

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 18 April 97 17:04
FROM Murray, Lori E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Hewlms rebuttals[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Harris, Elisa D.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[PRESPTS.DOC : 4439 in PRESPTS.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 18 April 97 17:3
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** PRESPTS.DOC

Rebuttal Points for Helms Conditions

#1 US cannot join Convention until Russia ratifies, makes reasonable progress on implementing the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, Russia has resolved outstanding compliance questions under the Wyoming MOU and BDA, Russia is committed to forgoing a chemical weapons capability.

- ☐ This condition would hold hostage our ability to join the CWC to the hardliners in the Russian Duma.
- ☐ We would not be able to deposit in time for April 29 when the Convention comes into force: Americans not hired for key positions, including inspectors, lose influence over setting rules for the inspection regime, sanctions kick in for US industry, lose of US leadership.
- ☐ We would allow Russian hardliners to deny us the non-proliferation benefits of this treaty.
- ☐ Bad Policy: our ratification is clearly putting pressure on Russia to ratify. We would lose that leverage. Russia does not want to be on the outside either, especially if the US is on the inside setting the rules.

☐ BDA--neither the U.S. or Russia have ratified the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, so standard would definitely delay for some time US participation.

☐ Regarding outstanding compliance questions under the Wyoming MOU, the CWC not only requires the Russians to declare again their CW capabilities, but also has the enforcement provisions so we can pursue our compliance concerns (i.e. challenge inspections.) The BDA is not in force.

#2 Stemming Proliferation--Requires amending Article X, XI.

Says to rewrite Article XI to strike any provision that states or implies disapproval of trade restrictions. Says to strike Article X.

☐ We have gone the extra mile to fully address these concerns in two of the conditions in the agreed package.

☐ The condition obligates the President to obtain assurances from our Australia Group partners that Article XI is fully consistent with maintaining strict export controls on dangerous chemicals. We have already heard from most of our Australia Group partners who have reaffirmed that this is there understanding also.

☐ There is no concern that has not been addressed by the condition regarding Article XI.

☐ Regarding Article X, we have agreed that we will only give medical antidotes to countries of concern, such as Cuba, if assistance to protect against a chemical weapons attack is requested. We will not be sharing advanced defense technology.

#3 Essential Verification

Says we must have high confidence that we can detect a one ton of chemical weapons capability.

This is clearly a killer amendment. Our Intelligence Community has testified that it would be very difficult to detect small levels of CW. But we do have high confidence that we can detect a large scale systematic effort of a potential adversary to equip its armed forces with a chemical weapons capability.

#4 Rogue States/Universality

Says we can not become a party until rogue states do.

Again, Senator Helms would make our policy hostage to Qaddafi (etc.) Can't get in until they do, would allow them to continue business as usual with no constraints, while our industry suffers, our leadership is undermined, and our ability to influence and benefit from the CWC regime is compromised.

#5 Denial of Inspectors

Automatically denies inspectors from countries of concerns.

☐ Would set up a quid pro quo where contras would respond by not letting our inspectors in. These countries of concern are the ones we would like most to have our inspectors in.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 18 April 97 17:16
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Quinn, Mary E.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[PRESPTS.DOC : 4369 in PRESPTS.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 18 April 97 17:16
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** PRESPTS.DOC

Rebuttal Points for Helms Conditions

#1 Russian Elimination of Chemical Weapons. Precludes US from joining Convention until Russia ratifies, makes reasonable progress on implementing the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, resolves outstanding compliance questions under the Wyoming MOU and BDA, and is committed to forgoing a chemical weapons capability.

- ☐ This condition would hold hostage our ability to join the CWC to the hardliners in the Russian Duma.
- ☐ We would not be able to deposit in time for April 29 when the Convention comes into force: Americans not hired for key positions, including inspectors, lose influence over setting rules for the inspection regime, sanctions kick in for US industry, lose of US leadership.
- ☐ We would allow Russian hardliners to deny us the non-proliferation benefits of this treaty.
- ☐ Bad Policy: our ratification is clearly putting pressure on Russia to ratify. We would lose that leverage. Russia does not want to be on the outside either, especially if the US is on the inside setting the rules.

☐ BDA--neither the U.S. or Russia have ratified the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, so standard would definitely delay for some time US participation.

☐ Regarding outstanding compliance questions under the Wyoming MOU, the CWC not only requires the Russians to declare again their CW capabilities, but also has the enforcement provisions so we can pursue our compliance concerns (i.e. challenge inspections.) The BDA is not in force.

#2 Stemming Proliferation. Prohibits U.S. from joining CWC until Convention has been amended by: rewriting Article XI to strike any provision that states or implies disapproval of trade restrictions; and, deleting Article X.

☐ We have gone the extra mile to fully address these concerns in two of the conditions in the agreed package.

☐ The condition obligates the President to obtain assurances from our Australia Group partners that Article XI is fully consistent with maintaining strict export controls on dangerous chemicals. We have already heard from most of our Australia Group partners who have reaffirmed that this is there understanding also.

☐ There is no concern that has not been addressed by the condition regarding Article XI.

☐ Regarding Article X, we have agreed that we will only give medical antidotes to countries of concern, such as Cuba, if assistance to protect against a chemical weapons attack is requested. We will not be sharing advanced defense technology.

#3 Essential Verification. Prohibits U.S. from joining Convention unless we can certify we have high confidence that we can detect a one ton chemical weapons capability.

☐ This is clearly a killer amendment. Our Intelligence Community has testified that it would be very difficult to detect small levels of CW. But we do have high confidence that we can detect a large scale systematic effort of a potential adversary to equip its armed forces with a chemical weapons capability.

#4 Rogue States/Universality. Prohibits U.S. from joining until rogue states do.

Again, Senator Helms would make our policy hostage to Qaddafi (etc.) Can't get in until they do, would allow them to continue business as usual with no constraints, while our industry suffers, our leadership is undermined, and our ability to influence and benefit from the CWC regime is compromised.

#5 Denial of Inspectors. Automatically denies inspectors from countries of concerns.

☐ Would set up a quid pro quo where others would respond by not letting our inspectors in. These countries of concern are the ones we would like most to have our inspectors in.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 18 April 97 18:49
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Urgent SP [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.
Sonenshine, Tara D.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[SP418.DOC : 4651 in SP418.DOC]]

per tara's request, attached is draft SP for Weds event. pls clear asap.
thanks!

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 18 April 97 18:48

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** SP418.DOC

Schedule Proposal date ____/____/____

____ACCEPT ____REGRET ____PENDING

TO: Stephanie Streett

FROM: Samuel Berger

REQUEST: Meeting with key military supporters of the Chemical Weapons Convention

PURPOSE: To underscore the military benefits of the CWC on the eve of the Senate vote on the treaty.

BACKGROUND: The Senate will vote on the CWC on April 24, five days before the treaty enters into force. We need to defeat 5 killer conditions sponsored by Sen. Helms as well as secure 22 Republican votes to win final passage of the treaty. At this point, success is far from assured. Many of the "undecided" Senators will base their final decision on whether the treaty will improve the safety of our troops. This event would highlight the military benefits of the treaty by bringing together five former JCS Chairmen, three former Secretaries of Defense, more than a dozen veterans organizations and other key retired military supporters of the treaty.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: President has spoken out frequently on the importance of CWC ratification, including at a White House event on April 4 and a press briefing on April 18.

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, April 23, 1997

BRIEFING TIME: 30 minutes

DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Rose Garden

PARTICIPANTS: President
Vice President
Secretary Cohen
General Shalikashvili
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Samuel Berger
Elliot Richardson
Harold Brown
William Perry
John Vessey
David Jones
William Crowe
Colin Powell
Brent Scowcroft
Norman Schwarzkopf
Veterans Organizations

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: To be provided

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: open

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: no

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: yes

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

CONTACT: Elisa D. Harris, ext. 69181

ORIGIN OF THIS PROPOSAL: NSC

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: no

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 18 April 97 18:54
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT helms[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Murray, Lori E.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[HELMPT.DOC : 4634 in HELMPT.DOC]]

lori: have made a few revisions and fixed spacing. am leaving you a copy of sally horn points on same, which actually are better on the inspector issue.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 18 April 97 18:25
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** HELMPT.DOC
HELMPT.DOC

Rebuttal Points for Helms Conditions

#1 Russian Elimination of Chemical Weapons. Precludes US from joining Convention until Russia ratifies, makes reasonable progress on implementing the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, resolves outstanding compliance questions under the Wyoming MOU and BDA, and is committed to forgoing a chemical weapons capability.

☐ This condition would hold hostage our ability to join the CWC to the hard-liners in the Russian Duma.

☐ We would not be able to deposit in time for April 29 when the Convention comes into force: Americans not hired for key positions, including inspectors, lose influence over setting rules for the inspection regime, sanctions kick in for US industry, loss of US leadership.

☐ We would allow Russian hard-liners to deny us the

non-proliferation benefits of this treaty.

☐ Bad Policy: our ratification is clearly putting pressure on Russia to ratify. We would lose that leverage. Russia does not want to be on the outside either, especially if the US is on the inside setting the rules.

☐ BDA--neither the U.S. or Russia have ratified the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, so standard would definitely delay for some time US participation.

☐ Regarding outstanding compliance questions under the Wyoming MOU, the CWC not only requires the Russians to declare again their CW capabilities, but also has the enforcement provisions so we can pursue our compliance concerns (i.e. challenge inspections.) The BDA is not in force.

#2 Stemming the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons. Prohibits U.S.

from joining CWC until Convention has been amended by: rewriting Article XI to strike any provision that states or implies disapproval of trade restrictions; and, deleting Article X.

☐ We have gone the extra mile to fully address these concerns in two of the conditions in the agreed package.

☐ One condition obligates the President to obtain assurances from our Australia Group partners that Article XI is fully consistent with maintaining strict export controls on dangerous chemicals. We have already heard from most all our Australia Group partners, who have reaffirmed that this is their understanding also.

☐ Regarding Article X, we have agreed that we will only give medical antidotes to countries of concern, such as Cuba, if assistance to protect against a chemical weapons attack is requested. We will not be sharing advanced defense technology.

#3 Effective Verification. Prohibits U.S. from joining Convention

unless we can certify we have high confidence that we can detect a one ton chemical weapons capability.

☐ This is clearly a killer amendment. Our Intelligence Community has testified that it would be very difficult to detect small

levels of CW. But we do have high confidence that we can detect a large scale systematic effort of a potential adversary to equip its armed forces with a chemical weapons capability.

#4 Chemical Weapons in Other States. Prohibits U.S. from joining until rogue states do.

☐ Again, Senator Helms would make our policy hostage to Qaddafi (etc.). Can't get in until they do, would allow them to continue business as usual with no constraints, while our industry suffers, our leadership is undermined, and our ability to influence and benefit from the CWC regime is compromised.

#5 Exercise of Right to Bar Certain Inspectors. Automatically denies inspectors from countries of concerns.

☐ Would set up a quid pro quo where others would respond by not letting our inspectors in. These countries of concern are the ones we would most like to have Americans help inspect.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 19 April 97 17:10
FROM Gibney, James S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT BERGER CWC OPED [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Black, Todd F.
Brennan, Steven A.
Brooks, Jennifer
Cicio, Kristen K.
Florio, Elaine
Gerstner, Christina L.
Glinski, David L.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harmon, Joyce
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Helweg, M. Diana
Higgins, David B.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Johnson, Natalie A.
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Koehler, Marc
Lawrence, Cynthia
Millison, Cathy L.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
O'loughlin, Kathrine
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Rice, Sean P.
Robinson, Wylma
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Veit, Katherine M.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Wright, Jay

CARBON_COPY

Bell, Robert G.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy

Harris, Elisa D.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.
Sonenshine, Tara D.

TEXT_BODY

ATTENTION SIT ROOM: PLEASE PUT IN SRB TAKE. THANKS

FOR SRB REVIEW

Attached is text of USA TODAY op-ed, cleared by Blinken, sent simultaneously to Bell, Harris, Murray in interests of time.
[[CWCED2.DOC : 4389 in CWCED2.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

19 April 97 17:6

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCED2.DOC

04/19/97 5:15 pm

**NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
OP-ED ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION
FOR USA TODAY**

Tomorrow, the Senate will vote on an issue of vital importance to the security of the American people and the strength of American leadership: ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and soldiers its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side of the fence as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

Despite these stark alternatives -- and the fact that this treaty will take effect with or without us next week -- some treaty critics still sincerely believe that America's best interests will be served by sitting on the sidelines. They're wrong, and here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided

to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As they eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The Convention will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could buy, bribe away or steal. And by imposing strict new controls on dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some Republican senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are [measures] for maintaining strong defenses against chemical attack; toughening enforcement; allowing the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and requiring search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. A handful of disagreements remain, each with the potential to make it impossible for us to participate in this treaty. Some would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hardliners in Russia who want to hold on to their

weapons. Or they would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- and delay our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws. Others would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits for some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a silver bullet, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. This treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 April 97 18:59
FROM Gibney, James S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CWC OP-Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Blinken, Antony J.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Tony--attached reflects SRB changes, mostly minor line edits, with additional language in fifth paragraph, Albright citation in last paragraph.

As discussed, other big change is second paragraph: sandy wanted to use the "real test: are we better off inside or outside, with or without it. The way I've set it up may be too fatalistic, however. let me know

[[CWCED2.DOC : 4701 in CWCED2.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 21 April 97 18:56
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CWCED2.DOC

04/21/97 7:15 pm

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
OP-ED ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION
FOR USA TODAY

Tomorrow, the Senate will vote on an issue of vital importance to the security of the American people and the strength of American leadership: ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention.

After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and soldiers its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us. That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better off with or without it. By that basic measure, this treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest. Here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As they eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The Convention will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could steal or buy on the black market. And by imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules. Today, it is not illegal in the United States to possess chemical weapons. If this treaty and its implementing legislation pass, it will be.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; toughen enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas

in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents of the treaty are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in this treaty. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hardliners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- and delay our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws. Others would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to implement and enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright likes to point out, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 April 97 19:12
FROM Blinken, Antony J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: CWC BERGER LETTER [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Gibney, James S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

James -- looks good. See blue lines. also, please make any relevant changes from Berger's eidt to op/ed. Then e-mail to him priority, saying we want to fax it to key editorial page editors and t.v. news editors Tuesday.

From: Gibney, James S.
To: Blinken, Antony J.
CC: /R, Record at A1; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm
Subject: CWC BERGER LETTER [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, April 21, 1997 05:53 PM

[[CWCLET.DOC : 4888 in CWCLET.DOC]]

is attached

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 21 April 97 19:10

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CWCLET.DOC

04/21/97 5:15 pm

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERBER
LETTER TO EDITORS ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION

On Thursday, the Senate will vote on the
Chemical Weapons Convention.

After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens

and soldiers its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side of the fence as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

Despite these stark alternatives -- and the fact that this treaty will take effect with or without us next week -- some treaty critics still sincerely believe that America's best interests will be served by sitting on the sidelines. They're wrong, and here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As other countries eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The Convention will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could buy, bribe away or steal. And by imposing strict new controls on dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some Republican senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack;

toughening enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents of the treaty are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in the CWC. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hard-liners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- and delay our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws. [Flesh out a little more on both Russia and Rogues using POTUS arguments from Friday] Others would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

Finally, one amendment would have the United States refuse to join until the Convention has been amended by striking Article X and rewriting Article XI. Treaty critics claim that these two articles will in effect force the United States to help rogue states develop chemical weapons technology. These interpretations fly in the face of the treaty's language and intent.

□ First, under Article X, only countries that have joined the CWC, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request assistance -- and only if they are threatened or under chemical attack. To emphasize this point, President Clinton has committed that under Article X the United States will limit our assistance to certain countries of concern, such as Iran or Cuba, to emergency medical supplies.

□ Second, Article XI in no way forces parties to the treaty to spread chemical weapons technology. It would be strange if a treaty expressly aimed at eliminating chemical weapons caused their proliferation -- and it would be wrong. The

President has committed to the Senate that neither we nor our allies shares this bizarre interpretation, and that we will certify annually that the United States and our allies continue to maintain equally effective or more comprehensive controls over chemical weapons materials. In addition to misreading the treaty, these critics of Article XI miss a fundamental point: dangerous exchanges of technology can take place now without the CWC. With the CWC, the countries undertaking exchanges are legally bound by the fundamental obligation of the treaty to renounce chemical weapons.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. This treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 April 97 19:20
FROM Blinken, Antony J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: CWC OP-Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Gibney, James S.
CARBON_COPY Gray, Wendy
TEXT_BODY

looks good. see blue lines. Send forward to SRB, Sit Room for morning take. Did SRB not want to do Art. 10 and 11 here?()

From: Gibney, James S.
 To: Blinken, Antony J.
 CC: /R, Record at A1
 Subject: CWC OP-Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
 Date: Monday, April 21, 1997 06:59 PM

[[CWCED2.DOC : 4879 in CWCED2.DOC]]

Tony--attached reflects SRB changes, mostly minor line edits, with additional language in fifth paragraph, Albright citation in last paragraph.

As discussed, other big change is second paragraph: sandy wanted to use the "real test: are we better off inside or outside, with or without it. The way I've set it up may be too fatalistic, however. let me know

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 21 April 97 19:19
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CWCED2.DOC

04/21/97 7:15 pm

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
 OP-ED ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION
 FOR USA TODAY

Tomorrow, the Senate will vote on an issue of vital importance to the security of the American people and the strength of American leadership: ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the

Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and soldiers its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us. That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better off inside or outside the treaty.. By that basic measure, this treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest. Here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As they eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The treaty will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could steal or buy on the black market. And by imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules. Today, it is not illegal in the United States to possess chemical weapons. If this treaty and its implementing legislation pass, it will be.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority

Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; toughen enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in this treaty. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hardliners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws and giving them a veto over our national security. Others would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to implement and enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright likes to point out, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 April 97 19:53
FROM Gibney, James S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT USA TODAY OP-ED FINAL [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Black, Todd F.
Brennan, Steven A.
Brooks, Jennifer
Cicio, Kristen K.
Florio, Elaine
Gerstner, Christina L.
Glinski, David L.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harmon, Joyce
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Helweg, M. Diana
Higgins, David B.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Johnson, Natalie A.
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Koehler, Marc
Lawrence, Cynthia
Millison, Cathy L.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
O'loughlin, Kathrine
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Rice, Sean P.
Robinson, Wylma
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Veit, Katherine M.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Wright, Jay

CARBON_COPY

Bell, Robert G.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy

Harris, Elisa D.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.

TEXT_BODY

ATTENTION SIT ROOM PLEASE PUT IN MORNING TAKE
FOR SRB REVIEW

Attached is draft op-ed for USA TODAY that reflects your comments. We would like to send forward to USA TODAY this morning (Tuesday).

[[CWCED2.DOC : 4916 in CWCED2.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 April 97 19:49

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCED2.DOC

04/21/97 7:45 pm

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
OP-ED ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION
FOR USA TODAY

Tomorrow, the Senate will vote on an issue of vital importance to the security of the American people and the strength of American leadership: ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention.

After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and soldiers its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us. That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better off inside or outside it. By that basic measure, this treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest. Here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As they eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The treaty will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could steal or buy on the black market. And by imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules. Today, it is not illegal in the United States to possess chemical weapons. If this treaty and its implementing legislation pass, it will be.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; toughen enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which

would make it impossible for us to participate in this treaty. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hard-liners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws and giving them a veto over our national security. Still another would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to implement and enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright likes to point out, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 April 97 19:57
FROM Gibney, James S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT SRB CWC LETTER TO EDITORS [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Black, Todd F.
Brennan, Steven A.
Brooks, Jennifer
Cicio, Kristen K.
Florio, Elaine
Gerstner, Christina L.
Glinski, David L.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harmon, Joyce
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Helweg, M. Diana
Higgins, David B.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Johnson, Natalie A.
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Koehler, Marc
Lawrence, Cynthia
Millison, Cathy L.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
O'loughlin, Kathrine
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Rice, Sean P.
Robinson, Wylma
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Veit, Katherine M.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Wright, Jay

CARBON_COPY

Bell, Robert G.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy

Harris, Elisa D.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.

TEXT_BODY

ATTENTION SIT ROOM PLEASE PUT IN MR. BERGER'S MORNING
TAKE

FOR SRB REVIEW

Attached is a draft letter to editors/news editors based on your USA TODAY
op-ed that we would like to send forward tomorrow morning.

[[CWCLET.DOC : 4917 in CWCLET.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 April 97 19:49

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCLET.DOC

04/21/97 7:45 pm

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
LETTER TO EDITORS ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION

On Thursday, the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons
Convention.

After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the
Senate faces a clear choice: we
can continue to lead the widening international commitment to
begin banishing poison gas from
the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort
to make it work. Or we can walk
away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and
soldiers its benefits, expose our
companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as
pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us.
That's why the real test of the
Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but
whether we will be better off inside
or outside it. By that basic measure, this treaty is
overwhelmingly in our national interest. Here's
why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring
other countries to do what we decided

to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As other countries eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The treaty will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could steal or buy on the black market. And by imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules. Today, it is not illegal in the United States to possess chemical weapons. If this treaty and its implementing legislation pass, it will be.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; toughen enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents of the treaty are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in the CWC. One would have us

wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hard-liners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws and giving them a veto over our national security. Still another would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

Finally, one amendment would have the United States refuse to join until the Convention has been amended by striking Article X and rewriting Article XI. Treaty critics claim that these two articles will in effect force the United States to help rogue states develop chemical weapons technology. These interpretations fly in the face of the treaty's language and intent.

□ First, under Article X, only countries that have joined the CWC, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request assistance -- and only if they are threatened or under chemical attack. To emphasize this point, President Clinton has committed that under Article X the United States will limit our assistance to certain countries of concern, such as Iran or Cuba, to emergency medical supplies.

□ Second, Article XI in no way forces parties to the treaty to spread chemical weapons technology. It would be strange if a treaty expressly aimed at eliminating chemical weapons caused their proliferation -- and it would be wrong. The President has committed to the Senate that neither we nor our allies shares this bizarre interpretation, and that we will certify annually that the United States and our allies continue to maintain equally effective or more comprehensive controls over chemical weapons materials. In addition to misreading the treaty, these critics of Article XI miss a fundamental point: dangerous exchanges of technology can take place now without the CWC. With the CWC, the countries undertaking exchanges are legally bound by the fundamental obligation of the treaty to renounce chemical

weapons.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to implement and enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright likes to point out, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 April 97 20:01
FROM Gibney, James S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT BERGER OP-ED AND ED LETTER [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
CARBON_COPY Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Naplan, Steven J.

TEXT_BODY

Bob-- Sandy Berger asked me to forward his revised op-ed, now reflecting his comments, to you for a last look (any fixes early tomorrow morning, if possible). Also attached is a longer letter to editors that draws on op-ed, incorporates Articles X and XI, for your clearance.

Thanks very much, James G

[[CWCLET.DOC : 5120 in CWCLET.DOC]][[CWCED2.DOC : 5121 in CWCED2.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 April 97 19:49

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCLET.DOC

04/21/97 7:45 pm

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
LETTER TO EDITORS ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION

On Thursday, the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and soldiers its benefits, expose our

companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us. That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better off inside or outside it. By that basic measure, this treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest. Here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As other countries eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The treaty will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could steal or buy on the black market. And by imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules. Today, it is not illegal in the United States to possess chemical weapons. If this treaty and its implementing legislation pass, it will be.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are

binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; toughen enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents of the treaty are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in the CWC. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hard-liners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws and giving them a veto over our national security. Still another would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

Finally, one amendment would have the United States refuse to join until the Convention has been amended by striking Article X and rewriting Article XI. Treaty critics claim that these two articles will in effect force the United States to help rogue states develop chemical weapons technology. These interpretations fly in the face of the treaty's language and intent.

□ First, under Article X, only countries that have joined the CWC, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request assistance -- and only if they are threatened or under chemical attack. To emphasize this point, President Clinton has committed that under Article X the United States will limit our assistance to certain countries of concern, such as Iran or Cuba, to emergency medical supplies.

□ Second, Article XI in no way forces parties to the treaty to spread chemical weapons technology. It would be strange if a treaty expressly aimed at eliminating chemical weapons

caused their proliferation -- and it would be wrong. The President has committed to the Senate that neither we nor our allies shares this bizarre interpretation, and that we will certify annually that the United States and our allies continue to maintain equally effective or more comprehensive controls over chemical weapons materials. In addition to misreading the treaty, these critics of Article XI miss a fundamental point: dangerous exchanges of technology can take place now without the CWC. With the CWC, the countries undertaking exchanges are legally bound by the fundamental obligation of the treaty to renounce chemical weapons.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to implement and enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright likes to point out, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 April 97 19:49

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCED2.DOC

04/21/97 7:45 pm

**NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
OP-ED ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION
FOR USA TODAY**

Tomorrow, the Senate will vote on an issue of vital importance to the security of the American people and the strength of American leadership: ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention.

After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and soldiers its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us. That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better off inside or outside it. By that basic measure, this treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest. Here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As they eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The treaty will also make it harder for rogue states and

terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could steal or buy on the black market. And by imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules. Today, it is not illegal in the United States to possess chemical weapons. If this treaty and its implementing legislation pass, it will be.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; toughen enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in this treaty. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hard-liners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws and giving them a veto over our national security. Still another would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our

troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to implement and enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright likes to point out, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 April 97 08:20
FROM Murray, Lori E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT One pgers on Conditions [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
[[5KILLER.DOC : 2088 in 5KILLER.DOC]]
Bob, It is my understanding that Ed Hall wanted conservative quotes, so that's how I tried to select except for one or two that were not conservatives but good.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 21 April 97 8:18
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 5KILLER.DOC

Rebuttal Points for Helms Conditions

#1 Russian Elimination of Chemical Weapons. Precludes US from joining Convention until Russia ratifies, makes reasonable progress on implementing the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, resolves outstanding compliance questions under the Wyoming MOU and BDA, and is committed to forgoing a chemical weapons capability.

☐ This condition would hold hostage our ability to join the CWC to the hard-liners in the Russian Duma. We would allow Russian hard-liners to deny us the non-proliferation benefits of this treaty.

☐ We would not be able to deposit in time for April 29 when the Convention comes into force: Americans not hired for key positions, including inspectors, lose influence over setting rules for the inspection regime, sanctions kick in for US industry, loss of US leadership.

☐ Bad Policy: our ratification is clearly putting pressure on Russia to ratify. We would lose that leverage. Russia does not want to be on the outside either, especially if the US is on the

inside setting the rules.

☐ BDA--neither the U.S. or Russia have ratified the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, so standard would definitely delay for some time US participation.

☐ As President Clinton informed the Senate in 1993, while the BDA was an important agreement in its own right, it has become less relevant than it was in 1990 because the CWC was completed. The CWC goes much further than the BDA in its provisions. In contrast to the BDA, the CWC requires total destruction of CW stocks (BDA allows both sides to keep 5,000 tons of agent). The CWC captures more than just the United States and Russia. It is a multilateral agreement which to date has 74 countries that have ratified out of the 162 that have signed. The CWC includes challenge inspections for addressing compliance concerns.

☐ Delaying until the BDA is in force and being implemented would deny us the non-proliferation benefits of the CWC, regarding other countries of concern.

☐ The CWC's verification regime stands on its own. Article IV, paragraph 13, and Article V, paragraph 16, allow a bilateral agreement to substitute for specific provisions of the CWC verification regime, if the OPCW approves. We continue to press the Russians on bilateral verification. Nevertheless, Russian chemical weapons elimination will be subject to a comprehensive, systematic verification regime under the CWC which will include challenge inspections, not provided for under the BDA.

☐ Regarding outstanding compliance questions under the Wyoming MOU, the CWC not only requires the Russians to declare again their CW capabilities, but also has the enforcement provisions so we can pursue our compliance concerns (i.e. challenge inspections.) The BDA is not in force.

☐ Regarding Russia's commitment to forego a CW capability, pressure on Russia to join the CWC and undertake the commitment to forego a CW capability will increase not decrease by our ratification. Russia, like the rogue states will be subject to the automatic trade restrictions that will be imposed when the Convention comes

into force on April 29, 1997.

Quotes:

□ "But I think if we fail to ratify this Chemical Warfare Convention, it is going to give the Russians an excuse on a silver platter to say well, the United States did not ratify and we won't either." Edward I. Rowny, Lt. General, US Army (retired) 4/9/97 SFRC hearing.

□ "By remaining outside the CWC, we let those rogue states off the hook by making it easier for them to ignore pressures to abandon the chemical weapons option. Perhaps more to the point, it gives Russia--which has the world's largest stock of chemical weapons--an easy excuse to delay further its own accession to the CWC. In all these cases, we undermine the effectiveness of the CWC to do unto others what we already have decided to do for ourselves: get out of the chemical weapons business." Brent Scowcroft and John M. Deutch, February 11, 1997, Washington Post.

□ "In 1993 and 1994 my isolation and lack of understanding about the Convention's provisions led me to advise against the treaty's ratification. At first, I did not fully appreciate the Convention's tough inspection measures, nor did I know that the treaty's list of banned and controlled chemicals can be expanded to keep pace with technical developments, such as those that have occurred in the novichok program. After doing my homework, I became a staunch supporter of the Convention as the most viable way to bring the novichok program, or for that matter, any other runaway chemical weapons development program, under control." Vil S. Mirzayanov March 19, 1997 letter to Senator Lugar.

□ "Senate ratification of the Convention is crucial to securing action on the treaty in Moscow...The Russian government does not want America to dominate the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the important decisions that the body will soon be making about the Convention's implementation. My point is that the U.S. ratification will have a significant impact on the likelihood of Russian ratification." Vil S. Mirzayanov, March 19, 1997 letter to Senator Lugar.

□ "Senator Helms and others have argued that the situation is

Russia

would be better handled through a 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement. This argument is truly flawed. The bilateral accord requires Russia to destroy only the majority of its chemical weapons stockpile; the Convention requires total elimination.

The

bilateral treaty has only routine inspections, but the Convention also includes far more intrusive challenge inspections. Finally, Russia is not the only country that has fostered or is now conducting a chemical weapons program. The bilateral agreement can

partly address chemical weapons problems in Russia, but it cannot grapple with similar problems elsewhere. The Convention is designed to reduce the threat of chemical weapons worldwide."

Vil

S. Myrzanov, March 19, 1997, letter to Senator Lugar.

☐ "I believe that Russia is far likelier to come in if we ratify

than if we do not -- far likelier." Admiral Zumwalt, aSFRC, 4/9/96.

#2 Stemming the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons. Prohibits U.S.

from joining CWC until Convention has been amended by: rewriting Article XI to strike any provision that states or implies disapproval of trade restrictions; and, deleting Article X.

☐ We have gone the extra mile to address these concerns in two of the conditions in the agreed package.

☐ One condition obligates the President to obtain assurances from our Australia Group partners that Article XI is fully consistent with maintaining strict export controls on dangerous chemicals. We have already heard from most all our Australia Group partners, who have reaffirmed that this is their understanding also.

☐ This condition also requires an annual certification that Australia Group members continue to maintain equally effective or more comprehensive controls over CW related materials and that the Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for limiting the spread of chemical and biological weapons related material and technology.

☐ Regarding Article X, we have agreed that we will only give

medical

antidotes to countries of concern, such as Cuba, if assistance to protect against a chemical weapons attack is requested. We will not be sharing advanced defense technology.

□ This is a killer condition. It requires renegotiation of the Convention. It says destroy the village in order to save it. Starting over in the negotiations is pure fantasy.

□ The critics arguments defy logic--they claim that a treaty expressly devoted to eliminating chemical weapons somehow would force its parties to facilitate the spread of chemical weapons.

□ Similar language to the CWC on promoting trade for peaceful purposes is found in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Under these two agreements, export controls have been made tougher and these controls, as well as the treaties themselves, have gained the support of more and more countries over the years. In the early 1960s, President Kennedy predicted that there would be 15-20 nuclear weapon states by the 1970s. Due largely to the NPT, that number is far lower today. Controls on biological weapons continue to be strengthened, including in 1992, when the Australia Group decided to add biological pathogens and related equipment to their list of controlled items.

□ The critics concerns about unscrupulous exchanges under Article X or Article XI misses the main point, which is that any such unscrupulous exchanges can take place now without the CWC.

□ With the CWC, the countries undertaking exchanges are legally bound by the fundamental obligation of the treaty in Article I, which obligates Parties never to "...assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State under this Convention." This is not just an obligation regarding a Party to the Convention, it is an obligation regarding anyone.

□ The Chemical Weapons Convention will mean not only that all relevant trade is subject to closer scrutiny, especially with countries whose compliance may be in doubt, but it will also provide the legal basis, as well as the verification and compliance measures to redress those concerns.

□ Far from undercutting export controls, the CWC will be a basis

for
stronger controls, enforced by more countries.

Quotes:

□ "I would like to make a comment about the article X and article XI situation...We made it very clear throughout the negotiations that all of this was subject to Article I, which is the fundamental obligation not to assist. So we reiterated that again and again.

But the most important, I think, telling factoid in support of the U.S. interpretation is the fact that after the convention was done so many of the usual list of suspects were so unhappy that they did not get what they wanted in these provisions. That is why I wish the critics would be a little more careful about asserting that they did get what they wanted, because they did not." Ron Lehman, SFRC 4/17/97.

□ "I think there is a consensus on both sides that we do not find ourselves forced, if we ratify, to do anything harmful to us. The issue is then, what about the other members of the regime? I repeat again, they are in that regime whether or not we ratify. So that their conduct is something that we will have more opportunity to influence from within than without." Admiral Zumwalt, SFRC, 4/9/96.

□ "Starting over, as was suggested this afternoon, I think is pure fantasy. IF we reject this treaty, we will incur the bitterness of all of our friends and allies who followed us for 10 years in putting this together. It is not just will, let's scrap this and let's start over again. We will throw the whole civilized world into confusion, and the idea that we can lead our again down a different path I think is just not in the cards. We have got to deal with the situation we face now, not an ideal one out in the future. Let me close by saying that I spoke to President Bush this morning and he asked me to state for the record that he is a strong and enthusiastic supporter of the Chemical Warfare Convention and that it would be a severe blow to the U.S. role in the world were we to repudiate it." General Brent Scowcroft, SFRC, 4/9/96

□ "The Chemical Weapons Convention does not trump U.S. export control laws. Instead, it will expand and improve the effectiveness of U.S. non-proliferation policy by instituting a strong system of multilateral export controls. The CWC does not lower the bar on U.S. non-proliferation policy. It raises the bar for other nations to the same high standard held by the U.S." Statement by the Chemical Manufacturers Association, November 5, 1996

#3 Effective Verification. Prohibits U.S. from joining Convention unless we can certify we have high confidence that we can detect a one ton chemical weapons capability.

□ This is clearly a killer condition. It sets an unprecedented and unrealistically high standard for effective verification of a problem -- verifying CW -- that has been widely acknowledged as being very difficult to verify. This condition would ensure that we would not become a party to the agreement any time in the near future.

□ Our Intelligence Community has testified that it would be very difficult to detect small quantities of CW. But we do have high confidence that we can detect a large scale systematic effort of a potential adversary to equip its armed forces with a chemical weapons capability.

□ Our intelligence monitoring capabilities focus on doctrine, training, logistics, infrastructure and systems of delivery. This would require our monitoring resources to emphasize quantities of chemical agent.

□ There is no such thing as perfect verifiability in a treaty, but, the CWC tough monitoring, reporting, and on site inspection requirements will enable us to detect militarily significant cheating.

□ This condition makes the perfect the enemy of the good, prohibiting us from joining the CWC until we knew that we could detect pretty much all violations. It doesn't make sense to reject tools that will help us in a job that we would have to do anyway with or without the CWC.

Quotes:

□ "The CWC offers at the outset verification tools that go beyond those of other arms-control treaties. The CWC provides additional mechanisms to press for universal participation and strengthens obligations to punish cheating. A vigorous U.S. voice in the CWC will reinforce these efforts. American leadership in the CWC's councils, American inspectors pushing the envelope of inspection tactics in the field and American technology giving those inspectors abilities that no other arms control inspectors have ever had to ensure that this treaty contributes to our and the world's security." David Kay, Ronald F. Lehman, R. James Woolsey,
The Washington Post, April 13, 1997

□ The CWC gives us important tools which give us more data, greater access and more leverage. The chemical weapons threat is serious and will grow worse without the CWC... We do not have high confidence that we will detect cheating, but the cheater must still worry that we might. Should we deny ourselves the strategic warning that comes from the detection of indications of chemical weapons activity, even if there is not complete proof? Ronald Lehman, SFRC, 4/17/97

□ "But the possession of lethal chemicals, does not by itself sufficient to constitute a military capability." Richard Perle, SFRC, 4/9/97

#4 Chemical Weapons in Other States. Prohibits U.S. from joining until rogue states do.

□ Again, Senator Helms would make our policy hostage to Qaddafi (etc.). Can't get in until they do, would allow them to continue business as usual with no constraints, while our industry suffers, our leadership is undermined, and our ability to influence and benefit from the CWC regime is compromised.

□ After years of providing international leadership in the fight to stop the spread of CW, we would be sitting, not with our allies on the inside, but on the outside with Libya, Syria and Iraq.

□ Our industry will be subject to the automatic trade restraints at entry into force of the agreement. Ironically, these are the same restrictions we fought for in the negotiations to put pressure on the rogue states.

□ This condition will not promote ratification in any of the rogue states but instead give leverage to those factions within these countries who do not want their governments to be parties. With this condition, our message to the hard-liners will be don't worry, take your time, we are not going to be a party until you decide.

□ No country, especially an outlaw state, should have a veto over our national security.

Quotes

□ "In an ideal world, rogue states and terrorist groups would simply give up the use of chemical weapons. But ours is not an ideal world. The Chemical Weapons Convention recognizes that, and so should its opponents. It makes no sense to argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention the United States should line up with them rather than with the rest of the world." James A. Baker 3rd, NYTimes, February 16, 1997.

□ "If we has this Convention two decades ago, we might have been able to prevent or at least severely hamper Iraq's chemical weapons activities." former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, SFRC, March 1996?

□ "By remaining outside the CWC, we let these rogue states off the hook by making it easier for them to ignore pressures to abandon the chemical weapons option...In all these cases, we undermine the effectiveness of the CWC to do unto others what we have decided to do for ourselves: get out of the chemical weapons business." General Brent Scowcroft, John Deutch, Washington Post, February 11, 1997.

□ "If we do not join and [we] walk away from the CWC an awful lot of people will probably walk away from it as well, and our influence

on the rogue states will only decrease." General Shalikashvili, SFRC, 1994.

□ "I am very, very much in favor of the ratification of that treaty.

We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future warfares. And, frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I just as soon not be associated with those thugs in this particular matter. So I am very, very much in favor of ratification of that particular treaty." General Norman Schwarzkopf, Senate Veterans Affairs Committee Hearing, 1997.

□ ""I would like to make a comment about the article X and article XI situation...We made it very clear throughout the negotiations that all of this was subject to Article I, which is the fundamental obligation not to assist. So we reiterated that again

and again. But the most important, I think, telling factoid in support of the U.S. interpretation is the fact that after the convention was done so many of the usual list of suspects were so unhappy that they did not get what they wanted in these provisions. That is why I wish the critics would be a little more careful about asserting that they did get what they wanted, because they did not." Ron Lehman, SFRC 4/17/97.

□ "If we refuse to ratify, some governments will use our refusal as

an excuse to keep their chemical weapons. Worldwide availability of chemical weapons will be higher, and we will know less about other countries' chemical activities. The diplomatic credibility of our threat retaliation against anyone who uses chemical weapons

on our troops will be undermined by our lack of "clean hands."

At

the bottom line, our failure to ratify will substantially increase

the risk of a chemical attack against American service personnel." Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Washington Post, January 6, 1997.

#5 Exercise of Right to Bar Certain Inspectors. Automatically denies inspectors from countries of concerns.

□ Would set up a quid pro quo where others would respond by not

letting our inspectors in. These countries of concern are the ones we would most like to have Americans help inspect.

☐ The CWC already provides all parties the right to bar inspectors from their country. The problem with this condition is that it unnecessarily raises the visibility of these actions.

☐ The sponsors of this amendment have argued, regarding Russia that we need to get our inspectors in under the BDA. The same holds true of other countries of concern.

☐ This condition would undoubtedly result in other nations blackballing American inspectors, who otherwise would take the lead in finding violations, just as we have for UNSCOM in Iraq. We have ten years experience successfully protecting DOD and DOD-contractor facilities from national security and industrial espionage during arms control on-site inspections by the Soviets.

We can protect our security and our business under the CWC, without taking a meat-ax approach to whom we would let join an international inspection team.

☐ We know we can [lay defense well. So the question is why should we deny ourselves an offense.

Quotes:

"The ability for us to get more access is an important thing to me as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board...I can tell you that we need to improve it in that, however less than perfect it might be the opportunity to inspect is going to give us additional information which can be cross-compared with what we get through the intelligence community. And it will, without a doubt, enhance our ability to know more about what is going on."
Admiral Zumwalt SFRC 4/9/97

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 April 97 09:40
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT urgent memo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.
CARBON_COPY Kelly, Sandra L.
TEXT_BODY [[2748A.DOC : 2312 in 2748A.DOC]]

pls clear asap. thanks!!!!

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 22 April 97 9:39
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME 2748A.DOC
2748

MEETING WITH
MILITARY SUPPORTERS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
DATE: April 23, 1997
LOCATION: Roosevelt Room
TIME: 10:45-11:30

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

To underscore the military benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on the eve of the Senate vote on the treaty.

II. BACKGROUND

The Senate will vote on the CWC on April 24, five days before the treaty enters into force. As a consequence of the process you worked out with Majority Leader Lott earlier this year, we now have 28 agreed conditions in the Resolution of Ratification covering nearly every issue of concern. However, the Resolution also contains five killer conditions sponsored by Senator Helms which: hold U.S. participation in the treaty hostage to ratification by Russia and various rogue states; require us to blackball inspectors from countries of concern (thus inviting reciprocal action against U.S. inspectors); require renegotiation of two treaty provisions concerning technical cooperation and defensive assistance; and preclude the U.S. from joining the treaty until we certify that we can detect an unrealistically low level of chemical weapons.

We need to defeat these five killer conditions as well as secure 22 Republican votes to win final passage of the treaty. At this point, success is far from assured.

Many of the "undecided" Senators have indicated that they will base their vote on whether the treaty will improve the safety of our troops. This event would highlight the military benefits of the treaty by bringing together former Chairmen of the joint Chiefs of Staff, former Secretaries of Defense, more than a dozen veterans organizations and other key retired military supporters of the treaty.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Final list to be provided separately. Partial List at Tab A.

IV. PRESS PLAN

pool

V. SEQUENCE

We will begin the meeting at 10:45 with a meet and greet/photo op in the Oval Office with the other speakers (Vice President Gore, possibly General Powell, a Veterans Service Organization representative). (Talking points are at Tab B). At 10:57, the

meet and greet group will be escorted to their seats in the Roosevelt Room.

The Vice President will open the event with brief welcoming remarks. A VSO representative will then speak about why so many veterans organizations have endorsed the treaty. General Powell or another distinguished guest will then discuss the wider military benefits to the treaty. This last speaker will then introduce you. (Your remarks will be provided separately.)

Attachments

Tab A Guest List

Tab B Points to be Made at Meet and Greet

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 April 97 10:06
FROM Gray, Wendy
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CWC Letter and Op-Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Naplan, Steven J.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Hi All!

Attached are text letter and Op-ed as of 9:55 this am

[[CWCLET.DOC : 2569 in CWCLET.DOC]][[CWCED2.DOC : 2570 in CWCED2.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 22 April 97 10:5
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CWCLET.DOC

Dear Editor:

On Thursday, the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make

it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and soldiers its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us. That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better off inside or outside it. By that basic measure, this treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest. Here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As other countries eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The treaty will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could steal or buy on the black market. And by imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules. Today, it is not illegal in the United States to possess chemical weapons. If this treaty and its implementing legislation pass, it will be.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; toughen enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents of the treaty are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in the CWC. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hard-liners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws and giving them a veto over our national security. Still another would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

Finally, one amendment would have the United States refuse to join until the Convention has been amended by striking Article X and rewriting Article XI. Treaty critics claim that these two articles will in effect force the United States to help rogue states develop chemical weapons technology. These interpretations fly in the face of the treaty's language and intent.

□ First, under Article X, only countries that have joined the CWC, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can

request assistance -- and only if they are threatened or under chemical attack. To emphasize this point, President Clinton has committed that under Article X the United States will limit our assistance to certain countries of concern, such as Iran or Cuba, to emergency medical supplies.

□ Second, Article XI in no way forces parties to the treaty to spread chemical weapons technology. It would be strange if a treaty expressly aimed at eliminating chemical weapons caused their proliferation -- and it would be wrong. The President has committed to the Senate that neither we nor our allies shares this bizarre interpretation, and that we will certify annually that the United States and our allies continue to maintain equally effective or more comprehensive controls over chemical weapons materials. In addition to misreading the treaty, these critics of Article XI miss a fundamental point: dangerous exchanges of technology can take place now without the CWC. With the CWC, the countries undertaking exchanges are legally bound by the fundamental obligation of the treaty to renounce chemical weapons.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to implement and enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military

leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright has said, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

22 April 97 9:55

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCED2.DOC

04/22/97 9:55 am

**NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
OP-ED ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION
FOR USA TODAY**

Tomorrow, the Senate will vote on an issue of vital importance to the security of the American people and the strength of American leadership: ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and

soldiers its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us. That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better off inside or outside it. By that basic measure, this treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest. Here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As they eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The treaty will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could steal or buy on the black market. And by imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules. Today, it is not illegal in the United States to possess chemical weapons. If this treaty and its implementing legislation pass, it will be.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of

ratification. Among them are binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; toughen enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in this treaty. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hard-liners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws and giving them a veto over our national security. Still another would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to implement and enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made

U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright has said, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 April 97 12:45
FROM Gray, Wendy
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Berger CWC Letter to the Editor and CWC Op-ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Naplan, Steven J.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Hi!

Attached are as signed by Berger (letter) and faxed out (Op-ed)

[[CWCLET.DOC : 3134 in CWCLET.DOC]][[CWCED2.DOC : 3135 in CWCED2.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 22 April 97 12:41
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CWCLET.DOC

April 22, 1997

Dear Editor:

On Thursday, the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make it

work.

Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and soldiers its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us.

That's

why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better off inside or outside it.

By that basic measure, this treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest. Here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other

countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical

weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other

nation's weapons, not ours. As other countries eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such

weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The treaty will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to

get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it

will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they

could steal or buy on the black market. And by imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the

raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish

those who seek to break its rules. Today, it is not illegal in the United States to possess chemical weapons. If this treaty and its implementing legislation pass, it will be.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; toughen enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents of the treaty are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in the CWC. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hard-liners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws and giving them a veto over our national security. Still another would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

Finally, one amendment would have the United States refuse to join until the Convention has been amended by striking Article X and rewriting Article XI. Treaty critics claim that these two articles will in effect force the United States to help rogue states develop chemical weapons technology. These interpretations fly in the face of the treaty's language and intent.

□ First, under Article X, only countries that have joined the CWC, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request assistance -- and only if they are threatened or under chemical attack. To emphasize this point, President Clinton has committed that under Article X the United States will limit our assistance to certain countries of concern, such as Iran or Cuba should they ratify and comply with the treaty, to emergency medical supplies.

□ Second, Article XI in no way forces parties to the treaty to spread chemical weapons technology. It would be passingly strange if a treaty expressly aimed at eliminating chemical weapons caused their proliferation -- and it would be wrong. The President has committed to the Senate that neither we nor our allies shares this bizarre interpretation, and that we will certify annually that the United States and our allies continue to maintain equally effective or more comprehensive controls

over chemical weapons materials. In addition to misreading the treaty, these critics of Article XI miss a fundamental point: dangerous exchanges of technology can take place now without the CWC.

With the CWC, the countries undertaking exchanges are legally bound by the fundamental obligation of the treaty to renounce or assist in any way anyone to engage in any activity that violates the treaty chemical weapons.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to implement and enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright has said, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

If you would like to speak with members of my staff about the Chemical Weapons Convention, please call Bob Bell, NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control (202-456-9191) or Tony Blinken, NSC Senior Director for Strategic Planning (202-456-9371).

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

22 April 97 11:33

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCED2.DOC

04/22/97 9:55 am

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
OP-ED ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION
FOR USA TODAY

Tomorrow, the Senate will vote on an issue of vital importance to the security of the American people and the strength of American leadership: ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth, start putting that ban into place, and head the effort to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our citizens and soldiers its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us. That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better off inside or outside it. By that basic measure, this treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest. Here's why:

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. Put simply, the Chemical Weapons Convention is about other nation's weapons, not ours. As more and more nations eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face one of modern war's most lethal killers.

The treaty will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of ready-made weapons that they could steal or buy on the black market. And by imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence and information network, and strengthening the authority of our own law

enforcement officials, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules. Today, it is not illegal in the United States to possess chemical weapons. If this treaty and its implementing legislation pass, it will be.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; toughen enforcement; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. Taken together, these conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in this treaty. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- a course of action that would give cover to hard-liners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws and giving them a veto over our national security. Still another would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and thereby risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

If the Senate approves these or other "killer amendments," it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the chance to implement and enforce the rules we helped make, or to have Americans serve as international inspectors. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading

exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send an unmistakable signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. For while the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty now before the Senate has broad, bipartisan support that includes General Colin Powell and General Schwarzkopf, every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright has said, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 April 97 15:57
FROM Gray, Wendy
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Quick Request [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Akers, Dale W.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brown, Nancy E.
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Hale, John E.
Hawes, David J.
Lowry, Jay E.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Gwyn M. Parker
Peggins, John W.
Roach, Darren S.
Simons, James R.
Snyder, Julie A.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Willis, Robin M.
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

This is it
Thanks!

From: Blinken, Antony J.
To: Gray, Wendy E.; Naplan, Steven J.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Quick Request
Date: Tuesday, April 22, 1997 03:51 PM

[[SRBOPED.DOC : 3923 in SRBOPED.DOC]]

Anyway we can quickly put this onto OASIS for e-mailing to Washington Times?

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 22 April 97 15:12

ATTACHMENT SRBOPED.DOC

FILE NAME

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
OP-ED ON THE CHEMICALS WEAPONS CONVENTION

Tomorrow, the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. After years of international negotiation and domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice: we can continue to lead the widening international commitment to begin banishing poison gas from the earth and head the effort to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped write, deny our soldiers and citizens its benefits, expose our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.

This treaty will take effect next week -- with or without us. That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better off inside or outside it. By that basic measure, this treaty is overwhelmingly in our national interest.

First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years ago -- get rid of chemical weapons. As more and more nations eliminate their chemical arsenals and give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons in the future, our troops will be less likely to face poison gas on the battlefield.

The treaty will also make it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will remove the single largest source of weapons that they could steal or buy on the black market. By imposing new controls on the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.

Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global intelligence network, and strengthening the authority of our own law enforcement, this treaty will make it easier for us to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules.

Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate Majority Leader Lott established a process to work through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a result of this effort, and negotiations led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; allow the use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide range of military and law enforcement situations; and require search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an American business. These conditions resolve almost all the issues that have been raised about this treaty.

Almost, but not all. Opponents are insisting on a handful of additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible for us to participate in this treaty. One would have us wait to join until Russia does -- giving cover to hard-liners in Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members -- delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these international outlaws and giving them a veto over our national security. Another would impose an unrealistically high standard of verification -- and risk our ability to protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.

Two other killer conditions would require us to re-open negotiations on the treaty. First, some critics mistakenly believe the treaty requires the United States to provide advanced chemical weapons defenses to rogue states. In fact, only countries that have joined the CWC, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request assistance -- and then, only if they are threatened with chemical weapons by a non-party. There is no requirement to provide high-tech defenses or even gas masks. President Clinton has committed to the Senate that if a country of concern such as Cuba or Iran should meet the strict conditions for aid, the United States will restrict our assistance to emergency medical supplies -- and to use our influence as

member of the CWC to prevent other states from transferring equipment that could harm our national security.

Second, some opponents misread treaty language to conclude that the CWC -- which obligates parties to renounce chemical weapons -- would somehow facilitate their spread. President Clinton has made it clear we reject this far-fetched interpretation. He has committed to maintain strict U.S. and multilateral export controls on certain dangerous chemicals. To reinforce the treaty's restraints internationally, we have obtained the same assurance from our allies and the President has agreed to reaffirm their commitment every year.

If the Senate approves any of these "killer conditions" it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear benefits and incurring some clear -- and painful -- costs. We will be denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists. We will lose the ability to enforce the rules we helped make. We will subject our chemical companies -- among our leading exporters -- to trade restrictions that could cost them hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. And we will send a clear signal of retreat that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

That must not be allowed to happen. While the Convention is not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen the global fight against a threat that no one nation can meet on its own. That is why Presidents and legislators from both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty has broad, bipartisan support that includes every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years and the overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers and arms control experts. As Secretary Albright has said, this treaty was "made in America." It is right for America. And now, at last, it must be ratified in America.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 23 April 97 07:42
FROM Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Early-Bird April 23 News Summary [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Helweg, M. Diana
Johnson, David T.
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Millison, Cathy L.
Rubin, Eric S.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[APR23.DOC : 1823 in APR23.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 23 April 97 7:42

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** APR23.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS SUMMARY
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 23, 1997

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN

PERU: Raid frees hostages; one hostage, two soldiers, all guerrillas killed. Fujimori basks in triumph but is further in army's debt. U.S., Japan not informed in advance. In Japan, regret over lack of notification but joy over successful rescue. Disastrous defeat for MRTA; concerns about possible retaliation.
(WP1,26,27;NYT1,14,15)

MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA

IRAQ: U.S. avoids confrontation over pilgrimage flights, says no action will be taken to stop them.

Saddam's son undergoes surgery. (WP1,25;NYT13)

ALGERIA: 93 villagers killed near Algiers as civil strife worsens. (WP25,NYT13)

IRAN: Tehran recalls ambassadors from 14 European nations. (WP25)

INDIA: New PM Gujral wins confidence vote. (WP25)

ASIA/PACIFIC

BURMA/U.S.: Albright says SLORC chose not to heed U.S. warnings on sanctions; says U.S. has "consistent principles and flexible tactics" on human rights. (WP4,NYT10)

CHINA: New evidence that China illegally diverted U.S. machinery for military purposes. Long Beach cancels COSCO lease due to court ruling, environmental concerns. Clinton to drop by Vice President's meeting with Dalai Lama today. President Jiang in Moscow to expand ties. (NYT1,9;WP16,18,24)

N. KOREA: Defector warns Pyongyang has nuclear weapons and is prepared to use them. (WP23,NYT12)

HONG KONG: Colony expels illegal immigrant children from China as warning. (WP24)

JAPAN: Appeals court confirms life sentence for Red Army hijacker. (NYT12)

EUROPE/NIS/CANADA

FRANCE: Mitterrand's legacy is tarnished by revelations of illegal wiretaps. (WP23)

CEE/NATO: Ministers from Slovenia, Romania and Slovakia make the rounds in Washington pushing for inclusion in NATO enlargement. (WP24)

RUSSIA: President of national hockey federation is slain in apparent contract murder. Truck full of treasures is moved from Corcoran to Russian Embassy after interim accord is reached. Izvestia elects new board as struggle for editorial control continues. (WP25,D1;NYT8,22)

BRITAIN: European integration becomes main issue in May 1 elections. (NYT3)

CROATIA: Zagreb court indicts Yugoslav Army commander for war crimes. (NYT4)

IRELAND: Opposition Fianna Fail rocked by testimony on campaign gifts to ex-PM Haughey. (NYT5)

GERMANY: Heirs of Jewish holocaust survivors seek property restitution. (NYT8)

AFRICA

ZAIRE: Kabila's rebels are reported to be moving toward Kinshasa. Stalemate over talks continues. Rebels prevent relief workers from aiding Rwandan refugees; allegations that they are murdering them as well. (WP25, NYT12)

GLOBAL/DEFENSE/ECON

CWC: Clinton is optimistic about treaty's prospects tomorrow; D'Amato announces support. (WP4, NYT10)

DoD: Bad weather keeps search teams away from suspected A-10 wreckage in Colorado. Commander of Aberdeen training unit testifies he knew nothing about abuse. (WP2, B1; NYT21)

IMMIGRATION: Legal admissions by INS up 27 percent over last year. Gay illegal immigrants are fighting deportation mandated by new law. (WP15, B3)

ENVIRONMENT: Gore, Albright issue "Environmental Diplomacy" report, pledge new initiatives. (WP19, NYT3)

ADMINISTRATION

KAMEN: USTR facing new gaps; Pozen withdraws from consideration as deputy. Britain hoping for a "heavyweight" ambassador such as Mitchell or Talbott. Tina Brown's chances to become arts minister in a Labor government are hurt by Joe Klein's New Yorker piece on Blair. Curran to be ambassador to Mozambique. (WP19)

OPINION

WP: Editorial urges Senate to ratify CWC tomorrow, says opponents' demands to rewrite treaty are

unacceptable. Rowny op-ed also calls for ratification. Sen. Helms' reply says the treaty is "worse than nothing" unless Articles 10 and 11 are modified. (WP20,21)

NYT: Editorial calls on Lott and other Republicans to do the right thing and ratify CWC. Editorial praises U.S. decision on Burma sanctions. Safire column on concerns about Orthodox push for religious monopoly in Israel. Dowd column compares Blair to Clinton with typical cynical sarcasm. White op-ed on U.S. cigarette marketing in the Third World. Simons op-ed on the need for all-male combat units. (NYT30,31)

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 23 April 97 14:44
FROM Gray, Wendy
CLASSIFICATION ***** CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND *****
SUBJECT On the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Roosevelt Room
TO Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
Johnson, David T.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Naplan, Steven J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[CWCRMKS.doc : 3604 in CWCRMKS.doc]]
**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 23 April 97 14:41
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CWCRMKS.doc

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 23, 1997

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The Roosevelt Room

11:25 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Wallace, for your remarks and for your service; Mr. Vice President, General Shalikashvili. Thank you, General Scowcroft, for being here. Thank you, Admiral Zumwalt, for being here and for being on this issue for so long. General Jones, Admiral Arthur, to all the distinguished veterans and veterans groups who are with us today, and to the men and women in uniform who are here today. And I'd like to say a special word of thanks to General Powell and to Senator Dole for being here.

You have witnessed today, I believe, an example of America at its best, working as it should, putting the interests of the American people and the interests of the men and women of America in uniform first. And it is something for which I am very grateful.

This treaty will make our troops safer. It will make our nation more secure. It will at least reduce the likelihood that innocent civilians here and around the world will be exposed in the future to horrible chemical weapons. That is why every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for the last 20 years and all the military leaders and political leaders and veterans you have heard today have supported it.

All the arguments have been made, so I would like to tell you a story. We now know that chemical weapons have bedeviled Americans in uniform from Belleau Wood in World War I to Baghdad in the Gulf War. We know that thousands were injured or killed by chemical warfare in World War I. And I thought it would be a wonderful thing today to show what this treaty is all about, to have one remarkable American veteran of World War I who survived such an

attack. And he is here with us today, Mr. George Clark. Thank you for coming sir. (Applause.) God bless you.

Mr. Clark was just in the Oval Office with all of us. And Senator Dole apparently asked him if he was a contemporary of Senator Thurmond -- (laughter) -- and he said he thought Senator Thurmond was a little young for the heavy responsibilities that he has enjoyed. (Laughter.)

As a 16-year-old Marine, almost 80 years ago, George Clark fought in the Battle of Soissons in July of 1918. Taking cover in a ditch during fierce fighting, his squad came under artillery attack by mustard gas. Every man except him was either killed or wounded as the poisonous fog settled on the ground.

But

Corporal Clark, who received the Purple Heart for what he endured that day -- and he's wearing it here today, 80 years later -- refused medical treatment even though, as he said, "it hurt my lungs

bad." This man went on to serve our country in World War II and the

Korean War in the Army and in the Air Force, retiring after 32 years of active duty.

Sir, I thank you for your extraordinary record of service and sacrifice to our nation. I thank you for caring about

all the young people who will follow in your footsteps and for taking the effort and the trouble to be here today to support the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. God bless you, sir, and thank you. (Applause.)

All the arguments have been made and the vote is about to come in. But let me just restate a couple of points I think are

very important that the opponents of this treaty cannot effectively

rebut. We have decided -- as General Powell said, we have decided

to give up our chemical weapons. We decided to do that a long time ago.

Now, as more and more nations eliminate their arsenals and they give up not only their arsenals, but they give up developing, producing and acquiring such weapons, our troops will be

less likely to face attack. But also as stockpiles are eliminated and as the transfer of dangerous chemicals, including chemicals which can be put together to form chemical weapons for that purpose, as that is controlled it will be more difficult for terrorists and for rogue states to get or make poison gas.

That is why it is not a good argument that we don't have some countries involved in this treaty. That's not an argument against ratification. This commits everybody else not to give them anything that they can use to make chemical weapons to use against our forces or innocent civilians.

We also have now tough new tools on short notice, on-site inspections; we create a worldwide intelligence and information sharing network; we strengthen the authority of our own law enforcement officials. That is also very important. That's one of the reasons the Japanese were so supportive of this, because of what they have endured in their country. All these things together are going to help us make America's men and women in uniform and American citizens safer.

During the last two months, as Senator Dole said so clearly, we have worked hard with Senate Majority Leader Lott, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, Senator Biden and others. We've resolved virtually all the concerns that some senators have raised, and those resolutions will be embodied tomorrow in an amendment with the 28 understandings to which Senator Dole referred.

Now, we can't let the minor and relatively small number of disagreements that remain blind us to the overwhelming fact -- to use the words of Admiral Zumwalt, that at the bottom line our failure to ratify will substantially increase the risk of a chemical attack against American service personnel. None of us should be willing to take that. As Commander-in-Chief, I cannot in good conscience. I'm very proud of the work that's been done under the two predecessor administrations to mine of the opposite party.

And
I'm very proud that we're all standing here together today as
Americans in support of a good and noble and tremendously
significant endeavor. And all working together, maybe tomorrow
it
will come out all right.

Thank you and God bless you. (Applause.)

Q Mr. President, at his briefing today, Senator Lott
appeared to be leaning towards supporting this treaty -- that's
sort
of my analysis -- because of the so-called 28 conditionalities,
as
he says. If there are so many provisos -- if this passes with so
many provisos, what is the rest of the world going to think of
this
treaty? And can we just -- the United States say, because we're
putting so much in the bill -- can we just say, you accept it the
way we like it?

THE PRESIDENT: If you read the provisos tomorrow, every
one of them is consistent with the overall treaty and would
clearly
be a clarification of it. I think the rest of the world will
applaud what we have done. And I believe that in very important
respects they will say, that's the way we read the treaty all
along.
So I believe it will be reinforcing it. And I think you'll see
the
differences over the debate tomorrow, where the line falls.

I think it will be clear that this will strengthen and
enhance the meaning of the treaty, not only for ourselves, but
for
others all around the world.

Thank you. (Applause.)

END 11:33
A.M. EDT

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 April 97 12:41
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Points for Bowles to Helms call [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Brown, Nancy E.
 Bass, Peter E.
 Cicio, Kristen K.
 Davies, Glyn T.
 Friedrich, M. K.
 Hall, Wilma G.
 Harmon, Joyce
 Helweg, M. Diana
 Hilliard, Brenda I.
 Joshi, M. Kay
 Kale, Dora A.
 Kerrick, Donald L.
 Kessinger, Jodi
 Millison, Cathy L.
 Poole, Jennifer C.
 Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
 Baker, James E.
 Bell, Robert G.
 Bendick, Gordon L.
 Bouchard, Joseph F.
 Burrell, Christina L.
 Danvers, William C.
 Davis, William K.
 Hunerwadel, Joan S.
 Kelly, Sandra L.
 Kreczko, Alan J.
 Langley, Janice M.
 Mulligan, George D.
 Murray, Lori E.
 Seaton, James B.
 Sparks, John E.
 Witkowsky, Anne A.

TEXT_BODY

Note for Sandy:

Attached are TPs for Erskine's call to Helms. Cleared by Alan. Steve Andreasson did most of the work.

[[ERSKCWC.DOC : 3099 in ERSKCWC.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

24 April 97 12:38

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

ERSKCWC.DOC

Talking Points for Erskine Bowles Call to Sen. Helms on CWC

- ☐ Calling pursuant to a conversation that Majority Leader Trent Lott had with Sandy Berger this morning.
- ☐ Want to first thank you Mr. Chairman for all the hard work you and your staff have put into this issue.
- ☐ We may disagree on what the final outcome should be, but we have managed to work together on the process. I know the President is also grateful for your efforts.
- ☐ As you know, the President sent a letter to the Majority Leader today providing a specific assurance concerning three situations under which he would, in consultation with Congress, be prepared to withdraw from the treaty.
- ☐ Senator Lott in his conversation with Sandy this morning indicated that you would like some assurance that the commitment made in the letter from the President to Sen. Lott would also be lived up to by future Presidents.
- ☐ While the President's pledge cannot bind a future President, the President has indicated to me, and asked that I pass on to you, that he believes that any President confronted with any of these three grave developments would make the same decision.
- ☐ As former Sen. Dole said on Wednesday, "if this Convention increases proliferation of chemical weapons, it would lead to public outrage which would compel any President to act."
- ☐ He is happy to have you make this message to you known during the course of the debate on the CWC, as part of the overall record on the treaty.
- ☐ I hope this is of some help to you. Again, thank you for your hard work.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 April 97 18:15

FROM Blinken, Antony J.

CLASSIFICATION ***** CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND *****

SUBJECT URGENT: Draft CWC Statement

TO Andreassen, Steven P.
 Bass, Peter E.
 Bell, Robert G.
 Bendick, Gordon L.
 Benjamin, Daniel
 Blinken, Antony J.
 Bouchard, Joseph F.
 Burrell, Christina L.
 Caravelli, John M.
 Cicio, Kristen K.
 Danvers, William C.
 Davis, William K.
 Edwards, Joan
 Gibney, James S.
 Gray, Wendy
 Hall, Wilma G.
 Harris, Elisa D.
 Helweg, M. Diana
 Johnson, David T.
 Kale, Dora A.
 Kelly, Sandra L.
 Kerrick, Donald L.
 LaFleur, Vinca A.
 Langley, Janice M.
 Luzzatto, Anne R.
 Millison, Cathy L.
 Mulligan, George D.
 Murray, Lori E.
 Naplan, Steven J.
 Quinn, Mary E.
 Rubin, Eric S.
 Samore, Gary S.
 Seaton, James B.
 Tucker, Maureen E.
 Veit, Katherine M.
 Witkowsky, Anne A.
 Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

[[VOTESTMT.DOC : 4672 in VOTESTMT.DOC]]IMMEDIATE FOR SRB

Draft statement for POTUS to use in case of victory.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

24 April 97 18:13

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

VOTESTMT.DOC

4/24/97 6 p.m.

PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
THE WHITE HOUSE
APRIL 24, 1997

By voting today to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Senate has served our soldiers, our citizens and our country very well. Now, our troops will be less likely to face poison gas on the battlefield. Our hand in the fight against rogue states and terrorists will be strengthened. And we will end a century that began with the horror of chemical weapons in World War I one step closer to their elimination -- thanks to American leadership.

These past few months, I have had many occasions to explain why this treaty is good for America. Tonight, I want to say a few words about why this vote shows very powerfully what is so good about America. It is an example of leaders working as they should -- not as Democrats or Republicans, but as Americans -- putting the interests of our country first. It is a model for how we must try to move forward to meet the challenges of the new century that will soon begin -- reaching across party lines, reaching for the common good.

Two and a half months ago, Majority Leader Lott and I put together a bipartisan process to work through the concerns of some Senators about this treaty. Our negotiating teams held thirty hours worth of meetings, and so did groups led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden. At the end of the day, because we all went the extra mile, we resolved virtually

all of the problems that had been raised.

I thank the Majority Leader for guiding these negotiations so successfully. I applaud the efforts of Senators on both sides of the aisle, including Minority Leader Daschle, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar and Senator McCain. And I want to say how gratified I have been, these past few weeks, that so many people put politics aside to stand together behind this treaty -- as we saw just yesterday at the White House, when Senator Dole, General Powell, Brent Scowcroft and other prominent Republicans joined me, the Vice President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and our military leaders past and present to call for ratification.

Fifty years ago, an earlier generation of Americans also put partisanship aside and built NATO, the Marshall Plan, the United Nations, and the international financial institutions that helped keep the peace, spread prosperity and secure victory in the Cold War. Now, our challenge is to build the new institutions and understandings -- like the Chemical Weapons Convention -- that will make us all more secure and prosperous for the next fifty years and beyond. We can do it -- if we do it together.

It is fitting that today's vote reminds us how much stronger we can be as a nation when we work together. After all, the Reagan Administration took the lead in negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Bush Administration concluded it and my administration sent it to the Senate. This treaty truly was made in America. It is right for America. And now, it has been ratified in America. For that, on behalf of the American people, I am profoundly grateful.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 April 97 19:57
FROM Blinken, Antony J.
CLASSIFICATION ***** CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND *****
SUBJECT URGENT - CWC Statement
TO Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Veit, Katherine M.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[VOTESTMT.DOC : 4938 in VOTESTMT.DOC]]IMMEDIATE FOR SRB

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 24 April 97 19:55
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME VOTESTMT.DOC

4/24/97 8 p.m.

PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
THE WHITE HOUSE
APRIL 24, 1997

By voting today to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Senate has served our soldiers, our citizens and our country well. With this treaty, our troops will be less likely to face poison gas on the battlefield. Our hand will be strengthened in the fight against rogue states and terrorists. And we will end a century that began with the horror of chemical weapons in World War I much closer to their elimination -- thanks to American leadership.

These past few months, I have had many occasions to explain why this treaty is good for America. Tonight, I want to say a few words about why this vote shows very powerfully what is so good about America. It is an example of leaders working as they should -- not as Democrats or Republicans, but as Americans -- putting the interests of our country first. It is a model for how we must try to move forward to meet the challenges of the new century that will soon begin -- reaching across party lines, reaching for the common good.

Two and a half months ago, Majority Leader Lott and I put together a process to work through the concerns of some Senators about this treaty. Our negotiating teams held thirty hours worth of meetings, and so did groups led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden. At the end of the day, because we all went the extra mile, we resolved virtually all of the problems that had been raised.

I thank the Majority Leader for guiding these negotiations so successfully. I applaud the efforts of Senators on both sides of the aisle, including Minority Leader Daschle, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar and Senator McCain. And I want to say how gratified I have been, these past few weeks, that so many people put politics aside to stand together behind this treaty -- as we saw just yesterday at the White House, when Senator Dole, General Powell, Brent Scowcroft and other prominent Republicans joined me, the Vice President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and our military leaders past and present to call for ratification.

Today's vote is vivid proof that we are stronger as a nation when we work together. That's true for America's leadership in the world. And it's just as true when it comes to dealing with our challenges here at home -- strengthening our education system... finishing the job of reforming welfare... fighting crime and defending our environment... and balancing the budget in a way that protects our priorities for the future.

The Chemical Weapons Convention truly was made in America. It is right for America. Now, it has been ratified in America -- and it will make our future more

secure. For that, on behalf of
the American people, I am profoundly grateful.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 April 97 20:11
FROM Blinken, Antony J.
CLASSIFICATION ***** CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND *****
SUBJECT CWC Stmt.
TO Gray, Wendy
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[VOTESTMT.DOC : 5183 in VOTESTMT.DOC]]Pls put in big type and get to Phil ASAP. Thanks.

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 24 April 97 19:55
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME VOTESTMT.DOC

4/24/97 8 p.m.

PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
STATEMENT ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
THE WHITE HOUSE
APRIL 24, 1997

By voting today to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Senate has served our soldiers, our citizens and our country well. With this treaty, our troops will be less likely to face poison gas on the battlefield. Our hand will be strengthened in the fight against rogue states and terrorists. And we will end a century that began with the horror of chemical weapons in World War I much closer to their elimination -- thanks to American leadership.

These past few months, I have had many occasions to explain why this treaty is good for America. Tonight, I want to say a few words about why this vote shows very powerfully what is so good about America. It is an example of leaders working as they should -- not as

Democrats or Republicans, but as Americans -- putting the interests of our country first. It is a model for how we must try to move forward to meet the challenges of the new century that will soon begin -- reaching across party lines, reaching for the common good.

Two and a half months ago, Majority Leader Lott and I put together a process to work through the concerns of some Senators about this treaty. Our negotiating teams held thirty hours worth of meetings, and so did groups led by Senator Helms and Senator Biden. At the end of the day, because we all went the extra mile, we resolved virtually all of the problems that had been raised.

I thank the Majority Leader for guiding these negotiations so successfully. I applaud the efforts of Senators on both sides of the aisle, including Minority Leader Daschle, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar and Senator McCain. And I want to say how gratified I have been, these past few weeks, that so many people put politics aside to stand together behind this treaty -- as we saw just yesterday at the White House, when Senator Dole, General Powell, Brent Scowcroft and other prominent Republicans joined me, the Vice President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and our military leaders past and present to call for ratification.

Today's vote is vivid proof that we are stronger as a nation when we work together. That's true for America's leadership in the world. And it's just as true when it comes to dealing with our challenges here at home -- strengthening our education system... finishing the job of reforming welfare... fighting crime and defending our environment... and balancing the budget in a way that protects our priorities for the future.

The Chemical Weapons Convention truly was made in America. It is right for America. Now, it has been ratified in America -- and it will make our future more secure. For that, on behalf of the American people, I am profoundly grateful.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 25 April 97 09:11

FROM Gray, Wendy

CLASSIFICATION ***** CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND *****

SUBJECT Remarks by the President After the Vote on Ratification of the

TO Benjamin, Daniel
 Blinken, Antony J.
 Gibney, James S.
 Gray, Wendy
 Johnson, David T.
 LaFleur, Vinca A.
 Luzzatto, Anne R.
 Naplan, Steven J.
 Rubin, Eric S.
 Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[CWCVOTE.doc : 2355 in CWCVOTE.doc]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 25 April 97 9:9

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CWCVOTE.doc

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 24, 1997

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
 AFTER THE VOTE ON RATIFICATION OF
 THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The Briefing Room

10:51 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, the United States Senate has served America well tonight. Because they have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, our troops will be less likely to face poison gas on the battlefield, our hand will be strengthened in the fight against terrorists and rogue states. We will end a century that began with the horror of chemical weapons in World War I much closer to the elimination of those kinds of weapons. And once again, America has displayed the leadership that we must demonstrate as we build a safer world for the 21st century.

Two and a half months ago, Majority Leader Lott and I put together a process to work through the concerns that some senators had about the treaty. Our negotiating teams held 30 hours of meetings. So did groups led by Senator Biden and Senator Helms. At the end of the day, because we went the extra mile, we resolved the problems that had been raised by the vast majority of the senators.

I thank the Majority Leader for guiding these efforts so successfully. I applaud the efforts of senators on both sides of the aisle, including Minority Leader Daschle, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, and Senator McCain. And I've been so gratified that in these past few weeks so many have put politics aside to join together behind this treaty, as we saw yesterday when Senator Dole and General Powell, Brent Scowcroft and other Republicans joined me, as they had previously.

I thank the Vice President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and so many of our military leaders, past and present, who also came out strongly in support of this treaty.

This vote is an example of America working as it should, Democrats and Republicans together, putting our country first,

reaching across party lines, reaching for the common good. This vote is vivid proof that we are stronger as a nation when we work together. It's true when it comes to our leadership in the world; it's also true when it comes to dealing with our challenges here at home -- strengthening our education system, finishing the job of reforming welfare, fighting crime, defending the environment, and finishing the job of balancing the budget.

The Chemical Weapons Convention truly was made in America, under two of my predecessors. It is right for America. Now it has been ratified in America, and it will make our future more secure. For that, on behalf of the American people, I am profoundly grateful to the United States Senate.

Q Mr. President, Senator Lott said today that, in light of his support of this treaty, that you should show -- quote -- "similar courage against your base and make budget concessions that might upset Democrats." Are you willing to anger Democrats to balance the budget if that's what it takes?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, a majority of Republicans supported this treaty, and all the Democrats. And I think we can get a balanced budget supported by a majority of Republicans and a majority of Democrats in both Houses if we work together in good faith. This was not some unilateral move. This was an honest, good-faith negotiation. We put 28 clarifying conditions on to the treaty that we worked very hard with Senator Lott and others with.

I am -- what I am willing to do, I'm willing to work through this process on the budget just the way we worked through this. I'm very encouraged by it, and I think that America should be encouraged by it. If we work together in a very practical way to do what's in the national interest, I think we can get there.

Q Mr. President, how far apart are you right now with the Republican leadership and the Democrats in Congress in achieving a balanced budget agreement?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't want to characterize it.

They're working hard and they're working in good faith. And I want to leave it like that.

I'm going to -- we're going to talk tomorrow. It's late. Let's go to bed.

Q Mr. President, we're told that two military trucks are missing tonight, one carrying four unarmed Air Force missiles, the other said to be carrying machine guns and mortar. Mr. President, we're told that they are overdue three to four days. What's being done to find these trucks, and is foul play suspected?

THE PRESIDENT: I've just been briefed on it. The FBI is working on it -- working hard on it. It's my understanding that one of the trucks has been recovered, and that the other one has weapons that are inert and cannot cause any harm. But we're working on it. We'll have more reports tomorrow.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:57
P.M. EDT

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 May 97 13:35
FROM Armstrong, Fulton T.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Helms/Burton/Gilman Letter on HB [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Baker, James E.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Kreczko, Alan J.
Peters, Mary A.
Sparks, John E.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

For your clearance/comment, attached is package with reply to letter from Helms et al. on implementation of HB. Let me know if you need a copy of the incoming. -- Gracias, Fulton

[[3578.DOC : 3357 in 3578.DOC]][[3578A.DOC : 3358 in 3578A.DOC]][[3578B.DOC : 3359 in 3578B.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

22 May 97 13:32

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

3578.DOC

Dear Senator/Representative XX:

Thank you for your letter on the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.

As I said in a message broadcast on Radio Marti to millions of Cuban listeners on May 20, Cuban Independence Day, I am personally determined to continue efforts to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. We will not rest until Cuba takes its rightful

place alongside its democratic neighbors.

Implementation of the Libertad Act is central to our efforts and, as you noted, has resulted in considerable progress in focussing world attention on the deplorable human rights conditions and economic deterioration in Cuba today. I assure you that my Administration will continue to carry out the law with a view to expediting the arrival of democracy in Cuba.

Sincerely,

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

22 May 97 13:31

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

3578A.DOC
XXXX

May 22, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JAMES F. DOBBINS

FROM: FULTON T. ARMSTRONG

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Helms, Representative Gilman, et al., on Implementation of Helms-Burton Act

At Tab I is a Memorandum for the President covering a proposed reply to a letter from Senator Helms, Representative Gilman and 10 others criticizing our implementation of the Helms-Burton Act.

This Congressional letter highlights the need to reinvigorate our efforts to gain additional EU steps to promote democracy in Cuba.

The deadline for the next Presidential decision on waiver of

provisions of Title III is July 15, and we have relatively little to show for the last four or five months. In addition, Castro will have opportunities in the future to portray himself as defeating our efforts to isolate him, such as by hosting a visit by Jamaican Prime Minister Patterson later this month, the King of Spain next year (anniversary of Spanish-American War), and the Ibero-American Summit scheduled for Havana in 1999.

We understand that Secretary Albright has asked Stu to continue as Special Envoy for Cuban Democracy in his new position. Delays in his confirmation may have prolonged the period of relative inactivity on this issue, although he can still function as Undersecretary of Commerce. We recommend that you raise with Albright again the need for a bigger push in Europe as well as outreach to the Cuban-American community as soon as possible. If Stu's schedule and confirmation do not permit extensive travel, perhaps a delegation headed by AS Jeff Davidow, or DASs Tony Wayne and Bryan Samuel, could fill the void.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers; Alan Kreczko; Mary Ann Peters

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Draft Reply to Letter from Senator Helms, et al.

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

22 May 97 10:56

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

3578B.DOC

XXXX

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Helms, Representative Gilman, et al., on Implementation of Helms-Burton Act

Purpose

To reply to a letter from Senator Helms, Representative Gilman and 10 others on implementation of the Helms-Burton Act.

Background

Senator Helms, Representative Gilman and 10 others have written to you expressing concern that unnamed Administration officials have not pursued implementation of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton) as vigorously as they had expected. Specifically, they are concerned that your statement in January that you "would expect to continue" suspending provisions of Title III of the law "so long as our allies continued their stepped-up efforts" to promote democracy in Cuba" has been construed as an automatic waiver. They point to a recent French decision to sign an investment protection accord with Cuba as reason to question whether another suspension is warranted.

The proposed reply at Tab A assures the letter's signers that you are committed to promoting democratic transition in Cuba and to fully carrying out the Helms-Burton Act.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Draft Reply to Letter from Senator Helms, et al.

Tab B Incoming Correspondence