

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	June Bartlett to Eric Pierce and Lee Wolosky. Subject: Double Red Dot package 6697. (66 pages)	10/27/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/27/2000-12/08/2000]

2006-1363-F

vz5719

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/31/2000 3:16:21 PM

FROM Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: Phone Call Re PCKG 5948: Report to Congress -- Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Report [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Countryman, Mary Ellen (PRESS)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Cruise, Daniel L. (PRESS)
Hammer, Michael A. (INTERAM)
Pisar, Leah F. (NSCCOMM)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Bash, Brooks L. (EXSEC)
Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Haas, Dean J. (ADMIN)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Countryman, Mary Ellen (PRESS)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Cruise, Daniel L. (PRESS)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Pisar, Leah F. (NSCCOMM)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Beardsworth, Richard R. (Randy) (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Bolton, Edward L. Jr. (DEFENSE)
Cullom, Philip H. (DEFENSE)
Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)
Metzinger, Erin M. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)

TEXT_BODY

Mary Ellen, Brooke et al:

Cross-referencing my earlier e-mail regarding the Jim Glanz inquiry, we were informed this afternoon that the President has now signed off on the latest certification of the stockpile, and it will be transmitted to relevant Congressional committees. The previous two years, we have released the text of the transmittal letter (which is unclassified) as a press release from the White House.

We could do that again -- and it would be certain to catch Glanz's eye if we did, and almost certainly make it into his story ... and also, almost certainly provoke more questions. Alternatively, we don't have to release the text of the letter ... or, we could delay its release (although to release it after the Glanz story might look awkward, depending on your point of view). Thoughts?

Steve.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bartlett,
L. June (EXSEC)
Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2000 1:39 PM
To: @DEFENSE
- Defense Policy
Cc: @PRESS - Public Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: Phone Call Re PCKG 5948: Report to Congress
-- Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Report [UNCLASSIFIED]

Executive
Clerk's office called. The letters are signed, but asked if the text of the letter(s) (unclassified) can be released.

Please advise.

Copy
of letters submitted to Staff Secretary:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

I am pleased to note the Secretaries' conclusion that the nuclear stockpile has no safety or reliability concerns that require underground testing at this time. Problems that have arisen in the stockpile are being addressed and resolved without underground nuclear testing to ensure the stockpile remains safe and reliable. In reaching this conclusion, the Secretaries obtained the advice of the Directors of the National Weapons Laboratories, the Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

In order for the stockpile stewardship program to continue to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for this program. As part of this effort, we will continue to review the priorities and resources for the stockpile stewardship program.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Senator Biden:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0802

Dear Mr. President:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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priorities
and resources for the stockpile stewardship program.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Al Gore
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4601

Dear Senator Levin:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2202

Dear Mr. Leader:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

I am pleased to note the Secretaries' conclusion that the nuclear

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and resources for the stockpile stewardship program.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2403

Dear Mr. Leader:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I
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that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the
annual

certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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In order for the stockpile stewardship program to continue to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for this program. As part of this effort, we will continue to review the priorities and resources for the stockpile stewardship program.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas A. Daschle
Democratic Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4103

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-1314

Dear Mr. Leader:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt
Democratic Leader
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2503

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4002

Dear Representative Skelton:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2504

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Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I
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and resources for the stockpile stewardship program.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

Dear Representative Gejdenson:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban
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that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the
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certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of
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Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0702

13

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA~~
ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
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~~SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA~~
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UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA~~
ATTACHMENT

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/07/2000 12:26:06 PM
FROM Beardsworth, Richard R. (Randy) (DEFENSE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT transmittal letters [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY Rosie here are the trons, i've played with them some. Thak you very much! Randy

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT POTUS ltr 1999 report.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to transmit the 1999 Department of State Annual Arms Control Report, titled Department of State Activities in Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament, pursuant to Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended. It reviews all aspects of last year's arms control policies, negotiating efforts, compliance activities and other activities conducted in the process of meeting the statutory requirements of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended. A secret annex to the report is enclosed, and those ORCON materials that the CIA has approved for release are also included.

Under Executive Order 12958, the Department may not disseminate classified

information outside the Executive Branch except under conditions that ensure that the information will be given protection equivalent to that afforded to such information within the Executive Branch. Classified, proprietary, intelligence sources and other sensitive information may not be publicly disclosed or handled in such a manner that might lead to public disclosure. We ask that you protect the classified information by applying standards at least as stringent as E.O. 12958 on the handling of classified information. Sensitive documents must be protected from unauthorized disclosure because they contain information specifically protected by statute. We request that only Members, and staff with the necessary clearance and need-to-know the information be allowed to review the material.

I strongly believe that arms control plays a significant role in enhancing the security of the United States and its allies. I ask for the support of Congress in achieving our arms control objectives and in that spirit, commend this report to you.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate.

[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/08/2000 11:49:25 AM
FROM Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Arms Control Report [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Beardsworth, Richard R. (Randy) (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Walldorff, Rebecca L. (LEGIS)
Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Beardsworth, Richard R. (Randy) (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Bolton, Edward L. Jr. (DEFENSE)
Cullom, Philip H. (DEFENSE)
Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)
Metzinger, Erin M. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)

TEXT_BODY Leg clears with changes to POTUS memo and letter. I still don't think we should use ORCON in letter-doubt recipients will know what it means.

-----Original Message-----

From: Beardsworth, Richard
R. (Randy) (DEFENSE)
Sent: Thursday, December 07, 2000 7:58 PM
To: @LEGISLAT
- Legislative Affairs
Cc: Beardsworth, Richard R. (Randy) (DEFENSE)
Subject: Arms
Control Report [UNCLASSIFIED]

Mark, we've tightened up the POTUS letter and tweaked the memos. Please clear on these as soon as possible
- hopefully before 10 am Thanks, Randy

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

7393 Berger memo 1999 report.doc

December 7, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: HANS BINNENDIJK

FROM: RANDY BEARDSWORTH

SUBJECT: Arms Control, Nonproliferation, And Disarmament
Report For 1999

The memorandum at Tab I recommends the President sign the
transmittal letters to
Senator Helms, Senator Biden, Congressman Hastert, and
Congressman Gephardt.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on December 2, 2000
after having
sent the original report back to State for extensive rewrite.

Concurrence by: Elisa Harris, and Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Letters to Congress
Tab B Report to Congress
Tab C Classified Supplement
Tab D Codeword Annex

1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET CODEWORD~~

UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED WITH

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Classified by: O.J. Sheaks, Alan Foley
Reason: E.O. 12958, 1.5(b),(c),(d)
Declassify On: 1.6, X1, X6

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7393 POTUS memo 1999 report.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: Arms Control, Nonproliferation, And Disarmament
Report For 1999

Purpose

Transmit the 1999 Annual Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and
Disarmament Report
to Congress.

Background

The Department of State Activities in Arms Control, Nonproliferation,
and
Disarmament report, including the classified Annex on compliance
activities is
prepared pursuant to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. The
report is
prepared by State in consultation with the Secretaries of Energy and
Defense, and
with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence, for
submission by
you to Congress.

John Holum summarizes successes and setbacks in his overview of
the report and
concludes by asking Congress for its continued support for the
Administration's
arms control and nonproliferation policies.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the four letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Congress

Tab B Report to Congress

Tab C Classified Supplement

Tab D Codeword Annex

1

2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET CODEWORD~~

UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

~~SECRET CODEWORD~~

UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Classified by: O.J. Sheaks, Alan Foley

Reason: E.O. 12958, 1.5 (b),(c),(d)

Declassify On: 1.6, X1, X6

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT POTUS ltr 1999 report.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to transmit the 1999 Department of State Annual Arms Control Report,
titled Department of State Activities in Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and
Disarmament, pursuant to Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as
amended. It reviews all aspects of last year's arms control policies,
negotiating efforts, compliance activities and other activities
conducted in the
process of meeting the statutory requirements the Act. A secret annex
to the
report is enclosed, and those ORCON materials that the CIA has
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release are also included.

I ask that you protect the classified information by applying standards at least as stringent as E.O. 12958 on the handling of classified information. I also request that only Members, and staff with the necessary clearance and need-to-know the information be allowed to review the material.

I strongly believe that arms control plays a significant role in enhancing the security of the United States and its allies. I ask for the support of Congress in achieving our arms control objectives and in that spirit, commend this report to you.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate.

[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]