

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 April 97 20:30
FROM Friedrich, M. K.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT POTUS-CWC Talking Points [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Naplan, Steven J.

CARBON_COPY Brown, Nancy E.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Harmon, Joyce
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.

TEXT_BODY

Tony et al.

Please take a look at the attached talking points for the "POTUS Mtg with Senators on CWC." Fred Dohse noted that the points are factual, however, you will likely be able to add value to the prose.

Pls get back to EXECSEC as soon as possible.

[[2324TPS.DOC : 5147 in 2324TPS.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 7 April 97 20:24

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 2324TPS.DOC

CWC Points for Hill Meeting

Why Support the Treaty

☐ Need your support for Chemical Weapons Convention, which we expect

to be voted on in next two weeks.

☐ Last Friday, had honor of hosting broad-based, bipartisan group of treaty supporters here at White House, including former Secretary of State James Baker, former JCS Chairman Colin Powell, former Reagan arms control advisors Paul Nitze and Ed Rowny and 100 other prominent, former government officials, retired military officers, veterans, small and large business leaders, religious leaders, scientists and arms control experts.

☐ Prior to event, received two important letters expressing strong support for ratification. First was from former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and former Senators Kassebaum and Boren.

☐ Second letter was from 17 retired flag officers, including three former Chairmen of the JCS (Powell, Vessey, Jones), five former Service Chiefs (McPeak, Mundy, Sullivan, Zumwalt and Dugan), Norman Schwarzkopf and 8 other Generals and Admirals.

☐ These letters join previous letters/expressions of support from former President Bush, Larry Eagleburger, former Senator Sam Nunn and many other leading Republican and Democratic officials.

☐ Would like to spend a few minutes outlining some of reasons why all of these people, with such diverse backgrounds and political views, believe CWC is in our national security interest.

☐ First, because it will reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers in the future. Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile. The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision. That is why every Chairman of the JCS since the Carter Administration -- General David Jones, General John Vessey, Admiral William Crowe, General Colin Powell and General Shali -- as well as former Secretaries of Defense Melvin Laird, Harold Brown and William Perry support this treaty.

☐ Second, because our participation is a tangible demonstration of our willingness to lead international efforts against CW proliferation and other transnational problems. That is why former President Bush and former Secretaries of State Baker and Eagleburger support this treaty.

☐ Third, because the treaty's declaration and inspection provisions will help the Intelligence Community do a better job of monitoring CW programs worldwide -- a task they face with or without the CWC. That is why former CIA Directors Gates, Woolsey and Deutch and Acting DCI Tenet all support this treaty.

☐ Fourth, because it will give us new tools to deal with the emerging threat of CW terrorism. By eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons, the CWC will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons. That is why Janet Reno, the International Union of Police Associations, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers and the National Association of Police Organizations all support this treaty.

☐ Fifth, because it will ensure a level playing field for our chemical companies, our largest exporters, by requiring all parties to control trade with non-parties in certain dual-use chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons. If we are not a party, our chemical companies will face CWC-mandated traded restrictions which could cost hundreds of millions of dollars a year in sales.

That is why the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America all support the treaty.

☐ Finally, because it will establish a global norm against the possession of poison gas, thus making any attempts to develop or use it not only immoral but illegal. That is why the Anti-Defamation League, B'nai B'rith, the U.S. Catholic Conference, the Presbyterian Church, the Episcopal Church, the United Methodist Church and so many other religious organizations support this treaty.

☐ Recognize that the CWC will not "solve" the chemical weapons problem. But it is a key element of any effective response.

- ☐ Since January, we have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and a group he has put together in an effort to address the concerns of some members of the Republican caucus about the treaty.
- ☐ During these discussions, Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions, and in nearly every case, we have either reached agreement on a compromise or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.
- ☐ Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and his CWC task force to facilitate a Senate vote by mid-April so we can deposit our instrument of ratification prior to April 29, when the treaty comes into force.
- ☐ CWC has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been 13 Senate hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings of both members and staff.
- ☐

☐ We have moved well beyond the resolution of ratification that was on the Senate calendar last September. It's now time for the Senate to debate and vote.

Importance of April 29 Deadline

☐ April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act before then, Americans will be less secure. Will be denied access to CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. Will also be denied the ability to require other states to do what we are already doing -- getting out of the chemical weapons business.

☐ Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.

☐ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve

as
inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as
head of security, administration and industry inspections, will
be
replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.

□ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to
overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against
non-parties phase in. Industry estimates this could put at risk
as
much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 08 April 97 14:20
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT for pol retreat [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Brown, Nancy E.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Harmon, Joyce
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.

CARBON_COPY Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Sonenshine, Tara D.

TEXT_BODY

cathy:

bob asked me to send you these for the foreign policy retreat on the 16th.
depeding on what happens next week, they may need to be updated before the
retreat. thanks!

[[2230B.DOC : 3630 in 2230B.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

8 April 97 14:17

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

2230B.DOC

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- ☐ Prior to event, received two important letters expressing strong support for ratification. First was from former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and former Senators Kassebaum and Boren.
- ☐ Second letter was from 17 retired flag officers, including three former Chairmen of the JCS (Powell, Vessey, Jones), five former Service Chiefs (McPeak, Mundy, Sullivan, Zumwalt and Dugan), Norman Schwarzkopf and 8 other Generals and Admirals.
- ☐ These letters join previous letters/expressions of support from former President Bush, Larry Eagleburger, former Senator Sam Nunn and many other leading Republican and Democratic officials.
- ☐ Would like to spend a few minutes outlining some of reasons why all of these people, with such diverse backgrounds and political views, believe CWC is in our national security interest.
- ☐ First, because it will reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers in the future. Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile. The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision. That is why every Chairman of the JCS since the Carter Administration -- General David Jones, General John Vessey, Admiral William Crowe, General Colin Powell, and General Shali -- as well as former Secretaries of Defense Melvin Laird, Harold Brown and William Perry support this treaty.
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Treaty Status in Senate

□ Since January, we have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and a group he has put together in an effort to address the concerns of some members of the Republican caucus about the treaty.

- ☐ During these discussions, Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions, and in nearly every case, we have either reached agreement on a compromise or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.
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- ☐ Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.
- ☐ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as head of security, administration, and industry inspections, will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 08 April 97 16:34
FROM LaFleur, Vinca A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT For SRB: Revised CWC Op-Ed! [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
Harris, Elisa D.
Kelly, Sandra L.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.
Seaton, James B.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Witkowski, Anne A.

TEXT_BODY

[[CWCHELM.DOC : 4173 in CWCHELM.DOC]]

FOR SRB - Priority Please!

I understand from Kris that Sandy has a window at 5pm.

The attached reflects last minute additions from Lori Murray, in response to today's hearings with Sen Helms. It has been cleared by Bell, Blinken,

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

Harris and Danvers. Comments to Vinca please at 6-9376.

8 April 97 16:31

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

CWCHELM.DOC

04/08/97 4:30 PM

[Stonewalling Op-Ed]

The clock is ticking toward April 29, the day the Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force. This critical treaty, negotiated under President Reagan and completed and signed under President Bush, will require other nations to do what we have already decided to do ourselves: Get out of the chemical weapons business. It will make it less likely that our soldiers will have to face chemical weapons on the battlefield, or that our citizens will ever face them in the hands of rogue states or terrorists. With broad bipartisan support from former senior officials, military and business leaders, veterans, religious organizations and scientific experts, President Clinton has spared no effort to secure the treaty's passage.

Now, with just [x] days to the critical deadline, the Administration has been accused of "stonewalling" on the issues in dispute and trying to rush the Senate to decision. With all due respect, these allegations just don't stand up to the facts.

The President submitted the CWC to the Senate in November 1993. In the past three and a half years, there have been 16 hearings and the Administration has conducted dozens of briefings for Senators and staff. We have provided the Senate more than 1,500 pages of information on the CWC, including more than 300 pages of testimony, more than 500 pages of answers to letters and reports, more than 400 pages of answers to questions for the record, and more than 300 pages of other information.

The real question is, will the Senate vote on this vital treaty in time for America to make our troops safer by compelling other nations to destroy their stockpiles of poison gas; to help govern the treaty's implementation; and to serve as inspectors and

verifiers of the tough regime we designed? Or will we put our national security at risk; be slapped with the very trade penalties we created to pressure those who don't sign on; and go from leading the world to joining the company of pariah nations?

We have taken very seriously Congressional concerns. In early January, the Administration began working with Senate leadership to address a number of criticisms some members of the Republican Caucus had levied against the treaty. A process was established to try to find in every case some remedy or reassurance. On those few issues where no common ground existed, we agreed to propose alternative options, so the Senate could vote on the points in dispute as the Constitution provides.

Since that time, there have been eight different sessions -- four in which [I/National Security Advisor Samuel Berger] led the Administration's discussions with a task force appointed by the Majority Leader's office, followed by four intensive sessions at the senior-staff level. After two months of rigorous, good faith negotiations, we have managed in almost every case to reach a compromise agreement, or identify a reasonable alternative from which the Senate can decide.

[Far from stonewalling, the Administration's aim has been to smooth the way to ratification. The real culprits here are the small group of Senators denying their colleagues the right to vote on this landmark arms control treaty.]

For example, some Senators expressed concern that our Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures would be trampled by international inspectors. In fact, at the insistence of the United States, the CWC explicitly allows members to take into account their constitutional obligations when providing access for short notice inspections. We went even farther, agreeing to a condition that would require the government to obtain a search warrant for any involuntary inspection.

Others worried that joining the treaty might lead us to lessen our efforts to protect our troops

against the effects of chemical weapons. The President has no graver responsibility than safeguarding our servicemen and women. We are committed to ensuring a robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical or biological attack -- as our budget request reflects.

We reassured critics who mistakenly feared the treaty obligates members to facilitate the transfer of militarily-relevant chemical technology to untrustworthy countries that join. And we have done more -- offering to certify to the Senate that national and multilateral export controls on chemical-related materials are fully consistent with the CWC.

And to assuage those who argued that the treaty obligates us to give away our chemical weapons defense equipment to countries such as Iran, if they request aid after having been attacked with chemical weapons, we have agreed to a condition that would restrict U.S. assistance to medical treatment to countries of concern.

In short, we have made a tremendous effort so the CWC can move forward. Working with Senate leadership, the gaps have been narrowed significantly. But frankly, this process has run its course. It is hard to imagine what significant information more debate on the treaty could bring to light. And April 29 is not negotiable. Our security, authority and prosperity are at stake.

This is no time to go it alone, or abdicate our leadership role. We simply can't afford to let the clock run out. It's time for the Senate to vote.

###

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 08 April 97 16:43
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: For SRB: Revised CWC Op-Ed! [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO LaFleur, Vinca A.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

vinca: what has changed?

From: LaFleur, Vinca S.
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1; Harris, Elisa D.; Murray, Lori E.; Sonenshine, Tara D.; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: For SRB: Revised CWC Op-Ed! [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, April 08, 1997 04:34 PM

<<Attached File: CWCHELM.DOC>>

FOR SRB - Priority Please!

I understand from Kris that Sandy has a window at 5pm.

The attached reflects last minute additions from Lori Murray, in response to today's hearings with Sen Helms. It has been cleared by Bell, Blinken, Harris and Danvers. Comments to Vinca please at 6-9376.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 08 April 97 12:05
FROM Norris, John J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: China [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Wise, William M.
CARBON_COPY Kuipers, Keelin G.
TEXT_BODY

Bill --

I know that various parts of the State Department are interested in getting a read-out on the VP's visit. I just got off the phone with Bob Einhorn's office; they are clamoring for info on the non-pro side. DRL is hungry for information on human rights.

Commerce, USTR, Treasury, and DOD would also be interested, I believe. We have not given full briefings to NSC (functional elements) or NEC.

If we do not have a debrief, how will we get the info to those parts of the bureaucracy that have a valid claim to know?

John

From: Wise, William M.
To: Norris, John J.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; Babcock, Douglas W.; Woolston, Ann E.
Subject: China [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, April 08, 1997 10:07 AM

John: A couple of China items --

1. We would like to talk with Sandy Kristoff and/or Bob Suettinger a few minutes before Berger's 4:15 PM meeting today re pros and cons of VP meeting with Martin Lee and whatever else is on Berger's agenda for that meeting.

2. Need copy of the two human rights covenants.

3. ASAP need a short background paper and TP's for VP call to Sen Helms either today (preferable) or tomorrow (if necessary). Note that the primary reason for calling Helms is to report back on Chinese response to Helms' interest in visiting China. Meeting also provides opportunity to clarify some misinformation in the press w/o being defensive or making a

specific point. For example, VP can assure Helms that he raised all the issues in China that VP told Helms he would raise, including nonproliferation, human rights, etc.

4. Cancel the meeting with USG Asia persons re VP trip. If there is anyone who would have attended the meeting and does not already have a debrief on the trip, let me know.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 08 April 97 16:51
FROM LaFleur, Vinca A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: For SRB: Revised CWC Op-Ed! [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Harris, Elisa D.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

An addition, per Lori, after the 4th para on p. 2, concerning Article X, which was evidently a source of much attention in the hearings. I mistakenly thought you had all cleared on the language; in any event, I had to move the draft forward in order to catch Sandy during his only available (and very brief) window at 5pm. The addition seemed logical to me -- but I'm only the scribe...

From: Harris, Elisa D.
To: LaFleur, Vinca S.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: RE: For SRB: Revised CWC Op-Ed! [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, April 08, 1997 04:43 PM

vinca: what has changed?

From: LaFleur, Vinca S.
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1; Harris, Elisa D.; Murray, Lori E.; Sonenshine, Tara D.; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: For SRB: Revised CWC Op-Ed! [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, April 08, 1997 04:34 PM

<<Attached File: CWCHELM.DOC>>

FOR SRB - Priority Please!

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 08 April 97 19:46

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT April 8 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Babcock, Douglas W.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Bujold, Noelle D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, JoAnne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Kuipers, Keelin G.
Moore, Lori A.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Wise, William M.
Woolston, Ann E.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[APR08GUI.DOC : 4877 in APR08GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 8 April 97 19:45

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** APR08GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 8, 1997

Bahrain

Middle East

Dalai Lama

CWC

Zaire

Chile

Russia/NIS

Saudi Arabia/Khobar

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

Nazi Assets

Fast Track

Laser Incident

BAHRAIN

Q: Can you comment on reports that the U.S. expects a terrorist attack on its troops in Bahrain?

A: I refer you to the Defense Department for details.

They have increased the terrorism alert posture in Bahrain. As you know, we do not comment on classified intelligence information, so I can not go into whether intelligence reports caused the higher alert . We do, however, appreciate the excellent cooperation we have received from the Government of Bahrain, which is an ally in the fight against terrorism.

MIDDLE EAST

Q: The President seemed to suggest that his talks with Netanyahu were strained. He said they were inconclusive. Does the President feel he failed in his efforts to revive negotiations? Is the process dead? Did he roll the President again?

A: The President has made clear since the beginning of his Administration that he is committed to helping the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict make peace after five decades of war and violence.

-- We have supported the peace process at every stage. We have been there when there was something to celebrate, and we have been there at moments of crisis, like the Sharm-al-Sheikh and Washington summits.

-- The talks that the President has had over the past couple months, including two meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu, have been for the purpose of developing an approach which will move the process closer to our goal of a comprehensive peace.

-- But let's be clear, for us to succeed, two things are necessary:

- o There can be zero tolerance for terror. Israel has a right to expect a 100% effort by the Palestinian Authority to prevent acts of terror and to take stern measures against those who seek to carry out such acts.

- o And a readiness by both parties to take steps which build confidence in the integrity of the negotiating process in order to move forward.

-- Prime Minister Netanyahu and I had a serious discussion about this and those discussions will continue both with the Israelis and the Palestinians.

-- I am prepared to do everything in my power to help bring peace to the Middle East. And I believe it would be a tragedy if the progress of the last few years were lost.

Q: What are the next steps? Is Albright going out? Ross? Will you bring Arafat here?

A: We're considering that now.

-- As you know, there will be a Palestinian delegation here later in the week, and we will want to talk with them and other parties before making any final decisions.

-- At this point we don't have any plans for an Arafat visit, but we will certainly be consulting with him in the days ahead.

-- We don't rule out sending the Secretary or Ross to the region to follow-up on discussions here. But we have not yet made any final decisions.

Q: Do you agree or disagree with PM Netanyahu that Arafat has not kept his commitments, such as amending the Palestinian Charter, collecting weapons, etc.?

A: Obviously we expect the Palestinians to keep their commitments. That's an integral part of maintaining confidence between the two sides so that they can move forward.

DALAI LAMA

□ The Dalai Lama, religious leader of Tibetan Buddhists and Nobel laureate, is always a most welcome visitor to the United States.

□ Americans have tremendous feelings of goodwill toward His Holiness and adherents of Tibetan Buddhism in the United States and elsewhere.

□ The administration welcomes the Dalai Lama's visit and looks forward to discussions with him.

□ He will be meeting members of the administration, but at what level and with whom has not been decided.

☐ As a religiously diverse nation, we also welcome the contributions to our nation's spiritual life of Americans who have embraced Tibetan Buddhism.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

☐ CWC enjoys broad, bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker, Ed Rowney, Paul Nitze and other leading Republican foreign policy experts support it.

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☐ CWC will also make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons by eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.

☐ Recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But it is a key element of any effective response.

☐ Treaty has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been 13 Senate hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings of both members and staff. More than 1500 pages of information has been provided to the Senate. It's time for the Senate to debate and vote.

☐ If we do not ratify by April 29, Americans will be less secure. We will be denied access to CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons.

☐ The United States will also not have a seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as head of security, administration, and industry inspections, will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.

- Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.
- Finally, American chemical companies will begin losing sales to overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Industry estimates this could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

HELMS AND CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions

and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the

ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

ZAIRE

ZAIRE PEACE PROCESS

- ☐ South Africa will be leading efforts later this week to bring the GOZ and rebels together for negotiations.
- ☐ UN SRSG Sahnoun is in South Africa and we hope he will be part of these discussions. The United States thinks Sahnoun has a central role to play in his double-hatted capacity as both UN and OAU representative.
- ☐ We are hopeful that both parties will send senior-level delegations to discuss seriously a cease-fire and comprehensive negotiated solution. We continue to see a negotiated solution as the best means of solving the ongoing crisis in Zaire.
- ☐ We have worked very hard with neighboring governments and France to secure commitments from both sides to a negotiated solution.

If asked:

- ☐ We have offered to assist the South Africans, but they are leading this effort alone.
- ☐ Understand UN Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun is in South Africa, but we don't know if he will be part of any negotiations. South

African Deputy President
Thabo Mbeki discussed the concept of talks in South Africa during
his meeting with President
Mobutu last week in Kinshasa. Other representatives of the SAG
met with Kabila shortly
thereafter to secure their commitment to talks.

MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu?
Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a
national consensus on
how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a
seven-person committee of
negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We
are waiting to get more
details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee
designated immediately
and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the
rebel alliance, within the
context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire.
Obviously, during this
time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political
figures to work together
towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the
U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special
Envoy Howard Wolpe is
attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult
dependents and eight
temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of
temporary duty (TDY)
personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in

Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

CHILE

Q: Has the Administration decided to permit the sale of advanced fighters to Chile?

A: No. The USG has decided to authorize the issuance of marketing

licenses to companies which wish to compete in Chile's selection of fighter aircraft, while making clear to both the Government of Chile and to the companies involved that there has been no decision on whether to permit the sale itself.

The licenses are for marketing information only and do not constitute approval for an actual sale. A decision whether to permit such sale has not been made.

This decision to issue marketing licenses was made so as not to disadvantage U.S. companies in the competition. These licenses allow these companies to provide the Government of Chile with technical data on advanced fighter aircraft.

Q: Has the U.S. changed its Latin American conventional arms transfer policy?

A: No. As you know, the Administration is reviewing U.S. conventional arms transfer policy toward Latin America in the context of the significant political, economic, and military changes that have been occurring in the past ten years.

This policy review is on-going. While the review is underway current policy remains unchanged.

Q: What is the current policy on arms exports to Latin America?

A: Our policy worldwide is to consider pending arms transfers on a case-by-case basis. Our long-standing policy in Latin America is, and remains, to address potential transfers in the context of restraint.

Q: Why is a review necessary?

A: The welcome expansion and strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions in recent years makes it prudent for us to undertake this policy review to determine whether any changes in our policy are appropriate.

Our policy goals for the countries of Latin America are to enhance democracy,

including civilian control of the military, foster regional stability, transparency and confidence building, and ensure that the weapons modernization decisions of these countries address legitimate defense needs within their existing economic resources.

Any possible change made to our current arms export policy will be in accordance with these goals.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Russia Signs Integration Treaty with Belarus

☐ Russia and Belarus signed Treaty April 2; apparently not very different from last year's agreement; provides for territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence of Russia and Belarus; allows one month for public comment prior to submitting to parliaments for ratification.

☐ We have no objections in principle to integration as long as voluntary, mutually beneficial, done on basis of equality, does not harm relations with other countries or create new divisions among nations.

☐ But continue to be concerned about political developments in Belarus -- restrictions on personal and press freedoms; unwarranted actions against foreigners, including recent expulsion of U.S. diplomat; recalled our Ambassador for consultations on situation; have cut U.S. assistance.

IMF Resumes Russia Program

☐ Welcome IMF Managing Director Camdessus' comments that Russia taking necessary reforms, management steps to resume IMF program. Shows confidence in new economic team. Expect decision to be made formally later this month by IMF board.

General Items

Helsinki Summit and Aftermath, Way Forward in U.S.-Russia Relations

☐ Welcomed Yeltsin's positive comments on summit results; Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

NATO-Russia

☐ NATO enlargement proceeding on schedule. Part of broader effort to build comprehensive European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. It is going forward in way that does not threaten any nation's security, enhances stability in Europe.

☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.

☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

Russia Prepared to Sign NATO-Russia Charter in May?

☐ Charter can formalize cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. U.S. prepared to sign Charter before Madrid NATO summit in July, but Alliance and Russia must first agree on contents of document, which is now being discussed in NATO-Russia channel.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

BOSNIA

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ Passage of the proposed legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. We strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued.

Radovan Karadzic (NYT Piece)

☐ Karadzic has been out of power for almost one year, having been removed from public office as required under Dayton. In accordance with the agreement reached with Republika Srpska, he is banned from participating in any political activities or making public appearances.

☐ We continue to monitor the situation to ensure Republika Srpska lives up to this agreement. However, we will not be satisfied until Karadzic and all others

indicted by the War Crimes
Tribunal stand trial in The Hague.

War Criminals

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement includes provisions that are under the purview of the individual states and which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

CHINA

COSCO

Q: Does COSCO represent a threat to US national security? Does COSCO engage in predatory pricing and operate outside the normal rules and motivations of commercial behavior? Did COSCO decide to purchase ships from US yards to curry favor?

A: COSCO is the world's largest shipping line. It operates out of virtually every major West Coast port. And it moves much of the traffic in our trans-Pacific market.

We welcome its participation in our trading relationship. But like other companies, it must abide by our laws. I am confident that our Coast Guard, Customs and Maritime authorities will ensure that our laws are effectively enforced -- whether they involve COSCO or any other company.

Senator McCain has made some serious allegations with respect to COSCO. We are looking at those allegations. I'm not going to prejudge that review or its outcome.

UNHRC

Background: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain reportedly have decided not to co-sponsor a China resolution, which means that there will not be an EU-introduced resolution this year. However, any individual country can introduce the resolution, and we expect at least 10 EU countries to co-sponsor the resolution once it is introduced. Our position is that we are working with other countries on a resolution and will oppose China's no-action motion (which, if passed, would bar consideration of the resolution by the Commission). A vote is scheduled for the third week in April.

Points

- ☐ U.S. is working with other members of the Commission on a resolution concerning the human rights situation in China.
- ☐ U.S. will oppose motions designed to keep the resolution off the Commission's agenda.

☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.

☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record.

☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with European partners on a proposed resolution.

☐ During his recent visit, Ambassador Richardson expressed the U.S. position in a statement to Commission members and met with several important delegations to convey our views.

☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.

☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.

☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.

☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate,

unequivocal cease-fire.

☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.

☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.

☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.

☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the

Blood Supply may be unsafe?

- ☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.
- ☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.
- ☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

- ☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.
- ☐ Leading examples:
 - ☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
 - ☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.
 - ☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
- ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to

change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.

- ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
- ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
- ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

- ☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.
- ☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.
- ☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.
- ☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of

what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

- ☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.
- ☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.
- ☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.
- ☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

- ☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.
- ☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.
- ☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.
- ☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

- ☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.
- ☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of

everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.

☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all

Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means.

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.

☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible.

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings?

☐ President asked them to take a careful look...

☐ Obviously doing so...

☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings...

☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway...

☐ Look forward to getting PAC interim letter report at the end of April...

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts...
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned...

Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight -- we will await the results of those activities...

What about the statement (in the FEB 97 Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC

staff in January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

- ☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah and about possible demolition operations involving those munitions. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision the President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical

demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.
- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.
- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
- ☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address

many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

FAST TRACK

Q: It has been reported that the President is planning to delay his request for fast track authority to accommodate the budget process. Is that true? Does this signal Administration retreat on fast track? Has Gephardt scared the President off?

A: Not at all. The President is still firmly committed to seeking fast track authority to open

foreign markets. It is critical if we want to continue creating good jobs for American workers.

Every President since Ford has had fast track authority for key periods, and the reasons for it now are more compelling than ever. Over 11 million U.S. jobs now depend on exports, and these jobs pay 13-16 percent more than the average U.S. job. Today, 95 percent of the world's consumers live outside the U.S., and the vast majority of those consumers live in the emerging and fastest growing markets of Latin America and Asia. We simply must continue to open these markets for U.S. exports if we are to succeed in the global economy.

We cannot afford inaction. If we are not seizing opportunities to break down trade barriers and open foreign markets, we can be sure other countries will act -- to the benefit of their companies and their workers.

The United States has nothing to fear. We are the most competitive large economy in the world as judged by independent experts. But our ability to define the nature of our trade relationships will in significant measure determine our leadership role in the next century. Fast track authority is the most important factor determining these relationships.

As you know, we have been consulting with Congress to develop bipartisan support for this legislation. We think that is the best way to build a strong foundation for this effort. We will continue to consult with Congress as to the substance, tactics and timing of the fast track initiative.

Q: It has been reported that the Administration is weighing the dropping of labor and environmental goals from fast track trade authority legislation, a move certain to infuriate labor unions. Is this true?

A: As we have stated before, our goal is to build the broadest possible support for the fast

track legislation. To that end, Ambassador Barshefsky and others have been consulting actively with members of Congress representing all points of view on this subject, and with all interested parties, including organized labor. We will continue to do so with the goal of enacting legislation that receives broad support.

M/V KAPITAN MAN INCIDENT

Background: On Friday, April 4, 1997, a Canadian military helicopter was illuminated by a suspected laser device aboard the Russian merchant ship M/V KAPITAN MAN. At the time of the incident, the M/V KAPITAN MAN was in U.S. territorial waters approximately 5 nautical miles northwest of Port Angeles, Washington. The Canadian helicopter was on a routine maritime patrol flight with a U.S. Navy observer embarked. After the incident, M/V KAPITAN MAN continued on to a routine port call in Tacoma, Washington.

On Saturday the Canadian pilot of the helicopter and the U.S. observer, a U.S. Navy Lieutenant assigned as a liaison officer to the Canadian Maritime Pacific Command, sought medical attention for eye pain. The examining physician diagnosed their condition as consistent with the damage caused by laser burns. The eye damage they suffered is expected to be non-permanent. Photographs of the M/V KAPITAN MAN taken by the Canadian helicopter could be interpreted as indicating that a laser-type device may have been pointed at the helicopter from the bridge of the vessel (one photo shows a bright red spot of light but not the device from which the light originates).

On Monday morning, April 7, 1997, the U.S. Coast Guard notified the Master of M/V KAPITAN MAN in writing that the vessel was being detained in port for a Coast Guard inspection to determine if hazardous materials or conditions were present on the vessel. The Coast Guard inspection commenced at about 8:30 p.m. EST and lasted approximately two hours. The inspection team searched for the laser device, interviewed the

vessel's officers and crew, and inspected the ship's logs. The Master and crew of the vessel were cooperative, opening all compartments that the inspection team desired to inspect. No laser device was found, there was no evidence that an installed device had recently been removed, and the officers and crew claimed they did not have a laser device aboard the vessel and had not shined one at the Canadian helicopter.

The Coast Guard inspection team departed the M/V KAPITAN MAN at about 1:30 a.m. EST April 8th, and the Coast Guard released the vessel from detention. The M/V KAPITAN MAN is currently scheduled to depart Tacoma at 4:00 p.m. EST today.

Q: What is the condition of the injured men?

A: The initial evaluation by Canadian military physicians was that the eye damage would be non-permanent. The two men have been flown to Brooks Army Medical Center in Texas for further examination and evaluation.

Q: Why was a Canadian military helicopter flying around a ship in U.S. territorial waters?

A: The Canadian helicopter was on a routine maritime surveillance patrol in the Strait of San Juan de Fuca, which lies between the United States and Canada. The M/V KAPITAN MAN was in the inbound traffic lane, which lies on the U.S. side of the Strait. Our two nations work closely together to ensure the safety and security of shipping in the Strait.

Q: Why was a U.S. Navy officer in the Canadian helicopter?

A: The U.S. Navy lieutenant is a liaison officer assigned to the Canadian Maritime Command Pacific. The U.S. and Canadian armed forces work closely together in many areas, including maritime patrol and reconnaissance. The U.S. Navy lieutenant's presence on the Canadian helicopter was a routine part of his liaison duties.

Q: On what grounds was the Russian ship detained?

A: The U.S. Coast Guard has statutory authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and the Magnuson Act to inspect vessels in U.S. ports and waters for hazardous materials or conditions, and to detain vessels for this purpose.

Q: Who conducted the inspection? Did Canadian officials participate?

A: The inspection was conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard. They were assisted by a Russian linguist for crew interviews and U.S. military personnel to aid in identifying any laser-type devices that might have been found. No Canadian officials participated.

Q: Did the U.S. Government notify the Russian Government of this incident?

A: We informed the Russian Government of the incident and that the M/V KAPITAN MAN had been detained by the U.S. Coast Guard for inspection.

Q: How did the Russian Government react to our actions?

A: The Russian Consulate in Seattle offered their services to assist the Coast Guard in their inspection of the ship. The Coast Guard expressed willingness to conduct the inspection with a Russian consular officer present. The Russian Consulate in Seattle elected not to participate. The Russian Government has indicated that it will cooperate in our investigation of this incident.

Q: If no laser device was found on the Russian ship and the crew denied shining a laser at the Canadian helicopter, how do you explain the eye damage suffered by the two men?

A: I am not going to speculate on possible causes of their injuries. The Department of Defense is continuing to investigate the incident.

Q: Why was the Russian ship released?

A: The Coast Guard inspection team reported that they had

satisfied the purpose of the inspection, which was to determine if hazardous materials or conditions were present on the vessel. The inspection team found no hazardous materials or conditions, and the Coast Guard informed the Master of the M/V KAPITAN MAN that the order detaining his vessel had been canceled.

For use only if asked:

Q: If the Russian ship did point a laser at the helicopter, would it be a violation of the ban on blinding laser weapons?

A: Until we have a great deal more information, we could not say whether the system that was used would be prohibited under the 1996 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons. The Convention on Conventional Weapons protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons prohibits only the employment of "laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices." Laser systems that are not covered by the Protocol are widely used by the armed forces of many nations, including those of the United States, for purposes such as detection, targeting, range-finding, and communications.

Q: Has the protocol on blinding laser weapons entered into force?

A: No, but signatory states have taken on an obligation to respect its terms to "the fullest extent possible" pending its entry into force." The CCW Protocol on blinding laser weapons was signed on May 3, 1996 and requires the ratification of twenty countries. It was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on January 7th of this year. Although Protocol IV has not yet entered into force, the Final Declaration adopted by all CCW parties at the conclusion of the conference at which Protocol IV was adopted stated that all parties "solemnly declare ... their desire that all states, pending entry into force, respect and ensure respect of the substantive provisions of Protocol IV to the

fullest extent possible."

Q: Does the U.S. Government plan to protest this incident to the Russian government?

A: As I said, our investigation continues; once we have determined exactly what happened, we will consider further appropriate actions. I should note that the Russian government has been responsive and cooperative in this matter.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 08 April 97 19:48
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Akers, Dale W.
Birkland, Andrea L.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brown, Nancy E.
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Hale, John E.
Hawes, David J.
Lowry, Jay E.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Gwyn M. Parker
Peggins, John W.
Roach, Darren S.
Simons, James R.
Snyder, Julie A.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Abdulmalik, April B.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Black, Todd F.

Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Brooks, Jennifer
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Davis, William K.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Florio, Elaine
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen

Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Mercier, Henry J.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.

Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Prendergast, John P.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Smith, Michael P.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.
Vershow, Alexander R.

Verville, Elizabeth G.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Wednesday, April 9. Thank you.

[[APR08GUI.DOC : 4951 in APR08GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

8 April 97 19:46

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

APR08GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 8, 1997

Bahrain

Middle East

Dalai Lama

CWC

Zaire

Chile

Russia/NIS

Saudi Arabia/Khobar

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

Nazi Assets

Fast Track

Laser Incident

BAHRAIN

Q: Can you comment on reports that the U.S. expects a terrorist attack on its troops in Bahrain?

A: I refer you to the Defense Department for details.

They have increased the terrorism alert posture in Bahrain. As you know, we do not comment on classified intelligence information, so I can not go into whether intelligence reports caused the higher alert. We do, however, appreciate the excellent cooperation we have received from the Government of Bahrain, which is an ally in the fight against terrorism.

MIDDLE EAST

Q: The President seemed to suggest that his talks with Netanyahu were strained. He said they were inconclusive. Does the President feel he failed in his efforts to revive negotiations? Is the process dead? Did he roll the President again?

A: The President has made clear since the beginning of his Administration that he is

committed to helping the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict
make peace after five decades
of war and violence.

-- We have supported the peace process at every stage. We have
been there when there
was something to celebrate, and we have been there at moments of
crisis, like the
Sharm-al-Sheikh and Washington summits.

-- The talks that the President has had over the past couple
months, including two
meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu, have been for the purpose
of developing an
approach which will move the process closer to our goal of a
comprehensive peace.

-- But let's be clear, for us to succeed, two things are
necessary:

- o There can be zero tolerance for terror. Israel has a right to
expect a 100% effort
by the Palestinian Authority to prevent acts of terror and to
take stern measures
against those who seek to carry out such acts.

- o And a readiness by both parties to take steps which build
confidence in the
integrity of the negotiating process in order to move forward.

-- Prime Minister Netanyahu and I had a serious discussion about
this and those
discussions will continue both with the Israelis and the
Palestinians.

-- I am prepared to do everything in my power to help bring peace
to the Middle East.
And I believe it would be a tragedy if the progress of the last
few years were lost.

Q: What are the next steps? Is Albright going out? Ross? Will
you bring Arafat here?

A: We're considering that now.

-- As you know, there will be a Palestinian delegation here later
in the week, and we will
want to talk with them and other parties before making any final
decisions.

-- At this point we don't have any plans for an Arafat visit, but we will certainly be consulting with him in the days ahead.

-- We don't rule out sending the Secretary or Ross to the region to follow-up on discussions here. But we have not yet made any final decisions.

Q: Do you agree or disagree with PM Netanyahu that Arafat has not kept his commitments, such as amending the Palestinian Charter, collecting weapons, etc.?

A: Obviously we expect the Palestinians to keep their commitments. That's an integral part of maintaining confidence between the two sides so that they can move forward.

DALAI LAMA

□ The Dalai Lama, religious leader of Tibetan Buddhists and Nobel laureate, is always a most welcome visitor to the United States.

□ Americans have tremendous feelings of goodwill toward His Holiness and adherents of Tibetan Buddhism in the United States and elsewhere.

□ The administration welcomes the Dalai Lama's visit and looks forward to discussions with him.

□ He will be meeting members of the administration, but at what level and with whom has not been decided.

□ As a religiously diverse nation, we also welcome the contributions to our nation's spiritual life of Americans who have embraced Tibetan Buddhism.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

- CWC enjoys broad, bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker, Ed Rowney, Paul Nitze and other leading Republican foreign policy experts support it.
- CWC will reduce the threat to our soldiers by requiring others to do what we are already doing -- getting out of the chemical weapons business.
- CWC will also make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons by eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.
- Recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But it is a key element of any effective response.
- Treaty has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been 13 Senate hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings of both members and staff. More than 1500 pages of information has been provided to the Senate. It's time for the Senate to debate and vote.
- If we do not ratify by April 29, Americans will be less secure. We will be denied access to CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons.
- The United States will also not have a seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as head of security, administration, and industry inspections, will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.
- Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.
- Finally, American chemical companies will begin losing sales to overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Industry estimates this could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

HELMS AND CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29,

when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

ZAIRE

ZAIRE PEACE PROCESS

- ☐ South Africa will be leading efforts later this week to bring the GOZ and rebels together for negotiations.
- ☐ UN SRSG Sahnoun is in South Africa and we hope he will be part of these discussions. The United States thinks Sahnoun has a central role to play in his double-hatted capacity as both UN and OAU representative.
- ☐ We are hopeful that both parties will send senior-level delegations to discuss seriously a cease-fire and comprehensive negotiated solution. We continue to see a negotiated solution as the best means of solving the ongoing crisis in Zaire.
- ☐ We have worked very hard with neighboring governments and France to secure commitments from both sides to a negotiated solution.

If asked:

- ☐ We have offered to assist the South Africans, but they are leading this effort alone.
- ☐ Understand UN Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun is in South Africa, but we don't know if he will be part of any negotiations. South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki discussed the concept of talks in South Africa during his meeting with President Mobutu last week in Kinshasa. Other representatives of the SAG met with Kabila shortly thereafter to secure their commitment to talks.

MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu?
Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a national consensus on how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a seven-person committee of negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We are waiting to get more details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee designated immediately and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the rebel alliance, within the context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire. Obviously, during this time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political figures to work together towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

CHILE

Q: Has the Administration decided to permit the sale of advanced fighters to Chile?

A: No. The USG has decided to authorize the issuance of marketing licenses to companies which wish to compete in Chile's selection of fighter aircraft, while making clear to both the Government of Chile and to the companies involved that there has been no decision on whether to permit the sale itself.

The licenses are for marketing information only and do not constitute approval for an actual sale. A decision whether to permit such sale has not been

made.

This decision to issue marketing licenses was made so as not to disadvantage U.S. companies in the competition. These licenses allow these companies to provide the Government of Chile with technical data on advanced fighter aircraft.

Q: Has the U.S. changed its Latin American conventional arms transfer policy?

A: No. As you know, the Administration is reviewing U.S. conventional arms transfer policy toward Latin America in the context of the significant political, economic, and military changes that have been occurring in the past ten years.

This policy review is on-going. While the review is underway current policy remains unchanged.

Q: What is the current policy on arms exports to Latin America?

A: Our policy worldwide is to consider pending arms transfers on a case-by-case basis. Our long-standing policy in Latin America is, and remains, to address potential transfers in the context of restraint.

Q: Why is a review necessary?

A: The welcome expansion and strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions in recent years makes it prudent for us to undertake this policy review to determine whether any changes in our policy are appropriate.

Our policy goals for the countries of Latin America are to enhance democracy, including civilian control of the military, foster regional stability, transparency and confidence building, and ensure that the weapons modernization decisions of these countries address legitimate defense needs within their existing economic resources.

Any possible change made to our current arms export policy will be in accordance with these goals.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Russia Signs Integration Treaty with Belarus

☐ Russia and Belarus signed Treaty April 2; apparently not very different from last year's agreement; provides for territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence of Russia and Belarus; allows one month for public comment prior to submitting to parliaments for ratification.

☐ We have no objections in principle to integration as long as voluntary, mutually beneficial, done on basis of equality, does not harm relations with other countries or create new divisions among nations.

☐ But continue to be concerned about political developments in Belarus -- restrictions on personal and press freedoms; unwarranted actions against foreigners, including recent expulsion of U.S. diplomat; recalled our Ambassador for consultations on situation; have cut U.S. assistance.

IMF Resumes Russia Program

☐ Welcome IMF Managing Director Camdessus' comments that Russia taking necessary reforms, management steps to resume IMF program. Shows confidence in new economic team. Expect decision to be made formally later this month by IMF board.

General Items

Helsinki Summit and Aftermath, Way Forward in U.S.-Russia Relations

☐ Welcomed Yeltsin's positive comments on summit results; Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

- ☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.
- ☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

NATO-Russia

- ☐ NATO enlargement proceeding on schedule. Part of broader effort to build comprehensive European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. It is going forward in way that does not threaten any nation's security, enhances stability in Europe.
- ☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.
- ☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

Russia Prepared to Sign NATO-Russia Charter in May?

- ☐ Charter can formalize cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. U.S. prepared to sign Charter before Madrid NATO summit in July, but Alliance and Russia must first agree on contents of document, which is now being discussed in NATO-Russia channel.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

BOSNIA

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ Passage of the proposed legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. We strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued.

Radovan Karadzic (NYT Piece)

☐ Karadzic has been out of power for almost one year, having been removed from public office as required under Dayton. In accordance with the agreement reached with Republika Srpska, he is banned from participating in any political activities or making public appearances.

☐ We continue to monitor the situation to ensure Republika Srpska lives up to this agreement. However, we will not be satisfied until Karadzic and all others indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal stand trial in The Hague.

War Criminals

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist

the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement includes provisions that are under the purview of the individual states and which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

CHINA

COSCO

Q: Does COSCO represent a threat to US national security? Does COSCO engage in predatory pricing and operate outside the normal rules and motivations of commercial behavior? Did COSCO decide to purchase ships from US yards to curry favor?

A: COSCO is the world's largest shipping line. It operates out of virtually every major West Coast port. And it moves much of the traffic in our

trans-Pacific market.

We welcome its participation in our trading relationship. But like other companies, it must abide by our laws. I am confident that our Coast Guard, Customs and Maritime authorities will ensure that our laws are effectively enforced -- whether they involve COSCO or any other company.

Senator McCain has made some serious allegations with respect to COSCO. We are looking at those allegations. I'm not going to prejudge that review or its outcome.

UNHRC

Background: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain reportedly have decided not to co-sponsor a China resolution, which means that there will not be an EU-introduced resolution this year. However, any individual country can introduce the resolution, and we expect at least 10 EU countries to co-sponsor the resolution once it is introduced. Our position is that we are working with other countries on a resolution and will oppose China's no-action motion (which, if passed, would bar consideration of the resolution by the Commission). A vote is scheduled for the third week in April.

Points

- ☐ U.S. is working with other members of the Commission on a resolution concerning the human rights situation in China.
- ☐ U.S. will oppose motions designed to keep the resolution off the Commission's agenda.
- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights

progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ During his recent visit, Ambassador Richardson expressed the U.S. position in a statement to Commission members and met with several important delegations to convey our views.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.
- ☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.
- ☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.

☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.

☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.

☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like

British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.
- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

- ☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.
- ☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.
- ☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross

have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

- ☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.
- ☐ Leading examples:
- ☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
- ☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.
- ☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
- ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
- ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
- ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.

☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC

lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.

☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of

Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

- ☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

- ☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

- ☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

- ☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

- ☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.

- ☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

- ☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

- ☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.

- ☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.

- ☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all

Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf

theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical

exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated

by public service announcements and many other means.

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers

reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between

low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.

☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible.

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical

exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more

significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings?

☐ President asked them to take a careful look...

☐ Obviously doing so...

☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings...

☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway...

☐ Look forward to getting PAC interim letter report at the end of April...

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

☐ President committed to getting out all the facts...

☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone

unturned...

Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight -- we will await the

results of those activities...

What about the statement (in the FEB 97 Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC

staff in January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah and about possible demolition operations involving those munitions. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.

☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

☐ Yes, and that's the decision the President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.

☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.

☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.

☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides;

chemical warfare agents;
 biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB);
 infectious diseases;
 depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum
 products. The Committee also
 found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf
 War illnesses.

☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed
 the federal research portfolio
 and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending
 increased emphasis in certain
 areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical
 exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War
 illnesses is required and is now in
 progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are
 sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans
 are receiving the care they
 need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free
 medical exams; (3) 26,000+
 compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying
 disability for Gulf veterans with
 undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and
 (6) 90+ federally-sponsored
 research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future
 deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning
 future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance
 System for Deployments is near
 completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and
 Southwest Asia.

☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review
 Directive (PRD) process to address
 many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the
 veterans and their families who
 make experience future deployments.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press

guidance on the decision
to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the
historians' report on the postwar USG
role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main
Administration spokesman on this issue is
U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to
assess a huge amount of
historical material discovered they needed a little more time
than originally anticipated..
This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best
possible understanding at this point
of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians'
report is being prepared at his
behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is
completed.

FAST TRACK

Q: It has been reported that the President is planning to delay
his request for fast track
authority to accommodate the budget process. Is that true? Does
this signal
Administration retreat on fast track? Has Gephardt scared the
President off?

A: Not at all. The President is still firmly committed to seeking
fast track authority to open
foreign markets. It is critical if we want to continue creating
good jobs for American
workers.

Every President since Ford has had fast track authority for key
periods, and the reasons
for it now are more compelling than ever. Over 11 million U.S.
jobs now depend on
exports, and these jobs pay 13-16 percent more than the average
U.S. job. Today, 95

percent of the world's consumers live outside the U.S., and the vast majority of those consumers live in the emerging and fastest growing markets of Latin America and Asia. We simply must continue to open these markets for U.S. exports if we are to succeed in the global economy.

We cannot afford inaction. If we are not seizing opportunities to break down trade barriers and open foreign markets, we can be sure other countries will act -- to the benefit of their companies and their workers.

The United States has nothing to fear. We are the most competitive large economy in the world as judged by independent experts. But our ability to define the nature of our trade relationships will in significant measure determine our leadership role in the next century. Fast track authority is the most important factor determining these relationships.

As you know, we have been consulting with Congress to develop bipartisan support for this legislation. We think that is the best way to build a strong foundation for this effort. We will continue to consult with Congress as to the substance, tactics and timing of the fast track initiative.

Q: It has been reported that the Administration is weighing the dropping of labor and environmental goals from fast track trade authority legislation, a move certain to infuriate labor unions. Is this true?

A: As we have stated before, our goal is to build the broadest possible support for the fast track legislation. To that end, Ambassador Barshefsky and others have been consulting actively with members of Congress representing all points of view on this subject, and with all interested parties, including organized labor. We will continue to do so with the goal of enacting legislation that receives broad support.

M/V KAPITAN MAN INCIDENT

Background: On Friday, April 4, 1997, a Canadian military helicopter was illuminated by a suspected laser device aboard the Russian merchant ship M/V KAPITAN MAN. At the time of the incident, the M/V KAPITAN MAN was in U.S. territorial waters approximately 5 nautical miles northwest of Port Angeles, Washington. The Canadian helicopter was on a routine maritime patrol flight with a U.S. Navy observer embarked. After the incident, M/V KAPITAN MAN continued on to a routine port call in Tacoma, Washington.

On Saturday the Canadian pilot of the helicopter and the U.S. observer, a U.S. Navy Lieutenant assigned as a liaison officer to the Canadian Maritime Pacific Command, sought medical attention for eye pain. The examining physician diagnosed their condition as consistent with the damage caused by laser burns. The eye damage they suffered is expected to be non-permanent. Photographs of the M/V KAPITAN MAN taken by the Canadian helicopter could be interpreted as indicating that a laser-type device may have been pointed at the helicopter from the bridge of the vessel (one photo shows a bright red spot of light but not the device from which the light originates).

On Monday morning, April 7, 1997, the U.S. Coast Guard notified the Master of M/V KAPITAN MAN in writing that the vessel was being detained in port for a Coast Guard inspection to determine if hazardous materials or conditions were present on the vessel. The Coast Guard inspection commenced at about 8:30 p.m. EST and lasted approximately two hours. The inspection team searched for the laser device, interviewed the vessel's officers and crew, and inspected the ship's logs. The Master and crew of the vessel were cooperative, opening all compartments that the inspection team desired to inspect. No laser device was found, there was no evidence that an installed device had recently been removed, and the officers and crew claimed they did not have a laser device aboard the vessel and had not shined one at the Canadian helicopter.

The Coast Guard inspection team departed the M/V KAPITAN MAN at about 1:30 a.m. EST April 8th, and the Coast Guard released the vessel from detention. The M/V KAPITAN MAN is currently scheduled to depart Tacoma at 4:00 p.m. EST today.

Q: What is the condition of the injured men?

A: The initial evaluation by Canadian military physicians was that the eye damage would be non-permanent. The two men have been flown to Brooks Army Medical Center in Texas for further examination and evaluation.

Q: Why was a Canadian military helicopter flying around a ship in U.S. territorial waters?

A: The Canadian helicopter was on a routine maritime surveillance patrol in the Strait of San Juan de Fuca, which lies between the United States and Canada. The M/V KAPITAN MAN was in the inbound traffic lane, which lies on the U.S. side of the Strait. Our two nations work closely together to ensure the safety and security of shipping in the Strait.

Q: Why was a U.S. Navy officer in the Canadian helicopter?

A: The U.S. Navy lieutenant is a liaison officer assigned to the Canadian Maritime Command Pacific. The U.S. and Canadian armed forces work closely together in many areas, including maritime patrol and reconnaissance. The U.S. Navy lieutenant's presence on the Canadian helicopter was a routine part of his liaison duties.

Q: On what grounds was the Russian ship detained?

A: The U.S. Coast Guard has statutory authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and the Magnuson Act to inspect vessels in U.S. ports and waters for hazardous materials or conditions, and to detain vessels for this purpose.

Q: Who conducted the inspection? Did Canadian officials participate?

A: The inspection was conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard. They were assisted by a Russian linguist for crew interviews and U.S. military personnel to aid in identifying any laser-type devices that might have been found. No Canadian officials participated.

Q: Did the U.S. Government notify the Russian Government of this incident?

A: We informed the Russian Government of the incident and that the M/V KAPITAN MAN had been detained by the U.S. Coast Guard for inspection.

Q: How did the Russian Government react to our actions?

A: The Russian Consulate in Seattle offered their services to assist the Coast Guard in their inspection of the ship. The Coast Guard expressed willingness to conduct the inspection with a Russian consular officer present. The Russian Consulate in Seattle elected not to participate. The Russian Government has indicated that it will cooperate in our investigation of this incident.

Q: If no laser device was found on the Russian ship and the crew denied shining a laser at the Canadian helicopter, how do you explain the eye damage suffered by the two men?

A: I am not going to speculate on possible causes of their injuries. The Department of Defense is continuing to investigate the incident.

Q: Why was the Russian ship released?

A: The Coast Guard inspection team reported that they had satisfied the purpose of the inspection, which was to determine if hazardous materials or conditions were present on the vessel. The inspection team found no hazardous materials or conditions, and the Coast Guard informed the Master of the M/V KAPITAN MAN that the order detaining his vessel had been canceled.

For use only if asked:

Q: If the Russian ship did point a laser at the helicopter, would it be a violation of the ban on blinding laser weapons?

A: Until we have a great deal more information, we could not say whether the system that was used would be prohibited under the 1996 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons. The Convention on Conventional Weapons protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons prohibits only the employment of "laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices." Laser systems that are not covered by the Protocol are widely used by the armed forces of many nations, including those of the United States, for purposes such as detection, targeting, range-finding, and communications.

Q: Has the protocol on blinding laser weapons entered into force?

A: No, but signatory states have taken on an obligation to respect its terms to "the fullest extent possible" pending its entry into force." The CCW Protocol on blinding laser weapons was signed on May 3, 1996 and requires the ratification of twenty countries. It was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on January 7th of this year. Although Protocol IV has not yet entered into force, the Final Declaration adopted by all CCW parties at the conclusion of the conference at which Protocol IV was adopted stated that all parties "solemnly declare ... their desire that all states, pending entry into force, respect and ensure respect of the substantive provisions of Protocol IV to the fullest extent possible."

Q: Does the U.S. Government plan to protest this incident to the Russian government?

A: As I said, our investigation continues; once we have determined exactly what happened, we will consider further appropriate actions. I should note that the Russian government has been responsive and cooperative in this matter.

