

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 10 April 97 11:09
FROM Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Draft Guidance Pkg [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Johnson, David T.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[APR10GUI.DOC : 2895 in APR10GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 10 April 97 11:6

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** APR10GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 10, 1997

Zaire

Iraq

Bahrain

Middle East

Dalai Lama

CWC

Chile

Russia/NIS

Saudi Arabia/Khobar

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

Nazi Assets

Fast Track

Laser Incident

Mykonos Verdict

ZAIRE

Q: Is the U.S. urging that Mobutu step down?

A: The U.S. has been pressing for a negotiated solution to the conflict in Zaire and for a cessation of hostilities. We recognize that any negotiated solution is likely to entail agreement on interim transitional government arrangements leading ultimately to elections. For negotiations to succeed, the government of President Mobutu as well as the rebels must recognize a need for a change in the status quo. We believe the era of Mobutuism is past, and we urge both sides to work together to find a negotiated solution to the current crisis in order to bring stable and representative government to Zaire.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the negotiations that concluded yesterday in South Africa?

A: We welcome reports of initial progress achieved in the first round of face-to-face talks between representatives of the government of Zaire and the Alliance. The communique issued by both sides indicates several areas of agreement and offers some hope for an eventual negotiated settlement. We fully support the efforts of UN Special Representative Sahnoun and the government of South Africa and welcome the progress achieved thus far.

Q: Can you give an update on the fighting and the political situation?

A: We understand Lubumbashi was occupied by the Rebel Alliance April 9, although some pockets of resistance remain.

President Mobutu named General Likulia Bolongo as Prime Minister April 9. Likulia has said he will name his cabinet

today, but we don't have anything on that yet. We understand Etienne Tshisekedi is at home today; he has not been detained.

We have seen reports that rebel leader Kabila has publicly announced there would be a pause in Alliance military operations for a period of three days during which he hoped President Mobutu would make direct contact with him to arrange for his (Mobutu's) departure.

Q: (If asked) Do you recognize Likulia as the Prime Minister?

A: We do not take a position on who the Zairian Prime Minister should be. That is an internal Zairian matter.

Q: Do we still recognize Mobutu as head of state?

A: Mobutu is still the President of Zaire.

We believe Mobutu's system of government is finished, however. We think it is time for a new democratic form of government in Zaire, arrived at through direct negotiations between the government and rebels leading to elections with all parties participating.

Q: Has Ambassador Simpson seen Mobutu in the past few days?

A: No.

(if asked) Our Ambassador has requested an appointment with Mobutu, but it has not been set yet. Simpson last met with Mobutu in January.

Q: How many official Americans are still in Zaire?

A: There are 52 official Americans in Zaire at this time.

Q: What is the threat status? Is it safe for Americans to remain?

A: The situation in Kinshasa is calm today.

The Department issued a travel warning for Zaire March 20 which strongly encouraged Americans to depart Zaire in light of the uncertain political and security situation and the potential for unrest throughout the country. The travel warning remains in effect.

Q: What is the evacuation status?

A: There is no change. Americans who wish to depart Zaire at

this time are able to do so via

IRAQ

[NOTE TO BRIEFER: Following is press guidance for the Iraqi air sanctions violation. Vetted with State. FYI: We understand the plane has been allowed to return to Iraq, but Mike should not confirm that at this time.]

Q: What do you have to say about the Iraqi aircraft which flew pilgrims to Saudi Arabia yesterday (4/9)?

A: This is a significant violation of the sanctions regime established after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

We will be taking action at the UN and with Saudi Arabia and other regional parties to ensure Iraq's full compliance with all its UN obligations, including those relating to civil aviation.

BAHRAIN

Q: Can you comment on reports that the U.S. expects a terrorist attack on its troops in Bahrain?

A: I refer you to the Defense Department for details.

They have increased the terrorism alert posture in Bahrain. As you know, we do not comment on classified intelligence information, so I can not go into whether intelligence reports caused the higher alert. We do, however, appreciate the excellent cooperation we have received from the Government of Bahrain, which is an ally in the fight against terrorism.

MIDDLE EAST

Q: Any progress in getting the talks between the Palestinians and Israelis re-started? Will you exert more pressure on Netanyahu to stop construction at Har Homa?

A: I don't have a lot to add to what I've said in the last few days. The Palestinian negotiators will be meeting Secretary Albright and her team today. We'll be reviewing with them ideas for dealing with the current impasse. And we are continuing to consult with the Israeli government. This is not going to be a quick or easy process, but we'll just keep working on it.

IF PRESSED ON WHAT'S NEEDED FROM PARTIES

As I have made clear, we need to see two things to get this process back on track:

- o There needs to be zero tolerance for terror. Israel has a right to expect a 100% effort by the Palestinian Authority to prevent acts of terror and to take stern measures against those who seek to carry out such acts.

- o And a readiness by both parties to take steps which build confidence in the integrity of the negotiating process in order to move forward.

Q: What are the next steps? Is Albright going out? Ross?

A: We're considering that now.

Don't rule out sending the Secretary or Ross to the region for follow-up on the discussions here, but we have not yet made any final decisions.

Q: Do you agree or disagree with PM Netanyahu that Arafat has not kept his commitments, such as amending the Palestinian Charter, collecting weapons, etc.?

A: Obviously we expect the Palestinians to keep their commitments. That's an integral part of maintaining confidence between the two sides so that they can move forward.

IF PRESSED ON WHETHER ARAFAT IS DOING ENOUGH TO PREVENT TERRORISM

A:
I've made it clear repeatedly that Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority need to demonstrate zero tolerance for terrorism.

DALAI LAMA

- ☐ The Dalai Lama, religious leader of Tibetan Buddhists and Nobel laureate, is always a most welcome visitor to the United States.
- ☐ Americans have tremendous feelings of goodwill toward His Holiness and adherents of Tibetan Buddhism in the United States and elsewhere.
- ☐ The administration welcomes the Dalai Lama's visit and looks forward to discussions with him.
- ☐ He will be meeting members of the administration, but at what level and with whom has not been decided.
- ☐ As a religiously diverse nation, we also welcome the contributions to our nation's spiritual life of Americans who have embraced Tibetan Buddhism.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

- ☐ CWC enjoys broad, bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker, Ed Rowney, Paul Nitze and other leading Republican foreign policy experts support it.
- ☐ CWC will reduce the threat to our soldiers by requiring others to do what we are already doing -- getting out of the chemical weapons business.
- ☐ CWC will also make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons by eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.
- ☐ Recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But it is a key element of any effective response.
- ☐ Treaty has been before the Senate since November 1993. There

have been 13 Senate hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings of both members and staff. More than 1500 pages of information has been provided to the Senate. It's time for the Senate to debate and vote.

☐ If we do not ratify by April 29, Americans will be less secure. We will be denied access to CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons.

☐ The United States will also not have a seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as head of security, administration, and industry inspections, will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.

☐ Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.

☐ Finally, American chemical companies will begin losing sales to overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Industry estimates this could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

HELMS AND CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the

Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed

alternative conditions
should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

CHILE

Q: Has the Administration decided to permit the sale of advanced fighters to Chile?

A: No. The USG has decided to authorize the issuance of marketing licenses to companies which wish to compete in Chile's selection of fighter aircraft, while making clear to both the Government of Chile and to the companies involved that there has been no decision on whether to permit the sale itself.

The licenses are for marketing information only and do not constitute approval for an actual sale. A decision whether to permit such sale has not been made.

This decision to issue marketing licenses was made so as not to disadvantage U.S. companies in the competition. These licenses allow these companies to provide the Government of Chile with technical data on advanced fighter aircraft.

Q: Has the U.S. changed its Latin American conventional arms transfer policy?

A: No. As you know, the Administration is reviewing U.S. conventional arms transfer policy toward Latin America in the context of the significant political, economic, and military changes that have been occurring in the past ten years.

This policy review is on-going. While the review is underway current policy remains unchanged.

Q: What is the current policy on arms exports to Latin America?

A: Our policy worldwide is to consider pending arms transfers on a case-by-case basis. Our long-standing policy in Latin America is, and remains, to address potential transfers in the context of restraint.

Q: Why is a review necessary?

A: The welcome expansion and strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions in recent years makes it prudent for us to undertake this policy review to determine whether any changes in our policy are appropriate.

Our policy goals for the countries of Latin America are to enhance democracy, including civilian control of the military, foster regional stability, transparency and confidence building, and ensure that the weapons modernization decisions of these countries address legitimate defense needs within their existing economic resources.

Any possible change made to our current arms export policy will be in accordance with these goals.

RUSSIA/NIS

Primakov Comments in Paris on possible May 27 Signing of NATO-Russia Accord

☐ Noted Foreign Minister's comments on prospects for reaching agreement on NATO-Russia relationship in advance of Madrid summit -- encouraged Russia taking positive tack toward issue.

☐ Primakov's idea interesting, we're prepared to consider late May meeting to sign Charter -- of course, first need to finish document, actually have agreement between NATO and Russia -- before we can set date, make concrete plans for any event.

If pressed on suggestion of Paris as venue and/or on May date

☐ Obviously first order of business to get agreement on document spelling out relationship; if that's successful, sure we with NATO members and Russia can settle on time and place.

NATO-Russia

☐ Consultations with Russia continue; NATO Secretary General Solana goes to Moscow again next week to discuss contents of proposed agreement with Primakov.

☐ Plans for NATO enlargement also proceeding on schedule -- Madrid summit on track; will issue first invitations to prospective new members.

☐ Enlargement part of broader effort to build comprehensive European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. It is going forward in way that does not threaten any nation's security, enhances stability in Europe.

☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to

build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.

☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

Allegations of Corruption in Ukraine

☐ Seriously concerned about reports of corruption coming from wide range of American businesses operating in Ukraine. Have made clear to Ukrainian leadership that they must act decisively to create open, transparent climate for investment.

☐ Ukraine proposed measures to improve investment climate in legislative package now before parliament; passage of package would send signal that Ukraine is serious about investment; also a prerequisite to \$2.5 billion multilateral support package.

☐ Congress earmarked \$225 million in assistance to Ukraine for FY97, same level proposed for FY98; ability to use this effectively depends on whether Ukraine acts on serious reform agenda, combats crime; if progress not made, will discuss appropriate actions with Congress.

(If Raised -- Risk of U.S. Funds Diverted?)

☐ U.S. does not provide cash assistance to Ukraine; assistance provided in form of technical expertise, exchange programs, selected equipment and humanitarian commodities, all of which are carefully monitored.

Russia Signs Integration Treaty with Belarus

☐ Russia and Belarus signed Treaty April 2; not very different from last year's agreement; provides for territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence of Russia and Belarus; allows one month for public comment prior to submitting to parliaments for ratification.

☐ We have no objections in principle to integration as long as voluntary, mutually beneficial, done on basis of equality, does not harm relations with other countries or create new

divisions among nations.

□ Remain concerned about political developments in Belarus -- restrictions on personal and press freedoms; unwarranted actions against foreigners, including recent expulsion of U.S. diplomat; recalled our Ambassador for consultations on situation; have cut U.S. assistance.

General Items

Helsinki Summit and Aftermath, Way Forward in U.S.-Russia Relations

□ Welcomed Yeltsin's positive comments on summit results; Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

□ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

□ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

IMF Resumes Russia Program

□ Welcome IMF Managing Director Camdessus' comments that Russia taking necessary reforms, management steps to resume IMF program. Shows confidence in new economic team. Expect decision to be made formally later this month by IMF board.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing

more, nothing less.

BOSNIA

Humanitarian and Economic Assistance to Bosnia

□ The U.S. has provided extensive humanitarian and emergency assistance during and following the war in Bosnia, but the focus in 1997 and beyond is increasingly on economic reconstruction efforts and helping to foster a stable, democratic Bosnia with a functioning market economy.

□ U.S. humanitarian assistance to the Former Yugoslavia totaled about \$400 million in FY96, including USAID, State and DoD contributions. With peace now taking root and the focus shifting to economic reconstruction, we expect the humanitarian assistance totals to be substantially smaller in FY97 and will be even less in FY98.

□ In terms of economic reconstruction, we are now in the second year of a three year, \$600 million assistance program through USAID that has been approved by Congress. The FY98 request as part of this program is for about \$225 million. We, of course, also indirectly provide substantial economic assistance through support of international institutions such as the World Bank.

SFOR Mission Duration

□ We believe that SFOR's mission should be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to establish conditions to maintain security and stability without an outside military presence.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

□ We strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. Passage of the proposed legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S.

credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world.

Radovan Karadzic

☐ Karadzic has been out of power for almost one year. In accordance with the agreement reached with Republika Srpska, he is banned from participating in any political activities or making public appearances. We continue to monitor the situation to ensure Republika Srpska lives up to this agreement. However, we will not be satisfied until Karadzic and all others indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal stand trial in The Hague.

War Criminals

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement includes provisions that are under the purview of the individual states and which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

CHINA

COSCO

Q: Does COSCO represent a threat to US national security? Does COSCO engage in predatory pricing and operate outside the normal rules and motivations of commercial behavior? Did COSCO decide to purchase ships from US yards to curry favor?

A: COSCO is the world's largest shipping line. It operates out of virtually every major West Coast port. And it moves much of the traffic in our trans-Pacific market.

We welcome its participation in our trading relationship. But like other companies, it must abide by our laws. I am confident that our Coast Guard, Customs and Maritime authorities will ensure that our laws are effectively enforced -- whether they involve COSCO or any other company.

Senator McCain has made some serious allegations with respect to COSCO. We are looking at those allegations. I'm not going to prejudge that review or its outcome.

UNHRC

Background: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain reportedly have decided not to co-sponsor a China resolution, which means that there will not be an EU-introduced resolution this year. However, any individual country can introduce the resolution, and we expect at least 10 EU countries to co-sponsor the resolution once it is introduced. Our position is that we are working with other countries on a resolution and will oppose China's no-action motion (which, if passed, would bar consideration of the resolution by the Commission). A vote is scheduled for

the third week in April.

Points

- ☐ U.S. is working with other members of the Commission on a resolution concerning the human rights situation in China.
- ☐ U.S. will oppose motions designed to keep the resolution off the Commission's agenda.
- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ During his recent visit, Ambassador Richardson expressed the U.S. position in a statement to Commission members and met with several important delegations to convey our views.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.

- ☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.
- ☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.
- ☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

- ☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.
- ☐ We expect President and Hashimoto to meet at the end of April here at the White House and final details on date, time and likely topics will be available early next week.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

- ☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.
- ☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together

to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

- ☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.
- ☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

- ☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.
- ☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

- ☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and

Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.

☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is the significance of CIA's recently-released Khamisiyah white paper?

☐ CIA's white paper places approximately 40 just-declassified documents related to Khamisiyah into context and complements DOD's "Khamisiyah case narrative" released in FEB 97.

☐ My understanding is that the white paper and accompanying documents do not change the essence of what we know about what happened at Khamisiyah that might be related to undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses. Moreover, the white paper is distinct from the forthcoming CIA IG report which has not yet been released.

☐ The white paper does, however, highlight certain intelligence community "lessons learned" from an analytical perspective, and I understand that CIA plans to address these.

What about the statement in the CIA white paper that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in JAN 96 on the Khamisiyah evidence?

☐ The CIA white paper (and one of the accompanying documents containing briefing slides) reflects the classified CIA brief the NSC staff received in JAN 96.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative and ongoing study of potential exposures -- the staff was told that information had come to light about the possibility of chemical munition storage and agent release at the Khamisiyah facility. This was briefed as preliminary information, and the NSC staff noted at the close of the brief that CIA needed to pursue this possibility aggressively together with DOD.

☐ Subsequent CIA and DOD efforts to investigate this concern

eventually led to the JUN 96
DOD announcement of Khamisiyah.

The CIA Khamisiyah white paper mentions that an AUG 91
"highly-classified" intelligence
assessment discussing chemical munitions storage at Khamisiyah
was circulated among the entire
national security team. Does this mean that the Bush
Administration knew about the possibility
of exposure of U.S. forces soon after the Gulf War?

☐ We have no information indicating that the Bush Administration
knew of this possibility.

☐ To my knowledge, the assessment you are referring to focused on
the issue of whether

Khamisiyah was a known chemical munitions storage site, and did
not even reflect the issue of
the possible exposure of U.S. forces.

How does the CIA explain these 40 or so documents coming out now,
months after we had
various assurances that the Agency had done its best on behalf of
Gulf War veterans?

☐ First, it's important to note that earlier statements were based
on what was known at the time
they were made. And the continuing DOD and CIA investigative
efforts have identified new
information, changing what we know over time.

☐ Finally, while these documents do not change our substantive
understanding of the possible
exposure of U.S. forces at Khamisiyah, they do indicate certain
intelligence community
"lessons learned" which CIA intends to act on.

The intelligence community admits making mistakes in its handling
of the Gulf War illnesses
investigation, and this latest batch of 40 or so documents
clearly should have come out much
sooner. With much of the related activity occurring during
George Tenet's tenure at CIA, does
the Director designate retain your full confidence?

☐ Absolutely.

☐ The CIA has contributed a tremendous amount to our knowledge
about chemical weapons in
the Gulf War theater and specifically about incidents that might
be related to undiagnosed
Gulf War illnesses.

☐ George Tenet is fully supportive of my commitment to get out all
the facts, and has increased
the level of resources devoted to the Gulf War illnesses problem
when new information has

highlighted the need to do so.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
 - ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
 - ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
 - ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
 - ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Should more veterans be warned now about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means.
- ☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.
- ☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach; CIA and DOD are working together to resolve these expeditiously.
- ☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible.

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

Do these "intelligence failures" -- specifically, getting an appropriate warning to troops in the field during the Gulf War and failing to uncover the possibility of chemical exposure at Khamisiyah for more than five years -- indicate that the intelligence community and/or its relationship to the military need to be reconsidered?

☐ At this juncture, I would say no. Mistakes were clearly made during this process, these mistakes have been acknowledged, and the agencies involved will seek to develop appropriate "lessons learned" for implementation.

☐ Beyond that, we need to await the outcome of the various ongoing IG and other investigations to determine whether any other actions may be appropriate.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted -- to

initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War

veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been

strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I

requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to

address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After

Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the

"lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ Overall, to date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses, with an extension of the presumptive period for undiagnosed illness compensation forthcoming soon; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

- ☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

- ☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

- ☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

FAST TRACK

Q: It has been reported that the President is planning to delay his request for fast track authority to accommodate the budget process. Is that true? Does this signal Administration retreat on fast track? Has Gephardt scared the President off?

A: Not at all. The President is still firmly committed to seeking fast track authority to open foreign markets. It is critical if we want to continue creating good jobs for American workers.

Every President since Ford has had fast track authority for key periods, and the reasons for it now are more compelling than ever. Over 11 million U.S. jobs now depend on exports, and these jobs pay 13-16 percent more than the average U.S. job. Today, 95 percent of the world's consumers live outside the U.S., and the vast majority of those consumers live in the emerging and fastest growing markets of Latin America and Asia. We simply must continue to open these markets for U.S. exports if we are to succeed in the global economy.

We cannot afford inaction. If we are not seizing opportunities to break down trade barriers and open foreign markets, we can be sure other countries will act -- to the benefit of their companies and their workers.

The United States has nothing to fear. We are the most competitive large economy in the world as judged by independent experts. But our ability to define the nature of our trade relationships will in significant measure determine our leadership role in the next century. Fast track authority is the most important factor determining these relationships.

As you know, we have been consulting with Congress to develop bipartisan support for this legislation. We think that is the best way to build a strong foundation for this effort. We will continue to consult with Congress as to the substance,

tactics and timing of the fast track initiative.

Q: It has been reported that the Administration is weighing the dropping of labor and environmental goals from fast track trade authority legislation, a move certain to infuriate labor unions. Is this true?

A: As we have stated before, our goal is to build the broadest possible support for the fast track legislation. To that end, Ambassador Barshefsky and others have been consulting actively with members of Congress representing all points of view on this subject, and with all interested parties, including organized labor. We will continue to do so with the goal of enacting legislation that receives broad support.

M/V KAPITAN MAN INCIDENT

Background: On Friday, April 4, 1997, a Canadian military helicopter was illuminated by a suspected laser device aboard the Russian merchant ship M/V KAPITAN MAN. At the time of the incident, the M/V KAPITAN MAN was in U.S. territorial waters approximately 5 nautical miles northwest of Port Angeles, Washington. The Canadian helicopter was on a routine maritime patrol flight with a U.S. Navy observer embarked. After the incident, M/V KAPITAN MAN continued on to a routine port call in Tacoma, Washington.

On Saturday the Canadian pilot of the helicopter and the U.S. observer, a U.S. Navy Lieutenant assigned as a liaison officer to the Canadian Maritime Pacific Command, sought medical attention for eye pain. The examining physician diagnosed their condition as consistent with the damage caused by laser burns. The eye damage they suffered is expected to be non-permanent. Photographs of the M/V KAPITAN MAN taken by the Canadian helicopter could be interpreted as indicating that a laser-type device may have been pointed at the helicopter from the bridge of the vessel (one photo shows a bright red spot of light but not the device from which the light

originates).

On Monday morning, April 7, 1997, the U.S. Coast Guard notified the Master of M/V KAPITAN MAN in writing that the vessel was being detained in port for a Coast Guard inspection to determine if hazardous materials or conditions were present on the vessel. The Coast Guard inspection commenced at about 8:30 p.m. EST and lasted approximately two hours. The inspection team searched for the laser device, interviewed the vessel's officers and crew, and inspected the ship's logs. The Master and crew of the vessel were cooperative, opening all compartments that the inspection team desired to inspect. No laser device was found, there was no evidence that an installed device had recently been removed, and the officers and crew claimed they did not have a laser device aboard the vessel and had not shined one at the Canadian helicopter.

The Coast Guard inspection team departed the M/V KAPITAN MAN at about 1:30 a.m. EST April 8th, and the Coast Guard released the vessel from detention. The M/V KAPITAN MAN is currently scheduled to depart Tacoma at 4:00 p.m. EST today.

Q: What is the condition of the injured men?

A: The initial evaluation by Canadian military physicians was that the eye damage would be non-permanent. The two men have been flown to Brooks Army Medical Center in Texas for further examination and evaluation.

Q: Why was a Canadian military helicopter flying around a ship in U.S. territorial waters?

A: The Canadian helicopter was on a routine maritime surveillance patrol in the Strait of San Juan de Fuca, which lies between the United States and Canada. The M/V KAPITAN MAN was in the inbound traffic lane, which lies on the U.S. side of the Strait. Our two nations work closely together to ensure the safety and security of shipping in the Strait.

Q: Why was a U.S. Navy officer in the Canadian helicopter?

A: The U.S. Navy lieutenant is a liaison officer assigned to the Canadian Maritime Command Pacific. The U.S. and Canadian armed forces work closely together in many areas, including maritime patrol and reconnaissance. The U.S. Navy lieutenant's presence on the Canadian helicopter was a routine part of his liaison duties.

Q: On what grounds was the Russian ship detained?

A: The U.S. Coast Guard has statutory authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and the Magnuson Act to inspect vessels in U.S. ports and waters for hazardous materials or conditions, and to detain vessels for this purpose.

Q: Who conducted the inspection? Did Canadian officials participate?

A: The inspection was conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard. They were assisted by a Russian linguist for crew interviews and U.S. military personnel to aid in identifying any laser-type devices that might have been found. No Canadian officials participated.

Q: Did the U.S. Government notify the Russian Government of this incident?

A: We informed the Russian Government of the incident and that the M/V KAPITAN MAN had been detained by the U.S. Coast Guard for inspection.

Q: How did the Russian Government react to our actions?

A: The Russian Consulate in Seattle offered their services to assist the Coast Guard in their inspection of the ship. The Coast Guard expressed willingness to conduct the inspection with a Russian consular officer present. The Russian Consulate in Seattle elected not to participate. The Russian Government has indicated that it will cooperate in our investigation of this incident.

Q: If no laser device was found on the Russian ship and the crew

denied shining a laser at the Canadian helicopter, how do you explain the eye damage suffered by the two men?

A: I am not going to speculate on possible causes of their injuries. The Department of Defense is continuing to investigate the incident.

Q: Why was the Russian ship released?

A: The Coast Guard inspection team reported that they had satisfied the purpose of the inspection, which was to determine if hazardous materials or conditions were present on the vessel. The inspection team found no hazardous materials or conditions, and the Coast Guard informed the Master of the M/V KAPITAN MAN that the order detaining his vessel had been canceled.

For use only if asked:

Q: If the Russian ship did point a laser at the helicopter, would it be a violation of the ban on blinding laser weapons?

A: Until we have a great deal more information, we could not say whether the system that was used would be prohibited under the 1996 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons. The Convention on Conventional Weapons protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons prohibits only the employment of "laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices." Laser systems that are not covered by the Protocol are widely used by the armed forces of many nations, including those of the United States, for purposes such as detection, targeting, range-finding, and communications.

Q: Has the protocol on blinding laser weapons entered into force?

A: No, but signatory states have taken on an obligation to respect its terms to "the fullest extent possible" pending its entry into force." The CCW Protocol on blinding laser weapons was signed on May 3, 1996 and requires the ratification

of twenty countries. It was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on January 7th of this year. Although Protocol IV has not yet entered into force, the Final Declaration adopted by all CCW parties at the conclusion of the conference at which Protocol IV was adopted stated that all parties "solemnly declare ... their desire that all states, pending entry into force, respect and ensure respect of the substantive provisions of Protocol IV to the fullest extent possible."

Q: Does the U.S. Government plan to protest this incident to the Russian government?

A: As I said, our investigation continues; once we have determined exactly what happened, we will consider further appropriate actions. I should note that the Russian government has been responsive and cooperative in this matter.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 10 April 97 16:44
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT cwc guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Johnson, David T.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[APR10GUI.DOC : 4116 in APR10GUI.DOC]]

have updated cwc a bit.
**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 10 April 97 16:44
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** APR10GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 10, 1997

Zaire

Mykonos Verdict

Middle East

Dalai Lama

CWC

Chile

Russia/NIS

Saudi Arabia/Khobar

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

Nazi Assets

Fast Track

Angola

ZAIRE

Q: Is the U.S. urging that Mobutu step down?

A: The U.S. has been pressing for a negotiated solution to the conflict in Zaire and for a cessation of hostilities. We recognize that any negotiated solution is likely to entail agreement on interim transitional government arrangements leading ultimately to elections. For negotiations to succeed, the government of President Mobutu as well as the rebels must recognize a need for a change in the status quo. We believe the era of Mobutuism is past, and we urge both sides to work together to find a negotiated solution to the current crisis in order to bring stable and representative government to Zaire.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the negotiations that concluded yesterday in South Africa?

A: We welcome reports of initial progress achieved in the first round of face-to-face talks between representatives of the government of Zaire and the Alliance. The communique issued by both sides indicates several areas of agreement and offers some hope for an eventual negotiated settlement. We fully support the efforts of UN Special Representative Sahnoun and the government of South Africa and welcome the progress achieved thus far.

Q: Can you give an update on the fighting and the political situation?

A: We understand Lubumbashi was occupied by the Rebel Alliance April 9, although some pockets of resistance remain.

President Mobutu named General Likulia Bolongo as Prime Minister April 9. Likulia has said he will name his cabinet today, but we don't have anything on that yet. We understand Etienne Tshisekedi is at home today; he has not been detained.

We have seen reports that rebel leader Kabila has publicly announced there would be a pause in Alliance military operations for a period of three days during which he hoped President Mobutu would make direct contact with him to arrange for his (Mobutu's) departure.

Q: (If asked) Do you recognize Likulia as the Prime Minister?

A: We do not take a position on who the Zairian Prime Minister should be. That is an internal Zairian matter.

Q: Do we still recognize Mobutu as head of state?

A: Mobutu is still the President of Zaire.

We believe Mobutu's system of government is finished, however. We think it is time for a new democratic form of government in Zaire, arrived at through direct negotiations between the government and rebels leading to elections with all parties participating.

Q: Has Ambassador Simpson seen Mobutu in the past few days?

A: No.

(if asked) Our Ambassador has requested an appointment with Mobutu, but it has not been set yet. Simpson last met with Mobutu in January.

Q: How many official Americans are still in Zaire?

A: There are 52 official Americans in Zaire at this time.

Q: What is the threat status? Is it safe for Americans to remain?

A: The situation in Kinshasa is calm today.

The Department issued a travel warning for Zaire March 20 which strongly encouraged Americans to depart Zaire in light of the uncertain political and security situation and the potential for unrest throughout the country. The travel warning remains in effect.

Q: What is the evacuation status?

A: There is no change. Americans who wish to depart Zaire at this time are able to do so via

MYKONOS VERDICT

(Type in State guidance from Thursday)

MIDDLE EAST

Q: Any progress in getting the talks between the Palestinians and Israelis re-started? Will you exert more pressure on Netanyahu to stop construction at Har Homa?

A: I don't have a lot to add to what I've said in the last few days. The Palestinian negotiators will be meeting Secretary Albright and her team today. We'll be reviewing with them ideas for dealing with the current impasse. And we are continuing to consult with the Israeli government. This is not going to be a quick or easy process, but we'll just keep working on it.

IF PRESSED ON WHAT'S NEEDED FROM PARTIES

As I have made clear, we need to see two things to get this process back on track:

- o There needs to be zero tolerance for terror. Israel has a right to expect a 100% effort by the Palestinian Authority to prevent acts of terror and to take stern measures against those who seek to carry out such acts.

- o And a readiness by both parties to take steps which build confidence in the integrity of the negotiating process in order to move forward.

Q: What are the next steps? Is Albright going out? Ross?

A: We're considering that now.

Don't rule out sending the Secretary or Ross to the region for follow-up on the discussions here, but we have not yet made any final decisions.

Q: Do you agree or disagree with PM Netanyahu that Arafat has not kept his commitments, such as amending the Palestinian Charter, collecting weapons, etc.?

A: Obviously we expect the Palestinians to keep their commitments. That's an integral part of maintaining confidence

between the two sides so that they can move forward.

IF PRESSED ON WHETHER ARAFAT IS DOING ENOUGH TO PREVENT TERRORISM

A:

I've made it clear repeatedly that Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority need to demonstrate zero tolerance for terrorism.

DALAI LAMA

☐ The Dalai Lama, religious leader of Tibetan Buddhists and Nobel laureate, is always a most welcome visitor to the United States.

☐ Americans have tremendous feelings of goodwill toward His Holiness and adherents of Tibetan Buddhism in the United States and elsewhere.

☐ The administration welcomes the Dalai Lama's visit and looks forward to discussions with him.

☐ He will be meeting members of the administration, but at what level and with whom has not been decided.

☐ As a religiously diverse nation, we also welcome the contributions to our nation's spiritual life of Americans who have embraced Tibetan Buddhism.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

☐ CWC enjoys broad, bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker, Ed Rowny, Paul Nitze and other leading Republican and Democratic foreign policy experts support it.

☐ CWC will reduce the threat to our soldiers by requiring others to do what we are already doing -- getting out of the chemical weapons business.

☐ CWC will also make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons by eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.

☐ Recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But it is a key element of any effective response.

☐ Treaty has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been 16 Senate hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings of both members and staff. More than 1500 pages of information has been provided to the Senate. It's time for the Senate to debate and vote.

☐ If we do not ratify by April 29, Americans will be less secure. We will be denied access to CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons.

☐ The United States will also not have a seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as head of security, administration, and industry inspections, will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.

☐ Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.

☐ Finally, American chemical companies will begin losing sales to overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Industry estimates this could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

HELMS AND CWC

Q: yy
yy

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over

the CWC?

A: In early January, the President and the Majority Leader agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of some members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the task force, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a Senate vote on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's recent statements that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the

broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

CHILE

Q: Has the Administration decided to permit the sale of advanced fighters to Chile?

A: No. The USG has decided to authorize the issuance of marketing licenses to companies which wish to compete in Chile's selection of fighter aircraft, while making clear to both the Government of Chile and to the companies involved that there has been no decision on whether to permit the sale itself.

The licenses are for marketing information only and do not constitute approval for an actual sale. A decision whether to permit such sale has not been made.

This decision to issue marketing licenses was made so as not to disadvantage U.S. companies in the competition. These licenses allow these companies to provide the Government of Chile with technical data on advanced fighter aircraft.

Q: Has the U.S. changed its Latin American conventional arms transfer policy?

A: No. As you know, the Administration is reviewing U.S. conventional arms transfer policy toward Latin America in the context of the significant political, economic, and military changes that have been occurring in the past ten years.

This policy review is on-going. While the review is underway current policy remains unchanged.

Q: What is the current policy on arms exports to Latin America?

A: Our policy worldwide is to consider pending arms transfers on a case-by-case basis. Our long-standing policy in Latin America is, and remains, to address potential transfers in the context of restraint.

Q: Why is a review necessary?

A: The welcome expansion and strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions in recent years makes it prudent for us to undertake this policy review to determine whether any changes in our policy are appropriate.

Our policy goals for the countries of Latin America are to enhance democracy, including civilian control of the military, foster regional stability, transparency and confidence building, and ensure that the weapons modernization decisions of these countries address legitimate defense needs within their existing economic resources.

Any possible change made to our current arms export policy will be in accordance with these goals.

RUSSIA/NIS

Primakov Comments in Paris on possible May 27 Signing of NATO-Russia Accord

☐ Noted Foreign Minister's comments on prospects for reaching agreement on NATO-Russia relationship in advance of Madrid summit -- encouraged Russia taking positive tack toward issue.

☐ Primakov's idea interesting, we're prepared to consider late May meeting to sign Charter -- of course, first need to finish document, actually have agreement between NATO and Russia -- before we can set date, make concrete plans for any event.

If pressed on suggestion of Paris as venue and/or on May date

☐ Obviously first order of business to get agreement on document spelling out relationship; if that's successful, sure we with NATO members and Russia can settle on time and place.

NATO-Russia

☐ Consultations with Russia continue; NATO Secretary General Solana goes to Moscow again next week to discuss contents of proposed agreement with Primakov.

☐ Plans for NATO enlargement also proceeding on schedule -- Madrid summit on track; will issue first invitations to prospective new members.

☐ Enlargement part of broader effort to build comprehensive European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. It is going forward in way that does not threaten any nation's security, enhances stability in Europe.

☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.

☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is

good for United States, Russia and Europe.

Allegations of Corruption in Ukraine

☐ Seriously concerned about reports of corruption coming from wide range of American businesses operating in Ukraine. Have made clear to Ukrainian leadership that they must act decisively to create open, transparent climate for investment.

☐ Ukraine proposed measures to improve investment climate in legislative package now before parliament; passage of package would send signal that Ukraine is serious about investment; also a prerequisite to \$2.5 billion multilateral support package.

☐ Congress earmarked \$225 million in assistance to Ukraine for FY97, same level proposed for FY98; ability to use this effectively depends on whether Ukraine acts on serious reform agenda, combats crime; if progress not made, will discuss appropriate actions with Congress.

(If Raised -- Risk of U.S. Funds Diverted?)

☐ U.S. does not provide cash assistance to Ukraine; assistance provided in form of technical expertise, exchange programs, selected equipment and humanitarian commodities, all of which are carefully monitored.

Russia Signs Integration Treaty with Belarus

☐ Russia and Belarus signed Treaty April 2; not very different from last year's agreement; provides for territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence of Russia and Belarus; allows one month for public comment prior to submitting to parliaments for ratification.

☐ We have no objections in principle to integration as long as voluntary, mutually beneficial, done on basis of equality, does not harm relations with other countries or create new divisions among nations.

☐ Remain concerned about political developments in Belarus -- restrictions on personal and

press freedoms; unwarranted actions against foreigners, including recent expulsion of U.S. diplomat; recalled our Ambassador for consultations on situation; have cut U.S. assistance.

General Items

Helsinki Summit and Aftermath, Way Forward in U.S.-Russia Relations

☐ Welcomed Yeltsin's positive comments on summit results; Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

IMF Resumes Russia Program

☐ Welcome IMF Managing Director Camdessus' comments that Russia taking necessary reforms, management steps to resume IMF program. Shows confidence in new economic team. Expect decision to be made formally later this month by IMF board.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

BOSNIA

Humanitarian and Economic Assistance to Bosnia

□ The U.S. has provided extensive humanitarian and emergency assistance during and following the war in Bosnia, but the focus in 1997 and beyond is increasingly on economic reconstruction efforts and helping to foster a stable, democratic Bosnia with a functioning market economy.

□ U.S. humanitarian assistance to the Former Yugoslavia totaled about \$400 million in FY96, including USAID, State and DoD contributions. With peace now taking root and the focus shifting to economic reconstruction, we expect the humanitarian assistance totals to be substantially smaller in FY97 and will be even less in FY98.

□ In terms of economic reconstruction, we are now in the second year of a three year, \$600 million assistance program through USAID that has been approved by Congress. The FY98 request as part of this program is for about \$225 million. We, of course, also indirectly provide substantial economic assistance through support of international institutions such as the World Bank.

SFOR Mission Duration

□ We believe that SFOR's mission should be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to establish conditions to maintain security and stability without an outside military presence.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

□ We strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. Passage of the proposed legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world.

Radovan Karadzic

☐ Karadzic has been out of power for almost one year. In accordance with the agreement reached with Republika Srpska, he is banned from participating in any political activities or making public appearances. We continue to monitor the situation to ensure Republika Srpska lives up to this agreement. However, we will not be satisfied until Karadzic and all others indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal stand trial in The Hague.

War Criminals

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement includes provisions that are under the purview of the individual states and which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

CHINA

COSCO

Q: Does COSCO represent a threat to US national security? Does COSCO engage in predatory pricing and operate outside the normal rules and motivations of commercial behavior? Did COSCO decide to purchase ships from US yards to curry favor?

A: COSCO is the world's largest shipping line. It operates out of virtually every major West Coast port. And it moves much of the traffic in our trans-Pacific market.

We welcome its participation in our trading relationship. But like other companies, it must abide by our laws. I am confident that our Coast Guard, Customs and Maritime authorities will ensure that our laws are effectively enforced -- whether they involve COSCO or any other company.

Senator McCain has made some serious allegations with respect to COSCO. We are looking at those allegations. I'm not going to prejudge that review or its outcome.

UNHRC

Background: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain reportedly have decided not to co-sponsor a China resolution, which means that there will not be an EU-introduced resolution this year. However, any individual country can introduce the resolution, and we expect at least 10 EU countries to co-sponsor the resolution once it is introduced. Our position is that we are working with other countries on a resolution and will oppose China's no-action motion (which, if passed, would bar consideration of the resolution by the Commission). A vote is scheduled for the third week in April.

Points

- ☐ U.S. is working with other members of the Commission on a resolution concerning the human rights situation in China.
- ☐ U.S. will oppose motions designed to keep the resolution off the Commission's agenda.
- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ During his recent visit, Ambassador Richardson expressed the U.S. position in a statement to Commission members and met with several important delegations to convey our views.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May

6-10.

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

☐ We expect President and Hashimoto to meet at the end of April here at the White House and final details on date, time and likely topics will be available early next week.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.

☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.

☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.

☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.

☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.

☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.

- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is the significance of CIA's recently-released Khamisiyah white paper?

- ☐ CIA's white paper places approximately 40 just-declassified documents related to Khamisiyah into context and complements DOD's "Khamisiyah case narrative" released in FEB 97.
- ☐ My understanding is that the white paper and accompanying documents do not change the essence of what we know about what happened at Khamisiyah that might be related to undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses. Moreover, the white paper is distinct from the forthcoming CIA IG report which has not yet been released.
- ☐ The white paper does, however, highlight certain intelligence community shortfalls and "lessons learned" from an analytical perspective, and I understand CIA is addressing these.

What about the statement in the CIA white paper that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in JAN 96 on the Khamisiyah evidence?

- ☐ The CIA white paper (and one of the accompanying documents containing briefing slides) reflects the classified CIA brief the NSC staff received in JAN 96.
- ☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative and ongoing study of potential exposures -- the staff was told that information had come to light about the possibility of chemical munition storage and agent release at the Khamisiyah facility. This was briefed as preliminary information, and the NSC staff noted at the close of the brief that CIA needed to pursue this possibility aggressively together with DOD.
- ☐ Subsequent CIA and DOD efforts to investigate this concern eventually led to the JUN 96 DOD announcement of Khamisiyah.

The CIA Khamisiyah white paper mentions that an AUG 91

"highly-classified" intelligence assessment discussing chemical munitions storage at Khamisiyah was circulated among the entire national security team. Does this mean that the Bush Administration knew about the possibility of exposure of U.S. forces soon after the Gulf War?

- ☐ We have no information indicating that the Bush Administration knew of this possibility.
- ☐ To my knowledge, the assessment you are referring to focused on the issue of whether Khamisiyah was a known chemical munitions storage site, and did not even reflect the issue of the possible exposure of U.S. forces.

How does the CIA explain these 40 or so documents coming out now, months after we had various assurances that the Agency had done its best on behalf of Gulf War veterans?

- ☐ First, it's important to note that earlier statements were based on what was known at the time they were made. And the continuing DOD and CIA investigative efforts have identified new information, changing what we know over time.
- ☐ Finally, while these documents do not change our substantive understanding of the possible exposure of U.S. forces at Khamisiyah, they do indicate certain intelligence community shortfalls and "lessons learned" which CIA intends to act on.

The intelligence community admits making mistakes in its handling of the Gulf War illnesses investigation, and this latest batch of 40 or so documents clearly should have come out much sooner. With much of the related activity occurring during George Tenet's tenure at CIA, does the Director-designate retain the President's full confidence?

- ☐ Absolutely.
- ☐ The CIA has contributed a tremendous amount to our knowledge about chemical weapons in the Gulf War theater and specifically about exposure incidents that might be related to undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ George Tenet is fully supportive of the President's commitment to get out all the facts, and has increased the level of resources devoted to the Gulf War illnesses problem when new information has highlighted the need to do so.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there

seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.

☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:

☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.

☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process the President directed and remains fully committed to.

☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.

☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Should more veterans be warned now about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last NOV and DEC cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means.

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach; CIA and DOD are working together to resolve these expeditiously.

☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible.

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more

significant acute symptoms.

Do these "intelligence failures" -- specifically, getting an appropriate warning to troops in the field during the Gulf War and failing to uncover the possibility of chemical exposure at Khamisiyah for more than five years -- indicate that the intelligence community and/or its relationship to the military need to be reconsidered?

☐ At this juncture, I would say no. Mistakes were clearly made during this process, these mistakes have been acknowledged, and the agencies involved will seek to develop appropriate "lessons learned" for implementation.

☐ Beyond that, we need to await the outcome of the CIA IG and various other ongoing investigations to determine whether any other actions may be appropriate.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early JAN 97?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown prepared a recommendation -- which the President has accepted --

to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to DEC 31, 2001. This measure has been

strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they

need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ Overall, to date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses, with an extension of the presumptive period for undiagnosed illness compensation forthcoming soon; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

FAST TRACK

Q: It has been reported that the President is planning to delay his request for fast track

authority to accommodate the budget process. Is that true? Does this signal

Administration retreat on fast track? Has Gephardt scared the President off?

A: Not at all. The President is still firmly committed to seeking fast track authority to open foreign markets. It is critical if we want to continue creating good jobs for American workers.

Every President since Ford has had fast track authority for key periods, and the reasons for it now are more compelling than ever. Over 11 million U.S. jobs now depend on exports, and these jobs pay 13-16 percent more than the average U.S. job. Today, 95 percent of the world's consumers live outside the U.S., and the vast majority of those consumers live in the emerging and fastest growing markets of Latin America and Asia. We simply must continue to open these markets for U.S. exports if we are to succeed in the global economy.

We cannot afford inaction. If we are not seizing opportunities to break down trade barriers and open foreign markets, we can be sure other countries will act -- to the benefit of their companies and their workers.

The United States has nothing to fear. We are the most competitive large economy in the world as judged by independent experts. But our ability to define the nature of our trade relationships will in significant measure determine our leadership role in the next century. Fast track authority is the most important factor determining these relationships.

As you know, we have been consulting with Congress to develop bipartisan support for this legislation. We think that is the best way to build a strong foundation for this effort. We will continue to consult with Congress as to the substance, tactics and timing of the fast track initiative.

Q: It has been reported that the Administration is weighing the

dropping of labor and environmental goals from fast track trade authority legislation, a move certain to infuriate labor unions. Is this true?

A: As we have stated before, our goal is to build the broadest possible support for the fast track legislation. To that end, Ambassador Barshefsky and others have been consulting actively with members of Congress representing all points of view on this subject, and with all interested parties, including organized labor. We will continue to do so with the goal of enacting legislation that receives broad support.

ANGOLA

BACKGROUND

The events in Angola this week are a milestone in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, an agreement signed November 20, 1994, and which provides a blueprint for ending the civil war. Under its provisions, the soldiers of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) entered UN-administered quartering areas, disarmed, and will be either demobilized or integrated into the national army. In return for transforming itself into an unarmed political movement, UNITA will be able to participate in Angola's governance.

The process has been long and contentious. In February 1995, the United Nations authorized UNAVEM III, the UN Verification Mission in Angola, which is now the largest blue-helmet force in the world. As one of the official observers to the Lusaka Protocol, the United States has worked closely with the UN Special Representative and our observer partners, Portugal and Russia, to help implement the detailed provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

Q: The formation of a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation is to be sworn in tomorrow in Angola. What does this mean?

A: More than two years after the Government and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol, they will form a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation tomorrow in Luanda.

The Lusaka Protocol gives UNITA positions in the government, including four ministries, seven deputy ministries, eight ambassadorships, governorships, and other posts down to the communal and municipal levels.

Our delegation to this event is headed by Assistant Secretary of State Princeton Lyman, and includes Special Envoy Amb. Paul Hare, Amb. K. F. Inderfurth from our Mission to the United Nations, our present and past Ambassadors to Angola, Donald K. Steinberg and Edmund De Jarnette, and our Director for Southern African Affairs, Mr. John Blaney.

This follows the swearing-in of the UNITA deputies to the Angolan Parliament yesterday. UNITA won 70 of the 220 seats in the 1992 election, and 66 of them who were present yesterday took their seats.

We look forward to UNITA playing a constructive role in the government of Angola.

It is important the political parties in Angola continue to work together as the remaining steps of the Lusaka Protocol are implemented including incorporation of UNITA troops into the national army and extension of state administration.

Q: What is Jonas Savimbi's role in the process?

A: Under the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, the leader of the largest opposition party, UNITA, is to have a "special role." After a long negotiation, both sides agreed that Dr. Savimbi would become the official "Leader of the Opposition," a role which allows him access to the President along with certain rights and privileges including a house, staff, powers to travel throughout Angola, and personal protection. The legal statute for Dr. Savimbi's role was passed by the National Assembly on April 8.

Q: (If asked) Will Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, be in Luanda for the event tomorrow?

A: We understand that he may not come to Luanda, but hope that he will. The important point is that the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation is moving forward.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 10 April 97 17:27
FROM MacDonald, Bruce W.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: GUIDANCE UPDATE FOR FRIDAY [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Rubin, Eric S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Here is the Space Station guidance that OSTP worked out with McCurry's office earlier today.

[[APR10GUI.DOC : 4400 in APR10GUI.DOC]]

From: Rubin, Eric S.
To: @ALLNSC - NSC Staff
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: GUIDANCE UPDATE FOR FRIDAY [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, April 10, 1997 04:19 PM

[[APR10GUI.DOC : 4399 in APR10GUI.DOC]]

Please provide updates/changes/additions/deletions no later than 10 am Friday 4/11 to @PRESS. Many thanks.

P

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 10 April 97 17:5
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** APR10GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 10, 1997

Zaire

Mykonos Verdict

Middle East

Dalai Lama

CWC

Chile

Russia/NIS

Saudi Arabia/Khobar

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

Nazi Assets

Fast Track

Angola

ZAIRE

Q: Is the U.S. urging that Mobutu step down?

A: The U.S. has been pressing for a negotiated solution to the conflict in Zaire and for a cessation of hostilities. We recognize that any negotiated solution is likely to entail agreement on interim transitional government arrangements leading ultimately to elections. For negotiations to succeed, the government of President Mobutu as well as the rebels must recognize a need for a change in the status quo. We believe the era of Mobutuism is past, and we urge both sides to work together to find a negotiated solution to the current crisis in order to bring stable and representative government to Zaire.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the negotiations that concluded yesterday in South Africa?

A: We welcome reports of initial progress achieved in the first round of face-to-face talks between representatives of the

government of Zaire and the Alliance. The communique issued by both sides indicates several areas of agreement and offers some hope for an eventual negotiated settlement. We fully support the efforts of UN Special Representative Sahnoun and the government of South Africa and welcome the progress achieved thus far.

Q: Can you give an update on the fighting and the political situation?

A: We understand Lubumbashi was occupied by the Rebel Alliance April 9, although some pockets of resistance remain.

President Mobutu named General Likulia Bolongo as Prime Minister April 9. Likulia has said he will name his cabinet today, but we don't have anything on that yet. We understand Etienne Tshisekedi is at home today; he has not been detained.

We have seen reports that rebel leader Kabila has publicly announced there would be a pause in Alliance military operations for a period of three days during which he hoped President Mobutu would make direct contact with him to arrange for his (Mobutu's) departure.

Q: (If asked) Do you recognize Likulia as the Prime Minister?

A: We do not take a position on who the Zairian Prime Minister should be. That is an internal Zairian matter.

Q: Do we still recognize Mobutu as head of state?

A: Mobutu is still the President of Zaire.

We believe Mobutu's system of government is finished, however. We think it is time for a new democratic form of government in Zaire, arrived at through direct negotiations between the government and rebels leading to elections with all parties participating.

Q: Has Ambassador Simpson seen Mobutu in the past few days?

A: No.

(if asked) Our Ambassador has requested an appointment with Mobutu, but it has not been set yet. Simpson last met with Mobutu in January.

Q: How many official Americans are still in Zaire?

A: There are 52 official Americans in Zaire at this time.

Q: What is the threat status? Is it safe for Americans to remain?

A: The situation in Kinshasa is calm today.

The Department issued a travel warning for Zaire March 20 which strongly encouraged Americans to depart Zaire in light of the uncertain political and security situation and the potential for unrest throughout the country. The travel warning remains in effect.

Q: What is the evacuation status?

A: There is no change. Americans who wish to depart Zaire at this time are able to do so via

MYKONOS VERDICT

(Type in State guidance from Thursday)

MIDDLE EAST

Q: Any progress in getting the talks between the Palestinians and Israelis re-started? Will you exert more pressure on Netanyahu to stop construction at Har Homa?

A: I don't have a lot to add to what I've said in the last few days. The Palestinian negotiators will be meeting Secretary Albright and her team today. We'll be reviewing with them ideas for dealing with the current impasse. And we are continuing to consult with the Israeli government. This is not going to be a quick or easy process, but we'll just keep working on it.

IF PRESSED ON WHAT'S NEEDED FROM PARTIES

As I have made clear, we need to see two things to get this process back on track:

- o There needs to be zero tolerance for terror. Israel has a right to expect a 100% effort by the Palestinian Authority to prevent acts of terror and to take stern measures against those who seek to carry out such acts.

- o And a readiness by both parties to take steps which build confidence in the integrity of the negotiating process in order to move forward.

Q: What are the next steps? Is Albright going out? Ross?

A: We're considering that now.

Don't rule out sending the Secretary or Ross to the region for follow-up on the discussions here, but we have not yet made any final decisions.

Q: Do you agree or disagree with PM Netanyahu that Arafat has not kept his commitments, such as amending the Palestinian Charter, collecting weapons, etc.?

A: Obviously we expect the Palestinians to keep their commitments. That's an integral part of maintaining confidence between the two sides so that they can move forward.

IF PRESSED ON WHETHER ARAFAT IS DOING ENOUGH TO PREVENT TERRORISM

A:

I've made it clear repeatedly that Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority need to demonstrate zero tolerance for terrorism.

DALAI LAMA

☐ The Dalai Lama, religious leader of Tibetan Buddhists and Nobel laureate, is always a most welcome visitor to the United States.

☐ Americans have tremendous feelings of goodwill toward His Holiness and adherents of Tibetan Buddhism in the United States and elsewhere.

☐ The administration welcomes the Dalai Lama's visit and looks forward to discussions with him.

☐ He will be meeting members of the administration, but at what level and with whom has not been decided.

☐ As a religiously diverse nation, we also welcome the contributions to our nation's spiritual life of Americans who have embraced Tibetan Buddhism.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

- ☐ CWC enjoys broad, bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker, Ed Rowney, Paul Nitze and other leading Republican foreign policy experts support it.
- ☐ CWC will reduce the threat to our soldiers by requiring others to do what we are already doing -- getting out of the chemical weapons business.
- ☐ CWC will also make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons by eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.
- ☐ Recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But it is a key element of any effective response.
- ☐ Treaty has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been 13 Senate hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings of both members and staff. More than 1500 pages of information has been provided to the Senate. It's time for the Senate to debate and vote.
- ☐ If we do not ratify by April 29, Americans will be less secure. We will be denied access to CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons.
- ☐ The United States will also not have a seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as head of security, administration, and industry inspections, will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.
- ☐ Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.
- ☐ Finally, American chemical companies will begin losing sales to overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Industry

estimates this could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

HELMS AND CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC

task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will

also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

CHILE

Q: Has the Administration decided to permit the sale of advanced fighters to Chile?

A: No. The USG has decided to authorize the issuance of marketing licenses to companies which wish to compete in Chile's selection of fighter aircraft, while making clear to both the Government of Chile and to the companies involved that there has been no decision on whether to permit the sale itself.

The licenses are for marketing information only and do not constitute approval for an actual sale. A decision whether to permit such sale has not been made.

This decision to issue marketing licenses was made so as not to disadvantage U.S. companies in the competition. These licenses allow these companies to provide the Government of Chile with technical data on advanced fighter aircraft.

Q: Has the U.S. changed its Latin American conventional arms transfer policy?

A: No. As you know, the Administration is reviewing U.S. conventional arms transfer policy toward Latin America in the context of the significant political, economic, and military changes that have been occurring in the past ten years.

This policy review is on-going. While the review is underway current policy remains unchanged.

Q: What is the current policy on arms exports to Latin America?

A: Our policy worldwide is to consider pending arms transfers on a case-by-case basis.

Our long-standing policy in Latin America is, and remains, to address potential transfers in the context of restraint.

Q: Why is a review necessary?

A: The welcome expansion and strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions in recent years makes it prudent for us to undertake this policy review to determine whether any changes in our policy are appropriate.

Our policy goals for the countries of Latin America are to enhance democracy, including civilian control of the military, foster regional stability, transparency and confidence building, and ensure that the weapons modernization decisions of these countries address legitimate defense needs within their existing economic resources.

Any possible change made to our current arms export policy will be in accordance with these goals.

RUSSIA/NIS

Space Station

☐ We are committed to completing the International Space Station -- the most complex technological project ever undertaken. We have a partnership with 14 countries to build it, and Russia is an important partner in this program.

☐ Russia has experienced difficulties in financing their portion of the Space Station. As a result, NASA announced on April 9 that the first launch to begin assembly of the International Space Station would be delayed from November 1997 to no later than October 1998.

☐ We have long had, and discussed, a contingency plan to deal with

potential shortfalls in Russia's contributions to the Space Station. We are now beginning to implement the first stage of that plan to protect ourselves against the possibility of further delays. We plan to reallocate \$200 million in unspent funds from the Space Shuttle program to begin building and modifying U.S. hardware to serve as a temporary substitute for the delayed Russian hardware. (IF ASKED: This reallocation will have no operational or safety impact on the Space Shuttle program. The funds represent unanticipated savings resulting from management changes in that program.)

☐ We are still hopeful that Russia will be able to deliver on their Space Station commitments. We must not lose sight of the fact that we have gained enormously from our expanded cooperation in space, particularly in the Shuttle-Mir program.

☐ If Russia continues to have trouble meeting their program commitments, we are prepared to implement further contingency steps in a measured, stepwise fashion that will allow us to move forward with the program.

☐ We are committed to working closely with the Congress and our Russian partners as we work through these challenges.

Primakov Comments in Paris on possible May 27 Signing of NATO-Russia Accord

☐ Noted Foreign Minister's comments on prospects for reaching agreement on NATO-Russia relationship in advance of Madrid summit -- encouraged Russia taking positive tack toward issue.

☐ Primakov's idea interesting, we're prepared to consider late May meeting to sign Charter -- of course, first need to finish document, actually have agreement between NATO and Russia -- before we can set date, make concrete plans for any event.

If pressed on suggestion of Paris as venue and/or on May date

☐ Obviously first order of business to get agreement on document spelling out relationship; if that's successful, sure we with NATO members and Russia can settle on time and place.

NATO-Russia

☐ Consultations with Russia continue; NATO Secretary General Solana goes to Moscow again next week to discuss contents of proposed agreement with Primakov.

☐ Plans for NATO enlargement also proceeding on schedule -- Madrid summit on track; will issue first invitations to prospective new members.

☐ Enlargement part of broader effort to build comprehensive European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. It is going forward in way that does not threaten any nation's security, enhances stability in Europe.

☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.

☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

Allegations of Corruption in Ukraine

☐ Seriously concerned about reports of corruption coming from wide range of American businesses operating in Ukraine. Have made clear to Ukrainian leadership that they must act decisively to create open, transparent climate for investment.

☐ Ukraine proposed measures to improve investment climate in legislative package now before parliament; passage of package would send signal that Ukraine is serious about investment; also a prerequisite to \$2.5 billion multilateral support package.

☐ Congress earmarked \$225 million in assistance to Ukraine for FY97, same level proposed for FY98; ability to use this effectively depends on whether Ukraine acts on serious reform

agenda, combats crime; if progress not made, will discuss appropriate actions with Congress.

(If Raised -- Risk of U.S. Funds Diverted?)

☐ U.S. does not provide cash assistance to Ukraine; assistance provided in form of technical expertise, exchange programs, selected equipment and humanitarian commodities, all of which are carefully monitored.

Russia Signs Integration Treaty with Belarus

☐ Russia and Belarus signed Treaty April 2; not very different from last year's agreement; provides for territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence of Russia and Belarus; allows one month for public comment prior to submitting to parliaments for ratification.

☐ We have no objections in principle to integration as long as voluntary, mutually beneficial, done on basis of equality, does not harm relations with other countries or create new divisions among nations.

☐ Remain concerned about political developments in Belarus -- restrictions on personal and press freedoms; unwarranted actions against foreigners, including recent expulsion of U.S. diplomat; recalled our Ambassador for consultations on situation; have cut U.S. assistance.

General Items

Helsinki Summit and Aftermath, Way Forward in U.S.-Russia Relations

☐ Welcomed Yeltsin's positive comments on summit results; Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press

conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

IMF Resumes Russia Program

☐ Welcome IMF Managing Director Camdessus' comments that Russia taking necessary reforms, management steps to resume IMF program. Shows confidence in new economic team. Expect decision to be made formally later this month by IMF board.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

BOSNIA

Humanitarian and Economic Assistance to Bosnia

□ The U.S. has provided extensive humanitarian and emergency assistance during and following the war in Bosnia, but the focus in 1997 and beyond is increasingly on economic reconstruction efforts and helping to foster a stable, democratic Bosnia with a functioning market economy.

□ U.S. humanitarian assistance to the Former Yugoslavia totaled about \$400 million in FY96, including USAID, State and DoD contributions. With peace now taking root and the focus shifting to economic reconstruction, we expect the humanitarian assistance totals to be substantially smaller in FY97 and will be even less in FY98.

☐ In terms of economic reconstruction, we are now in the second year of a three year, \$600 million assistance program through USAID that has been approved by Congress. The FY98 request as part of this program is for about \$225 million. We, of course, also indirectly provide substantial economic assistance through support of international institutions such as the World Bank.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We believe that SFOR's mission should be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to establish conditions to maintain security and stability without an outside military presence.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ We strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. Passage of the proposed legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world.

Radovan Karadzic

☐ Karadzic has been out of power for almost one year. In accordance with the agreement reached with Republika Srpska, he is banned from participating in any political activities or making public appearances. We continue to monitor the situation to ensure Republika Srpska lives up to this agreement. However, we will not be satisfied until Karadzic and all others indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal stand trial in The Hague.

War Criminals

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are

reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement includes provisions that are under the purview of the individual states and which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

CHINA

COSCO

Q: Does COSCO represent a threat to US national security? Does COSCO engage in predatory pricing and operate outside the normal rules and motivations of commercial behavior? Did COSCO decide to purchase ships from US yards to curry favor?

A: COSCO is the world's largest shipping line. It operates out of virtually every major West Coast port. And it moves much of the traffic in our trans-Pacific market.

We welcome its participation in our trading relationship. But like other companies, it

must abide by our laws. I am confident that our Coast Guard, Customs and Maritime authorities will ensure that our laws are effectively enforced -- whether they involve COSCO or any other company.

Senator McCain has made some serious allegations with respect to COSCO. We are looking at those allegations. I'm not going to prejudge that review or its outcome.

UNHRC

Background: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain reportedly have decided not to co-sponsor a China resolution, which means that there will not be an EU-introduced resolution this year. However, any individual country can introduce the resolution, and we expect at least 10 EU countries to co-sponsor the resolution once it is introduced. Our position is that we are working with other countries on a resolution and will oppose China's no-action motion (which, if passed, would bar consideration of the resolution by the Commission). A vote is scheduled for the third week in April.

Points

- ☐ U.S. is working with other members of the Commission on a resolution concerning the human rights situation in China.
- ☐ U.S. will oppose motions designed to keep the resolution off the Commission's agenda.
- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ During his recent visit, Ambassador Richardson expressed the U.S. position in a statement to Commission members and met with several important delegations to convey our views.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.
- ☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.
- ☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime

Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

☐ We expect President and Hashimoto to meet at the end of April here at the White House and final details on date, time and likely topics will be available early next week.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.

☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.

☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.

☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.

☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.

☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.

☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is the significance of CIA's recently-released Khamisiyah white paper?

☐ CIA's white paper places approximately 40 just-declassified documents related to Khamisiyah into context and complements DOD's "Khamisiyah case narrative" released in FEB 97.

☐ My understanding is that the white paper and accompanying documents do not change the essence of what we know about what happened at Khamisiyah that might be related to undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses. Moreover, the white paper is

distinct from the forthcoming
CIA IG report which has not yet been released.
☐ The white paper does, however, highlight certain intelligence
community shortfalls and
"lessons learned" from an analytical perspective, and I
understand CIA is addressing these.

What about the statement in the CIA white paper that the CIA
briefed the NSC staff in JAN 96
on the Khamisiyah evidence?

☐ The CIA white paper (and one of the accompanying documents
containing briefing slides)
reflects the classified CIA brief the NSC staff received in JAN
96.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's
declassification initiative and ongoing
study of potential exposures -- the staff was told that
information had come to light about the
possibility of chemical munition storage and agent release at the
Khamisiyah facility. This
was briefed as preliminary information, and the NSC staff noted
at the close of the brief that
CIA needed to pursue this possibility aggressively together with
DOD.

☐ Subsequent CIA and DOD efforts to investigate this concern
eventually led to the JUN 96
DOD announcement of Khamisiyah.

The CIA Khamisiyah white paper mentions that an AUG 91
"highly-classified" intelligence
assessment discussing chemical munitions storage at Khamisiyah
was circulated among the entire
national security team. Does this mean that the Bush
Administration knew about the possibility
of exposure of U.S. forces soon after the Gulf War?

☐ We have no information indicating that the Bush Administration
knew of this possibility.

☐ To my knowledge, the assessment you are referring to focused on
the issue of whether
Khamisiyah was a known chemical munitions storage site, and did
not even reflect the issue of
the possible exposure of U.S. forces.

How does the CIA explain these 40 or so documents coming out now,
months after we had
various assurances that the Agency had done its best on behalf of
Gulf War veterans?

☐ First, it's important to note that earlier statements were based
on what was known at the time
they were made. And the continuing DOD and CIA investigative

efforts have identified new information, changing what we know over time.

- ☐ Finally, while these documents do not change our substantive understanding of the possible exposure of U.S. forces at Khamisiyah, they do indicate certain intelligence community shortfalls and "lessons learned" which CIA intends to act on.

The intelligence community admits making mistakes in its handling of the Gulf War illnesses investigation, and this latest batch of 40 or so documents clearly should have come out much sooner. With much of the related activity occurring during George Tenet's tenure at CIA, does the Director-designate retain the President's full confidence?

- ☐ Absolutely.
- ☐ The CIA has contributed a tremendous amount to our knowledge about chemical weapons in the Gulf War theater and specifically about exposure incidents that might be related to undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ George Tenet is fully supportive of the President's commitment to get out all the facts, and has increased the level of resources devoted to the Gulf War illnesses problem when new information has highlighted the need to do so.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
- ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
- ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process the President directed and remains fully committed to.
- ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
- ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Should more veterans be warned now about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last NOV and DEC cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means.
- ☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.
- ☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach; CIA and DOD are working together to resolve these expeditiously.
- ☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible.
- ☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

Do these "intelligence failures" -- specifically, getting an appropriate warning to troops in the field during the Gulf War and failing to uncover the possibility of chemical exposure at Khamisiyah for more than five years -- indicate that the intelligence community and/or its relationship to the military need to be reconsidered?

- ☐ At this juncture, I would say no. Mistakes were clearly made during this process, these mistakes have been acknowledged, and the agencies involved will seek to develop appropriate "lessons learned" for implementation.
- ☐ Beyond that, we need to await the outcome of the CIA IG and various other ongoing investigations to determine whether any other actions may be appropriate.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives

announced during the roll-out of the
 PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early JAN 97?

- ☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.
- ☐ Leading examples:
 - ☐ Secretary Brown prepared a recommendation -- which the President has accepted --
 to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to DEC 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
- ☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.
- ☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ Overall, to date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses, with an extension of the presumptive period for undiagnosed illness compensation forthcoming soon; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main

Administration spokesman on this issue is
U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

FAST TRACK

Q: It has been reported that the President is planning to delay his request for fast track authority to accommodate the budget process. Is that true? Does this signal Administration retreat on fast track? Has Gephardt scared the President off?

A: Not at all. The President is still firmly committed to seeking fast track authority to open foreign markets. It is critical if we want to continue creating good jobs for American workers.

Every President since Ford has had fast track authority for key periods, and the reasons for it now are more compelling than ever. Over 11 million U.S. jobs now depend on exports, and these jobs pay 13-16 percent more than the average U.S. job. Today, 95 percent of the world's consumers live outside the U.S., and the vast majority of those consumers live in the emerging and fastest growing markets of Latin America and Asia.

We simply must continue to open these markets for U.S. exports if we are to succeed in the global economy.

We cannot afford inaction. If we are not seizing opportunities to break down trade barriers and open foreign markets, we can be sure other countries will act -- to the benefit of their companies and their workers.

The United States has nothing to fear. We are the most competitive large economy in the world as judged by independent experts. But our ability to define the nature of our trade relationships will in significant measure determine our leadership role in the next century. Fast track authority is the most important factor determining these relationships.

As you know, we have been consulting with Congress to develop bipartisan support for this legislation. We think that is the best way to build a strong foundation for this effort. We will continue to consult with Congress as to the substance, tactics and timing of the fast track initiative.

Q: It has been reported that the Administration is weighing the dropping of labor and environmental goals from fast track trade authority legislation, a move certain to infuriate labor unions. Is this true?

A: As we have stated before, our goal is to build the broadest possible support for the fast track legislation. To that end, Ambassador Barshefsky and others have been consulting actively with members of Congress representing all points of view on this subject, and with all interested parties, including organized labor. We will continue to do so with the goal of enacting legislation that receives broad support.

ANGOLA

BACKGROUND

The events in Angola this week are a milestone in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, an agreement signed November 20, 1994, and which provides a blueprint for ending the civil war. Under its provisions, the soldiers of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) entered UN-administered quartering areas, disarmed, and will be either demobilized or integrated into the national army. In return for transforming itself into an unarmed political movement, UNITA will be able to participate in Angola's governance.

The process has been long and contentious. In February 1995, the United Nations authorized UNAVEM III, the UN Verification Mission in Angola, which is now the largest blue-helmet force in the world. As one of the official observers to the Lusaka Protocol, the United States has worked closely with the UN Special Representative and our observer partners, Portugal and Russia, to help implement the detailed provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

Q: The formation of a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation is to be sworn in tomorrow in Angola. What does this mean?

A: More than two years after the Government and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol, they will form a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation tomorrow in Luanda.

The Lusaka Protocol gives UNITA positions in the government, including four ministries, seven deputy ministries, eight ambassadorships, governorships, and other posts down to the communal and municipal levels.

Our delegation to this event is headed by Assistant Secretary of State Princeton Lyman, and includes Special Envoy Amb. Paul Hare, Amb. K. F. Inderfurth from our Mission to the United Nations, our present and past Ambassadors to Angola, Donald K. Steinberg and Edmund De Jarnette, and our Director for Southern African Affairs, Mr. John Blaney.

This follows the swearing-in of the UNITA deputies to the Angolan Parliament yesterday. UNITA won 70 of the 220 seats in the 1992 election, and 66 of them who were present yesterday took their seats.

We look forward to UNITA playing a constructive role in the government of Angola.

It is important the political parties in Angola continue to work together as the remaining steps of the Lusaka Protocol are implemented including incorporation of UNITA troops into the national army and extension of state administration.

Q: What is Jonas Savimbi's role in the process?

A: Under the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, the leader of the largest opposition party, UNITA, is to have a "special role." After a long negotiation, both sides agreed that Dr. Savimbi would become the official "Leader of the Opposition," a role which allows him access to the President along with certain rights and privileges including a house, staff, powers to travel throughout Angola, and personal protection. The legal statute for Dr. Savimbi's role was passed by the National Assembly on April 8.

Q: (If asked) Will Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, be in Luanda for the event tomorrow?

A: We understand that he may not come to Luanda, but hope that he will. The important point is that the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation is moving forward.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

10 April 97 17:16

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

APR10GU1.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 10, 1997

Zaire

Mykonos Verdict

Middle East

Dalai Lama

CWC

Chile

Russia/NIS

Saudi Arabia/Khobar

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

Nazi Assets

Fast Track

Angola

ZAIRE

Q: Is the U.S. urging that Mobutu step down?

A: The U.S. has been pressing for a negotiated solution to the conflict in Zaire and for a cessation of hostilities. We recognize that any negotiated solution is likely to entail agreement on interim transitional government arrangements leading ultimately to elections. For negotiations to succeed, the government of President Mobutu as well as the rebels must recognize a need for a change in the status quo. We believe the era of Mobutuism is past, and we urge both sides to work together to find a negotiated solution to the current crisis in order to bring stable and representative government to Zaire.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the negotiations that concluded yesterday in South Africa?

A: We welcome reports of initial progress achieved in the first round of face-to-face talks between representatives of the government of Zaire and the Alliance. The communique issued by both sides indicates several areas of agreement and offers some hope for an eventual negotiated settlement. We fully support the efforts of UN Special Representative Sahnoun and the government of South Africa and welcome the progress achieved thus

far.

Q: Can you give an update on the fighting and the political situation?

A: We understand Lubumbashi was occupied by the Rebel Alliance April 9, although some pockets of resistance remain.

President Mobutu named General Likulia Bolongo as Prime Minister April 9. Likulia has said he will name his cabinet today, but we don't have anything on that yet. We understand Etienne Tshisekedi is at home today; he has not been detained.

We have seen reports that rebel leader Kabila has publicly announced there would be a pause in Alliance military operations for a period of three days during which he hoped President Mobutu would make direct contact with him to arrange for his (Mobutu's) departure.

Q: (If asked) Do you recognize Likulia as the Prime Minister?

A: We do not take a position on who the Zairian Prime Minister should be. That is an internal Zairian matter.

Q: Do we still recognize Mobutu as head of state?

A: Mobutu is still the President of Zaire.

We believe Mobutu's system of government is finished, however. We think it is time for a new democratic form of government in Zaire, arrived at through direct negotiations between the government and rebels leading to elections with all parties participating.

Q: Has Ambassador Simpson seen Mobutu in the past few days?

A: No.

(if asked) Our Ambassador has requested an appointment with Mobutu, but it has not been set yet. Simpson last met with Mobutu in January.

Q: How many official Americans are still in Zaire?

A: There are 52 official Americans in Zaire at this time.

Q: What is the threat status? Is it safe for Americans to remain?

A: The situation in Kinshasa is calm today.

The Department issued a travel warning for Zaire March 20 which strongly encouraged Americans to depart Zaire in light of the uncertain political and security situation and the potential for unrest throughout the country. The travel warning remains in effect.

Q: What is the evacuation status?

A: There is no change. Americans who wish to depart Zaire at this time are able to do so via

MYKONOS VERDICT

(Type in State guidance from Thursday)

MIDDLE EAST

Q: Any progress in getting the talks between the Palestinians and Israelis re-started? Will you exert more pressure on Netanyahu to stop construction at Har Homa?

A: I don't have a lot to add to what I've said in the last few days. The Palestinian negotiators will be meeting Secretary Albright and her team today. We'll be reviewing with them ideas for dealing with the current impasse. And we are continuing to consult with the Israeli government. This is not going to be a quick or easy process, but we'll just keep working on it.

IF PRESSED ON WHAT'S NEEDED FROM PARTIES

As I have made clear, we need to see two things to get this process back on track:

- o There needs to be zero tolerance for terror. Israel has a right to expect a 100% effort by the Palestinian Authority to prevent acts of terror and to take stern measures against those who seek to carry out such acts.

- o And a readiness by both parties to take steps which build confidence in the integrity of the negotiating process in order to move forward.

Q: What are the next steps? Is Albright going out? Ross?

A: We're considering that now.

Don't rule out sending the Secretary or Ross to the region for follow-up on the discussions here, but we have not yet made any

final decisions.

Q: Do you agree or disagree with PM Netanyahu that Arafat has not kept his commitments, such as amending the Palestinian Charter, collecting weapons, etc.?

A: Obviously we expect the Palestinians to keep their commitments. That's an integral part of maintaining confidence between the two sides so that they can move forward.

IF PRESSED ON WHETHER ARAFAT IS DOING ENOUGH TO PREVENT TERRORISM

A:

I've made it clear repeatedly that Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority need to demonstrate zero tolerance for terrorism.

DALAI LAMA

☐ The Dalai Lama, religious leader of Tibetan Buddhists and Nobel laureate, is always a most welcome visitor to the United States.

☐ Americans have tremendous feelings of goodwill toward His Holiness and adherents of Tibetan Buddhism in the United States and elsewhere.

☐ The administration welcomes the Dalai Lama's visit and looks forward to discussions with him.

☐ He will be meeting members of the administration, but at what level and with whom has not been decided.

☐ As a religiously diverse nation, we also welcome the contributions to our nation's spiritual life of Americans who have embraced Tibetan Buddhism.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

☐ CWC enjoys broad, bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Jim

Baker, Ed Rowney, Paul Nitze and other leading Republican foreign policy experts support it.

☐ CWC will reduce the threat to our soldiers by requiring others to do what we are already doing -- getting out of the chemical weapons business.

☐ CWC will also make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons by eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.

☐ Recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But it is a key element of any effective response.

☐ Treaty has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been 13 Senate hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings of both members and staff. More than 1500 pages of information has been provided to the Senate. It's time for the Senate to debate and vote.

☐ If we do not ratify by April 29, Americans will be less secure. We will be denied access to CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons.

☐ The United States will also not have a seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as head of security, administration, and industry inspections, will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.

☐ Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.

☐ Finally, American chemical companies will begin losing sales to overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Industry estimates this could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

HELMS AND CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and

that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors,

as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

CHILE

Q: Has the Administration decided to permit the sale of advanced fighters to Chile?

A: No. The USG has decided to authorize the issuance of marketing licenses to companies which wish to compete in Chile's selection of fighter aircraft, while making clear to both the Government of Chile and to the companies involved that there has been no decision on whether to permit the sale itself.

The licenses are for marketing information only and do not constitute approval for an actual sale. A decision whether to permit such sale has not been made.

This decision to issue marketing licenses was made so as not to disadvantage U.S. companies in the competition. These licenses allow these companies to provide the Government of Chile with technical data on advanced fighter aircraft.

Q: Has the U.S. changed its Latin American conventional arms transfer policy?

A: No. As you know, the Administration is reviewing U.S. conventional arms transfer policy toward Latin America in the context of the significant political, economic, and military changes that have been occurring in the past ten years.

This policy review is on-going. While the review is underway current policy remains unchanged.

Q: What is the current policy on arms exports to Latin America?

A: Our policy worldwide is to consider pending arms transfers on a case-by-case basis. Our long-standing policy in Latin America is, and remains, to address potential transfers in the context of restraint.

Q: Why is a review necessary?

A: The welcome expansion and strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions in recent years makes it prudent for us to undertake this policy review to determine whether any changes in our policy are appropriate.

Our policy goals for the countries of Latin America are to enhance democracy, including civilian control of the military, foster regional stability, transparency and confidence building, and ensure that the weapons modernization decisions of these countries address legitimate defense needs within their existing economic resources.

Any possible change made to our current arms export policy will be in accordance with these goals.

RUSSIA/NIS

Space Station

☐ We are committed to completing the International Space Station -- the most complex technical project ever undertaken. We have a partnership with 14 countries to build it, and Russia is an important partner in this program.

☐ Russia has experienced difficulties in financing their portion of the Space Station. As a result, NASA announced on April 9 that the first launch to begin assembly of the International Space Station would be delayed from November 1997 to no later than October 1998.

☐ We have long had, and discussed, a contingency plan to deal with potential shortfalls in Russia's contributions to the Space Station. We are now beginning to implement the first stage of that plan to protect ourselves against the possibility of further delays. We plan to

reallocate \$200 million in unspent funds from the Space Shuttle program to begin building and modifying U.S. hardware to serve as a temporary substitute for the delayed Russian hardware. (IF ASKED: This reallocation will have no operational or safety impact on the Space Shuttle program. The funds represent unanticipated savings resulting from management changes in that program.)

☐ We are still hopeful that Russia will be able to deliver on their Space Station commitments. We must not lose sight of the fact that we have gained enormously from our expanded cooperation in space, particularly in the Shuttle-Mir program.

☐ If Russia continues to have trouble meeting their program commitments, we are prepared to implement further contingency steps in a measured, stepwise fashion that will allow us to move forward with the program.

☐ We are committed to working closely with the Congress and our Russian partners as we work through these challenges.

Primakov Comments in Paris on possible May 27 Signing of NATO-Russia Accord

☐ Noted Foreign Minister's comments on prospects for reaching agreement on NATO-Russia relationship in advance of Madrid summit -- encouraged Russia taking positive tack toward issue.

☐ Primakov's idea interesting, we're prepared to consider late May meeting to sign Charter -- of course, first need to finish document, actually have agreement between NATO and Russia -- before we can set date, make concrete plans for any event.

If pressed on suggestion of Paris as venue and/or on May date

☐ Obviously first order of business to get agreement on document spelling out relationship; if that's successful, sure we with NATO members and Russia can settle on time and place.

NATO-Russia

- ☐ Consultations with Russia continue; NATO Secretary General Solana goes to Moscow again next week to discuss contents of proposed agreement with Primakov.
- ☐ Plans for NATO enlargement also proceeding on schedule -- Madrid summit on track; will issue first invitations to prospective new members.
- ☐ Enlargement part of broader effort to build comprehensive European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. It is going forward in way that does not threaten any nation's security, enhances stability in Europe.
- ☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.
- ☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

Allegations of Corruption in Ukraine

- ☐ Seriously concerned about reports of corruption coming from wide range of American businesses operating in Ukraine. Have made clear to Ukrainian leadership that they must act decisively to create open, transparent climate for investment.
- ☐ Ukraine proposed measures to improve investment climate in legislative package now before parliament; passage of package would send signal that Ukraine is serious about investment; also a prerequisite to \$2.5 billion multilateral support package.
- ☐ Congress earmarked \$225 million in assistance to Ukraine for FY97, same level proposed for FY98; ability to use this effectively depends on whether Ukraine acts on serious reform agenda, combats crime; if progress not made, will discuss appropriate actions with Congress.

(If Raised -- Risk of U.S. Funds Diverted?)

☐ U.S. does not provide cash assistance to Ukraine; assistance provided in form of technical expertise, exchange programs, selected equipment and humanitarian commodities, all of which are carefully monitored.

Russia Signs Integration Treaty with Belarus

☐ Russia and Belarus signed Treaty April 2; not very different from last year's agreement; provides for territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence of Russia and Belarus; allows one month for public comment prior to submitting to parliaments for ratification.

☐ We have no objections in principle to integration as long as voluntary, mutually beneficial, done on basis of equality, does not harm relations with other countries or create new divisions among nations.

☐ Remain concerned about political developments in Belarus -- restrictions on personal and press freedoms; unwarranted actions against foreigners, including recent expulsion of U.S. diplomat; recalled our Ambassador for consultations on situation; have cut U.S. assistance.

General Items

Helsinki Summit and Aftermath, Way Forward in U.S.-Russia Relations

☐ Welcomed Yeltsin's positive comments on summit results; Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

IMF Resumes Russia Program

□ Welcome IMF Managing Director Camdessus' comments that Russia taking necessary reforms, management steps to resume IMF program. Shows confidence in new economic team. Expect decision to be made formally later this month by IMF board.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

BOSNIA

Humanitarian and Economic Assistance to Bosnia

□ The U.S. has provided extensive humanitarian and emergency assistance during and following the war in Bosnia, but the focus in 1997 and beyond is increasingly on economic reconstruction efforts and helping to foster a stable, democratic Bosnia with a functioning market economy.

□ U.S. humanitarian assistance to the Former Yugoslavia totaled about \$400 million in FY96, including USAID, State and DoD contributions. With peace now taking root and the focus shifting to economic reconstruction, we expect the humanitarian assistance totals to be substantially smaller in FY97 and will be even less in FY98.

□ In terms of economic reconstruction, we are now in the second year of a three year, \$600 million assistance program through USAID that has been approved by Congress. The FY98 request as part of this program is for about \$225 million. We,

of course, also indirectly provide substantial economic assistance through support of international institutions such as the World Bank.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We believe that SFOR's mission should be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to establish conditions to maintain security and stability without an outside military presence.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ We strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. Passage of the proposed legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world.

Radovan Karadzic

☐ Karadzic has been out of power for almost one year. In accordance with the agreement reached with Republika Srpska, he is banned from participating in any political activities or making public appearances. We continue to monitor the situation to ensure Republika Srpska lives up to this agreement. However, we will not be satisfied until Karadzic and all others indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal stand trial in The Hague.

War Criminals

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement includes provisions that are under the purview of the individual states and which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

CHINA

COSCO

Q: Does COSCO represent a threat to US national security? Does COSCO engage in predatory pricing and operate outside the normal rules and motivations of commercial behavior? Did COSCO decide to purchase ships from US yards to curry favor?

A: COSCO is the world's largest shipping line. It operates out of virtually every major West Coast port. And it moves much of the traffic in our trans-Pacific market.

We welcome its participation in our trading relationship. But like other companies, it must abide by our laws. I am confident that our Coast Guard, Customs and Maritime authorities will ensure that our laws are effectively enforced -- whether they involve COSCO or any other company.

Senator McCain has made some serious allegations with respect to COSCO. We are looking at those allegations. I'm not going to prejudge that review or its outcome.

UNHRC

Background: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain reportedly have decided not to co-sponsor a China resolution, which means that there will not be an EU-introduced resolution this year. However, any individual country can introduce the resolution, and we expect at least 10 EU countries to co-sponsor the resolution once it is introduced. Our position is that we are working with other countries on a resolution and will oppose China's no-action motion (which, if passed, would bar consideration of the resolution by the Commission). A vote is scheduled for the third week in April.

Points

- ☐ U.S. is working with other members of the Commission on a resolution concerning the human rights situation in China.
- ☐ U.S. will oppose motions designed to keep the resolution off the Commission's agenda.
- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.

- ☐ During his recent visit, Ambassador Richardson expressed the U.S. position in a statement to Commission members and met with several important delegations to convey our views.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.
- ☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.
- ☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

- ☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM

Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

☐ We expect President and Hashimoto to meet at the end of April here at the White House and final details on date, time and likely topics will be available early next week.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.

☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.

☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.

☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.
- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is the significance of CIA's recently-released Khamisiyah white paper?

- ☐ CIA's white paper places approximately 40 just-declassified documents related to Khamisiyah into context and complements DOD's "Khamisiyah case narrative" released in FEB 97.
- ☐ My understanding is that the white paper and accompanying documents do not change the essence of what we know about what happened at Khamisiyah that might be related to undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses. Moreover, the white paper is distinct from the forthcoming CIA IG report which has not yet been released.
- ☐ The white paper does, however, highlight certain intelligence community shortfalls and "lessons learned" from an analytical perspective, and I

understand CIA is addressing these.

What about the statement in the CIA white paper that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in JAN 96 on the Khamisiyah evidence?

☐ The CIA white paper (and one of the accompanying documents containing briefing slides) reflects the classified CIA brief the NSC staff received in JAN 96.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative and ongoing study of potential exposures -- the staff was told that information had come to light about the possibility of chemical munition storage and agent release at the Khamisiyah facility. This was briefed as preliminary information, and the NSC staff noted at the close of the brief that CIA needed to pursue this possibility aggressively together with DOD.

☐ Subsequent CIA and DOD efforts to investigate this concern eventually led to the JUN 96 DOD announcement of Khamisiyah.

The CIA Khamisiyah white paper mentions that an AUG 91 "highly-classified" intelligence assessment discussing chemical munitions storage at Khamisiyah was circulated among the entire national security team. Does this mean that the Bush Administration knew about the possibility of exposure of U.S. forces soon after the Gulf War?

☐ We have no information indicating that the Bush Administration knew of this possibility.

☐ To my knowledge, the assessment you are referring to focused on the issue of whether Khamisiyah was a known chemical munitions storage site, and did not even reflect the issue of the possible exposure of U.S. forces.

How does the CIA explain these 40 or so documents coming out now, months after we had various assurances that the Agency had done its best on behalf of Gulf War veterans?

☐ First, it's important to note that earlier statements were based on what was known at the time they were made. And the continuing DOD and CIA investigative efforts have identified new information, changing what we know over time.

☐ Finally, while these documents do not change our substantive understanding of the possible exposure of U.S. forces at Khamisiyah, they do indicate certain

intelligence community
shortfalls and "lessons learned" which CIA intends to act on.

The intelligence community admits making mistakes in its handling of the Gulf War illnesses investigation, and this latest batch of 40 or so documents clearly should have come out much sooner. With much of the related activity occurring during George Tenet's tenure at CIA, does the Director-designate retain the President's full confidence?

☐ Absolutely.

☐ The CIA has contributed a tremendous amount to our knowledge about chemical weapons in the Gulf War theater and specifically about exposure incidents that might be related to undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

☐ George Tenet is fully supportive of the President's commitment to get out all the facts, and has increased the level of resources devoted to the Gulf War illnesses problem when new information has highlighted the need to do so.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.

☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:

☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.

☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process the President directed and remains fully committed to.

☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.

☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Should more veterans be warned now about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last NOV and DEC cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War

veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means.

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach; CIA and DOD are working together to resolve these expeditiously.

☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible.

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

Do these "intelligence failures" -- specifically, getting an appropriate warning to troops in the field during the Gulf War and failing to uncover the possibility of chemical exposure at Khamisiyah for more than five years -- indicate that the intelligence community and/or its relationship to the military need to be reconsidered?

☐ At this juncture, I would say no. Mistakes were clearly made during this process, these mistakes have been acknowledged, and the agencies involved will seek to develop appropriate "lessons learned" for implementation.

☐ Beyond that, we need to await the outcome of the CIA IG and various other ongoing investigations to determine whether any other actions may be appropriate.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early JAN 97?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.

☐ Leading examples:

- ☐ Secretary Brown prepared a recommendation -- which the President has accepted -- to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to DEC 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
- ☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.
- ☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ Overall, to date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses, with an extension of the presumptive period for undiagnosed illness compensation forthcoming soon; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

- ☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of

historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated..

This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

FAST TRACK

Q: It has been reported that the President is planning to delay his request for fast track authority to accommodate the budget process. Is that true? Does this signal Administration retreat on fast track? Has Gephardt scared the President off?

A: Not at all. The President is still firmly committed to seeking fast track authority to open foreign markets. It is critical if we want to continue creating good jobs for American workers.

Every President since Ford has had fast track authority for key periods, and the reasons for it now are more compelling than ever. Over 11 million U.S. jobs now depend on exports, and these jobs pay 13-16 percent more than the average U.S. job. Today, 95 percent of the world's consumers live outside the U.S., and the vast majority of those consumers live in the emerging and fastest growing markets of Latin America and Asia. We simply must continue to open these markets for U.S. exports if we are to succeed in the global economy.

We cannot afford inaction. If we are not seizing opportunities

to break down trade barriers and open foreign markets, we can be sure other countries will act -- to the benefit of their companies and their workers.

The United States has nothing to fear. We are the most competitive large economy in the world as judged by independent experts. But our ability to define the nature of our trade relationships will in significant measure determine our leadership role in the next century. Fast track authority is the most important factor determining these relationships.

As you know, we have been consulting with Congress to develop bipartisan support for this legislation. We think that is the best way to build a strong foundation for this effort. We will continue to consult with Congress as to the substance, tactics and timing of the fast track initiative.

Q: It has been reported that the Administration is weighing the dropping of labor and environmental goals from fast track trade authority legislation, a move certain to infuriate labor unions. Is this true?

A: As we have stated before, our goal is to build the broadest possible support for the fast track legislation. To that end, Ambassador Barshefsky and others have been consulting actively with members of Congress representing all points of view on this subject, and with all interested parties, including organized labor. We will continue to do so with the goal of enacting legislation that receives broad support.

ANGOLA

BACKGROUND

The events in Angola this week are a milestone in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, an agreement signed November 20, 1994, and which provides a blueprint for ending the civil war. Under its

provisions, the soldiers of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) entered UN-administered quartering areas, disarmed, and will be either demobilized or integrated into the national army. In return for transforming itself into an unarmed political movement, UNITA will be able to participate in Angola's governance.

The process has been long and contentious. In February 1995, the United Nations authorized UNAVEM III, the UN Verification Mission in Angola, which is now the largest blue-helmet force in the world. As one of the official observers to the Lusaka Protocol, the United States has worked closely with the UN Special Representative and our observer partners, Portugal and Russia, to help implement the detailed provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

Q: The formation of a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation is to be sworn in tomorrow in Angola. What does this mean?

A: More than two years after the Government and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol, they will form a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation tomorrow in Luanda.

The Lusaka Protocol gives UNITA positions in the government, including four ministries, seven deputy ministries, eight ambassadorships, governorships, and other posts down to the communal and municipal levels.

Our delegation to this event is headed by Assistant Secretary of State Princeton Lyman, and includes Special Envoy Amb. Paul Hare, Amb. K. F. Inderfurth from our Mission to the United Nations, our present and past Ambassadors to Angola, Donald K. Steinberg and Edmund De Jarnette, and our Director for Southern African Affairs, Mr. John Blaney.

This follows the swearing-in of the UNITA deputies to the Angolan Parliament yesterday. UNITA won 70 of the 220 seats in the 1992 election, and 66 of them who were present yesterday took their seats.

We look forward to UNITA playing a constructive role in the government of Angola.

It is important the political parties in Angola continue to work together as the remaining steps of the Lusaka Protocol

are implemented including incorporation of UNITA troops into the national army and extension of state administration.

Q: What is Jonas Savimbi's role in the process?

A: Under the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, the leader of the largest opposition party, UNITA, is to have a "special role." After a long negotiation, both sides agreed that Dr. Savimbi would become the official "Leader of the Opposition," a role which allows him access to the President along with certain rights and privileges including a house, staff, powers to travel throughout Angola, and personal protection. The legal statute for Dr. Savimbi's role was passed by the National Assembly on April 8.

Q: (If asked) Will Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, be in Luanda for the event tomorrow?

A: We understand that he may not come to Luanda, but hope that he will. The important point is that the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation is moving forward.