

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Dallas Brown to Richard Clarke. Subject: Miscellaneous Haiti Stuff. (5 pages)	08/26/1995	P1/b(1)
002. email	Dallas Brown to Richard Clarke. Subject: FW: CPL. (4 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)

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[07/20/1995-09/12/1995]

2006-1363-F
vz5625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 July 95 09:57
FROM Mack, Kathryn S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Fetig, James L.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[JUL19GUI.DOC : 2401 in JUL19GUI.DOC]]Please note that we made changes to the first question on China MFN legislation. Kathryn Mack

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 20 July 95 9:54
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** JUL19GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 19, 1995

Bosnia

-- Points for Presidential Use with Press on Margins of Meeting with Congressional Leaders

-- Talking Points on Dole Amendment

U.S.-Cuba Migration Talks

Cuba and News Bureaus

China

U.S.-Japan Civil Aviation Dispute

Jordan: Najim Extradition (to be provided)

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

Haiti

Russia

BOSNIA

Key Points:

- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:
- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state;
- to prevent the spread of the conflict;
- to help limit the loss of life;
- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.
- That is why the United States
- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;
- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;
- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;
- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;
- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.
- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.
- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo
- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.

-- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.

-- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

Srebrenica and Zepa

-- What has happened in Srebrenica and Zepa is tragic and inhumane. No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- Continued actions by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and against the enclave of Zepa is a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.

-- The Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas were established primarily as a haven for refugees expelled from other parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The attack against these undefended enclaves and the peacekeepers stationed there, and the reports of brutal ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of this travesty, provide further dramatic proof of the intent of Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group

to ensure
that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are

ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to all the civilian refugees in the enclave, and to cease their illegal and inhumane detention of groups of refugees on the basis of unsubstantiated or trumped-up "war criminal" charges.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.

-- Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.

-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their influence to stop this aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers. Serbia must make clear in word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts. In particular, it should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission.

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and

draw the United States in.

Q & A: Hot Issues

U.S. Military Assistance for defense of Gorazde

Q: U.S. commitment of ground troops/Chirac request for assistance in saving enclave
s.

-- As we have said consistently, we will not commit ground troops to the conflict.

-- We are reviewing other options under discussion.

-- General Shali met over the weekend with his British and French counterparts to
as
sess various

military options for strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to protect the remaining
Safe
Areas, and the
National Security Council and key advisors have been examining those options
over th
e past 48 hours.

-- Short of providing ground forces, we are looking for ways to support our allies
i
n their
commitment to make UNPROFOR stronger. These include those that have
already been ma
de public,
such as using helicopters to assist UNPROFOR reinforcement of Gorazde and
restoring
the legitimacy of
the threat of air power. Since the details involve sensitive military plans being d
eveloped in conjunction
with the troop contributing nations, and it would not be appropriate to comment
on t
hem further.

(If pressed) Q: Wouldn't the use of helicopters cross the line into the use of Ameri
can ground
forces?

-- No. What is being looked at is a one time provision of airlift to assist the French in moving troops to Gorazde, if this option is chosen -- and that decision has NOT been taken by us or our allies yet.

Q: Are the Eastern enclaves viable?

-- We deplore the tragic and inhumane events taking place in Srebrenica and Zepa.

-- We are consulting with the Contact Group and UNHCR to address the urgent humanitarian needs of civilians.

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- We have not seen the final text.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift. Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces. The 12 week delay Dole is proposing flies in the face of all U.S. and Allied military advice, which sees withdrawal taking up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war

-- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

Q: Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey is meeting with administration and congressional leaders to call for lifting the arms embargo. If that's what the Bosnians say they want, why not support them?

-- We support the concept of a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, should the UNPROFOR mission be

terminated.

-- We do not support unilateral lift, which would have the effect of causing UNPROFO
R to withdraw
prematurely.

-- We remain concerned that, in the time between lifting the embargo and the integra
tion of new weapons
into the Bosnian armed forces, the Bosnian Serbs would take military action that
the
Bosnians would be hard
pressed to resist on their own.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR
withdraws.
Isn't that the
Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of
UNPROFOR
and
cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame
for th
e deteriorating situation
would be placed on us.

President's Comments on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR may
leave.
Do you expect
UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with
Serb acti
ons to
interfere with its mission.

Q: In reiterating his support for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the Pr

esident signaling his expectation
that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia
but we
do not
expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to
achi
eve that goal.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15
mil
lion of
transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a
P
residential
Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transpiration support to
the allies. The
Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of
equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$27 mi
llion of goods
and services -- under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged
appr
oach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political i
ndependence and
territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its et
hnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already
accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and
tighteni

ng his
cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for
Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central
Bosn
ia,
promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the
prospect
s for an
overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of
all-out
war that
would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the
conflic
t, and effectively end
the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providin
g our
own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate,
most notably
through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on
th
e
ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable,
an adequa
te plan
and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support
missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as
NAT
O to deter a
repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we
abandon
our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate th
e military
standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other parties to the conflict in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR efforts that have proven ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel. It will be used to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the

RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move it into theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does not seem to be any Congressional support?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our Allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We plan to work with the United Nations and other member states to establish a voluntary fund as a means to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services

to support our allies.)

-- (If pressed) Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- (If pressed) As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services will be provided.

-- (If pressed) The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser target designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to aircraft and helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence support.

-- (If pressed) We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. This support would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings (Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ceilings previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will represent no more than \$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.)

-- We have informally consulted with the Congress on our intent to use Section 506(a)(1) emergency drawdown authorities of the FAA to provide up to \$15 million of DOD goods and services (primarily transportation and equipment) to our allies participating in the RRF.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3 million.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for the provision of up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a authorities and primarily for transportation services and equipment.

NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusion zones been rendered null and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the UN commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and political situation.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demonstrated that it is totally

ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid , protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alternatives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Results to Date:

Q: Isn't our policy of support for UNPROFOR bankrupt?

-- No. While the tragedy of recent events is enormous, you should not overlook what

has been

accomplished to date:

-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bo

snia's

Muslims and Croats, which has brought peace to the vast majority of territory under

Bosnian government

control;

-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)

;

-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne

relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;

-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);

-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war

out of the

air over Bosnia for two and a half years; and

-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in

Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.

U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the

conflict or

to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or

if units
need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through
NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete,
temp
orary
operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the
parties,
to use U.S. troops
as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were
carryin
g out in good
faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and
review of m
ilitary plans,
we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNP
ROFOR have
formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an
eme
rgency
extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in
Bos
nia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to
withdraw.
UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and
wider war, re
duce chances
for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to
acqui
re arms
and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Be
lgrade resumes all-out
support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

BOSNIA POINTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP:

ù There are three key points I want to make to you about Bosnia.

-- First, we should keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia, where, despite "common knowledge" to the contrary, it has had a major positive impact -- but we must make it work better.

-- Second, we will be making critical decisions with our Allies over the next few days on how to use the RRF and effective air power to halt Serb aggressiveness.

-- Third, we should not be undermining these efforts by seeking a unilateral lift of the arms embargo when our Allies are putting their troops on the line in a last ditch effort to make UNPROFOR work.

ù Bosnia remains extremely difficult, as it was when I arrived here. But as we press for a resolution, let's not lose sight of the results that have been achieved -- in part by UNPROFOR, in part by NATO and in part with U.S. persistence.

-- The war continues, but at greatly reduced levels. There were 130,000 Bosnian civilians killed in 1992; 2,500 in 1994;

-- Over 3 million Bosnians now depend on the UN for food and medicine. 50,000 tons of

supplies have been delivered in the longest humanitarian relief effort in history;

-- A three-way conflict has been transformed into a two-way conflict, with the Bosnian-Croat Federation we helped broker continuing to hold. This has great strategic significance; nearly all of central Bosnia is now at peace.

-- Through the no-fly zone, we have kept the war out of the air over Bosnia and with our deployments in Macedonia and other warnings, we've kept the war from spreading beyond Bosnia.

ù Nevertheless, given the events of the past few weeks, it is clear that staying with the status quo is totally unacceptable.

-- UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies are prepared to take to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

ù

ù At the upcoming meeting in London, we will work with our Allies to put some teeth into UNPROFOR. We intend to make the case that the most important thing is to be able to bring air power to bear decisively, not in the timid manner done to date.

-- We will seek a clear warning to the Bosnian Serbs: any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a massive air campaign that cripples Serb military capability.

-- Cannot be just another empty threat. If Bosnian Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering even if we suffer losses or additional hostages are taken.

-- In addition to supporting Bosnian defense of Gorazde, important to open secure routes to Sarajevo. This is the most pressing mission for the RRF.

ù Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partners to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them support and time to prove themselves.

-- Understand frustration that bill's supporters feel.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but unilateral lift would undermine efforts to reach negotiated settlement, lead to escalation of conflict, and possibly Americanize the war.

-- No simple or risk free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious consequences.

-- Allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that unilateral lift, which would place the troops in greater danger, will result in their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse.

-- I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation under those circumstances to assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission.

-- Consequently, at the least, unilateral lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out of Bosnia and pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined mission.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain

n
outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility.

-- It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more. It will provide the pretext for absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a stronger role at this critical moment.

-- It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. action that forces UN PROFOR departure.

-- First, as I have noted, we immediately would be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw UNPROFOR.

-- Second, after that operation is complete, there will be an intensification of the fighting in Bosnia.

-- The Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air support and if that fails, more active military support.

-- At that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as a result of unilateral lift. The U.S. will be asked to fill the void -- in military support, humanitarian aid and in response to refugee crises.

-- Third, intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace.

-- Finally, UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future.

-- In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. We are in this with our allies now. We would be in it by ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and risks of an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and protecting the Bosnians that will follow?

-- I want to state clearly that I will veto any resolution or bill that may require the United States to lift unilaterally the arms embargo. It will make a bad situation much worse. I ask that you not support the pending legislation, S.21.

Points on the Dole Amendment

-- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would hinder our efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.

-- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. military support to the Bosnian government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and Serbia.

-- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the international community's other efforts have yielded significant benefits.

-- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing the killing and suffering in Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.

- UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million

people.

Its

presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of Central Bosnia.

- UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and is fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.

-- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

-- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partner to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them limited support and time to prove themselves.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue to oppose unilateral lift.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government

would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively with its new arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

-- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo within 12 weeks of the date the Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually ensures A

llied entanglement in the war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the mission could take up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war

-- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like Serbia, would likely provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes, such as those against Iraq and Libya, that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to distinguish between Bosnia and other situations.

-- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with respect to decisions that could

involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and other Americans to imminent risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential responsibilities.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and risks of an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and protecting the Bosnians that will follow?

-- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

U.S. - CUBA MIGRATION TALKS

Background: U.S. -Cuba migration review talks were held in Havana July 17-18. These were part of a series of regular talks to discuss exclusively migration issues between the two countries. The U.S. delegation was led by Anne Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and the Cuban delegation was led by Ricardo Alarcon, president of Cuba's National Assembly. No agreement was reached, and differences remain on a number of issues.

Key Points

-- The talks held in Havana were part of regular discussions on migration issues between the U.S. and Cuba.

-- Both sides agreed that the September 9 and May 2 accords were working: They are directing migration into legal channels, while discouraging unsafe migration.

-- The U.S. raised several suggestions to assure that the two sides do everything to facilitate safe, orderly and legal migration.

-- No new agreements were reached.

Qs & As

Q: Which issues remain unresolved?

A: A broad range of migration issues was discussed. Many of them were operational. These talks were not aimed simply at reaching discrete agreements but are part of an ongoing process to promote safe, orderly and legal migration.

[If pressed]

The fees charged by the Cuban government to migrants who have already been issued travel documents was one of the issues discussed.

Q: Did the Cubans raise other issues such as lifting the sanctions imposed by President Clinton last August?

A: Yes, the Cuban government raised those issues but they were outside the scope of these talks. These discussions dealt solely with questions involving safe, orderly and legal migration.

CUBA AND NEWS BUREAUS

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times story of July 17? Are we on the verge of a deal with the Cuban Government on news bureaus?

A: The Administration continually reviews all aspects of our policy toward Cuba, exploring ways to make the embargo more effective and to provide support to the Cuban people. In that context, the Administration is still reviewing the possibility of licensing U.S. news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba and of permitting Cuban official news organs to operate in the United States.

Licensing decisions are exclusively the decision of the U.S. Government and no "negotiations" with Cuba about this issue have occurred nor are any planned.

Q: Is Senator Helms' insistence on letting Radio Marti/TV Marti into Cuba the sticking point?

A: Radio and TV Marti are not commercial news stations. They comprise the Office of Cuban Broadcasting in the Bureau of Broadcasting of USIA which is represented at our Interests Section in Havana. Under consideration is the licensing of commercial news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba.

Although Radio and TV Marti would certainly benefit from a greater flow of accurate, uncensored news from Cuba, they are not directly related to the issue of reciprocal news bureaus.

CHINA

Q: What is the Administration's position on the upcoming China MFN legislation?

There are two pieces of legislation the House is likely to consider. One is a resolution of disapproval which would overturn the President's decision to continue Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status for China. The Administration strongly opposes this resolution. I am pleased to say that we believe this resolution will be tabled later today.

The second is a bill developed by the House leadership that addresses many of the outstanding issues in the U.S.-China relationship (e.g., Harry Wu, nonproliferation). We have problems with some specific provisions of this bill, although we support its goals. We will not oppose this bill because the disapproval resolution is so much worse.

Q: How can you grant MFN when Harry Wu is still in jail?

A: We remain very concerned about the Harry Wu case and continue to work to persuade the Chinese government to release him. But we do not believe denying MFN to China would help. It would, in fact, more likely result in harsher treatment for Wu.

It is important that the issues be treated separately. The President determined in 1994 and reiterated this year that the best way for bringing about long-term improvements in China's human rights record was to maintain a comprehensive engagement with China, including in the area of economic and commercial relations.

Q: What are you doing to get Harry Wu out?

A: We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself.

We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case

is
of great
importance for U.S.-China relations.

Q: What about Chinese hints that he will be freed after the investigation is
complet
ed?

A: We cannot base our approach on hints and rumors. Our position is unchanged.
He
should be
released immediately.

Background: (NOT FOR USE WITH PRESS)

China announced today that it is closing an area off the coast of Fujian Province
(i
n the Taiwan Straits) to all
foreign air traffic and shipping from July 21-28 for the purpose of launching a
surf
ace-to-surface missile. It did
not say what kind of missile, but the size of the closed area -- small and circular
-- suggests it could be an MRBM.
Taiwan is somewhat alarmed and has put its own military on relatively low-level
ale
rt in response.

Q: What about the Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait?

A: We have no information to suggest that this is anything other than an exercise.

Taiwan's
security is not in jeopardy.

We would be concerned if tensions were to rise significantly in the Taiwan
Straits.

We hope
that both sides will seek to avoid taking steps that would bring about such a situat
ion.

The United States has for many years supported the process of peaceful dialogue
and

negotiation of differences between China and Taiwan. Both sides, in our view,
have
an interest in

maintaining the atmosphere of peace and cooperation that has enabled both sides to develop their economies.

We believe that China and Taiwan over the past few years have developed good, cooperative

processes for discussing problems and resolving differences. We hope they will continue to develop.

Q: Is this saber-rattling related to the Lee Teng-hui visit to the U.S.?

A: That is a question for the Chinese government.

Q: Will the United States protest to China about the exercise?

A: There are no plans to do so. The PRC has undertaken training exercises in this region in the past. It has notified the international shipping and air transport communities of the closure areas in an appropriate fashion.

Q: Will the United States support Taiwan if China attacks?

A: That is a completely speculative question unwarranted by the circumstances.

Q: What impact is all this having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

A: Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range of our bilateral interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engaged on issues

of mutual interest.

The Secretary of State will be meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on August 1, when both will be attending an ASEAN meeting in Brunei.

Q: What is your view of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement that the meeting between Qian and Christopher is critical to the future of the relationship?

A: We acknowledge that this is an important meeting to discuss serious issues. We would caution against over-dramatization, however. The communication process between two major powers is a continuing process at many levels.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that apologize for inviting Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. and promise not to let it happen again?

The President stands by his decision and has no intention of apologizing.

The decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and fully consistent with American values and opinion.

We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it constitute a change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will Lee be allowed to visit again?

We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case basis, based on our judgment of what is in the U.S. interest. The Secretary of State noted a few days ago that we expect visits to be completely private and rare. There is no request pending at the moment.

U.S.-JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION DISPUTE

Background: There was no agreement between the U.S. and Japan during the July 13-15 civil aviation talks in Tokyo. However, Japan has proposed another Vice Ministerial-level meeting, followed by a meeting between Secretary Pena and Ministry of Transport Minister Kamei. We have accepted this proposal in principle and are now in the process of discussing with the Japanese the modalities (e.g., time, place) of that meeting.

Talking Points:

-- We continue to work towards a negotiated solution to this dispute which recognizes the rights of U.S. carriers such as Federal Express under the existing agreement.

-- While the talks last week did not reach an agreement, we believe that they were productive.

-- Japan has proposed another round of Vice Ministerial-level talks, followed by a meeting between Secretary Pena and Minister Kamei.

-- We have accepted that idea in principle and are now discussing the venue and timing for such talks in the next several days.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign

operations appr
 opriations bill last evening
 passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your
 advisors have not yet
 recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to
 appropriati
 ng considerably less than we
 need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which
 would reinf
 orce the Mexico City
 family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to
 Russia
 and Mexico. It also contains
 other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign
 operations a
 ppropriations
 bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, g
 iving the Administration
 flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is pa
 rticularly important
 because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are too meet our
 int
 ernational
 commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems.
 T
 hese include
 the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning
 process and
 other
 amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign
 policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many
 prog
 rams. These
 reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy.
 We will work with the
 committees to obtain additional funding for these programs , (e.g. funding for the
 W
 orld Bank and for
 Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a
 decision
 about what to
 do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies; and deep funding cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and the Foreign Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto the State Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendation for the Foreign Assistance Act.)

HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announced where reruns would be taking place. The results point to a significant Lavalas victory, but it is important to note that, overall, non-Lavalas parties gathered roughly 60-65% of the vote and that a second round will be required in about 70% of the parliamentary or senate races. The Lavalas share of 35-40% of the vote should be viewed in light of President Aristide's 70% share when he was elected in 1991. Reruns will take place in about 20% of localities. This is more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns are now scheduled for August 6 and the second round for August 27, though both dates remain subject to change.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral Council's announcement. A number of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the elections. Ambassador Swing is attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral council acted in ways that justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the elections was not significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud.

Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time, were able to vote peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of their choice. In light of Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine months ago it was ruled by a repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, will require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or of an attempt to subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy, especially in one of the poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral process and might not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a mistake. The parties, the electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards strengthening Haiti's

democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and preparing for upcoming elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicly and privately, that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitution, limiting the President to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on track, which calls for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President in February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in US policy.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protracted.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change. Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat,

over
50% of
Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or
Baltics.

Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Yeltsin acknowledged in his July 18 television interview he had suffered heart
at
tack.

-- Understand there will be period of convalescence.

-- With proper care and medical attention, Yeltsin should be able to return to
norma
l schedule.

-- Prior to his interview on Tuesday, Yeltsin spent hour talking with
Chernomyrdin a
nd
Nationalities Minister Mikhaylov about various issues, including Chechnya .

Announcement of Duma Election Date

-- Yeltsin has issued decree that Russian Duma elections will be held December
17. W
elcome this
as positive, normal step for democratizing Russia.

Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices.
Address
ing
political as well as military issues. Understand remaining point of difference at t
his time is the future
status of Chechnya (i.e. Chechnya's relationship to the Russian Federation

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence
, " achieve
negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime
Mini
ster

Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively with Russia toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to

develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 July 95 18:50
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: FW: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO

Andreasen, Steven P.
Andricos, George M.
Aoki, Steven N.
Appel, Edward J.
Argarin, Jocelyn D.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atkin, Timothy J.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Bakke, Kyle D.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bassett, Leslie A.
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beardsley, Tyler S.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Benjamin, Daniel
Bieda, James M.
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blacker, Coit D.
Blieberger, Marion H.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boorstin, Robert O.
Boright, John
Bradley, Amelia J.
Breeland, Jocelyn G
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadway, Jamuna
Brown, Dallas
Bruton, Robert G.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Kevin J. Cadieux
Canty, Mary T.

Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Claussen, Eileen B.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Crispell, Thomas G.
Daniel, Patty A.
Danvers, William C.
Darby, Melanie B.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Debortoli, Michelle A.
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dragone, Karen D.
Drew, Samuel N.
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Dymersky, Debra L.
Eddy, Randolph P.
Edwards, Joan
Emery, Mary C.
Evans, Paul A.
Feinberg, Richard E.
Fetig, James L.
Ficklin, John W.
Flessas, Daniel
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Froman, Michael B.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
Gardner, Anthony
Gates, Brian K.
Genton, Regina A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Glinski, David
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Guekel, Kathi A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, Wilma G.
Halperin, Morton H.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Hammond, Cathy J.
Hammonds, Lisa W.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harrison, Lyle M.

Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Herrington, David E.
Heslin, Sheila N.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilty, JoAnne M.
Hofmann, Stephen D.
Houck, Baerbel K.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Jensen, Noelle B.
Jones, Steven R.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kammerer, Kelly C.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerr, Andrew S.
Ketterer, James P.
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Laipson, Ellen B.
Leary, William H.
Lindsey, Wanda
Litwak, Robert C.
Longoria, Michael A.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
Mack, Kathryn S.
Malley, Robert
Marmol, Madelyn P.
Marshall, Betty A.
Marshall, Dana M.
Martinez, Alejandro
Stefan T. Mauzy
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Mazzuchi, Anthony D.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Miller, Matthew E.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Moody, Angelyn D.
Moore, Lori A.
Neil, M. Elise
Norman, Marcia G.
Nuccio, Richard A.
O'Loughlin, Katherine
Parco, Jim E.

Gwyn M. Parker
Parramore, Carl W.
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Pease, Bruce E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Pifer, Steven K.
Poneman, Daniel B.
Poppiti, Victoria L.
Porter, Gidell
Quinn, Mary E.
Ramsay, Martha S.
Reade, Evan G.
Realuyo, Celina B.
Reed, George
Rice, Susan E.
Roth, Stanley O.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Satterfield, David M.
Saunders, John W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Schifter, Richard
Schmidt, John R.
Schmidt, Sandra E.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Seeley, Charlotte P.
Sens, Andrew D.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Sevigny, Theodore T.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Stauffer, Helen L.
Stern, Jessica E.
Sterns, Crayton L.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sullivan, Kathryn
Sulser, Jack A.
Tarullo, Daniel K.
Marcel T. Thomas
Turner, Joe T.
Tyler, John T.
Unrue, Michael M.
Van DeCar, Karen J.

Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.
Vershow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Wales, Jane
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Wilhelm, Richard J.
Wilson, Marilyn E.
Wise, William M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Woolston, Ann E.
Wooton, Kevin B.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Yorkdale, Glenn H.

CARBON_COPY

NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

From: Danvers, William C.
To: @nsa; @up
CC: Record; @legislat; fuerth; wise
Subject: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, July 20, 1995 06:28 PM

Note for Tony, Sandy and Nancy:

Bob Bell has indicated that we are on track for START II ratification. There should be a July 31 or Aug. 1 SFRC mark up and negotiations with Helms staff on the text of the resolution have begun. We are organizing an interagency meeting with Bob on ABM/TMD to see how best to counter language in the Senate DoD auth bill and if not in conference.

Bosnia UC accepted in the Senate today. Nine possible amends but there will be no filibuster. We will meet with friendly Senate staff at the WH on Monday to discuss next steps, particularly after the weekend's activities. We will also work a briefing schedule with State and DoD on what occurs this weekend.

The President made a public statement on May 23 indicating that he would veto H.R. 1561, the House companion bill. The Senate version, sponsored by Sen. Helms, is as equally troublesome bill. Secretary Christopher has recommended a veto as have other key foreign policy advisers, particularly since the bill contains a provision that would force the consolidation of the four key foreign policy agencies-- the State Department, AID, ACDA and

USIA.

SFRC Nigeria hearing today. Both Kassebaum and Feingold want to talk with McHenry on Nigeria. I will work with Susan on this.

The DoD approps bill goes to full ct. tomorrow. Murtha may still offer and amend to bill on requiring a prior authorization for carrying out op plan. Asked WH LA to see if chief of staff can call Murtha. DoD is trying to get Shali or Owens to call him. There is also a problem with drawdown language. DoD is trying to work this.

State Authorization bill could come up next week after Bosnia. Still uncertain.

Lynn Davis briefed HIRC staff on GCC related issues. Lugar will be briefed tomorrow.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 02 August 95 08:39
FROM Reed, George
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: FW: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Wise, William M.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Bill: The last item below pertains to an ABM letter which Christopher is drafting to send to the Hill--they want to send it over first for Bell to look at. It strikes me that Leon would want to have a look at that, also. Do you want to call Bell and ask him if we could get a coord copy? I don't know if he would perceive a call from me on that as above my pay grade. Geo

From: Danvers, William C.
To: @NSC - NSC Staff; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: FW: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, August 01, 1995 07:23 PM

From: Danvers, William C.
To: @up; @nsa
CC: Record; @legislat; fuerth; wise
Subject: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, August 01, 1995 07:21 PM

Note for Tony, Nancy and Sandy:

The Bosnia vote was an improvement over the last go around and puts us within striking distance of a veto override.

DoD auth should come to the Senate floor in the next couple of days, could be as soon as tomorrow.

DoD approps bill will be taken up in House tomorrow. They began debate last evening for about 10 minutes.

S. 908 was pulled from the House floor today after two cloture votes failed. Sen. Helms was quite upset, and indicated that he would bring the bill up again. Dole put the bill back on the calendar. While this is not a

guarantee it will come up, it means that it could.

HIRC hearings on Middle East tomorrow and SCt. hearing on nuclear developments in Cuba.

State is working with Treasury on funding options in light of the fact we should be getting more money from the Senate for ops SCt.

Christopher is going to send an ABM letter to the Hill. State wants Bob to take look at it. They want to send it as soon as possible.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 08 August 95 18:22
FROM Clarke, Richard A.
CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJECT Subject: FW: S.908 ~~(TOP SECRET)~~
TO Simon, Steven N.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By. VZ NARA, Date 2/7/2014
2006-1362-F(7)

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Clarke, Richard A.; Halperin, Morton H.
CC: /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: S.908 ~~(TOP SECRET)~~
Date: Monday, August 07, 1995 07:25 PM

Mort and Dick:

I want to give you both a brief, very close hold update on S. 908, the Helms State Dept. Auth. bill. Last week, Sen. Helms called Wendy Sherman and asked to have a private meeting with her. He indicated that he would not even tell his staff initially.

They met and agreed to have further conversations. Wendy notified AID (Brian and LA); USIA (Duffy), ACDA (Holum), White House Chief of Staff Office, Jack Quinn of OVP, Gordon Adams, Pat Griffin and me of the Helms meeting. She is also calling Leon Fuerth tonight. I spoke to Elaine Kamarck.

Helms' chief of staff sent a letter to Wendy, formally asking for a meeting. Wendy will send a reply back to Helms' staffer tomorrow, asking for, among other things, a bipartisan meeting.

The meeting will likely take place sometime next week. It will be very small, and the first meeting will likely be used to set an agenda-- i.e. there will not be a specific proposal to be discussed. Another suggestion is that all things, including the Helms' consolidation proposal, are potentially on the table.

I assume there will be a meeting of the principals before the meeting with the Helms' staff.

I will keep you abreast of all that is going on. These details were fully

confirmed with me tonight.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 15 August 95 18:10
FROM Clarke, Richard A.
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT Subject: FW: S. 908 ~~[SECRET]~~
TO Halperin, Morton H.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 4/7/14
2006-1363-F(7)

surprise!

you see "it was no big deal"...but it is also VERY CLOSE HOLD.

now that you know about it...why not ask Tony/Sandy what the strategy is?

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Halperin, Morton H.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Bass, Peter E.; Clarke, Richard A.; Simon, Steven N.;
Wise, William M.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: S. 908 ~~[SECRET]~~
Date: Tuesday, August 15, 1995 05:37 PM

Note for Mort:

I wanted to give you a further update on where we are on consolidation. I assume that is why you called.

There have been a further exchange of letters between State and Helms' staff. There will be an agenda setting meeting tomorrow with legislative affairs staff from the agencies-- State, USIA, ACDA and AID-- as well as Helms' staff and SFRC Dem. staff.

There will be NO/NO talk of policy or substance. That was agreed upon with Helms' staff and the interagency leg. group that met this afternoon.

You should also know that in a conversation I had with Bill Wise this morning, he stressed that any discussion of policy changes to our position on reorganization has to include NSC/OVP/NPR/OMB. He further stressed that we need to communicate that we have not changed our message on reorganization-- i.e. we are against consolidation. I passed this on State who understood and agreed.

One other point you should be aware of: last Friday, the President, the VP, Erskine Bowles, the Secretary of State, Sandy Berger, Pat Griffin (for a

moment), Leon Panetta (for a moment) and Wendy Sherman met with Sen. Helms and four of his staff members to discuss consolidation.

As I understand it, Helms' staff made a presentation to the President on his consolidation proposal and there was not much more to it than that. Pat Griffin STRESSED that this meeting was not a big deal and should not be viewed as such. The meeting was VERY CLOSE HOLD, and I believe that people would prefer we not discuss it, particularly with the press.

Now you know all that I know.

I will give you an update after tomorrow's meeting.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 17 August 95 11:48

FROM Hawkins, Ardenia R.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: NES document for longterm meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Baker, Jane E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Darby, Melanie B.
Gray, Wendy
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Not to throw anyone from the trail, the actual title on the document is "Foreign Policy Action Agenda - Second Half 1995"

From: Hawkins, Ardenia R.
To: @CROSS - Cross Hatches
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: NES document for longterm meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, August 16, 1995 07:32 PM

[[LONG816.DOC : 2831 in LONG816.DOC]]

please find attached the document I worked on for Nancy this evening. It can be found on the G:\EXECSEC\LONG816.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 16 August 95 19:14

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** LONG816.DOC

Bosnia

Depending on the outcome of the Holbrooke mission, we should be prepared to speak to the press during these next days of talks and upon the team's return. The group suggests that Tony Lake grant an

exclusive interview to Terry Hunt of the Associated Press. A senior White House correspondent and award-winning journalist, Hunt's story will run in countless newspapers throughout the country, particularly in the areas where the Senate "swing" votes are: North Dakota, California and Nevada. Such a piece and supporting television hits should sustain our effort through the dead days of August.

Week of the Congressional Override Vote

Leading off the week should be OpEd pieces. The Defense Department/JCS is preparing an OpEd in the name of Secretary Perry which we hope to place in a newspaper syndicate. The group also suggested that an OpEd from Secretary Christopher be placed in one of the major east coast papers.

With an approved speakers list, we can explore with the White House Media Affairs office, State and Defense ways to reach out to local radio and editorial boards and writers during this week.

White House meeting with Influentials Congressional briefings

A unified set of talking points was required for this outreach program. State/EUR/PA offered to begin the process of drafting talking points for clearance by the Deputies.

Override OpEds for Sept

Perry -- Action: Defense

Christopher -- Action: State

Ed writers -- who/when

Ed Boards -- who/when

locals

Talking points -- State/NSC clearances by Sept. 1

OP-ED Placements: (Suggested)

ù Christopher/Rubin -- Balanced Multi- Bilateral Aid -- in draft at Treasury; must be cleared by State & NSC/NEC -- seek placement in WSJ, LA Times or WP.

ù Strobe Talbot -- Our Stake in Russia: a worldwide exercise in cost avoidance -- State draft; clear NSC -- seek placement in

Chicago Tribune Syndicate.

ù J. Brian Atwood -- Foreign Assistance: Small Investments Produce Big Results -- Clear State & NPR/OVP -- seek placement in NYT or CSM.

ù Larry Summers -- The Case for the MDBs: Growth Abroad and Jobs in America -- Clear OMB/NSC/NEC -- seek placement in Knight-Ridder Syndicate.

ù Tony Lake -- Focusing Our Resources--the Hard Trade Offs -- seek placement in the NYT.

ù Joe Duffy --

Drafts of OP-EDs should be available at the Thursday, August 31, 1995 meeting of the "Friday Group."

Media Options to Explore:

ù CSM Sperling Breakfast -- Al Hunt Lunch Bunch

ù NPR -- Lake session on a Wednesday -- address resources vice Bosnia.

ù PBS -- "Focus" on MacNeil-Lehrer? (NSC Press explore)

ù National Press Center: Morning Newsmaker (if there is news).

ù USIA's Foreign Press Center -- reschedule Sandy Berger for session on Resources and American Leadership in the Post-Cold War Era.

ù Series of backgrounder briefings with the media, with the wire services? Is there any utility to having, for example, an AP exclusive. Is there any utility to approaching selected editorial boards? (NSC Press explore)

ù Could we get one of the major weeklies to agree to special issue on national security and foreign policy?

ù Dr. Tyson to do a Press Roundtable on international affairs resources and the overall budget?

Briefings/Events:

ù Selected NGO Briefing -- September 6th/Roosevelt Room from 11-12 -- Tony Lake host -- presentations by Bill Danvers, Wendy Sherman, Jill Buckley, (Treasury, USIA, ACDA available). This is approved and on the Lake schedule.

ù (IF we become mired in a CR, then consider additional Administration Roosevelt Room "briefings" for the NGOs.)

ù Continue WH 150 Task Force NGO meetings every Wednesday beginning September 13--call ad hoc meetings if situation warrants.

ù Beginning after Labor Day, OMB/NSC lead a small briefing team (State, AID, Treasury) to meet with some of the think tanks -- Brookings, AEI, CSIS, CFR -- to discuss resources issue and need

for bipartisan foreign policy.

ù Wednesday, August 30, 150 TF ask US Chamber of Commerce to host a meeting with focus on foreign assistance (bilateral and multilateral) and US jobs. (This is suggested by the Chamber's VP Intl.)

ù Reinitiate Daily faxes -- prepared by AID and cleared with 150 Task Force/NSC -- continued focus on resources.

Terrorism

Opportunity

We have a chance to highlight the Administration's tough record on terrorism -- both individual and state-sponsored. Ongoing trials, extradition cases and status of terrorism bill in Congress give us pegs for speeches, etc.

Plan

Our strategy should be primarily aimed at two audiences: general public and members of Congress. We should find forums (Congressional hearings, public meetings and key press interviews) to make sure and highlight our accomplishments.

Proposed Speech Schedule

Speaker

Date

Subject

POTUS

Sept. 6-13

Israel/PLO signing

-- press conference

could be venue for

statement on

state-sponsored

terror

Lake

week of Sept. 18

Terrorism, emphasis

on web of crime,

nuclear smuggling,

etc. -- World Trade

Center with foreign
policy/Wall Street
audience

Atty Gen
(FBI director?)
early Oct.
Terrorism, emphasis
on domestic policy
to protect our
people

V-POTUS
mid Oct.
Russia speech on
efforts to control
nuclear
materials/stopping
nuclear smuggling

POTUS
Oct. 25
UN 50th -- New
dangers facing the
world; terrorism
initiative

ABM/TMD:

-- No matter the outcome of the proposed agreement on the DoD Authorization bill, we should consider some public outreach efforts on our position on ABM/TMD. Thursday's editorial in the Washington Post is an example of how we can get our message out. ACTION: PA strategy, DoD, State and NSC.

START II:

-- START II is stuck in SFRC, tied to progress on S. 908. Don't need to target Sen. Helms, but would be useful to get people writing about START II and its importance and the need for Congress to act.

We should consider raising CWC as well. ACTION: PA strategy, State, DoD and NSC.

Suggested ABM/TMD and START II PA strategy:

- Briefings of regional press.
- Briefings of major editorial boards.
- Possible briefing of electronic media.
- Possible speech by Bell, Carter, Davis in Washington or Chicago, LA or elsewhere outside beltway.
- Briefings of NGOs, think tanks.

DoD AUTHORIZATION BILL:

- Work with Dems to secure passage of compromise on ABM/TMD.
- Work with Dems on CTB amendment.

ACTION: DoD State.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Dallas Brown to Richard Clarke. Subject: Miscellaneous Haiti Stuff. (5 pages)	08/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Non-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/20/1995-09/12/1995]

2006-1363-F
vz5625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Dallas Brown to Richard Clarke. Subject: FW: CPL. (4 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Non-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 605000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/20/1995-09/12/1995]

2006-1363-F

vz5625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 12 September 95 20:19
FROM Bell, Robert G.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Daily Guidance Update [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Cullin, Brian P.
Fetig, James L.
Johnson, David T.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Schuker, Jill A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

OK with me.

From: Wozniak, Natalie S.
To: @NSC - NSC Staff
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Daily Guidance Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, September 12, 1995 07:28 PM

[[SEP12GUI.DOC : 5172 in SEP12GUI.DOC]]

Please review and forward your updates to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m. Wednesday, September 13. Thanks.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 12 September 95 18:59
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** SEP12GUI.DOC
FOREIGN AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

September 12, 1995

Bosnia/Croatia

Liberia: Peace Process

Burundi: Departure of Ambassador

Cuba -- New Foreign Investment Law

Senate Endorsement of START II and CWC Ratification

Jerusalem 3000

Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Iraq

Kashmir

China/Tibet

Ireland

Russia

BOSNIA/CROATIA

Geneva Meetings

-- Important progress was made at Friday's Geneva meeting between the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, and Contact Group representatives. Ambassador Holbrooke and EU negotiator Carl Bildt co-chaired the meeting.

-- In specific, the three foreign ministers announced they had agreed to basic principles for further negotiations toward final settlement. The principles are the following:

-- For the first time, all agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue as a single state, with its present borders, and with continuing international recognition.

-- Consistent with the Contact Group plan, all three agreed that under the terms of a settlement, Bosnia-Herzegovina will consist of two entities: the Federation established under

last year's Washington Agreements, and a Bosnian Serb republic.

-- The 51-49 parameter of the Contact Group's territorial proposal will be the basis for a settlement, subject to any adjustments the parties make by mutual agreement.

-- The two entities will have the right to establish relationships with neighboring states, but new relationships must be consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

-- The parties have pledged to adhere to human rights standards, to ensure freedom of movement and the right of the displaced to return to their homes, and to collaborate on joint economic projects that will promote transportation links and communications among all of Bosnia's peoples.

-- As the President said, this is an important milestone on the path to peace.

-- The President was briefed yesterday by Ambassador Holbrooke and his team on next steps. He instructed the Holbrooke delegation to return to Europe tonight for further negotiations with the parties and consultations with the Contact Group and our other European partners.

If asked whether the new diplomatic effort divides Bosnia)

-- We have not partitioned Bosnia, nor do we intend to.

-- It cannot be emphasized too strongly that according to the Geneva agreements, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a single state, retaining its seat in international organizations and its bilateral diplomatic relations with other countries in the world, including the U.S.

-- I would note President Izetbegovic's statement yesterday that the Serbs compromise

ed by
recognizing and accepting the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Bosnians
compromi
sed by accepting
a Serb republic. Izetbegovic further noted that the reason for the compromises
was
to end the war.
According to Izetbegovic, "the world has made clear its support for peace but not
fo
r war."

NATO/UN Air Campaign

-- The NATO/UN air campaign is continuing because of Bosnian Serb refusal to
agree t
o
conditions laid down by UN Commander Janvier and the NAC.

-- Last Sunday NATO used cruise missiles against Bosnian Serb air defense sites
in B
anja Luka.

-- This is not an escalation, but reflects a tactical judgment on how best to contin
ue the current
mission while minimizing the risks to NATO pilots.

-- The NATO and UN commanders will make tactical judgments on next steps if
the Serb
s
continue to reject the UN/NATO conditions.

-- We regret that the recent meeting between Janvier and Mladic was
unsuccessful. D
espite
repeated claims to the contrary, the Bosnian Serbs have still not complied with
the
three conditions:

-- a beginning of withdrawal of heavy weapons from the 20-kilometer exclusion
zone
around Sarajevo;

-- cessation of all attacks on Sarajevo and other safe areas;

-- complete freedom of movement for the UN and NGOs, including the opening
of
ground routes and the Sarajevo airport.

-- We note Bosnian government assurances that it will not take military
advantage of

a Serb
withdrawal of heavy weapons from around Sarajevo.

-- The NATO/UN action, which began in response to the August 28 attack on the Sarajevo marketplace, should leave the Bosnian Serbs in no doubt about the determination of the Alliance and the UN to follow through on their commitments to protect safe areas.

-- The response is in full conformity with NATO decisions and UN Security Council resolutions on protection of Bosnian safe areas, and is taking place under rules established at the July 21 London Conference and subsequent NATO meetings.

(If asked what the objective of the campaign is)

-- The action demonstrates our resolve to uphold NATO and UN commitments and to show that further attacks on civilians will have consequences.

(If asked about Russian criticism of the NATO air campaign)

-- Like the rest of the international community, the Russians were very critical of the Serb attack on the Sarajevo market that precipitated the UN/NATO response.

-- The U.S. and NATO differ with Russia over air strikes, which are firmly grounded in UN resolutions. We discussed our different approaches yesterday at the UN and NATO, where Russian Ambassadors made presentations.

-- We agree on the importance of negotiated settlement and are working closely as members of the Contact Group to that end.

-- We have made clear to the Russians that the air strikes will end when the Bosnian Serbs comply with NATO/UN conditions, and we have pointed out that we are urging Bosnian

governme
nt restraint. (IF
PRESSED: The President wrote to Yeltsin on this Saturday.)

-- Russia has a unique contribution to make to European security. We believe a
soli
d
NATO-Russia relationship is in the interest of the U.S., Europe and Russia; thus
we
are pressing to
develop that relationship.

(If asked how long the response will last)

-- NATO will continue its campaign until the conditions laid down by General
Janvier
and the
NAC are met.

(If pressed for other details of the response)

-- For details, I refer you to NATO and the UN, which are carrying out the
retaliati
on.

(If asked whether the strikes are making the Bosnian Serbs more obdurate)

-- The international community and parties to the conflict with the exception of
the
Bosnian Serbs
have accepted UN resolutions and NAC decisions establishing safe areas in
Bosnia. N
ATO and the UN
will not abandon previous commitments.

-- Mechanisms have been established by the UN Security Council and NATO
commanders t
o step
up the pressure of the air campaign should the Bosnian Serbs continue to refuse
to m
eet international
conditions.

(If asked whether use of cruise missiles will destroy the peace process)

-- This is not an escalation, we are using the appropriate measures to let the Bosni
an Serbs know
they must adhere to UN resolutions.

-- In addition, we would underscore that the Bosnian government has given clear, public assurances that GoBH forces will not take advantage of the current situation to gain ground around Sarajevo.

-- Ultimately, the end of the NATO campaign depends on Bosnian Serb behavior.

Downed French Pilots

-- The Allies are in close consultation on all aspects of the NATO operation, including how best to respond to the downing of the French Mirage last week.

-- We have no confirmation of the Bosnian Serb claim that the pilots are in their custody.

-- As we have reason to believe the pilots of the plane may be alive, it is inappropriate to comment further.

Granic Visit

-- Croatian Foreign Minister Granic is in Washington for meetings with various Administration officials.

-- We will discuss how to advance the search for a political solution to the Serb-held area of Croatia known as Eastern Slavonia or UN Sector East. Among the other subjects on the agenda is the ongoing Croatian offensive inland from the Dalmatian coast, which we feel is very inadvisable in the current negotiating climate.

-- We will also raise Croatian human rights violations in Krajina.

Italian Exclusion from CG

-- Various European governments including Italy have in the past approached the Cont

act Group
to request closer involvement with international decisionmaking on Bosnia. On
sever
al occasions in
recent weeks, Italy and other states have attended Contact Group events.

-- As a member of the EU Troika, member of the UN Security Council, and in its
capac
ity as one
of the principal staging areas for NATO efforts in ex-Yugoslavia, Italy has an
impor
tant role to play in the
international response to the crisis. We take its views of the negotiations, NATO
a
nd UN activities, and
other aspects of the peace process very seriously.

-- Assistant Secretary Holbrooke explained to Prime Minister Dini and Secretary
Gene
ral Salles in
Rome last week that Friday's Geneva meeting was to be limited in participation
so as
to establish elements
of the original five-nation Contact Group plan as the basis for further negotiations
with the parties to the
conflict.

-- The EU was represented at the Geneva meeting by its Balkan negotiator Carl
Bildt,
as well as by
European states originally part of the Contact Group.

-- We are aware that subsequent to the Geneva meeting, Italy raised certain
objectio
ns to aspects
of the NATO/UN air campaign. All states participating in the effort are closely
mon
itoring the effect of
the campaign on Bosnian Serb behavior, and all are in close contact with one
another
at the UN and
NATO.

-- We do not believe Italy's questions about the campaign stem from pique over
perce
ived
exclusion from the Contact Group.

-- We intend to continue to consult closely with Italy as our diplomatic efforts
con

tinue.

-- Following the Contact Group meetings in Geneva and Moscow, we plan to meet in Rome with a broad range of allies and partners to consult fully on the peace process.

CORE BOSNIA POINTS

-- From the outset, we have consistently worked to relieve the human suffering in Bosnia, contain the war, and bring about a peaceful settlement. These efforts have saved many lives, brought an end to the fighting between Muslims and Croats through the formation of the Bosnia-Croat Federation, and prevented the war from spreading. However, as we all know, the fighting continues and peace has been tragically elusive in Bosnia.

-- We are now at an important moment in the history of the Bosnian conflict. The events of the last few weeks changed the situation on the ground in Bosnia and presented the sides with opportunities to settle that could disappear in the wake of today's market attack.

-- Unless there is settlement in the next several weeks, the risks will grow of an escalation and spreading of the war, the collapse of the UN operation, and the danger that the United States will be drawn more deeply into the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. This is a path we must try to avoid.

-- There is still the possibility of another path -- toward an end to fighting through a strengthened UN operation on the ground and aggressive pursuit of a new diplomatic solution. This is an opportunity we continue to try to take advantage of.

-- Over the last few weeks we have worked with our allies to strengthen the United Nations operation by supporting the Rapid Reaction Force and providing for the protection of safe areas by the threat of aggressive use of NATO air power.

-- We are now working closely with our allies on the prospect for a new diplomatic effort. There are no guarantees -- but I am determined to present the parties with a chance to reassess and pursue a peaceful settlement.

What if the Negotiating Process Breaks Down in the Wake of the Serb Attack?

-- We are committed to pursuing multilateral lifting of the arms embargo, and to consulting with Congress on arming and training the Bosnian government, should the Serbs prove unwilling to settle and UNPROFOR withdraws.

Have You Retreated from Troop Commitments Upon Settlement? (Aug. 28 WP p. 24)

-- No.

-- We have long said we would be willing to participate in a NATO-led effort, under previously-specified conditions, to help implement a viable peace settlement.

Are You Considering Fewer Troops?

-- The number of troops we would consider devoting to settlement implementation would depend on the nature of the settlement package.

Are You Presenting A U.S. Map/Have You Ceded Goradze to Serbs

-- We are discussing a number of ideas, including some notions on territorial issues

-- We are not presenting a U.S. map, nor are we insisting on any particular territorial trades.

Did the Bosnians reject our plan out of hand?

-- No.

Mini Marshall Plan?

-- Certainly, a major reconstruction effort would need to follow any peace settlement.

-- Hope the international community would be prepared to assist in that effort.

Haiti or Cyprus Model?

-- Avoid such comparisons.

-- Any plan would be specific to the needs in Balkans.

Hasn't U.S. Leadership in Bosnia Failed?/What is New about the Current Initiative?

-- American diplomacy has had several notable successes: creation of the Federation and ending the fighting in Central Bosnia; stabilizing Macedonia; ending the siege of Sarajevo; containing the conflict.

-- New elements aiding our current efforts: recent developments on the ground, coup led with general war-weariness, have created new opportunities to break long-standing diplomatic logjams.

Give Up on Multi-ethnic Bosnian State?

-- No. Continue to support maintaining Bosnia within internationally recognized borders.

-- Supported Federation, combined Croat-Muslim enterprise.

Croatians Engaged in Ethnic Cleansing?

-- Refugee flow is human tragedy and we are actively supporting efforts of international relief agencies.

-- Have been reports of abuses. We strongly condemn all violations of the rights of civilians, prisoners of war and international personnel.

-- We have repeatedly stressed to the Croatian government its obligation to respect these rights; to investigate allegations of human rights abuses, and to hold accountable those responsible.

-- Also urged government of Croatia to provide assurances to all Serbs in the Krajina, and to those who fled, that they are welcome to stay and return. Importance of allowing international monitors (ICRC) to assure rights of Serbs are respected. Croatian government has agreed.

-- It is not clear whether the Croatian government's actions in Krajina amount to a systematic policy of ethnic cleansing -- a deliberate and organized strategy of force and intimidation to drive all members of an ethnic group from their homes to "purify" the area. But clearly, serious abuses have occurred and we condemn any acts that force anyone to leave because of ethnicity.

-- We will continue to monitor the situation closely and hold the Croatians to the same standards as the Serbs and others in this conflict.

Shattuck Report On Atrocities

[Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck confirmed reports of egregious human rights violations committed by Bosnian-Serb forces in the aftermath of their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa..]

-- We continue to condemn the policy of ethnic cleansing. We continue to call for international

access to all those detained and displaced, and for a full accounting of the whereabouts

of those missing.

We will continue to urge all parties in the former Yugoslavia to respect human rights and international humanitarian law.

-- Ambassador Albright presented information we have on atrocities to the U.N. Security Council.

-- At our urging, the U.N. Security Council has adopted resolutions condemning crimes on all sides, highlighting Bosnian Serb atrocities against refugees from Srebrenica and Zepa.

-- There must be justice, and those who have violated international humanitarian law must be held accountable. We will continue to work with the International War Crimes Tribunal and urge that it prosecute those suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Such criminal actions must not and will not remain unpunished.

What About Kosovo?

-- We have told Belgrade we believe major resettlement of Krajina Serbs in Kosovo is potentially very provocative.

-- Before the "FRY" can be integrated into the world community, a solution must be found to the situation in Kosovo.

Second-level Ethnic Cleansing in Sandzak, Vojvodina

-- We have urged Serbian authorities to enforce laws preventing the eviction of ethnic minorities from their homes in the aim of making room for Krajina refugees.

U.S. Relief to Krajina Serbs

-- We support efforts of international relief agencies, and have called for comprehensive, direct relief to all those in need.

Reconstruction Aid

-- The U.S. has consulted with the EU on the size and shape of an economic reconstruction effort, should a peace settlement be achieved.

-- The Spaniards, in their EU presidency capacity, have agreed to take the lead in planning for the effort. We are consulting with Congress on what the U.S. might be prepared to provide.

-- We expect the effort to include reconstruction assistance, IFI debt relief, humanitarian aid and encouragement of regional economic interdependence in terms of trade and other economic activities.

LIBERIA: PEACE PROCESS

Q: Do we believe that the war is now over?

A: We are pleased that Liberian faction leaders signed a new peace agreement in Abuja, Nigeria, on August 19.

We believe the chances for success of this accord are better than previous ones, given the participation of faction leaders on the new Council of State, and given the apparently helpful atmosphere resulting from NPFL leader Charles Taylor's meetings with Nigerian

Head o
f State Abacha.

A good start has been made in implementing the new accord. A cease-fire which went into effect August 26 is generally holding, and a new Council of State was sworn in September 1.

We urge all parties to work together to implement all provisions of the Abuja Accord, especially disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.

Given the length of the conflict and the suffering of the Liberian people, we hope that faction leaders will remain committed to the peace process.

Q: What is the USG attitude towards NPFL leader Charles Taylor?

A: The participation and cooperation of all faction leaders, including Charles Taylor, is essential to the peace process.

Those faction leaders who aspire to national leadership have a special responsibility to ensure that the provisions of the new Abuja accord are implemented swiftly and smoothly.

We hope that all parties will now begin a process of national reconciliation and healing.

Q: Did U.S. Special Envoy Dane Smith travel to Liberia?

A: Special Presidential Envoy to Liberia Ambassador Dane Smith and NSC Director MacArthur DeShazer have just been in West Africa for discussions about next steps in the peace process following the signing of a new agreement in Abuja, Nigeria, August 19 by Liberia's faction leaders.

They were in Monrovia for the September 1 installation of the new Council of State.

Q: How much aid have we given to Liberia?

Since the war began in 1989, the United States has provided over \$60 million for conflict resolution and over \$380 million for humanitarian assistance.

Q: What types of assistance is the USG prepared to provide, and how does the US intend to fund such assistance?

A: The United States is encouraged by the new agreement among Liberia's faction leaders, the swearing in of the Council of State as scheduled on September 1, and by the fact that the cease-fire that took effect August 26 is generally holding.

If the cease-fire holds and implementation of the peace process begins in earnest, Liberia will need assistance to successfully carry out disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of faction soldiers, and for reconstruction of the country.

(If asked): The issue of "child soldiers" is but one of the challenges to successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of fighters.

The United States is exploring ways in which we can help.

(If pressed): No decisions have been made on the nature and amount of U.S. assistance.

Q: Who is the U.S. Ambassador in Monrovia?

A: We do not have an Ambassador in Monrovia, as we have not recognized the interim governments which have been in place since the war began in 1989. The U.S. Embassy in Monrovia is headed by a Chief of Mission, John Fuhrer.

(FYI TO BRIEFER: John Fuhrer is DCM, currently acting as COM, pending arrival of a

new
COM.)

Q: Will we recognize the new government?

A: It is premature to consider the question of recognition.

Our Embassy officers in Monrovia will certainly be in close contact with the new government and political actors. We will continue to monitor developments closely and work with Liberians and the international community to ensure that the peace process continues to move forward, and the suffering of the Liberian people comes to an end.

BURUNDI: DEPARTURE OF AMBASSADOR

(IF ASKED):

Q: What can you tell us about U.S. Ambassador Robert Krueger's departure from Burundi?

A: (If asked) The State Department has asked Ambassador Robert Krueger to return (a request) to discuss a number of issues concerning Burundi, specifically including the human rights situation.

(FYI: Ambassador Krueger departed Bujumbura Sunday, September 10, and has now returned to the U.S.)

We are deeply concerned about the human rights situation in Burundi. The continuing assassinations, attacks by Hutu Bandes-Armee and the Tutsi militias, combined with increasing civilian

causalities resulting from clashing between guerrillas and the army, do not augur we
ll for the future of
peace and democracy in Burundi.

The United States continues to work with other members of the international communi
ty to
pursue the goals of reconciliation, peace and democracy.

(IF ASKED):

Q: What about the safety of Americans?

A: (If asked) All Americans are reported safe. The Embassy is in contact with the A
merican
community and other members of the international community.

(IF ASKED):

Q: What about reported threats against Ambassador Krueger?

A: In a country such as Burundi which is experiencing high levels of instability, we
are always
concerned about the safety of all Americans.

A travel warning for Americans considering travel to Burundi, with restrictions on
travel for
USG personnel, remains in effect for Burundi (effective June 16, 1995).

The authorized departure for dependents of USG personnel in Burundi remains in effe
ct
(authorized March 25, 1995).

(FYI: All USG dependents departed Burundi on March 29, 1995.)

(IF ASKED):

Q: How many Americans are in Burundi?

A: (If asked): There are approximately 100 Americans in Burundi, mostly missionarie
s. There are
approximately 20 official Americans in country.

Q: Has the President lost confidence in Ambassador Krueger?

A: Absolutely not. Ambassador Krueger continues to have the full confidence of the President.

Krueger has been an exemplary representative of the U.S. -- taking brave actions to ensure that widespread human rights abuses are brought to light and to end the cycle of impunity

CUBA -- NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW

-- We have not yet reviewed in detail the text of the new foreign investment law but it appears to offer new opportunities for foreign investors.

-- While this would be a welcome development, it also appears to have serious limitations. Cuban citizens, for instance, are still barred from investing in property, hiring non-family employees or forming small businesses. In addition, foreign investors are required to contract labor through the Cuban government, thereby preserving the government's strict economic hold on individuals.

-- These continuing restrictions significantly limit the scope of the law and indicate that the Cuban government is not interested in fundamental changes.

-- These changes are necessary to create incentives to raise Cubans' standard of living, improve Cuba's overall investment climate, and allow individuals essential economic freedom.

-- As we have indicated, major reforms of the kind that would bring about fundamental change

could merit a carefully calibrated responses from the United States.

-- Finally, we will continue to urge foreign investors to avoid investing in properties on which U.S. citizens have claims.

SENATE ENDORSEMENT OF START II & CWC RATIFICATION

-- The President applauds the Senate for its vote on September 5 calling for prompt ratification of the pending START II and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) treaties and urges it to provide its advice and consent to both treaties before this session is over.

-- As the President said in his May 31 commencement address at the Air Force Academy, "Both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention will make every American safer, and we need them now."

[IF ASKED IF THIS IS A SLAP AT SENATOR HELMS FOR HOLDING THE TWO TREATIES HOSTAGE TO

THE
HIS BILL ON STATE REORGANIZATION]:

-- Our dialogue with Senator Helms on that issue is continuing. Meanwhile, we have made clear before this vote and will continue to make clear that the President believes that it is crucial that the Senate complete its action on these two treaties this year.

JERUSALEM 3000

Q: Why didn't Ambassador Indyk attend the opening ceremonies for the Jerusalem 3000

celebrations? Was there any official USG representation?

A: Jerusalem 3000 is a year-long series of cultural events commemorating Jerusalem's culture and history. The U.S. will be represented during the course of Jerusalem 3000 events as appropriate at times, this may involve the Ambassador.

The U.S. was represented at the opening ceremony by our senior Cultural Affairs officer in Tel Aviv.

Ambassador Indyk had prior commitments and could not attend.

Given the cultural nature of the event, it was appropriate to send our senior Cultural Affairs officer.

Q: Does this represent a change in U.S. policy? Does the U.S. recognize Israeli annexation of Jerusalem?

A: Our policy on Jerusalem has not changed. It remains a matter for permanent-status talks between Israel and the Palestinians.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS

Q: What is the status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks?

A: Both the Israelis and the Palestinians continue to work hard to bridge their differences and have made progress.

We understand that both sides believe they are fairly close to an agreement.

Q: Will there be a ceremony for the parties to sign their agreement in Washington

so
on?

A: The parties have expressed their desire for a signing ceremony in Washington.
As
we have
said, we are prepared to host a ceremony, once agreement has been reached.

IRAQ

If asked:

Q: Does the United States want to see Saddam Hussein replaced?

A: The Iraqis themselves should decide who leads Iraq. We want to see a stable
Iraq
that does not
represent a threat to its neighbors. We support Iraq's territorial integrity.

As we have said in the past, it is difficult to foresee Saddam remaining in power
w
ere Iraq to
comply fully with all the resolutions, which he is obliged to do.

Recent events, including the Hussein Kamal defection, tend to reinforce this
impres
sion.

But I don't want to speculate on possible succession scenarios. It is up to the Ir
aqis themselves
to determine who should lead them.

KASHMIR

Background: The situation remains unclear and extremely fluid. Contact between
the
Al-Faran group holding the
hostages and the Indian authorities continues to be intermittent and the crisis appe
ars to be building toward a

conclusion. Tension in the area continues to mount following a bomb blast in Srinagar this past weekend and troop movements by both India and Pakistan along the line of control (border) that separates them.

Points

-- We are encouraged by reports that the hostages are well.

-- We continue to work closely with the Indian authorities and hope for the speedy and safe release of the hostages.

-- We urge all involved to continue to work cooperatively to secure the release of these innocent men.

CHINA/TIBET

DALAI LAMA VISIT

Q: Is the President meeting with the Dalai Lama?

A: The Dalai Lama is coming to the White House tomorrow to meet with Vice President Gore. They have met many times before. The VP is meeting the Dalai Lama as a respected religious figure.

Although the Dalai Lama does not have an appointment to see President Clinton, he will drop by the Vice President's office to pay his respects, as he did last year and in 1993. The President admires the Dalai Lama and his commitment to his people.

Q: Did the President refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama out of concern about offending the

Chinese, as the New York Times charged?

A: No. The Administration decided in 1993 that it would be appropriate for the Vice President to meet with the Dalai Lama in his capacity as a well-known religious leader he has known for many years.

This is the formula under which the meetings were held for the last two years. There are no changes.

IF ASKED:

Q: What is U.S. policy toward Tibet?

The United States recognizes Tibet as a part of China, under Chinese sovereignty.

The President has a deep concern for human rights in China, including freedom of religious practice and the preservation of the unique religion and culture of the Tibetan people.

We have raised this concern with the Chinese government, and have advocated the re-opening of discussions between the government and the Dalai Lama or his representatives.

We continue to believe the Dalai Lama has a unique standing and perspective that the Chinese Government should take into account in dealing with Tibetan issues.

IRELAND

Status of the Peace Process/Cancellation of the Anglo-Irish Summit?

-- As you know, the British and the Irish Governments decided it would be premature

to go ahead
with the summit of the two prime ministers planned for September 6. We know
the two
governments are
continuing their efforts to find a way forward.

-- As we have been all along, we remain in contact with the two governments and
with

representatives of different viewpoints in Northern Ireland. We will continue to
en
courage all sides to
be flexible and creative in the search for peace.

Adams Visit to Washington

-- Adams was granted a visa waiver in June, but did not travel to the U.S. at that t
ime. He
received a visa on September 6 in Dublin..

-- Adams will be in Washington September 12-14 for meetings with National
Security A
dviser
Tony Lake and State Department officials.

(If asked)

-- His meeting with Mr. Lake is on Wednesday afternoon.

(If pressed)

-- No, we have not requested a meeting with the President for Adams.

White House Meeting for Ian Paisley?

-- We understand Dr. Paisley is in town and would be prepared to schedule a
meeting
for him at
the White House, if he wishes.

President's Trip Affected?

-- No, the President's plans to travel to Northern Ireland in late November are not
affected by the
delay moving ahead with the peace process..

British Stalling on Talks?

-- We hope that talks will be underway by the time the President visits Northern
Ire

land at the end
of November.

Position on Decommissioning:

-- On decommissioning of weapons, the President has said that parties observing the
cease-fire
"must take the next step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have
made
it clear to Sinn
Fein and loyalists that we expect movement on this issue.

Decommissioning a Precondition to Talks:

-- It is up to the parties to resolve the remaining obstacles.

-- We continue to urge all parties to address outstanding issues seriously and
move
to talks that
will lead to a lasting settlement.

(If asked)

-- The President has not said that he favors discussing decommissioning of IRA
weapons
at new,
all-party talks rather than before them. He has said that decommissioning remains
an
essential element of
the peace process, and he has urged the IRA and loyalist paramilitaries to begin
to
discuss
decommissioning seriously.

Background: USA Today of August 28 in its World Roundup says "Clinton, who
has thrown
his weight behind
efforts to end one of Europe's longest guerrilla wars, said in a letter that he favors
discussing the
decommissioning of IRA arms at new, all-party talks rather than before them."
The letter
is one the President
wrote to former congressman Bruce Morrison in July in which he said "To help
heal the
wounds of an entire
generation of people in Northern Ireland and as part of the peace process, all the
people

arties should have the opportunity to raise issues of concern to them. Thus, I would expect all-party talks to address policing, prisoner issues, decommissioning of weapons and other issues of particular concern to communities and families."

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

-- The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet made a decision.

-- It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there is a formal decision.

Election of new Ulster Unionist Party Chairman

-- David Trimble was elected UUP chairman on September 8.

-- Tony Lake called to congratulate him and to express our hope that he will visit Washington soon.

-- We hope to continue to build on the good relations with the UUP that we enjoyed during Mr. Molyneaux's tenure as party leader.

RUSSIA

Current Items

Yeltsin's Warning Against NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in deliberate and transparent manner that threatens no country and strengthens security and stability of Europe as a whole.

-- Want to engage Russia closely in developing Europe's security structure.
Russia
a key player in
building stable, undivided Europe.

-- Want to work actively with Russia toward this end. Our goal is to develop
NATO-R
ussia
relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members. Robust
NATO-
Russia
relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Iranian Oil Swaps

-- As part of our policy of supporting the independence and stability of Caucasus
an
d Central Asia
states, USG willing to consider allowing American companies to swap Caspian
oil with
Iran in short-term
while alternative reliable export pipelines are developed.

-- Long-term independence of these states depends on ability to export energy
resour
ces.

-- Bottlenecks in Russian pipeline system severely limit ability of Kazakhstan,
Turk
menistan and
Azerbaijan to export oil and gas. No other pipelines currently available.

-- We are actively encouraging U.S. companies in region to develop alternative
non-I
ranian options
for oil export, including pipelines through Caucasus to Turkey. That will take
time

Chevron Swap Deal with Iran

-- Chevron has not yet presented license application. We will review all
applicatio
ns on
case-by-case basis.

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.
- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protracted.
- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change. Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.
- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Russian Banking Crisis

- Good news is that Russian government and Central Bank effectively managed complex short-term problems. Financial markets have stabilized.
- After markets originally froze, government injected judicious amounts of capital to unblock freeze while minimizing inflationary pressures. No general run on deposits, and August monthly inflation rate of 4.6% lowest since 1992.
- Expect additional bank closures and consolidations as weaker banks fold. If prudently managed, will strengthen banking system. We encourage Russian to keep working with IMF and World Bank on bank reform, as it is already doing.

Fred Cuny

-- Engaged Yeltsin, Russian officials to secure cooperation on Cuny case. Doing all we can to find out what happened, e.g., sent FBI team. Investigation ongoing.

-- Sympathize with Cuny family's deep sense of frustration. Share Cuny family's commitment to thorough and honest investigation.

-- No confirmed reports on fate of Cuny or the Russians traveling with him.

Chechnya

-- Russians and Chechens signed military agreement on July 30 that inter alia provides for cessation of hostilities, disarmament and stage-by-stage withdrawal of Russian forces.

-- Clashes continue. Implementation of agreement proceeding slowly -- complex and hinders frequent snags. Situation changing daily.

-- Dispute can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides quickly to resolve these issues and move toward political agreement.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have begun serious dialogue that will continue.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers

succeed
in building
democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S.
Not i
n our interest to
cut this assistance.