

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 01/24/2000 5:33:52 PM
FROM Edwards, Joan K. (NONPRO)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT 9259 labels.doc;9259 letters.doc [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Tucker, Maureen E. (NONPRO)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY check these over before I print them and send them forward. There is a letter to Helms, but I had to include it because otherwise I wouldn't get a label.

9259 labels.doc;9259 letters.doc

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

9259 labels.doc

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
221 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-0802

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
United States Senate
311 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-4801

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
House of Representatives
1401 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-0702

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
House of Representatives
2449 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
403 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

The Honorable David R. Obey
House of Representatives
2462 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-4907

The Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senate
522 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-0201

The Honorable C.W. Young
House of Representatives
2407 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-0910

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 9259 letters.doc

Dear Joe:

On October 25, 1999, I signed into law the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000 ("the Act"). Section 9001(d)(2) of the Act requires me to provide the appropriate congressional committees with an unclassified and classified report listing "those Indian and Pakistani entities whose activities

contribute
to missile programs or weapons of mass destruction programs."
Following India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests in May 1998,
my
Administration imposed economic and military sanctions on both
countries in
accordance with section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act ("the
Glenn
Amendment") and section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of
1945. In
addition, my Administration identified Indian and Pakistani
government,
parastatal, and private entities involved in nuclear, missile, and certain
conventional military activities. These entities were added to the
existing
"Entity List" published by the Department of Commerce and special
licensing
requirements were applied to them.

In early autumn of 1999, after nearly a year of experience using the
revised
lists of Indian and Pakistani entities, my Administration began to
review those
lists to further refine and focus them. While the review process
continues, my
Administration has revised the lists based on interagency agreements
reached thus
far. The revised Indian and Pakistani entities lists are attached. Based
on an
assessment of available information, fifty-one Indian entities (plus
two
locations from one Indian entity) have been removed from the
previous list of
212. There may be further deletions or additions in the future, as
circumstances
change and/or as more information becomes available. As changes
occur, we will
inform the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as appropriate.

The format of the Indian and Pakistani entities lists has been revised
to further
clarify the organizational connections between many of the entities
and their
sub-entities. This reformatting does not affect in any way the lists'
coverage
with regard to any listed entity or sub-entity.

There are presently forty principal entities on the India list. In the
interest

of precision and transparency, those specified sub-entities (subsidiaries, branches, plants, etc.) remain listed as well. This approach more clearly avoids capturing unrelated sub-entities and allows a more precise focus for U.S. Government nonproliferation efforts.

In addition, we are changing the license review policy for export of those goods which are subject to Commerce Department jurisdiction but are not specifically listed on the Commerce Control List from a presumption of denial to a presumption of approval for all listed Indian and Pakistani entities. This change affects exports of goods for which a license is not generally required by the United States, and which are not controlled as specifically listed items.

I appreciate the Congress' interest in this matter. The appropriate agencies are available to brief members and staff, if needed.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0802

Dear Senator Byrd:

On October 25, 1999, I signed into law the Department of Defense Appropriations

Act of 2000 ("the Act"). Section 9001(d)(2) of the Act requires me to provide the appropriate congressional committees with an unclassified and classified report listing "those Indian and Pakistani entities whose activities contribute to missile programs or weapons of mass destruction programs." Following India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, my Administration imposed economic and military sanctions on both countries in accordance with section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act ("the Glenn Amendment") and section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. In addition, my Administration identified Indian and Pakistani government, parastatal, and private entities involved in nuclear, missile, and certain conventional military activities. These entities were added to the existing "Entity List" published by the Department of Commerce and special licensing requirements were applied to them.

In early autumn of 1999, after nearly a year of experience using the revised lists of Indian and Pakistani entities, my Administration began to review those lists to further refine and focus them. While the review process continues, my Administration has revised the lists based on interagency agreements reached thus far. The revised Indian and Pakistani entities lists are attached. Based on an assessment of available information, fifty-one Indian entities (plus two locations from one Indian entity) have been removed from the previous list of 212. There may be further deletions or additions in the future, as circumstances change and/or as more information becomes available. As changes occur, we will inform the Senate Committee on Appropriations as appropriate.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4801

Dear Sam:

On October 25, 1999, I signed into law the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000 ("the Act"). Section 9001(d)(2) of the Act requires me to provide the appropriate congressional committees with an unclassified and classified report listing "those Indian and Pakistani entities whose activities contribute to missile programs or weapons of mass destruction programs." Following India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, my Administration imposed economic and military sanctions on both countries in accordance with section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act ("the Glenn Amendment") and section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. In addition, my Administration identified Indian and Pakistani government, parastatal, and private entities involved in nuclear, missile, and certain conventional military activities. These entities were added to the existing "Entity List" published by the Department of Commerce and special licensing requirements were applied to them.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0702

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On October 25, 1999, I signed into law the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000 ("the Act"). Section 9001(d)(2) of the Act requires me to provide the appropriate congressional committees with an unclassified and classified report listing "those Indian and Pakistani entities whose activities contribute to missile programs or weapons of mass destruction programs." Following India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, my Administration imposed economic and military sanctions on both countries in accordance with section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act ("the Glenn Amendment") and section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. In addition, my Administration identified Indian and Pakistani government, parastatal, and private entities involved in nuclear, missile, and certain conventional military activities. These entities were added to the existing "Entity List" published by the Department of Commerce and special licensing requirements were applied to them.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman

Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Dave:

On October 25, 1999, I signed into law the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000 ("the Act"). Section 9001(d)(2) of the Act requires me to provide the appropriate congressional committees with an unclassified and classified report listing "those Indian and Pakistani entities whose activities contribute to missile programs or weapons of mass destruction programs." Following India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, my Administration imposed economic and military sanctions on both countries in accordance with section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act ("the Glenn Amendment") and section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. In addition, my Administration identified Indian and Pakistani government, parastatal, and private entities involved in nuclear, missile, and certain conventional military activities. These entities were added to the existing "Entity List" published by the Department of Commerce and special licensing requirements were applied to them.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable David R. Obey
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4907

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0201

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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I appreciate the Congress' interest in this matter. The appropriate agencies are available to brief members and staff, if needed.

Sincerely,

The Honorable C.W. "Bill" Young
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0910

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 01/26/2000 6:21:50 PM
FROM Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: SRB profile in "The Hill" [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

I did everything but provide the violin music

-----Original Message-----

From: Bradtke,
Robert A. (EXSEC)
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2000 5:50 PM
To: Lackey,
Miles M. (LEGIS)
Subject: RE: SRB profile in "The Hill" [UNCLASSIFIED]

how
did you ever get him to say that stuff??

-----Original Message-----

From:
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2000 5:35
PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: SRB profile in "The Hill"
[UNCLASSIFIED]

PLEASE PASS TO SANDY

The profile in "The Hill"
was published today (I'll fax over a copy). (And yes, I'm happy!).
The first few paragraphs read as follows:

President Clinton's
top national security advisor has pledged that the Clinton administration
will work closely with the Republican Congress to keep partisan politics
out of foreign policy deliberations during the 2000 presidential

campaign.

"I really hope and believe very deeply that we ought to conduct American foreign policy on a bi-partisan basis," Samuel R. (Sandy) Berger, assistant to the president for national security affairs, told The Hill. "I am absolutely committed to do everything in my power this year to further that objective."

Berger's comments came on the eve of Vice President Al Gore's resounding victory in the Iowa caucuses and in the wake of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms warning to the UN Security Council that the United States would withdraw from the world body if it ignores American interests.

"We're in the midst of a presidential campaign, that's a great exercise of American democracy," Berger said. "But I believe that we can, and we must, pursue America's interests in the world on a bipartisan basis, and that means the president, the executive branch and the Congress, Democrat and Republican, working together."

He added, "It means we have responsibilities as the executive to keep Congress fully informed on what we're doing, and to consult with them on a genuine basis and on a bipartisan basis. I hope that they will also feel we can do a lot this year in advancing America's common interests in the world, notwithstanding the fact that there is a vigorous American political campaign going on."

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 03/01/2000 3:30:26 PM
FROM Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: CFE Compliance report to Congress -- [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Caroline:

One last question on the subject Report. Attached is the transmittal letter -- almost identical to the one we used last year. Wanted to make sure you were ok with it, since I don't believe you were here when we did last year's package. (I haven't been sitting on this -- it's just taken almost a week to get a typo-free version of the Report over here.)

I've also attached the revised POTUS and SRB memos, for info.

-----Original Message-----

From: Krass,
Caroline D. (LEGAL)
Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2000 5:16 PM
To: Witkowsky,
Anne A. (DEFENSE)
Cc: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;
@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: FW:
CFE Compliance report to Congress -- [UNCLASSIFIED]

Please see
changes in both documents, including a recommendation for an extra
sentence in the memo to the President.

-----Original Message-----

From: Witkowsky,
Anne A. (DEFENSE)

Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2000 12:38 PM
To: @RUSSIA
- Russia/Ukraine; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT -
Legislative
Affairs
Subject: CFE Compliance report to Congress -- [UNCLASSIFIED]

It's
that time of year (again)...

For Andrew, Mark, and Caroline:

* You
have, or will have soon, the final CFE Compliance Report to
Congress,
for concurrence. (Due 1 January and just received today from State).

* Would like your comments/ << File: 1265prs.doc >> << File:
1265srb.doc >> concurrence by COB, Tuesday, February 29.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1265a.doc

Dear Joe:

In accordance with Condition (5)(C) of the resolution of advice and
consent to
ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the
Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 ("The
CFE Flank
Document"), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14,
1997, enclosed
is the 1999 Report on CFE Compliance.

The Report is provided in both a classified and unclassified version.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph Biden
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

2

UNCLASSIFIED
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1265b.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Condition (5)(C) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 ("The CFE Flank Document"), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14, 1997, enclosed is the 1999 Report on CFE Compliance.

The Report is provided in both a classified and unclassified version.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, D.C. 20510

2

UNCLASSIFIED
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1265c.doc

Dear Mr. Leader:

In accordance with Condition (5)(C) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 ("The CFE Flank Document"), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14, 1997, enclosed is the 1999 Report on CFE Compliance.

The Report is provided in both a classified and unclassified version.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard Gephardt
Minority Leader
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

2

UNCLASSIFIED
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1265d.doc

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with Condition (5)(C) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification on the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 ("The CFE Flank Document"), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14, 1997, enclosed is the 1999 Report on CFE Compliance.

The Report is provided in both a classified and unclassified version.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

UNCLASSIFIED
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1265prs.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: CFE Compliance Report

Purpose

Transmit an annual Report to Congress on CFE Compliance.

Background

At Tab B is the third annual Report to Congress on CFE Compliance, which has been prepared by the State Department consistent with Condition (5)(C) of the May 14, 1997 Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the CFE Flank Document. Condition (5)(C) states that you must certify which countries are in

compliance with the CFE Treaty and discuss the compliance issues concerning those countries not certified.

Like previous years, this year's Report judges that, of the 30 CFE Parties, 25 (all but Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine) are certified to be in compliance. In the case of the five states that are not certified as in compliance, our judgments are based mainly on previously existing issues.

The scale of Russia's violations of the flank limits, however, have been exacerbated because of the situation in Chechnya. This noncompliance problem is well known on the Hill among those who follow CFE and European security, but the details of its scale may provide a basis for additional criticism of Russia and/or Administration policy toward Russian actions in Chechnya. Russia's compliance problems also extend now to several other areas of the Treaty, including, for the first time, exceeding one of its overall CFE limits by a small amount (in the category of artillery) -- also as a result of the Chechnya

operation. We have raised all of these issues with Russia repeatedly, and pressed the flank issue in particular. As a result of our high level intervention, Prime Minister Putin has publicly committed that Russia will reduce to adapted CFE Treaty levels as soon as possible. At the Istanbul summit you publicly stated our concern about this noncompliance and made clear you would only submit the adapted CFE Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russia had in fact made its promised reductions.

The Report concludes that, although they may have regional implications, none of the compliance issues identified are militarily significant to the United States, our NATO allies, or to NATO as a whole.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters of transmittal for the CFE Compliance

Report at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Letters of Transmittal
Tab B Report to Congress

2
UNCLASSIFIED
~~w/SECRET Attachment~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~w/SECRET Attachment~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~w/SECRET Attachment 1265~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~w/SECRET Attachment~~ cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1265srb.doc

March 1, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS BINNENDIJK

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY

SUBJECT: CFE Compliance Report

Attached is the third annual Report on CFE Compliance, for submittal to Congress consistent with the Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the CFE Flank Document. It was prepared by State and has been cleared by all relevant agencies. The memorandum for the President at Tab I recommends he forward the Report to the Congress.

This correspondence was received by the NSC on February 28th.

Concurrence by: Caroline Krass, Andrew Weiss, and
Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Letters of Transmittal

Tab B Report to Congress

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

2

UNCLASSIFIED

~~W/SECRET Attachment~~ 1265

UNCLASSIFIED

~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 03/08/2000 7:19:26 PM
FROM vonLipsey, Roderick K. (SEE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Helms voices opposition to promoting senior official for Balkans
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Manning, Michael T. (WHSR)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Thank you very much, Michael. We all received it. Not good news for State.....

-----Original Message-----

From: Manning, Michael
T. (WHSR)

Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2000 6:47 PM

To: vonLipsey,
Roderick K. (SEE); Hill, Christopher R. (SEE); Kaidanow, Tina S.
(SEE)

Cc: @WHSR - WH Situation Room

Subject: Helms voices opposition
to promoting senior official for Balkans [UNCLASSIFIED]

Rod--Per
your request:

^AM-NC--Helms-Diplomat,430
^Helms voices opposition
to promoting senior official for Balkans
^Eds: note N.C. interest
throughout; also moving on national lines
WASHINGTON (AP) Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Jesse Helms said Wednesday
he will oppose any attempt to promote a senior
U.S. diplomat who
now oversees American policy in the Balkans.
Helms, R-N.C.,
cited reports that the Clinton administration
would name James
Dobbins assistant secretary of state for European Affairs
without
submitting the appointment to the Senate as a nomination.

In explaining his opposition, the senator referred to allegations that Dobbins may have misled Congress about death squads in Haiti.

"The administration knows that the Senate could not possibly confirm anyone who has conducted himself in such a fashion, but for some reason that I cannot fathom, some top officials of the administration

insist on promoting Mr. Dobbins," Helms said in a statement. "I hope and suggest that they reconsider this position."

In response, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said through a spokesman she had the highest confidence in Dobbins' integrity and

effectiveness.

Dobbins has served her and the United States "extraordinarily well" and "so far as I know he has been fully cleared of all these allegations," spokesman James P. Rubin said.

On the reports of a promotion, Rubin said he could not comment

on any "possible nominations by the president."

Dobbins, a former ambassador and a former member of the White House national security staff, has produced documents showing he was cleared in 1998 of accusations of intentionally misleading the House International Relations Committee. But a letter criticizing the way he testified was placed in his file that year.

The State Department's inspector general, Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, had found Dobbins "acted with reckless disregard" in his testimony in 1995 about an FBI investigation into the murder of a right-wing critic of President Jean-Bernard Aristide.

Later, the State Department concluded Dobbins had not been briefed fully by the FBI and that the information

the FBI gave the U.S. Embassy in Haiti was not specific, and in some cases inaccurate, department officials said.

Last year, when Albright selected Dobbins to oversee U.S. policy in Bosnia and in Kosovo, Helms wrote Albright suggesting she pick someone ``who has not been accused by the State Department's inspector general of lying to Congress."

Helms said that any attempt by the State Department to try to give Dobbins the new post without submitting his name to the Senate would be ``a particularly egregious abuse of the nomination process."

APE- 03/08/00 18:18:26

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 03/21/2000 11:10:09 PM
FROM Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: PCKG 0707 -- Report to Congress [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Package in ExecSec hold bin -- letters printed and included in package.
Awaiting confirmation from NONPRO.

June

-----Original Message-----

From: Bartlett,
L. June (EXSEC)
Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2000 11:03 PM
To: @NONPRO
- Export Controls
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: PCKG
0707 -- Report to Congress [UNCLASSIFIED]

Re: Semi-Annual Report
on North Korea

Can you reconfirm that the attached letters are
the correct letters that should be transmitted with the report attached.

ExecSec
had a question concerning the additional letters -- only one letter
was printed as part of the package. I discovered the additional
letters on the diskette while making minor formatting edits.

I
noted that Senator McConnell was addressed as the Chairman,
Committee

on Rules and Administration -- shouldn't he be addressed as the
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in this instance?

Also,
I added Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, etc. to
Representative
Callahan.

Please let us know if these letters are okay now.

Thanks.

June

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 0707 letters.doc

Dear Senator Biden:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading
"International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign
Operations
Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean
Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0802

Dear Senator Byrd:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading
"International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign
Operations
Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean
Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4801

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading

"International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sonny Callahan
Chairman
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-6021

Dear Representative Gejdenson:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0702

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Senator Leahy:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510-4502

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Chairman
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,
Export Financing and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6031

Dear Representative Obey:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable David R. Obey
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4907

Dear Representative Pelosi:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0508

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0201

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations

Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable C.W. "Bill" Young
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0910

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 03/22/2000 10:29:57 AM
FROM Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: PCKG 0707 -- Report to Congress [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Okay, I'm confused. Do we address a letter to someone as Chairman of a subcommittee? I thought we did not do that. See letters to Callahan and McConnell.

-----Original Message-----

From:
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2000
9:29 AM
To: Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC); @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs
Cc: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @NONPRO - Export Controls;
@EXECSEC
- Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: PCKG 0707 -- Report to Congress
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Attached letters are fine.

-----Original Message-----

From: Millison,
Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2000 9:18 AM
To: @LEGISLAT
- Legislative Affairs
Cc: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @NONPRO - Export
Controls; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW: PCKG 0707
-- Report to Congress [UNCLASSIFIED]

I think it would be helpful
to have input from your office. Can you let us know. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)

Sent: Tuesday,

March 21, 2000 11:03 PM

To: @NONPRO - Export Controls

Cc: @EXECSEC

- Executive Secretary

Subject: PCKG 0707 -- Report to Congress [UNCLASSIFIED]

Re:

Semi-Annual Report on North Korea

Can you reconfirm that the attached letters are the correct letters that should be transmitted with the report attached.

ExecSec had a question concerning the additional letters -- only one letter was printed as part of the package. I discovered the additional letters on the diskette while making minor formatting edits.

I noted that Senator McConnell was addressed as the Chairman, Committee on Rules and Administration -- shouldn't he be addressed as the Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in this instance?

Also, I added Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, etc. to Representative Callahan.

Please let us know if these letters are okay now.

Thanks.

June

<< File: 0707 letters.doc >>

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 0707 letters.doc

Dear Senator Biden:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0802

Dear Senator Byrd:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4801

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sonny Callahan
Chairman
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-6021

Dear Representative Gejdenson:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0702

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Senator Leahy:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

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United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4502

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Export Financing and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6031

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Sincerely,

The Honorable David R. Obey
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4907

Dear Representative Pelosi:

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House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0508

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Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0201

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Sincerely,

The Honorable C.W. "Bill" Young
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0910

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 04/26/2000 7:37:20 AM
FROM Edwards, Joan K. (NONPRO)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT 2427 ltrs [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

2427ltrs.doc

Dear Joe:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense, submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0802

Dear Senator Byrd:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense, submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4801

Dear Sam:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0702

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological
Weapons Defense,
submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and
consent to
ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
adopted by the
United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-6501

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense, submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Carl:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense, submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2202

Dear Dave:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense, submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable David R. Obey
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4907

Dear Ike:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense, submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-2504

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense, submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,

adopted by the
United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4002

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological
Weapons Defense,
submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and
consent to
ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
adopted by the
United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510-0201

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense, submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4601

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached is a report to the Congress on Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense, submitted pursuant to Condition 11(F) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the United States Senate on April 24, 1997.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Don Young
Chairman
Committee on Resources
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0201

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 04/28/2000 7:41:24 PM

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT MKA Remarks (4-27-2000) at Joint Press Avail with FM Ivanov
[UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Aragoncillo, Leandro A. (VP)
Babbitt, James F. (VP)
Beardsley, Tyler S. (VP)
Black, Steven K. (VP)
Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
Davidson, Leslie K. (VP)
Dennett, Todd H. (VP)
Fuerth, Leon S. (VP)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
Orfini, Michael H. (VP)
Osius, Theodore G. (VP)
Roberts, Michael W. (VP)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Woolston, Ann E. (VP)
Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE)
Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN)
Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
Segal, Jack D. (NONPRO)
Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Albright (4-27-00) Jt Press Avail with FM Ivanov.doc

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release April 27, 2000
2000/485

REMARKS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
AT
JOINT PRESS AVAILABILITY WITH
RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IGOR IVANOV

Treaty Room
Washington, D.C.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I am very pleased to have had time with my friend and colleague, Foreign Minister Ivanov, here at the Department of State. We've had much to talk about in these past two days, and although we do not agree on all issues, as I told the Foreign Minister, this is only to be expected. After all, we can't both be right all the time.

In truth, we had some very in-depth conversations about subjects that are at the heart of our bilateral relationship, as we prepare for the meeting of our presidents in June. We obviously spent a lot of time on issues of nonproliferation and arms control.

Both the United States and Russia recognize a responsibility to reduce the threats posed to our own citizens and to world peace by weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that can deliver them.

Accordingly, the Foreign Minister and I devoted much of our time to strategic arms control, and I congratulated him on the Duma's recent approval of START II and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaties. I also expressed American determination to continue working with Russia to promote nuclear stability through further mutual reductions in our arsenals and through preserving the ABM

Treaty by adapting it to meet 21st century needs.

We also discussed the need to stem the flow of sensitive technology to countries that could threaten both our nations. To this end, we have made significant progress, but ongoing vigilance and further concrete steps are required.

The Foreign Minister and I reviewed regional security issues, as well. As co-sponsors of the Middle East Peace Process, we focused on the recent visits to Washington of Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat, and on the need for cooler heads to prevail in southern Lebanon.

We talked about the importance of strengthening the forces of tolerance in the Balkans, including Kosovo, and the requirement for maintaining a vigorous international presence.

On Korea, we both welcomed the upcoming North-South Summit, and agreed to continue working together to address common concerns.

We also have shared interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The zero-sum thinking of the Cold War is especially irrelevant here. The US and Russia both gain by helping countries in this region to strengthen sovereignty, achieve democratic progress and counter transnational threats.

Trade and investment were also on our agenda. At lunch yesterday with Commerce Secretary Bill Daley, we discussed ways for Russia to improve its investment climate, including through the ratification of our Bilateral Investment Treaty.

Finally, the Foreign Minister and I resumed our dialogue on Chechnya. The United States looks to Russia to heed the recent call by the UN Human Rights Commission for an investigation of credible reports of human rights violations.

As I think the Foreign Minister agrees, there is no military solution to the

conflict in Chechnya. The sooner Russia achieves a political solution, the sooner the suffering of the Chechen people will end and Russia's international standing will recover.

As we saw again during these meetings, the United States and Russia have a broad range of important business to conduct, and we can do so in a businesslike and productive manner.

President Clinton told Minister Ivanov that he is looking forward to his summit with President-elect Putin in that spirit. And I believe that our discussions this week have gone far to preparing the ground for that very important event.

Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV: First of all, I would like to sincerely thank the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, for the warm reception accorded to the Russian delegation in Washington. At the core of the meetings here with President Clinton, Secretary of State and other representatives of the US Administration and the leaders of the US Senate and the business interests of the United States and the governor of Texas, Mr. Bush, we put the questions of the furtherance of the Russian-American cooperation.

Special attention in this connection was paid to the preparations for the forthcoming summit meeting in Moscow between President Putin and President of the United States Clinton. Both sides are resolved to do their utmost for the Moscow Summit to become a major event in the Russian-American relations, conducive to the strengthened international security and stability, and a constructive development of interaction between our two countries. We will have a very busy time to prepare this agenda.

As Madame Albright mentioned, an important place in this work

belongs to the issues related to strategic stability. After the ratification of the package of agreements on START II and the ABM in 1997, as well as the CTBT, favorable opportunities open for our interaction in this area, including timely or initiation of negotiations without delay on further deep cuts of the strategic offensive arms within START III. We expect that the US side would ratify a similar package of instruments, and this wish was made known yesterday during my meeting with senators.

At the same time, quite naturally, there are certain differences of view, sometimes considerable differences, having to do with the plans to deploy in United States the National Missile Defense System. These issues were discussed in detail both at the State Department and at the Pentagon. We believe, and it has been stressed at the highest level, the ABM treaty of 1972 should remain a cornerstone of the strategic stability and the basis for strategic stability in the world. We are confident that this corresponds to the interests of both Russia and the United States of America.

In this connection, during the consultations in Washington, the Russian side proposed an alternative program of action that would enable, in our view, us to adequately respond to new threats related inter alia to the threat of the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. Of principal importance is to address those issues on the basis of dialogue and taking into account mutual interests of each other. The Russian side is fully prepared for it.

In specific terms, we discussed the main regional issues, including the situation in the Balkans, the Middle East settlement, and we also had an exchange on the situation in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Both sides stressed the importance and the urgency of cooperation in fighting such a global challenge as international terrorism.

Considerable attention was devoted to the prospect of economic interaction between Russia and the United States of America. We have agreed that the most considerable economic and trade projects would receive the patronage of the leaders of the two countries.

Now, we in Russia developed a set of serious measures to improve investment climate and to protect the rights of foreign investors, including through the adoption of relevant legal acts. And it is beginning to bring first results, as supported by my meetings with numerous leaders of the business interests of the United States. But one must recognize, at the same time, that our capabilities or the potential of our relations are not yet realized to the full extent and we have a major work ahead.

We are satisfied in general by the negotiations held, and primarily by the environment atmosphere of these negotiations, which was frank and constructive. And we were focused on finding solutions to the questions that we are faced with now. At the same time, negotiations confirmed once again that the positive experience of the eight years of cooperation serves as a good basis for furtherance of interaction between our countries in different areas to ensure continuity in our relations.

Thank you.

Q Madame Secretary, if I understand what the Foreign Minister particularly what he said yesterday correctly, the demarcation agreement of 1997 on the kind of missile tests that would be permissible - both sides agree - under the ABM Treaty could be a basis for resolving this dispute over anti-missile defenses. And I was at that meeting and the US was ecstatic with the results of the meeting. Apparently, the US got everything approved that it wanted approved.

Is there a basis now, or at least are you closer to getting around this

problem?

And if you don't mind me tagging on one little thing: is Senator Jesse Helms a new problem for you?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me say, first of all -

Q I thought you had him neutralized.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me say on the demarcation, we were very - are very - I pleased with what it did. And it is a very important agreement. But what it does is deal with the issue of shorter range missiles. And we have a new problem. That is the issue. It does not deal with intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that is our concern about how we deal with the new threats.

We have spoken before, and we did again during this meeting, about cooperating on theater missile defense, and we think that it can supplement but it is not sufficient for dealing with the problems that we have. And so I think we will continue to talk about it.

As far as what was said yesterday from the Hill, I believe that the American people support a policy that seeks to both further reduce nuclear dangers left over from the Cold War and to address new threats. And we are going to continue to pursue this policy in the months ahead.

I don't think we can take a pause for the rest of the year in defending US national interests, because neither the threats are taking a pause, nor would it be suitable for us not to be concerned about national interests 24 hours a day, seven days a week, until the end of this Administration. So I disagree with what Senator Helms said yesterday.

Q Russian State TV and Radio Company. Ms. State Secretary, will you please ask such a question? Can you imagine the future when the United States build up its

new defense system but Russia withdraw from all the military treaties? If yes, how can you see such a future?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I am hoping that, as a result of what will be continued discussions - they were very intensive here now, they will continue to be - we will not be in that kind of a position, because I think that we have a great deal that we need to do together and we will continue to have very intensive discussions. We are very involved in analyzing the various problems. I think we had very, very good and productive meetings here and so I would hope that we could continue to talk intensively.

Q Ben Barber of The Washington Times. Madame Albright, is it possible for the United States to build a limited National Missile Defense, such as the one that's been thought of in Alaska with about 100 interceptors, without bringing this before the US Senate for approval, to allow Jesse Helms to oppose it in his way?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I think that, obviously, we want to have support for this agreement but, first, we have to get it. And we are going to be involved in intensive discussions.

And as I said, I believe the American people want us to end some of the problems that were left over from the Cold War and deal with the new threats, and that's what we are doing. And I think that we are following what the American people basically want.

Q Could you describe what economic documents are now being prepared for the forthcoming summit?

And to both foreign ministers, when the START III negotiations could be expected?

FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV: I think that today, now, it would be premature to name

any specific documents to be signed in the course of the summit meeting in Moscow. This is precisely the stuff that we will have to discuss in the near future, including agenda and specific documents. But, at the same time, I would like to stress that now - and I realized this during my negotiations, including with the business interests of the United States - the period of disenchantment is over in the United States related to August of 1998, and they realize all too well here that some positive results have been achieved and recorded in our economy in all economic areas - indicators, rather.

I, for my part, tried to describe the plans that are now in the making in the Russian Government in terms of further strengthening of the legal base, basis for the market economy that would further the basics of the market mechanisms, and create appropriate and encouraging investment climate. My impression is that this information produces hope amongst the American investors and the capital in connection with coming to the Russian markets. At least we will facilitate it.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: We had a long discussion about this yesterday. And I think that, in terms of investment, America is already the largest investor in Russia. But I think that what is very important is for there to be a framework established that would encourage increased investment, and it requires a whole set of pieces of legislation, I think, on the Russian side that would give additional confidence to American and other investors.

In terms of START III, I think that President Yeltsin and President Clinton in Cologne said that they wanted to have ABM and START III discussions go on in a parallel form. And we are involved, I think, as I've now said a couple of times, in very intensive discussions on arms control issues and on NMD issues.

Q Madame Secretary, a short time ago, while the two of you were

back there
talking, Fidel Castro in an interview with CNN directly accused the
State
Department of throwing up roadblocks and preventing Cuban
diplomats from seeing
Elian Gonzalez and his father out at the Wye River Plantation. Is this
true?

And, secondly, on Iran, how concerned are you about this
conservative, hard-line
crackdown on Iranian newspapers, and do you think that they will
succeed in
intimidating Iranian voters ahead of next month's second round of
Majlis
elections? Thank you.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, I think that we have - the
State Department
has fulfilled its appropriate role We've granted visas to these
playmates, the
children that are coming with their either parents or chaperones, and
we will
look at the cases of Cuban diplomats that want to go to Wye on a
case-by-case
basis.

On Iran, I think we clearly are very concerned about what is
happening there
now, and would hope that this is not the overwhelming trend because
we were very
encouraged by the Majlis elections and some of the other activities
there that
indicated that there was a movement towards reform.

I think we're going to have to watch this very carefully. There really
clearly
are two contending approaches for the future of Iran. And in speeches
that I've
given and in comments, I have pointed out a number of times that
those who have
voted for President Khatami or for the Majlis reform members are the
younger
generation, and they are the future of Iran. And so we will watch this
very
carefully.

Q Elaine Monaghan of Reuters. Foreign Minister Ivanov, you
mentioned that you
wanted the United States to ratify a similar package of documents to
those

approved in Moscow. Do you mean ratification of the CTBT, or is there a wider array of demands that you have?

FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV: I would like to remind you that Russia ratified the START II Treaty and ratified agreements on the ABM of 1997. Also, the CTBT has been ratified. I think that the ratification of all of these instruments in the United States would serve the interests of the United States and the interests of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the interests of the further reduction of strategic offensive arms.

Q Do you have an impression that on the issues that separate us certain breakthroughs have been achieved? And are you satisfied after the discussions, difficult discussions, of these issues with Secretary Albright?

FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV: First of all, I have a feeling that both in Washington and in Moscow - and I'm speaking of myself here - there is a desire to find solutions to the issues where we differ. Indeed, these include the issues of, as we say, vital importance that would determine the future policies in the world and the relations between our two countries.

I came to realize after numerous meetings, primarily with the US President Mr. Clinton and after other negotiations, that there is an understanding and desire within the United States to find such solutions that will take into account the interests of our countries and would further strengthen security in the world. This gives us hope to continue actively to work together and, in this sense, the forthcoming summit meeting between the two presidents, Clinton and Putin, in early June in Moscow would be of particular importance.

Q I have a question for both. Mr. Minister, the first question to you. The new Russian military doctrine actually says that Russia can use nuclear weapons if

all other means did not work, plus it actually extends the nuclear umbrella towards its allies - without defining who the allies are. So who are the allies of Russia? That's first. And what kind of influence will this new doctrine have on the international stability?

And Mrs. Secretary of State, I wanted to ask you if there were consultations, if this was the topic of these discussions in Washington. And what's your opinion; what kind of impact will it have on the international stability? Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV: As far as our new military doctrine is concerned, it is based on the concept of national security which takes into account the prevailing realities of the world. Unfortunately, last year, in connection with the action by NATO, in connection with the new concept of NATO that was adopted by it, with the increased threat from international terrorism, and due to other challenges, we had to take certain measures that ensured our national interests, that would ensure the defense capability of my country. Thus, the changes introduced to our military doctrine. It does not mean that nuclear weapons would be used as weapons of attack. The nuclear weapons would be used in the event when the national interest, the security of Russia, would be put at danger.

As far as the allies that you mentioned, this is an issue that will be considered in each particular case, and I'm not able to discuss any particular countries now.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me say that we did not specifically discuss this issue but, from our perspective, NATO - and the enlarged NATO - is not an offensive alliance; it is a defensive alliance and is based on the idea that there is a community that wants to be a part of it. And that is something that we have

talked about, is what the enlargement of NATO has meant for Russia.
It is not an
anti-Russian alliance.

Also, I would like to say that one of the things that we have been
talking about
is what the new threats are and how they should be dealt with, which
is why we
are proposing the National Missile Defense and also deep cuts in
nuclear weapons.
That is the way we think it is appropriate to deal with the threats that
we face
in the 21st century.

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Exchange Mail

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FROM Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
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SUBJECT 5-10-2000 Lockhart Press Briefing [UNCLASSIFIED]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 10, 2000

PRESS BRIEFING BY
JOE LOCKHART

The James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

1:45 P.M. EDT

MR. LOCKHART: Let me start with a brief announcement today. On Friday, May 12th, the President will take his case to the American people for extending PNTR to China. He will travel to Ohio and to Minnesota. In Akron, Ohio, the President will meet with business and workers and community leaders interested in the impact of extending PNTR to China, and in Minnesota the President will make remarks on the benefits to American farmers of extending PNTR to China.

Q Where is that?

MR. LOCKHART: Shakopee, Minnesota, which is not far from Minneapolis-St. Paul.

Q Is he meeting again with the Governor?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't think he will be there that day. I know the representative from that area, David Minge will be there and hosting the President.

Questions?

Q Joe, what is the cost of the Democratic prescription drug plan?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't think it's been scored yet by CBO, so I don't know the exact cost. I think it's in the same general range as the proposal the President put forward. It might be slightly higher. We're going to look at what CBO does and we're taking a look at it now on what the costs are. But I think the important thing is that we think this legislation will meet our budgetary framework of fiscal discipline, paying down the debt and investing in Medicare and Social Security, as well as provide an accessible universal and optional prescription drug benefit for Medicare.

Q Joe, is there some reason why the administration has waited this long to present language on this?

MR. LOCKHART: No, I think the President put forward in the budget in February the proposal for prescription drugs for Medicare. We have worked very hard with the leadership of Representative Gephardt and Senator Daschle to get consensus among Democrats. I think that was reflected in the event we had today that we have of all the good ideas on how to do this synthesized into a piece of legislation that's as well ahead of where the Republicans are. And we hope now that the momentum of today's event will crystallize into some action. Speaker Hastert has said he's willing to work with Democrats, provide prescription drug benefit. This legislation offers a blueprint for how to do it.

Q Chairman Archer says that he wants bipartisan cooperation on this. How does your plan compare with the Republican Plan?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, the Republicans don't really have a plan yet, they have a fact sheet. I know you've all seen it because they've handed it out to you. They haven't gone beyond that. The Democrats have been talking about this now for several years, are all ahead of where the Republicans have been. But I think today's legislation offers a blueprint for how we can move forward. The Democrats will reach out their hand in bipartisanship, and we hope the Republicans will take it.

Q Joe, when the President spoke, he called for the kind of bipartisan effort that you suggested. However, it seemed when Congressman Gephardt spoke, he started railing on all the bad things the Republicans have done on this issue. What are the prospects for actually reaching agreement, and for refraining from

partisan point-scoring?

MR. LOCKHART: I think the Republicans have put forward a plan that is not workable, and that's one of the reasons why you don't see legislation, because right now it is more of a set -- an ideology. But we have seen over the last 18 months to two years a real shift in the Republican leadership and the Republican Party's view on this issue. They started out by saying, basically, not over our dead bodies. And they've moved and slowly shifted to the point now where they say they want to work with Democrats to provide a real prescription drug benefit.

So we've made a lot of progress, and it's been because of the leadership of the President and the Democratic leaders. We believe the Republican leadership when they say they want to work with us on a bipartisan basis. We have a bill now; we should get to work.

Q Just to follow up on that, what are the prospects for actually bridging the gap between the two proposals? The Republicans favor a method where essentially individuals get some kind of voucher and then try to buy insurance from different insurance companies, and you folks favor setting up one company and having --

MR. LOCKHART: Again, I think it's difficult to compare the two because you've got what is not even a proposal, just a set of ideas on a short piece of paper, as opposed to a full legislative proposal that the Democrats have put forward today. I think the Republican position has evolved on this. It's certainly our hope that what we have put down today will serve as the basis for a bipartisan agreement.

Q Joe, in the last couple weeks the Republicans have kind of made some moves to push a lot of decisions into the next administration. There's the Kosovo deadline; Colombia funding was restricted to one year. Jesse Helms said don't bother to negotiate a new arms control treaty with the Russians, that will be for the next President. What is the White House's reaction to the fact that Congress seems to be limiting the scope of what the President can do to his term of office?

MR. LOCKHART: Let me just say that I think the Republicans believe they can put off things like a prescription drug benefit, a patients' bill of rights, a rise

in the minimum wage and sensible gun safety laws, then they do it at their own political risk. These are issues that average Americans are quite concerned about. They want Congress to work on it this year. They want Congress to act on it this year.

And if they've made the political calculation that somehow this can all be put off to a future Congress when they think the situation might be better for them, then that's a decision they'll have to take. But I think it is a decision that comes with some political risk.

Q Joe, how damaging is it to fund Colombia -- to only have the money for one year, instead of the two the President asked for?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, certainly, I think it's important that we make the commitment over the two years that we asked for, because I think this shouldn't be looked at in a vacuum of just the United States. There are a number of international -- countries around the world that are working with Colombia, as you know, and Colombia is providing the bulk of the resources. So I think it's important that we send the message that we're committed to this.

I think, overall, what has the potential to cause damage, though, is the kind of process that we've got through here. It can best be described as a mess. You have the House moving this -- they moved it quite quickly in a supplemental. Now you have the Senate moving it in maybe one bill, maybe three bills; it may be 2000 money, it may be 2001 money. They haven't figured any of that out. These are urgent needs for the country. We don't need to play politics. We don't need to subject it to the kind of slow walking appropriations that we've seen over the last few years.

I think we firmly believe that the Senate leadership should bring this forward in a way that we can rapidly conclude this debate and pass the supplemental.

Q Do you actually think there's a chance that they'll regroup this into a stand-alone supplemental bill?

MR. LOCKHART: It's hard to know. I think even those who are devising the strategy are not quite sure what they've got now. I mean, when you can't explain

whether it's 2000 or 2001 money, you can't explain whether it's going to go on one bill, three bills or four bills, then you have to recognize that the situation has gotten out of control and it's a mess. And often the best way, when you've dug a hole, is to stop digging and to figure out a way to get it done in a way that meets the country's needs.

Q How about the Republican move to loosen the embargo on Cuba?

MR. LOCKHART: I hadn't seen anything specifically on that. I can only reiterate that we have worked actively over the last few years to try to make sure that as far as things like humanitarian or medical needs of the Cuban American people we tried to address, but did not in a way that didn't provide any benefit to the Cuban government.

The President has some flexibility as far as how we can do that. We've taken various steps over the last few years and that's something I think we should ensure that that flexibility remains.

Q Joe, the House is voting to extend the Internet tax moratorium by five years. The President said he doesn't like that, it's too long, it pushes some issues back. Would he veto a five year extension? And also, as part of that, he said that the states should solve the taxation issue by restructuring some of their tax policies. What's the federal role in sorting this all out?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, let me answer it in the negative first. The federal role in sorting this all out is not kicking the can down the road for another five years. There's a bit of phoniness in this debate, so let me be clear on where we stand.

We oppose -- and are for a permanent moratorium on any excess taxes, where we oppose any discriminatory taxes. But our concern is if you move, kick the can down the road for another five years, Congress states all the affected parties will find a way to put off the tough decisions that need to be made as far as how state and localities handle sales tax and their own tax issues.

So I think the federal government has a role and partnership with governors. I think the President talked about it the last time the governors were here, it was

a big part of the conversation. We support a two-year extension because, obviously, our position is that we are opposed to discriminatory or access taxes. But we think if you go and extend out through five years you really run the risk of putting off some decisions that need to be made.

Q But you can't really veto that bill, can you? I mean, the high-tech community is very much for that. Can you really envision the President --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I'm just not going to answer a hypothetical about something that's not down here yet.

Q I have a question back on prescription drugs. Does the President have some objection to the model the Republicans want to use, where an individual Medicare recipient could go out and buy prescription drug coverage? Is he insistent that all Medicare recipients have to be in the same government-run program?

MR. LOCKHART: Let me deal with that a couple of ways. One is, I think the major problem with the ideas the Republicans put forward is, the insurance industry has indicated they have no interest in participating in it. So that's -- there are two players on this, and if one player says they're not playing, there's no game.

Secondly, I think the kind of reform you can see in Medicare, the kind of discount and volume buying has to be done as a group. I don't think that 68-year-old John Smith is going to be particularly effective going into his pharmacist and saying, let's deal, let's make a deal here. Just like private -- whether they be HMOs or other health care groups can provide cheaper prescription drugs for their beneficiaries; within Medicare, we can do the same thing. I think the problem with the Republican plan for the President, for most of the Democrats is that we just don't think it will work.

Q It's not like all insurance companies or all HMOs negotiate together with the drug companies, they all set up their own individual agreements. Why couldn't there be room for multiple plans as opposed to one government plan?

MR. LOCKHART: Because I don't know any HMOs or insurance companies who have one or two beneficiaries. They represent large groups. There is an economy of

scale; otherwise they wouldn't be in the business. There isn't like the front row here has their health plan and the second row has their health plan; that's just not the way it works.

Q Well, federal employees choose from dozens of different plans.

MR. LOCKHART: Right, and each -- well, I guess there is. If we can get Terry to move, but he wasn't even listening so he doesn't even know what I said. (Laughter.)

Q Joe, on China. The Chinese government has said that they cannot guarantee that they will not sell in the future missile and nuclear technology to other countries like Pakistan and Iran. Do you think it will affect in the Congress PNTR or --

MR. LOCKHART: Well, we have made our position on proliferation quite clear to the Chinese, and I think as a general point we believe we are better able to make our points and to articulate our national security concerns when we are engaged and we bring China into rules-based organizations, rather than by isolating China. So can I predict an impact? No. But should it have an impact? Not according to our judgment.

Q Is the President aware of the Washington Post story the other day that honored killings are continuing still in Pakistan?

MR. LOCKHART: Yes, I'm sorry, I didn't see that. I'd have to check on that for you.

Q I think Vladimir Putin just named a Prime Minister -- any reaction to this person? I guess he was on the previous government also. Do we know anything about him?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't know in particular what we know about him. I think, as a general principle -- we have congratulated Mr. Putin for the democratic transition -- the President did, in writing -- on the occasion of his inauguration. But as a general principle, we are less interested in the people that they put forward, rather more interested in the policies, the general move

toward economic reform, the cleaning up of corruption, our bilateral issues of arms control and nonproliferation. So, again, I think -- I don't have a great deal of detail about the newly-appointed Prime Minister, but what's important is they follow the general policy outline and agenda that Putin talked about.

Q Joe, do you know what the practical impact will be of the executive order the President signed today on AIDS drugs in sub-Saharan Africa, and is it a change in administration policy, or does it formalize the existing policy?

MR. LOCKHART: I think the practical impact is that it will promote the accessibility of HIV-AIDS drugs into sub-Saharan Africa. I think over the last months there's been some focus on the crisis that exists there. I mean, some 80 percent of the deaths of AIDS right now are in sub-Saharan Africa, and over 11 million people have already died, 44 million I think are infected.

The executive order finds the balance between protecting intellectual property rights and also promoting accessibility of the drugs in this area, and allowing the companies to deal with the public health crisis that they face.

Q Does this mean that what countries like South Africa are trying to do in sort of setting up I guess licensing agreements on their own to start producing AIDS drugs, maybe without the full permission of the companies involved --

MR. LOCKHART: What it does is it provides them flexibility within their own intellectual property construct, as long as they stay within the trips agreement within the WTO. I mean, I think the basic -- I think our intellectual property laws here are much more stringent than even within the WTO. And this allows sub-Saharan countries, a group of identified countries, flexibility for them to take steps in order to make these drugs more accessible.

Q Developing countries have been saying for years that intellectual property laws prevented them from getting badly-needed drugs at costs that they could afford. Doesn't this executive order prove that point?

MR. LOCKHART: I don't think that it proves that our intellectual property laws are too stringent. I think that this executive order recognizes the truly great public health crisis that exists now in sub-Saharan Africa, and I think it

creates the flexibility that the countries there need to address the problem.

Q Joe, you mentioned the patients' bill of rights. Is there going to be a meeting tomorrow with the conferees?

MR. LOCKHART: It's still on, right? Let me check for you. It was tentatively set for tomorrow, and I just haven't checked since Monday. But I'll check for you.

Q One more question on prescription drugs. If you could respond to the two main criticisms of it -- the Republicans charge that it's going to be too costly, and consumer groups are saying that the administration is buckling to the pharmaceutical industry.

MR. LOCKHART: That puts us right in the middle, so I think it's normally a pretty good place. I think you'll find that the prescription drug program that the President laid out is affordable and fits within our budget framework, it pays down the debt by 2013, invests in Medicare, Social Security and our other urgent national needs.

As far as those who say we're buckling to the pharmaceutical companies, if we have, the pharmaceutical companies have shown a peculiar way of expressing their appreciation by opposing it.

Q What's the President's view of the lawsuit the DCCC filed against Tom Delay?

MR. LOCKHART: You know, I saw a couple of things on that in the paper this morning. I don't know, I haven't talked to him about it. I'll try to get his opinion.

Q Do you know, has anyone at the White House -- as you may have seen, a former White House official is quoted as saying, or wrote a piece saying he thought it was a bad idea. Did any input come from the White House --

MR. LOCKHART: No.

Q -- did DCCC check here before they did this, or was it just a --

MR. LOCKHART: Not that I'm aware. The first I saw of it was when I saw it in the newspaper.

Q Joe, how much political advice, if any, is the White House giving the Million Moms March organizers?

MR. LOCKHART: Political advice?

Q -- coordination and getting this thing together? I know they were here to meet with the President --

MR. LOCKHART: No, I think this, as has been reported, this came out of some mothers and groups that wanted to find a way to make a statement on Mother's Day. We have worked with them some this week, finding an appropriate way for the President to participate in the effort, but as far as political advice, I don't think they've come looking for that here.

Q Is he going to it or is there any plan for him to participate directly in it, speaking or by remote control?

MR. LOCKHART: We're still trying to work that out. We're battling the normal things that we have here, which is -- we represent a considerable logistical and security challenge to any organization. We want to find a way to participate that doesn't sort of fundamentally change the way this group wants to put on their event.

Q Joe, with crude oil prices rising again, is anyone here beginning to worry that the problem is not taken care of and more needs to be done?

MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think you've got -- if you look back on the price of gas at the pump, it went down six or seven weeks in a row, and went up slightly this week. So I don't know that I'm going to draw any grand conclusions from one week's report.

Thank you.

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2:07 P.M. EDT #193-05/10

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