

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/6/98 6:10:11 PM
FROM Dowling, John N. (Nick)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT POTUS Letter to Lott -- As Delivered [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bandler, Donald K.
Brown, Keirn C.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Hurley, C. Michael
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Schulte, Gregory L.
Bandler, Donald K.
Braden, Susan R.
Brown, Keirn C.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Gordon, Philip H.
Hurley, C. Michael
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schulte, Gregory L.
Uyehara, Margaret A.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Rudman, Mara E.
Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)

Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Witkowski, Anne A.
Bernard, Kenneth W.
Busby, Scott W.
Guarnieri, Valerie N.
Hawley, Leonard R.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Kale, Dora A.
Malley, Robert
Metzl, Jamie F.
Moller, Catherine A.
Naplan, Steven J.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Wippman, David
Crowley, Philip J.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
Blinken, Antony J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted)
Williams, Mary C.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

-----Original Message-----
From: Hasman, Thomas M.
Sent: Tuesday,
October 06, 1998 6:06 PM
To: Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Cc: @BOSNIA
- Bosnian Affairs
Subject: Package 6780 - Final Text of Letters
- Lott et al [UNCLASSIFIED]

Here it is.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Final letters.doc

October 6, 1998

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. You have raised a number of critical issues. Before addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is appropriate to lead-off by describing our overall approach and the vital interests at stake.

We are entering a crucial period regarding the crisis in Kosovo. Serb repression and violence, clear evidence of atrocities, the uncertain fate of more than 250,000 displaced persons and the approach of winter have coalesced an international consensus behind U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, adopted on September 23, 1998, the international community reaffirmed in clear terms what steps Milosevic must take:

- * immediately cease offensive operations;
- * withdraw security forces;
- * allow full access to international monitors and relief agencies;
- * negotiate a settlement with the Kosovar Albanians.

Since, as of now, Milosevic has not complied with these requirements, we and our NATO allies will soon consider the potential use of force. I want to provide you and others in the Congress our full thinking and strategy on this issue.

As your letter recognizes, the crisis in Kosovo began when Serbian special police launched an offensive against the Kosovo insurgents in February of this year. In the seven months that have followed, Serbian military and police have steadily escalated their systematic campaign of violence and expulsions designed to

terrorize the local population and suppress armed insurgent groups. The roots of the current crisis can be traced back to 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic revoked the autonomous status that Kosovo had enjoyed since 1974. My Administration has long pressed Belgrade to restore the rights and freedoms of the Kosovar Albanians, making clear that this was a prerequisite to Serbia's reintegration into the international community. However, Belgrade resisted our support for building an effective dialogue with the Kosovars, instead escalating the fighting by targeting civilians with increasing brutality.

Over the past several months, we have endeavored to contain and ultimately resolve the conflict through extensive humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. On the humanitarian track, we have committed more than \$45 million in emergency relief funds and other types of assistance and we have urged the UNHCR and other international agencies and donors to do the same. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Chris Hill has had some success, pulling together a Kosovar Albanian negotiating team under Ibrahim Rugova and obtaining Milosevic's acknowledgment of an "interim" agreement that would allow for self-government. Ambassador Hill has also worked with Contact Group countries to develop the text of a settlement that they now have endorsed. This settlement would allow the people of Kosovo to administer their own local affairs, including education, justice and a separate police force, while protecting the human rights and cultural sites of all ethnic groups, including the small Serb minority. It would do so while preserving the FRY's territorial integrity, because we believe that an independent Kosovo could not survive as a viable state. Moreover, independence would send entirely the wrong signal to those in the region calling for a "greater Albania," and to minorities elsewhere in Europe, leading to greater instability. However, our

humanitarian and diplomatic efforts have been thwarted by the tactics of
Milosevic's security forces.

In recent days, the intensifying threat of NATO military action has caused
Milosevic to throttle back the operations of his security forces; some
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half steps that leave open the prospect of renewed hostilities in the
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weeks, or after this winter.

It is important to focus on U.S. national interests that are at stake here.

* First, Kosovo is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider European war with
dangerous consequences for the United States. Throughout Balkan
history, ethnic
conflicts often have been used for political manipulation. The violence
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against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo already has exacerbated political
tensions and
civil disorder in neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in
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Republic of Macedonia, with dangerously destabilizing consequences.
Wider
instability and refugee flows further south would threaten the differing
regional
interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, exacerbating tensions in
the Aegean.
The radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support radical
Islamic
fundamentalist efforts to establish a foothold in southeastern Europe,
potentially creating new sources of instability and increasing the
threat of
terrorism to us and our allies in Europe.

* Second, we are faced with a major humanitarian and human rights
crisis that
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General's report on the crisis condemned the wanton killing and
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one quarter of the homes in over 200 villages. They have committed atrocities, including the mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and children. We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the onset of winter, to prevent further atrocities and to demonstrate that the international community will not tolerate such acts.

* Third, it is important to sustain NATO's credibility as the principal peace and security instrument in Europe. Just as NATO's effective response in Bosnia has had a stabilizing influence throughout Europe, so too will NATO's efficacy in responding to Kosovo help achieve our long-term goals for Europe. Moreover, as the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated, the credibility of U.S. warnings to Milosevic first issued by President Bush in 1992, and reaffirmed by me, also are challenged.

We prefer to advance each of these interests through diplomacy that leads to a peaceful and principled settlement, as our negotiating efforts have sought to accomplish. But largely as a result of Milosevic's assault, those negotiating efforts are impossible to pursue under these circumstances. I believe the credible threat, and therefore the willingness to use force, has become necessary. It now appears that our NATO allies share this view.

I will now turn to the four specific issues raised in your letter.

First, I too am concerned about military readiness, as I discussed at length with the Chiefs and CINCs recently. As noted in my letters to Congress and Secretary Cohen, we have moved promptly to address these concerns, building on efforts initiated by my Administration over the past several months to support military operations. For example, in FY 1998 we worked with Congress to secure a \$1 billion reprogramming that reallocated funds to readiness programs and a \$1.85 billion emergency funding package to cover the unanticipated costs of

the Bosnia
and Southwest Asia contingencies. For FY 1999, I have proposed a
\$1.9 billion
emergency funding measure to cover the continuing costs of our
Bosnia deployment.
To preclude serious readiness problems in FY 1999, I again urge
Congress to
approve this measure.

In addition to these actions, I committed my Administration to work
with Congress
to provide adequate resources for readiness and other defense
programs in FY 1999
and beyond. For the short term, I proposed that members of my
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work with you prior to the Congressional adjournment to craft a \$1
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supplemental package that will augment FY 1999 funding for key
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programs. For the longer term, the Office of Management and Budget
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National Security Council have been instructed to work with
Secretary Cohen and
the Joint Chiefs to develop a multi-year plan that provides the
resources
necessary to preserve military readiness, support our troops, and
modernize aging
weapons systems. This plan will be incorporated in my FY 2000
defense budget
request to Congress. As I wrote you last month, the men and women
of our armed
forces will have the resources they need to do their job.

The cost of potential military operations in Kosovo would be a
function of the
scope and intensity of such operations. My Administration will work
with the
Congress to ensure timely passage of appropriate funding measures
and that this
does not come at the expense of our defense program.

Second, on the question of ground forces, although NATO planners
have reviewed a
broad range of options, some of which would involve ground forces in
hostile
circumstances, I can assure you the United States would not support
these options
and there currently is no sentiment in NATO for such a mission. The
mission
under consideration involves the use of graduated air power, not

military forces
on the ground.

In the event that Milosevic agrees to comply with UNSCR 1199, and if there is a subsequent political settlement, some form of international presence may be needed. Whether this can be done entirely by international civilian personnel and whether Americans should participate are matters we will need to consider in the context of any such agreement and with full consultation with the Congress.

Third, regarding the nature of the air campaign in Kosovo, NATO has developed a clear military plan. It entails the graduated but effective use of air power harnessed to two achievable objectives. The primary objective is by threat of force, or its use, to persuade Milosevic to comply with the demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199. If initial use of air power does not result in compliance, NATO's secondary objective is to strike Belgrade's military capabilities in ways that will damage his ability to conduct repressive operations in Kosovo, the same objective you identify in your letter.

Let me assure you that NATO planning provides for air power to be used effectively. There will be no "pin prick" strikes. Even the initial use of air power will send a very clear signal of our ability to disrupt operations by the FRY military and special police, and follow-on phases will progressively expand in their scale and scope. These operations are planned to involve virtually all NATO allies.

Finally, regarding your desire for a clear policy linked to our national interests and a defined end-state, NATO air power will be used as part of a broader political strategy to advance our overall objectives of promoting a political settlement and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. We are not replacing diplomacy with military force; rather we are combining the two to

achieve our objectives. Secretary Albright recently dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to the region to make crystal clear to Milosevic what steps he needs under UNSC 1199 to take to avoid NATO air strikes. Even if Milosevic gives NATO no choice but to execute air strikes, we will use them in a way designed to help bring an end to Serbian operations in Kosovo, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Our desired end-state in Kosovo is clear, comprising three parts. Our immediate objective is to achieve full compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199, thus reducing the risk of wider conflict, averting a humanitarian catastrophe and lessening the chance of further atrocities. Our mid-term objective is to secure a political settlement that grants broad autonomy to the Kosovars, while keeping Kosovo within the FRY. In particular, the agreement should ensure that the Kosovars have their own bodies of government and police. Our longer-term objective is a FRY that is democratic and on the path to European integration. This requires a responsible government that is accountable to its own citizens, of all ethnic backgrounds, and that carries out its obligations abroad, including in Bosnia. In this regard, we continue to support opposition parties and free and independent media in the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

The United Nations, the Contact Group, NATO and my Administration all agree that Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current situation including the brutal tactics of his security forces. Not only has he displaced a quarter million of his own citizens, but he has also suppressed the human rights of all citizens of the FRY and forced them to bear the burden of the current conflict, of UN economic sanctions and of isolation from the rest of Europe.

While Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current crisis,

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willingness to work with the Administration to protect American
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southeastern Europe. We will continue to consult closely with you in
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Sincerely,

The Honorable Pete V. Domenici
Chairman
Committee on the Budget
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3101

October 6, 1998

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Milosevic to throttle back the operations of his security forces; some withdrawals have begun to occur. However, he has not done enough to come into full compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199. We cannot accept hollow promises or half steps that leave open the prospect of renewed hostilities in the coming weeks, or after this winter.

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The Honorable Chuck Hagel
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2705

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In the event that Milosevic agrees to comply with UNSCR 1199, and if there is a subsequent political settlement, some form of international presence may be needed. Whether this can be done entirely by international civilian personnel and whether Americans should participate are matters we will need to consider in the context of any such agreement and with full consultation with the Congress.

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Let me assure you that NATO planning provides for air power to be used effectively. There will be no "pin prick" strikes. Even the initial use of air power will send a very clear signal of our ability to disrupt operations by the FRY military and special police, and follow-on phases will progressively expand in their scale and scope. These operations are planned to involve virtually all NATO allies.

Finally, regarding your desire for a clear policy linked to our national interests and a defined end-state, NATO air power will be used as part of a broader political strategy to advance our overall objectives of promoting a political settlement and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. We are not replacing diplomacy with military force; rather we are combining the two to achieve our objectives. Secretary Albright recently dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to the region to make crystal clear to Milosevic what steps he needs under UNSC 1199 to take to avoid NATO air strikes. Even if Milosevic gives NATO no choice but to execute air strikes, we will use them in a way designed to help bring an end to Serbian operations in Kosovo, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Our desired end-state in Kosovo is clear, comprising three parts. Our immediate objective is to achieve full compliance with UN Security Council

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willingness to work with the Administration to protect American
interests in
southeastern Europe. We will continue to consult closely with you in
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critical days and weeks ahead.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

October 6, 1998

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. You have raised a number of
critical
issues. Before addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is
appropriate to
lead-off by describing our overall approach and the vital interests at
stake.

We are entering a crucial period regarding the crisis in Kosovo. Serb
repression
and violence, clear evidence of atrocities, the uncertain fate of more
than
250,000 displaced persons and the approach of winter have coalesced

an international consensus behind U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, adopted on September 23, 1998, the international community reaffirmed in clear terms what steps Milosevic must take:

- * immediately cease offensive operations;
- * withdraw security forces;
- * allow full access to international monitors and relief agencies;
- * negotiate a settlement with the Kosovar Albanians.

Since, as of now, Milosevic has not complied with these requirements, we and our NATO allies will soon consider the potential use of force. I want to provide you and others in the Congress our full thinking and strategy on this issue.

As your letter recognizes, the crisis in Kosovo began when Serbian special police launched an offensive against the Kosovo insurgents in February of this year. In the seven months that have followed, Serbian military and police have steadily escalated their systematic campaign of violence and expulsions designed to terrorize the local population and suppress armed insurgent groups. The roots of the current crisis can be traced back to 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic revoked the autonomous status that Kosovo had enjoyed since 1974. My Administration has long pressed Belgrade to restore the rights and freedoms of the Kosovar Albanians, making clear that this was a prerequisite to Serbia's reintegration into the international community. However, Belgrade resisted our support for building an effective dialogue with the Kosovars, instead escalating the fighting by targeting civilians with increasing brutality.

Over the past several months, we have endeavored to contain and ultimately resolve the conflict through extensive humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. On

the humanitarian track, we have committed more than \$45 million in emergency relief funds and other types of assistance and we have urged the UNHCR and other international agencies and donors to do the same. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Chris Hill has had some success, pulling together a Kosovar Albanian negotiating team under Ibrahim Rugova and obtaining Milosevic's acknowledgment of an "interim" agreement that would allow for self-government. Ambassador Hill has also worked with Contact Group countries to develop the text of a settlement that they now have endorsed. This settlement would allow the people of Kosovo to administer their own local affairs, including education, justice and a separate police force, while protecting the human rights and cultural sites of all ethnic groups, including the small Serb minority. It would do so while preserving the FRY's territorial integrity, because we believe that an independent Kosovo could not survive as a viable state. Moreover, independence would send entirely the wrong signal to those in the region calling for a "greater Albania," and to minorities elsewhere in Europe, leading to greater instability. However, our humanitarian and diplomatic efforts have been thwarted by the tactics of Milosevic's security forces.

In recent days, the intensifying threat of NATO military action has caused Milosevic to throttle back the operations of his security forces; some withdrawals have begun to occur. However, he has not done enough to come into full compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199. We cannot accept hollow promises or half steps that leave open the prospect of renewed hostilities in the coming weeks, or after this winter.

It is important to focus on U.S. national interests that are at stake here.

* First, Kosovo is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider European war with dangerous consequences for the United States. Throughout Balkan

history, ethnic conflicts often have been used for political manipulation. The violence directed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo already has exacerbated political tensions and civil disorder in neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in Kosovo likely would trigger further refugee flows into Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with dangerously destabilizing consequences. Wider instability and refugee flows further south would threaten the differing regional interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, exacerbating tensions in the Aegean. The radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support radical Islamic fundamentalist efforts to establish a foothold in southeastern Europe, potentially creating new sources of instability and increasing the threat of terrorism to us and our allies in Europe.

* Second, we are faced with a major humanitarian and human rights crisis that could soon become a catastrophe. Yesterday, the United Nations Secretary General's report on the crisis condemned the wanton killing and destruction perpetrated by security forces in Kosovo. These forces have destroyed at least one quarter of the homes in over 200 villages. They have committed atrocities, including the mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and children. We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the onset of winter, to prevent further atrocities and to demonstrate that the international community will not tolerate such acts.

* Third, it is important to sustain NATO's credibility as the principal peace and security instrument in Europe. Just as NATO's effective response in Bosnia has had a stabilizing influence throughout Europe, so too will NATO's efficacy in responding to Kosovo help achieve our long-term goals for Europe. Moreover, as the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated, the credibility of U.S. warnings to

Milosevic first issued by President Bush in 1992, and reaffirmed by me, also are challenged.

We prefer to advance each of these interests through diplomacy that leads to a peaceful and principled settlement, as our negotiating efforts have sought to accomplish. But largely as a result of Milosevic's assault, those negotiating efforts are impossible to pursue under these circumstances. I believe the credible threat, and therefore the willingness to use force, has become necessary. It now appears that our NATO allies share this view.

I will now turn to the four specific issues raised in your letter.

First, I too am concerned about military readiness, as I discussed at length with the Chiefs and CINCs recently. As noted in my letters to Congress and Secretary Cohen, we have moved promptly to address these concerns, building on efforts initiated by my Administration over the past several months to support military operations. For example, in FY 1998 we worked with Congress to secure a \$1 billion reprogramming that reallocated funds to readiness programs and a \$1.85 billion emergency funding package to cover the unanticipated costs of the Bosnia and Southwest Asia contingencies. For FY 1999, I have proposed a \$1.9 billion emergency funding measure to cover the continuing costs of our Bosnia deployment. To preclude serious readiness problems in FY 1999, I again urge Congress to approve this measure.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2403

October 6, 1998

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. You have raised a number of critical issues. Before addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is appropriate to lead-off by describing our overall approach and the vital interests at stake.

We are entering a crucial period regarding the crisis in Kosovo. Serb repression and violence, clear evidence of atrocities, the uncertain fate of more than 250,000 displaced persons and the approach of winter have coalesced an international consensus behind U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, adopted on September 23, 1998, the international community reaffirmed in clear terms what steps Milosevic must take:

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While Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current crisis, there are others whose actions could prolong and exacerbate it. I am referring in

particular to the various armed insurgent groups in Kosovo, including the Kosovar Liberation Army, or UCK. Ambassador Holbrooke this week delivered a firm message to these groups to cooperate in bringing about a peaceful solution. Armed reprisals against Serb civilians, or the continued pursuit of independence by military means, will only shatter a cease-fire and the hopes of attaining a political settlement that gives Kosovo true autonomy. We have told them that failure to cooperate will cause us to reassess our operations against the Serbs.

Larry Eagleburger, our former ambassador to Yugoslavia, once said that the war in Yugoslavia began in Kosovo and will ultimately end there. His prediction was correct. Our job is to bring that war to an end, to keep it from destabilizing the region and to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. I appreciate your willingness to work with the Administration to protect American interests in

southeastern Europe. We will continue to consult closely with you in the critical days and weeks ahead.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Chairman
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1401

October 6, 1998

Dear Senator Nickles:

Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. You have raised a number of critical issues. Before addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is appropriate to lead-off by describing our overall approach and the vital interests at stake.

We are entering a crucial period regarding the crisis in Kosovo. Serb repression and violence, clear evidence of atrocities, the uncertain fate of more than 250,000 displaced persons and the approach of winter have coalesced an international consensus behind U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, adopted on September 23, 1998, the international community reaffirmed in clear terms what steps Milosevic must take:

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* negotiate a settlement with the Kosovar Albanians.

Since, as of now, Milosevic has not complied with these requirements, we and our NATO allies will soon consider the potential use of force. I want to provide you and others in the Congress our full thinking and strategy on this issue.

As your letter recognizes, the crisis in Kosovo began when Serbian special police launched an offensive against the Kosovo insurgents in February of this year. In the seven months that have followed, Serbian military and police have steadily escalated their systematic campaign of violence and expulsions designed to terrorize the local population and suppress armed insurgent groups. The roots of the current crisis can be traced back to 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic revoked the autonomous status that Kosovo had enjoyed since 1974. My Administration has long pressed Belgrade to restore the rights and freedoms of the Kosovar Albanians, making clear that this was a prerequisite to Serbia's reintegration into the international community. However, Belgrade resisted our support for building an effective dialogue with the Kosovars, instead escalating the fighting by targeting civilians with increasing brutality.

Over the past several months, we have endeavored to contain and ultimately resolve the conflict through extensive humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. On the humanitarian track, we have committed more than \$45 million in emergency relief funds and other types of assistance and we have urged the UNHCR and other international agencies and donors to do the same. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Chris Hill has had some success, pulling together a Kosovar Albanian negotiating team under Ibrahim Rugova and obtaining Milosevic's acknowledgment of an "interim" agreement that would allow for self-government. Ambassador Hill has also worked with Contact Group countries to develop the text of a

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The radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support radical Islamic

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including the mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and children.

We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the onset of winter, to prevent

further atrocities and to demonstrate that the international community will not

tolerate such acts.

* Third, it is important to sustain NATO's credibility as the principal peace and

security instrument in Europe. Just as NATO's effective response in Bosnia has

had a stabilizing influence throughout Europe, so too will NATO's efficacy in

responding to Kosovo help achieve our long-term goals for Europe.

Moreover, as

the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated, the credibility of U.S. warnings to

Milosevic first issued by President Bush in 1992, and reaffirmed by me, also are

challenged.

We prefer to advance each of these interests through diplomacy that leads to a

peaceful and principled settlement, as our negotiating efforts have sought to

accomplish. But largely as a result of Milosevic's assault, those negotiating

efforts are impossible to pursue under these circumstances. I believe the

credible threat, and therefore the willingness to use force, has become

necessary. It now appears that our NATO allies share this view.

I will now turn to the four specific issues raised in your letter.

First, I too am concerned about military readiness, as I discussed at length with the Chiefs and CINCs recently. As noted in my letters to Congress and Secretary Cohen, we have moved promptly to address these concerns, building on efforts initiated by my Administration over the past several months to support military operations. For example, in FY 1998 we worked with Congress to secure a \$1 billion reprogramming that reallocated funds to readiness programs and a \$1.85 billion emergency funding package to cover the unanticipated costs of the Bosnia and Southwest Asia contingencies. For FY 1999, I have proposed a \$1.9 billion emergency funding measure to cover the continuing costs of our Bosnia deployment. To preclude serious readiness problems in FY 1999, I again urge Congress to approve this measure.

In addition to these actions, I committed my Administration to work with Congress to provide adequate resources for readiness and other defense programs in FY 1999 and beyond. For the short term, I proposed that members of my Administration work with you prior to the Congressional adjournment to craft a \$1 billion supplemental package that will augment FY 1999 funding for key readiness programs. For the longer term, the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council have been instructed to work with Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs to develop a multi-year plan that provides the resources necessary to preserve military readiness, support our troops, and modernize aging weapons systems. This plan will be incorporated in my FY 2000 defense budget request to Congress. As I wrote you last month, the men and women of our armed forces will have the resources they need to do their job.

The cost of potential military operations in Kosovo would be a function of the scope and intensity of such operations. My Administration will work with the Congress to ensure timely passage of appropriate funding measures and that this does not come at the expense of our defense program.

Second, on the question of ground forces, although NATO planners have reviewed a broad range of options, some of which would involve ground forces in hostile circumstances, I can assure you the United States would not support these options and there currently is no sentiment in NATO for such a mission. The mission under consideration involves the use of graduated air power, not military forces on the ground.

In the event that Milosevic agrees to comply with UNSCR 1199, and if there is a subsequent political settlement, some form of international presence may be needed. Whether this can be done entirely by international civilian personnel and whether Americans should participate are matters we will need to consider in the context of any such agreement and with full consultation with the Congress.

Third, regarding the nature of the air campaign in Kosovo, NATO has developed a clear military plan. It entails the graduated but effective use of air power harnessed to two achievable objectives. The primary objective is by threat of force, or its use, to persuade Milosevic to comply with the demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199. If initial use of air power does not result in compliance, NATO's secondary objective is to strike Belgrade's military capabilities in ways that will damage his ability to conduct repressive operations in Kosovo, the same objective you identify in your letter.

Let me assure you that NATO planning provides for air power to be used effectively. There will be no "pin prick" strikes. Even the initial use of air

power will send a very clear signal of our ability to disrupt operations by the FRY military and special police, and follow-on phases will progressively expand in their scale and scope. These operations are planned to involve virtually all NATO allies.

Finally, regarding your desire for a clear policy linked to our national interests and a defined end-state, NATO air power will be used as part of a broader political strategy to advance our overall objectives of promoting a political settlement and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. We are not replacing diplomacy with military force; rather we are combining the two to achieve our objectives. Secretary Albright recently dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to the region to make crystal clear to Milosevic what steps he needs under UNSC 1199 to take to avoid NATO air strikes. Even if Milosevic gives NATO no choice but to execute air strikes, we will use them in a way designed to help bring an end to Serbian operations in Kosovo, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Our desired end-state in Kosovo is clear, comprising three parts. Our immediate objective is to achieve full compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199, thus reducing the risk of wider conflict, averting a humanitarian catastrophe and lessening the chance of further atrocities. Our mid-term objective is to secure a political settlement that grants broad autonomy to the Kosovars, while keeping Kosovo within the FRY. In particular, the agreement should ensure that the Kosovars have their own bodies of government and police. Our longer-term objective is a FRY that is democratic and on the path to European integration. This requires a responsible government that is accountable to its own citizens, of all ethnic backgrounds, and that carries out its obligations abroad, including in Bosnia. In this regard, we continue to support opposition parties and free

and independent media in the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

The United Nations, the Contact Group, NATO and my Administration all agree that Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current situation including the brutal tactics of his security forces. Not only has he displaced a quarter million of his own citizens, but he has also suppressed the human rights of all citizens of the FRY and forced them to bear the burden of the current conflict, of UN economic sanctions and of isolation from the rest of Europe.

While Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current crisis, there are others whose actions could prolong and exacerbate it. I am referring in

particular to the various armed insurgent groups in Kosovo, including the Kosovar Liberation Army, or UCK. Ambassador Holbrooke this week delivered a firm message to these groups to cooperate in bringing about a peaceful solution. Armed reprisals against Serb civilians, or the continued pursuit of independence by military means, will only shatter a cease-fire and the hopes of attaining a political settlement that gives Kosovo true autonomy. We have told them that failure to cooperate will cause us to reassess our operations against the Serbs.

Larry Eagleburger, our former ambassador to Yugoslavia, once said that the war in Yugoslavia began in Kosovo and will ultimately end there. His prediction was correct. Our job is to bring that war to an end, to keep it from destabilizing the region and to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. I appreciate your willingness to work with the Administration to protect American interests in southeastern Europe. We will continue to consult closely with you in the critical days and weeks ahead.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Don Nickles
Majority Whip
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3602

October 6, 1998

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. You have raised a number of critical issues. Before addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is appropriate to lead-off by describing our overall approach and the vital interests at stake.

We are entering a crucial period regarding the crisis in Kosovo. Serb repression and violence, clear evidence of atrocities, the uncertain fate of more than 250,000 displaced persons and the approach of winter have coalesced an international consensus behind U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, adopted on September 23, 1998, the international community reaffirmed in clear terms what steps Milosevic must take:

- * immediately cease offensive operations;
- * withdraw security forces;
- * allow full access to international monitors and relief agencies;
- * negotiate a settlement with the Kosovar Albanians.

Since, as of now, Milosevic has not complied with these requirements, we and our NATO allies will soon consider the potential use of force. I want to provide you

and others in the Congress our full thinking and strategy on this issue.

As your letter recognizes, the crisis in Kosovo began when Serbian special police launched an offensive against the Kosovo insurgents in February of this year. In the seven months that have followed, Serbian military and police have steadily escalated their systematic campaign of violence and expulsions designed to terrorize the local population and suppress armed insurgent groups. The roots of the current crisis can be traced back to 1989, when Slobodan Milosevic revoked the autonomous status that Kosovo had enjoyed since 1974. My Administration has long pressed Belgrade to restore the rights and freedoms of the Kosovar Albanians, making clear that this was a prerequisite to Serbia's reintegration into the international community. However, Belgrade resisted our support for building an effective dialogue with the Kosovars, instead escalating the fighting by targeting civilians with increasing brutality.

Over the past several months, we have endeavored to contain and ultimately resolve the conflict through extensive humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. On the humanitarian track, we have committed more than \$45 million in emergency relief funds and other types of assistance and we have urged the UNHCR and other international agencies and donors to do the same. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Chris Hill has had some success, pulling together a Kosovar Albanian negotiating team under Ibrahim Rugova and obtaining Milosevic's acknowledgment of an "interim" agreement that would allow for self-government. Ambassador Hill has also worked with Contact Group countries to develop the text of a settlement that they now have endorsed. This settlement would allow the people of Kosovo to administer their own local affairs, including education, justice and a separate police force, while protecting the human rights and cultural sites of all ethnic

groups, including the small Serb minority. It would do so while preserving the FRY's territorial integrity, because we believe that an independent Kosovo could not survive as a viable state. Moreover, independence would send entirely the wrong signal to those in the region calling for a "greater Albania," and to minorities elsewhere in Europe, leading to greater instability. However, our humanitarian and diplomatic efforts have been thwarted by the tactics of Milosevic's security forces.

In recent days, the intensifying threat of NATO military action has caused Milosevic to throttle back the operations of his security forces; some withdrawals have begun to occur. However, he has not done enough to come into full compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199. We cannot accept hollow promises or half steps that leave open the prospect of renewed hostilities in the coming weeks, or after this winter.

It is important to focus on U.S. national interests that are at stake here.

* First, Kosovo is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider European war with dangerous consequences for the United States. Throughout Balkan history, ethnic conflicts often have been used for political manipulation. The violence directed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo already has exacerbated political tensions and civil disorder in neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in Kosovo likely would trigger further refugee flows into Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with dangerously destabilizing consequences. Wider instability and refugee flows further south would threaten the differing regional interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, exacerbating tensions in the Aegean. The radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support radical Islamic fundamentalist efforts to establish a foothold in southeastern Europe, potentially creating new sources of instability and increasing the threat of

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0201

October 6, 1998

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. You have raised a number of critical issues. Before addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is appropriate to lead-off by describing our overall approach and the vital interests at stake.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4001

October 6, 1998

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter about Kosovo. You have raised a number of critical issues. Before addressing your specific concerns, I believe it is appropriate to lead-off by describing our overall approach and the vital interests at stake.

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It is important to focus on U.S. national interests that are at stake here.

* First, Kosovo is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider European war with

dangerous consequences for the United States. Throughout Balkan history, ethnic

conflicts often have been used for political manipulation. The violence directed

against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo already has exacerbated political tensions and

civil disorder in neighboring Albania. Continuation of the fighting in Kosovo

likely would trigger further refugee flows into Albania and the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, with dangerously destabilizing consequences. Wider

instability and refugee flows further south would threaten the differing regional

interests of NATO allies Greece and Turkey, exacerbating tensions in the Aegean.

The radicalization of ethnic Albanians also could support radical Islamic

fundamentalist efforts to establish a foothold in southeastern Europe, potentially creating new sources of instability and increasing the threat of

terrorism to us and our allies in Europe.

* Second, we are faced with a major humanitarian and human rights crisis that

could soon become a catastrophe. Yesterday, the United Nations Secretary

General's report on the crisis condemned the wanton killing and destruction

perpetrated by security forces in Kosovo. These forces have destroyed at least

one quarter of the homes in over 200 villages. They have committed atrocities,

including the mutilation and execution of senior citizens, women and children.

We must act to prevent widespread deaths with the onset of winter, to prevent further atrocities and to demonstrate that the international community will not tolerate such acts.

* Third, it is important to sustain NATO's credibility as the principal peace and security instrument in Europe. Just as NATO's effective response in Bosnia has had a stabilizing influence throughout Europe, so too will NATO's efficacy in responding to Kosovo help achieve our long-term goals for Europe. Moreover, as the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated, the credibility of U.S. warnings to Milosevic first issued by President Bush in 1992, and reaffirmed by me, also are challenged.

We prefer to advance each of these interests through diplomacy that leads to a peaceful and principled settlement, as our negotiating efforts have sought to accomplish. But largely as a result of Milosevic's assault, those negotiating efforts are impossible to pursue under these circumstances. I believe the credible threat, and therefore the willingness to use force, has become necessary. It now appears that our NATO allies share this view.

I will now turn to the four specific issues raised in your letter.

First, I too am concerned about military readiness, as I discussed at length with the Chiefs and CINCs recently. As noted in my letters to Congress and Secretary Cohen, we have moved promptly to address these concerns, building on efforts initiated by my Administration over the past several months to support military operations. For example, in FY 1998 we worked with Congress to secure a \$1 billion reprogramming that reallocated funds to readiness programs and a \$1.85 billion emergency funding package to cover the unanticipated costs of the Bosnia and Southwest Asia contingencies. For FY 1999, I have proposed a

\$1.9 billion
emergency funding measure to cover the continuing costs of our
Bosnia deployment.
To preclude serious readiness problems in FY 1999, I again urge
Congress to
approve this measure.

In addition to these actions, I committed my Administration to work
with Congress
to provide adequate resources for readiness and other defense
programs in FY 1999
and beyond. For the short term, I proposed that members of my
Administration
work with you prior to the Congressional adjournment to craft a \$1
billion
supplemental package that will augment FY 1999 funding for key
readiness
programs. For the longer term, the Office of Management and Budget
and the
National Security Council have been instructed to work with
Secretary Cohen and
the Joint Chiefs to develop a multi-year plan that provides the
resources
necessary to preserve military readiness, support our troops, and
modernize aging
weapons systems. This plan will be incorporated in my FY 2000
defense budget
request to Congress. As I wrote you last month, the men and women
of our armed
forces will have the resources they need to do their job.

The cost of potential military operations in Kosovo would be a
function of the
scope and intensity of such operations. My Administration will work
with the
Congress to ensure timely passage of appropriate funding measures
and that this
does not come at the expense of our defense program.

Second, on the question of ground forces, although NATO planners
have reviewed a
broad range of options, some of which would involve ground forces in
hostile
circumstances, I can assure you the United States would not support
these options
and there currently is no sentiment in NATO for such a mission. The
mission
under consideration involves the use of graduated air power, not
military forces
on the ground.

In the event that Milosevic agrees to comply with UNSCR 1199, and if there is a subsequent political settlement, some form of international presence may be needed. Whether this can be done entirely by international civilian personnel and whether Americans should participate are matters we will need to consider in the context of any such agreement and with full consultation with the Congress.

Third, regarding the nature of the air campaign in Kosovo, NATO has developed a clear military plan. It entails the graduated but effective use of air power harnessed to two achievable objectives. The primary objective is by threat of force, or its use, to persuade Milosevic to comply with the demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199. If initial use of air power does not result in compliance, NATO's secondary objective is to strike Belgrade's military capabilities in ways that will damage his ability to conduct repressive operations in Kosovo, the same objective you identify in your letter.

Let me assure you that NATO planning provides for air power to be used effectively. There will be no "pin prick" strikes. Even the initial use of air power will send a very clear signal of our ability to disrupt operations by the FRY military and special police, and follow-on phases will progressively expand in their scale and scope. These operations are planned to involve virtually all NATO allies.

Finally, regarding your desire for a clear policy linked to our national interests and a defined end-state, NATO air power will be used as part of a broader political strategy to advance our overall objectives of promoting a political settlement and averting a humanitarian catastrophe. We are not replacing diplomacy with military force; rather we are combining the two to achieve our objectives. Secretary Albright recently dispatched Ambassador

Holbrooke to the region to make crystal clear to Milosevic what steps he needs under UNSC 1199 to take to avoid NATO air strikes. Even if Milosevic gives NATO no choice but to execute air strikes, we will use them in a way designed to help bring an end to Serbian operations in Kosovo, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Our desired end-state in Kosovo is clear, comprising three parts. Our immediate objective is to achieve full compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199, thus reducing the risk of wider conflict, averting a humanitarian catastrophe and lessening the chance of further atrocities. Our mid-term objective is to secure a political settlement that grants broad autonomy to the Kosovars, while keeping Kosovo within the FRY. In particular, the agreement should ensure that the Kosovars have their own bodies of government and police. Our longer-term objective is a FRY that is democratic and on the path to European integration. This requires a responsible government that is accountable to its own citizens, of all ethnic backgrounds, and that carries out its obligations abroad, including in Bosnia. In this regard, we continue to support opposition parties and free and independent media in the FRY. Further efforts in these areas are an important part of our broader strategy.

The United Nations, the Contact Group, NATO and my Administration all agree that Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current situation including the brutal tactics of his security forces. Not only has he displaced a quarter million of his own citizens, but he has also suppressed the human rights of all citizens of the FRY and forced them to bear the burden of the current conflict, of UN economic sanctions and of isolation from the rest of Europe.

While Milosevic bears primary responsibility for the current crisis, there are others whose actions could prolong and exacerbate it. I am referring in

particular to the various armed insurgent groups in Kosovo, including the Kosovar Liberation Army, or UCK. Ambassador Holbrooke this week delivered a firm message to these groups to cooperate in bringing about a peaceful solution. Armed reprisals against Serb civilians, or the continued pursuit of independence by military means, will only shatter a cease-fire and the hopes of attaining a political settlement that gives Kosovo true autonomy. We have told them that failure to cooperate will cause us to reassess our operations against the Serbs.

Larry Eagleburger, our former ambassador to Yugoslavia, once said that the war in Yugoslavia began in Kosovo and will ultimately end there. His prediction was correct. Our job is to bring that war to an end, to keep it from destabilizing the region and to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. I appreciate your willingness to work with the Administration to protect American interests in southeastern Europe. We will continue to consult closely with you in the critical days and weeks ahead.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
Committee on Rules and Administration
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4601

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