.

Adaptation on course. Spanish integration likely, French integration questionable.
 Leads to more equitable defense burdensharing with Europe, thereby shoring up domestic support for residual defense spending and our presence in Europe.
 Dispute between France and U.S. may require occasional intervention by President

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(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

Advance Self-Sustaining Peace in Bosnia

Support full implementation of Dayton Accords (including: bring war criminals to

justice, help refugees return, promote economic reconstruction,

democratization,

arms reduction, support institutions.)

Complete SFOR mission on schedule. Decide on post-SFOR

participation by U.S., if

any, to ensure implementation continues. Build public and congressional support

for continuing role.

Now through June 1998: use SFOR presence to push for full implementation of

Dayton.

Fall 1997 decide post SFOR presence, if any; sustain position in Congress.

Strengthen self-sustaining peace in Bosnia; save countless lives; preserve

stability at heart of Europe; help hundreds of thousands displaced persons return home.

SFOR likely to complete mission on schedule. But ability to advance individual

components of Dayton uncertain - especially provisions on war criminals, refugee

return. Will require difficult policy decisions by President, agreement with

allies and could entail risks to troops.

Will be difficult to build public and Congressional support for post-SFOR

military presence by U.S., easier to garner support for out-of-country military

effort and/or continued economic, humanitarian assistance.

Cost? [Unknown]

Presidential involvement includes decision on post-SFOR Fall '97; if some U.S.

presence, major effort with Congress on funding/cutoff early '98.

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

Push to improve ties btw. Greece & Turkey

Use current promising circumstances for major effort to improve bilateral ties,
building on momentum of Madrid agreement on principles to govern bilateral

relations; address core issue of dispute over continental shelf.

Initial push now through end of 1997.

Additional steps contemplated for 1998.

Opportunity to further defuse enduring and dangerous flashpoint for conflict in

Europe, promote productive ties between NATO allies

Uncertain. Recent steps forward encouraging but history of conflict sobering.

Would require high profile engagement by President only if agreement within reach.

Advance Resolution to Cyprus Dispute

Capitalize on appointment of Presidential emissary, initiation of UN-sponsored

direct talks and EU engagement to bring parties to framework negotiations and

move them toward bizonal, bicomunal federation

From now until 1998, lay framework for comprehensive negotiations, as well as

focus on Aegean issues and the EU-Turkey relationship.

1999-2000: Implement settlement if achieved; otherwise continue efforts to narrow differences.

Same as above.

Same as above.

BUILDING BLOCKS OF PILLAR

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

Deepen Turkey's integration with the West

Support democratic, secular leadership that can govern effectively within Turkey

and play a constructive role in the region; strengthen the US-Turkish bilateral

relationship; and anchor Turkey firmly in Europe.

From now until end of 1997, use possible POTUS-Yilmaz mtg and other opportunities

to strengthen security, political and econ aspects of bilateral relationship,

foster improved Turkey-EU ties, and address regional issues (e.g., Aegean, N-K, Iraq).

1998-2000: focus on internal political reforms, maximizing economic opportunities

(e.g. energy, trade, investment) and further progress on resolving regional

problems.

Secure U.S. strategic, political and economic interests in an important country

at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Increased broad and high-level engagement on a diplomatic, military and economic

level with Turkey, and diplomatic efforts with European allies, should yield

positive results.

Presidential involvement would be Modest. Possible Yilmaz Meeting.

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

Russia/NIS

Nurture U.S.-Russian relationship to advance democratic, market reform in Russia

and advance U.S. interests in arms control, trade, regional and global stability

Advance Minsk Group negotiations on Nagorno-Karabac toward goal of peace agreement.

Play more active role in conflict resolution in Georgia/Abkhazia
Encourage free and fair elections throughout region

Ongoing

Intensified negotiations fall 1997 Target Phase I agreement by end of '97. Phase

II agreement by '98

Negotiations process led by UN during fall 1997

Russia: Parliament '99; President '00

Ukraine Parliament March '98; President Oct. 99

Most important transformation in world for U.S. interests.

Resolution of NK and Abkhazia conflicts promotes regional stability and

cooperation in Caucasus and strengthens prospects of rapid energy development in

Caspian Basin.

Key to reinforcing principles of democracy and elections as basis for political transition in NIS.

Presidential involvement would be absent crisis, modest, except for annual summits (U.S./Moscow).

Prospects for peace are good.
Final push could require POTUS interventions.

Requires high-level diplomatic engagement on free and fair elections; as needed, consider targeted technical assistance for electoral processes; minimal Presidential Involvement.

Support regional and international integration of NIS states, e.g. WTO, OECD, NATO and IFIs.

Strengthen cooperation in science and technology
Begin in 1998
Promotes democracy by enhancing economic, political and military development.

S & T enterprise strengthened, providing economic stimulus and opportunities for former defense scientists.
Requires broad and high-level diplomatic engagement and trade negotiations.

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

STABLE

ASIA

STABLE

ASIA

STABLE

ASIA

STABLE

ASIA

STABLE

ASIA

STABLE

ASIA

Advance Engagement with China

Work to rebuild bipartisan consensus on engagement with China.

Draw China into

world community to encourage economic and political change, respects for human

rights and non-proliferation norms.

Promote WTO accession , reduce trade deficit, permanent MFN, end to Tiananmen

sanctions in context of Chinese actions improving rights and performance on other issues

Gain broad China conformity with non-proliferation regime and cut off arms sales

to rogue states (e.g Iran).

Stabilize PRC-Taiwan relationship through enhanced cross-strait ties.

Strengthen cooperation in science and technology.

Jiang State Visit: October 1997. POTUS return visit: late 1998 (T)

Annual summits thereafter?

Clean Energy Initiative; VP Forum on Env. and Devel.; Joint Commission

U.S. has profound stake in China's evolution as peaceful, open, stable country.

Americans will benefit from cooperation with China on trade, non-proliferation, stability on Korean peninsula. Chinese will benefit from greater political freedom, economic opportunity if China abides by international rules of conduct on trade, nonproliferation, human rights, etc. China that turns inward is destabilizing factor for Asia Pacific region.

Cooperative work b/n US and China - large economies, large producers of greenhouse gases - will have significant impact on global problems such as climate change. In wake of MFN vote, opportunity to rebuild consensus on engagement and reverse demonization of China. Key moments are state visits. Congressional effort (permanent MFN, Tiananmen sanctions) only in context of significant Chinese progress.

Serious POTUS leadership needed to convince public, Congress of benefits of relationship despite difficulties.

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

Promote Peace and Stability on Korean Peninsula

Pursue Four-Party Peace Talks toward goal of peace between Koreans, normalize of

U.S.-DPRK relations.

Implement dismantling of frozen North Korean nuclear weapons program.

Seek limits on North Korean missile and CW program.

Continue to provide humanitarian assistance to avert famine

Talks: Fall 1997.

Nuclear dismantlement: Ongoing.

Ongoing

Ongoing

Cold War's last armed frontier, Korean peninsula remains dangerous flashpoint for

conflict, with 37,000 U.S. troops on frontline. Peace talks could finally defuse

danger, increase stability in Asia. Implementing nuclear agreement makes

unpredictable North Korea less dangerous to neighbors, region.

Helps ensure against massive population displacements and general disorder which

might result in irrational military action.

Preliminary negotiations for peace talks difficult but ongoing - chance parties

will agree to begin formal talks in fall. But highly volatile, given history.

Grave risk of instability in North due to economic collapse. Little

POTUS

involvement likely.

Nuclear accord moving forward. \$30 million/year US costs.

Groundbreaking for

replacement light water reactor in August.

The overall food situation continues to deteriorate. Face continued need to

provide emergency assistance to avert famine. Have provided \$60 million over

past three years.

Strengthen U.S.-Japan Partnership
Deepening security cooperation, resolving trade and economic issues
and
enhancing science and technology cooperation will strengthen alliance
that is
bulwark for regional stability and catalyst for regional growth.
Encourage Russian-Japanese Cooperation
Finish defense guidelines by 1997.
Trade and economics ongoing.

No defined timeline

Benefits people of both countries in increased security, economic
opportunities.
Increases stability in volatile region going through profound change.

Reduces longstanding regional tensions and opens prospects for more
constructive
cooperation among the Eight.

Trade deficit and macro-economic issues remain difficult; will
become flashpoint
if U.S. economy weakens; guidelines pose some potential challenge
for Hashimoto,
but should prove achievable. Roughly bi-annual summits with
POTUS.

U.S. encouragement has already facilitated dialogue.

BUILDING BLOCKS OF PILLAR**DESCRIPTION****TIMELINE****BENEFITS**

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

South Asia (India-Pakistan)

Use Secretary of State visit, POTUS trip to broaden dialogues; strengthening

bilateral ties; promote regional stability including non-proliferation, economic,

and regional security

SecState visit: 1997.

POTUS trip: 1998 (T)

Regional stability in too-long neglected South Asia; promotes trade and economic

development and strenghtens democracy.

POTUS visit 1998, with some prior involvement in lead up if serious initiatives

warrant.

BUILDING BLOCKS OF PILLAR**DESCRIPTION****TIMELINE****BENEFITS**

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

LEADER FOR PEACE

LEADER FOR PEACE

LEADER FOR PEACE

LEADER

FOR PEACE

LEADER

FOR PEACE

LEADER FOR PEACE

Promote progress and international cooperation on democracy and human rights

Strengthen authority and resources of international human rights institutions and compliance.

Ongoing

Strengthening High Commissioner will enhance UN's ability to monitor abuses and

thus alleviate suffering by victims; strengthening tribunals will help to promote

justice necessary for reconciliation and long term stability in post-conflict

societies; coordinating democracy promotion among the Eight will improve

collective efforts on promoting democratic transitions worldwide; ratification of

human rights treaties will bring our commitments into accord with our actions

and strengthen our international advocacy efforts on these issues; increased

reporting and advocacy on religious freedom issues will bring pressure to bear

against offending governments and encourage other democracies to make this issue

a greater priority.

Budget costs not substantial. High potential for US impact on High Commissioner

and War Crimes Tribunal. Will be more difficult to establish formalized

coordination of democracy promotion among the Eight. Given objections of Sen.

Helms, ratification of treaties dealing with women and children will be very

difficult, though there may be possibility to move on former if we can obtain

support from Republican Senators-women in particular. Increased efforts on

religious freedom issues will be helpful in augmenting international awareness

and curbing individual abuses. Minimal POTUS involvement.

BUILDING BLOCKS OF PILLAR DESCRIPTION TIMELINE

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

Pursue Middle East Peace Process

Restart meaningful Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and negotiations.

Fully

implement interim accord and make progress on permanent status talks.

Pursue peace between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria

Promote regional economic and political cooperation

Restart cooperation: Fall 1997.

Complete interim accord and progress on final status: 1998.

Progress with Lebanon and Syria: 1998-9.

MiddleEast/N.African Economic Summit: Doha 1997 (SecState to attend)

Move closer to resolution one of great conflicts of 20th century; avoid breakdown

in peace process that will have profound adverse consequences for U.S. in entire region.

Israel/PA progress: Highly uncertain. Will require regular attention by the

President; high intensity/high risk involvement if peace process on verge of

collapse or breakthrough. Key first step is defusing present crisis and resuming cooperation.

Israel/Lebanon; Israel/Syria: likely to take back seat to progress on Palestinian

track. President will need to be involved if there is an endgame

Continue to Support Haiti's Transition to Democracy.

Promote peaceful parliamentary elections, UN mission transition.

Work with GOH to improve security.

Support free presidential elections

Parliamentary election and UNMIH transition: through 1997.

Focus on security: 1998.

Presidential elections: 2000

Measurably improve lives of Haitian people (greater security, political freedom,

prospects for economic stability.) Sustain one of President's signature achievements.

Prevent return to refugee exodus and attendant costs to U.S..

Maintain stability in Caribbean
 Haiti bogged down in political paralysis. Need to break election logjam.
 Security somewhat more positive. Civilian police force major improvement. Need to strengthen court system.
 Congress fear that gains threatened, could help secure commitment to continued assistance. Cost: \$100 million per year including food aid.
 Minimal POTUS involvement unless crisis.

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(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

Pursue Settlement in Northern Ireland

Support British and Irish governments in effort to start all-party talks process

toward goal of final settlement.

Support economic development in Northern Ireland

All talks beginning Sept 1997; deadline May '98.

People of Northern Ireland and UK benefit from end to terrorism, possibility of

leading normal lives and ending inter-communal tensions.

U.S. contributes \$20 million to International Fund for Ireland. Real agreement a

long-shot; Presidential visit could be necessary to clinch agreement.

Promote Peru-Ecuador Peace Process

As co-guarantor of Peru-Ecuador peace process, encourage parties to reach

definitive resolution of border dispute while avoiding arms race.

Seek resolution of border dispute by April 1998 Santiago Summit.

People of both countries benefit from absence of tension, increased stability,

improved climate for trade and investment, dampened arms race and reduced chance

of conflict

Strengthens stability and integration, give U.S. stronger partners for dealing

with common problems like crime, drugs etc...

Chances are good for significant progress toward definitive resolution by next

April.

May be minor costs associated with supporting final peace agreement.

Current US

supported PKO force is paid for by Peru and Ecuador.

Minimal POTUS Involvement.

Continue to Promote Peaceful Transition to Democracy in Cuba

Maintain economic embargo on Castro. Periodically Review Helms-Burton Title III

sanctions on foreign entities doing business in Cuba. Continue to reach out to

Cuban people.

Helms-Burton review every six months (October 1997; March, 1988.)

Continuing

review of Cuba policy.

Democracy to last holdout in hemisphere would dramatically improve lives,

prospects for Cuban people. remove source of regional instability 100 miles from

U.S. Sudden collapse of Cuban regime or internal strife could cause major

instability, refugee crisis dramatically affecting southern U.S.

Continuing to suspend application of Helms-Burton Title III feasible if we can

show continued allied support for Cuban democracy, condemnation of human rights

abuses. Democratic transition unpredictable.

Public and private funding by the international community projected in event of

democratic transition estimated at \$4-8B over six years.

Minimal POTUS involvement unless crisis.

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(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

Agent for Peace in Africa

In coordination with African & European states, work to promote implementation of

Angolan peace accords; political settlements and respect for human rights in

Great Lakes; constructive government in Congo; free and transparent elections in

Liberia; resolution to civil war in Sudan; free and fair elections in Kenya;

return to civilian government in Nigeria; Africa Trade and Investment Initiative.

POTUS trip in 1998 (T)

POTUS trip offers unique opportunity to advance U.S. interests in democracy and

economic development in Africa; educate American people to diversity, success

stories of Africa; long-term benefits in stability, humanitarian gains, trade and

investment.

Africa Trade and Investment Initiative could cost \$200 million in the early

stages; will be difficult on Hill but strong CBC allies.

Minimal POTUS involvement (speech) until trips.

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TRANS-NATIONAL THREATS**TRANS-NATIONAL THREATS****TRANS-NATIONAL THREATS****TRANS-NATIONAL****THREATS****TRANS-NATIONAL****THREATS****TRANS-NATIONAL****THREATS**

Chemical Weapons Convention

Secure passage of implementing legislation.

Advance broader participation including Russia.

Fall 1997.

Brings U.S. law in line with all treaty requirements so we can fully implement

landmark agreement that bans production, use, transfer of poison gas.

Troops and

citizens will be safer.

High probability of passage in the Fall. Minimal POTUS involvement.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Submit for ratification to Senate historic treaty banning all nuclear testing by

explosions. Seek India's accession to treaty.

Submit: Fall 1997. Seek ratification by early 1998, entry into force by end of 1998.

Achieve goal set by Eisenhower, advanced by Kennedy to end nuclear testing for

all time. Will help prevent development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons,

and help prevent their spread.

Submission requires closure within administration on funding for stockpile

stewardship program (up to \$500 million add on/years for 5 years.)

Ratification achievable, but likely to be more difficult than CWC.

Substantial

POTUS involvement needed for ratification (e.g. CWC) but timing of Senate push

can be controlled.

START II

Encourage ratification by Russian Duma and complete protocol on extension

Fall 1997.

Ratification by Duma would put treaty into force, requiring U.S. and Russia to

reduce nuclear arsenals to and opening door for further reductions under START

III.

U.S. can have only modest influence on Duma decision. In Russia's hands.

Prospects highly uncertain. Occasional POTUS intervention with Yeltsin.

ABM/TMD

Agts. on ABM/TMD demarcation, ABM succession now completed.

Fall 1997

Would preserve cornerstone of arms control, allow research on

defense vs. short
range missiles. Make troops, allies safer from theater missile attacks.
Will be highly contentious in Senate which must ratify. Should hold
until Duma
ratifies START II; then major push, with some POTUS intervention.

START III

After START II ratification, negotiate START III.
Initiate negotiations 1998; ideally conclude 1999-2000.
Would reduce strategic nuclear arsenals 80% below Cold War levels;
historic
achievement.
Depends upon Russian ratification of START II, which is uncertain.
POTUS
decisions will be needed.

CFE Treaty

Conclude negotiations on an adapted "Conventional Forces in
Europe" treaty.

1998

Success would promote stability throughout Europe by ensuring that
verifiable
limits on conventional weapons are maintained into next century, as
NATO
enlarges.

Requires agreement of all 30 CFE States Parties; implementation
costs of new
treaty not likely to be significantly different from current treaty. All
states
parties share goal of concluding in 1998. Little POTUS involvement.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

Send to Senate for ratification South Pacific and African Nuclear
Weapons Free
Zones Treaties.

1998

Would help prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons to South Pacific
and Africa.
Ratification likely, although there will be opposition. Little POTUS
involvement

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

Fissile Material Cutoff Convention

Begin negotiations on international treaty to end production of fissile materials

for nuclear weapons.

Start negotiations: 1999/2000.

Treaty would help prevent proliferation and cap existing nuclear weapons program.

Negotiations stalled due to Pakistani/Indian opposition. No POTUS involvement.

Plutonium Disposition

Reach agreement through G-7/ Russia, complete necessary R&D, build pilot plant to

convert plutonium from nuclear weapons to peaceful uses.

Lay out options: 1998.

Secure G/7-Russia agreement: 1998

Build plant: 2001.

Dispose of weapons plutonium reduce risk of proliferation and nuclear smuggling.

Delicate negotiations remain with Russia; prospects uncertain; no POTUS

involvement.

Biological Weapons

Strengthen compliance with Biological Weapons Convention to prevent use of

disease as weapon of war.

1998-1999.

Help prevent BW proliferation and threat to US and allies.

Negotiation difficult. Would require Senate ratification. POTUS involvement

only if needed at end.

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Landmines

Negotiate ban on anti-personnel landmines and secure Senate ratification of treaty.

Achieve Senate Ratification of CCW Amended Mines Protocol restricting use of landmines

Expand USG humanitarian demining program

1997

1997

Ongoing

Would help end worldwide scourge of landmines which kill thousands every year.

Would help limit threat to civilians from landmine use through specific protections, even as we pursue a global ban.

By helping return unproductive lands, the areas once again become inhabitable.

May require key September policy decision by President whether to sign Ottawa

treaty that may not meet all the requirements of U.S. military. POTUS

involvement in ratification effort (late '98 '99) would be significant.

Cost

associated with development of alternatives.

Budget is on the rise. However, technical advances must be achieved or completion of the goal of returning all landmined areas will be distant.

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Rogue States

Continue unilateral and multilateral efforts to contain Iran, Iraq, Libya

-

especially ability to conduct terrorism and access to WMD; establish greater

convergence with allies.

Ongoing.

Prevent terrorism against citizens of democracies, including

Americans. Advance

regional stability. Protect energy supply in Persian Gulf. Advance

Middle East

peace process.

Will require persistent effort to keep allies behind multilateral sanctions;

POTUS involvement in decision-making, ongoing discussions with allies and crisis

management.

Energy Security

Take steps to ensure continued stable supply of energy from diversified sources

(e.g. Venezuela; Caspian Basin; Persian Gulf)

Ongoing

New Caspian reserves could provide 1-2 million barrels/day by 2000 in new oil

production.

POTUS visit to Venezuela in October will highlight this theme.

Increased

importance of Caspian region suggests maintaining POTUS relationship with key

players (e.g. Aliyev, Nazarbayev).

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Continue to Combat Terrorism

Reorganize and elevate USG anti-terrorism efforts.

Press arrest, extradition, prosecution of foreign terrorists who violate U.S.

law.

Improve ability to prevent terrorists from entering U.S., locate, expel.

Adopt ten major anti-terrorism conventions.

Secure funding to implement Gore Commission steps on aviation security.

Ensure adequate investment in and coordination of R&D efforts.

These are long term programs, most of which will continue through FY 2000

Protect Americans against increasingly likely terrorist attacks and assure them

that we are making "100% effort."

Reorganization planning underway.

Programs are feasible, but will not provide total protection against terrorist

attacks. Protection of infrastructure, especially cyber systems will be long

term and costly both to the USG and the private sector/public utilities whose

cooperation will be essential (Critical Infrastructure Committee, preparing

recommendations). Building local capabilities to cope with a WMD terrorist

attack will cost approx. \$100m over 5 years. As technologies improve and

population increases, cost could grow. Minimal aviation security improvement

will cost \$220 m over 4 years.

Preventing terrorists from entering the US will require additional

resources for
 INS; expelling terrorists will require new legislation.
 POTUS involvement minimal except in event of terrorist action.

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(e.g. How does it affect the party?)

Continue Fight Against Drug Trafficking

Within Hemisphere, work with major drug-producing countries to
 develop and pursue

multi-lateral strategy against drugs; negotiate agreement with Panama
 for

multinational counter-narcotics center; establish U.S.-Mexico drug
 strategy.

Annually certify counter-narcotics cooperation.

Explore new United Nations anti-narcotics unit and possible P-8
 Justice

Ministerial

Hemispheric goals: 1997-1998.

Report to Congress Sept. 1 on prospects of hemispheric alliance.

Annual certifications: January-March 1998, 1999, 2000.

Zedillo working visit in November will address drug strategy due by
 end of 1997.

Save countless lives in hemisphere and in U.S. lost to overdoses,
 drug-associated violence. Diminish corrosive effects of corruption that

undermines new democracies.

Absent unsustainable increase in federal budget for enforcement, crop
 substitution, ending drug trafficking impossible, dramatic supply
 reductions

difficult. Little POTUS involvement.

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Increase Cooperation Against Arms Trafficking

Negotiate, sign and ratify hemispheric convention against illegal arms trafficking.

Develop technical approaches so that sophisticated conventional weaponry

automatically disarms if it falls into wrong hands

Negotiate convention: 1997. Sign and ratify: 1998

Convention would save lives by helping reduce gun violence throughout hemisphere,

decrease number of legally sold weapons that wind up on black market in U.S.,

decrease number of weapons easily available to drug traffickers.

Very likely agreement will be signed. Ratification and implementation should be

manageable. Little POTUS involvement.

Increase Cooperation Against International Crime

Pass International Crime Control Act

Establish regional law enforcement academy in Panama similar to one in Budapest.

Extend Colombia anti-money laundering program to other nations.

Fall 1997 or winter 1998.

Regional academy: 1997

Will help train police forces throughout region in modern techniques, imbue

respect for human rights, promote cooperation and information sharing.

Cost: TK

Little POTUS involvement.

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Increase Cooperation Against Corruption

Ratify Organization of American States Anti-Corruption Convention.

Ratification: 1999-2000

Will help combat corrosive effect of corruption on fragile democracies in

hemisphere.

No POTUS involvement.

Increase Cooperation on Migration to Promote Regional Stability

Seek legislation restoring ex-ante deportation rules for Central

Americans and

certain others and/or undertake administrative action to ensure against mass

deportations to region.

Through end of 1997

Promote fairness for certain immigrant groups and enhance peace and stability in

region.

Same as above

Combat Illegal Migration

Implement and streamline new criminal deportation procedures

Now through end of 1997.

Help prevent criminals from remaining in U.S. Increase support for generous legal

migration laws.

Same as above.

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OPEN TRADING SYSTEM

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Fast Track Trading Authority

Introduce and secure passage of legislation granting President fast track

authority to conclude trade agreements.

Introduce legislation September 1997. Seek votes starting in October, final

passage by end of 1997, early 1998.

Vital tool for sustaining record economic growth, 25% of which due to exports.

Passage uncertain but achievable. Will require difficult political decision on

labor and environment standards, major campaign. Heavy Presidential engagement.

Caribbean Basin Trade Enhancement Act

Make good POTUS/VPOTUS pledge to win Congressional passage of act to promote trade

and investment in Caribbean.

By end of 1997.

Important tool to promote increased U.S. trade with, investment in neighboring

Caribbean states. Spur their depressed economies, avoiding destabilizing

collapse, creating jobs, while making it easier for U.S. business to take

advantage of opportunities.

May be dead for '97. Final effort in fall. No POTUS involvement unless passage

on line.

Free Trade Area of Americas

Negotiate free trade agreement with Chile once Fast Track secured - first step to FTAA.

Start negotiations toward FTAA by 2005.

Chile: 1998

FTAA preparatory work: 1997.

Begin FTAA negotiations: Santiago Summit in April 1998.

Dramatic benefits to American workers, businesses that export by taking down

trade barriers throughout hemisphere (already leading market for U.S. exports.)

Will help create, sustain better paying jobs. Will also promote growth, wealth

in Latin America and so strengthen new democracies.

Both FTAA and Chile controversial. Tied up with Fast Track authority.

Step-by-step approach and long time line should make Chile FTA, FTAA feasible

politically in U.S. Passage of free trade agreement with Chile more problematic.

Some POTUS involvement with Congress on Chile.

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WTO Negotiations

Pursue Uruguay Round "built-in" agenda of future negotiations to liberalize trade

in key sectors - agriculture; services; government procurement; intellectual

property

Initiate negotiations: Agriculture (1999); Services(2000) But preliminary talks

could begin sooner if U.S. has Fast Track authority.

Would make trade more free, fair for American workers, business in sectors vital

to U.S. economy and/or where U.S. already world leader. Will create, sustain

higher paying jobs and growth.
 Dependent on President securing Fast Track authority.
 Negotiations will be difficult but should be achievable. POTUS involvement limited.

Open Asia-Pacific Markets Thru APEC

In working toward free trade in Asia Pacific by 2010/2020, will seek key sectoral agreements (e.g. energy related technology; environmental technology; medical equipment). APEC agreements could then become basis for global agreements in WTO (e.g. ITA).
 Annual APEC Summit: Vancouver '97; KL '98; New Zealand '99; Brunei '00.

Would make trade more free, fair for American workers, business in sectors vital to U.S. economy and/or where U.S. already world leader. Will create, sustain higher paying jobs and growth.
 Negotiations difficult. POTUS involvement: annual APEC summit (Vancouver '97; KL '98; New Zealand '99; Brunei '00).

NIS Economic Reform

Support development on new tax laws, commercial codes, financial markets key to economic growth and opening economies to foreign investment

Pass Partnership for Freedom in 1997; 1999-2000 reforms assistance on investment bottlenecks
 Locks in nascent reforms in NIS, opens NIS markets to American exports, creates conditions for American development of NIS resources, needed for NIS integration into global markets.
 Partnership for Freedom FY '98 request; \$900 million; Senate mark \$800 million;

House mark \$625 million need to preserve Senate level. Little POTUS involvement.

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Russia/NIS accession to WTO

Help bring Russia and NIS into global marketplace.

1998: Russia Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia possible, all NIS on path to membership

As NIS adopts international standards for trade and investment, U.S. firms will

gain access to export markets and vast natural resources. Increased prosperity in

NIS will help democracy take hold.

Achievable. Gore-Chernomyrdin and Gore-Kuchma best vehicles to promote progress.

Little POTUS involvement.

China Accession to WTO

Complete negotiations with China to allow its accession to WTO on commercially

acceptable terms.

Between now and 2000 (1998 target).

Major benefits to U.S. workers, business as WTO accession requires China to

eliminate trade barriers. Important component of engagement policy that seeks to

draw China into world community.

Difficult but achievable if good agreement. Jiang Summit in D.C. and POTUS

return visit could catalyze progress. Some POTUS involvement on Hill necessary.

Africa Trade & Investment Initiative

Help secure passage of legislation to promote U.S. trade with and investment in

Africa.

Early 1998.

Major benefits to American workers, business by increasing market share (now just

7%) in emerging African economies. By increasing African prosperity, will

strengthen stability and fragile democracies.

Strong chance for success given bipartisan support in Congress. \$200 million in

the early stages. Little POTUS involvement.

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STRONG MILITARY, DPLOMACY

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Maintain a Strong and Ready Military (QDR)

Implement QDR Report's blueprint for maintaining strong and ready military;

increase funding for force modernization; sustain R&D efforts to maintain

qualitative edge; take care of our men and women in uniform; work with Congress

to enact infrastructure, management and business practice reforms.

1997: Ensure FY-98 Auth and Approp bills support QDR plan.

1998: Ensure FY-99 Auth and Approp bills support QDR plan.

1999: Ensure FY-00 Auth and Approp bills support QDR plan.

By protecting and advancing peace and security, provide foundation for American

leadership and a stable environment for prosperity.

QDR plan is based on a fiscally-constrained defense budget consistent with the

balanced budget agreement, thus ensuring national security while supporting

efforts to reduce the deficit and the control national debt.

The QDR was based on a projection that the defense budget would

remain level at
 about \$250 billion in constant FY-97 dollars.
 The budget agreement that was reached between Congress and the
 Administration
 provides slightly more than the QDR projected.
 Achieving the modernization and readiness goals stated in the QDR
 Report is
 feasible if Congress can be persuaded to support infrastructure,
 defense
 management and business practice reforms
 Little POTUS involvement.

Peacekeeping
 Enhance capabilities of US, friends, allies, internt. orgs. for
 peacekeeping)

Would strengthen capacity of global (e.g UN) and regional (e.g. OAU,
 ACRF)
 organizations to stem internal crises and expand peacekeeping burden
 sharing.
 Gradual progress at UN possible; some support for African
 peacekeeping force.
 Little POTUS involvement.

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Gulf War Illness

Continue effort to discover causes for GWI, repair health of veterans,
 integrate
 lessons learned into military planning.

Final PAC Report due 10/97.

Ongoing effort through 2000.

Help thousands of sick veterans discover cause of illness, find
 treatments.

Restore public confidence in DoD, military, USG. Ensure future
 recruitment does

not suffer. Sustain flexibility of military to deploy troops where and
 when

necessary, improve defenses against disease. Reduce post-conflict/deployment health problems.
 Discovering cause highly uncertain given difficulty to date.
 Improvements in treatment, planning more feasible. Will require continued low level POTUS/FLOTUS engagement; onus of action with Pentagon and VA.

United Nations

Encourage UN. reform, refocus on challenges of 21st century, strengthen security council, including international campaign to achieve S.903 benchmarks, thereby enabling payment of arrears.

S.903 benchmarks campaign - 1997.

Pay arrears: 1998 - 2000

UNGA opening, New York: Sept 97, 98, 99, 00.

Reform needed for UN efficiency, U.S. support.

Even with S.903, still roughly \$400 million shortfall in arrears.

Little POTUS involvement beyond statements.

International Resources

Ensure passage of Foreign operations and CJS appropriations bills.
 Fall 1997.

President's budget request for function 150 is \$19.45billion; Budget agreement would allow for full funding. Individual appropriations bills still in play.
 Presidential "enforcement" necessary.

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Reorg. of State, USIA, AID, and ACDA

Reinvent our foreign affairs agencies to meet the needs of the 21st

century.

Legislation should be passed this year. ACDA will integrate with State over one

year; USIA will integrate in two years; AID will integrate certain functions over

two years. State will reinvent itself.

Helps foreign policy makers by streamlining operations while preserving functions

of integrated agencies. Helps taxpayers by promoting efficiency.

Cost uncertain.

Little POTUS involvement.

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