

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/2/98 6:02:17 PM
FROM Witkowsky, Anne A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Transmittal Letters -- [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Langley, Janice M.

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY Janice -

Please prepare the attached letter for transmittal to Helms, Biden, Gingrich and Gephardt. Pls make whatever changes are necessary to the Helms address. Complete package to follow.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 3717ltr.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with the Condition (5)(C) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification on the Document Agreed Among the States parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 ("The CFE Flank Document"), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14, 1997, enclosed is the Report on CFE Compliance.

The Report is provided in both a classified and unclassified version.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, D.C.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/3/98 3:37:06 PM
FROM Bell, Robert G.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Blinken, Antony J.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.

TEXT_BODY

No deal - I meant a Director's slot; not an irreplaceable Senior Directors' slot. There is a serious tactical issue here, though: at what stage do we send someone out to lay some real lumber up against the side of the heads of certain Republican Senate leaders. That is, when do we supplement our "high road" approach ("I again urge the Senate to act this year") with some pointed comments ("In stonewalling this treaty, the Senate Republican leadership is on the wrong side of US diplomatic and national security interests, the wrong side of history, the wrong side of American public opinion and the wrong side of the view of virtually the rest of the entire world.")?

-----Original

Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J.

Sent: Wednesday, June 03,
1998 2:24 PM

To: Bell, Robert G.; Andreasen, Steven P.

Subject: RE:

CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]

he can have mine.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Bell, Robert G.

Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 1998
12:36 PM

To: Andreasen, Steven P.; Blinken, Antony J.

Subject: RE:

CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]

Hey, do we have a slot open in
Speechwriting for this guy?!

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P.
Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 1998 9:13 AM
To: Bell, Robert
G.; Blinken, Antony J.
Subject: CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Bob/Tony

-- Another sample of "what's out there..." Steve...

^Nuclear

Tests Rain Fallout on Cause of Nonproliferation<

^Walsh is a visiting

scholar at the Center for Global Security<

^Research at the Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory<

^By Jim Walsh=

^Special to the Los

Angeles Times=

Historians and theologians have long recognized
a perverse logic
in human affairs: Bad events can lead to good outcomes.

This has
been particularly true of nuclear weapons, where actions
by
countries to acquire or use nuclear weapons often have led to
a
strengthening of the international efforts to stem their spread.

China's test of a nuclear weapon in 1964 focused the attention
of

American and Soviet leaders and the result was the Nuclear
Nonproliferation

Treaty, the cornerstone of today's

nonproliferation regime. India's

peaceful nuclear test in 1974 had

similar effects. Likewise, revelations

about Iraq's clandestine

nuclear program led countries to tighten

their export laws and to

changes at the International Atomic Energy

Agency.

But what of the recent nuclear tests in South Asia?

Will they

spur the international community to do a better job on
the problem

of proliferation? Early indications are not encouraging.

World reaction to the nuclear tests has been negative but understated.

Major countries like England, France and Germany have issued statements

denouncing the tests while at the same time making clear that they

will not impose full-scale sanctions. France and Germany went so

far as to thwart an EU effort to impose strong penalties on the

guilty parties.

Here in the U.S., political discussions of the Indian and

Pakistani tests have taken a decidedly odd turn. While arms control

advocates watched passively from the sidelines, conservatives jumped

on the testing issue and with a straight face, declared that the

tests had proved them right: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was

a bad idea.

The conservative senators and pundits who have trotted out this

line have to be admired for theirchutzpah, if not their logic. A

month ago, the two most vociferous critics of the comprehensive test

ban were Jesse Helms and the prime minister of India. Today, Helms

somehow manages to simultaneously condemn the Indian tests and the

treaty banning such tests.

Who is responsible for this sad state

of affairs? Two parties

deserve special mention. The first is President Clinton. Clinton,

like other presidents before him, ignored the South Asian nuclear

rivalry. Now the administration is paying the price for its

neglect.

The second group deserving criticism

consists of the arms

control community and its more flamboyant cousin, the peace

movement. These groups have fallen on hard times as the public's

interest in nuclear weapons has all but evaporated. Worse still,

fickle foundations have abandoned the nuclear issue in favor of

new, sexier topics.

But the arms control and peace groups also have contributed to their own irrelevance. Arms control groups have myopically focused on U.S. policy. Their ``Beltway mentality" has prevented them from seeing that arms control has fundamentally changed, that it is an international issue requiring the expenditure of time and resources in other countries.

Peace groups, known for their youthful exuberance, have performed no better. When France conducted a series of nuclear tests a few years back, these groups responded with protests and wine boycotts. The result: French public opinion shifted and France eventually committed itself to the test ban treaty. Now there are new tests, but where are the protests? Where are the boycotts of Indian goods? Where is the criticism of India's provocatively nationalist government? Many of these groups are no doubt embarrassed by their past endorsement of the Indian position. India had long been the darling of some peace groups because of its ``Third World" critique of the U.S. nuclear policies.

This situation need not continue. Clinton could take on the ideologues in the Senate. Arms control and peace groups could start looking beyond the Beltway, and foundations might acknowledge that the problem of nuclear weapons has not gone away and that serious work on proliferation will require sustained effort for years to come.

If the president and others fail this challenge, it will mark a new departure in the history of nuclear weapons. The Indian and

Pakistani missteps
could lead, not to a strengthening of the
nonproliferation regime,
but rather to its erosion and eventual
collapse.

LAWP 06/03/98

02:20:00

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/4/98 7:05:19 PM
FROM Bell, Robert G.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Latest from Helms on CTBT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Farrar, Jay C.
Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY Blinken, Antony J.
Rudman, Mara E.

TEXT_BODY

Think Steve was being a bit sarcastic. What Helms "meant to say" was: "I'm not opposed to all arms control treaties or holding hearings on any of them -- hell, I voted FOR the CFE flank agreement and held hearings on START II, CWC, CFE Flank, to name just a few, but I'll be damned if I'm going to support or hold hearings on CTB!" At least that's how I interpret his statement.

-----Original Message-----

From: Farrar,
Jay C.
Sent: Thursday, June 04, 1998 6:17 PM
To: Andreasen, Steven
P.
Cc: Bell, Robert G.; Blinken, Antony J.; Rudman, Mara E.
Subject: RE:
Latest from Helms on CTBT [UNCLASSIFIED]

I applaud you optimism
Steve - you find the sliver of silver inside every cloud.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.
Sent: Thursday, June 04,
1998 5:14 PM
To: Bell, Robert G.; Blinken, Antony J.; Rudman, Mara
E.; Farrar, Jay C.
Subject: Latest from Helms on CTBT [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Colleagues

-- a somewhat rambling discourse by the Chairman...note he says he

is "not opposed to any treaty" and "certainly not opposed to considering them...". I think he's softening up, don't you? Steve.

^Helms

digs in heels on Test Ban Treaty ratification despite nuclear tests<

^By

The Associated Press=

Sen. Jesse Helms says he will continue to block Senate ratification of an international test ban treaty, despite recent nuclear tests in India and Pakistan.

Helms,

chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has refused

to hold hearings on the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since

President Clinton submitted it in September.

On Wednesday, Clinton

and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

said the recent nuclear

tests make Senate ratification of the treaty imperative.

However,

Helms, R-N.C., said he will continue to resist the president's demand

that senators take up the test-ban treaty until

Clinton sends them

several other key accords.

"I'm not opposed to any treaty,

I'm certainly not opposed to considering them, but it is hard to deal with somebody who says,

'This is my way, that's the only way and nothing else is going to matter,'" Helms said in an interview

this week with The News & Observer of Raleigh.

"Well, something

else does matter," he said. "This is supposed to be a tripartite

form of government, but he (Clinton) wants to make it a kingdom."

The president signed the test-ban accord at the United Nations in

1996, making the United States the first of 149 signatory nations.

Only 13 countries have ratified it, including two nuclear

powers,
France and Britain. The treaty cannot take effect until 44
countries
have ratified it.

Nine prominent physicists and former senior
U.S. intelligence
and military officials sent a letter Tuesday to
Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott urging him to support ratification
of the treaty.

"Now more than ever, it is crucial for the United
States to
send the clearest possible message that nuclear testing
is not
legitimate and will not be tolerated by the international
community,"
they wrote.

Behind the fight over the test-ban treaty is a larger
struggle
between Clinton and GOP congressional leaders over the
future of
U.S. arms-control policy in the post-Cold War world.

Helms and other Senate Republicans want Clinton to submit
changes
to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty he negotiated last
year with
Russian President Boris Yeltsin. They also want him to
send them
an international pact to fight global warming, which he
says is
not ready.

In a letter to Clinton Jan. 21, Helms said he would
not hold
hearings on the test-ban treaty until the Senate can consider
the

ABM and global-warming pacts.

In his response to Helms
on Feb. 10, Clinton noted he had called
for Senate approval of the
test-ban treaty in his State of the
Union address. The president
explained the delay in submitting the
global-warming accord, but
did not mention Helms' objections about
the ABM treaty.

APE-
06/04/98 09:32:00

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/5/98 5:22:06 PM

FROM Harris, Elisa D.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(b)(c)(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/05/1998

DECLASSIFYON 06/05/2008

SUBJECT CWC REPORT TO CONGRESS ~~SECRET~~

TO Bell, Robert G.
Farrar, Jay C.
Highsmith, Newell L.

CARBON_COPY Edwards, Joan K.
Samore, Gary S.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Rudman, Mara E.
Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WZ NARA, Date 2/7/2017
2006-1363-F(3)

TEXT_BODY would appreciate your clearance on the attached by COB Monday,
June
8. anyone interested in seeing the actual report should contact
joan, who has the package. thanks!!

joan: could you please do
the letters to Biden on SFRC, Gilman and Hamilton on HIRC? thanks!
also, I had trouble with the classification header on page 2 of
the memo to POTUS. wld appreciate if you could fix. thanks again!!

June 4, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GARY SAMORE

FROM: ELISA D. HARRIS

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on CWC Compliance

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President recommending that he sign the attached letters transmitting the CWC Compliance Report to Congress. The report has been cleared by all relevant agencies.

Concurrence by: Bob Bell, Newell Highsmith, Jay Farrar

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Letters of Transmittal

Tab B Report to Congress

Tab II Incoming

1

UNCLASSIFIED ~~WITH SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED ~~WITH SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED ~~WITH SECRET~~ 3782

~~U.S. ONLY/ORCON ATTACHMENT 1~~

UNCLASSIFIED ~~WITH SECRET~~

~~U.S. ONLY/ORCON ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on CWC Compliance

Purpose

To transmit the report to Congress on compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Background

Condition 10(C) of the resolution giving advice and consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention requires an annual report to Congress on the countries included in the Intelligence Community's monitoring strategy who are in compliance with the CWC. This standard is in contrast to the requirements of the annual Pell report, which requires us to determine which countries are in noncompliance with various arms control treaty obligations.

The proposed report at Tab B concludes that one country, Saudi Arabia, can be certified as in compliance with its CWC obligations. Sixteen other countries, including China and Russia, are not certified either because:

- they ratified the CWC in late 1997 and thus were not required to submit a declaration until after the end of the reporting period; or,
- they have not yet made the required declaration; or,
- the Intelligence Community has not completed its analysis of their declaration; or,
- we have unanswered questions that preclude us from making a

compliance
judgment.

The report emphasizes that failure to certify a country does not mean that it is in violation of the CWC, but only that we lack sufficient information to be able to make a definitive compliance judgement at this time. Given that this is the first report of its kind, and only one country is certified as in compliance with the CWC, the report may draw attention on the Hill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters of transmittal for the CWC Compliance Report at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Letters of Transmittal
Tab B Report to Congress

UNCLASSIFIED ~~WITH SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED ~~WITH SECRET~~
~~U.S. ONLY/ORCON ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED ~~WITH SECRET 3782~~
~~U.S. ONLY/ORCON ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED ~~WITH SECRET~~ cc: Vice President
~~U.S. ONLY/ORCON ATTACHMENT~~ Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 3782c.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Condition 10(C) of the resolution of advice and

consent to the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the
Senate of the United
States on April 24, 1997, enclosed is the report to Congress on CWC
Compliance.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

2

UNCLASSIFIED WITH ~~SECRET~~
~~U.S. ONLY/ORCON ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED WITH ~~SECRET~~
~~U.S. ONLY/ORCON ATTACHMENT~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/12/98 10:21:04 AM
FROM Langley, Janice M.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Revised letters [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Witkowsky, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

3717ltr.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with the Condition (5)(C) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification on the Document Agreed Among the States parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 ("The CFE Flank Document"), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14, 1997, enclosed is the Report on CFE Compliance.

The Report is provided in both a classified and unclassified version.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Washington, D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 3717ltr2.doc

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with the Condition (5)(C) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification on the Document Agreed Among the States parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 ("The CFE Flank Document"), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14, 1997, enclosed is the Report on CFE Compliance.

The Report is provided in both a classified and unclassified version.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the House
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

UNCLASSIFIED

~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 3717ltr3.doc

Dear Mr. Leader:

In accordance with the Condition (5)(C) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification on the Document Agreed Among the States parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 ("The CFE Flank Document"), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14, 1997, enclosed is the Report on CFE Compliance.

The Report is provided in both a classified and unclassified version.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard Gephardt
Minority Leader
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

UNCLASSIFIED

~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 3717ltr4.doc

Dear Joe:

In accordance with the Condition (5)(C) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification on the Document Agreed Among the States parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 ("The CFE Flank Document"), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14, 1997, enclosed is the Report on CFE Compliance.

The Report is provided in both a classified and unclassified version.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph Biden
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

UNCLASSIFIED

~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/22/98 3:43:52 PM
FROM Halperin, David E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Revised Berger CTBT Rebuttal [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.
@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
Blinken, Antony J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Leavy, David C.
Widmer, Edward L.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Revised 1st graf to address Tony's concern.

-----Original Message-----

From: Halperin,
David E.
Sent: Monday, June 22, 1998 3:27 PM
To: Andreasen, Steven
P.
Cc: @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; Bell, Robert G.
Subject: RE:
Revised Berger CTBT Rebuttal [UNCLASSIFIED]

Steve -- edits on
your op-ed. Let me know if I can do more.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J.
Sent: Monday, June 22, 1998
11:29 AM
To: @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm
Subject: FW: Revised
Berger CTBT Rebuttal [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

can a pen
please look for turnaround today. thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P.
Sent: Friday, June 19, 1998 10:11 AM
To: Blinken, Antony
J.
Cc: Gray, Wendy E.; Bell, Robert G.
Subject: Revised Berger
CTBT Rebuttal [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Tony --

I have
made a few edits to the piece I sent you last night -- but I think
this is close. Please perfect. And remember the advice of the Tobacco
consultant: strike while the iron's hot!

Thanks. Steve

<<

File: Berger CTBT Rebuttal.doc >>

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Berger CTBT Rebuttal.doc

6/22 3:45 pm
CTBT OP-ED
BY SAMUEL R. BERGER

Senator Jesse Helms recently argued on this page [if not for WSJ: in
the Wall
Street Journal] that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is
"worthless" now
that India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear explosions. He
compared the treaty
to "closing the stable door after the horses have galloped away." He
also
charged that the Clinton Administration refuses to transmit for advice
and
consent U.S.-Russian agreements reached last fall concerning the
1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty because it fears Senate rejection.
Senator
Helms is wrong about the CTBT. The unfortunate events in South
Asia show that it
is more urgent than ever to bring this critical agreement into effect. It
is
important to set the record straight on the CTBT and on the ABM

agreements -- all
of which are vital to protecting our people from the danger of nuclear
war.

First, with respect to the ABM agreements, we have made clear we
will send them
to the Senate. These accords clarify the obligations of Russia and
other
countries in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union and establish
principles
to distinguish between defenses against long-range missiles, which are
limited
under the ABM Treaty, and defenses against shorter-range missiles,
which are not.
We will also transmit for ratification a separate agreement extending
the
deadline for final destruction of long-range nuclear missiles and
bombers under
the START II Treaty, to meet Russian budgetary concerns about
destruction costs.

But it makes no sense to ratify these accords until after the Russian
Duma
ratifies START II, which our Senate has already approved. Before we
ask our
Senate to approve modification of START II and the ABM Treaty, we
should insist
Russia commit itself to START II. To do otherwise risks inviting
Russia to
further delay START II ratification, pending the outcome of our own
debate over
the START/ABM package.

Once Russia ratifies START II, we look forward to working with
Senator Helms to
achieve prompt Senate ratification of the START/ABM agreements.
The ABM accord
is particularly important. It does not in any respect impinge on our
ongoing
programs with respect to defenses against long-range or shorter-range
missiles.
It does create a framework for preservation of the ABM Treaty. And
further
progress on START - meaning full implementation of START I and
START II and the
achievement of even deeper cuts in nuclear weapons under START III
- will not
happen unless we adhere to the ABM Treaty. Without that treaty, we
could expect

a return to an unconstrained nuclear missile buildup -- precisely what four Republican and two Democratic administrations have worked so hard to prevent over the last quarter century.

Just as important as the START/ABM framework on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms is the effort to stop the development of new nuclear weapons around the world by means of the CTBT, which would bar all nations from any further testing of nuclear explosives. The Treaty was signed in 1996, more than a year before the START/ABM accords, and yet Senator Helms' Foreign Relations Committee has taken no action.

The United States has a strong interest in bringing the CTBT into force at the earliest possible date, because we must do everything within our power to preclude India and Pakistan, as well as other countries, from further developing their nuclear capability through more tests. As Secretary of State Albright said at the University of Minnesota last week in encouraging the Senate to approve CTBT for America, "If we want others to refrain from nuclear tests -- and we do -- others want us to promise the same -- and we should."

The CTBT's ban on nuclear explosions will constrain the nuclear powers from developing new generations of weapons -- and make a costly and dangerous arms race less likely. It can stop India and Pakistan and others from developing more sophisticated weapons, optimized for regional warfare. And it will help prevent still more nations from seeking to enter the nuclear arena, especially by creating a worldwide network of sensors and a system of on-site inspection to make it much easier to monitor suspicious activity and deter cheating than it is in the absence of a treaty. To borrow Senator Helms' analogy, while the horses may have run through the stable door, we have every interest in keeping them in the corral.

Few major international agreements have enjoyed as much widespread support as the CTBT. Two years ago, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly, 158-3, to adopt the Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya opposing. A few days later, at the General Assembly, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the treaty. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the other states that had declared possession of nuclear weapons -- followed suit, and the UK and France have now ratified the Treaty. In all, 149 nations are now signatories.

The CTBT enjoys the support of all five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs - John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell, William Crowe, and David Jones -- and the directors of our national nuclear weapons laboratories. It also has the support of over 70 percent of the American public.

Conceived by President Eisenhower, the Comprehensive Test Ban reflects a long legacy of bipartisan commitment to using arms control to protect our national security. Thirty years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which banned all above-ground nuclear tests -- "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of global confrontation. Now, the Cold War is over, but the dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. By putting the Comprehensive Test Ban into force, we can make every American more secure. The agreement has sat in the Senate's "in box" for almost two years. It is time to take it out and move to forward.

Samuel R. Berger is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

###

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/22/98 6:37:39 PM
FROM Halperin, David E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Berger CTBT Op Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreassen, Steven P.
@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
Blinken, Antony J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Leavy, David C.
Widmer, Edward L.
Andreassen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Witkowski, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Steve -- great. A few tiny tweaks for you to consider -- and then run with it.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen, Steven P.

Sent: Monday, June 22, 1998 6:27 PM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense

Policy; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm

Subject: FW: Berger CTBT Op Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Dave -- A few changes. Back to you. I think we are "there" (although it pains me to delete the reference to the University of Minnesota...)].

-----Original Message-----

From: Halperin, David E.

Sent: Monday, June 22, 1998 5:50 PM
To: @DEFENSE - Defense
Policy; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm
Subject: FW: Berger CTBT Op
Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Over to Steve and Bob again.
My remarks may seem a tad barbed -- but meant in the spirit of
buildig
a better future for our children.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P.
Sent: Monday, June 22, 1998 5:26 PM
To: @PLANNING -
Strat Plan & Comm
Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: Berger
CTBT Op Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Dave -- Thanks for
the hard work on draft one. Attached is a coordinated
"Bell/Andreassen"
mark up of your mark up. Look forward to seeing the next mark up
to your mark up of our mark up to your mark up. Steve

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Berger CTBT OP ED REVISIO.doc
6/22 6:40 pm
CTBT OP-ED
BY SAMUEL R. BERGER

Senator Jesse Helms recently argued on this page [if not for WSJ: in
the Wall
Street Journal] [I'm assuming this is for WSJ so you can delete
previous
bracketed remark and this one] that the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) is
"worthless" now that India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear
explosions. He
compared the treaty to "closing the stable door after the horses have
galloped
away." He also charged that the Clinton Administration refuses to
transmit for

advice and consent three U.S.-Russian agreements reached last fall concerning the

1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty because it fears Senate rejection.

Senator Helms is wrong about both Treaties. The dangerous developments in South

Asia show it is more critical than ever to move forward on nuclear arms control.

So it is important to set the record straight.

First, with respect to the three ABM agreements, we have made clear we will send

them to the Senate. These accords clarify the obligations of Russia and other

countries in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union and establish principles

to distinguish between defenses against long-range missiles, which are limited

under the ABM Treaty, and defenses against shorter-range missiles, which are not.

We will also transmit for ratification a fourth agreement that will extend the

deadline for final destruction of long-range nuclear missiles and bombers under

the START II Treaty to meet Russian budgetary concerns about destruction costs,

while still requiring these missiles and bombers to be deactivated on roughly the

original schedule.

But it makes no sense to ratify these accords until after the Russian Duma

ratifies START II, which our Senate has already approved. Before we ask our

Senate to approve a modification of the START II Treaty and the ABM accords, we

should insist Russia commit itself to START II. To do otherwise risks inviting

the Duma to further delay ratification.

Once Russia ratifies START II, we look forward to working with Senator Helms to

achieve prompt Senate ratification of the four START/ABM agreements. The ABM

accords are particularly important. They do not in any respect impinge on our

ongoing programs with respect to defenses against long-range or shorter-range

missiles. They do create a framework for effective continued implementation of

the ABM Treaty, taking into account emerging threats to our national

security.

And further progress on START - meaning full implementation of START I and START

II and the achievement of even deeper cuts in nuclear weapons under START III -

will not happen unless we adhere to the ABM Treaty. Without that treaty, we

could expect a return to an unconstrained nuclear missile buildup -- precisely

what four Republican and two Democratic administrations have worked so hard to

prevent over the last quarter century.

Just as important as the START/ABM framework on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms is the

effort to constrain the development of new nuclear weapons around the world by

means of the CTBT, which would bar all nations from any further testing of

nuclear explosives. The Administration submitted the Treaty in 1997, at a time

when the Senate was, at our request, focused on ratifying the agreement to add

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO. But that effort was successfully

concluded this spring, and yet Senator Helms' Foreign Relations Committee still

has taken no action on CTBT.

The United States has a strong interest in bringing the CTBT into force at the

earliest possible date, because we must do everything within our power to prevent

India and Pakistan, as well as other countries, from further developing their

nuclear capability through more tests. As Secretary of State Albright said last

week, "If we want others to refrain from nuclear tests -- and we do -- others

want us to promise the same -- and we should."

The CTBT's ban on nuclear explosions will constrain the nuclear powers from

developing new generations of weapons -- and make a costly and dangerous arms

race less likely. It can constrain India and Pakistan and others from developing

more sophisticated weapons, optimized for regional warfare. And it will

strengthen our capabilities to monitor for nuclear explosions - a

requirement
that exists with or without CTBT - through the creation of a
worldwide network
of sensors and a system of on-site inspection. To borrow Senator
Helms' analogy,
while some horses may have run through the stable door, we have
every interest in
keeping them in the corral.

Few major international agreements have enjoyed as much
widespread support as the
CTBT. Two years ago, the United Nations General Assembly voted
overwhelmingly,
158-3, to adopt the Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya
opposing. A few
days later, at the General Assembly, President Clinton was the first
world leader
to sign the treaty. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom --
the other
states that had declared possession of nuclear weapons -- followed
suit, and the
UK and France have now ratified the Treaty. In all, 149 nations are
now
signatories.

The CTBT enjoys the support of all six members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff,
four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs - John Shalikashvili, Colin
Powell,
William Crowe, and David Jones -- and the directors of our national
nuclear
weapons laboratories. It also has the support of over 70 percent of the
American
public.

Conceived by President Eisenhower, the Comprehensive Test Ban
reflects a long
legacy of bipartisan commitment to using arms control to protect our
national
security. Thirty years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of
the
Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which banned all above-ground nuclear
tests -- "a
shaft of light cut into the darkness" of global confrontation. Now, the
Cold War
is over, but the dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. By putting the
Comprehensive Test Ban into force, we can make every American
more secure. The
agreement has sat in the Senate's "in box" for too long. The time to
lead is

now.

Samuel R. Berger is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

###

2

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/25/98 9:07:29 AM
FROM LaFleur, Vinca S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Halperin, David E.

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen, Steven P.
Sent: Wednesday,
June 24, 1998 8:26 PM
To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Cc: @NONPRO
- Export Controls; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; LaFleur, Vinca

S.; Gray, Wendy E.
Subject: FW: SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT
op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Dave -- A few edits --

most important, I think we should avoid the "classic" missile defense debate with Helms, and instead point to our own (robust) program and note it is consistent with and supported by our arms control commitments. I did not have a chance to show this to Bob before he departed; you might want to send around a clean draft before he gets in around 10:00 a.m. tomorrow, at which point I'll have him focus on this. Thanks. Steve.

-----Original Message-----

From: Halperin,
David E.
Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 1998 5:34 PM
To: @DEFENSE -
Defense Policy
Cc: @NONPRO - Export Controls; @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs; LaFleur, Vinca S.; Gray, Wendy E.
Subject: SRB Wall Street
Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

Draft of SRB op-ed in response
to Senator Helms WSJ essay of 6/18 (available on request).

Comments

back to me, please -- by 10 am Thursday if possible (only 800 words
to read) -- so we can get it to SRB on the road. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

SRB CTB WSJ.doc

6/24 5:30 pm

TIME TO LEAD ON THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
BY SAMUEL R. BERGER

Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Jesse Helms recently
argued on this
page that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is "worthless"
now that India
and Pakistan have conducted nuclear explosions. He compared the
treaty to
"closing the stable door after the horses have galloped away." In fact,
the
dangerous developments in South Asia make it more critical than ever
to move
forward on the CTBT, while the horses are still in the corral, and
before there
is a stampede.

The CTBT, which would ban all nuclear explosive tests, was first
proposed by
President Eisenhower. President Clinton has called it the "longest-
sought,
hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control."

That prize is finally within reach. Two years ago, the U.N. General
Assembly
voted 158-3 to adopt the Treaty. President Clinton was the first world
leader to
sign. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the nations
with declared
nuclear arsenals -- followed suit, and the U.K. and France have
already ratified
it. All told, 149 nations - including our NATO allies, Japan, South
Korea and
Israel - have now signed.

We should pause and contemplate this achievement: After five
decades of nuclear
danger, 149 nations have signed an accord to never, or never again,
test a
nuclear explosive. We must not let this extraordinary opportunity slip
away.

Four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell, William Crowe, and David Jones -- plus all six current members of the JCS say the Treaty is in our national interest. The directors of our three national nuclear weapons labs and leading independent experts say America can maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent without explosive testing. The public strongly supports the Treaty, as it has for forty years.

The CTBT will constrain the development of more advanced and dangerous nuclear weapons by nations that already possess them -- and limit the possibilities for other states to acquire them. It will also enhance our ability to monitor for nuclear explosions by other nations.

With or without a CTBT we must monitor for such activities. The Treaty gives us new tools to pursue this vital mission: a global network of sensors to supplement our intelligence capabilities, and the right to request short-notice, on-site inspections in other countries.

We have no hope of persuading India, Pakistan and other crucial nations to join the CTBT if we do not. Failing to ratify would remove any barrier to further tests by India and Pakistan and spur nuclear arms competition in other regions. This would create a much more dangerous world.

Senator Helms suggests we could be protected in such a world by giving up on arms control and simply deploying nationwide defenses against ballistic missiles. We continue to develop national missile defense systems so that we can meet future threats, and we are moving forward on improving defenses against shorter-range missiles which threaten our forces and allies today. Moreover, our arms control agreements are consistent with and supportive of our missile defense program. Once the Russian Duma ratifies the START II Treaty, which will

make deep cuts in
U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, President Clinton will send to the
Senate
several agreements reached with Russia last fall. Among them is an
agreement to
clarify our right to continue work on modern theater defenses,
consistent with
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

Senator Helms calls the ABM Treaty "antiquated." But without this
Treaty ,
further missile reductions under START II and III would be
imperiled, and we
could expect a return to an unconstrained nuclear race -- precisely
what four
Republican and two Democratic administrations have worked so hard
to prevent for
the last thirty years.

Constraining the spread of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear,
chemical and
biological -- is a key pillar of President Clinton's national security
policy.
We have stood firmly against Saddam Hussein to ensure U.N. efforts
to destroy
Iraq's dangerous weapons. Recently, we worked with the U.K. and the
Republic of
Georgia to ensure safe storage of nuclear materials left over from the
breakup of
the Soviet Union. The CTBT, which would inhibit the spread of the
most dangerous
weapons of all, is a vital component of our strategy.

Thirty years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the
Limited Test Ban
Treaty -- which banned all above-ground nuclear tests -- "a shaft of
light cut
into the darkness" of global confrontation. Now, the Cold War is over,
but the
dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. The Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty can help
turn the global tide against nuclear weapons, and thereby make every
American
more secure. The agreement has sat in the Senate's in box for too long.
It is
urgent that we go forward.

Samuel R. Berger is Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/25/98 9:58:40 AM
FROM Halperin, David E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Caravelli, John M.
Edwards, Joan K.
Harris, Elisa D.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Samore, Gary S.
Tucker, Maureen E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Gray, Wendy E.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Steve and Bob -- I've edited from Steve's edits. (My comments in blue; Steve's in red.) I must leave here by 11 am for the day, so if we want to get it to SRB before bedtime in China, we should get it done before then. I think it could wait til tomorrow, though.

Nonpro, any comment before I send this to SRB?
(Steve, Please
note: Got your edits from Vinca. You forgot to send it to me.)
Legis
has cleared
-----Original Message-----
From: LaFleur, Vinca S.

Sent: Thursday, June 25, 1998 9:07 AM
To: Halperin, David E.
Subject: FW:
SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

-----Original
Message-----
From: Andreasen, Steven P.
Sent: Wednesday, June
24, 1998 8:26 PM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Cc: @NONPRO - Export Controls; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; LaFleur, Vinca S.; Gray, Wendy E.
Subject: FW: SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Dave

-- A few edits -- most important, I think we should avoid the "classic" missile defense debate with Helms, and instead point to our own (robust) program and note it is consistent with and supported by our arms control commitments. I did not have a chance to show this to Bob before he departed; you might want to send around a clean draft before he gets in around 10:00 a.m. tomorrow, at which point I'll have him focus on this. Thanks. Steve.

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From: Halperin, David E.
Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 1998 5:34 PM
To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Cc: @NONPRO - Export Controls; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; LaFleur, Vinca S.; Gray, Wendy E.
Subject: SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

Draft of SRB op-ed in response to Senator Helms WSJ essay of 6/18 (available on request).
Comments
back to me, please -- by 10 am Thursday if possible (only 800 words to read) -- so we can get it to SRB on the road. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

SRB CTB WSJ.doc
6/25 9:55 am
TIME TO LEAD ON THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
BY SAMUEL R. BERGER

Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Jesse Helms recently argued on this page that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is "worthless" now that India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear explosions. He compared the treaty to "closing the stable door after the horses have galloped away." But, in

fact, the dangerous developments in South Asia make it more critical than ever to move forward on the CTBT, while the horses are still in the corral, and before there is a stampede.

The CTBT, which would ban all nuclear explosive tests, was first proposed by President Eisenhower. President Clinton has called it the "longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control."

That prize is finally within reach. Two years ago, the U.N. General Assembly voted 158-3 to adopt the Treaty. President Clinton was the first world leader to sign. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the nations with declared nuclear arsenals -- followed suit, and the U.K. and France have already ratified it. All told, 149 nations - including Japan, South Korea, Israel and our NATO allies - have now signed.

We should pause and contemplate this achievement: After five decades of nuclear danger, 149 nations have signed an accord to never, or never again, test a nuclear explosive. We must not let this extraordinary opportunity slip away.

Four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell, William Crowe, and David Jones -- plus all six current members of the JCS say the Treaty is in our national interest. The directors of our three national nuclear weapons labs and leading independent experts say America can maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent without explosive testing. The public strongly supports the Treaty, as it has for forty years.

The CTBT will constrain the development of more advanced and dangerous nuclear weapons by nations that already possess them -- and limit the possibilities for other states to acquire them. It will also enhance our ability to monitor for

nuclear explosions by other nations.

With or without a CTBT we must watch for such activities. The Treaty gives us new tools to pursue this vital mission: a global network of sensors to supplement our intelligence capabilities, and the right to request short-notice, on-site inspections in other countries.

We have no hope of persuading India, Pakistan and other crucial nations to join the CTBT if we do not. U.S. rejection of a future without nuclear testing might convince India and Pakistan to accelerate their nuclear weapons programs. It might spur nuclear arms competition in other regions. This would create a much more dangerous world.

Senator Helms suggests we could be protected in such a world by giving up on arms control and simply deploying nationwide defenses against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. [need "nuclear-armed" to explain connection between nukes and ballistic missiles] But that would be a terrible mistake. We continue to

examine the feasibility of national missile defense systems, and we are moving forward on improving defenses against shorter-range missiles which threaten our forces and allies in regional conflicts. [Steve, your formulation suggests that ICBMs and SLBMs don't threaten our forces today. The real reason we are not a crash course to deploy ABMs is the "classic" argument you want to take out: technological difficulty (practical impossibility) and strategic stability. Once the Russian Duma ratifies the START II Treaty, which will make deep cuts in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, President Clinton will send to the Senate several agreements reached with Russia last fall, including one clarifying our right to build modern short-range defenses, consistent with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

Senator Helms calls the ABM Treaty "antiquated." But without continued agreement between the U.S. and Russia on controlling nationwide defenses against missiles, further missile reductions under START II and III would be imperiled, and we could expect a return to an unconstrained nuclear race -- precisely what four Republican and two Democratic administrations have worked so hard to prevent for the last thirty years. [Steve, again, I guess we're now reluctant to stand up for the logical arguments against ABMs, but this is an op-ed in a popular publication, and Sandy rejected the last draft as too technical. I don't think the WSJ editors will welcome an article that makes an assertion without any explanation of the logic behind it. Only Safire has that privilege today.]

Constraining the spread of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical and biological -- is a key pillar of President Clinton's national security policy. We have stood firmly against Saddam Hussein to ensure U.N. efforts to destroy Iraq's dangerous weapons. Recently, we worked with the U.K. and the Republic of Georgia to ensure safe storage of nuclear materials left over from the breakup of the Soviet Union. The CTBT, which would inhibit the spread of the most dangerous weapons of all, is a vital component of our strategy.

Thirty years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which banned all above-ground nuclear tests -- "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of global confrontation. Now, the Cold War is over, but the dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can help turn the global tide against nuclear weapons, and thereby make every American more secure. The agreement has sat in the Senate's in box for too long. It is urgent that we go forward.

Samuel R. Berger is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

2

3

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/25/98 11:11:28 AM

FROM Samore, Gary S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Halperin, David E.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Caravelli, John M.
Edwards, Joan K.
Harris, Elisa D.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Samore, Gary S.
Tucker, Maureen E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Gray, Wendy E.

CARBON_COPY Riedel, Bruce O.

TEXT_BODY Looks good, with a minor change. We need to be careful not to overstate the importance of U.S. CTBT ratification for Indo-Pak nuclear arms race (i.e. they're probably going to do it anyway).

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT SRB CTB WSJ.doc
6/25 9:55 am
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BY SAMUEL R. BERGER

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examine the feasibility of national missile defense systems, and we are
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forward on improving defenses against shorter-range missiles which
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 into the darkness" of global confrontation. Now, the Cold War is over,
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 dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. The Comprehensive Test Ban
 Treaty can help
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 more secure. The agreement has sat in the Senate's in box for too long.
 It is
 urgent that we go forward.

Samuel R. Berger is Assistant to the President for National Security
 Affairs.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/25/98 1:28:26 PM

FROM Dejbani, Donna D.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT PKG 4576 - POTUS Reply to Congressional on UNSCOM
[UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Rice, Edward A.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Ed, attached is the package that General Kerrick has asked to be forwarded to the road for prompt response.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4576bc.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Congressional Letter on UNSCOM

Purpose

To reply to a letter from Trent Lott, Newt Gingrich, Jesse Helms, and Benjamin Gilman.

Background

Lott, Gingrich, Helms and Gilman signed a letter expressing their concerns that the Administration has not been fully supporting UNSCOM, and has become 'complicit' in sweeping evidence of Iraqi violations under the rug.

They then
ask a series of questions about the discovery of VX nerve gas agent on
Iraqi
warhead fragments.

You respond that the U.S. government has consistently been
UNSCOM's strongest
supporter. You note that the traces of VX nerve gas were in fact
identified in
U.S. government facilities provided to UNSCOM. Finally, you
express your
steadfastness in demanding that Iraq comply fully with all relevant
Security
Council Resolutions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Reply to Members
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

1

4576

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4576lott.doc

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter voicing your concerns about UNSCOM's
on-going
inspections in Iraq. Since 1991, President Bush and I have made
UNSCOM's mission

in Iraq a sustained priority; no government has provided more support to UNSCOM than our own. We have provided and will continue to provide vigorous technical and diplomatic support to UNSCOM.

My Administration welcomed the thorough report provided on June 24 by UNSCOM to the Security Council. As you foreshadowed in your letter, UNSCOM's report revealed that significant traces of VX nerve gas were found on warhead fragments which UNSCOM discovered in March 1998. As part of our commitment to UNSCOM's mission, the U.S. government provided UNSCOM with the testing facilities at the Aberdeen Proving Ground so that UNSCOM could prepare a careful analysis of the samples it had collected.

My Administration will continue to support UNSCOM's right, as authorized by United Nations Security Council resolutions, to use the means of its own choosing to pursue every shred of evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. The United States has never acquiesced to demands that sanctions be lifted before this work is done, and I remain steadfast in our insistence that Iraq comply completely with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

I also continue to look forward to the day when there is leadership in Iraq that cooperates fully with UNSCOM and the international community. Until that day, you can be certain UNSCOM will have my full support and I hope that of the Congress as well.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4576sb.doc

June 24, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: BRUCE RIEDEL

FROM: ALEXANDER THIER

SUBJECT: POTUS Reply to Congressional Letter on UNSCOM

The attached memorandum to the President and draft reply respond to
a
Congressional letter regarding support for UNSCOM.

Concurrence by: Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Draft Reply

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

1

4576

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/26/98 3:09:15 PM
FROM Halperin, David E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Witkowski, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Steve -- another volley. If these changes don't work for you, call me and let's escape cyberspace, sit down face to face and finish this up. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen,
Steven P.
Sent: Friday, June 26, 1998 12:23 PM
To: @DEFENSE -
Defense Policy; @NONPRO - Export Controls; @PLANNING - Strat
Plan
& Comm; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Subject: FW: SRB Wall Street
Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Dave

-- I've made some edits on the ABM grafts, again. Two points: First, I think we can and should include the appropriate references to "deployment," since that is part of our program. Second, I've reinserted a reference to the ABM succession agreement: in short, if we only explicitly reference our intent to transmit the two demarcation agreements to the Senate for approval, we risk fueling suspicions in the Senate that we will NOT transmit the succession protocol.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Halperin, David E.
Sent: Friday, June 26, 1998
10:25 AM
To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @NONPRO - Export Controls;
@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; LaFleur, Vinca S.; Gray, Wendy
E.
Subject: FW:
SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Steve

-- I messed with the ABM grafs again, still with an eye to making this accessible to the public/acceptable to the WSJ editors. Your last draft moved us closer, and I hope you think this one finishes the job or at least comes close. Use "track changes" if you want to see how I edited your last draft. Thanks.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.
Sent: Thursday, June 25,
1998 3:28 PM
To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @NONPRO - Export Controls;
@PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs
Subject: FW:
SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Dave

-- In coordination with Bob, I have "lined-in-lined-out" the draft you sent below; I am also attaching a "clean" version of what that draft would look like to ease in translation. Not to belabor the point, but the administration is committed to a "robust" (indeed, "muscular") deployment readiness program as it relates to national missile defense. This is more than just "technology demonstration" -- we have a program designed to field a limited ABM system by 2003, if the threat so warrents. Thanks again for your hard work on this.
Steve.

-----Original Message-----

From: Halperin,
David E.
Sent: Thursday, June 25, 1998 9:59 AM
To: Andreasen,
Steven P.; Bell, Robert G.; @NONPRO - Export Controls; LaFleur,

Vinca
S.; Gray, Wendy E.
Subject: FW: SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT
op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

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could wait til tomorrow, though.
Nonpro, any comment before I
send this to SRB?
(Steve, Please note: Got your edits from Vinca.
You forgot to send it to me.)
Legis has cleared

-----Original

Message-----

From: LaFleur, Vinca S.
Sent: Thursday, June 25,
1998 9:07 AM
To: Halperin, David E.
Subject: FW: SRB Wall Street
Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreassen, Steven P.
Sent: Wednesday, June
24, 1998 8:26 PM
To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Cc: @NONPRO - Export
Controls; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; LaFleur, Vinca S.;
Gray,
Wendy E.
Subject: FW: SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed
[UNCLASSIFIED]
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David E.

Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 1998 5:34 PM

To: @DEFENSE -

Defense Policy

Cc: @NONPRO - Export Controls; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; LaFleur, Vinca S.; Gray, Wendy E.

Subject: SRB Wall Street

Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

Draft of SRB op-ed in response

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Comments

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Berger Again, Clean Again.doc

6/26 3 pm

**TIME TO LEAD ON THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
BY SAMUEL R. BERGER**

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms recently argued on this page that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is "worthless" now that India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear explosions. He compared the treaty to "closing the stable door after the horses have galloped away." But, in fact, the dangerous developments in South Asia make it more critical than ever to move forward on the CTBT, while the horses are still in the corral, and before there is a stampede.

The CTBT, which would ban all nuclear explosive tests, was first proposed by President Eisenhower. President Clinton has called it the "longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control."

That prize is finally within reach. Two years ago, the U.N. General Assembly voted 158-3 to adopt the Treaty. President Clinton was the first world leader to

sign. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the nations with declared nuclear arsenals -- followed suit, and the U.K. and France have already ratified it. All told, 149 nations - including Japan, South Korea, Israel and our NATO allies - have now signed.

We should pause and contemplate this achievement: After five decades of nuclear danger, 149 nations have signed an accord to never, or never again, test a nuclear explosive. We must not let this extraordinary opportunity slip away.

Four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell, William Crowe, and David Jones -- plus all six current members of the JCS say the Treaty is in our national interest. The directors of our three national nuclear weapons labs and leading independent experts say America can maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent without explosive testing. The public strongly supports the Treaty, as it has for forty years.

The CTBT will constrain the development of more advanced and dangerous nuclear weapons by nations that already possess them -- and limit the possibilities for other states to acquire them. It will also enhance our ability to monitor for nuclear explosions by other nations.

With or without a CTBT we must watch for such activities. The Treaty gives us new tools to pursue this vital mission: a global network of sensors to supplement our intelligence capabilities, and the right to request short-notice, on-site inspections in other countries.

Continued U.S. inaction on the CTBT could unravel the emerging global consensus to reduce nuclear dangers and contribute to the acceleration of nuclear weapons programs in India and Pakistan. It might spur nuclear arms competition in other regions. This would create a much more dangerous world.

Senator Helms suggests we could be protected in such a world by giving up on arms control and simply deploying nationwide defenses against ballistic missile attacks. But that approach could seriously undermine America's security.

Missile defenses are part of our strategy. We continue to develop national anti-missile systems that could protect us from emerging threats, such as the acquisition of long-range missiles by rogue nations, so we would be able to deploy such a defense as early as 2003, if necessary. We are also moving forward with deployment of advanced defenses against shorter or theater-range missiles, which threaten our forces and allies in regional conflicts.

But arms control is also part of our strategy. To facilitate deployment of new theater missile defenses, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed agreements last fall that clarify our right to test these systems, consistent with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Once the Russian Duma ratifies the START II Treaty, President Clinton will send this new accord and related agreements to the Senate for approval.

Senator Helms calls the ABM Treaty "antiquated." But without continued agreement between the U.S. and Russia on rules of the road controlling deployment of nation-wide defenses against missiles, further missile reductions under START II and III -- cutting nuclear inventories by 80 percent from Cold War peaks -- would be at risk. We must not endanger the process -- advanced by four Republican and two Democratic presidents over 30 years -- to reduce these deadly arsenals and protect our people from nuclear war. [STEVE -- Reaganites would respond there was no "START" before 1982. Also, giving the process a name makes the sentence confusing -- sounds like it might mean, "we must not stop the

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Thirty years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which banned all above-ground nuclear tests -- "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of global confrontation. Now, the Cold War is over, but the dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can help turn the global tide against nuclear weapons, and thereby make every American more secure. The agreement has sat in the Senate's in box for too long. It is urgent that we go forward.

Samuel R. Berger is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

4

5

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

SRB CTB WSJ.doc

6/25 3:20 p.m.

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Affairs.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/26/98 4:11:36 PM
FROM Witkowsky, Anne A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Sure hopes SRB likes it, after all this.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen,
Steven P.
Sent: Friday, June 26, 1998 3:48 PM
To: Halperin, David
E.
Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: FW: SRB Wall Street Journal
CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Dave -- we are
down to four words: instead of "clarify our right to test," suggest
instead "clarify conditions for testing." Rationale is as follows:
we do not want to imply that we do not have the "right" to test
TMD systems under the ABMT: we do. What we have clarified is the
testing conditions, not the right. If you can accept, send me a
"clean," and I'll clear with Bob around 4:00 when he gets back to
the office. [FYI -- "endanger the process" is still not my favorite
phrase. Sounds like State Dept, stripe-pants speak. My only
suggestion
is the possible insertion of "binding agreements" after "deadly
arsenals,"
which is a bit more concrete. Your call.]

-----Original Message-----

From: Halperin,
David E.
Sent: Friday, June 26, 1998 3:09 PM
To: @DEFENSE - Defense
Policy
Subject: FW: SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Steve

-- another volley. If these changes don't work for you, call me and let's escape cyberspace, sit down face to face and finish this up. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven

P.

Sent: Friday, June 26, 1998 12:23 PM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense

Policy; @NONPRO - Export Controls; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm;

@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs

Subject: FW: SRB Wall Street Journal

CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Dave -- I've

made some edits on the ABM grafts, again. Two points: First, I think we can and should include the appropriate references to

"deployment,"

since that is part of our program. Second, I've reinserted a reference to the ABM succession agreement: in short, if we only explicitly reference our intent to transmit the two demarcation agreements to the Senate for approval, we risk fueling suspicions in the Senate that we will NOT transmit the succession protocol.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Halperin, David E.

Sent: Friday, June 26, 1998

10:25 AM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @NONPRO - Export Controls;

@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; LaFleur, Vinca S.; Gray, Wendy E.

Subject: FW:

SRB Wall Street Journal CTBT/ABMT op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Steve

-- I messed with the ABM grafts again, still with an eye to making this accessible to the public/acceptable to the WSJ editors. Your last draft moved us closer, and I hope you think this one finishes the job or at least comes close. Use "track changes" if you want to see how I edited your last draft. Thanks.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.

Sent: Thursday, June 25,
1998 3:28 PM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @NONPRO - Export Controls;
@PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs

Subject: FW:

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3

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SRB CTB WSJ.doc

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2

4

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/26/98 6:35:07 PM
FROM Halperin, David E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Revised draft for Wall Street Journal op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Davies, Glyn T.
 DeJban, Donna D.
 Friedrich, Mary K.
 Hachigian, Nina L.
 Kerrick, Donald L.
 Malley, Robert
 Millison, Cathy L.
 O'Brien, Penelope R.
 Poole, Jennifer C.
 Rice, Edward A.
 Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
 Storey, Sharon V.

CARBON_COPY
 Andreasen, Steven P.
 Bell, Robert G.
 Bouchard, Joseph F.
 Kelly, Sandra L.
 Langley, Janice M.
 Mulligan, George D.
 vonLipsey, Roderick K.
 Witkowsky, Anne A.
 @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
 Blinken, Antony J.
 Gobush, Matthew N.
 Gray, Wendy E.
 Halperin, David E.
 LaFleur, Vinca S.
 Leavy, David C.
 Spence, Matthew J.
 Widmer, Edward L.
 Caravelli, John M.
 Edwards, Joan K.
 Harris, Elisa D.
 Hill, Roseanne M.
 Samore, Gary S.
 Tucker, Maureen E.
 Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
 Burrell, Christina L.
 Farrar, Jay C.

Rudman, Mara E.

TEXT_BODY

To SRB,

Please ignore previous draft (sent a few minutes ago in error) and review this one.

Revised draft for Wall Street Journal
op-ed, replying to Sen. Helm's 6/18 piece on CTBT/ABM. Prepared
by Andreasen, Bell, and I. Reviewed by Legis and nonpro. When
you can get to it, comments to Halperin, please. Phone 6-9377; fax
69210; page 4192. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

SRB CTB WSJ.doc

6/26 6:30 pm

TIME TO LEAD ON THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
BY SAMUEL R. BERGER

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms recently
argued on this
page that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is "worthless"
now that India
and Pakistan have conducted nuclear explosions. He compared the
treaty to
"closing the stable door after the horses have galloped away." But, in
fact, the
dangerous developments in South Asia make it more critical than ever
to move
forward on the CTBT, while the horses are still in the corral, and
before there
is a stampede.

The CTBT, which would ban all nuclear explosive tests, was first
proposed by
President Eisenhower. President Clinton has called it the "longest-
sought,
hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control."

That prize is finally within reach. Two years ago, the U.N. General
Assembly
voted 158-3 to adopt the Treaty. President Clinton was the first world
leader to
sign. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the nations
with declared
nuclear arsenals -- followed suit, and the U.K. and France have
already ratified
it. All told, 149 nations - including Japan, South Korea, Israel and our
NATO

allies - have now signed.

We should pause and contemplate this achievement: After five decades of nuclear danger, 149 nations have signed an accord to never, or never again, test a nuclear explosive. We must not let this extraordinary opportunity slip away.

Four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell, William Crowe, and David Jones -- plus all six current members of the JCS say the Treaty is in our national interest. The directors of our three national nuclear weapons labs and leading independent experts say America can maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent without explosive testing. The public strongly supports the Treaty, as it has for forty years.

The CTBT will constrain the development of more advanced and dangerous nuclear weapons by nations that already possess them -- and limit the possibilities for other states to acquire them. It will also enhance our ability to monitor for nuclear explosions by other nations.

With or without a CTBT we must watch for such activities. The Treaty gives us new tools to pursue this vital mission: a global network of sensors to supplement our intelligence capabilities, and the right to request short-notice, on-site inspections in other countries.

Continued U.S. inaction on the CTBT could unravel the emerging global consensus to reduce nuclear dangers and contribute to the acceleration of nuclear weapons programs in India and Pakistan. It might spur nuclear arms competition in other regions. This would create a much more dangerous world.

Senator Helms suggests we could be protected in such a world by giving up on arms control and simply deploying nationwide defenses against ballistic missile attacks. But abandoning arms control could undermine America's

security, and
missile defenses are already part of our strategy.

We continue to develop national anti-missile systems that could protect us from emerging threats, such as the acquisition of long-range missiles by rogue nations, so we would be able to deploy such a defense as early as 2003, if necessary. We are also moving forward with deployment of advanced defenses against shorter or theater-range missiles, which threaten our forces and allies in regional conflicts.

Arms control is also a key element of our strategy. To facilitate deployment of new theater missile defenses, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed agreements last fall that clarify conditions for testing these systems, consistent with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Once the Russian Duma ratifies the START II Treaty, President Clinton will send these new accords and related agreements to the Senate for approval.

Senator Helms calls the ABM Treaty "antiquated." But without continued agreement between the U.S. and Russia on rules of the road controlling deployment of nationwide defenses against missiles, further missile reductions under START II and III -- cutting nuclear inventories by 80 percent from levels at the end of the Cold War -- would be at risk. We must not undercut the effort, advanced by four Republican and two Democratic presidents over 30 years, to reduce these deadly arsenals and protect our people from nuclear war.

Constraining the spread of all weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical and biological -- is a key pillar of President Clinton's national security policy. We have stood firmly against Saddam Hussein to ensure U.N. efforts to destroy Iraq's dangerous weapons. Recently, we worked with the U.K. and the Republic of Georgia to ensure safe storage of nuclear materials left over from

the breakup of the Soviet Union. The CTBT, which would inhibit the spread of the most dangerous weapons of all, is a vital component of our strategy.

Thirty years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which banned all above-ground nuclear tests -- "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of global confrontation. Now, the Cold War is over, but the dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can help turn the global tide against nuclear weapons, and thereby make America more secure. The agreement has sat in the Senate's in box for too long. It is urgent that we go forward.

Samuel R. Berger is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

3

4

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/6/98 5:32:55 PM
FROM Sapiro, Miriam E.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 07/05/1998
DECLASSIFYON 07/05/2008
SUBJECT FW: Clearance on Helms-Burton Title III Package (#4512)
~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 2/7/2019
2006-1363-F(3)

TO

Addonizio, Elizabeth
Armstrong, Fulton T.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
Dobbins, James F.
Gallucci, Gerard M.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Lawson, Chappell H.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Bandler, Donald K.
Braden, Susan R.
Brown, Keirn C.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Covey, James P.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Rudman, Mara E.
Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Antholis, William J.
Boone, Sherman G.
Brainard, S. Lael

Hendricks, Lori A.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Marchick, David M
Mitsler, Elaine M.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Fulton - in addition to changes in texts below, you should add a sentence or 2 on current efforts to amend title IV, as well as to take soundings with respect to title III amendment. this was part of the deal with the EU, which you foreshadow in potus public statement's
ref to working with congress to bring disciplines into full effect. but didn't see anything in memo to potus (or srb) about the link and - more important - the state of play. thanks, Miriam

-----Original

Message-----

From: Butler, Lawrence E.

Sent: Monday, July 06,
1998 8:10 AM

To: Sapiro, Miriam E.

Subject: FW: Clearance on Helms-Burton

Title III Package (#4512) ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

-----Original Message-----

From: Armstrong,
Fulton T.

Sent: Sunday, July 05, 1998 9:22 AM

To: Rudman, Mara

E.; Baker, James E.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Lee, Malcolm R.

Cc: Kinser-Kidane,
Brenda J.

Subject: Clearance on Helms-Burton Title III Package (#4512)

~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Mara, Jamie, Larry, Malcolm: Jeff DeLaurentis left this package for me to finalize and get to the President a.s.a.p. His notes are unclear on whether you've cleared yet or not. If so, please confirm. If not, pls do so. Gracias. --Fulton

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

4512 srb.doc

July 3, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JAMES F. DOBBINS

FROM: JEFFREY DE LAURENTIS

SUBJECT: Continued Suspension of Provisions of Title III of Helms-Burton Act

At Tab I is a decision memorandum for the President recommending renewal of suspension of provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton) for another six months. As the memorandum indicates, State, Treasury, and Stu Eizenstat support the recommendation.

We also request the President's signature on letters (Tab A) informing the Congress of his decision, as required by law. Specifically, the letters certify that the continued suspension of the right of U.S. claimants to file suit against foreign businesses "trafficking" in confiscated properties in Cuba is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba, as required by the Act. The determination must be reported to the Congress at least 15 days before the date on which the additional suspension is to begin - that is, by Thursday, July 16.

We propose a low-key public rollout as soon as possible, coordinated with Stu Eizenstat, including a release of a written Presidential statement (draft at Tab B) and a press briefing at State. We will also prepare fact sheets and Q&As on accomplishments made over the past six months.

Concurrence by: Mara Rudman, James Baker, Miriam Sapiro ,
Malcolm Lee

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum for the President

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Certification Letters to Congress

Tab B Draft Presidential Statement on Title III Decision

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4512

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify On: 6/22/08

Derived From: Multiple

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4512 potus.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Suspension of Provisions of Title III of Helms-Burton Act

Purpose

To decide whether to renew for another six months the suspension of provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton).

Background

On July 15, 1996, on January 3, 1997, on July 16, 1997, and again on January 16, 1998, you decided to suspend provisions of the Helms-Burton Act under which U.S. registered claimants could file suit in Federal court against foreign firms "trafficking" in confiscated properties in Cuba. As provided by the law, you determined that suspension was necessary to the U.S. national interests and would expedite democratic transition in Cuba.

In January, you again cited as rationale for extending the suspension the steps our allies and friends had taken to press for peaceful democratic transition in Cuba. You also reiterated that you "would expect to continue suspending the right to file suit so long as America's friends and allies continue their stepped up efforts to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba."

Under the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act, eligibility for Title III action expanded on March 13, 1998, to include non-registered claimants. Before that, only U.S. nationals whose claims were certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission were eligible to file suit. Many Cubans who subsequently became U.S. citizens are now eligible to file a Title III law suit.

Recent progress

Progress continues to be made in our international pro-democracy efforts. The defeat of the U.S.-led Cuban human rights resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission in April and several high-level European and Latin American leaders' visits to Cuba since the Pope's visit may have created an impression that some allies' efforts have slackened, but they actually continue to condition any improvements in relations with Cuba remains on concrete steps toward political and economic change on the island. Prime Minister Chretien, Foreign Minister Lampreia, and Foreign Minister Dini all used their recent visits to Cuba to press

publicly on human rights, democracy and political prisoners. Friends in the hemisphere have also spoken out more forcefully on the need for a transition to democracy. A sampling of our allies' efforts to promote democracy in Cuba and of steps taken by NGOs and business groups follows:

- In January, Amnesty International released a report documenting cases of political prisoners in Cuba.
- On February 17, El Salvador's President Armando Calderon Sol firmly conditioned normal relations with Cuba on an "opening to Democracy."
- On February 23, the EU urged the Cuban government to release political prisoners, including the four members of the Dissident Working Group, and permit their reintegration into society in response to the Pope's visit.
- In April, Argentina's President Menem reiterated his commitment to pressing for "a rapid return of Cuba to democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights."
- Also in April, the EU allowed its WTO case against the United States over the Helms-Burton Act to lapse in order to seek a solution to differences over Cuba policy.
- On May 18, the U.S. and the EU agreed to an Understanding which will inhibit and deter the acquisition of expropriated property around the world, including in Cuba.
- Also in May, Dutch NGO Pax Christi released a report describing serious human rights abuses in Cuba and calling on the UN and the Catholic Church to establish permanent human rights offices in Cuba, and for the EU to establish a Human Rights Commission for Cuba.
- Brazilian Foreign Minister Lampreia in May met publicly with a leading dissident in Havana and spoke out clearly in support of human rights.

He said
that human rights in Cuba was a "heartfelt and priority policy" for
President
Cardoso.

– On June 2, the Inter American Human Rights Committee released a
report which
concluded that Cuba continues to seriously violate civil and political
liberties.

– On June 8, the EU formally reaffirmed its Common Position for
another six
months, calling for "a peaceful transition to pluralist democracy in
Cuba and
greater respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." The
EU's Working
Group on Human Rights among its Havana ambassadors held several
meetings with
dissidents to coordinate EU human rights efforts in Cuba, despite
repeated
criticism from Cuban authorities.

– The North American Committee (NAC) of the National Policy
Association,
representing over 100 business, labor and academic leaders from
Mexico, Canada,
and the U.S., established an internal task force to develop plans to
organize a
broad coalition to promote its "Principles for Private Sector
Involvement in
Cuba."

– On June 29, the EU General Affairs Council (GAC) granted Cuba
observer status
in the upcoming negotiations on the Lome Convention, but it publicly
stressed
that full cooperation with Cuba would depend upon Cuban progress
toward political
freedom and human rights. The GAC explicitly called for an end to
the
obstruction of the EU's Human Rights Working Group in Havana and
the release the
four members of the Dissident Working Group.

These steps indicate that international consensus for change in Cuba
has
strengthened and that, despite differences on tactics and levels of
engagement,
our friends and allies continue stepped-up efforts to promote

democracy.

Moreover, NGOs and business groups have become more active in supporting this effort.

NSC, NEC, Stu Eizenstat, Treasury and State support extending the suspension of U.S. citizens' rights to file suit under Title III for six more months. They believe EU pro-democracy efforts warrant it and that extension would maximize prospects of gaining further international cooperation on Cuba and thereby expediting the transition to democracy in Cuba. Failure to do so would derail the Understanding with the EU on expropriated property and prompt the EU to reintroduce a WTO case against Helms-Burton and reassess its cooperation with us in actively promoting Cuban democracy.

This decision may draw more criticism than your waiver in January, which passed largely unnoticed. The Cuban-American "core group" would support the move, as would Members of Congress who supported previous extensions. Critics, however, may point to the high-level visits and the granting of Lome observer status as signs that our strategy is not working. Chairmen Helms and Gilman have criticized the Understanding on expropriated property protections as inadequate and have objected to EU statements that they construe as conditioning

pro-democracy efforts on a permanent waiver of Title III. (careful not to mislead here; we are committed to taking soundings on the hill on this EU goal) Some conservative Cuban-American leaders, still jockeying to fill the leadership vacuum in the wake of Jorge Mas Canosa's death, may come out forcefully against. Representatives Menendez, Diaz-Balart and Ros-Lehtinen will claim the extension is unwarranted.

At Tab A is a proposed letter to the chairmen of the House and Senator foreign relations and appropriations committees notifying them of your

decision by July
16, as required by the law. We further propose issuing a presidential
statement
announcing the decision.

RECOMMENDATION

That you suspend the right to file suit under Title III of Helms-Burton
for
another six months and sign the congressional notification letters at
Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Congressional Notification Letters
4

5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4512

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ cc: Vice President
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d) Chief of Staff
Declassify On: 6/22/08
Derived From: Multiple

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4512 statement.doc
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

July 16, 1998

Today, I am notifying Congress of my decision to suspend for an
additional six

months the provision of U.S. nationals to file suit against foreign firms trafficking in confiscated properties in Cuba. I have made this decision because of my strong commitment to implementing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD Act) in a way that best advances U.S. national interests and hastens a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

In January 1997, I said that I expected to continue suspending this provision of the LIBERTAD Act so long as our friends and allies continue their stepped-up efforts to promote a democratic transition in Cuba. I made this decision to take advantage of the growing realization throughout the world, in Europe and Latin America especially, that Cuba must change. We and our allies agree on the importance of promoting democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Cuba, and on the vital need for a peaceful transition to democracy on the island.

I have taken this action again today to continue the effort we began in July 1996 to strengthen international cooperation in the effort to promote democracy in Cuba. For the past two years, we have worked with our allies and friends to support concrete measures that promote peaceful change in Cuba. There is now broad agreement in the international community on the importance of promoting democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. The visit of the Pope to Cuba in January offered a ray of hope to the Cuban people when he called for the recognition of traditional (otherwise sounds like POTUS endorsing these as Christian values) values of freedom and respect for individual rights.

The European Union (EU) has again honored its own commitment to democratic values by reaffirming its Common Position on Cuba, which commits the 15 member nations to promote human rights and democracy in Cuba. The EU and its member states have strongly urged the Cuban government to release imprisoned dissidents

and stop the harassment of those who seek peaceful democratic change. The EU Working Group on Human Rights has met with dissidents as part of its effort to promote greater respect for human rights. European leaders have made clear their commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba.

The May 18 Understanding with Respect to Disciplines on Expropriated Property with the EU, is a major advance in our efforts to protect property rights world-wide, including in Cuba. By discouraging investment in illegally expropriated property, it sends a strong signal that the Cuban regime must follow the rule of law and respect fundamental rights. Of particular importance, the Europeans have acknowledged that one of the primary tools that the Castro regime has used to expropriate property from U.S. citizens appears to have been contrary to international law. We will continue to work with Congress to bring this important understanding into effect.

The Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua have also called on Cuba to begin a process of democratic transition. Sending a strong message, Brazil's foreign minister met with a leading dissident in Cuba and spoke out clearly in support of human rights.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continue to increase their support for dissidents on the island and call international attention to repression in Cuba.

The Dutch organization Pax Christi has reported on continuing political and religious repression in Cuba. Amnesty International has maintained pressure on Cuba to release the [four dissidents] of the [Dissident Working Group] [confusing to a non cuba expert] who were arrested in July 1997, and issued a special report on new cases of imprisonment for political offenses. The international effort to promote "best business practices" in Cuba is advancing, with several

NGOs seeking
to develop a working group to encourage businesses in these areas.

why do we want to say this? delete as we are seeking a waiver of title
iv

I remain deeply committed to expanding and strengthening the U.S.-
led
international effort to achieve our goal of a peaceful democratic
transition in
Cuba.

3

3

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4512 letter.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to subsection 306(c)(2) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-114), (the "Act"), I hereby
determine and
report to the Congress that suspension for six months beyond August
1, 1998, of
the right to bring an action under Title III of the Act is necessary to
the
national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to
democracy in Cuba.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Attachment

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/7/98 7:13:06 PM
FROM DeRosa, Mary B.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 07/05/1998
DECLASSIFYON 07/05/2008
SUBJECT FW: Clearance on Helms-Burton Title III Package (#4512)
~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO Armstrong, Fulton T.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 3/7/2019
2006-1363-F (3)

CARBON_COPY Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.

TEXT_BODY
Fulton, here are a few minor comments on the SRB memo and the letter.
I gave you comments on the POTUS memo and statement separately.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Armstrong, Fulton T.
Sent: Monday, July 06,
1998 4:23 PM
To: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; Lee, Malcolm R.
Subject: FW:
Clearance on Helms-Burton Title III Package (#4512)
~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Jamie,
Malcolm.: Any chance of clearance by this evening? --Fulton

-----Original
Message-----

From: Armstrong, Fulton T.
Sent: Sunday, July 05,
1998 9:22 AM
To: Rudman, Mara E.; Baker, James E.; Butler, Lawrence
E.; Lee, Malcolm R.

Cc: Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Subject: Clearance
on Helms-Burton Title III Package (#4512) ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Mara,
Jamie, Larry, Malcolm: Jeff DeLaurentis left this package for me to finalize and get to the President a.s.a.p. His notes are unclear on whether you've cleared yet or not. If so, please confirm. If not, pls do so. Gracias. --Fulton

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4512.srb.doc

July 3, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JAMES F. DOBBINS

FROM: JEFFREY DE LAURENTIS

SUBJECT: Continued Suspension of Provisions of Title III of Helms-Burton Act

At Tab I is a decision memorandum for the President recommending renewal of suspension of provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton) for another six months. State (including Stueckert) and Treasury support the recommendation.

We also request the President's signature on letters (Tab A) informing the Congress of his decision, as required by law. Specifically, the letters report to Congress the President's determination that the continued suspension of the right of U.S. claimants to file suit against foreign businesses "trafficking" in confiscated properties in Cuba is necessary to the national interests of

the
United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba, as
required by
the Act. The determination must be reported to the Congress at least
15 days
before the date on which the additional suspension is to begin - that is,
by
Thursday, July 16.

We propose a low-key public rollout as soon as possible, coordinated
with Stu
Eizenstat, including a release of a written Presidential statement (draft
at Tab
B) and a press briefing at State. We will also prepare fact sheets and
Q&As on
accomplishments made over the past six months.

Concurrence by: Mara Rudman, James Baker, Larry Butler, Malcolm
Lee

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum for the President

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Certification Letters to Congress

Tab B Draft Presidential Statement on Title III Decision

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4512

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify On: 6/22/08

Derived From: Multiple

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4512 potus.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Suspension of Provisions of Title III of Helms-Burton Act

Purpose

To decide whether to renew for another six months the suspension of provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton).

Background

On July 15, 1996, on January 3, 1997, on July 16, 1997, and again on January 16, 1998, you decided to suspend provisions of the Helms-Burton Act under which U.S. registered claimants could file suit in Federal court against foreign firms "trafficking" in confiscated properties in Cuba. As provided by the law, you determined that suspension was necessary to the U.S. national interests and would expedite democratic transition in Cuba.

In January, you again cited as rationale for extending the suspension the steps our allies and friends had taken to press for peaceful democratic transition in Cuba. You also reiterated that you "would expect to continue suspending the right to file suit so long as America's friends and allies continue their stepped up efforts to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba."

Under the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act, eligibility for Title III action expanded on March 13, 1998, to include non-registered claimants. Before that, only U.S. nationals whose claims were certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission were eligible to file suit. Many Cubans who subsequently became U.S. citizens are now eligible to file a Title III law suit.

Recent progress

Progress continues to be made in our international pro-democracy efforts. The defeat of the U.S.-led Cuban human rights resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission in April and several high-level European and Latin American leaders' visits to Cuba since the Pope's visit may have created an impression that some allies' efforts have slackened, but they actually continue to condition any improvements in relations with Cuba remains on concrete steps toward political and economic change on the island. Prime Minister Chretien, Foreign Minister Lampreia, and Foreign Minister Dini all used their recent visits to Cuba to press publicly on human rights, democracy and political prisoners. Friends in the hemisphere have also spoken out more forcefully on the need for a transition to democracy. A sampling of our allies' efforts to promote democracy in Cuba and of steps taken by NGOs and business groups follows:

- In January, Amnesty International released a report documenting cases of political prisoners in Cuba.
- On February 17, El Salvador's President Armando Calderon Sol firmly conditioned normal relations with Cuba on an "opening to Democracy."
- On February 23, the EU urged the Cuban government to release political prisoners, including the four members of the Dissident Working Group, and permit their reintegration into society in response to the Pope's visit.
- In April, Argentina's President Menem reiterated his commitment to pressing for "a rapid return of Cuba to democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights."
- Also in April, the EU allowed its WTO case against the United States over the Helms-Burton Act to lapse in order to seek a more longstanding solution to differences over Cuba policy.

– On May 18, the U.S. and the EU agreed to an Understanding which will inhibit and deter the acquisition of expropriated property around the world, including in Cuba.

– Also in May, Dutch NGO Pax Christi released a report describing serious human rights abuses in Cuba and calling on the UN and the Catholic Church to establish permanent human rights offices in Cuba, and for the EU to establish a Human Rights Commission for Cuba.

– Brazilian Foreign Minister Lampreia in May met publicly with a leading dissident in Havana and spoke out clearly in support of human rights. He said that human rights in Cuba was a "heartfelt and priority policy" for President Cardoso.

– On June 2, the Inter American Human Rights Committee released a report which concluded that Cuba continues to seriously violate civil and political liberties.

– On June 8, the EU formally reaffirmed its Common Position for another six months, calling for "a peaceful transition to pluralist democracy in Cuba and greater respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." The EU's Working Group on Human Rights among its Havana ambassadors held several meetings with dissidents to coordinate EU human rights efforts in Cuba, despite repeated criticism from Cuban authorities.

– The North American Committee (NAC) of the National Policy Association, representing over 100 business, labor and academic leaders from Mexico, Canada, and the U.S., established an internal task force to develop plans to organize a broad coalition to promote its "Principles for Private Sector Involvement in Cuba."

– On June 29, the EU General Affairs Council (GAC) granted Cuba observer status in the upcoming negotiations on the Lome Convention, but it publicly stressed that full cooperation with Cuba would depend upon Cuban progress toward political freedom and human rights. The GAC explicitly called for an end to the obstruction of the EU's Human Rights Working Group in Havana and the release the four members of the Dissident Working Group.

These steps indicate that international consensus for change in Cuba has strengthened and that, despite differences on tactics and levels of engagement, our friends and allies continue stepped-up efforts to promote democracy. Moreover, NGOs and business groups have become more active in supporting this effort.

NSC, NEC, Stu Eizenstat, Treasury and State support extending the suspension of U.S. citizens' rights to file suit under Title III for six more months. They believe EU pro-democracy efforts warrant it and that extension would maximize prospects of gaining further international cooperation on Cuba and thereby expedite the transition to democracy in Cuba. Failure to do so would derail the Understanding with the EU on expropriated property and prompt the EU to reintroduce a WTO case against Helms-Burton and reassess its cooperation with us in actively promoting Cuban democracy.

This decision may draw more criticism than your waiver in January, which passed largely unnoticed. The Cuban-American "core group" would support the move, as would Members of Congress who supported previous extensions. Critics, however, may point to the high-level visits and the granting of Lome observer status as signs that our strategy is not working. Chairmen Helms and Gilman have criticized the Understanding on expropriated property protections as

inadequate
and have objected to EU statements that they construe as conditioning
pro-democracy efforts on a permanent waiver of Title III. Some
conservative
Cuban-American leaders, still jockeying to fill the leadership vacuum
in the wake
of Jorge Mas Canosa's death, may come out forcefully against.
Representatives
Menendez, Diaz-Balart and Ros-Lehtinen will claim the extension is
unwarranted.

At Tab A is a proposed letter to the chairmen of the House and
Senator foreign
relations and appropriations committees notifying them of your
decision by July
16, as required by the law. We further propose issuing a presidential
statement
announcing the decision.

RECOMMENDATION

That you suspend the right to file suit under Title III of Helms-Burton
for
another six months and sign the congressional notification letters at
Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Congressional Notification Letters
4

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4512

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ cc: Vice President
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d) Chief of Staff
Declassify On: 6/22/08
Derived From: Multiple

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

July 16, 1998

Today, I am notifying Congress of my decision to suspend for an additional six months the provision of U.S. nationals to file suit against foreign firms trafficking in confiscated properties in Cuba. I have made this decision because of my strong commitment to implement the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD Act) in a way that best advances U.S. national interests and hastens a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

In January 1997, I said that I expected to continue suspending this provision of the LIBERTAD Act so long as our friends and allies continue their stepped-up efforts to promote a democratic transition in Cuba. I made this decision to take advantage of the growing realization throughout the world, in Europe and Latin America especially, that Cuba must change. We and our allies agree on the importance of promoting democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Cuba, and on the vital need for a peaceful transition to democracy on the island.

I have taken this action again today to continue the effort we began in July 1996 to strengthen international cooperation in the effort to promote democracy in Cuba. For the past two years, we have worked with our allies and friends to support concrete measures that promote peaceful change in Cuba. There is now broad agreement in the international community of the importance of promoting

democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. The visit of the Pope to Cuba in January offered a ray of hope to the Cuban people as he called for the recognition of historic Christian values of freedom and respect for individual rights.

The European Union (EU) has again honored its own commitment to democratic values by reaffirming its Common Position on Cuba, which commits the 15 member nations to promote human rights and democracy in Cuba. The EU and its member states have strongly urged the Cuban government to release imprisoned dissidents and stop the harassment of those who seek peaceful democratic change. The EU Working Group on Human Rights has met with dissidents as part of its effort to promote greater respect for human rights. European leaders have made clear their commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba.

The May 18 Understanding with Respect to Disciplines on Expropriated Property, negotiated by Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat with the EU, is a major advance in our efforts to protect property rights world wide, including in Cuba. By discouraging investment in illegally expropriated property, it sends a strong signal that the Cuban regime must follow the rule of law and respect fundamental rights. Of particular importance, the Europeans have acknowledged that one of the primary tools that the Castro regime has used to expropriate property from U.S. citizens appears to have been contrary to international law. We will continue to work with Congress to bring this important understanding into effect.

The Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua have also called on Cuba to being a process of democratic transition. Sending a strong message, Brazil's foreign minister met with a leading dissident in Cuba and spoke out clearly in support of human rights.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continue to increase their support for dissidents on the island and call international attention to repression in Cuba.

The Dutch organization Pax Christi has reported on continuing political and religious repression in Cuba. Amnesty International has maintained pressure on Cuba to release the four dissidents of the Dissident Working Group who were arrested in July 1997, and issued a special report on new cases of imprisonment for political offenses. The international effort to promote "best business practices" in Cuba is advancing, with several NGOs seeking to develop a working group to encourage businesses in these areas.

As the multinational effort has moved forward, we have continued to implement

Title IV of the LIBERTAD Act, which denies entry to the U.S. to executives of firms determined to be "trafficking" in confiscated property in Cuba.

As a result of our efforts, nineteen companies from ten countries have withdrawn from commitments or altered their plans in Cuba in order to avoid determinations of "trafficking."

I remain deeply committed to expanding and strengthening the U.S.-led international effort to achieve our goal of a peaceful democratic transition in Cuba.

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to subsection 306(c)(2) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-114), (the "Act"), I hereby determine and report to the Congress that suspension for six months beyond August 1, 1998, of the right to bring an action under Title III of the Act is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Attachment