

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 01 April 97 19:34

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT April 1 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Babcock, Douglas W.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Bujold, Noelle D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, JoAnne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Kuipers, Keelin G.
Moore, Lori A.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Szasz, Nicholas J.
Wise, William M.
Woolston, Ann E.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[APR01GUI.DOC : 4940 in APR01GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 1 April 97 14:27

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** APR01GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 1, 1997

Jordan/Hussein Visit

Chile

Russian Nuclear Bunkers

Fast Track

Taiwan

Middle East

Khobar

Korea

Baltics

Nuclear Cuts/Targeting

Kissinger Op-Ed

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Zaire

Albania

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Indonesia

Cambodia

JORDAN -- HUSSEIN VISIT

Q: Any comment on the bombs in Gaza today?

A: I understand that several Palestinian bystanders were injured in one of the incidents -- I wish them speedy recovery. Terror cannot be tolerated. Every effort needs to be made to discourage and prevent such incidents.

Q: Is Arafat doing enough to prevent and fight terror?

A: I've made very clear my view that violence is not the answer. I think Chairman Arafat understands that he and the Palestinian Authority need to do everything they can, in word and deed, to make clear that terror will not be tolerated.

Q: What's your reaction to article in the New York Times yesterday saying that you (President) have to act to save the Middle East peace process?

A: No question about the amount of time and effort that we've put into helping achieve peace in the Middle East.

Been through difficult periods before, and we've helped restore calm and gotten the parties to re-focus on negotiations. Have been in constant touch with the leadership in the region.

Will take some hard work on all sides to move away from confrontation and back to the serious give and take of negotiations. Will help the parties do that, but up to them to create the conditions to move forward.

Q: Yesterday you met with your foreign policy team to discuss the Middle East peace process. What was the result of that meeting? Are you launching a new initiative?

A: Meeting yesterday was a briefing on Amb. Ross' recent trip to meet with the Israeli and Palestinian leadership.

No easy solutions to difficulties the peace process faces. On the other hand, we've seen crises and difficulties before; dealt with them before. The parties need to do everything they can to prevent terrorism, to exercise restraint and to restore the mutual confidence so necessary to make the process work. Will take goodwill and hard work, and we will help the parties as they proceed.

Q: So you don't have any plan to accelerate the negotiations?

A: We are having discussions with the parties about how to restore the confidence necessary to let negotiations work. These discussions will

continue. That's certainly one of the topics I'll be discussing with King Hussein today.

JORDAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

Q: The new Prime Minister of Jordan criticized Secretary Albright's speech on Iraq, calling it interference in Iraqi internal affairs. Why is Jordan still defending Iraq?

A: I can't speak for Jordan. I know King Hussein has taken steps to help maintain and enforce the Security Council resolutions and I appreciate that. Let me just say this:

The international community needs to contain Iraq as long as it remains a threat to its neighbors or is in violation of Security Council resolutions. We want to see Iraq integrated back into the international community -- sooner the better. But it's not feasible now -- Saddam Hussein remains a threat. We need to be realistic about that.

ISOLATION OF ISRAEL BY ARAB LEAGUE

Q: What is your reaction to the Arab League action recommending cutting Arab ties to Israel?

A: We need a regional environment that's supportive of peacemaking; I don't think declarations like this are helpful.

DALEY

Q: Why is King Hussein seeing Daley?

A: The Daley meeting is a routine courtesy call to discuss trade and investment ties between our two countries.

CHILE

Q: Has the Administration decided to permit the sale of advanced fighters to Chile?

A: No. The USG has decided to authorize the issuance of marketing licenses to companies which wish to compete in Chile's selection of fighter aircraft, while making clear to both the Government of Chile and to the companies involved that there has been no decision on whether to permit the sale itself.

The licenses are for marketing information only and do not constitute approval for an actual sale. A decision whether to permit such sale has not been made.

This decision to issue marketing licenses was made so as not to disadvantage U.S. companies in the competition. These licenses allow these companies to provide the Government of Chile with technical data on advanced fighter aircraft.

Q: Has the U.S. changed its Latin American conventional arms transfer policy?

A: No. As you know, the Administration is reviewing U.S. conventional arms transfer policy toward Latin America in the context of the significant political, economic, and military changes that have been occurring in the past ten years.

This policy review is on-going. While the review is underway current policy remains unchanged.

Q: What is the current policy on arms exports to Latin America?

A: Our policy worldwide is to consider pending arms transfers on a case-by-case basis. Our long-standing policy in Latin America is, and remains, to address potential transfers in the context of restraint.

Q: Why is a review necessary?

A: The welcome expansion and strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions in recent years makes it prudent for us to undertake this policy review to determine whether any changes in our policy are appropriate.

Our policy goals for the countries of Latin America are to

enhance democracy, including civilian control of the military, foster regional stability, transparency and confidence building, and ensure that the weapons modernization decisions of these countries address legitimate defense needs within their existing economic resources.

Any possible change made to our current arms export policy will be in accordance with these goals.

RUSSIAN DEEP UNDERGROUND FACILITIES

Q: How can the administration justify the agreement reached with President Yeltsin in Helsinki last month to delay the deadline for START II reductions by five years, or continued funding for Nunn-Lugar programs, when Russia continues to fund expensive, secret military projects like those described in today's Washington Times?

A: Our latest Nunn-Lugar certification for Russia found that Russia is committed to forgoing in the future modernization programs beyond those required for legitimate defense purposes.

Russian military spending has fallen dramatically in recent years, and nuclear and conventional weapons programs are expected to continue to decline in the future.

In this context, believe strongly that it was in our interest to provide Russia additional time to implement START II, to 2007, especially since the entry into force of this Treaty has been delayed for over four years.

□ Moreover, have agreed to deactivate systems that are to be eliminated under START II by end of 2003, only one year after the original destruction timelines under START II, by taking warheads off of missiles or through other agreed measures.

☐ Have also agreed to further reduce strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000-2,500 by 2007 in a START III. Believe this package is in America's national security interests.

With respect to Nunn-Lugar programs, believe strongly that investments in programs to dismantle and destroy Russian weapons of mass destruction remain in the U.S. national interest.

FACT TRACK

Q: The Wall Street Journal reported today (4/1) that the Administration is weighing the dropping of labor and environmental goals from fast track trade authority legislation, a move certain to infuriate labor unions. Is this true?

A: As we have stated consistently, this Administration remains committed to promoting labor and environmental standards around the world.

Our goal is to build the broadest possible support for the fast track legislation. To that end, Ambassador Barshefsky and others have been consulting actively with members of Congress representing all points of view on this subject, and with all interested parties, including labor. We will continue to do so with the goal of enacting legislation that receives broad support.

TAIWAN AND GINGRICH

Q: Did the Administration coordinate with the Speaker on the Taiwan issue and do his remarks represent Administration policy?

A: The Administration met with the Speaker prior to his departure and discussed a number of issues, including Taiwan. His remarks in China, however, were made on his own authority, and do not represent Administration policy. The

Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States: "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and ... to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan." The Clinton Administration has stood by the TRA, most recently in March 1996 when we dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Western Pacific in response to a situation that appeared to threaten the security of the region.

Q: What is the USG policy with respect to the use of force or the threat of use of force by China against Taiwan? Do we concur with the Speaker's remarks?

A: The Administration has maintained a consistent position of opposing the use of force or threat of the use of force to resolve issues between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Our "one China" policy is grounded on that understanding. We have urged both sides to avoid taking provocative steps that would increase tensions in the region, and to engage in a serious dialogue to resolve differences of view.

Q: Have we taken any steps to clarify our position with either China or Taiwan in the aftermath of the Speaker's remarks?

A: As indicated, the Speaker's remarks reflected his own views, not those of the U.S. Government. Neither China nor Taiwan has requested a clarification of Administration policy on this issue.

MIDDLE EAST

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Q: What's your reaction to article in The New York Times today (3/31) saying that the President has to act to save the Middle East peace process?

A: The President has been and continues to be active in supporting efforts to make peace in the Middle East. The notion that the Administration hasn't been faced with, and dealt with, difficulties and crises in the peace process before is obviously nonsense.

We've been through very difficult periods before, and you're well aware that the President has been willing to act and take risks to restore calm to the situation and to help the parties re-focus on negotiations. We have been in constant touch with the leadership in the region, including, but not limited to Amb. Ross' trip to the Middle East last week.

It will take some hard work on all sides to move away from confrontation and back to the serious give and take of negotiations. We will help the parties do that, and they know we can and will help, but ultimately it's up to them to create the conditions to move forward.

Q: Could you tell us the results of the meeting the President had today (3/31) with Ambassador Ross?

A: I'm not going to get into the specifics of that meeting. Amb. Ross reported to the President on his conversations late last week with the Israeli and Palestinian leadership.

We all recognize that there are no easy solutions to the difficulties the peace process faces. On the other hand, we've seen crises and difficulties before; this is not a linear process that always goes in one direction. The parties need to do everything they can to prevent terrorism, to exercise restraint and to restore the mutual confidence so necessary to make the process work. This will take goodwill and hard work, and we will help the parties as they proceed.

During his trip, he had good, thorough exchanges with both the Palestinian and Israeli leadership.

His meeting with the President today was an opportunity to review his trip to the region and the next steps in the process.

The President's meeting Tuesday with King Hussein will provide a further opportunity to exchange news on how we can help the parties move the process forward.

Q: So you don't have any plan to accelerate the negotiations?

A: We are having discussions with the parties about how to restore confidence and move forward in their negotiations. These discussions will continue.

PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian authority must comply with all its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in order for negotiations to resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to do everything it can to prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian authority must make certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process understand that violence and terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is to be restored and negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and terrorism? Shouldn't he be arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to prevent violence and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that those associated with violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem

through its moving
ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is absolutely essential for the Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very clearly in both words and deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will not be tolerated.

KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy last night with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

KOREA -- FOUR PARTY PEACE TALKS

Q: At the working level meeting between the U.S., South and North Korea in New York on Wednesday, did the North agree to come to the Four Party Peace Talks in exchange for food assistance?

A: The talks in New York on March 26 were at the working level and no formal requests were made by either side. The North and South Korean representatives took the opportunity to clarify each other's concerns. The meeting can

best be described as a working level follow-on to the official Joint Briefing that was conducted in New York on 5 March. In that regard, it was extremely useful for all parties to discuss their views and work together to realize the Peace Talks that Presidents Clinton and Kim offered in April 1996.

Q: South Korea indicated that the North "conditionally accepted the Four Party Talks." Is that accurate?

A: A wide range of subjects were discussed, but there were no agreements reached in New York on Wednesday. We remain hopeful that the North will accept the offer of Peace Talks and are waiting for their formal response to the Presidents offer as it was briefed on 5 March.

BALTIC "SECURITY PACT"

U.S. Offer of "Security" Pact for Baltic States

Q: Has the U.S. offered a "security pact" to the Baltic states to compensate for lack of NATO membership?

A: The U.S. is working actively with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to advance their integration with the Transatlantic community and its institutions. We have a number of initiatives, both bilateral, regional and through PFP, well underway.

As part of this process, we have discussed with the Baltic governments the possibility of a joint document outlining our shared commitment to the sovereignty, independence and security of the Baltic states.

Any joint document would not be a "substitute" or "compensation" for NATO membership, nor a "security pact" in its own right, but rather a supplement to ongoing

efforts to advance Baltic integration.

As President Clinton has repeatedly made clear, the process of NATO enlargement is and will remain open for all of Europe's new democracies, including the Baltic states.

U.S. NUCLEAR CUTS

Q: The President of the Sandia National Laboratories has suggested that as the United States makes further reductions in its nuclear forces it may move to targeting civilians and population centers. Is this true?

A: No.

First, as of May, 1994, all U.S. nuclear missiles have been "detargeted," as per the agreement between President Clinton and President Yeltsin earlier that year.

Second, the United States has not targeted civilian population centers as part of its deterrent strategy for decades.

Third, reductions to 2,000-2,500 warheads agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki will not precipitate such a change.

KISSINGER OP-ED ATTACK RE HELSINKI, NATO-RUSSIA

Q: Comment on Kissinger's attack on Helsinki as a "fiasco"; his charge that steps toward NATO-Russia partnership will ruin NATO?

A: Helsinki was a significant success for American interests. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin recorded significant progress on nuclear arms reductions and ABM/TMD demarcation. While they disagreed on NATO enlargement, President Yeltsin agreed to

work with NATO to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.
Moreover, President Clinton made clear that NATO will enlarge on schedule.

Helsinki shows that steadiness and consistency in our ambitious agenda of building a united Europe -- including NATO enlargement and a strong NATO-Russia relationship -- brings results. We have rejected the extremes -- those who want us to abandon efforts to build partnership with Russia and those who want us to abandon efforts to bring in all of Europe's democracies to Europe's institutions.

NATO-Russia partnership is no concession to Russia, it is in U.S. interests.

The NATO-Russia Council will not dilute NATO decision making. After all, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has existed since 1991 and includes Russia; PFP has existed since 1994 and includes Russia. Neither has competed with NATO and neither will the NATO-Russia Council.

Should NATO and Russia disagree in NATO-Russia Council, each would retain freedom to take independent decisions and action. Russians understand this.

The Central Europeans were quite pleased. "This was no Yalta," announced Poland's largest daily, edited by Solidarity hero Adam Michnik; "a reverse Yalta," wrote one of Hungary's leading dailies; "very hopeful" wrote a major Estonian newspaper.

NATO is not abandoning collective defense. The Administration has made clear -- from the President on down -- that NATO's primary mission will remain the defense of NATO territory from external attack. This mission does not render NATO incapable of pursuing cooperation with non-members when doing so advances the security of current and future members and our interest in building a more stable and secure Europe.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Russia to Sign Integration Agreement with Belarus?

- ☐ Expect Russia and Belarus to sign some form of agreement on April 2, one-year anniversary of earlier integration agreement; not clear how new agreement might differ from last year's ineffectual agreement, except citizens may have dual nationality.
- ☐ All accounts suggest Russia and Belarus would remain sovereign states. Clear that some in Russia concerned about cost to Russia of "carrying Belarus." Will need to review agreement once finalized.

Russia Prepared to Sign NATO-Russia Charter in May?

- ☐ Charter can formalize cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. U.S. prepared to sign Charter even before Madrid NATO summit in July, but Alliance and Russia must first agree on contents of document, which is now being discussed in NATO-Russia channel.

Yeltsin March 26 Radio Address

- ☐ Yeltsin outlined Helsinki results, citing "serious agreements" on START, ABM Treaty, economic cooperation. Noted disagreement over NATO enlargement, but reiterated interest in concluding NATO-Russia at "highest level."
- ☐ Welcome Yeltsin's comments. Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

General Items

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

- ☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

- ☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

U.S. Recalls Ambassador to Belarus after American Diplomat Detained, Expelled

- ☐ In response to Belarusian government's expulsion of U.S. diplomat engaged in normal diplomatic duties: have recalled our Ambassador for consultations, cut off most aid, redirected remaining funds (about \$5 million) to NGOs, humanitarian purposes; declared Belarusian Embassy First Secretary and Consul Vladimir Gramyka Persona Non-Grata; requested Belarus delay planned arrival of Ambassador-designate to U.S.
- ☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by Lukashenko regime and government's rejection of internationally recognized human rights, as shown in last November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of legitimacy."

NATO-Russia

- ☐ NATO enlargement proceeding on schedule. Part of broader effort to build more stable European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. Determined that enlargement proceed in manner that threatens security of no country.
- ☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.
- ☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

BOSNIA

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

☐ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

War Criminals

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the

ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

Brcko Decision

☐ The Brcko arbitration decision mandates that the office of the High Representative assume interim international supervision of the Brcko area. Implementation will be a gradual and long-term effort requiring sustained commitment by the parties and international community. The recent implementation conference in Vienna was the first step in this process.

Izetbegovic visit

☐ President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of Bosnia, met with President Clinton last Wednesday. They discussed a broad range of issues relating to the Bosnia peace process. (David Johnson provided read-out Wednesday)

If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and equipping of the Bosnian military

☐ We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation self-defense capability through the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a key part of building a stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was

signed at Dayton.

□ Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

□ Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

□ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

CHINA

TEXTILES

Q: What are we doing about China's efforts to circumvent our textile quotas by relabeling their textiles "Made in Hong Kong?" Isn't this going to get much worse after July 1?

A: We take our responsibility to enforce our Customs laws and our trade agreements very seriously. We have addressed this issue both through Customs Service investigations and through USTR enforcement actions.

Like IPR and other issues with China, we have sought to address

them on the basis of engagement -- getting our officials the access they need to enforce our laws and, if necessary, imposing the kind of penalties that get attention and change behavior.

We've proven a willingness to deal with this issue firmly in the past; if required, we will do that in the future as well.

COSCO

Q: Does COSCO represent a threat to US national security? Does COSCO engage in predatory pricing and operate outside the normal rules and motivations of commercial behavior? Did COSCO decide to purchase ships from US yards to curry favor?

A: COSCO is the world's largest shipping line. It operates out of virtually every major West Coast port. And it moves much of the traffic in our trans-Pacific market.

We welcome its participation in our trading relationship. But like other companies, it must abide by our laws. I am confident that our Coast Guard, Customs and Maritime authorities will ensure that our laws are effectively enforced -- whether they involve COSCO or any other company.

Senator McCain has made some serious allegations with respect to COSCO. We are looking at those allegations. I'm not going to prejudge that review or its outcome.

GORE TRIP

Q: On what basis did the Vice President assert that the Administration's policy toward China would not change as a result of the current investigation into alleged illegal campaign contributions by Chinese officials?

A: The Vice President discussed this issue during his meeting in Beijing with Premier Li Peng; he also will raise it with President Jiang Zemin.

The Vice President explained that we regard these allegations

very seriously. Were the FBI investigation to establish that China engaged in illegal acts, the potential consequences for sustaining the current positive momentum in U.S.-China relations could be jeopardized.

The FBI investigation is still ongoing, however, and we will not speculate on its outcome or allow it to deter the Administration's pursuit of our objectives with China, including improving market access for U.S. products, pressing for improvements in human rights practices and holding China to international standards on nonproliferation issues.

UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with

demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

Points

☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.

Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record.

☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.

☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.

☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

- ☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.
- ☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.
- ☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.
- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

- ☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

ZAIRE

ZAIRE PEACE PROCESS

- ☐ South Africa will be leading efforts later this week to bring the GOZ and rebels together for negotiations.
- ☐ UN SRSG Sahnoun is in South Africa and we hope he will be part of these discussions. The United States thinks Sahnoun has a central role to play in his

double-hatted capacity as both
UN and OAU representative.

☐ We are hopeful that both parties will send senior-level delegations to discuss seriously a cease-fire and comprehensive negotiated solution. We continue to see a negotiated solution as the best means of solving the ongoing crisis in Zaire.

☐ We have worked very hard with neighboring governments and France to secure commitments from both sides to a negotiated solution.

If asked:

☐ We have offered to assist the South Africans, but they are leading this effort alone.

☐ Understand UN Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun is in South Africa, but we don't know if he will be part of any negotiations. South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki discussed the concept of talks in South Africa during his meeting with President Mobutu last week in Kinshasa. Other representatives of the SAG met with Kabila shortly thereafter to secure their commitment to talks.

MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu? Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a national consensus on how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a seven-person committee of negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We are waiting to get more details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee designated immediately and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the rebel alliance, within the context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire. Obviously, during this time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political figures to work together towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a

forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of

whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

ALBANIA

Any Update on Albania?

☐ The OSCE has approved a permanent mission to Albania headed by former Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky. The Vranitzky will coordinate international efforts to improve the situation there and prepare for new parliamentary elections.

☐ We strongly support this effort which we hope will buttress the Fino government and lead to the restoration of civil society within the country.

☐ The OSCE also took note of the desire of some European countries to put together a force that could provide protection for the ongoing humanitarian relief effort.

☐ Over the weekend, the UN Security Council approved a resolution authorizing an Italian-led force.

☐ We are supportive of the idea of deploying such a force with a properly defined mission, but we do not intend to have any on-the-ground participation in the force.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.

☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.

☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.

☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.

☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.

☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.

☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.

☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.

☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.

☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:

☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.

☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.

☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.

☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there

is currently no evidence of a cover-up.

☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD

Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.

☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.

☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.

☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all

Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

- ☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.
- ☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...
- ☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

- ☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.
- ☐

During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it

unlikely that exposure to
CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even
with independent oversight?

☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997
in extending the PAC to
provide independent oversight.

☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a
thorough & open process.

☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered
intelligence reports and the publication
of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's
commitment.

☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation
of a new Special Assistant for
Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative
resources (including more than 100
additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than
20,000 Gulf War veterans
who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical
demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the
many experts -- at DOD, HHS and
VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf
War illnesses.

☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors
and concluded that current
scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides;
chemical warfare agents;
biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB);
infectious diseases;
depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum
products. The Committee also
found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf
War illnesses.

☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed
the federal research portfolio
and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending
increased emphasis in certain
areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical
exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War
illnesses is required and is now in
progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are
sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.
- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
- ☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Helms and CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with

Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

INDONESIA

Freeport/McMoRan

Q: What is your reaction to the Indonesian government suspension of Bre-X's (partner with Freeport--Jim Moffett) license to mine gold in Busang?

A: We have no reason to believe that this story is other than what it purports to be, namely a report on Jakarta's suspension of Bre-X's mining license as a result of concerns about the extent of estimated gold reserves. This is a commercial and contractual issue between the involved companies and the Indonesian government.

Sale of Pakistani F-16s

Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia F-16s?

A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains committed to the sale, but the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the transfer at this time. Our decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations, including regional and

bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.

We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter evolves.

CAMBODIA

Q: What is your position on the violence taking place in Cambodia?

A: We deplore the violence; we urge the Cambodia government to investigate promptly this incident and bring those responsible to justice. We continue to support the evolution of the democratic process in Cambodia and the holding of free and fair elections next year. We believe this incident is one of intimidation, however, and we will raise with the Cambodians our serious doubts that free and fair elections can occur in a climate of fear and intimidation.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 01 April '97 19:36
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Akers, Dale W.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Hale, John E.
Hawes, David J.
Lowry, Jay E.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Simons, James R.
Snyder, Julie A.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Abdulmalik, April B.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Brooks, Jennifer

Brown, Nancy E.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Davis, William K.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Florio, Elaine
Flynn, Stephen E.
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.

Helweg, M. Diana
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Mercier, Henry J.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.

Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Gwyn M. Parker
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Prendergast, John P.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Smith, Michael P.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.

Veit, Katherine M.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates **IN BOLD** to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Wednesday, April 2. Thank you.

[[APR01GUI.DOC : 4952 in APR01GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

1 April 97 19:34

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

APR01GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 1, 1997

Jordan/Hussein Visit

Chile

Russian Nuclear Bunkers

Fast Track

Taiwan

Middle East

Khobar

Korea

Baltics

Nuclear Cuts/Targeting

Kissinger Op-Ed

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Zaire

Albania

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Indonesia

Cambodia

JORDAN -- HUSSEIN VISIT

Q: Any comment on the bombs in Gaza today?

A: I understand that several Palestinian bystanders were injured in one of the incidents -- I wish them speedy recovery. Terror cannot be tolerated. Every effort needs to be made to discourage and prevent such incidents.

Q: Is Arafat doing enough to prevent and fight terror?

A: I've made very clear my view that violence is not the answer. I think Chairman Arafat understands that he and the Palestinian Authority need to do everything they can, in word and deed, to make clear that terror will not be tolerated.

Q: What's your reaction to article in the New York Times yesterday saying that you

(President) have to act to save the Middle East peace process?

A: No question about the amount of time and effort that we've put into helping achieve peace in the Middle East.

Been through difficult periods before, and we've helped restore calm and gotten the parties to re-focus on negotiations. Have been in constant touch with the leadership in the region.

Will take some hard work on all sides to move away from confrontation and back to the serious give and take of negotiations. Will help the parties do that, but up to them to create the conditions to move forward.

Q: Yesterday you met with your foreign policy team to discuss the Middle East peace process. What was the result of that meeting? Are you launching a new initiative?

A: Meeting yesterday was a briefing on Amb. Ross' recent trip to meet with the Israeli and Palestinian leadership.

No easy solutions to difficulties the peace process faces. On the other hand, we've seen crises and difficulties before; dealt with them before. The parties need to do everything they can to prevent terrorism, to exercise restraint and to restore the mutual confidence so necessary to make the process work. Will take goodwill and hard work, and we will help the parties as they proceed.

Q: So you don't have any plan to accelerate the negotiations?

A: We are having discussions with the parties about how to restore the confidence necessary to let negotiations work. These discussions will continue. That's certainly one of the topics I'll be discussing with King Hussein today.

JORDAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

Q: The new Prime Minister of Jordan criticized Secretary Albright's speech on Iraq, calling it interference in Iraqi internal affairs. Why is Jordan still

defending Iraq?

A: I can't speak for Jordan. I know King Hussein has taken steps to help maintain and enforce the Security Council resolutions and I appreciate that. Let me just say this:

The international community needs to contain Iraq as long as it remains a threat to its neighbors or is in violation of Security Council resolutions. We want to see Iraq integrated back into the international community -- sooner the better. But it's not feasible now -- Saddam Hussein remains a threat. We need to be realistic about that.

ISOLATION OF ISRAEL BY ARAB LEAGUE

Q: What is your reaction to the Arab League action recommending cutting Arab ties to Israel?

A: We need a regional environment that's supportive of peacemaking; I don't think declarations like this are helpful.

DALEY

Q: Why is King Hussein seeing Daley?

A: The Daley meeting is a routine courtesy call to discuss trade and investment ties between our two countries.

CHILE

Q: Has the Administration decided to permit the sale of advanced fighters to Chile?

A: No. The USG has decided to authorize the issuance of marketing licenses to companies which wish to compete in Chile's selection of fighter aircraft, while making clear to both the Government of Chile and to the companies involved that there has been no decision on whether to permit the sale itself.

The licenses are for marketing information only and do not constitute approval for an actual sale. A decision whether to permit such sale has not been made.

This decision to issue marketing licenses was made so as not to disadvantage U.S. companies in the competition. These licenses allow these companies to provide the Government of Chile with technical data on advanced fighter aircraft.

Q: Has the U.S. changed its Latin American conventional arms transfer policy?

A: No. As you know, the Administration is reviewing U.S. conventional arms transfer policy toward Latin America in the context of the significant political, economic, and military changes that have been occurring in the past ten years.

This policy review is on-going. While the review is underway current policy remains unchanged.

Q: What is the current policy on arms exports to Latin America?

A: Our policy worldwide is to consider pending arms transfers on a case-by-case basis. Our long-standing policy in Latin America is, and remains, to address potential transfers in the context of restraint.

Q: Why is a review necessary?

A: The welcome expansion and strengthening of democracy and democratic institutions in recent years makes it prudent for us to undertake this policy review to determine whether any changes in our policy are appropriate.

Our policy goals for the countries of Latin America are to enhance democracy, including civilian control of the military, foster regional stability, transparency and confidence building, and ensure that the weapons modernization decisions of these countries address legitimate defense needs within their existing economic resources.

Any possible change made to our current arms export policy will be in accordance with these goals.

RUSSIAN DEEP UNDERGROUND FACILITIES

Q: How can the administration justify the agreement reached with President Yeltsin in Helsinki last month to delay the deadline for START II reductions by five years, or continued funding for Nunn-Lugar programs, when Russia continues to fund expensive, secret military projects like those described in today's Washington Times?

A: Our latest Nunn-Lugar certification for Russia found that Russia is committed to forgoing in the future modernization programs beyond those required for legitimate defense purposes.

Russian military spending has fallen dramatically in recent years, and nuclear and conventional weapons programs are expected to continue to decline in the future.

In this context, believe strongly that it was in our interest to provide Russia additional time to implement START II, to 2007, especially since the entry into force of this Treaty has been delayed for over four years.

☐ Moreover, have agreed to deactivate systems that are to be eliminated under START II by end of 2003, only one year after the original destruction timelines under START II, by taking warheads off of missiles or through other agreed measures.

☐ Have also agreed to further reduce strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000-2,500 by 2007 in a START III. Believe this package is in America's national security interests.

With respect to Nunn-Lugar programs, believe strongly that investments in programs to dismantle and destroy Russian weapons of mass destruction remain

in the U.S. national interest.

FACT TRACK

Q: The Wall Street Journal reported today (4/1) that the Administration is weighing the dropping of labor and environmental goals from fast track trade authority legislation, a move certain to infuriate labor unions. Is this true?

A: As we have stated consistently, this Administration remains committed to promoting labor and environmental standards around the world.

Our goal is to build the broadest possible support for the fast track legislation. To that end, Ambassador Barshefsky and others have been consulting actively with members of Congress representing all points of view on this subject, and with all interested parties, including labor. We will continue to do so with the goal of enacting legislation that receives broad support.

TAIWAN AND GINGRICH

Q: Did the Administration coordinate with the Speaker on the Taiwan issue and do his remarks represent Administration policy?

A: The Administration met with the Speaker prior to his departure and discussed a number of issues, including Taiwan. His remarks in China, however, were made on his own authority, and do not represent Administration policy. The Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States: "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and ... to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan." The Clinton Administration has stood by the

TRA, most recently in March 1996 when we dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Western Pacific in response to a situation that appeared to threaten the security of the region.

Q: What is the USG policy with respect to the use of force or the threat of use of force by China against Taiwan? Do we concur with the Speaker's remarks?

A: The Administration has maintained a consistent position of opposing the use of force or threat of the use of force to resolve issues between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Our "one China" policy is grounded on that understanding. We have urged both sides to avoid taking provocative steps that would increase tensions in the region, and to engage in a serious dialogue to resolve differences of view.

Q: Have we taken any steps to clarify our position with either China or Taiwan in the aftermath of the Speaker's remarks?

A: As indicated, the Speaker's remarks reflected his own views, not those of the U.S. Government. Neither China nor Taiwan has requested a clarification of Administration policy on this issue.

MIDDLE EAST

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Q: What's your reaction to article in The New York Times today (3/31) saying that the President has to act to save the Middle East peace process?

A: The President has been and continues to be active in supporting efforts to make peace in the Middle East. The notion that the Administration hasn't been faced with, and dealt with, difficulties and crises in the peace process before is obviously nonsense.

We've been through very difficult periods before, and you're well

aware that the President has been willing to act and take risks to restore calm to the situation and to help the parties re-focus on negotiations. We have been in constant touch with the leadership in the region, including, but not limited to Amb. Ross' trip to the Middle East last week.

It will take some hard work on all sides to move away from confrontation and back to the serious give and take of negotiations. We will help the parties do that, and they know we can and will help, but ultimately it's up to them to create the conditions to move forward.

Q: Could you tell us the results of the meeting the President had today (3/31) with Ambassador Ross?

A: I'm not going to get into the specifics of that meeting. Amb. Ross reported to the President on his conversations late last week with the Israeli and Palestinian leadership.

We all recognize that there are no easy solutions to the difficulties the peace process faces. On the other hand, we've seen crises and difficulties before; this is not a linear process that always goes in one direction. The parties need to do everything they can to prevent terrorism, to exercise restraint and to restore the mutual confidence so necessary to make the process work. This will take goodwill and hard work, and we will help the parties as they proceed.

During his trip, he had good, thorough exchanges with both the Palestinian and Israeli leadership.

His meeting with the President today was an opportunity to review his trip to the region and the next steps in the process.

The President's meeting Tuesday with King Hussein will provide a further opportunity to exchange news on how we can help the parties move the process forward.

Q: So you don't have any plan to accelerate the negotiations?

A: We are having discussions with the parties about how to restore confidence and move forward in their negotiations. These discussions will continue.

PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian authority must comply with all its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in order for negotiations to resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to do everything it can to prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian authority must make certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process understand that violence and terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is to be restored and negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and terrorism? Shouldn't he be arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to prevent violence and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that those associated with violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem through its moving ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is absolutely essential for the Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very clearly in both words and deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will not be tolerated.

KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy last night with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

KOREA -- FOUR PARTY PEACE TALKS

Q: At the working level meeting between the U.S., South and North Korea in New York on Wednesday, did the North agree to come to the Four Party Peace Talks in exchange for food assistance?

A: The talks in New York on March 26 were at the working level and no formal requests were made by either side. The North and South Korean representatives took the opportunity to clarify each other's concerns. The meeting can best be described as a working level follow-on to the official Joint Briefing that was conducted in New York on 5 March. In that regard, it was extremely useful for all parties to discuss their views and work together to realize the Peace Talks that Presidents Clinton and Kim offered in April 1996.

Q: South Korea indicated that the North "conditionally accepted the Four Party Talks." Is that accurate?

A: A wide range of subjects were discussed, but there were no agreements reached in New York on Wednesday. We remain hopeful that the North will accept the offer of Peace Talks and are waiting for their formal response to the Presidents offer as it was briefed on 5 March.

BALTIC "SECURITY PACT"

U.S. Offer of "Security" Pact for Baltic States

Q: Has the U.S. offered a "security pact" to the Baltic states to compensate for lack of NATO membership?

A: The U.S. is working actively with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to advance their integration with the Transatlantic community and its institutions. We have a number of initiatives, both bilateral, regional and through PFP, well underway.

As part of this process, we have discussed with the Baltic governments the possibility of a joint document outlining our shared commitment to the sovereignty, independence and security of the Baltic states.

Any joint document would not be a "substitute" or "compensation" for NATO membership, nor a "security pact" in its own right, but rather a supplement to ongoing efforts to advance Baltic integration.

As President Clinton has repeatedly made clear, the process of NATO enlargement is and will remain open for all of Europe's new democracies, including the Baltic states.

U.S. NUCLEAR CUTS

Q: The President of the Sandia National Laboratories has suggested that as the United States makes further reductions in its nuclear forces it may move to targeting civilians and population centers. Is this true?

A: No.

First, as of May, 1994, all U.S. nuclear missiles have been "detargeted," as per the agreement between President Clinton and President Yeltsin earlier that year.

Second, the United States has not targeted civilian population centers as part of its deterrent strategy for decades.

Third, reductions to 2,000-2,500 warheads agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki will not precipitate such a change.

KISSINGER OP-ED ATTACK RE HELSINKI, NATO-RUSSIA

Q: Comment on Kissinger's attack on Helsinki as a "fiasco"; his charge that steps toward NATO-Russia partnership will ruin NATO?

A: Helsinki was a significant success for American interests. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin recorded significant progress on nuclear arms reductions and ABM/TMD demarcation. While they disagreed on NATO enlargement, President Yeltsin agreed to work with NATO to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. Moreover, President Clinton made clear that NATO will enlarge on schedule.

Helsinki shows that steadiness and consistency in our ambitious agenda of building a united Europe -- including NATO enlargement and a strong NATO-Russia relationship --

brings results. We have rejected the extremes -- those who want us to abandon efforts to build partnership with Russia and those who want us to abandon efforts to bring in all of Europe's democracies to Europe's institutions.

NATO-Russia partnership is no concession to Russia, it is in U.S. interests.

The NATO-Russia Council will not dilute NATO decision making. After all, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has existed since 1991 and includes Russia; PFP has existed since 1994 and includes Russia. Neither has competed with NATO and neither will the NATO-Russia Council.

Should NATO and Russia disagree in NATO-Russia Council, each would retain freedom to take independent decisions and action. Russians understand this.

The Central Europeans were quite pleased. "This was no Yalta," announced Poland's largest daily, edited by Solidarity hero Adam Michnik; "a reverse Yalta," wrote one of Hungary's leading dailies; "very hopeful" wrote a major Estonian newspaper.

NATO is not abandoning collective defense. The Administration has made clear -- from the President on down -- that NATO's primary mission will remain the defense of NATO territory from external attack. This mission does not render NATO incapable of pursuing cooperation with non-members when doing so advances the security of current and future members and our interest in building a more stable and secure Europe.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Russia to Sign Integration Agreement with Belarus?

☐ Expect Russia and Belarus to sign some form of agreement on April 2, one-year anniversary of earlier integration agreement; not clear how new agreement might differ from last year's ineffectual agreement, except citizens may have dual nationality.

☐ All accounts suggest Russia and Belarus would remain sovereign states. Clear that some in Russia concerned about cost to Russia of "carrying Belarus." Will need to review agreement once finalized.

Russia Prepared to Sign NATO-Russia Charter in May?

☐ Charter can formalize cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. U.S. prepared to sign Charter even before Madrid NATO summit in July, but Alliance and Russia must first agree on contents of document, which is now being discussed in NATO-Russia channel.

Yeltsin March 26 Radio Address

☐ Yeltsin outlined Helsinki results, citing "serious agreements" on START, ABM Treaty, economic cooperation. Noted disagreement over NATO enlargement, but reiterated interest in concluding NATO-Russia at "highest level."

☐ Welcome Yeltsin's comments. Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

General Items

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

U.S. Recalls Ambassador to Belarus after American Diplomat Detained, Expelled

☐ In response to Belarusian government's expulsion of U.S.

diplomat engaged in normal diplomatic duties; have recalled our Ambassador for consultations, cut off most aid, redirected remaining funds (about \$5 million) to NGOs, humanitarian purposes; declared Belarusian Embassy First Secretary and Consul Vladimir Gramyka Persona Non-Grata; requested Belarus delay planned arrival of Ambassador-designate to U.S.

☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by Lukashenko regime and government's rejection of internationally recognized human rights, as shown in last November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of legitimacy."

NATO-Russia

☐ NATO enlargement proceeding on schedule. Part of broader effort to build more stable European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. Determined that enlargement proceed in manner that threatens security of no country.

☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.

☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

BOSNIA

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

☐ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

War Criminals

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

Brcko Decision

☐ The Brcko arbitration decision mandates that the office of the High Representative assume interim international supervision of the Brcko area. Implementation will be a gradual and long-term effort requiring sustained commitment by the parties and international community. The recent implementation conference in Vienna was the first step in this process.

Izetbegovic visit

☐ President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of Bosnia, met with President Clinton last Wednesday. They discussed a broad range of issues relating to the Bosnia peace process. (David Johnson provided read-out Wednesday)

If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and equipping of the Bosnian military

☐ We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation self-defense capability through the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a key part of building a stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

☐ Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic

reconstruction.

- ☐ Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.
- ☐ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

CHINA

TEXTILES

Q: What are we doing about China's efforts to circumvent our textile quotas by relabeling their textiles "Made in Hong Kong?" Isn't this going to get much worse after July 1?

A: We take our responsibility to enforce our Customs laws and our trade agreements very seriously. We have addressed this issue both through Customs Service investigations and through USTR enforcement actions.

Like IPR and other issues with China, we have sought to address them on the basis of engagement -- getting our officials the access they need to enforce our laws and, if necessary, imposing the kind of penalties that get attention and change behavior.

We've proven a willingness to deal with this issue firmly in the past; if required, we will

do that in the future as well.

COSCO

Q: Does COSCO represent a threat to US national security? Does COSCO engage in predatory pricing and operate outside the normal rules and motivations of commercial behavior? Did COSCO decide to purchase ships from US yards to curry favor?

A: COSCO is the world's largest shipping line. It operates out of virtually every major West Coast port. And it moves much of the traffic in our trans-Pacific market.

We welcome its participation in our trading relationship. But like other companies, it must abide by our laws. I am confident that our Coast Guard, Customs and Maritime authorities will ensure that our laws are effectively enforced -- whether they involve COSCO or any other company.

Senator McCain has made some serious allegations with respect to COSCO. We are looking at those allegations. I'm not going to prejudge that review or its outcome.

GORE TRIP

Q: On what basis did the Vice President assert that the Administration's policy toward China would not change as a result of the current investigation into alleged illegal campaign contributions by Chinese officials?

A: The Vice President discussed this issue during his meeting in Beijing with Premier Li Peng; he also will raise it with President Jiang Zemin.

The Vice President explained that we regard these allegations very seriously. Were the FBI investigation to establish that China engaged in illegal acts, the potential consequences for sustaining the current positive momentum in U.S.-China relations could be jeopardized.

The FBI investigation is still ongoing, however, and we will not

speculate on its outcome or allow it to deter the Administration's pursuit of our objectives with China, including improving market access for U.S. products, pressing for improvements in human rights practices and holding China to international standards on nonproliferation issues.

UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

Points

☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.

Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record.

☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.

☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.

☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May

6-10.

- ☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.
- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

- ☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

ZAIRE

ZAIRE PEACE PROCESS

- ☐ South Africa will be leading efforts later this week to bring the GOZ and rebels together for negotiations.
- ☐ UN SRSG Sahnoun is in South Africa and we hope he will be part of these discussions. The United States thinks Sahnoun has a central role to play in his double-hatted capacity as both UN and OAU representative.
- ☐ We are hopeful that both parties will send senior-level delegations to discuss seriously a cease-fire and comprehensive negotiated solution. We continue to see a negotiated solution as the best means of solving the ongoing crisis in Zaire.

☐ We have worked very hard with neighboring governments and France to secure commitments from both sides to a negotiated solution.

If asked:

☐ We have offered to assist the South Africans, but they are leading this effort alone.

☐ Understand UN Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun is in South Africa, but we don't know if he will be part of any negotiations. South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki discussed the concept of talks in South Africa during his meeting with President Mobutu last week in Kinshasa. Other representatives of the SAG met with Kabila shortly thereafter to secure their commitment to talks.

MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu? Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a national consensus on how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a seven-person committee of negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We are waiting to get more details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee designated immediately and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the rebel alliance, within the context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire. Obviously, during this time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political figures to work together towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the

U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from

elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

ALBANIA

Any Update on Albania?

- ☐ The OSCE has approved a permanent mission to Albania headed by former Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky. The Vranitzky will coordinate international efforts to improve the situation there and prepare for new parliamentary elections.
- ☐ We strongly support this effort which we hope will buttress the Fino government and lead to the restoration of civil society within the country.
- ☐ The OSCE also took note of the desire of some European countries to put together a force that could provide protection for the ongoing humanitarian relief effort.
- ☐ Over the weekend, the UN Security Council approved a resolution authorizing an Italian-led force.
- ☐ We are supportive of the idea of deploying such a force with a properly defined mission, but we do not intend to have any on-the-ground participation in the force.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

- ☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.
- ☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

- ☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.
- ☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

- ☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.
- ☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

- ☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange

views on how to move process forward.

☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.

☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.

☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to

initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans

with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I

requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of

Veterans and Their

Families 'After Future Deployments.'" This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
- ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
- ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
- ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
- ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the

bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

- ☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.
- ☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

- Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.
- Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

- First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.
- DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.
- The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.
- As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

- I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.
- Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.
- Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's

commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.
☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.
☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...
☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.
☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.
☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...
☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical

exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in

January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

- ☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.

- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.
- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and

(6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.
- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
- ☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Helms and CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the

concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription

for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

INDONESIA

Freeport/McMoRan

Q: What is your reaction to the Indonesian government suspension of Bre-X's (partner with Freeport--Jim Moffett) license to mine gold in Busang?

A: We have no reason to believe that this story is other than what it purports to be, namely a report on Jakarta's suspension of Bre-X's mining license as a result of concerns about the extent of estimated gold reserves. This is a commercial and contractual issue between the involved companies and the Indonesian government.

Sale of Pakistani F-16s

Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia F-16s?

A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains committed to the sale, but the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the transfer at this time. Our decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations, including regional and bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.

We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter evolves.

CAMBODIA

Q: What is your position on the violence taking place in Cambodia?

A: We deplore the violence; we urge the Cambodia government to investigate promptly this incident and bring those responsible to justice. We continue to support the evolution of the democratic process in Cambodia and the holding of free and fair elections next year. We believe this incident is one of intimidation, however, and we will raise with the Cambodians our serious doubts that free and fair elections can occur in a climate of fear and intimidation.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 01 April 97 20:54
FROM Witkowsky, Anne A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Helms letter - [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Langley, Janice M.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Where I refer to the "March 26" response to Lott, please correct to March 25.

From: Witkowsky, Anne A.
To: Langley, Janice M.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Helms letter - [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, April 01, 1997 06:35 PM

[[2142BER.DOC : 5156 in 2142BER.DOC]][[2142R.DOC : 5157 in 2142R.DOC]]

Janice - Please prepare the attached for Bob's approval. Put Gordy Bendick down for concurrence in place of Danvers. (Bendick has concurred.)

I will place the rest of the package on your chair.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 1 April 97 16:42
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 2142BER.DOC
2142

April 1, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY

SUBJECT: CFE: Response to Letter from Senator Helms

Attached is a proposed response to Senator Helms' letter to the President urging submission of the Flank Agreement to the Senate.

Helms' letter appears simply to have crossed in the mail with your letter to Lott affirming that we would submit the flank agreement to the Senate, provided the Senate is prepared to act prior to May 15. We suggest you respond on behalf of the President, as you did in the case of the Lott letter.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Helms at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Letter to Senator Helms
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

1 April 97 18:2

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

2142R.DOC

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I am responding on behalf of the President to your letter of March 25 concerning the CFE flank agreement. Though you expressed concern in your letter that the Administration had not yet responded to Senator Lott's request for submission of the flank agreement to the Senate, I believe my letter to Senator Lott must have crossed with yours in the mail. My March 26 response to him on behalf of the President clarifies the Administration's views on the flank

agreement, as elaborated below.

On May 31, 1996, the United States, our NATO allies, Russia and the 13 other States Parties to the CFE Treaty approved a document in Vienna culminating more than two years of intensive negotiations on the CFE flank issue. The centerpiece of this agreement was a realignment of the CFE map (depicting the territory of the former USSR in the CFE area), which has the effect of reducing the size of the flank zone. The CFE parties had deliberately not included this map as part of the Treaty when it was signed in 1990, and the Bush Administration did not submit the map to the Senate in 1991 as part of the formal documents for advice and consent. Accordingly, legal counsels in the Clinton Administration's national security agencies determined last year that a change to the map does not constitute a formal amendment to the Treaty.

At the same time, we determined that a realignment of the map did constitute a change in a "shared understanding" formed with the Senate at the time the Senate gave its advice and consent to the Treaty. That "shared understanding" established that the Treaty would be applied and interpreted on the basis of the original map.

According to the 1988 "Biden Condition" on treaty interpretation (which was attached by the Senate to its resolution of ratification for the INF Treaty), Senate consent or congressional approval is required to change a shared understanding.

When the Administration submitted the CFE flank Document for legislative approval last August, we were faced with a time-urgent situation: by its own terms the Document required all States Parties to confirm their approval by December 15; yet very little time remained before the adjournment sine die of the 104th Congress. In this circumstance we chose to seek statutory approval by both houses, as is explicitly permitted under the Biden Condition.

We now face a complex situation. At the Lisbon OSCE Summit in December, the 30 States Parties to the CFE Treaty agreed to

extend
the deadline for confirmation of approval to May 15, 1997. In
recent
months, it has become evident that the flank agreement underpins
the
new negotiations in Vienna on "CFE adaptation," which in turn
underpins NATO's efforts to ensure that Russia does not view NATO
enlargement as threatening its national security interests. In
addition, both adaptation of the CFE Treaty and the admission of
new
states to NATO will be effected through agreements that will be
submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate. The
situation
and timing is therefore different from when the Administration
submitted the CFE flank agreement for legislative approval last
August
and the Administration is prepared, without prejudice to its
legal
position vis-...-vis the approval options we believe are available
to
us, to seek Senate advice and consent to the flank Document
provided
the Senate will act on this crucial matter prior to May 15th.

I hope this addresses your concerns. We expect to transmit the
flank agreement as soon as the Senate comes back into session.
We
look forward to working with you and your staff to ensure
approval by
May 15.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 02 April 97 12:40
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT pundits points [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Naplan, Steven J.
CARBON_COPY Bell, Robert G.
Murray, Lori E.
TEXT_BODY [[SRB4-3.DOC : 3159 in SRB4-3.DOC]]

steve: pls take a look at this.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 2 April 97 12:39

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** SRB4-3.DOC

POINTS

Why CWC is Important

☐ CWC enjoys broad, bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Larry Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker and other leading Republican foreign policy experts support the treaty.

☐ CWC is in our national interest. Will help reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers and our citizens.

☐ Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile.

The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision.

☐ Moreover, the elimination of our chemical weapons will not deny

us

a militarily useful tool. As JCS Chairman Shalikashvili has said,

Desert Storm proved that we don't need chemical weapons to deter the use of chemical weapons against our forces.

☐ CWC will also make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons by eliminating existing stockpiles

and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.

☐ Recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But it is a key element of any effective response.

☐ President is determined to do everything he can to secure a successful Senate vote by mid-April.

Treaty Status in Senate

☐ Since January, we have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and a group he has put together in an effort to address the concerns of some members of the Republican caucus about the treaty.

☐ I have led the Administration team for the "principals-level" meetings, of which there have been four. In addition, there have been four lengthy senior staff-level meetings.

☐ As a result of these discussions, we have moved well beyond the resolution of ratification that was on the Senate calendar last September.

☐ Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions, and in nearly every case, we have either reached agreement on a compromise or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

☐ Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and his CWC task force to facilitate a Senate vote by mid-April so we can deposit our instrument of ratification prior to April 29, when the treaty comes into force.

☐ CWC has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been 13 Senate hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings of both members and staff.

☐ In total, we have provided over 1500 pages of information on the

CWC to the Senate -- over 300 pages of testimony, over 500 pages of answers to letters and reports, over 400 pages of answers of answers to questions for the record, and over 300 pages of other documentation.

□

□ It's now time for the Senate to debate and vote.

Importance of April 29 Deadline

□ April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act before then, Americans will be less secure. Will be denied access to CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. Will also be denied the ability to require other states to do what we are already doing

--

getting out of the chemical weapons business.

□ Without ratification, the credibility of American leadership across a full range of transnational issues will be undermined.

□ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And Americans now serving in key posts, including as head of security, administration, and industry inspections, will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified.

□ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Industry estimates this could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

Contingency point on linkage to reorganization, etc.:

□ Senator Helms has raised a number of other important issues, such as UN reform and reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies. We are working hard to address these issues and will continue to

do so. They deserve, however, to be considered on their own merits, and should not be linked to the CWC. Linkage is a prescription for inaction -- the clock is ticking toward April 29, we cannot delay.