

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Mark Medish to Robert Bradtke, Wendy Gray, Dean Haas et al. Subject: FW: Chechen "Foreign Minister" Visit. (2 pages)	09/29/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	Mark Medish to Justin Siberell Subject: FW: Chechen "Foreign Minister" Visit. (3 pages)	10/02/2000	P1/b(1)
003. email	Peter D. R. Smith to Kennth Pollack. Subject: RE: [Confidential] (3 pages)	10/04/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/29/2000-10/24/2000]

2006-1363-F
vz5641

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/03/2000 1:48:23 PM

FROM Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT RE: Time-Sensitive: President's Report to Congress on USG Counter-Drug Strategy for Colombia [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)

CARBON_COPY Grandrimo, Nicole M. (TNT/INTERN)
Lieberson, Donna P. (TNT)
Pierce, Eric A. (TNT)
Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Bash, Brooks L. (EXSEC)
Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Haas, Dean J. (ADMIN)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Walldorff, Rebecca L. (LEGIS)

TEXT_BODY Here you go

-----Original Message-----

From: Haas,
Dean J. (ADMIN)
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2000 1:44 PM
To: Rosa,
Frederick M. (TNT)
Cc: @CRIME; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary;

@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: Time-Sensitive: President's
Report to Congress on USG Counter-Drug Strategy for Colombia
[UNCLASSIFIED]

HE
HAD NOT/NOT SIGNED. @execsec: could someone email the
package?
MANY thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Rosa, Frederick
M. (TNT)
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2000 1:44 PM
To: Haas, Dean
J. (ADMIN)
Cc: @CRIME; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @LEGISLAT
- Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: Time-Sensitive: President's Report
to Congress on USG Counter-Drug Strategy for Colombia
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Dean:
First, has POTUS signed (or approved) the report? As to your
question,
I recommend that you simply send me just an electronic version of
the latest copy of the report; with that, I'll incorporate changes
and obtain appropriate NSC, OMB and NSC clearances. Tx, Fred

-----Original
Message-----

From: Haas, Dean J. (ADMIN)
Sent: Tuesday, October
03, 2000 12:04 PM
To: Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
Cc: @DEFENSE -
Defense Policy; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @INTERAM -
Inter-American;
@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @RUDMAN;
@TRANSNATIONAL - Transnational
Threats
Subject: RE: Time-Sensitive: President's Report to Congress
on USG Counter-Drug Strategy for Colombia [UNCLASSIFIED]

Fred,

I
just got the package back from Staff Secretary. Is it best for us
to sign it back out to you to work and clear the changes you suggest?

Dean

-----Original Message-----

From: Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)

Sent: Tuesday,

October 03, 2000 11:54 AM

To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary

Cc: @DEFENSE

- Defense Policy; @INTERAM - Inter-American; @LEGISLAT -
Legislative

Affairs; @RUDMAN; @TRANSNATIONAL - Transnational Threats

Subject: Time-Sensitive:

President's Report to Congress on USG Counter-Drug Strategy for
Colombia

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Bob/Brooks:

1. As you may already be aware, the Gotbaum/Rudman/Lackey interagency process for ensuring that we get to the bottom of when, what type and how many Black Hawk helicopters we expect to deliver to Colombia with the Emergency Supplemental Act appropriations has resulted in some important clarifications. In essence, the latest information on the delivery timetable indicates that the bleak forecast of a week or so ago was not accurate, and we are very close to confirming that we should be able to deliver the helos roughly on time (as defined by what we told Congress early this year).

2. With these clarifications, the relevant paragraph in the President's required report to Congress on our counter-drug strategy for Colombia -- which OMB and all agencies had cleared on and which I understand has been with the President since yesterday morning (Package # 5941) -- is now incorrect. See page 19 (of my version anyway), 3rd full paragraph (beginning "The Defense Security Cooperation Agency"). Specifically, summer 2002 is no longer the projected date for commencing delivery of the Black Hawks, and retaining this statement in the report would be inconsistent with a key message of the OMB/NSC-led interagency briefing Miles is seeking to arrange for the Speaker's staff this Friday.

3.

Assuming the report has not already gone to the Hill, my initial cut at a fix would be to replace the last three sentences of that

paragraph with the following two sentences: "The first UH-60s should be delivered to Colombia in mid-2001, with the balance delivered by the end of the year. Current projections indicate that the necessary support infrastructure should be in place, and that Colombia should have sufficient pilots trained to fly the additional UH-60s, in time to meet this delivery schedule." Both Miles and Josh Gotbaum at OMB would need to clear on this language or a revised version.

4.

In addition, OMB may wish to review other "helicopter aspects" of the report. For example, while less problematic in my view, page 12 (under "Additional CNP Funding") and page 19 (at top) makes references

to two UH-60s for the CNP. Our latest information is that we will only be able to purchase one (actually, "1.3") optimally-configured Black Hawk with the amount Congress appropriated.

5. Request

advise on status of report.

Thanks, Fred

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5941 Congressional letter CO Supp Strategy.doc

September 20, 2000

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby report, pursuant to Section 3202 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, on current U.S. policy and strategy for counter-drug assistance to Colombia and neighboring countries.

The attached report sets forth the rationale for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries and highlights the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

Colombia's success is profoundly in the interest of the United States.

A

peaceful, democratic, and economically prosperous Colombia will result in a significant reduction of the supply of illicit drugs and help promote democracy and stability throughout the hemisphere. I am proud of the bipartisan effort that has made our Colombian initiative possible.

Sincerely,

Attachment
Report on U.S. Counter-Drug Assistance for Colombia and
Neighboring Countries

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5941 Memo for SRB on CO Supp Strategy Report.doc

September 26, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: ERIC A. PIERCE

SUBJECT: Report on U.S. Counterdrug Assistance for Colombia and
Neighboring
Countries

Attached at Tab I is an action memorandum from you, Barry McCaffrey and Chuck Brain recommending that the President send to the Congress the attached report dealing with current U.S. policy and strategy regarding counterdrug assistance for Colombia and neighboring countries.

The report to the Congress was due not later than September 11 (60 days after the

date of enactment of the Emergency Supplemental Act). Drafting and interagency clearance of the President's report by ONDCP took longer than anticipated, hence the delay in submission.

We concur with the report as prepared by ONDCP, as do OMB, State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, AID, and DEA.

The NSC received the final text of the report (Tab II) from ONDCP on September 18.

Concurrence by: Brooke Anderson, Randy Beardsworth, Mike Hammer, Don Mitchell, Wendy Patten, Dan Shapiro, David Stockwell, Jock Scharfen

RECOMMENDATION

That you, together with Barry McCaffrey and Chuck Brain, send the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Transmittal letters to Congress
Tab B Report on U.S. Counterdrug Assistance for Colombia and Neighboring Countries
Tab II Incoming Correspondence from ONDCP
2

5941-REDO

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5941 ONDCP Colombia Policy Strategy Report2.doc

Report on U.S. Policy and Strategy Regarding Counternarcotics Assistance for Colombia and Neighboring Countries

I. INTRODUCTION

This report is in compliance with Section 3202 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001 which states that the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on current U.S. policy and strategy regarding U.S. counternarcotics assistance for Colombia and neighboring countries. In addition to addressing the eight elements identified in Section 3202 of the Act, this report also provides background useful to understanding the reasons for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries. The report reviews the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of Goal 5 of the National Drug Control Strategy: Break Foreign and Domestic Drug Sources of Supply.

II. CONTEXT

1. Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production Data

The final 1999 coca cultivation and potential cocaine production estimates for the Andean Region released by the CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) show progress in attacking the cocaine trade. Overall Andean net coca cultivation declined to 183,000 hectares in 1999, 4 percent less than the 1998 figure, and 15 percent less than in 1995. Potential global cocaine production fell to 765 metric tons, a drop of 7 percent from the 1998 figure, and an 18 percent drop since 1995. Although the overall coca cultivation trends are positive, this data confirms that there has been a major shift of coca cultivation from Peru and Bolivia to territory dominated by guerrillas and illegal mercenaries in Colombia.

ANDEAN POTENTIAL COCAINE PRODUCTION
(Metric Tons)

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Peru
460
435
325
240
175
Bolivia
240
215
200
150
70
Colombia
230
300
350
435
520
Totals
930
950
875
825
765

ANDEAN COCA CULTIVATION
(Hectares)

1995
1996

1997
1998
1999
Peru
115,300
94,400
68,800
51,000
38,700
Bolivia
48,600
48,100
45,800
38,000
21,800
Colombia
50,900
67,200
79,500
101,800
122,500
Total
214,800
209,700
194,100
190,800
183,000

2. U.S. Interests

The ongoing, multiple and inter-related crises in Colombia directly affect a broad range of U.S. national interests. Among these are: disrupting the supply of cocaine and heroin that flows into the United States, supporting democratic government and rule of law in Colombia and the region, promoting adherence to human rights norms, advancing efforts to reach a negotiated settlement to Colombia's long-running internal conflict, maintaining regional stability, and promoting legitimate trade and investment. U.S. financial, technical, and political support is essential if we hope to avoid allowing Colombia's inter-related crises to affect our nation adversely, and to undermine

democracy
and stability in Colombia and the region in the near term.

Rapidly expanding cocaine and heroin production in Colombia constitutes a threat to U.S. national security and the well-being of our citizens. Ninety percent of the cocaine entering the United States originates in or passes through Colombia. The cultivation of opium poppies in Colombia has expanded from almost nothing in 1990 to some 7,500 hectares now, producing nearly 8 metric tons of high purity heroin -- enough to meet over half of the U.S. demand. Rising global demand for cocaine will continue to undermine peace and democracy in Colombia even as our own demand for cocaine continues to abate.

Despite an aggressive aerial drug eradication campaign, Colombian cultivation of coca, the raw material for cocaine, has more than tripled since 1992. Most of this expansion occurred in guerrilla-dominated southern Colombia which was beyond the reach of the government's aerial eradication campaign. The figures for 1999 indicate that the number of hectares of coca under cultivation in Colombia and the amount of cocaine produced from those crops continue to increase dramatically. Colombian coca cultivation rose 20 percent to 122,500 hectares in 1999; there was a corresponding 20 percent increase in potential cocaine production to 520 metric tons. Left unchecked, these increases in drug cultivation and production in Colombia will reverse gains achieved over the last four years in Peru and Bolivia. Continued expansion of drug production in Colombia will likely result in more drugs available for shipment to the United States and to an expanding population of drug abusers in Europe and Latin America.

3. Changes in Drug Trafficking Patterns

In large part due to successful counterdrug programs in Peru and Bolivia, the

drug production pattern in the Andean Region has changed dramatically over the last decade. Until recently, most coca was grown in Peru and Bolivia, and coca base was shipped to Colombia for processing and distribution. Aggressive drug crop eradication, interdiction operations, and a broad array of law enforcement programs in combination with alternative economic development programs in Peru and Bolivia have reduced coca cultivation in those countries 66 percent and 55 percent, respectively, since 1995.

Drug traffickers adapted to the problem of unreliable coca leaf supply in Peru and Bolivia by moving cultivation into areas of Colombia beyond the control of the democratically elected government, converting Colombia into the world's largest producer of coca. Domination of Colombia's vast coca growing regions by guerrilla or illegal mercenary groups has limited Colombian President Pastrana's ability to reduce drug production or enforce Colombian national law. The migration of coca leaf production and cocaine manufacturing to areas dominated by illegal armed groups in Colombia required a change in strategy, policy, and resources in order to protect our nation from being flooded with dramatically increased amounts of cocaine and heroin and avert corresponding increases in drug addiction, violence, and crime in the United States.

4. Crisis in Colombia

The immense amounts of money generated by the drug trade are fueling violence, lawlessness, and Colombia's long internal conflict. Colombia lacks the resources to dislodge organized terrorists and private armies that provide a safe haven for a drug-based economy. These illegal armed groups have a dominant presence in about half of Colombia's national territory, predominantly in remote areas where government presence has traditionally been weak.

Illegal armed groups are responsible for the overwhelming majority of the human rights violations committed in Colombia, and they are a threat to Colombia's democracy and legitimate economy. High levels of violence, kidnapping and extortion, and attacks on infrastructure are displacing large numbers of rural inhabitants and discouraging both Colombian and foreign investment. Drug money and income from kidnapping and extortion has produced a paradoxical situation in which the guerrillas and mercenary groups are militarily strong, politically weak, and generally feared. The reluctance of the guerrillas to attempt an evolution from a military to a political force is undermining the Colombian government's good faith efforts to negotiate peace with them.

Lack of investment, insecurity, and poor economic management are among the principal reasons Colombia has entered its worst economic recession since the 1930s. Real gross domestic product is estimated to have fallen by 3.5 percent in 1999, the result of external shocks, fiscal imbalances, and a further weakening of confidence related to stepped-up activity by illegal armed groups. Unemployment increased from under 9 percent in 1995 to about 20 percent today, adding to the pool of unemployed workers who can be drawn into the illegal drug trade or into insurgent or illegal mercenary groups. The deep recession has also reduced government resources available for social and economic programs, law enforcement, and national security.

5. Plan Colombia

The Pastrana Government developed an integrated strategy, Plan Colombia, that recognizes that solving Colombia's inter-related problems will require significant action on a variety of fronts.

Plan Colombia focuses on five strategic issues:

1. The peace process.
2. The Colombian economy.

3. The counterdrug strategy.
4. The reform of the justice system and the protection of human rights.
5. Democratization and social development.

These five planks respond comprehensively to Colombia's most severe problems. At the core is an effort to achieve peace through dialogue and address the need to strengthen democratic institutions as well as increase the capacity of the government to carry out its policy initiatives. Repairing the economy will make it easier for the Colombian people to provide for themselves and will decrease the attraction of the drug trade and other illicit activity. Breaking up the drug trade infrastructure will reduce the threat of corruption, allow for

legitimate economic development, remove a principal source of economic support from the illegal armed groups, and contribute to making the negotiating table a more attractive setting than the battlefield for resolving problems. Decreasing the scale of the internal conflict will facilitate the reform of the justice system and lead to improvement in the human rights situation.

The Government of Colombia estimates that implementing Plan Colombia will cost about \$7.5 billion over the next three years, and Colombia has committed to spending \$4 billion of its own resources and international financial institution loans to execute the plan. The Pastrana government is asking the international community to provide the remaining \$3.5 billion in bilateral foreign assistance. To date, the United States, Norway, Spain, Japan, and the United Nations have pledged significant support for President Pastrana and Plan Colombia. The United States will continue to support Government of Colombia efforts to obtain more funding from the international community, especially in the areas of economic and social development. There is a European Union donors conference scheduled for March 2001 to discuss support for Colombia.

6. Human Rights and the Security Forces

President Pastrana and the military high command have demonstrated a commitment to improving the government's human rights performance and have taken a number of important measures to that end. In 1999, President Pastrana removed from service four generals and a number of mid-level officers and NCOs accused of collaborating with paramilitaries or failing to confront them aggressively. The new military penal code, which entered into force August 12, 2000, has the potential to improve military justice while ensuring that human rights cases are tried in the civilian justice system. The new code requires that the military legal system operate outside and independent of the chain of command, and provides for the installation of professional military judges. The Colombian military is in the preliminary stages of establishing a Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps.

A reform of the military career personnel statutes, which became law on September 14, 2000, gave the Military Commander the authority to dismiss officers with fewer than 15 years of service, meaning that he now has the authority to dismiss from duty all Armed Forces personnel credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups. According to the Human Rights Report of the Colombian Ministry of Defense, 32 members of the Armed Forces were separated from service between 1998 and 1999 for presumed human rights violations. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense reported that approximately 63,000 Colombian security force members received human rights training in 1999. The U.S. State Department's annual human rights report has also documented a declining number of reported human rights violations attributed to members of the Colombian military. Nevertheless, serious problems remain.

President Pastrana and the top military and police commanders are committed to ending impunity for human rights violations and eliminating links between members of the security forces and paramilitary groups.

III. U.S. POLICY

The United States seeks to combat illicit drugs and foster free-market democracies that promote the rule of law, internal peace, and human rights as well as economic and social development. U.S. support for Plan Colombia implementation will further these critical and enduring goals. While Colombia must assume the primary responsibility for addressing its urgent problems, in view of the significant implications of Colombia's crisis for our national interests at home and abroad, and in keeping with the ongoing U.S. commitment to promote democracy and human rights in Colombia, the United States is supporting implementation of the counterdrug and other critical components of Plan Colombia as a matter of national priority. Additionally, the United States has increased assistance for other countries in the region, primarily to consolidate counterdrug gains in the major Andean drug-producing countries and to ensure that successful law enforcement efforts in Colombia do not simply drive illicit drug cultivation and production into neighboring countries.

IV. REGIONAL COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY

1. Key Objectives of the U.S. Counterdrug Strategy in Colombia and Neighboring Countries, with a Detailed Description of Benchmarks by Which to Measure Progress Toward Those Objectives

Objectives

The overarching objective of the U.S. counterdrug strategy is to reduce the quantity of illegal drugs flowing into the United States. The National Drug Control Strategy calls for a 20 percent reduction in the world-wide net cultivation of illicit coca by 2002 (base year 1996) and a 40 percent

reduction
by 2007. The goal of President Pastrana's Plan Colombia (October 1999) is to
reduce Colombia's cultivation, processing, and distribution of drugs
by 50
percent over six years.

In addition to directly supporting U.S. counterdrug interests in Colombia and
other nations in the region, U.S. assistance will go to strengthening democratic
institutions and promoting economic and social development in Colombia, Ecuador,
and Bolivia. In Colombia, priorities include supporting President Pastrana's
efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution to the country's long-standing civil
conflict and promoting respect for human rights. To assist with the objectives
of Plan Colombia and to accomplish the objectives of the National Drug Control
Strategy, (including sustaining the reduction of drug-flow over time), the U.S.
Government has developed a Colombia/Andean Region support package that is
balanced and comprehensive. It is designed to advance the U.S. interest in a
united, democratic, peaceful and prosperous hemisphere. The package supports
counterdrug activities, alternative economic development, rule of law, human
rights, good governance, and humanitarian assistance for internally displaced
persons. Specific, quantifiable objectives are currently being negotiated with
the Government of Colombia. The administration will keep the Congress informed
as to the outcome of these discussions.

Counterdrug Benchmarks

Benchmarks by which to measure progress toward U.S. counterdrug strategy
objectives in Colombia and neighboring countries consist of evidence that
regional drug production is decreasing and that the infrastructure required to
manufacture, transport, and market illegal drugs is functioning less effectively.
Set forth below is a list of general indicators the administration

intends to
use in determining whether the U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia is
successful;
they should not be taken as negotiated objectives with the
Government of
Colombia.

* Decrease in cultivation of new coca and opium poppy crops. Coca
hectarage has
increased at the rate of about 20 percent a year for the last five years
in
Colombia. Poppy cultivation, which for several years had been
relatively static,
increased by 23 percent in 1999. Future decreases in new coca and
poppy
cultivation in Colombia, combined with continued control of drug
production in
neighboring countries, would indicate progress toward the objectives
of the U.S.
counterdrug strategy.

* Increased aerial eradication capability. Almost all of the new
planting in
Colombia has been in areas where there is limited or no herbicidal
spray
eradication activity. In areas where the Government of Colombia can
eradicate
effectively, such as in Guaviare Department, total hectarage devoted
to coca
production has decreased, and attempts at new plantings have been
less intensive
than in areas where the government did not conduct intensive
spraying. Increased
ability to spray safely illegal crops in Colombia would indicate
progress toward
the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy.

* Increase in the amount of illicit crops eradicated. An increase in the
amount
of crops eradicated would indicate progress toward the objectives of
the U.S.
counterdrug strategy, provided the increase is not offset by new
plantings.

* Stress in the drug transportation network. In Peru, the value of coca
leaf
decreased when Peru's trafficker air interdiction policy made it
difficult to
convince pilots to transport coca base from production areas to
refining

laboratories. Inability to sell coca leaf reduced the value of the crop and convinced many farmers to abandon coca. In Colombia, most coca product is moved by road, river, or private aircraft from production areas to transshipment points outside of the production zone. A reduction in the price of coca leaf or base; decreased cultivation of new crops; abandonment of coca fields; or decreased number of drug flights; changes in trafficker modes and routes; abandonment or destruction of cache sites, clandestine airstrips, and drug transportation support infrastructure, such as transshipment sites on the rivers, all would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy.

* Interruption of refining capacity. Future reduction in the number of cocaine laboratories through destruction or abandonment because of an inability to obtain essential or precursor chemicals would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy. Elimination of refining capacity is the strategic objective. Elimination of a large cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) laboratory is more significant than elimination of many smaller cocaine base laboratories, which can be easily replaced. Reduced purity of cocaine HCl leaving Colombia, and reduced demand and/or prices for coca leaf and base, would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy.

* Kingpin incarceration. Arrest, conviction, prosecution (or extradition, as appropriate), and incarceration of more major traffickers in a prison from which they cannot continue to operate their criminal enterprises would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy. Arrest of key criminal personnel temporarily or permanently eliminates trafficker ability to manipulate large amounts of capital required for major drug shipments, removes organizational leadership, and creates uncertainty in criminal

networks upstream and downstream from the arrested major trafficker. In the longer run, secure incarceration of major traffickers may serve as a deterrent to would-be high-volume traffickers.

* Capital reduction. Increased disruption of cash flow required for illegal drug enterprises through anti-money laundering measures, asset seizures and forfeitures, and reduced ability of traffickers to control legitimate businesses would indicate progress toward the objectives of U.S. counterdrug strategy. The largest cash flow generator for drug traffickers in the Western Hemisphere and the primary money laundering conduit for Colombian drug cartels is the Black Market Peso Exchange. U.S. and Colombian law enforcement agencies have developed and implemented initiatives to combat this major source of funding for the illegal drug trade.

* Movement of drug workers and families into licit production. As an increased level of confidence in alternative employment opportunities is achieved among residents of drug-producing areas, increasingly larger numbers of people attempting to move into the legitimate economy indicates progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy. Plan Colombia and the U.S. assistance package also address basic governance issues in Colombia that will be harder to quantify, such as strengthening and increasing access to the judicial system, improving prison security, and protection of human rights workers. Though we expect to see positive results in the next two to three years, this effort will require long-term commitment by the government and people of Colombia, and long-term support by the United States and the international community.

2. Actions Required of the United States to Support and

Achieve Counterdrug Strategy Objectives

Implement the Colombia Initiative (including its Regional Component)

The U.S. initiative to support Colombia and the region is a \$1.3 billion assistance package carefully crafted to respond to urgent identified needs. It supplements ongoing United States Government counterdrug programs of \$330 million for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001. It also builds on long-standing, significant U.S. counterdrug assistance programs that have been operating in Colombia for the last decade. The assistance package for Colombia and the region is balanced and comprehensive. It supports counterdrug activities, alternative economic development, rule of law, human rights, good governance, and humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons. The interlinked elements of the assistance package break out as follows:

- * Provide counterdrug equipment, training, and technical assistance to help the Colombian police and military increase their capability to curtail the cultivation and production of illicit drugs in Colombia, including illicit crop eradication, drug processing lab destruction, and other law enforcement activities. The assistance will also help to increase the drug interdiction capabilities of both the Colombian National Police and Armed Forces. These programs will augment the existing coca and poppy eradication and drug interdiction efforts that have been in place for years.

- * Supplement major increases in Colombian alternative economic development programs, including new job generation, to offer alternatives to small farmers and migrant workers currently cultivating and harvesting drug crops and prevent population displacement. U.S. support for alternative economic development programs is in addition to the U.S.-funded alternative development programs

started in the poppy-growing regions in 1999. The package also provides emergency and longer term assistance to displaced persons.

* Strengthen governing capacity and enhance programs to support respect for human rights and promote the rule of law in Colombia. U.S.-supported programs build on existing administration of justice programs administered by the Department of Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

* Support Colombia's economic recovery. The Government of Colombia needs to attract more domestic and foreign investment. The United States will provide \$1.5 million in technical assistance to initiatives related to economic recovery.

* Promote progress in Colombia's peace process. The Government of Colombia needs to create better conditions for a successful peace process. The United States will provide \$4 million to fund training for Government of Colombia negotiators and policy advisors to facilitate progress in the peace process.

* Enhance regional capacity for drug interdiction and interdiction of essential and precursor chemicals. The supplemental assistance package includes \$25 million for interdiction in Bolivia, \$12 million for interdiction in Ecuador, and \$32 million in KMAX helicopters for the Peruvian National Police. Those funds augment ongoing programs and are included to maintain pressure on drug transportation routes throughout the region to prevent displacement of the drug trade.

* Support alternative development programs that build on successful efforts in Peru and Bolivia and help initiate such programs in Ecuador. Peru will receive about \$27 million in alternative development funding through the regular budget process for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001. Bolivia will receive \$14 million in FY

2000 and \$17 million in FY 2001 through the regular State Department budget. The supplemental assistance package will provide an additional \$85 million to Bolivia and \$8 million to Ecuador for alternative economic development programs.

Support of Initial Plan Colombia Implementation in Southern Colombia

The Colombian National Police (CNP) will continue to be the primary responsible agency for drug law enforcement operations including drug crop eradication, lab destruction, chemical and drug shipment interdiction, and investigation and dismantling of trafficking organizations. The CNP's crop control efforts are severely limited by the danger posed to eradication aircraft and personnel by guerrillas and illegal mercenary forces. Military support is required to provide a sufficient level of security for the CNP to perform their law enforcement mission.

The U.S. assistance package will enable the Colombian Army to operate jointly with the CNP as they move into the dangerous drug production sanctuaries in southern Colombia. To achieve this, the assistance package provides funds to stand up two additional Army Counternarcotics Battalions. The first Army Counternarcotics Battalion, which was trained and equipped by the United States, became active in early 2000. The second Counternarcotics Battalion has been through human rights vetting procedures and started training in August 2000. The third Counternarcotics Battalion will begin training in January 2001 and should become active in April 2001. The assistance package will also provide resources to increase intelligence for the Colombian Joint Task Force - South, based at Tres Esquinas, which includes fully vetted participants from all the military services and the CNP.

Drug producing sanctuaries exist in Colombia because illegal armed groups are able to take advantage of Colombia's rugged geography, lack of basic infrastructure, and poor road network, to set up areas in which they can rule by force of arms. The emergency supplemental funding provides air mobility assets for the Counternarcotics Battalions so that they can operate and provide security for law enforcement in the vast coca-growing areas. The 13-16 (depending on configuration) UH-60 (Black Hawk), 15 UH-1N, and 30 refurbished UH-1H (Huey II) helicopters Congress authorized for the Army Counternarcotics Battalions will help provide the needed mobility. Eighteen UH-1N helicopters were delivered to Colombia in November 1999 for this purpose.

Additional CNP Funding

The assistance package includes \$115.6 million in additional support for the Colombian National Police, including procuring two UH-60 helicopters and additional spray aircraft; upgrading existing helicopters and planes; providing training, equipment, and secure communications; building new bases and enhancing security at existing bases. This will augment the existing State Department-funded country program and air wing support (around \$80 million per year). DEA will continue to fund its critical cooperative initiatives (\$3.5 million for FY 2000) in the areas of investigations of major trafficking organizations, intelligence collection and analysis, anti-money laundering measures, chemical control, lab destruction, and interdiction of drugs in transit.

Intelligence Enhancements

The assistance package includes \$92 million to enhance the Colombian and United States Governments' ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate the intelligence necessary to support all aspects of operational planning and execution.

A

portion of the funding goes toward improving the Colombian Government's ability to field effective intelligence programs in support of police and military counterdrug operations. Other funds will support Colombian and U.S. counterdrug investigative and information gathering efforts in Colombia, including those being carried out by U.S. law enforcement agencies. There is also \$30 million to procure a U.S. Army Airborne Reconnaissance Low aircraft for counterdrug intelligence collection.

Interdiction Support

In addition to crop control efforts, the Government of Colombia needs vigorous drug interdiction operations. U.S. and Colombian analysts assess that the air transportation node that services Colombian cocaine labs and growing areas is vulnerable to interdiction. The goal is to cause a major disruption of the traffickers' ability to move their product. A successful interdiction campaign, similar to the Peruvian airbridge denial effort, is required. The nearly \$78 million in funding for Colombian air interdiction programs in the package will establish Colombia's ability to interdict drug air transit in southern Colombia, and improve upon existing capability in northern Colombia through aircraft upgrades, additional ground-based radars, and improvement of existing air bases near the drug-producing regions.

Nearly \$22 million is provided to improve Colombian riverine, maritime, and overland interdiction efforts to prevent the traffickers from moving to alternative transportation routes or methods as air transport is disrupted.

To enhance regional interdiction efforts, including detection and monitoring missions over Colombia, the assistance package includes \$116.6 million to fund

construction and upgrades at the U.S. forward operating locations in Manta, Ecuador; and Aruba and Curaçao in the Netherlands Antilles as well as planning and design costs at a potential FOL in El Salvador. U.S. detection and monitoring aircraft are flying day and night missions out of Manta, Aruba and Curaçao. The package also includes \$68 million to fund radar upgrades to four U.S. Customs Airborne Early Warning Radar equipped P-3 aircraft for increased detection and monitoring missions in Colombia and throughout the region. The radar upgrade is required to ensure that scheduled missions are not lost due to the current lack of parts and technical support for the older system.

Human Rights

In accordance with U.S. law and policy, delivery of all assistance to the Colombian police and armed forces is contingent upon successful completion of a human rights screening process. No U.S. Government assistance is provided to any unit of the Colombian police or military for which there is credible evidence of gross human rights violations by its members, nor will any assistance be provided to such units, unless, as required by U.S. law and policy, the Secretary of State determines that the Government of Colombia is taking effective measures to bring those responsible for gross human rights violations to justice.

The Colombian military has improved its human rights performance in recent years. At the same time, the number of abuses committed by the guerrillas and particularly by the illegal mercenary groups has increased. The United States has urged the Government of Colombia to take effective steps to end abuses and impunity within its security forces and to ensure that links between members of the security forces and paramilitary groups are severed. In 1999 President Pastrana removed four generals linked to paramilitary groups. President Pastrana, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the Armed Forces

have stated
that they will not tolerate collaboration with the paramilitaries. The
Colombian
military has one of the longest unbroken records of support for
democracy and
civilian government in the hemisphere.

In August of 2000, Colombian President Pastrana directed in writing
that
Colombian Armed Forces personnel who are credibly alleged to have
committed gross
violations of human rights will be tried in civilian courts, in
accordance with
the 1997 ruling of Colombia's Constitutional Court regarding civilian
court
jurisdiction in human rights cases. Based on President Pastrana's
directive, the
Secretary of State certified that Colombia met one of the seven criteria
for
assistance set forth in the Emergency Supplemental Act. The
President
subsequently exercised his waiver authority for the remaining criteria
on
national security grounds in order to allow aid for Colombia,
including aid
designed to promote respect for human rights. We expect the
Colombian Government
will continue to make steady progress toward meeting the remaining
conditions
before we conduct the next certification review.

Bolstering Government Capacity and Alternative Development

The Government of Colombia will need to provide improved local
government
services and licit economic alternatives to the illegal drug trade to
consolidate
its authority in the drug-producing regions. The assistance package
contains a
major increase in U.S. support for Colombian alternative development
programs and
funds to improve the delivery of municipal government services in the
affected
areas.

In the package, the United States commits \$228 million over the next
two years to
alternative development, enhancing good governance, judicial reform,
and human
rights protection in Colombia. The goal of the expanded alternative

development programs in the support package is to provide assistance and possible alternative employment for a displaced coca labor force. Alternative development programs have been a key factor in recent, record-level reductions in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia. It is imperative to expand and continue efforts to provide licit economic opportunities in all three of the principal coca source countries so that there are alternatives to coca production and other illegal activity.

Strengthening the Justice System

Colombia's ability to enforce drug control laws is weakened by poorly functioning courts, by untrained or inexperienced judges and prosecutors, by threats, and by corruption. The support package contains a significant administration of justice element to help Colombia strengthen its criminal justice capacity to create long-term counterdrug capability, enhance the rule of law, and increase public confidence in the justice system. The programs will support law enforcement, the police and prosecutor investigative capabilities, and increased prison security.

The \$111.5 million in the assistance package for justice-related programs contributes to a comprehensive solution to the problems in Colombia and to protecting human rights and the rule of law. Many of the dramatic and

inter-related challenges to the rule of law that Colombia faces stem from a culture of violence bred by a long-standing insurgency and weak governing institutions in the interior of the country. The booming illegal drug trade has spawned additional violence and corruption. U.S. assistance to justice programs includes increased training for the police, prosecutors and judges in the areas of human rights, drug trafficking, maritime and border security, corruption, kidnapping, and money laundering/asset forfeiture cases. U.S. funds

will also be used for security and protection for witnesses, judges, and prosecutors in the criminal justice system; assistance for prison design and administration; support for the multilateral case initiative; and assistance for a comprehensive law enforcement response to organized financial crime in Colombia. Additionally, U.S. support for Plan Colombia will provide for procedural and legislative reforms to ensure that the judicial system functions fairly and effectively, with particular emphasis on the transition to an accusatory system, including oral trials.

Aid to the NGOs

Other initiatives related to increasing Colombia's governing capacity are U.S. assistance to international organizations and Colombian and U.S. NGOs helping Colombians displaced by the internal conflict, as well as funding for programs designed to protect human rights workers, strengthen Colombian government and non-governmental human rights entities, and establish and train specialized units in the Colombian National Police and Prosecutor General's Office to handle human rights cases.

Economic Recovery and the Peace Process

The remaining Colombia-specific programs in the supplemental support package are designed to address inter-related issues that exacerbate or facilitate the drug trade in Colombia. The Government of Colombia needs to create better conditions for a successful peace process and needs to attract more domestic and foreign investment. The United States will provide \$1.5 million in technical assistance to initiatives related to economic recovery. The United States will also provide \$4 million to fund training for Government of Colombia negotiators and policy advisors to facilitate progress in the peace process.

3. The Role of the United States Government in the Efforts of the Government of Colombia to Respond to Illegal Drug Production in Colombia

The role of the United States Government is to assist the Government of Colombia with equipment, training, fuel, crop eradication supplies, technical expertise and information in an effort to reduce the production of drugs in Colombia and stop their transport to the United States. Colombia and the United States also cooperate on police investigations and judicial matters.

The bulk of new assistance for Colombia and the region approved by the Congress in Fiscal Year 2000 will be used for a mobility package to enable the Colombian armed forces to provide security for the initiation of illegal drug crop control programs, law enforcement, and government assistance programs in the major coca-producing regions of Colombia, primarily in the departments of Putumayo and Caquetá.

4. The Role of the United States Government in the Efforts of the Government of Colombia to Deal with the Insurgency and Paramilitary Forces in Colombia

Our increased support for the Colombian National Police (CNP) and Armed Forces will continue to be focused on the common counterdrug objective. As a matter of administration policy, we will not support Colombian counterinsurgency efforts. The United States Government will, however, provide training, equipment, and intelligence support, in accordance with existing authorities, to the Government of Colombia for force protection and for security directly related to counterdrug efforts, regardless of the source of the threat.

5. How the Strategy with Respect to Colombia Relates to and Affects the United States' Strategy in Neighboring Countries.

The U.S. strategy with respect to Colombia is based on an assessment that the drug problem is a regional one, with Colombia as the center of gravity. The U.S. Colombia Initiative has a regional component that includes \$85 million for alternative development in Bolivia and \$8 million for alternative development in Ecuador. These funds will be in addition to the substantial alternative development programs ongoing in Bolivia and Peru funded through the regular budget process. The supplemental assistance package also includes \$25 million for interdiction in Bolivia, \$12 million for interdiction in Ecuador, and \$32 million for KMAX helicopters for the Peruvian National Police. There is \$18 million in the package to support drug interdiction efforts in other countries in the region including Brazil, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Those funds are included to maintain pressure on drug production and transportation routes in other source and transit countries, and to maintain support for income generating alternatives, particularly in Peru and Bolivia, which have demonstrated success in reducing coca production over the last four years. This support should help ensure that drug traffickers do not simply relocate cultivation, production, and transportation to other nations as Colombia intensifies its counterdrug efforts.

6. How the Strategy with Respect to Colombia Relates to and Affects the United States' Strategy for Fulfilling Global Counternarcotics Goals

The Colombia Initiative support package is in line with the National Drug Control Strategy -- a comprehensive approach focusing on: educating children about the dangers of drug use; decreasing the addict population; breaking the cycle of drugs and crime; securing our borders; and reducing the supply of drugs. U.S. support for Colombia and the region directly supports Goal 5 of

the
National Drug Control Strategy: Break Foreign and Domestic Drug
Sources of
Supply. Pursuant to this goal, the United States seeks to: "(1)
eliminate
illegal drug cultivation and production; (2) destroy drug trafficking
organizations; (3) interdict drug shipments; (4) encourage
international
cooperation; and (5) safeguard democracy and human rights." As the
largest
producer of cocaine in the world and the foremost supplier of heroin
to the
United States, Colombia must be a focal point of this global strategy.

7. A Strategy and Schedule for Providing Material, Technical, and
Logistical Support to Colombia and Neighboring Countries
In the first two years of the Colombia Initiative, the U.S. strategy calls
for

assisting the Government of Colombia in implementing Plan
Colombia in the South,
coupled with increased support of: air, ground, and riverine
interdiction
efforts; CNP law enforcement capabilities; alternative and economic
development;
and programs relating to human rights, humanitarian assistance, and
judicial
reforms.

Specific objectives call for a southern Colombia emphasis extending
over a
two-year period, Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002. Successful
implementation of this
strategy in southern Colombia will strengthen the Government of
Colombia's
presence in the area and will reduce the cultivation, production,
processing, and
trafficking of illegal drugs. This objective will establish the security
conditions needed to implement programs in the southern
municipalities of Mocoa,
Villa Garzon, Puerto Guzman, Puerto Caicedo, and Puerto Asis. The
plan will
extend to cover the entire country over a six-year period.
Some of the key dates related to support the strategy implementation
are:

- * September 1999 - The 1st Counter-Narcotics Battalion (CNBN) is
formed, vetted,
and begins training. (Completed)
- * February 2000 - The 1st CNBN begins operations in the south of
Colombia (based
in Tres Esquinas). (Completed)
- * August 2000 - The 2nd CNBN is formed, vetted, and begins

ongoing training at
Larandia.

* December 2000 - The 2nd CNBN completes training and begins operations.

* January 2001 - The 3rd CNBN is formed, vetted, and begins training.

* April 2001 - The 3rd CNBN begins operations.

To support these efforts, 15 UH-1Ns, 13-16 (depending on configuration) UH-60s

(Black Hawks), and 30 Huey IIs to support the Army CNBNs will be operational

following funding, acquisition, and placement in Colombia. These units will all

be used in implementing Plan Colombia in the southern phase of the strategy. The

package provides two additional UH-60s and 12 additional Huey IIs dedicated to

supporting the CNP.

The State Department expects that the 15 UH-1Ns can be restored and delivered to

Colombia in late calendar year 2000 or early 2001. Actual delivery dates will be

subject to availability of Department of Defense transport.

There are currently 10 Huey IIs for the CNP in the production pipeline from

previous funding. The current rate of production is about 2 helicopters per

month. The State Department expects that rate of production to continue for the

42 Huey IIs (12 for the CNP and 30 for the Colombian Army) included in the

emergency supplemental package. Actual delivery dates are subject to the

availability of Department of Defense transport.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has been tasked with managing the

purchase of the UH-60 helicopters for the Colombian Army. They are in the

process of working with the Department of State and Sikorsky Corporation on the

contract. DSCA expects that the contract will be signed in the spring of 2001.

The first UH-60s should be ready for delivery approximately 14 months after the

contract is signed (summer of 2002), and then produced at the rate of 2 or 3 per

month. DSCA is exploring the possibility of moving up the delivery date of the

Colombian helicopters in discussions with the U.S. Army and Sikorsky Corporation.

There are currently 47 Colombian Army officers in various stages of pilot training in the United States and Colombia. A full training schedule to ensure adequate personnel to fly and maintain the new air assets is under development by the Department of Defense and the Colombian military. The assistance package includes funding to purchase nine additional spray planes for the CNP. The Department of State is in the process of negotiating the contract to purchase these aircraft. After the contract is let, it should take about six months for the first plane to be produced, with a subsequent rate of production of about one aircraft per month. The upgrade to the U.S. Customs Service P-3 radars will be completed as soon as possible following the procurement process. Customs estimates that the lead time to contract for these modifications is 12 months. Estimated downtime for each aircraft during modification is six months. Two aircraft will be modified simultaneously, allowing all four aircraft to be modified in a 12-month period after the contract is signed.

USAID intends to obligate \$123.5 million of the funds appropriated for Plan Colombia by September 29, 2000. They are prepared to move forward at the same time on assistance to displaced persons. USAID's ongoing activities in

administration of justice and human rights will be expanded in October, when USAID will initiate activities to support anti-corruption programs. The largest single USAID-managed program, alternative development in coca-producing areas, is to be competitively bid, with a bidders' conference scheduled for October 3 in Bogota. Meanwhile, USAID has already expanded its existing alternative development project in poppy to include the first steps in voluntary eradication of coca. The U.S. Colombia Initiative assistance package also includes \$93 million for alternative development for Bolivia and Ecuador. Additionally, there

is \$87 million in the package to support increased drug interdiction activities in other countries in the region, primarily for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Brazil. The State Department has begun obligating these monies.

8. Strategy and Schedule for Making Forward Operating Locations (FOLs)

Fully Operational, Including Cost Estimates and a Description of the Potential Capabilities for Each Proposed Location and an Explanation of How the FOL Architecture Fits into the Overall Strategy

A schedule for making each Forward Operating Location fully operational, including cost estimates, timeline of contracting, and construction with completion dates:

Per Congressional instruction, the Department of Defense is submitting a separate classified report on the FOLs.

The level of development at each FOL is a capability driven process, based on requirements tasked to the Department of Defense and other agencies for counternarcotics detection, monitoring, and tracking (DM&T) operations. The following chart outlines the current military construction (MILCON) projects to make each FOL fully operational to include costs and funding status of each project. Projects designated in the Colombia Supplemental (CO SUP) are funded and included in the Chairman Stevens and Senator Byrd Amendment FY 2001 Military Construction Bill to the FY 2000 Emergency Supplemental for Counternarcotics Activities, Peacekeeping Operations, and other National Security Matters, dated May 9, 2000. These funds total \$116.523 million and include \$1.1 million for plan and design costs at the El Salvador FOL.

1. Project

Cost

Status

Plan and Design Aruba/Curacao/Manta
 \$10.8M
 Funded
 Manta Runway, Taxiway, Ramp
 \$38.6M
 In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
 Manta Vertical Construction
 \$22.673M
 In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
 Curacao Ramp, Taxiway, Rinse Facility
 \$29.5M
 In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
 Curacao Vertical Construction
 \$14.4M
 In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
 Aruba Ramp/Rinse Facility
 \$8.8M
 In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
 Aruba Hangar/Squadron Operations
 \$1.45M
 In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
 Plan and Design El Salvador
 \$1.1M
 In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
 El Salvador (CENTAM) Construction
 \$9.87M
 Unfunded
 GRAND TOTAL
 \$137.193M
 \$9.87M (Unfunded)

The following charts provide FOL timelines for contracting and construction with completion dates for Aruba, Curaçao, and Manta. The timelines for the El Salvador FOL are still under development.

Manta Runway, Taxiway and Ramp

Activity
 Completion date
 Authority to presolicit
 21 Mar 00
 Design complete
 31 Mar 00
 Authority to advertise
 7 Apr 00
 Advertise
 14 Apr 00
 Pre-proposal conference

5 May 00
Receive proposals
9 Jun 00
MILCON funds
17 Aug 00
Award
25 Aug 00
Notice to proceed
TBD
Phase I & II complete
TBD
Phase III complete
TBD

Manta Vertical Construction

Activity
Completion Date
65% design review
8 Mar 00
Authority to advertise
17 Apr 00
Design complete
28 Apr 00
Advertise
12 May 00
Pre-proposal conference
25 May 00
Receive proposals
6 Jul 00
Award
TBD
Notice to proceed
TBD
50% design review
TBD
95% design review
TBD
Support facilities complete
NLT 01 Nov 01
Facilities completion
NLT 01 Feb 02

Aruba and Curaçao Construction

Activity

Completion Date

Complete survey data
30 Jun 00
35% submittal
14 Aug 00
Authority to advertise
Estimated 4 Oct 00
100% submittal
Estimated 16 Oct 00
Receive proposals
Estimated 30 Dec 00
Source selection board
Estimated 15 Jan 01
Award
Estimated Feb 01
Construction complete
Estimated Dec 02

A Description of Potential Capabilities at Each FOL

Once the military construction is complete, each FOL will have varying

capabilities to support large, medium and small aircraft. (Note:

Aircraft size

is: large = E-3 AWACS and KC-135; medium = E-2, P-3, C-130 and ARL; small =

F-15, F-16 and C-550.) The Manta FOL will support all counterdrug (CD) aircraft,

to include E-3 AWACS and KC-135 operations. The Manta FOL ramp space will

support up to four large and four medium aircraft. The Aruba FOL will support

all CD medium-size and small aircraft with ramp space available for two medium

and three small aircraft. The Curaçao FOL will support all CD aircraft to

include E-3 AWACS and KC-135 operations. The Curaçao ramp space will support up

to two large, four medium and six small aircraft. The EL Salvador FOL at

Comalapa will support all medium CD aircraft with ramp space for up to four

medium aircraft.

How the FOL Architecture Fits the Overall Strategy

With the closure of Howard Air Force Base in Panama, the establishment of FOLs

in the region is critical to our ability to implement the National Drug Control

Strategy and execute the U.S. Southern Command's Counterdrug

Campaign Plan. The

FOLs are critical components in the post-Panama theater architecture extending

counterdrug detection and monitoring (D&M) assets' operational reach into both

drug source and transit zones.

The FOLs are not bases. They are existing airfields, which, with some

modifications, will allow U.S. counterdrug detection and monitoring aircraft

consistent access into the region. Agreements are in place in Manta, Ecuador;

and Aruba and Curaçao in the Netherlands Antilles. Another FOL agreement is

awaiting approval in the Salvadoran legislature. U.S. detection and monitoring

aircraft are currently flying day and night missions out of Manta, Aruba and

Curaçao.

FOL sites require extensive additional modifications to support the full range of

U.S. detection and monitoring aircraft conducting day/night all-weather

operations. When fully operational (in Fiscal Year 2001), these FOLs will allow

increased coverage of key Eastern Pacific and Caribbean transit zones, and full

coverage of the southern Colombia cocaine growing areas. The U.S. Colombia

Initiative support package provides \$116.6 million for modifying the FOLs in the

region to enable the United States to continue its robust regional interdiction

initiatives. In addition, the Department of Defense has assumed responsibility

for out-year funding of these locations.

V. CONCLUSION

The current crisis in Colombia has precipitated a need for a major increase in

U.S. efforts to protect its national interests in stemming the flow of illegal

drugs, supporting democracy and human rights, and encouraging free economic

development by supporting the counterdrug efforts of Colombia and other countries

in the region. There is strong political will in Colombia and throughout the region to attack the drug trade, root out corruption, end violence, and establish peace and security within the framework of democracy and respect for human rights.

While Colombia has become the center of illegal drug production in our hemisphere, the commitment of the Government of Colombia to attacking drug production and trafficking is indisputable. The Government of Colombia is conducting a robust counterdrug effort including eradication of drug crops, lab destruction, alternative development, arrest and prosecution of drug traffickers, and disruption of their organization; and air, maritime, riverine, and land interdiction operations to seize and destroy drugs and chemicals. Hundreds of Colombian police and military personnel, judges, prosecutors, government officials, and innocent civilians have lost their lives as a result of drug trafficking and the violence it generates. Just as we share with Colombia an appreciation of the threat to national security and social well-being posed by illegal drugs, we share the responsibility to act against them. It is imperative that the United States do its fair share to fight drug production and trafficking in Colombia and throughout the region in close cooperation with our democratic allies.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5941 POTUS memo on CO Supp Strategy Report.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER
BARRY R. McCAFFREY
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: Report on U.S. Counterdrug Assistance for Colombia and
Neighboring
Countries

Purpose

Report to the Congress on U.S. policy and strategy regarding
counterdrug
assistance for Colombia and neighboring countries.

Background

The Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, enacted on
July 11, 2000,
states that, not later than 60 days after enactment, the President shall
submit a
report on current U.S. policy and strategy regarding our counterdrug
assistance
for Colombia and neighboring countries to the Committee on Foreign
Relations and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee
on International
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.

The report at Tab B, prepared by the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, sets
forth the rationale for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring
countries
and highlights the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the
Andean region in
support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters transmitting the report to Congress at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Transmittal Letters to the Congress

Tab B Report on U.S. Counterdrug Assistance for Colombia and
Neighboring
Countries

2

5941

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Congressional Merge.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby report, pursuant to Section 3202 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, on current U.S. policy and strategy for counterdrug assistance to Colombia and neighboring countries.

The enclosed report sets forth the rationale for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries and highlights the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

Colombia's success in combating the threat of drugs is profoundly in the interest of the United States. A peaceful, democratic, and economically prosperous Colombia will result in a significant reduction of the supply of illicit

drugs
and help promote democracy and stability throughout the hemisphere.
I am proud
of the bipartisan effort that has made our Colombian initiative
possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby report, pursuant to Section 3202 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, on current U.S. policy and strategy for counterdrug assistance to Colombia and neighboring countries.

The enclosed report sets forth the rationale for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries and highlights the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

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I am proud
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possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby report, pursuant to Section 3202 of the Military Construction
Appropriations Act of 2000, on current U.S. policy and strategy for
counterdrug
assistance to Colombia and neighboring countries.

The enclosed report sets forth the rationale for expanded support to
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Colombia's success in combating the threat of drugs is profoundly in
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I am proud
of the bipartisan effort that has made our Colombian initiative

possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0201

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby report, pursuant to Section 3202 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, on current U.S. policy and strategy for counterdrug assistance to Colombia and neighboring countries.

The enclosed report sets forth the rationale for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries and highlights the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

Colombia's success in combating the threat of drugs is profoundly in the interest of the United States. A peaceful, democratic, and economically prosperous Colombia will result in a significant reduction of the supply of illicit drugs and help promote democracy and stability throughout the hemisphere. I am proud of the bipartisan effort that has made our Colombian initiative possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable C.W. "Bill" Young
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0910

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Peter D. R. Smith to Kennth Pollack. Subject: RE: [Confidential] (3 pages)	10/04/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/29/2000-10/24/2000]

2006-1363-F

vz5641

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/24/2000 8:23:45 PM
FROM Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: 06676ltrs.doc;06676b.doc;06676c.doc;06676a.doc
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Bash, Brooks L. (EXSEC)
Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Haas, Dean J. (ADMIN)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

please start review
-----Original Message-----
From: Edwards,
Joan K. (NONPRO)
Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2000 8:23 PM
To: Siberell,
Justin H. (NSA); Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Subject: 06676ltrs.doc;06676b.doc;06676c.doc;06676a.doc
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Here tis! Package will be over soon.

06676ltrs.doc;06676b.doc;06676c.doc;06676a.doc

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

06676ltrs.doc

Dear Senator Brownback:

Thank you for your letter of October 13 regarding the 1995 Aide Memoire signed by the Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to limit transfers of Russian conventional arms to Iran. This Russian commitment has successfully served the national security interests of the United States and our friends and allies in the region by restricting both the quantity and sophistication of Russian arms sold to Iran.

It is important to understand that the Aide Memoire is one part of a larger Administration strategy to restrict Iran's ability to become the dominant military power in its region. That strategy is also reflected in our cooperation with the Russian Government to prevent exports of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies to Iran. In each case, we have made maximum use of sanctions leverage to limit the flow of dangerous weapons and technologies.

I can assure you that the Vice President did not commit the Administration not to apply our sanctions laws. Instead, the negotiations that led up to the Aide Memoire skillfully extracted a promise from the Russians to limit their arms deliveries to items that we judged would not destabilize the region.

The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 imposes sanctions for the transfer of "advanced conventional arms." We used the threat of such sanctions to persuade the Russians to provide us with a list of all arms they intended to deliver to Iran under Soviet-era contracts. Our defense experts analyzed that list and found that it contained no advanced conventional arms that

were
sanctionable under U.S. law. A review by the Department of Defense
also
determined that the proposed transfers would neither destabilize the
region nor
pose particularly dangerous threats to U.S. forces operating there. We
were
willing to allow such arms transfers to proceed under those existing
contracts in
exchange for Russian commitments to complete the deliveries by the
end of 1999,
not to expand the scope of the existing contracts, and not to sign any
new arms
contracts with Iran. Thus, in effect, we were able to use existing
sanctions
provisions to get a commitment from the Russians to limit arms
deliveries only to
items that are neither sanctionable nor destabilizing.

As you acknowledge, Congress was briefed on the Aide Memoire in
1995. The Aide
Memoire is not an international agreement requiring transmittal to
Congress under
the Case Act, but rather a method of recording the details of a political
understanding between the United States and Russia. It does not
create legally
binding obligations on either nation.

Some have complained that U.S. efforts have not been undertaken in
the open. In
fact, the effectiveness of our efforts to persuade Russian leaders to
voluntarily
refrain from sales to Iran depended on their confidentiality. Needless
to say,
such restraints are not popular in Russia, and the publicity
surrounding recent
press accounts of the Aide Memoire and other related documents
jeopardizes these
understandings, which threatens the security interests of the United
States and
our friends in the region. As we discuss these important issues, I hope
we can
maintain the necessary confidentiality to protect our national security
interests.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Brownback
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1604

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of October 13 regarding the 1995 Aide Memoire signed by the Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to limit transfers of Russian conventional arms to Iran. This Russian commitment has successfully served the national security interests of the United States and our friends and allies in the region by restricting both the quantity and sophistication of Russian arms sold to Iran.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Mr. Leader:

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the Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to limit transfers
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national security interests of the United States and our friends and
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Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-7010

Dear Senator Smith:

Thank you for your letter of October 13 regarding the 1995 Aide Memoire signed by the Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to limit transfers of Russian conventional arms to Iran. This Russian commitment has successfully served the national security interests of the United States and our friends and allies in

the region by restricting both the quantity and sophistication of Russian arms sold to Iran.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Gordon H. Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3704

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 06676b.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Lott et al on Russia-Iran Arms Transfers

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Senator Lott and three colleagues concerning Russian arms transfers to Iran.

Background

The October 13 letter from Senators Lott, Smith, Brownback, and Helms contends that the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin on conventional arms transfers to Iran was a "secret deal" that allowed Iran to escape sanctions that should have been imposed. The Senators ask for your reassurance that the 1995

document does not
commit your Administration to break U.S. law by "dodging" sanctions
requirements.

In addition, the signatories contend that the Aide Memoire appears to
constitute
a treaty or international agreement that should have been submitted to
the Senate
for ratification or transmitted to the Congress under the Case-Zablocki
Act.

Your response details the national security benefits of the
arrangement, explains
that the arrangement does not violate with applicable sanctions law,
and refutes
the implication that the Aide Memoire represents a treaty or
international
agreement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Response to Senator Lott et al
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 06676c.doc

Dear Senator Brownback:

Thank you for your letter of October 13 regarding the 1995 Aide Memoire signed by the Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to limit transfers of Russian conventional arms to Iran. This Russian commitment has successfully served the national security interests of the United States and our friends and allies in the region by restricting both the quantity and sophistication of Russian arms sold to Iran.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Brownback
United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510-1604

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 06676a.doc

October 24, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GARY SAMORE

FROM: TOM MAERTENS

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Lott et al on Russia-Iran Conventional
Arms Transfers

The attached memo forwards a proposed response to Senator Lott and
3 colleagues
who wrote the President on October 13 concerning the 1995 Russian
commitment to
limit arms transfers to Iran.

The NSC received the original incoming correspondence on October
15.

Concurrence by: Mark Tavlarides, Andrew Weiss, Brad Wiegmann

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Response to Senator Lott

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

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6676