

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 31 March 97 18:42
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Akers, Dale W.
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Hale, John E.
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Miyaoka, Lester H.
Abdulmalik, April B.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
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Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
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Beers, Rand R.
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Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
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Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
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Brennan, Steven A.
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Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.

Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Davis, William K.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Florio, Elaine
Flynn, Stephen E.
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
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Harris, Elisa D.
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Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.

Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Langley, Janice M.
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LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
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Lorin, Matthew E.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
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Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Murray, Lori E.
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Natoli, Kim M.
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O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
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Gwyn M. Parker
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Pascual, Carlos E.
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Prendergast, John P.
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Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
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Rajan, Nahla B.
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Tucker, Maureen E.
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Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.

Vershbow, Alexander R.
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Walsh, Helen C.
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TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates **IN BOLD** to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Tuesday, April 1. Thank you.

[[MAR31GUI.DOC : 4611 in MAR31GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

31 March 97 18:41

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

MAR31GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 31, 1997

Taiwan

Middle East

Khobar

Korea

Baltics

Nuclear Cuts/Targeting

Kissinger Op-Ed

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Zaire

Albania

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Indonesia

Cambodia

TAIWAN AND GINGRICH

Q: Did the Administration coordinate with the Speaker on the Taiwan issue and do his remarks represent Administration policy?

A: The Administration met with the Speaker prior to his departure and discussed a number of issues, including Taiwan. His remarks in China, however, were made on his own authority, and do not represent Administration policy. The Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States: "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and ... to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan." The Clinton Administration has stood by the TRA, most recently in March 1996 when we dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Western Pacific in response to a situation that appeared to threaten the security of the region.

Q: What is the USG policy with respect to the use of force or the threat of use of force by

China against Taiwan? Do we concur with the Speaker's remarks?

A: The Administration has maintained a consistent position of opposing the use of force or threat of the use of force to resolve issues between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Our "one China" policy is grounded on that understanding. We have urged both sides to avoid taking provocative steps that would increase tensions in the region, and to engage in a serious dialogue to resolve differences of view.

Q: Have we taken any steps to clarify our position with either China or Taiwan in the aftermath of the Speaker's remarks?

A: As indicated, the Speaker's remarks reflected his own views, not those of the U.S. Government. Neither China nor Taiwan has requested a clarification of Administration policy on this issue.

MIDDLE EAST

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Q: What's your reaction to article in The New York Times today (3/31) saying that the President has to act to save the Middle East peace process?

A: The President has been and continues to be active in supporting efforts to make peace in the Middle East. The notion that the Administration hasn't been faced with, and dealt with, difficulties and crises in the peace process before is obviously nonsense.

We've been through very difficult periods before, and you're well aware that the President has been willing to act and take risks to restore calm to the situation and to help the parties re-focus on negotiations. We have been in constant touch with the leadership in the region, including, but not limited to Amb. Ross' trip to the Middle East last week.

It will take some hard work on all sides to move away from confrontation and back to the serious give and take of negotiations. We will help the parties do that, and they know we can and will help, but ultimately it's up to them to create the conditions to move forward.

Q: Could you tell us the results of the meeting the President had today (3/31) with Ambassador Ross?

A: I'm not going to get into the specifics of that meeting. Amb. Ross reported to the President on his conversations late last week with the Israeli and Palestinian leadership.

We all recognize that there are no easy solutions to the difficulties the peace process faces. On the other hand, we've seen crises and difficulties before; this is not a linear process that always goes in one direction. The parties need to do everything they can to prevent terrorism, to exercise restraint and to restore the mutual confidence so necessary to make the process work. This will take goodwill and hard work, and we will help the parties as they proceed.

During his trip, he had good, thorough exchanges with both the Palestinian and Israeli leadership.

His meeting with the President today was an opportunity to review his trip to the region and the next steps in the process.

The President's meeting Tuesday with King Hussein will provide a further opportunity to exchange news on how we can help the parties move the process forward.

Q: So you don't have any plan to accelerate the negotiations?

A: We are having discussions with the parties about how to restore confidence and move forward in their negotiations. These discussions will continue.

PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian authority must comply with all its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in order for negotiations to resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to do everything it can to prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian authority must make certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process understand that violence and terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is to be restored and negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and terrorism? Shouldn't he be arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to prevent violence and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that those associated with violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem through its moving ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is absolutely essential for the Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very clearly in both words and deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will

not be tolerated.

KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy last night with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in

charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

KOREA -- FOUR PARTY PEACE TALKS

Q: At the working level meeting between the U.S., South and North Korea in New York on Wednesday, did the North agree to come to the Four Party Peace Talks in exchange for food assistance?

A: The talks in New York were at the working level and no formal requests were made by either side. The North and South Korean representatives took the opportunity to clarify each other's concerns. The meeting can best be described as a working level follow-on to the official Joint Briefing that was conducted in New York on 5 March. In that regard, it was extremely useful for all parties to discuss their views and work together to realize the Peace Talks that Presidents Clinton and Kim offered in April 1996.

Q: South Korea indicated that the North "conditionally accepted the Four Party Talks." Is that accurate?

A: A wide range of subjects were discussed, but there were no agreements reached in New York on Wednesday. We remain hopeful that the North will accept the offer of Peace Talks and are waiting for their formal response to the Presidents

offer as it was briefed
on 5 March.

BALTIC "SECURITY PACT"

U.S. Offer of "Security" Pact for Baltic States

Q: Has the U.S. offered a "security pact" to the Baltic states to compensate for lack of NATO membership?

A: The U.S. is working actively with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to advance their integration with the Transatlantic community and its institutions. We have a number of initiatives, both bilateral, regional and through PFP, well underway.

As part of this process, we have discussed with the Baltic governments the possibility of a joint document outlining our shared commitment to the sovereignty, independence and security of the Baltic states.

Any joint document would not be a "substitute" or "compensation" for NATO membership, nor a "security pact" in its own right, but rather a supplement to ongoing efforts to advance Baltic integration.

As President Clinton has repeatedly made clear, the process of NATO enlargement is and will remain open for all of Europe's new democracies, including the Baltic states.

U.S. NUCLEAR CUTS

Q: The President of the Sandia National Laboratories has suggested that as the United States makes further reductions in its nuclear forces it may move to targeting civilians and population centers. Is this true?

A: No.

First, as of May, 1994, all U.S. nuclear missiles have been "detargeted," as per the agreement between President Clinton and President Yeltsin earlier that year.

Second, the United States has not targeted civilian population centers as part of its deterrent strategy for decades.

Third, reductions to 2,000-2,500 warheads agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki will not precipitate such a change.

KISSINGER OP-ED ATTACK RE HELSINKI, NATO-RUSSIA

Q: Comment on Kissinger's attack on Helsinki as a "fiasco"; his charge that steps toward NATO-Russia partnership will ruin NATO?

A: Helsinki was a significant success for American interests. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin recorded significant progress on nuclear arms reductions and ABM/TMD demarcation. While they disagreed on NATO enlargement, President Yeltsin agreed to work with NATO to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. Moreover, President Clinton made clear that NATO will enlarge on schedule.

Helsinki shows that steadiness and consistency in our ambitious agenda of building a united Europe -- including NATO enlargement and a strong NATO-Russia relationship -- brings results. We have rejected the extremes -- those who want us to abandon efforts to build partnership with Russia and those who want us to abandon efforts to bring in all of Europe's democracies to Europe's institutions.

NATO-Russia partnership is no concession to Russia, it is in U.S. interests.

The NATO-Russia Council will not dilute NATO decision making. After all, the North

Atlantic Cooperation Council has existed since 1991 and includes Russia; PFP has existed since 1994 and includes Russia. Neither has competed with NATO and neither will the NATO-Russia Council.

Should NATO and Russia disagree in NATO-Russia Council, each would retain freedom to take independent decisions and action. Russians understand this.

The Central Europeans were quite pleased. "This was no Yalta," announced Poland's largest daily, edited by Solidarity hero Adam Michnik; "a reverse Yalta," wrote one of Hungary's leading dailies; "very hopeful" wrote a major Estonian newspaper.

NATO is not abandoning collective defense. The Administration has made clear -- from the President on down -- that NATO's primary mission will remain the defense of NATO territory from external attack. This mission does not render NATO incapable of pursuing cooperation with non-members when doing so advances the security of current and future members and our interest in building a more stable and secure Europe.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Russia Prepared to Sign NATO-Russia Charter in May?

☐ Charter can formalize cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. U.S. prepared to sign Charter even before Madrid NATO summit in July, but Alliance and Russia must first agree on contents of document, which is now being discussed in NATO-Russia channel.

Yeltsin March 26 Radio Address

☐ Yeltsin outlined Helsinki results, citing "serious agreements" on START, ABM Treaty,

economic cooperation. Noted disagreement over NATO enlargement, but reiterated interest in concluding NATO-Russia at "highest level."

☐ Welcome Yeltsin's comments. Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for cooperation."

General Items

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

U.S. Recalls Ambassador to Belarus after American Diplomat Detained, Expelled

☐ In response to Belarusian government's expulsion of U.S. diplomat engaged in normal diplomatic duties: have recalled our Ambassador for consultations, cut off most aid, redirected remaining funds (about \$5 million) to NGOs, humanitarian purposes; declared Belarusian Embassy First Secretary and Consul Vladimir Gramyka Persona Non-Grata; requested Belarus delay planned arrival of Ambassador-designate to U.S.

☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by Lukashenko regime and government's rejection of internationally recognized human rights, as shown in last November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of legitimacy."

NATO-Russia

☐ NATO enlargement proceeding on schedule. Part of broader effort to build more stable European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. Determined that enlargement proceed in manner that threatens security of no country.

- In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.
- See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

BOSNIA

Izetbegovic visit

- President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of Bosnia, met with President Clinton last Wednesday. They discussed a broad range of issues relating to the Bosnia peace process. (David Johnson provided read-out Wednesday)

If asked about Bosnian Membership in Partnership for Peace

- Our long term goal is to help establish a stable and prosperous Bosnia that will be part of a greater Europe and play an important role in the international community of democratic nations.

- At some point, this should include Bosnian membership in Partnership for Peace. However, further progress must first be made in several areas, including further strengthening of fledgling political institutions and the rebuilding of economic and societal infrastructures. The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work.

If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and equipping of the Bosnian military

- We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation self-defense capability through the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a key part of building a stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting

peace in the region.

☐ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving substantial additional security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

☐ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

☐ Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

☐

Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

☐ To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence in the Dayton process, gives them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume preparations for conflict that

would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a Congressional threat to walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question U.S. credibility and commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe. To our troops on the ground and those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation unjustly questions the purpose and value of their service and sacrifice.

☐ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

☐ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

War Criminals

☐ The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring peace.

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

CHINA

GORE TRIP

Q: On what basis did the Vice President assert that the Administration's policy toward China would not change as a result of the current investigation into alleged illegal campaign contributions by Chinese officials?

A: The Vice President discussed this issue during his meeting in Beijing with Premier Li Peng; he also will raise it with President Jiang Zemin.

The Vice President explained that we regard these allegations

very seriously. Were the FBI investigation to establish that China engaged in illegal acts, the potential consequences for sustaining the current positive momentum in U.S.-China relations could be jeopardized.

The FBI investigation is still ongoing, however, and we will not speculate on its outcome or allow it to deter the Administration's pursuit of our objectives with China, including improving market access for U.S. products, pressing for improvements in human rights practices and holding China to international standards on nonproliferation issues.

Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo. Also, what issues will he raise in Beijing?

A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice President affirmed the centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would maintain American force levels at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President urged Japan to implement fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework talks.

As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise a series of strategic issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and regional concerns, such as the Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be discussed. We do not believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to enable us to forego a UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.

(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign contributions will be part of the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our practices for investigating such allegations.

UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

Points

- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have decided in principle to

co-sponsor a resolution.

☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with European partners on a proposed resolution.

☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.

☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.

☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

ZAIRE

ZAIRE PEACE PROCESS

☐ South Africa will be leading efforts later this week to bring the GOZ and rebels together for negotiations.

☐ UN SRSG Sahnoun is in South Africa and we hope he will be part of these discussions. The United States thinks Sahnoun has a central role to play in his double-hatted capacity as both UN and OAU representative.

☐ We are hopeful that both parties will send senior-level delegations to discuss seriously a cease-fire and comprehensive negotiated solution. We continue to see a negotiated solution as the best means of solving the ongoing crisis in Zaire.

☐ We have worked very hard with neighboring governments and France to secure commitments from both sides to a negotiated solution.

If asked:

☐ We have offered to assist the South Africans, but they are

leading this effort alone.

□ Understand UN Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun is in South Africa, but we don't know if he will be part of any negotiations. South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki discussed the concept of talks in South Africa during his meeting with President Mobutu last week in Kinshasa. Other representatives of the SAG met with Kabila shortly thereafter to secure their commitment to talks.

MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu? Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a national consensus on how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a seven-person committee of negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We are waiting to get more details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee designated immediately and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the rebel alliance, within the context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire. Obviously, during this time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political figures to work together towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between

the government and rebel
leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

ALBANIA

Any Update on Albania?

- ☐ The OSCE has approved a permanent mission to Albania headed by former Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky. The Vranitzky will coordinate international efforts to improve the situation there and prepare for new parliamentary elections.
- ☐ We strongly support this effort which we hope will buttress the Fino government and lead to the restoration of civil society within the country.
- ☐ The OSCE also took note of the desire of some European countries to put together a force that could provide protection for the ongoing humanitarian relief effort.
- ☐ Over the weekend, the UN Security Council approved a resolution authorizing an Italian-led force.
- ☐ We are supportive of the idea of deploying such a force with a properly defined mission, but we do not intend to have any on-the-ground participation in the force.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

- ☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.
- ☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

- ☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.
- ☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence

that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

- ☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.
- ☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

- ☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.
- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.

☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.

☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to

initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans

with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly

supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I

requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive

(PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their

Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will

ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
- ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
- ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
- ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
- ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

- ☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.
- ☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.
- ☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD

Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.

☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

- ☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.
- ☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.
- ☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...
- ☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.
- ☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.
- ☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...
- ☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings

- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in

January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

- ☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐

During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for

Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.
- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

- Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
- We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Helms and CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force.

These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

INDONESIA

Freeport/McMoRan

Q: What is your reaction to the Indonesian government suspension of Bre-X's (partner with Freeport--Jim Moffett) license to mine gold in Busang?

A: We have no reason to believe that this story is other than what it purports to be, namely a report on Jakarta's suspension of Bre-X's mining license as a result of concerns about the extent of estimated gold reserves. This is a commercial and contractual issue between the involved companies and the Indonesian government.

Sale of Pakistani F-16s

Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia F-16s?

A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains committed to the sale, but the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the transfer at this time. Our decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations, including regional and bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.

We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter evolves.

CAMBODIA

Q: What is your position on the violence taking place in Cambodia?

A: We deplore the violence; we urge the Cambodia government to investigate promptly this incident and bring those responsible to justice. We continue to support the evolution of the democratic process in Cambodia and the holding of free and

fair elections next year.

We believe this incident is one of intimidation, however, and we will raise with the

Cambodians our serious doubts that free and fair elections can occur in a climate of fear and intimidation.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 31 March 97 19:20
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: CWC Points for Hill calls [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Harris, Elisa D.
Murray, Lori E.
CARBON_COPY Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.

TEXT_BODY

Per your suggestions. See if this works.

[[CWCPTS2.DOC : 4908 in CWCPTS2.DOC]]

From: Harris, Elisa D.
To: Danvers, William C.; Murray, Lori E.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: CWC Points for Hill calls [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, March 31, 1997 07:00 PM

bill, pls see my suggestion for 2 brief points. thanks!

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Murray, Lori E.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; /R, Record at A1; Harris, Elisa D.;
@LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: CWC Points for Hill calls [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, March 31, 1997 06:46 PM

Per Sandy, he thought the points were too much in the weeds. He suggested reordering them. We don't have to make the process points contingency and we can certainly add a line about the number of conditions we have agreed to. But the audience we are trying to reach with these calls are probably not going to be as focused on the details of our negotiations as Helms, Kyl et al.

Glad to entertain any compromise language you might suggest.

From: Murray, Lori E.
To: Danvers, William C.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; Harris, Elisa D.
Subject: RE: CWC Points for Hill calls [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Monday, March 31, 1997 06:30 PM

Bill sorry to do this in two e-mails; but I have been thinking about this further and was reminded of the logic of the other points. Our main leverage right now in getting people to think positively about the CWC is to emphasize the negotiations that have taken place and that we have a resolution of ratification that has about 20 agreed conditions with Helms. We have gone a long way to address concerns raised by some Republican members. This sales pitch for our hard work needs to be a central part of our strategy over the next couple of weeks. We need to make these members know that the ball has moved and this message from us is new and worth reviewing. Therefore, I recommend not making the points on process contingency. I would also recommend adding back in the points about the number of conditions we have agreed on and how we have alternatives for the others and that it is now time for the Senate to debate and vote.

From: Danvers, William C.

To: Harris, Elisa D.; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy

CC: /R, Record at A1; Blinken, Antony J.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs

Subject: CWC Points for Hill calls [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Monday, March 31, 1997 12:02 PM

<<Attached File: CWCPTS.DOC>>

Note for Lori, Elisa and Bob if you are around:

Sandy Berger wanted the CWC points redone. He wanted us to be more focused up front with the rationale for the treaty, then move to process and finally the reason why the April 29 deadline is so important.

See what you think about the changes, and get back to my ASAP. I want to get them back to him this afternoon if at all possible.

Thanks.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

31 March 97 19:18

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCPTS2.DOC

CWC Points for Senate Calls

WHY SUPPORT THE TREATY

☐ Calling to ask your support for the CWC.

- ☐ Treaty is in our national interest. Will help reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers and our citizens.
- ☐ Enjoys broad bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Larry Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker and other leading Republican foreign policy experts support the treaty.
- ☐ Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile.
The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision.
- ☐ Moreover, the elimination of our chemical weapons will not deny us a militarily useful tool. As JCS Chairman Shalikashvili has said, Desert Storm proved that we don't need chemical weapons to deter the use of chemical weapons against our forces.
- ☐ CWC will also help us deal with the threat of chemical terrorism.
By eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.
- ☐ We recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But we genuinely believe that it is a key element of any effective response.
- ☐ We need your support.

Process Toward Senate Action

- ☐ Since January, we have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and a group he has put together in an effort to address the concerns of some members of the Republican caucus about the treaty.
- ☐ During these discussions, Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions, and in nearly every case, we have either reached agreement on a compromise or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.
- ☐ Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the

members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the

Senate by mid-April so the United States can deposit the instruments of ratification on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force.

□

□ In short, we have moved well beyond the resolution of ratification that was on the Senate calendar last September. It's now time for the Senate to debate and vote.

(IF ASKED: Why April 29 Deadline is Important)

□ April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, Americans will be less secure. We will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

□ Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined.

□ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And, Americans now serving as head of key posts, including security, administration, and industrial inspections will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified the Convention.

□ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Without ratification, the chemical

industry
will feel the brunt of the treaty's sanctions, which they
estimate
could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

□ The Chemical Weapons Convention has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been over 13 hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings provided to both members and staff. These efforts have continued in this new Congress as well.

(Contingency Point on Linkage of CWC to Reorganization etc.)

□ Regarding the broader issues that Senator Helms has raised on the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies, the Administration has been working hard to address these concerns and we are prepared to continue to do so. Nonetheless, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 01 April 97 08:23
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CWC [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Brown, Nancy E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Harmon, Joyce
Helweg, M. Diana
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.
Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Burrell, Christina L.
Caravelli, John M.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Edwards, Joan
Harris, Elisa D.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Murray, Lori E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Samore, Gary S.
Seaton, James B.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Witkowski, Anne A.

TEXT_BODY

Note for Sandy and Jim:

Here are the revised CWC points. Please let us know if you think they work.

Once you have OK'd them, we will get them to agencies to begin calling their target Senators.

Thanks.

[[CWCPTS2.DOC : 2084 in CWCPTS2.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

31 March 97 19:46

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCPTS2.DOC

CWC Points for Senate Calls

WHY SUPPORT THE TREATY

- ☐ Calling to ask your support for the CWC.
- ☐ Enjoys broad bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Larry Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker and other leading Republican foreign policy experts support the treaty.
- ☐ Treaty is in our national interest. Will help reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers and our citizens.
- ☐ Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile.
The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision.
- ☐ Moreover, the elimination of our chemical weapons will not deny us a militarily useful tool. As JCS Chairman Shalikashvili has said, Desert Storm proved that we don't need chemical weapons to deter the use of chemical weapons against our forces.
- ☐ CWC will also help us deal with the threat of chemical terrorism.
By eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.
- ☐ We recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But we genuinely believe

that
it is a key element of any effective response.

- ☐ We need your support.

Process Toward Senate Action

- ☐ Since January, we have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and a group he has put together in an effort to address the concerns of some members of the Republican caucus about the treaty.

- ☐ During these discussions, Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions, and in nearly every case, we have either reached agreement on a compromise or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

- ☐ Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate by mid-April so the United States can deposit the instruments of ratification on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force.

- ☐

- ☐ In short, we have moved well beyond the resolution of ratification that was on the Senate calendar last September. It's now time for the Senate to debate and vote.

(IF ASKED: Why April 29 Deadline is Important)

- ☐ April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, Americans will be less secure. We will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny

ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

☐ Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined.

☐ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And, Americans now serving as head of key posts, including security, administration, and industrial inspections will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified the Convention.

☐ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Without ratification, the chemical industry will feel the brunt of the treaty's sanctions, which they estimate could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

☐ The Chemical Weapons Convention has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been over 13 hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings provided to both members and staff. These efforts have continued in this new Congress as well.

(Contingency Point on Linkage of CWC to Reorganization etc.)

☐ Regarding the broader issues that Senator Helms has raised on the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies, the Administration has been working hard to address these concerns and we are prepared to continue to do so. Nonetheless, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 01 April 97 08:44
FROM Pascual, Carlos E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Caravelli, John M.
Durham, Robert J.
Eggert, Tamara E.
Fort, Jane B.
Matera, Michael A.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Pifer, Steven K.
Rumer, Eugene B.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[APR01GUI.DOC : 2143 in APR01GUI.DOC]]

Added Russia/Belarus integration points. Tamara -- could you check with Ki if there's anything else to add and send to @Press when finalized?

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 1 April 97 8:42

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** APR01GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 31, 1997

Taiwan

Middle East

Khobar

Korea

Baltics

Nuclear Cuts/Targeting

Kissinger Op-Ed

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Zaire

Albania

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Indonesia

Cambodia

TAIWAN AND GINGRICH

Q: Did the Administration coordinate with the Speaker on the Taiwan issue and do his remarks represent Administration policy?

A: The Administration met with the Speaker prior to his departure and discussed a number of issues, including Taiwan. His remarks in China, however, were made on his own authority, and do not represent Administration policy. The Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States: "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and ... to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan." The Clinton Administration has stood by the TRA, most recently in March 1996 when we dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Western Pacific in response to a situation that appeared to threaten the security of the region.

Q: What is the USG policy with respect to the use of force or the threat of use of force by China against Taiwan? Do we concur with the Speaker's remarks?

A: The Administration has maintained a consistent position of opposing the use of force or threat of the use of force to resolve issues between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Our "one China" policy is grounded on that understanding. We have urged both sides to avoid taking provocative steps that would increase tensions in the region, and to engage in a serious dialogue to resolve differences of view.

Q: Have we taken any steps to clarify our position with either China or Taiwan in the aftermath of the Speaker's remarks?

A: As indicated, the Speaker's remarks reflected his own views, not those of the U.S. Government. Neither China nor Taiwan has requested a clarification of Administration policy on this issue.

MIDDLE EAST

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Q: What's your reaction to article in The New York Times today (3/31) saying that the President has to act to save the Middle East peace process?

A: The President has been and continues to be active in supporting efforts to make peace in the Middle East. The notion that the Administration hasn't been faced with, and dealt with, difficulties and crises in the peace process before is obviously nonsense.

We've been through very difficult periods before, and you're well aware that the President has been willing to act and take risks to restore calm to the situation and to help the parties re-focus on negotiations. We have been in constant touch with the leadership in the region, including, but not limited to Amb. Ross'

trip to the Middle East
last week.

It will take some hard work on all sides to move away from
confrontation and back to
the serious give and take of negotiations. We will help the
parties do that, and they know
we can and will help, but ultimately it's up to them to create
the conditions to move
forward.

Q: Could you tell us the results of the meeting the President had
today (3/31) with
Ambassador Ross?

A: I'm not going to get into the specifics of that meeting. Amb.
Ross reported to the
President on his conversations late last week with the Israeli
and Palestinian leadership.

We all recognize that there are no easy solutions to the
difficulties the peace process
faces. On the other hand, we've seen crises and difficulties
before; this is not a linear
process that always goes in one direction. The parties need to
do everything they can to
prevent terrorism, to exercise restraint and to restore the
mutual confidence so necessary
to make the process work. This will take goodwill and hard work,
and we will help the
parties as they proceed.

During his trip, he had good, thorough exchanges with both the
Palestinian and Israeli
leadership.

His meeting with the President today was an opportunity to review
his trip to the region
and the next steps in the process.

The President's meeting Tuesday with King Hussein will provide a
further opportunity
to exchange news on how we can help the parties move the process
forward.

Q: So you don't have any plan to accelerate the negotiations?

A: We are having discussions with the parties about how to restore
confidence and move
forward in their negotiations. These discussions will continue.

PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian authority must comply with all its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in order for negotiations to resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to do everything it can to prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian authority must make certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process understand that violence and terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is to be restored and negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and terrorism? Shouldn't he be arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to prevent violence and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that those associated with violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem through its moving ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is absolutely essential for the

Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very clearly in both words and deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will not be tolerated.

KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy last night with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary

nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

KOREA -- FOUR PARTY PEACE TALKS

Q: At the working level meeting between the U.S., South and North Korea in New York on Wednesday, did the North agree to come to the Four Party Peace Talks in exchange for food assistance?

A: The talks in New York were at the working level and no formal requests were made by either side. The North and South Korean representatives took the opportunity to clarify each other's concerns. The meeting can best be described as a working level follow-on to the official Joint Briefing that was conducted in New York on 5 March. In that regard, it was extremely useful for all parties to discuss their views and work together to realize the Peace Talks that Presidents Clinton and Kim offered in April 1996.

Q: South Korea indicated that the North "conditionally accepted the Four Party Talks." Is that accurate?

A: A wide range of subjects were discussed, but there were no agreements reached in New

York on Wednesday. We remain hopeful that the North will accept the offer of Peace Talks and are waiting for their formal response to the Presidents offer as it was briefed on 5 March.

BALTIC "SECURITY PACT"

U.S. Offer of "Security" Pact for Baltic States

Q: Has the U.S. offered a "security pact" to the Baltic states to compensate for lack of NATO membership?

A: The U.S. is working actively with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to advance their integration with the Transatlantic community and its institutions. We have a number of initiatives, both bilateral, regional and through PFP, well underway.

As part of this process, we have discussed with the Baltic governments the possibility of a joint document outlining our shared commitment to the sovereignty, independence and security of the Baltic states.

Any joint document would not be a "substitute" or "compensation" for NATO membership, nor a "security pact" in its own right, but rather a supplement to ongoing efforts to advance Baltic integration.

As President Clinton has repeatedly made clear, the process of NATO enlargement is and will remain open for all of Europe's new democracies, including the Baltic states.

U.S. NUCLEAR CUTS

Q: The President of the Sandia National Laboratories has suggested that as the United States makes further reductions in its nuclear forces it may move

to targeting civilians
and population centers. Is this true?

A: No.

First, as of May, 1994, all U.S. nuclear missiles have been
"detargeted," as per the
agreement between President Clinton and President Yeltsin earlier
that year.

Second, the United States has not targeted civilian population
centers as part of its
deterrent strategy for decades.

Third, reductions to 2,000-2,500 warheads agreed to by Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin
in Helsinki will not precipitate such a change.

KISSINGER OP-ED ATTACK RE HELSINKI, NATO-RUSSIA

Q: Comment on Kissinger's attack on Helsinki as a "fiasco"; his
charge that steps toward
NATO-Russia partnership will ruin NATO?

A: Helsinki was a significant success for American interests.
Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin recorded significant progress on nuclear arms reductions
and ABM/TMD
demarcation. While they disagreed on NATO enlargement, President
Yeltsin agreed to
work with NATO to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.
Moreover, President
Clinton made clear that NATO will enlarge on schedule.

Helsinki shows that steadiness and consistency in our ambitious
agenda of building a
united Europe -- including NATO enlargement and a strong
NATO-Russia relationship --
brings results. We have rejected the extremes -- those who want
us to abandon efforts to
build partnership with Russia and those who want us to abandon
efforts to bring in all of
Europe's democracies to Europe's institutions.

NATO-Russia partnership is no concession to Russia, it is in U.S.
interests.

The NATO-Russia Council will not dilute NATO decision making. After all, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has existed since 1991 and includes Russia; PFP has existed since 1994 and includes Russia. Neither has competed with NATO and neither will the NATO-Russia Council.

Should NATO and Russia disagree in NATO-Russia Council, each would retain freedom to take independent decisions and action. Russians understand this.

The Central Europeans were quite pleased. "This was no Yalta," announced Poland's largest daily, edited by Solidarity hero Adam Michnik; "a reverse Yalta," wrote one of Hungary's leading dailies; "very hopeful" wrote a major Estonian newspaper.

NATO is not abandoning collective defense. The Administration has made clear -- from the President on down -- that NATO's primary mission will remain the defense of NATO territory from external attack. This mission does not render NATO incapable of pursuing cooperation with non-members when doing so advances the security of current and future members and our interest in building a more stable and secure Europe.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Russia to Sign Integration Agreement with Belarus?

- ☐ Expect Russia and Belarus to sign some form of agreement on April 2, one-year anniversary of earlier integration agreement; not clear how new agreement might differ from last year's ineffectual agreement, except citizens may have dual nationality.
- ☐ All accounts suggest Russia and Belarus would remain sovereign states. Clear that some in

Russia concerned about cost to Russia of "carrying Belarus."
Will need to review agreement
once finalized.

Russia Prepared to Sign NATO-Russia Charter in May?

☐ Charter can formalize cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.
U.S. prepared to sign Charter
even before Madrid NATO summit in July, but Alliance and Russia
must first agree on
contents of document, which is now being discussed in NATO-Russia
channel.

Yeltsin March 26 Radio Address

☐ Yeltsin outlined Helsinki results, citing "serious agreements"
on START, ABM Treaty,
economic cooperation. Noted disagreement over NATO enlargement,
but reiterated interest in
concluding NATO-Russia at "highest level."

☐ Welcome Yeltsin's comments. Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian
intention to work together,
work through tough issues. As Yeltsin said, "our choice is for
cooperation."

General Items

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on
increased Russian involvement;
Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press
conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Seven will still discuss economic, financial matters; expect
this to be small part of agenda.

U.S. Recalls Ambassador to Belarus after American Diplomat Detained, Expelled

☐ In response to Belarusian government's expulsion of U.S.
diplomat engaged in normal
diplomatic duties: have recalled our Ambassador for
consultations, cut off most aid,
redirected remaining funds (about \$5 million) to NGOs,
humanitarian purposes; declared
Belarusian Embassy First Secretary and Consul Vladimir Gramyka
Persona Non-Grata;
requested Belarus delay planned arrival of Ambassador-designate

to U.S.

☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by Lukashenko regime and government's rejection of internationally recognized human rights, as shown in last November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of legitimacy."

NATO-Russia

☐ NATO enlargement proceeding on schedule. Part of broader effort to build more stable European security system, which includes strong NATO-Russia relationship. Determined that enlargement proceed in manner that threatens security of no country.

☐ In Helsinki, President and Yeltsin disagreed over enlargement but agreed to work together to build cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.

☐ See Russia as partner of NATO in shaping more secure, stable and undivided Europe. That is good for United States, Russia and Europe.

BOSNIA

Izetbegovic visit

☐ President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of Bosnia, met with President Clinton last Wednesday. They discussed a broad range of issues relating to the Bosnia peace process. (David Johnson provided read-out Wednesday)

If asked about Bosnian Membership in Partnership for Peace

☐ Our long term goal is to help establish a stable and prosperous Bosnia that will be part of a greater Europe and play an important role in the international community of democratic nations.

☐ At some point, this should include Bosnian membership in

Partnership for Peace. However, further progress must first be made in several areas, including further strengthening of fledgling political institutions and the rebuilding of economic and societal infrastructures. The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work.

If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and equipping of the Bosnian military

☐ We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation self-defense capability through the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a key part of building a stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving substantial additional security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

☐ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

☐ Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

□

Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

□ To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence in the Dayton process, gives them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume preparations for conflict that would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a Congressional threat to walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question U.S. credibility and commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe. To our troops on the ground and those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation unjustly questions the purpose and value of their service and sacrifice.

□ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

□ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

□ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to

happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

☐ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

War Criminals

☐ The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring peace.

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

CHINA

GORE TRIP

Q: On what basis did the Vice President assert that the Administration's policy toward China would not change as a result of the current investigation into alleged illegal campaign contributions by Chinese officials?

A: The Vice President discussed this issue during his meeting in Beijing with Premier Li Peng; he also will raise it with President Jiang Zemin.

The Vice President explained that we regard these allegations very seriously. Were the FBI investigation to establish that China engaged in illegal acts, the potential consequences for sustaining the current positive momentum in U.S.-China relations could be jeopardized.

The FBI investigation is still ongoing, however, and we will not speculate on its outcome or allow it to deter the Administration's pursuit of our objectives with China, including improving market access for U.S. products, pressing for improvements in human rights practices and holding China to international standards on nonproliferation issues.

Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo. Also, what issues will he raise in Beijing?

A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice President affirmed the centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would maintain American force levels at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President urged Japan to implement fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework talks.

As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise

a series of strategic issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and regional concerns, such as the Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be discussed. We do not believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to enable us to forego a UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.

(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign contributions will be part of the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our practices for investigating such allegations.

UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with

demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

Points

- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

- ☐ King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.
- ☐ POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the July 8-9 NATO Summit in Madrid.
- ☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do

not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.

☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

ZAIRE

ZAIRE PEACE PROCESS

☐ South Africa will be leading efforts later this week to bring the GOZ and rebels together for negotiations.

☐ UN SRSG Sahnoun is in South Africa and we hope he will be part of these discussions. The

United States thinks Sahnoun has a central role to play in his double-hatted capacity as both UN and OAU representative.

☐ We are hopeful that both parties will send senior-level delegations to discuss seriously a cease-fire and comprehensive negotiated solution. We continue to see a negotiated solution as the best means of solving the ongoing crisis in Zaire.

☐ We have worked very hard with neighboring governments and France to secure commitments from both sides to a negotiated solution.

If asked:

☐ We have offered to assist the South Africans, but they are leading this effort alone.

☐ Understand UN Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun is in South Africa, but we don't know if he will be part of any negotiations. South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki discussed the concept of talks in South Africa during his meeting with President Mobutu last week in Kinshasa. Other representatives of the SAG met with Kabila shortly thereafter to secure their commitment to talks.

MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu? Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a national consensus on how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a seven-person committee of negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We are waiting to get more details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee designated immediately and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the rebel alliance, within the context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire. Obviously, during this time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political figures to work together towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our

European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

ALBANIA

Any Update on Albania?

☐ The OSCE has approved a permanent mission to Albania headed by former Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky. The Vranitzky will coordinate international efforts to improve the situation there and prepare for new parliamentary elections.

☐ We strongly support this effort which we hope will buttress the Fino government and lead to the restoration of civil society within the country.

☐ The OSCE also took note of the desire of some European countries to put together a force that could provide protection for the ongoing humanitarian relief effort.

☐ Over the weekend, the UN Security Council approved a resolution authorizing an Italian-led force.

☐ We are supportive of the idea of deploying such a force with a properly defined mission, but we do not intend to have any on-the-ground participation in the force.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Start of Marching Season

- ☐ Pleased that Easter Monday parade went off smoothly. Commend those who took courageous decision to avoid confrontation.
- ☐ Hope people of goodwill in Northern Ireland will work together to avoid clashes and bitterness in this year's marching season.

Bomb at Sinn Fein Office

- ☐ Condemn this attempted attack, as we condemn all acts of violence.
- ☐ Urge loyalists to return to observing cease-fire; not precipitate downward spiral of violence that can only harm all people of Northern Ireland.

Continued IRA Violence

- ☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.
- ☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

- ☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching

closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

Berger/Steinberg Phone Calls

☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.

☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.

☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.

☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly

supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I

requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive

(PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their

Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will

ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.

☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:

☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.

☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.

☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.

☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the

bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC

lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD

acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased

its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that

effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.

□ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

□ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

□ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

□ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

□ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

□ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

□ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

- ☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.
- ☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.
- ☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.
- ☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

- ☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.
- ☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.
- ☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...
- ☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that

research continues, however.

- ☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.
- ☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...
- ☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

- ☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.

☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.

☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.

☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.

☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.

☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are

sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.
- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
- ☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Helms and CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina last week, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party

to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have

identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is

U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

INDONESIA

Freeport/McMoRan

Q: What is your reaction to the Indonesian government suspension of Bre-X's (partner with Freeport--Jim Moffett) license to mine good in Busang?

A: We have no reason to believe that this story is other than what it purports to be, namely a report on Jakarta's suspension of Bre-X's mining license as a result of concerns about the extent of estimated gold reserves. This is a commercial and contractual issue between the involved companies and the Indonesian government.

Sale of Pakistani F-16s

Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia F-16s?

A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains committed to the sale, but the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the transfer at this time. Our decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations,

including regional and bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.

We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter evolves.

CAMBODIA

Q: What is your position on the violence taking place in Cambodia?

A: We deplore the violence; we urge the Cambodia government to investigate promptly this incident and bring those responsible to justice. We continue to support the evolution of the democratic process in Cambodia and the holding of free and fair elections next year. We believe this incident is one of intimidation, however, and we will raise with the Cambodians our serious doubts that free and fair elections can occur in a climate of fear and intimidation.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 01 April 97 15:24
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CWC lists [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Brown, Nancy E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Harmon, Joyce
Helweg, M. Diana
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.
Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Burrell, Christina L.
Caravelli, John M.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Edwards, Joan
Harris, Elisa D.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Murray, Lori E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Samore, Gary S.
Seaton, James B.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Witkowski, Anne A.

TEXT_BODY

NOTE FOR PETER:

Sandy asked that he have the CWC "swing" list for his b-fast tomorrow. Attached is the list, annotated and broken down agency by agency. We have also attached the talking points with Sandy's changes (I hope I properly reflected all the changes).

Let me know if you need anything else.

[[CWCPTS2.DOC : 3868 in CWCPTS2.DOC]][[CWCLIST.DOC : 3869 in CWCLIST.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

1 April 97 15:17

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCPTS2.DOC

CWC Points for Senate Calls

WHY SUPPORT THE TREATY

- ☐ Calling to ask your support for the Chemical Weapons Convention which I hope will be before the Senate this month.
- ☐ Enjoy's broad bipartisan support: President Bush, Colin Powell, Larry Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, Jim Baker, Sam Nunn, Dave Boren and other leading Republican and Democratic foreign policy experts support the treaty.
- ☐ Treaty is in our national interest. Will help reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers and our citizens.
- ☐ Well before the CWC was concluded in 1993, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile. The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision.
- ☐ Moreover, the elimination of our chemical weapons will not deny us a militarily useful tool. As JCS Chairman Shalikashvili and other military leaders have said, Desert Storm proved that we don't need chemical weapons to deter the use of chemical weapons against our forces.

☐ CWC will also help us deal with the threat of chemical terrorism.

By eliminating existing stockpiles and sanctioning the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.

☐ We recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But we genuinely believe that it is a key element of any effective response.

☐ We need your support.

Process Toward Senate Action

☐ Since January, we have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and a group he has put together in an effort to address the concerns of some members of the Republican caucus about the treaty.

☐ During these discussions, Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions, and in nearly every case, with Senator Biden's help we have either reached agreement on a compromise or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

☐ Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate and vote on the resolution of ratification in the Senate by mid-April so the United States can deposit the instruments of ratification on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force.

☐

☐ In short, we have moved well beyond the resolution of

ratification
that was on the Senate calendar last September. It's now time
for
the Senate to debate and vote.

(IF ASKED: Why April 29 Deadline is Important)

☐ April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will be on the outside of this landmark arms control regime the U.S. led in negotiating, subject to its penalties, rather than on the inside designing its procedures. The credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined.

☐ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And, Americans now serving as head of key posts, including security, administration, and industrial inspections will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified the Convention.

☐ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Without ratification, the chemical industry will feel the brunt of the treaty's sanctions, which they estimate could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

☐ The Chemical Weapons Convention has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been over 13 hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings provided to both members and staff. These efforts have continued in this new Congress as well.

(Contingency Point on Linkage of CWC to Reorganization etc.)

☐ Regarding the broader issues that Senator Helms has raised on the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies, the Administration has been working hard to address these concerns and we are

prepared to continue to do so. Nonetheless, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

1 April 97 15:20

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCLIST.DOC

CWC SWING VOTE LIST

SENATOR OPPOSITION REMARKS

Abraham Const, verif Has chem indus in MI
 Allard Chem demil, Const, Russia
 Bennett Chem demil
 Brownback Russia Freshman
 Burns Small bus, Russia Impacted by Cheney
 Campbell Chem demil Leaning yes
 Coats Chem demil, univers,verif
 Collins Mil issues (Lean yes Close to Cohen
 DeWine Verif, Small bus Chem bus in OH
 Domenici Go with l-ship(if asked) Lean yes
 Enzi Mil issues Undecided
 Frist Small bus Lean yes
 Gorton Go with l-ship Wants to get to yes
 Grassley pro in past Lean yes
 Gregg Univ, verif Dole letter
 Hagel Mil issues, Russ
 Hatch Chem demil, Const Lean yes
 Hutchison Chem demil Can be convinced
 Mack Small bus, Cost Wants to support
 McConnell Chem demil Likely support
 Roberts Russ, Small bus, Mil issues
 Santorum Mil issues, Russ Undecided
 Sessions Const
 Smith, G (OR) Const, Small bus, verif, OPCW over-bureaucratic
 Thomas Cheney impact, Russ
 Thompson Supported Helms Can be convinced
 Warner Verif, Univ Wants to vote yes

CWC PRINCIPAL CALL LIST

BERGER ALBRIGHT

Bennett Brownback
Hatch DeWine
Hutchinson (AR) McConnell
Mack Smith (OR)
Thomas

COHEN SHALI

Coats Campbell
Collins Hagel
Domenici Santorum
Roberts
Warner Thompson

DALEY HOLUM

Abraham Allard
Frist Burns
Gorton Enzi
Grassley Sessions
Gregg