

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	John Duncan to Caryn Hollis. Subject: FW: Reports to Congress of Third Party Commerce with and Assistance to Cuba. (7 pages)	01/10/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	John Duncan to Caryn Hollis. Subject: FW: Reports to Congress of Third Country Commerce with Assistance to Cuba. (8 pages)	01/12/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/29/1999-01/20/2000]

2006-1363-F

vz5639

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/29/99 5:23:28 PM
FROM Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: acda report [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Dejban, Donna D. (NSA)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Saved to diskette.

-----Original Message-----

From: Witkowsky,
Anne A. (DEFENSE)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 1999 4:08 PM
To: Bradtke,
Robert A. (EXSEC); @NONPRO - Export Controls; @DEFENSE -
Defense
Policy; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Cc: @RUDMAN; @EXECSEC -
Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: acda report [UNCLASSIFIED]

Bob:
Try this.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bradtke, Robert
A. (EXSEC)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 1999 3:41 PM
To: @NONPRO
- Export Controls; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @LEGISLAT -
Legislative
Affairs
Cc: @RUDMAN; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary

Subject: acda
report [UNCLASSIFIED]

i confess that i find the president's transmittal letters citing acda's "extraordinarily distinguished history, "repeated successes," and status as a "model government agency" for its "efficiency and cost" to be a touch over the top -- particularly when they are covering the transmittal of a report that is ten months late. i'd hate to think how late the report would be if they were as efficient as the rest of the usg. plus, not to reopen old wounds, merging acda into state was this administration's idea. one could hardly tell that from the letter. could someone draft a toned down version of a transmittal letter? thank you.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2471ltr.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I submit herewith the 1998 Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

This report -- ACDA's last -- closes its extraordinarily distinguished history as the nation's premier arms control advocate, negotiator, and implementer. ACDA's 38 years of quietly preventing and removing foreign threats have contributed significantly to the safety and security of the American people.

ACDA has been merged into the Department of State under a new structure with the objectives of maintaining the effectiveness, performance and independent arms control advocacy the nation has benefited from in the past. I ask for the support of the Congress in achieving those objectives and, in that spirit, commend this report to you.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, D.C. 20510

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/4/99 12:37:38 PM
FROM Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: ILO Child Labor Convention [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Stromseth, Jane E. (MULTI)

CARBON_COPY DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Allen, Charles A. (LEGAL)

TEXT_BODY

Attached are the documents. These are internal, deliberative documents, so I do not feel comfortable putting them on the unclassified e-mail. If you show them to the NEC please be sure to emphasize that they should not be shared with others outside the White House.

-----Original Message-----

From: Stromseth, Jane E. (MULTI)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 1999 12:16 PM

To: Krass, Caroline
D. (LEGAL)

Cc: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @MULTILAT - Multilateral
and Humanitarian Affairs

Subject: RE: ILO Child Labor Convention
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Thanks very much, Caroline!! I'll make sure NSC is involved in any memo to Pres (which I agree should be joint memo from Sandy and Gene, as you suggest).

I'm trying unsuccessfully to open the example you forwarded -- is it possible to resend it -- perhaps on the unclass system if possible, so I can show it to Sarah at NEC as well. Thanks!

-----Original Message-----

From: Krass,
Caroline D. (LEGAL)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 1999 12:11 PM

To: Stromseth,
Jane E. (MULTI)

Cc: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @MULTILAT - Multilateral
and Humanitarian Affairs
Subject: RE: ILO Child Labor Convention
[UNCLASSIFIED]

My experience has been that State sends a package
over to the NSC in the normal Execsec to Execsec channels and then
the relevant policy directorate prepares the package for the President's
signature. The State package includes the instrument of ratification
and any other certifications requested by the Senate in its resolution
of advice and consent. I have attached an example of such a package.

<< Message: FW: Ratification of Convention on Nuclear Safety
[UNCLASSIFIED]
>>

In this case, I am not sure whether NSC or NEC would be the
lead. Thus State might decide to send the package to the NEC
Execsec.

Given your involvement in the issue, you might want to suggest to
NEC that, if this happens, there should be a joint Berger/Sperling
memo to the President.

-----Original Message-----

From: Stromseth,
Jane E. (MULTI)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 1999 11:37 AM
To: @LEGAL
- Legal Advisor
Cc: @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs;
@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Subject: ILO Child Labor Convention
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Mary, Chuck, Caroline: (assume Jamie is still
at home): It looks like the Senate will give its advice and consent
to ratification of the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child
Labor before it goes into recess. Sarah Rosen Wartell (NEC) has
been overseeing the process on this and is asking about the actual
WH process re Presidential ratification and transmittal of document
of ratification, etc. I've sent you all two unclass e-mails about
this (including one with DoL's thoughts), and I'd be grateful if
one of you could take a look and advise Sarah (and me too) on how
this process should proceed. Thanks very much!

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2117srb.doc

April 2, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL

FROM: JONATHAN ELKIND

SUBJECT: Proposed Ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety

The United States signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) on September 20, 1994. The Senate ratified it on March 25, 1999. The memorandum at Tab I recommends that the President sign the attached Instrument of Ratification of the CNS, along with the attached letters of certification required by the U.S. Senate.

Concurrence by: Jack Caravelli, Caroline Krass, Mark Tavarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Instrument of Ratification

Tab B Certification Letters and copies

Tab C Department of State Memo (Kenney-Davies memo)

Tab D Convention on Nuclear Safety

2

2117

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Proposed Ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety

Purpose

To sign the instrument of ratification for the Convention on Nuclear Safety ("CNS" or "Convention"), and four letters of certification.

Background

Madeline has forwarded the instrument of ratification for the CNS for your signature.

Attached for your signature are the instrument of ratification of the treaty (Tab A), and letters of certification (Tab B). Also attached are the State Department's memorandum on the Convention (Tab C), and the text of the Convention (Tab D).

The CNS was negotiated with strong U.S. support and leadership, and represents the first international legal instrument to address nuclear reactor safety specifically. It strengthens nuclear safety around the world by having each country's civilian nuclear power program held up for peer review every three years. Forty-seven of the sixty-five countries that are signatories have deposited their instruments of ratification, including all states with significant nuclear programs except the U.S. and India.

Speedy ratification is crucial. The United States is the only G-8 state that has not met the commitment to ratify made at the 1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security. The Convention is not controversial, but its ratification was held

up in the Senate, in part when it became linked to the issue of appointing a Republican to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Completing ratification now will allow the United States to participate in the civilian nuclear program peer review mechanism laid out in the CNS. U.S. involvement in these reviews maintains our ability to provide international leadership in nuclear safety fora, especially with regard to states with weak nuclear safety records and practices. The United States is already in compliance with all obligations under the CNS.

The Senate has prohibited U.S. participation in the "operation" of the Convention (which could be read to include attendance at an important April 1999 meeting of the Contracting Parties) until you certify that the U.S. Government will not engage in any unnecessarily duplicative multilateral activity in international nuclear regulation or safety. In our view, to the extent that the Senate is attempting to prohibit U.S. participation in an international forum, such a prohibition would be an unconstitutional interference with your foreign affairs power. Nevertheless, because other portions of this certification requirement are not unconstitutional, and because our compliance with the certification requirement is easily met, we recommend that you sign the attached letters of certification (Tab B) to the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee (with copies to the ranking minority members) at the same time as the Instrument of Ratification. [Stuart: Please confirm the "easily met" clause.] The letters confirm that we will meet the Senate's condition. In addition, the Senate has imposed two other conditions requiring Presidential certifications. You have forty-five days after the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification to make these certifications, and they will be transmitted at a later date.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the instrument of ratification and the letters of certification .

Attachments

Tab A Instrument of Ratification

Tab B Certification Letters Tab C Department of State Memorandum
(Kenney-Davies
memo)

Tab D Convention on Nuclear Safety

2

2117

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2117helmslet.doc

November 4, 1999

The Honorable Jesse Helms, Chairman
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
415 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-6225

Dear Senator Helms:

I am writing in reference to the Senate resolution of advice and consent on the
Convention on Nuclear Safety.

In accordance with Condition (1) of the resolution of advice and consent to
ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, adopted by the
Senate of the
United States on March 25, 1999, I hereby certify that the United
States

Government will not engage in any multilateral activity in the field of international nuclear regulation or nuclear safety that unnecessarily duplicates a multilateral activity undertaken pursuant to the Convention.

I would like to thank you for your consideration and action on this important matter.

Sincerely,

William J. Clinton

November 4, 1999

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman, Chairman
House Committee on International Relations
2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Gilman:

I am writing in reference to the Senate resolution of advice and consent on the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

In accordance with Condition (1) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, adopted by the Senate of the United States on March 25, 1999, I hereby certify that the United States Government will not engage in any multilateral activity in the field of international nuclear regulation or nuclear safety that unnecessarily duplicates a multilateral activity undertaken pursuant to the Convention.

Thank you for your consideration on this important matter.

Sincerely,

William J. Clinton

November 4, 1999

The Honorable Joseph Biden, Jr.
415 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-6225

Dear Senator Biden:

I am writing in reference to the Senate resolution of advice and consent on the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

In accordance with Condition (1) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, adopted by the Senate of the United States on March 25, 1999, I hereby certify that the United States Government will not engage in any multilateral activity in the field of international nuclear regulation or nuclear safety that unnecessarily duplicates a multilateral activity undertaken pursuant to the Convention.

I would like to thank you for your consideration and action on this important matter.

Sincerely,

William J. Clinton

November 4, 1999

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
B-360 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Gejdenson:

I am writing in reference to the Senate resolution of advice and consent on the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

In accordance with Condition (1) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, adopted by the Senate of the United States on March 25, 1999, I hereby certify that the United States Government will not engage in any multilateral activity in the field of international nuclear regulation or nuclear safety that unnecessarily duplicates a multilateral activity undertaken pursuant to the Convention.

Thank you for your consideration on this important matter.

Sincerely,

William J. Clinton

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/8/99 5:31:32 PM
FROM Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: CFE: Response to Helms/Lott -- [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY Allen, Charles A. (LEGAL)
Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Hunerwadel, Joan S. (LEGAL)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)

TEXT_BODY Anne: I made some changes to the letter based on a closer review of the underlying documents. Call me if they cause you heartache.

Just
added one word to the memo to the President.

-----Original Message-----

From: Witkowsky,
Anne A. (DEFENSE)

Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 1999 4:48 PM

To: @EUROPE

- European Affairs; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @LEGAL - Legal
Advisor;

@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs

Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy

Subject: CFE:

Response to Helms/Lott -- [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Carlos/Caroline/Dick/Mark

Revised

version of CFE letter (again) with agency comments (finally). Cover
memos, also below.

Clearance by 10:30 am tomorrow would be
appreciated, if possible. Since letter is already long (it grew
from one page-plus to two pages-plus, urge restraint on additional
text.)

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CFE Helms 2.doc

Dear Senator Helms:

Thank you for your letter(s)[plural for Helms] concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits. We are continuing our comprehensive effort to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my meeting with President Yeltsin in Istanbul and in my public remarks I have stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. I have tried to impress upon the Russians that they must take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE.

At the Istanbul summit, OSCE members, including the Russian Federation, signed a new Charter for European Security that recognizes European security in the 21st century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as security between states. Moreover, in the summit declaration, all OSCE participating states recognized that a political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the OSCE can contribute to achieving that goal. We expect Russia to abide by those statements. As a result of the

summit, we are now taking the first steps to promote such a dialogue, including the upcoming visit to the North Caucasus by OSCE Chairman-in-Office Vollebaek.

It is in this context in that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the United States and NATO and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally-based ceilings. This adjustment, for example, will eliminate the outdated requirement for our new NATO allies to coordinate their equipment limits with Russia and other former Warsaw Pact countries. The Agreement will provide for enhanced transparency of military forces, through increased information and more inspections. It will open the Treaty to accession by other European nations, including the Baltic nations and Slovenia, a priority identified by the Senate. And, it will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of non-NATO nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia.

Among the most important outcomes of the OSCE summit were, in fact, CFE-related commitments that U.S. negotiators facilitated on the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova -- addressing one of your key concerns regarding host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces. These commitments are reflected in the CFE Final Act, a document associated with the Adaptation Agreement, and in the OSCE summit declaration. Concerning Georgia, Russia undertook to substantially reduce Treaty Limited Equipment by December 31, 2000, and two Russian bases there will be closed by July 1, 2001. With respect to Moldova, Russia committed to remove all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment by the

end of 2001, and all Russian forces by the end of 2002. In the negotiations, both Georgia and Moldova understood that the Istanbul summit offered an opportunity to secure these commitments from Russia. We fully supported that strategy by directly engaging the senior Russian leadership on these issues as part of our effort to secure a successful CFE outcome.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very serious concern, though it does not rise to the level articulated in Condition (4) of the Flank Document Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification, that is, a violation that threatens U.S. national security interests. We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on our concerns and the Russian leadership has affirmed that they will comply with agreed flank levels as soon as possible. But, it is essential that we have confidence there will be real compliance. That is why, upon signing the Adaptation Agreement, I made clear that I will only submit the Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have in fact been reduced to the levels set forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree that entry into force of an adapted Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by States Parties with its limits. In this way, as part of our broader diplomatic approach, we are seeking to maintain pressure on Russia to reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC

3

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907prs.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: CFE: Letters from Senators Helms, Lott, et al

Purpose

To respond to letters from Senators Helms, Lott and ten other
Senators on CFE
Treaty adaptation.

Background

You received a letter from Senator Helms and a second letter from
Helms, Lott and
ten other Senators counseling against conclusion/signature of the
adapted CFE
Treaty. Their main concerns with respect to CFE were the presence of
Russian
forces in Moldova and Georgia without consent, and Russia's
violation of the
flank limits. The letter from the group of Senators also expressed
concern that
the OSCE summit "directly address" Russia's military actions in
Chechnya.

In your response you detail your own efforts to encourage Russia
toward a
political dialogue on Chechnya, and the Chechnya-related results of

the OSCE
summit, including Russia's agreement to a visit to the region by the
OSCE
Chairman-in-office. You also outline why it was in the US and NATO
interest to
sign the CFE Adaptation Agreement at Istanbul, and the important
outcomes we
facilitated on the Georgian and Moldovan withdrawal agreements that
address one
of the key Senate concerns. On the question of the flank limits, you
reiterate
the importance of compliance, and explain why you took the position
that you will
only submit the adapted Treaty for Senate advice and consent to
ratification when
Russia reduces its forces to agreed flank levels.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed reply at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Reply

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

2

8907

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907srb.doc

December 8, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS BINNENDIJK

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY

SUBJECT: CFE: Letters from Senators Helms, Lott, et al

Attached at Tab I is a proposed reply to a letter from Senator Helms and a second letter from Helms, Lott and ten other Senators counseling against signature of the adapted CFE Treaty. Recommend that you forward the memorandum for the President with the proposed response at Tab I.

We note that these letters were sent prior to the Istanbul summit; since then we have heard that SFRC staff is generally satisfied with the overall CFE adaptation outcome, though they may give us a difficult time on the President's withholding the Agreement from the Senate until the Russians return to adapted Treaty flank levels. We believe the latter issue to be related somehow to CTBT and the question of Senate prerogatives concerning a Treaty that has been signed but not ratified; we will learn more when we brief the staff on CFE adaptation, December 10.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on November 4th and 10th .

Concurrence by: Carlos Pascual, Caroline Krass, Dick Norland, and Mark Tavlartides

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Reply
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
1

8907

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/9/99 7:01:59 PM
FROM Witkowski, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Congressional Package -- [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Brackman, Stella S. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Stella:

Please prepare the attached package for Hans' signature.
I have gotten all of the relevant concurrences and will sign for
my colleagues. If you make any changes, please save to my December

file. I don't know if letter has right address. There will be twelve
letters in all, but I thought our current practice was to draft one,
and then, once that is approved, to do the rest. Please give to
Hans with one dot .

Anne

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

8907prs.doc

ACTION**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: CFE: Letters from Senators Helms, Lott, et al

Purpose

To respond to letters from Senators Helms, Lott and ten other
Senators on CFE
Treaty adaptation.

Background

You received a letter from Senator Helms and a second letter from Helms, Lott and ten other Senators counseling against conclusion/signature of the adapted CFE Treaty. Their main concerns with respect to CFE were the presence of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia without consent, and Russia's violation of the flank limits. The letter from the group of Senators also expressed concern that the OSCE summit "directly address" Russia's military actions in Chechnya.

In your response you detail your efforts to encourage Russia toward a political dialogue on Chechnya, and the Chechnya-related results of the OSCE summit, including Russia's agreement to a visit to the region by the OSCE Chairman-in-office. You also outline why it was in the US and NATO interest to sign the CFE Adaptation Agreement at Istanbul, and the important outcomes we facilitated on the Georgian and Moldovan withdrawal agreements that address one of the key Senate concerns. On the question of the flank limits, you reiterate the importance of compliance, and explain that you will only submit the adapted Treaty for Senate advice and consent to ratification when Russia reduces its forces to agreed flank levels.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed reply at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Reply

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

8907

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907srb.doc

December 8, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS BINNENDIJK

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY

SUBJECT: CFE: Letters from Senators Helms, Lott, et al

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The NSC received the incoming correspondence on November 4th and

10th .

Concurrence by: Carlos Pascual, Caroline Krass, Dick Norland, and Mark Tavarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Proposed Reply

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

1

8907

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CFE Helms 2.doc

Dear Senator Helms:

Thank you for your letter(s)[plural for Helms] concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits. We are continuing our comprehensive effort to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my meeting with President Yeltsin in Istanbul

and in my public remarks I stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. I have tried to impress upon the Russians that they must take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE.

At the Istanbul summit, OSCE members, including the Russian Federation, signed a new Charter for European Security that recognizes European security in the 21st century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as security between states. Moreover, in the summit declaration, all OSCE participating states recognized that a political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the OSCE can contribute to achieving that goal. We expect Russia to abide by those statements. As a result of the summit, we are taking steps to promote such a dialogue, including the upcoming visit to the North Caucasus by OSCE Chairman-in-Office Vollebaek.

It is in this context in that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the United States and NATO and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally-based ceilings. This adjustment, for example, will eliminate the outdated requirement for our new NATO allies to coordinate their equipment limits with Russia and other former Warsaw Pact countries. The Agreement will provide for enhanced transparency of military forces, through increased information and more inspections. It will open the Treaty to accession by other European nations, including the Baltic nations and Slovenia, an objective identified by the Senate. And, it will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to

the presence of foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of non-NATO nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia.

Among the most important outcomes of the OSCE summit were, in fact, CFE-related commitments that U.S. negotiators facilitated on the withdrawals of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova -- addressing one of your key concerns. These commitments are reflected in the CFE Final Act, a document associated with the Adaptation Agreement, and in the OSCE summit Declaration. Concerning Georgia, it was agreed that Treaty Limited Equipment will be substantially reduced by December 31, 2000, and two Russian bases there will be closed by July 1, 2001. Georgia and Russia committed to complete negotiations regarding the status of remaining Russian bases and facilities during the year 2000. With respect to Moldova, it was agreed that all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment will be withdrawn and/or destroyed by the end of 2001, and all Russian forces will be withdrawn by the end of 2002. Both Georgia and Moldova made effective use of the Istanbul summit to secure these commitments from Russia. We fully supported that strategy by directly engaging senior Russian leadership as part of our effort to achieve a successful CFE outcome.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very serious concern, though it does not rise to the level articulated in Condition (4) of the Flank Document Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification, that is, a violation that threatens U.S. national security interests. We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on our concerns and the Russian leadership has affirmed that they will comply with agreed flank levels as soon as possible. It is essential that we have confidence there will be real compliance. That is why, upon signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement, I made clear that I will only submit the

Agreement to the
Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have
in fact
been reduced to the levels set forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies
agree
that entry into force of an adapted Treaty can only be envisaged in the
context
of compliance by States Parties with its limits. In this way, as part of
our
broader diplomatic approach, we continue to send a clear message to
Russia to
reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with
the
Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/28/1999 2:32:07 PM
FROM Edwards, Joan K. (NONPRO)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT 8570b.doc;8570 Newt Gingrich.doc;8570A.doc;8570 Jesse Helms.doc
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Harris, Elisa D. (NONPRO)

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY In the G-Drive -- Here tis!

8570b.doc;8570 Newt Gingrich.doc;8570A.doc;8570
Jesse Helms.doc

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8570b.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Industry
Certification

Purpose

Sign certification letters to Congress required by the CWC resolution
of
ratification.

Background

Condition 9 of the Senate resolution giving advice and consent to

ratification of
the CWC requires you to certify to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and
Speaker of the House on January 1 of each year that the legitimate
commercial
activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology and pharmaceutical
firms in
the United States are not being significantly harmed by the CWC's
limitations on
Schedule 1 chemicals.

Proposed certification letters, prepared by the Commerce Department,
are at Tab
A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the certification letters at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Certification Letters

2

8570

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8570 Newt Gingrich.doc

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with the resolution of advice and consent to ratification
of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use

of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the
Senate of the United
States on April 24, 1997, I hereby certify that:

In connection with Condition (9), Protection of Advanced
Biotechnology, the
legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and
pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being significantly
harmed by
the limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of,
those
chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.

The Honorable Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the House
of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8570A.doc
December 28, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: GRAY SAMORE

FROM: ELISA D. HARRIS

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Industry
Certification

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President recommending that he sign the attached certification letters concerning the impact of the CWC on U.S. industry. The certification letters were prepared by Commerce and cleared by the relevant agencies.

Concurrence by: Newell Highsmith, Mara Rudman, Bob Bell

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Certification Letters

Tab II Incoming from Commerce

1

8570

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8570 Jesse Helms.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the Senate of the United States on April 24, 1997, I hereby certify that:

In connection with Condition (9), Protection of Advanced Biotechnology, the legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Relations
United State Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/28/1999 3:30:02 PM

FROM Harris, Elisa D. (NONPRO)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT another cwc package... [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Allen, Charles A. (LEGAL)
Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Hunerwadel, Joan S. (LEGAL)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)

CARBON_COPY Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)

TEXT_BODY also routine and identical to certification package done last year.
would appreciate clearance by OOB wednesday. many thanks!!

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 9292.doc
December 28, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: GRAY SAMORE

FROM: ELISA D. HARRIS

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Industry Certification

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President recommending that he sign the attached certification letters concerning the impact of the CWC on U.S. industry. The certification letters were prepared by Commerce and cleared by the relevant agencies.

Concurrence by: Mark Tavlarides, Caroline Krass

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Certification Letters

Tab II Incoming from Commerce

1

9292

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 9292B.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

**FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
CHARLES M. BRAIN**

**SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Industry
Certification**

Purpose

Sign certification letters to Congress required by the CWC resolution of ratification.

Background

Condition 9 of the Senate resolution giving advice and consent to ratification of the CWC requires you to certify to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Speaker of the House on January 1 of each year that the legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the CWC's limitations on Schedule 1 chemicals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the certification letters at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Certification Letters

2

9292

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 9292c.doc

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with the resolution of advice and consent to ratification

of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the
Senate of the United
States on April 24, 1997, I hereby certify that:

In connection with Condition (9), Protection of Advanced
Biotechnology, the
legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and
pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being significantly
harmed by
the limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of,
those
chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the House
of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 9292d.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with the resolution of advice and consent to ratification
of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use

of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the
Senate of the United
States on April 24, 1997, I hereby certify that:

In connection with Condition (9), Protection of Advanced
Biotechnology, the
legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and
pharmaceutical firms in the United States are not being significantly
harmed by
the limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of,
those
chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Relations
United State Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 01/06/2000 12:27:18 PM
FROM Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: WIPO report [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Duncan, John D. (INTECON/DOS)
Hammonds, D. Holly (INTECON)
Hendricks, Lori A. (INTECON)
Lee, Malcolm R. (NEC)
Mitsler, Elaine M. (INTECON)
Samans, Richard (NEC)
Smith, Holly M. (INTECON/INTERN)

CARBON_COPY Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Allen, Charles A. (LEGAL)
Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Hunerwadel, Joan S. (LEGAL)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)

TEXT_BODY Leg. clears with minor edits in the memos.

-----Original Message-----

From: Smith,
Holly M. (INTECON/INTERN)
Sent: Wednesday, January 05, 2000 7:13
PM
To: Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Cc: @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; Hendricks, Lori A. (INTECON)
Subject: WIPO
report [UNCLASSIFIED]

Please give final clearance/comments on
the following memos and letter for the report.
Thanks,
Holly
S.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7164sb-gs.doc

January 5, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING
CHARLES M. BRAIN

THROUGH: D. HOLLY HAMMONDS

FROM: LORI HENDRICKS

SUBJECT: President's Report to Congress on the World Intellectual
Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the Performances and
Phonograms Treaty

The memorandum for the President at Tab I forwards for his approval
a report to
Congress required by the resolution of ratification of the two WIPO
Treaties.

The report was prepared by the Department of Commerce, but
required clearance by
the Department of State, including the Economics Bureau and Treaty
Affairs
office. Based on State Department's review, a number of technical
changes were
required.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on September 27,
1999. After
clearance with State, the draft report was returned to NSC with needed
corrections on December 20, 1999.

Concurrence by: Chuck Allen, Miles Lackey

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum attached at Tab I to the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letters to the Speaker of the House and the Chairman, Senate
Foreign
Relations Committee
Tab B First Report to Congress on the Status of the World Intellectual
Property Organization Copyright Treaty and the Performances and
Phonograms Treaty
Tab C Memorandum from Secretary Daley
2

7164

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7164prs1.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
GENE SPERLING
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: Report to the Congress on the World Intellectual Property
Organization
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms
Treaty

Purpose

To forward the first annual Report to the Congress on the two WIPO
treaties, as
required by a proviso in the October 21, 1998, resolution of
ratification.

Background

The attached report to Congress covers the five elements specified in
the
Senate's instrument of ratification: ratification status; domestic

legislation
implementing the Treaties; enforcement measures; future negotiations
of the
Parties; and U.S. efforts to encourage other countries to ratify and
implement
the Treaties.

The report indicates that 50 countries and the EC signed the World
Copyright
Treaty (WCT), and 49 countries and the EC signed the World
Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). To date, however, only 9 have ratified or
acceded to
WCT, and 7 have ratified or acceded to the WPPT. The United States
deposited its
instruments of ratification with the WIPO Director General on
September 14, 1999.
(The Treaties will not enter into force until 30 countries have
deposited their
instruments of ratification.)

In addition, the report indicates that only the United States and
Hungary have
enacted domestic implementing legislation. (Burkina Faso is in the
process of
passing an implementing law.) The report also notes active efforts by
the
Administration to increase the number of countries ratifying WIPO
treaties
through bilateral discussions and trade agreements.

Regarding enforcement, U.S. Government and private industry
concerns have been
raised about lack of enforcement measures by several countries that
have ratified
the Treaties. USTR places such countries on their "Priority" or
"Special" 301
Watch Lists as required by 1974 Trade Act. The Administration
continues to
encourage countries to improve their copyright protection regimes
through a
variety of bilateral efforts, consultations with private industry, and the
"Special 301" review process.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign letters to the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of
the
Committee on Foreign Relations.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to the Speaker of the House and
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Tab B First Report to the Congress on the Status of World Intellectual

Property Organization Copyright Treaty and the Performances and
Phonograms Treaty

Tab C Memorandum from Secretary Daley

1

2

7164

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT WIPO helms ltr.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As required by the second proviso of the text of the resolution of
ratification
of the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and
the World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, passed by
the Senate on October 21, 1998, I transmit herewith to the Committee
on Foreign
Relations the first report on the status of the ratification of those
treaties
and related matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	John Duncan to Caryn Hollis. Subject: FW: Reports to Congress of Third Party Commerce with and Assistance to Cuba. (7 pages)	01/10/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/29/1999-01/20/2000]

2006-1363-F
vz5639

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	John Duncan to Caryn Hollis. Subject: FW: Reports to Congress of Third Country Commerce with Assistance to Cuba. (8 pages)	01/12/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/29/1999-01/20/2000]

2006-1363-F

vz5639

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 01/13/2000 6:05:43 PM
FROM Lee, Malcolm R. (NEC)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Best of Luck [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bouchard, Joseph F. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Its been great working with you. I wish you godspeed and safe voyage. (Not sure what one says to a ship commander). I am moving on as well. To State for a DAS position in the telecom area, and if Jesse Helms concurs, rank of ambassador.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 01/14/2000 7:43:31 PM
FROM Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT PCKG 8907 - Congressional Letters [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Bouchard, Joseph F. (DEFENSE)
Brackman, Stella S. (DEFENSE)
Cullom, Philip H. (DEFENSE)
Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Mulligan, George D. (DEFENSE)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)
Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)

TEXT_BODY

re: CFE

Berger/Brain have approved the text of the letter contained in package 8907. The additional letters need to be prepared. The approved version is below for your convenience; the letters should be dated January 18, 2000. A copy of the approved package and the diskette is on the way to you. PLEASE USE THE VERSION BELOW OR THE ONE ON THE DISKETTE.

Please note the minor edit made by Staff Secretary on the first page -- see marked copy.

Please return the letters and labels to Executive Secretary as soon as possible, but no later than OOB, January 19.

Thank you.

June

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CFE Helms 2.doc

January 18, 2000

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letters concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my meeting with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and in my public remarks, I stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. I have pressed the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE.

At the Istanbul Summit, OSCE members, including Russia, signed a new Charter for European Security that recognizes European security in the 21st century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as security between states. Moreover, in the summit declaration, all OSCE participating

states recognized that a political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the OSCE can contribute to achieving that goal. As a result of the summit, we continue to press for such a dialogue, including the visit to the North Caucasus by OSCE Chairman-in-Office Vollebaek.

It is in this context that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the United States and NATO, and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally based ceilings. This adjustment, for example, will eliminate the outdated requirement for our new NATO allies to coordinate their equipment limits with Russia and other former Warsaw Pact countries. The Agreement will provide for enhanced transparency of military forces, through increased information and more inspections. It will open the Treaty to accession by other European states, including the Baltic nations and Slovenia, an objective identified by the Senate. And, it will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of non-NATO nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia.

Among the summit's most important outcomes were CFE-related commitments that U.S. negotiators facilitated on Russian force withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova, addressing one of your key concerns. These commitments are reflected in the CFE Final Act, a document associated with the Adaptation Agreement, and in the OSCE Summit Declaration. Concerning Georgia, it was agreed that Russian Treaty Limited Equipment will be substantially reduced by December 31, 2000, and two Russian bases there will be closed by July 1, 2001. With respect to Moldova, it was agreed that all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment will be withdrawn and/or

destroyed by the end of 2001, and all Russian forces will be withdrawn by the end of 2002. Both Georgia and Moldova made effective use of the Istanbul Summit to secure these commitments from Russia. We fully supported that strategy by directly engaging senior Russian leadership as part of our effort to successfully conclude CFE adaptation.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very serious concern. We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on this point and the Russian leadership has affirmed that they will comply with agreed flank levels as soon as possible. It is essential that we have confidence there will be real compliance. That is why, upon signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement, I made clear that I will only submit the Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have in fact been reduced to the levels set forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree that entry into force of an adapted Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by States Parties with its limits. In this way, as part of our broader diplomatic approach, we continue to send a clear message to Russia to reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 01/20/2000 10:26:30 AM
FROM Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Congressional Letter (for Pkg 8907) [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CFE Helms 2.doc

January 20, 2000

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letters concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and then-Prime Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have pressed the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution,

either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE. We believe that both sides should implement an immediate cease-fire, halt indiscriminate attacks against innocent civilians, ensure freedom of movement for people displaced by the fighting, and cooperate with international humanitarian relief efforts.

At the Istanbul Summit, OSCE members, including Russia, signed a new Charter for European Security that recognizes European security in the 21st century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as security between states. In the summit declaration, all OSCE states recognized that a political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the OSCE can contribute to achieving that goal. We will continue to work with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to advance OSCE's role in promoting such a solution.

It is in this context that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the United States and NATO, and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally based ceilings. The Agreement will provide for enhanced transparency of military forces, through increased information and more inspections. It will open the Treaty to accession by other European states, including the Baltic nations and Slovenia, an objective identified by the Senate. And, it will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of non-NATO nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia.

Among the summit's most important outcomes were CFE-related commitments that U.S.

negotiators facilitated on Russian force withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova, addressing one of your key concerns. These commitments are reflected in the CFE Final Act, a document associated with the Adaptation Agreement, and in the OSCE Summit Declaration. Concerning Georgia, it was agreed that Russian Treaty Limited Equipment will be substantially reduced by December 31, 2000, and two Russian bases there will be closed by July 1, 2001. With respect to Moldova, it was agreed that all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment will be withdrawn and/or destroyed by the end of 2001, and all Russian forces will be withdrawn by the end of 2002. Both Georgia and Moldova made effective use of the Istanbul Summit to secure these commitments from Russia. We fully supported that strategy by directly engaging senior Russian leadership as part of our effort to successfully conclude CFE adaptation.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very serious concern. We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on this point and the Russian leadership has reaffirmed its commitment to all Treaty obligations and in particular to agreed flank levels. It is essential that we have confidence there will be real compliance. That is why, upon signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement, I made clear that I will only submit the Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have in fact been reduced to the levels set forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree on the importance of these reductions to bringing an adapted Treaty into force. In this way, as part of our broader diplomatic approach, we continue to send a clear message to Russia to reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 01/20/2000 4:17:10 PM

FROM Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT PCKG 8907 - Congressional Letters [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)

TEXT_BODY Rosie,

As I mentioned in my phone call to you, I worked on these letters -- adjusting margins. Also added the four missing letters to the package. Attached is the final version back to Staff Secretary for the President's signature.

June

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907 Brownback.doc

January 20, 2000

Dear Senator Brownback:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I

share your
concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's
military
actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty
flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in
Chechnya.
In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and
then-Prime
Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely
military
solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have
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the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution,
either through
direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of
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third-party such as the OSCE. We believe that both sides should
implement an
immediate cease-fire, halt indiscriminate attacks against innocent
civilians,
ensure freedom of movement for people displaced by the fighting, and
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with international humanitarian relief efforts.

At the Istanbul Summit, OSCE members, including Russia, signed a
new Charter for
European Security that recognizes European security in the 21st
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increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as
security
between states. In the summit declaration, all OSCE states recognized
that a
political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the
OSCE can
contribute to achieving that goal. We will continue to work with the
OSCE
Chairman-in-Office to advance OSCE's role in promoting such a
solution.

It is in this context that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing
the CFE
Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the
United States
and NATO, and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other
nations to its
terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits
with
nationally based ceilings. The Agreement will provide for enhanced

transparency
of military forces, through increased information and more
inspections. It will
open the Treaty to accession by other European states, including the
Baltic
nations and Slovenia, an objective identified by the Senate. And, it

will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to the
presence of
foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of
non-NATO
nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia.

Among the summit's most important outcomes were CFE-related
commitments that U.S.
negotiators facilitated on Russian force withdrawals from Georgia and
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addressing one of your key concerns. These commitments are
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Final Act, a document associated with the Adaptation Agreement, and
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destroyed by the end of 2001, and all Russian forces will be
withdrawn by the end
of 2002. Both Georgia and Moldova made effective use of the
Istanbul Summit to
secure these commitments from Russia. We fully supported that
strategy by
directly engaging senior Russian leadership as part of our effort to
successfully
conclude CFE adaptation.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very
serious concern.
We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on this point and the
Russian leadership
has reaffirmed its commitment to all Treaty obligations and in
particular to
agreed flank levels. It is essential that we have confidence there will
be real
compliance. That is why, upon signing the CFE Adaptation
Agreement, I made clear
that I will only submit the Agreement to the Senate for advice and

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ratification when Russian forces have in fact been reduced to the
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forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree on the importance of
these
reductions to bringing an adapted Treaty into force. In this way, as
part of our
broader diplomatic approach, we continue to send a clear message to
Russia to
reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with
the
Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Brownback
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1604

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907 DeWine.doc

January 20, 2000

Dear Senator DeWine:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of
the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in
Istanbul, and the
adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I
share your
concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's
military
actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty

flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya.

In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and then-Prime

Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely military

solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have pressed

the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through

direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a

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contribute to achieving that goal. We will continue to work with the OSCE

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directly engaging senior Russian leadership as part of our effort to successfully

conclude CFE adaptation.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very serious concern.

We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on this point and the Russian leadership

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reductions to bringing an adapted Treaty into force. In this way, as
part of our
broader diplomatic approach, we continue to send a clear message to
Russia to
reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with
the
Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Mike DeWine
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3503

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907 Grassley.doc

January 20, 2000

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of
the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in
Istanbul, and the
adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I
share your
concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's
military
actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty
flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in
Chechnya.
In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and

then-Prime Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have pressed the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE. We believe that both sides should implement an immediate cease-fire, halt indiscriminate attacks against innocent civilians, ensure freedom of movement for people displaced by the fighting, and cooperate with international humanitarian relief efforts.

At the Istanbul Summit, OSCE members, including Russia, signed a new Charter for European Security that recognizes European security in the 21st century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as security between states. In the summit declaration, all OSCE states recognized that a political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the OSCE can contribute to achieving that goal. We will continue to work with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to advance OSCE's role in promoting such a solution.

It is in this context that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the United States and NATO, and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally based ceilings. The Agreement will provide for enhanced transparency of military forces, through increased information and more inspections. It will open the Treaty to accession by other European states, including the Baltic nations and Slovenia, an objective identified by the Senate. And, it will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of

non-NATO

nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia.

Among the summit's most important outcomes were CFE-related commitments that U.S.

negotiators facilitated on Russian force withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova,

addressing one of your key concerns. These commitments are reflected in the CFE

Final Act, a document associated with the Adaptation Agreement, and in the OSCE

Summit Declaration. Concerning Georgia, it was agreed that Russian Treaty

Limited Equipment will be substantially reduced by December 31, 2000, and two

Russian bases there will be closed by July 1, 2001. With respect to Moldova, it

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destroyed by the end of 2001, and all Russian forces will be withdrawn by the end

of 2002. Both Georgia and Moldova made effective use of the Istanbul Summit to

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directly engaging senior Russian leadership as part of our effort to successfully

conclude CFE adaptation.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very serious concern.

We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on this point and the Russian leadership

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forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree on the importance of these

reductions to bringing an adapted Treaty into force. In this way, as part of our

broader diplomatic approach, we continue to send a clear message to Russia to

reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Chairman, Special Committee on Aging
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1501

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907 Hatch.doc

January 20, 2000

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and then-Prime Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely military

solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have pressed the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE. We believe that both sides should implement an immediate cease-fire, halt indiscriminate attacks against innocent civilians, ensure freedom of movement for people displaced by the fighting, and cooperate with international humanitarian relief efforts.

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It is in this context that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the United States and NATO, and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally based ceilings. The Agreement will provide for enhanced transparency of military forces, through increased information and more inspections. It will open the Treaty to accession by other European states, including the Baltic nations and Slovenia, an objective identified by the Senate. And, it will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of non-NATO nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia.

Among the summit's most important outcomes were CFE-related commitments that U.S. negotiators facilitated on Russian force withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova, addressing one of your key concerns. These commitments are reflected in the CFE Final Act, a document associated with the Adaptation Agreement, and in the OSCE Summit Declaration. Concerning Georgia, it was agreed that Russian Treaty Limited Equipment will be substantially reduced by December 31, 2000, and two Russian bases there will be closed by July 1, 2001. With respect to Moldova, it was agreed that all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment will be withdrawn and/or destroyed by the end of 2001, and all Russian forces will be withdrawn by the end of 2002. Both Georgia and Moldova made effective use of the Istanbul Summit to secure these commitments from Russia. We fully supported that strategy by directly engaging senior Russian leadership as part of our effort to successfully conclude CFE adaptation.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very serious concern. We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on this point and the Russian leadership has reaffirmed its commitment to all Treaty obligations and in particular to agreed flank levels. It is essential that we have confidence there will be real compliance. That is why, upon signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement, I made clear that I will only submit the Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have in fact been reduced to the levels set forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree on the importance of these reductions to bringing an adapted Treaty into force. In this way, as part of our broader diplomatic approach, we continue to send a clear message to Russia to reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the

Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch
Chairman, Committee on Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4402

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907 helms.doc

January 20, 2000

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letters concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and then-Prime Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have pressed the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution,

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Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the

Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907final letters.doc

January 20, 2000

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and then-Prime Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have pressed the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through

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Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable James E. Clyburn
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4006

January 20, 2000

Dear Senator Coverdell:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and then-Prime Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have pressed the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE. We believe that both sides should implement an immediate cease-fire, halt indiscriminate attacks against innocent civilians, ensure freedom of movement for people displaced by the fighting, and cooperate with international humanitarian relief efforts.

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Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Paul Coverdell
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1004

January 20, 2000

Dear Senator Hutchinson:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

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Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Tim Hutchinson
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0403

January 20, 2000

Dear Senator Kyl:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in

Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and then-Prime Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have pressed the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE. We believe that both sides should implement an immediate cease-fire, halt indiscriminate attacks against innocent civilians, ensure freedom of movement for people displaced by the fighting, and cooperate with international humanitarian relief efforts.

At the Istanbul Summit, OSCE members, including Russia, signed a new Charter for European Security that recognizes European security in the 21st century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as security between states. In the summit declaration, all OSCE states recognized that a political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the OSCE can contribute to achieving that goal. We will continue to work with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to advance OSCE's role in promoting such a solution.

It is in this context that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the United States and NATO, and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits

with
nationally based ceilings. The Agreement will provide for enhanced
transparency
of military forces, through increased information and more
inspections. It will
open the Treaty to accession by other European states, including the
Baltic
nations and Slovenia, an objective identified by the Senate. And, it

will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to the
presence of
foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of
non-NATO
nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia.

Among the summit's most important outcomes were CFE-related
commitments that U.S.
negotiators facilitated on Russian force withdrawals from Georgia and
Moldova,
addressing one of your key concerns. These commitments are
reflected in the CFE
Final Act, a document associated with the Adaptation Agreement, and
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Summit Declaration. Concerning Georgia, it was agreed that Russian
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Limited Equipment will be substantially reduced by December 31,
2000, and two
Russian bases there will be closed by July 1, 2001. With respect to
Moldova, it
was agreed that all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment will be
withdrawn and/or
destroyed by the end of 2001, and all Russian forces will be
withdrawn by the end
of 2002. Both Georgia and Moldova made effective use of the
Istanbul Summit to
secure these commitments from Russia. We fully supported that
strategy by
directly engaging senior Russian leadership as part of our effort to
successfully
conclude CFE adaptation.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very
serious concern.
We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on this point and the
Russian leadership
has reaffirmed its commitment to all Treaty obligations and in
particular to
agreed flank levels. It is essential that we have confidence there will
be real
compliance. That is why, upon signing the CFE Adaptation

Agreement, I made clear that I will only submit the Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have in fact been reduced to the levels set forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree on the importance of these reductions to bringing an adapted Treaty into force. In this way, as part of our broader diplomatic approach, we continue to send a clear message to Russia to reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jon Kyl
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0304

January 20, 2000

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and then-Prime

Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have pressed the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE. We believe that both sides should implement an immediate cease-fire, halt indiscriminate attacks against innocent civilians, ensure freedom of movement for people displaced by the fighting, and cooperate with international humanitarian relief efforts.

At the Istanbul Summit, OSCE members, including Russia, signed a new Charter for European Security that recognizes European security in the 21st century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as security between states. In the summit declaration, all OSCE states recognized that a political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the OSCE can contribute to achieving that goal. We will continue to work with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to advance OSCE's role in promoting such a solution.

It is in this context that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the United States and NATO, and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally based ceilings. The Agreement will provide for enhanced transparency of military forces, through increased information and more inspections. It will open the Treaty to accession by other European states, including the Baltic nations and Slovenia, an objective identified by the Senate. And, it will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of

non-NATO

nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia.

Among the summit's most important outcomes were CFE-related commitments that U.S.

negotiators facilitated on Russian force withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova,

addressing one of your key concerns. These commitments are reflected in the CFE

Final Act, a document associated with the Adaptation Agreement, and in the OSCE

Summit Declaration. Concerning Georgia, it was agreed that Russian Treaty

Limited Equipment will be substantially reduced by December 31, 2000, and two

Russian bases there will be closed by July 1, 2001. With respect to Moldova, it

was agreed that all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment will be withdrawn and/or

destroyed by the end of 2001, and all Russian forces will be withdrawn by the end

of 2002. Both Georgia and Moldova made effective use of the Istanbul Summit to

secure these commitments from Russia. We fully supported that strategy by

directly engaging senior Russian leadership as part of our effort to successfully

conclude CFE adaptation.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very serious concern.

We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on this point and the Russian leadership

has reaffirmed its commitment to all Treaty obligations and in particular to

agreed flank levels. It is essential that we have confidence there will be real

compliance. That is why, upon signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement, I made clear

that I will only submit the Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to

ratification when Russian forces have in fact been reduced to the levels set

forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree on the importance of these

reductions to bringing an adapted Treaty into force. In this way, as part of our

broader diplomatic approach, we continue to send a clear message to Russia to

reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-7010

January 20, 2000

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

We are continuing our efforts to seek an end to the tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my recent meetings with former President Yeltsin in Istanbul and then-Prime Minister Putin in Oslo, I have stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. In public and in private, I have pressed the Russians to take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE. We believe that both sides should

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with international humanitarian relief efforts.

At the Istanbul Summit, OSCE members, including Russia, signed a
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increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as
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between states. In the summit declaration, all OSCE states recognized
that a
political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the
OSCE can
contribute to achieving that goal. We will continue to work with the
OSCE
Chairman-in-Office to advance OSCE's role in promoting such a
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It is in this context that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing
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Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very serious concern. We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on this point and the Russian leadership has reaffirmed its commitment to all Treaty obligations and in particular to agreed flank levels. It is essential that we have confidence there will be real compliance. That is why, upon signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement, I made clear that I will only submit the Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have in fact been reduced to the levels set forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree on the importance of these reductions to bringing an adapted Treaty into force. In this way, as part of our broader diplomatic approach, we continue to send a clear message to Russia to reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
Chairman, Committee on Finance
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0801

January 20, 2000

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter concerning Chechnya, the recent summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus and Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with CFE Treaty flank limits.

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Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with the Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Smith
Chairman, Select Committee on Ethics
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2903

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