

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 03 April 97 19:34
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Akers, Dale W.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brown, Nancy E.
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Hale, John E.
Hawes, David J.
Lowry, Jay E.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Gwyn M. Parker
Roach, Darren S.
Simons, James R.
Snyder, Julie A.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Abdulmalik, April B.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.

Bouchard, Joseph F.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Brooks, Jennifer
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Davis, William K.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Florio, Elaine
Flynn, Stephen E.
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.

Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Mercier, Henry J.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Murray, Lori E.

Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Prendergast, John P.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Smith, Michael P.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.

Veit, Katherine M.
Vershow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

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TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Friday, April 4. Thank you.

[[APR03GUI.DOC : 4954 in APR03GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

3 April 97 19:33

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

APR03GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 3, 1997

CWC

Portugal

Iraq

Chile

Taiwan

Middle East

Khobar

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Korea

Trips and Visitors

Zaire

Albania

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

Nazi Assets

USEC/Pleiades

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

CWC EVENT ANNOUNCEMENT

☐ Friday's event (10:30-11:30 South Portico) will demonstrate broad-based, bipartisan support for the CWC and underscore the urgency of U.S. ratification before treaty enters into force April 29, with or without us.

☐ Event will bring together top cabinet members, military leaders past and present including the Joint Chiefs, former government officials, key Senators, leaders of the business community, veterans groups, religious organizations, arms control experts. Speakers are: VPOTUS, SecState, SecDef, former Senator Kassebaum, former Senator Boren, POTUS. Prominent attendees include General Powell, Paul Nitze, Davey.

☐ POTUS will announce receipt of two key letters of support: one co-signed by Boren, Kassebaum and Brent Scowcroft, the other by retired military leaders including Powell and Schwarzkopf.

Points

☐ CWC enjoys broad, bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker, Ed Rowney, Paul Nitze and other leading Republican foreign policy experts support it.

☐ CWC will reduce the threat to our soldiers by requiring others to do what we are already doing -- getting out of the chemical weapons business.

☐ CWC will also make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons by eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.

☐ Recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But it is a key element of any effective response.

☐ Treaty has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been 13 Senate hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings of both members and staff. More than 1500 pages of information has been provided to the Senate. It's time for the Senate to debate and vote.

☐ If we do not ratify by April 29, Americans will be less secure. We will be denied access to CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons.

☐ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as head of security, administration, and industry inspections, will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.

☐ Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.

☐ Finally, American chemical companies will begin losing sales to overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Industry estimates this could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

HELMS AND CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the

Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the

governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

PORTUGAL -- GUTERRES VISIT

EAST TIMOR

Q: What is the U.S. government doing to improve the human rights situation in East Timor?

☐ Deeply concerned about human rights situation in territory of East Timor; support UN efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation there.

☐ Applaud Portuguese efforts to draw international attention to the issue.

NAZI GOLD

Q: What do you think about Portugal's acceptance of looted gold from the Nazi government? Do you think Portugal should have to pay reparations to victims of the holocaust?

☐ I think it is laudable that a number of countries, including Portugal have undertaken reviews of their activities in the 1940s related to Nazi assets. The first step must be to understand the facts and history of this tragic period as well as we can.

☐ Our own report will be released shortly. I understand Portugal's report is still in preparation; I leave it to Prime Minister Guterres to comment further.

EXPO '98

Q: What is the status of U.S. preparations for Expo '98?

☐ We look forward to participating in exposition to highlight importance of world's oceans.

☐ U.S. pavilion is now in design phase, and our Commissioner-General, Tony Coelho, tells me we are on track in putting on a first-rate program.

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM

Q: Why do Portuguese still have to get visas to travel to the U.S.?

☐ There are certain criteria mandated by Congress which have to be met in order to be included in the visa waiver program; hope that Portugal will meet this requirements in near future.

AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION AND DEFENSE

Q: Why isn't the U.S. doing all of the things it committed to do in the Agreement on Cooperation and Defense (Lajes Agreement)?

☐ We are making progress; for example, we have transferred an oceanographic ship to Portugal under the agreement. I also understand that one of our space shuttle missions next year will carry a Portuguese experiment.

REPATRIATION OF PORTUGUESE DEPORTEES

Q: Why does the United States deport criminals to Portugal without giving the local governments advance notice? Don't the authorities know that it takes time to make arrangements to assimilate these convicted felons, many of whom have lived for years in the U.S. and don't even speak Portuguese?

☐ Our Immigration and Naturalization Service recently updated its procedures -- expect that Portugal and other foreign governments will receive adequate notification of future deportations.

NATO ADAPTATION

Q: Has the United States taken a position regarding the NATO command structure for

Iberia?

☐ This is an issue to be decided through consultations within the Alliance. Very pleased with strong NATO partnership we enjoy with Portugal.

IRAQ

[FYI -- State Dept. Press Statement for release upon Welch's arrival in Northern Iraq:

NEA Acting A/S Welch and NEA/NGA Director Deutsch are visiting northern Iraq for talks with the leadership of each of the two main Iraqi-Kurdish parties (KDP and PUK), the Iraqi Turkoman Front, the Assyrian Democratic Movement and the Peace Monitoring Force. Discussion will focus on the Ankara peace process. The U.S. continues to believe that reconciliation and stability are in the best interests of the inhabitants of northern Iraq.]

Q: Is David Welch in Turkey or N. Iraq? What's he doing?

A: David Welch is in the region for talks with Kurdish and other leaders from N. Iraq. He is also talking with Turkish officials.

Q: Will David Welch go to N. Iraq?

A: I do not intend to comment on David's precise itinerary.

CHILE

Q: Has the Administration decided to permit the sale of advanced fighters to Chile?

A: No. The USG has decided to authorize the issuance of marketing licenses to companies which wish to compete in Chile's selection of fighter aircraft, while making clear to both the Government of Chile and to the companies involved that there has been no decision

on whether to permit the sale itself.

The licenses are for marketing information only and do not constitute approval for an actual sale. A decision whether to permit such sale has not been made.

This decision to issue marketing licenses was made so as not to disadvantage U.S. companies in the competition. These licenses allow these companies to provide the Government of Chile with technical data on advanced fighter aircraft.

Q: Has the U.S. changed its Latin American conventional arms transfer policy?

A: No. As you know, the Administration is reviewing U.S. conventional arms transfer policy toward Latin America in the context of the significant political, economic, and military changes that have been occurring in the past ten years.

This policy review is on-going. While the review is underway current policy remains unchanged.

Q: What is the current policy on arms exports to Latin America?

A: Our policy worldwide is to consider pending arms transfers on a case-by-case basis. Our long-standing policy in Latin America is, and remains, to address potential transfers in the context of restraint.

Q: Why is a review necessary?

A: The welcome expansion and strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions in recent years makes it prudent for us to undertake this policy review to determine whether any changes in our policy are appropriate.

Our policy goals for the countries of Latin America are to enhance democracy, including civilian control of the military, foster regional stability, transparency and confidence building, and ensure that the weapons modernization decisions of these countries address legitimate defense needs within their existing

economic resources.

Any possible change made to our current arms export policy will be in accordance with these goals.

TAIWAN AND GINGRICH

Q: What is the U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan?

A: According to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA), it is the policy of the United States:

-- "To consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means... a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;"

According to the TRA:

-- The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom.

-- The President and Congress shall determine, in accordance with Constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

The TRA also requires that the United States:

-- Make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

In the U.S.-PRC 1982 Communiqué, the PRC articulated its fundamental policy of resolving the Taiwan question by peaceful means.

We regard the issue of Taiwan's future as one to be resolved by

the parties; our interest
is that such a resolution be peaceful.

Background: According to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), it is
the policy of the United
States:

-- To declare that peace and stability in the area are in the
political, security and economic
interests of the United States, and are matters of international
concern;

-- To make clear that the United States' decision to establish
diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the
future of Taiwan will be
determined by peaceful means;

-- To consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by
other than peaceful means,
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western
Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

-- To maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any
resort to force or other forms
of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the
people of Taiwan.

The TRA also requires that the United States:

-- Make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
self-defense capability.

MIDDLE EAST

NETANYAHU IN MINNESOTA

FYI -- State has been checking with the Israelis on Netanyahu's
travel plans. Link up with
Hussein at Mayo has not been firmed up yet. Has not been
officially announced, they are

exploring possibility.

State is saying: "We have nothing definite on this. Should of course check directly with the Israelis and Jordanians."

Q: Do you have anything on reports of a Clinton/Arafat/Netanyahu meeting?

A: The President will meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu Monday. There are no plans for any three-way meeting at this time.

Q: Any comment on the firebombing of the bus in the West?

A: Terror cannot be tolerated. Every effort needs to be made to discourage and prevent such incidents.

Q: Is Arafat doing enough to prevent and fight terror?

A: We have made very clear our view that violence is not the answer. I think Chairman Arafat understands that he and the Palestinian Authority need to do everything they can, in word and deed, to make clear that terror will not be tolerated.

Q: What's your reaction to criticism that the Administration is not doing enough to save the Middle East peace process?

A: No question about the amount of time and effort that we've put into helping achieve peace in the Middle East.

Been through difficult periods before, and we've helped restore calm and gotten the parties to re-focus on negotiations. Have been in constant touch with the leadership in the region.

Will take some hard work on all sides to move away from confrontation and back to the serious give and take of negotiations. Will help the parties do that, but up to them to create the conditions to move forward.

Q: Can you comment on a reported plan to accelerate the

negotiations?

A: We are having discussions with the parties about how to restore the confidence necessary to let negotiations work. These discussions will continue. That's certainly one of the topics the President discussed with King Hussein yesterday and will be on the agenda for the President's meeting on Monday with Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Q: What is your reaction to the Arab League action recommending cutting Arab ties to Israel?

A: We need a regional environment that's supportive of peacemaking; I don't think declarations like this are helpful, and we have made that very clear in our diplomatic contacts with Arab states.

KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy last night with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Russia Signs Integration Treaty with Belarus

□ Russia and Belarus signed Treaty April 2; unclear how it differs from last year's agreement; provides for territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence of Russia and Belarus; reportedly will allow one month for public comment prior to submitting to parliaments for ratification.

☐ We have no objections in principle to integration as long as voluntary, mutually beneficial, done on basis of equality, does not harm relations with other countries or create new divisions among nations.

☐ But continue to be concerned about political developments in Belarus -- restrictions on personal and press freedoms; unwarranted actions against foreigners, including recent expulsion of U.S. diplomat; recalled our Ambassador for consultations on situation; have cut U.S. assistance.

(If raised -- split in Russian government over treaty sign of fissure in Yeltsin administration?)

☐ Not unusual for different agencies in any government to have different viewpoints; would expect economic reformers to express concern over financial implications; public commentary period constructive way for Yeltsin to seek wide range of views.

IMF Resumes Russia Program

☐ Welcome IMF Managing Director Camdessus' comments that Russia taking necessary reforms, management steps to resume IMF program. Shows confidence in new economic team. Expect decision to be made formally later this month by IMF board.

General Items

Helsinki Summit and Aftermath, Way Forward in U.S.-Russia Relations

☐ Welcomed Yeltsin's positive comments on summit results; Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

NATO-Russia

☐ NATO enlargement proceeding on schedule. Part of broader effort to build comprehensive European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. It is going forward in way that does not threaten any nation's security, enhances stability in Europe.

☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.

☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

Russia Prepared to Sign NATO-Russia Charter in May?

☐ Charter can formalize cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. U.S. prepared to sign Charter before Madrid NATO summit in July, but Alliance and Russia must first agree on contents of document, which is now being discussed in NATO-Russia channel.

BOSNIA

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important

work we have to do between now and June 1998.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement includes provisions that are under the purview of the individual states and which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

War Criminals

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

☐

Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in

Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

□ Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

□ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

CHINA

TEXTILES

Q: What are we doing about China's efforts to circumvent our textile quotas by relabeling their textiles "Made in Hong Kong?" Isn't this going to get much worse after July 1?

A: We take our responsibility to enforce our Customs laws and our trade agreements very seriously. We have addressed this issue both through Customs Service investigations and through USTR enforcement actions.

Like IPR and other issues with China, we have sought to address them on the basis of engagement -- getting our officials the access they need to enforce our laws and, if necessary, imposing the kind of penalties that get attention and change behavior.

We've proven a willingness to deal with this issue firmly in the past; if required, we will do that in the future as well.

COSCO

Q: Does COSCO represent a threat to US national security? Does COSCO engage in predatory pricing and operate outside the normal rules and motivations of commercial behavior? Did COSCO decide to purchase ships from US yards to curry favor?

A: COSCO is the world's largest shipping line. It operates out of virtually every major West Coast port. And it moves much of the traffic in our trans-Pacific market.

We welcome its participation in our trading relationship. But like other companies, it must abide by our laws. I am confident that our Coast Guard, Customs and Maritime authorities will ensure that our laws are effectively enforced -- whether they involve COSCO or any other company.

Senator McCain has made some serious allegations with respect to COSCO. We are looking at those allegations. I'm not going to prejudge that review or its outcome.

UNHRC

Background: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain reportedly have decided not to co-sponsor a China resolution, which means that there will not be an EU-introduced resolution this year. However, any individual country can introduce the resolution, and we expect at least 10 EU countries to co-sponsor the resolution once it is introduced. Our position is that we are working with other countries on a resolution and will oppose China's no-action motion (which, if passed, would bar consideration of the resolution by the Commission). A vote is scheduled for the third week in April.

Points

- ☐ U.S. is working with other members of the Commission on a resolution concerning the human rights situation in China.
- ☐ U.S. will oppose motions designed to keep the resolution off the Commission's agenda.
- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ During his recent visit, Ambassador Richardson expressed the U.S. position in a statement to Commission members and met with several important delegations to convey our views.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

KOREA

Q: Have you told Taiwan to retract its contract with Pyongyang for the shipment of low level nuclear waste to North Korea? Did you discuss this issue with South Korea?

A: We have discussed with both Taipei and Seoul the concerns of the U.S. and others in the region regarding the proposed shipment of low-level nuclear

waste from Taiwan to North Korea. In particular, we have emphasized the need to ensure that any shipment meets international standards of safety for both transport and storage. We have encouraged Taiwan to discuss international practices with the IAEA and we expect Taiwan, and others in the region, to approach this issue constructively.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

- ☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3.
- ☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.
- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.
- ☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.
- ☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two

governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

ZAIRE

ZAIRE PEACE PROCESS

☐ South Africa will be leading efforts later this week to bring the GOZ and rebels together for negotiations.

☐ UN SRSG Sahnoun is in South Africa and we hope he will be part of these discussions. The United States thinks Sahnoun has a central role to play in his double-hatted capacity as both UN and OAU representative.

☐ We are hopeful that both parties will send senior-level delegations to discuss seriously a cease-fire and comprehensive negotiated solution. We continue to see a negotiated solution as the best means of solving the ongoing crisis in Zaire.

☐ We have worked very hard with neighboring governments and France to secure commitments from both sides to a negotiated solution.

If asked:

☐ We have offered to assist the South Africans, but they are leading this effort alone.

☐ Understand UN Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun is in South Africa, but we don't know if he will be part of any negotiations. South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki discussed the concept of talks in South Africa during his meeting with President Mobutu last week in Kinshasa. Other representatives of the SAG met with Kabila shortly thereafter to secure their commitment to talks.

MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu?
Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a national consensus on how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a seven-person committee of negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We are waiting to get more details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee designated immediately and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the rebel alliance, within the context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire. Obviously, during this time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political figures to work together towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible

evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

ALBANIA

☐ The security situation in Albania has improved slightly but remains very difficult, with armed gangs still at large, the central government still weak and deep divisions between the insurgents in the south and President Berisha, who remains in office.

☐

☐ While some humanitarian supplies are getting through, the possibility of a humanitarian crisis remains.

☐ The OSCE has taken on overall responsibility for coordinating

the international community's response to the Albanian crisis. The OSCE plans to send a large mission to Albania to support political reconciliation, promote a return to law and order and help foster the conditions for a return to democracy. The U.S. is playing a very active role with the OSCE on Albania

- ☐ As part of a separate effort to support security for humanitarian and other assistance to Albania, the OSCE and UN Security Council have welcomed the initiative being organized by Italy and other European nations to send a multinational force to Albania.
- ☐ Italy, joined by about ten other governments, are planning the details of this force. It may deploy in the middle of April. The United States does not plan to join this force.
- ☐ The United States continues to support the government of Prime Minister Fino and supports his efforts to reach out to all constructive political forces in the country, including responsible forces in the south.
- ☐ (If pressed). It is up to President Berisha to determine how he can act to support stability and democracy in Albania.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

- ☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.
- ☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

- ☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of

violence.

- ☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

- ☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.
- ☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

- ☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.
- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to

comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.

☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.

☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to

initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly

supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I

requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive

(PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their

Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will

ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard

the health of soldiers in
future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
 - ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
 - ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
 - ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
 - ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

- ☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.
- ☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.
- ☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to

review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD

Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.

☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is

that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

- ☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.
- ☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.
- ☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...
- ☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.
- ☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.
- ☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...
- ☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in

January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

- ☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐

During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication

of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.

☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.

☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision

to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 April 97 08:43
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT berger comments [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Murray, Lori E.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[BERGERA.DOC : 2073 in BERGERA.DOC]]
**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 4 April 97 8:41
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** BERGERA.DOC

POINTS FOR MEETING WITH BIDEN

BACKGROUND

In your meeting with Senator Biden you need to address three main areas: the state of play on the Biden/Helms staff negotiations, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings and the endgame for achieving a unanimous consent agreement.

Regarding the Biden/Helms staff negotiations, Biden's staff have isolated those issues they believe should be handled on the members level between Biden and Helms. You need to underscore with Biden your concern that we are very close to crossing a line of acceptability in the negotiations. You should also use this meeting to reach a shared understanding with Biden on which items remain unagreed and, therefore, would require a debate and vote on the floor. One of Biden's staffs main concerns is the RCA issue and their

belief that the Administration's condition may not pass.

Regarding Helms' hearings, you need to get the most recent state of play from Biden and to work jointly to make sure that there are as few hearings as possible, that the Administration is appropriately represented, and that the rules governing questions for the record, etc. are set so that they are manageable and do not interfere with the negotiation of a unanimous consent agreement and the actual floor consideration itself. Right now, the hearing situation is very confused.

Finally, you need to coordinate with Biden an endgame strategy for successfully negotiating a unanimous consent agreement by the beginning of next week that would allow for a debate the week of April 14 and a vote on the 18th. (assume you mean 18th, since 19 is a saturday)

POINTS

- ☐ Our main goal should be completing the discussions with Senator Helms, no later than Monday, so that negotiations can start on a unanimous consent agreement by Tuesday. We need the the Senate to debate and vote the week of April 14.
- ☐ From working with your staff, this outline is our understanding of where the negotiations stand on the conditions. (hand over attachment)
- ☐ You and I and our respective staffs have put many hours into this effort and we have bent over backwards to address Senator Helms' concerns. While I believe that these efforts will give members the necessary confidence to vote for the Convention, I am concerned that we may be getting close on some of these issues to crossing the line of acceptability for us.
- ☐ Reviewing this list, it is clear that there are issues that we will just not reach agreement on with Senator Helms, including those issues regarding Russia, RCAs, verification, and Senator

Helms' new condition which amends Article X and XI. Our staffs need to work together on alternative language that we believe can win the vote.

☐ I know RCAs is one issue where your staff has some concern about whether our alternative will be able to get the necessary votes. Even watering down the Helms resolution to an understanding would leave us in the very difficult position where we would have to have a statement disagreeing with the Senate understanding.

☐ Bob is scheduled to meet with John McCain next week to discuss our alternative and seek his support. I'd like to try to hold off on deciding how to proceed with this issue until then. What are your views on this

☐ Managing the SFRC hearings so that they do not undermine our efforts is critical. We need to do everything we can to limit it to one or two hearings, at most. .

☐ We also need to ensure that Administration witnesses are allowed to testify under appropriate arrangements (you need to be more specific here). We also need to make sure we have adequate protections that further hearings will not be requested, that a new report will not have to be issued and that the Chairman won't use questions for the record as a delaying tactic for a vote.

☐ I should also mention that both Secretary Cohen and Chairman Shalikashvili will be out of the country until April 12. What is your understanding of the Chairman's intentions on hearings?

☐ As we discussed earlier, the framework for the UC should be a vote on the agreed package of amendments followed by a debate and vote on the outstanding conditions and the alternatives. What is your view on the best way to proceed on the UC negotiations once you and Senator Helms have wrapped up your negotiations?

☐

☐

☐ lori: what is this business in your attachment about other possible conditions? biden should not be pushing that, as it violates the understanding we had in lott group that universe of conditions were those then under discussion.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 April 97 09:11
FROM Murray, Lori E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[BERGER.DOC : 2322 in BERGER.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 4 April 97 9:8
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** BERGER.DOC

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- ☐ I know RCAs is one issue where your staff has some concern about whether our alternative will be able to get the necessary votes. Even watering down the Helms resolution to an understanding would leave us in the very difficult position where we would have to

have a statement disagreeing with the Senate understanding.

☐ Bob is scheduled to meet with John McCain next week to discuss our alternative and seek his support. I recognize that we may need to decide on how to proceed with this issue before that. What are your views on how we should approach this issue?

☐ Managing the SFRC hearings so that they do not undermine our efforts is critical. I believe it is in our interests to have as few hearings as possible.

☐ We also need to ensure that Administration witnesses are allowed to testify under appropriate arrangements. We also need to make sure we have adequate protections that further hearings will not be requested, that a new report will not have to be issued and that the Chairman won't use questions for the record as a delaying tactic for a vote.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 April 97 11:29

FROM Harris, Elisa D.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Johnson, David T.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Murray, Lori E.
Seaton, James B.
Witkowsky, Anne A.

TEXT_BODY [[APR03GUI.DOC : 2866 in APR03GUI.DOC]]
have made a few changes to CWC guidance.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 4 April 97 11:29

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** APR03GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 3, 1997

CWC

Portugal

Iraq

Chile

Taiwan

Middle East

Khobar

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Korea

Trips and Visitors

Zaire

Albania

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

Nazi Assets

USEC/Pleiades

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

CWC EVENT ANNOUNCEMENT

□ Friday's event (10:30-11:30 South Portico) will demonstrate broad-based, bipartisan support for the CWC and underscore the urgency of U.S. ratification before treaty enters into force April 29, with or without us.

□ Event will bring together top cabinet members, military leaders past and present including the Joint Chiefs, former government officials, key Senators, leaders of the business community, veterans groups, religious organizations, arms control experts.

Speakers are: VPOTUS, SecState, SecDef, former Sec State Baker, former Senator Kassebaum, former Senator Boren, POTUS. Prominent attendees include General Powell, Paul Nitze, Ed Rowny.

□ POTUS will announce receipt of two key letters of support: one co-signed by Boren, Kassebaum and Brent Scowcroft, the other by retired military

leaders including Powell and Schwarzkopf.

Points

- ☐ CWC enjoys broad, bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker, Ed Rowney, Paul Nitze and other leading Republican foreign policy experts support it.
- ☐ CWC will reduce the threat to our soldiers by requiring others to do what we are already doing -- getting out of the chemical weapons business.
- ☐ CWC will also make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons by eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.
- ☐ Recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But it is a key element of any effective response.
- ☐ Treaty has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been 13 Senate hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings of both members and staff. More than 1500 pages of information has been provided to the Senate. It's time for the Senate to debate and vote.
- ☐ If we do not ratify by April 29, Americans will be less secure. We will be denied access to CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons.
- ☐ The United States will also not have a seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as head of security, administration, and industry inspections, will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.
- ☐ Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.

□ Finally, American chemical companies will begin losing sales to overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Industry estimates this could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

HELMS AND CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the

Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

PORTUGAL -- GUTERRES VISIT

EAST TIMOR

Q: What is the U.S. government doing to improve the human rights situation in East Timor?

☐ Deeply concerned about human rights situation in territory of East Timor; support UN efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation there.

☐ Applaud Portuguese efforts to draw international attention to the issue.

NAZI GOLD

Q: What do you think about Portugal's acceptance of looted gold from the Nazi government? Do you think Portugal should have to pay reparations to victims of the holocaust?

☐ I think it is laudable that a number of countries, including Portugal have undertaken reviews of their activities in the 1940s related to Nazi assets. The first step must be to understand the facts and history of this tragic period as well as we can.

☐ Our own report will be released shortly. I understand Portugal's report is still in preparation; I leave it to Prime Minister Guterres to comment further.

EXPO '98

Q: What is the status of U.S. preparations for Expo '98?

☐ We look forward to participating in exposition to highlight importance of world's oceans.

☐ U.S. pavilion is now in design phase, and our Commissioner-General, Tony Coelho, tells me we are on track in putting on a first-rate program.

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM

Q: Why do Portuguese still have to get visas to travel to the U.S.?

☐ There are certain criteria mandated by Congress which have to be met in order to be included in the visa waiver program; hope that Portugal will meet this requirements in near future.

AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION AND DEFENSE

Q: Why isn't the U.S. doing all of the things it committed to do in the Agreement on Cooperation and Defense (Lajes Agreement)?

☐ We are making progress; for example, we have transferred an oceanographic ship to Portugal under the agreement. I also understand that one of our space shuttle missions next year will carry a Portuguese experiment.

REPATRIATION OF PORTUGUESE DEPORTEES

Q: Why does the United States deport criminals to Portugal without giving the local governments advance notice? Don't the authorities know that it takes time to make arrangements to assimilate these convicted felons, many of whom have lived for years in the U.S. and don't even speak Portuguese?

☐ Our Immigration and Naturalization Service recently updated its procedures -- expect that Portugal and other foreign governments will receive adequate notification of future deportations.

NATO ADAPTATION

Q: Has the United States taken a position regarding the NATO command structure for Iberia?

□ This is an issue to be decided through consultations within the Alliance. Very pleased with strong NATO partnership we enjoy with Portugal.

IRAQ

[FYI -- State Dept. Press Statement for release upon Welch's arrival in Northern Iraq:

NEA Acting A/S Welch and NEA/NGA Director Deutsch are visiting northern Iraq for talks with the leadership of each of the two main Iraqi-Kurdish parties (KDP and PUK), the Iraqi Turkoman Front, the Assyrian Democratic Movement and the Peace Monitoring Force.

Discussion will focus on the Ankara peace process. The U.S. continues to believe that reconciliation and stability are in the best interests of the inhabitants of northern Iraq.]

Q: Is David Welch in Turkey or N. Iraq? What's he doing?

A: David Welch is in the region for talks with Kurdish and other leaders from N. Iraq. He is also talking with Turkish officials.

Q: Will David Welch go to N. Iraq?

A: I do not intend to comment on David's precise itinerary.

CHILE

Q: Has the Administration decided to permit the sale of advanced fighters to Chile?

A: No. The USG has decided to authorize the issuance of marketing

licenses to companies
which wish to compete in Chile's selection of fighter aircraft,
while making clear to both
the Government of Chile and to the companies involved that there
has been no decision
on whether to permit the sale itself.

The licenses are for marketing information only and do not
constitute approval for an
actual sale. A decision whether to permit such sale has not been
made.

This decision to issue marketing licenses was made so as not to
disadvantage U.S.
companies in the competition. These licenses allow these
companies to provide the
Government of Chile with technical data on advanced fighter
aircraft.

Q: Has the U.S. changed its Latin American conventional arms
transfer policy?

A: No. As you know, the Administration is reviewing U.S.
conventional arms transfer
policy toward Latin America in the context of the significant
political, economic, and
military changes that have been occurring in the past ten years.

This policy review is on-going. While the review is underway
current policy remains
unchanged.

Q: What is the current policy on arms exports to Latin America?

A: Our policy worldwide is to consider pending arms transfers on a
case-by-case basis.
Our long-standing policy in Latin America is, and remains, to
address potential transfers in
the context of restraint.

Q: Why is a review necessary?

A: The welcome expansion and strengthening of democracy and
democratic institutions in
recent years makes it prudent for us to undertake this policy
review to determine whether
any changes in our policy are appropriate.

Our policy goals for the countries of Latin America are to
enhance democracy,

including civilian control of the military, foster regional stability, transparency and confidence building, and ensure that the weapons modernization decisions of these countries address legitimate defense needs within their existing economic resources.

Any possible change made to our current arms export policy will be in accordance with these goals.

TAIWAN AND GINGRICH

Q: What is the U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan?

A: According to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA), it is the policy of the United States:

-- "To consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means... a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;"

According to the TRA:

-- The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom.

-- The President and Congress shall determine, in accordance with Constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

The TRA also requires that the United States:

-- Make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

In the U.S.-PRC 1982 Communiqué, the PRC articulated its fundamental policy of resolving the Taiwan question by peaceful means.

We regard the issue of Taiwan's future as one to be resolved by the parties; our interest is that such a resolution be peaceful.

Background: According to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), it is the policy of the United States:

- To declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;

- To make clear that the United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

- To consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

- To maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.

The TRA also requires that the United States:

- Make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

MIDDLE EAST

NETANYAHU IN MINNESOTA

FYI -- State has been checking with the Israelis on Netanyahu's travel plans. Link up with Hussein at Mayo has not been firmed up yet. Has not been officially announced, they are exploring possibility.

State is saying: "We have nothing definite on this. Should of course check directly with the Israelis and Jordanians."

Q: Do you have anything on reports of a Clinton/Arafat/Netanyahu meeting?

A: The President will meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu Monday. There are no plans for any three-way meeting at this time.

Q: Any comment on the firebombing of the bus in the West?

A: Terror cannot be tolerated. Every effort needs to be made to discourage and prevent such incidents.

Q: Is Arafat doing enough to prevent and fight terror?

A: We have made very clear our view that violence is not the answer. I think Chairman Arafat understands that he and the Palestinian Authority need to do everything they can, in word and deed, to make clear that terror will not be tolerated.

Q: What's your reaction to criticism that the Administration is not doing enough to save the Middle East peace process?

A: No question about the amount of time and effort that we've put into helping achieve peace in the Middle East.

Been through difficult periods before, and we've helped restore calm and gotten the parties to re-focus on negotiations. Have been in constant touch with the leadership in the region.

Will take some hard work on all sides to move away from confrontation and back to the serious give and take of negotiations. Will help the parties do

that, but up to them to
create the conditions to move forward.

Q: Can you comment on a reported plan to accelerate the negotiations?

A: We are having discussions with the parties about how to restore the confidence necessary to let negotiations work. These discussions will continue. That's certainly one of the topics the President discussed with King Hussein yesterday and will be on the agenda for the President's meeting on Monday with Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Q: What is your reaction to the Arab League action recommending cutting Arab ties to Israel?

A: We need a regional environment that's supportive of peacemaking; I don't think declarations like this are helpful, and we have made that very clear in our diplomatic contacts with Arab states.

KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy last night with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

On Amnesty International's Report of Police Brutality, Prison Conditions in Russia

☐ Have not seen report, cannot comment on specific allegations;

official U.S. views on political practices and conditions in countries worldwide, including Russia, found in annual Human Rights Reports, published by State Department .

Report (in "Jane's Air Defense 97-98") Russia developed new variant of anthrax toxin

- ☐ Unaware of information that tracks with this report; we maintain close contacts with Russia, other key countries, on all kinds of possible proliferants; monitor all related activities constantly and carefully; will continue that vigilance.

Russia Signs Integration Treaty with Belarus

- ☐ Russia and Belarus signed Treaty April 2; unclear how it differs from last year's agreement; provides for territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence of Russia and Belarus; reportedly will allow one month for public comment prior to submitting to parliaments for ratification.

- ☐ We have no objections in principle to integration as long as voluntary, mutually beneficial, done on basis of equality, does not harm relations with other countries or create new divisions among nations.

- ☐ But continue to be concerned about political developments in Belarus -- restrictions on personal and press freedoms; unwarranted actions against foreigners, including recent expulsion of U.S. diplomat; recalled our Ambassador for consultations on situation; have cut U.S. assistance.

(If raised -- split in Russian government over treaty sign of fissure in Yeltsin administration?)

- ☐ Not unusual for different agencies in any government to have different viewpoints; would expect economic reformers to express concern over financial implications; public commentary period constructive way for Yeltsin to seek wide range of views.

IMF Resumes Russia Program

- ☐ Welcome IMF Managing Director Camdessus' comments that Russia

taking necessary reforms, management steps to resume IMF program. Shows confidence in new economic team. Expect decision to be made formally later this month by IMF board.

General Items

Helsinki Summit and Aftermath, Way Forward in U.S.-Russia Relations

☐ Welcomed Yeltsin's positive comments on summit results; Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

NATO-Russia

☐ NATO enlargement proceeding on schedule. Part of broader effort to build comprehensive European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. It is going forward in way that does not threaten any nation's security, enhances stability in Europe.

☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.

☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

Russia Prepared to Sign NATO-Russia Charter in May?

☐ Charter can formalize cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. U.S. prepared to sign Charter before Madrid NATO summit in July, but Alliance and Russia must first agree on contents of

document, which is now being discussed in NATO-Russia channel.

BOSNIA

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement includes provisions that are under the purview of the individual states and which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

War Criminals

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

☐

Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

☐ Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

☐ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

CHINA

TEXTILES

Q: What are we doing about China's efforts to circumvent our textile quotas by relabeling their textiles "Made in Hong Kong?" Isn't this going to get much worse after July 1?

A: We take our responsibility to enforce our Customs laws and our trade agreements very seriously. We have addressed this issue both through Customs Service investigations and through USTR enforcement actions.

Like IPR and other issues with China, we have sought to address them on the basis of engagement -- getting our officials the access they need to enforce our laws and, if necessary, imposing the kind of penalties that get attention and change behavior.

We've proven a willingness to deal with this issue firmly in the past; if required, we will do that in the future as well.

COSCO

Q: Does COSCO represent a threat to US national security? Does COSCO engage in predatory pricing and operate outside the normal rules and motivations of commercial behavior? Did COSCO decide to purchase ships from US yards to curry favor?

A: COSCO is the world's largest shipping line. It operates out of virtually every major West Coast port. And it moves much of the traffic in our trans-Pacific market.

We welcome its participation in our trading relationship. But like other companies, it must abide by our laws. I am confident that our Coast Guard, Customs and Maritime authorities will ensure that our laws are effectively enforced -- whether they involve COSCO or any other company.

Senator McCain has made some serious allegations with respect to

COSCO. We are looking at those allegations. I'm not going to prejudge that review or its outcome.

UNHRC

Background: France, Germany, Italy, and Spain reportedly have decided not to co-sponsor a China resolution, which means that there will not be an EU-introduced resolution this year. However, any individual country can introduce the resolution, and we expect at least 10 EU countries to co-sponsor the resolution once it is introduced. Our position is that we are working with other countries on a resolution and will oppose China's no-action motion (which, if passed, would bar consideration of the resolution by the Commission). A vote is scheduled for the third week in April.

Points

- ☐ U.S. is working with other members of the Commission on a resolution concerning the human rights situation in China.
- ☐ U.S. will oppose motions designed to keep the resolution off the Commission's agenda.
- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ During his recent visit, Ambassador Richardson expressed the

U.S. position in a statement to Commission members and met with several important delegations to convey our views.

☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

KOREA

Q: Have you told Taiwan to retract its contract with Pyongyang for the shipment of low level nuclear waste to North Korea? Did you discuss this issue with South Korea?

A: We have discussed with both Taipei and Seoul the concerns of the U.S. and others in the region regarding the proposed shipment of low-level nuclear waste from Taiwan to North Korea. In particular, we have emphasized the need to ensure that any shipment meets international standards of safety for both transport and storage. We have encouraged Taiwan to discuss international practices with the IAEA and we expect Taiwan, and others in the region, to approach this issue constructively.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.

☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled

during the week of May
6-10.

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

ZAIRE

ZAIRE PEACE PROCESS

☐ South Africa will be leading efforts later this week to bring the GOZ and rebels together for negotiations.

☐ UN SRSG Sahnoun is in South Africa and we hope he will be part of these discussions. The United States thinks Sahnoun has a central role to play in his double-hatted capacity as both UN and OAU representative.

☐ We are hopeful that both parties will send senior-level delegations to discuss seriously a cease-fire and comprehensive negotiated solution. We continue to

see a negotiated solution
as the best means of solving the ongoing crisis in Zaire.

☐ We have worked very hard with neighboring governments and France
to secure
commitments from both sides to a negotiated solution.

If asked:

☐ We have offered to assist the South Africans, but they are
leading this effort alone.

☐ Understand UN Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun
is in South Africa,
but we don't know if he will be part of any negotiations. South
African Deputy President
Thabo Mbeki discussed the concept of talks in South Africa during
his meeting with President
Mobutu last week in Kinshasa. Other representatives of the SAG
met with Kabila shortly
thereafter to secure their commitment to talks.

MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu?
Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a
national consensus on
how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a
seven-person committee of
negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We
are waiting to get more
details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee
designated immediately
and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the
rebel alliance, within the
context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire.
Obviously, during this
time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political
figures to work together
towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

ALBANIA

☐ The security situation in Albania has improved slightly but remains very difficult, with armed gangs still at large, the central government still weak and deep divisions between the insurgents in the south and President Berisha, who remains in office.

☐ While some humanitarian supplies are getting through, the possibility of a humanitarian crisis remains.

☐ The OSCE has taken on overall responsibility for coordinating the international community's response to the Albanian crisis. The OSCE plans to send a large mission to Albania to support political reconciliation, promote a return to law and order and help foster the conditions for a return to democracy. The U.S. is playing a very active role with the OSCE on Albania

☐ As part of a separate effort to support security for humanitarian and other assistance to Albania, the OSCE and UN Security Council have welcomed the initiative being organized by Italy and other European nations to send a multinational force to Albania.

☐ Italy, joined by about ten other governments, are planning the details of this force. It may deploy in the middle of April. The United States does not plan to join this force.

☐ The United States continues to support the government of Prime Minister Fino and supports his efforts to reach out to all constructive political forces in the country, including responsible forces in the south.

☐ (If pressed). It is up to President Berisha to determine how he can act to support stability and democracy in Albania.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.

☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.

☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.

☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.
- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

- ☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.
- ☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.
- ☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January

1997?

- ☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.
- ☐ Leading examples:
- ☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
- ☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.
- ☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
- ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
- ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
- ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
- ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the

bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC

lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD

acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased

its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that

effort. And to my knowledge, there

is currently no evidence of a cover-up.

☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare

logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public

should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I

believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to

provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to

review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing

investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD

Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must

receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of

what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+

compensation claims approved,

90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level

chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of

Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions

without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to

chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

- ☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.
- ☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

- ☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.
- ☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.
- ☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.
- ☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

- ☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.
- ☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.
- ☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf

theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.

☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible

presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed

the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision

to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.