

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 28 March 97 13:09
FROM Bendick, Gordon L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: points [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please pass to Jim S

Attached for your review and concurrence are TPs that we plan to get to Principals (SRB, MKA, Cohen, Shali, Daley, Holum) to make calls to key Senators that we need to get to "yes" on the CWC vote.

With your concurrence on these TPs, we will forward to the respective agencies for Principal calls in the next week.

Gordy

From: Harris, Elisa D.
To: Murray, Lori E.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; Bell, Robert G.
Subject: points [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, March 28, 1997 12:43 PM

[[PTSPR.DOC : 3347 in PTSPR.DOC]]

lori: looks good: i made them a little more brief and got rid of some redundancy. thanks!

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 28 March 97 12:56

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** PTSPR.DOC

CWC Points for Senate Calls

- ☐ I am calling to urge your support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- ☐ In early January, the President and the Majority Leader agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- ☐ We have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and the group he has put together from his caucus. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Lott group. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.
- ☐ Senator Helms has participated as a member of the Lott group and has also been meeting separately with Senator Biden. Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.
- ☐ The Administration has been dedicated in its efforts to address the concerns of some of the members of the Republican caucus. We have agreed in these sessions to move well beyond the conditions in the resolution of ratification that was on the Senate calendar last September. We believe progress has been made.
- ☐ Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force.
- ☐ Like President Bush, Colin Powell, Larry Eagleburger and other members of the Bush foreign policy team, we strongly believe that this treaty is in our national security interest, and that it will help reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers and our citizens.
- ☐ Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons

stockpile.

The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision.

☐ Moreover, the elimination of our chemical weapons will not deny us

a militarily useful tool. As JCS Chairman Shalikashvili has said,

Desert Storm proved that we don't need chemical weapons to deter the use of chemical weapons against our forces.

☐ The CWC will also help us deal with the threat of chemical terrorism. By eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the

flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.

☐ We recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But we genuinely believe that

it is a key element of any effective response. I hope we will have your support.

Contingency points on April 29 deadline

☐ April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, Americans will be less secure. We will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny

ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

☐ Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across

the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined.

☐ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as

inspectors. And, Americans now serving as head of key posts, including security, administration, and industrial inspections will

be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified the Convention.

☐ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Without ratification, the chemical industry will feel the brunt of the treaty's sanctions, which they estimate could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

☐ The Chemical Weapons Convention has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been over 13 hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings provided to both members and staff. These efforts have continued in this new Congress as well.

Contingency point on linkage of CWC to reorganization etc.:

☐ Regarding the broader issues that Senator Helms has raised, the Administration has been working hard to address these concerns and we are prepared to continue to do so. Nonetheless, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

(I would make this contingency, rather than raise it.)

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 28 March 97 15:51

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT March 28 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Babcock, Douglas W.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Bujold, Noelle D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, JoAnne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Kuipers, Keelin G.
Moore, Lori A.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Szasz, Nicholas J.
Wise, William M.
Woolston, Ann E.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[MAR28GUI.DOC : 3847 in MAR28GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 28 March 97 12:44

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** MAR28GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 28, 1997

Middle East

Khobar

Korea

Baltics

Nuclear Cuts/Targeting

Iraq

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Zaire

Albania

Mexico

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Cuba

Peru

Indonesia

El Salvador

OECD/Encryption

MIDDLE EAST

Ross Update

Q: Anything on the Ross trip?

A: Ambassador Ross met today with PM Netanyahu and other senior Israeli officials. He will depart the region today and will be briefing the President and Secretary Albright after his return.

During his trip, he had good, thorough exchanges with both the Palestinian and Israeli

leadership. Not going to get into substance of his exchanges; he was sent out to talk to the parties and assess the situation, and he will report back to the President and Secretary.

Q: How would you characterize the situation on the ground in Gaza and the West Bank?

A: The situation on the ground remains tense.

We continue to urge all parties to do everything possible to avoid violent confrontations, and for the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government to work together to defuse tensions and lay the basis for moving forward in the talks.

RE-ARREST OF MUQADEMAH

Q: Has Hamas leader Ibrahim Muqademah been re-arrested?

A: We understand that the Palestinian Authority (PA) issued a warrant for Muqademah's arrest after the Friday bombing, but that he remains at large.

We remain extremely concerned about the situation and urge the PA to do everything possible to re-apprehend him.

PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian authority must comply with all its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in order for negotiations to resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to do everything it can to prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian authority must make certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process understand that violence and terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is to be restored and negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and terrorism? Shouldn't he be arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to prevent violence and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that those associated with violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem through its moving ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is absolutely essential for the Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very clearly in both words and deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will not be tolerated.

U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES

Q: Has the U.S. been in contact with the Israelis and Palestinians to solve this crisis?

A: We are in continuous contact with both parties now.

(If pressed): President Clinton spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu on Friday and the Secretary spoke to President Weizman on Saturday. We have also been in contact with the Palestinians.

KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing

investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten some cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy last night with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

KOREA -- FOUR PARTY PEACE TALKS

Q: At the working level meeting between the U.S., South and North Korea in New York on Wednesday, did the North agree to come to the Four Party Peace Talks in exchange for food assistance?

A: The talks in New York were at the working level and no formal requests were made by either side. The North and South Korean representatives took the opportunity to clarify each other's concerns. The meeting can best be described as a working level follow-on to the official Joint Briefing that was conducted in New York on 5 March. In that regard, it was extremely useful for all parties to discuss their views and work together to realize the Peace Talks that Presidents Clinton and Kim offered in April 1996.

Q: South Korea indicated that the North "conditionally accepted the Four Party Talks." Is that accurate?

A: A wide range of subjects were discussed, but there were no agreements reached in New York on Wednesday. We remain hopeful that the North will accept the offer of Peace Talks and are waiting for their formal response to the Presidents offer as it was briefed on 5 March.

BALTICS

U.S. Offer of "Security" Pact for Baltic States

Q: Has the U.S. offered a "security pact" to the Baltic states to compensate for lack of NATO membership?

A: The U.S. is working actively with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to advance their integration with the Transatlantic community and its institutions. We have a number of initiatives, both bilateral and regional, well underway.

As part of this process, we have discussed with the Baltic governments the possibility of a joint document outlining our shared commitment to the sovereignty, independence and security of the Baltic states.

Any joint document would not be a "substitute" or "compensation" for NATO membership, but rather a supplement to ongoing efforts to advance Baltic integration.

As President Clinton has repeatedly made clear, the process of NATO enlargement is and will remain open for all of Europe's new democracies, including the Baltic states.

U.S. NUCLEAR CUTS

Q: The President of the Sandia National Laboratories has suggested that as the United States makes further reductions in its nuclear forces it may move to targeting civilians and population centers. Is this true?

A: No.

First, as of May, 1994, all U.S. nuclear missiles have been "detargeted," as per the agreement between President Clinton and President Yeltsin earlier that year.

Second, the United States has not targeted civilian population centers as part of its deterrent strategy for decades.

Third, reductions to 2,000-2,500 warheads agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin

in Helsinki will not precipitate such a change.

IRAQ

Albright Speech

Q: Why did the Secretary give this speech now?

A: Secretary Albright gave this speech now -- at the beginning of the second term -- to underscore the point that Iraq policy is a strategic priority for this administration.

We have just recently completed a senior level, interagency, top-to-bottom review of our Iraq policy, including our goals and objectives and how best to achieve them.

The Secretary's speech reflects that review and provides a clear picture of it.

Q: What were the main conclusions of the policy review?

A: The central finding of the review was the ongoing need to contain Iraq for as long as it takes Iraq to demonstrate by deeds and actions that it is no longer a threat to its neighbors or in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

At the same time, the review validated our ultimate objective of seeing Iraq reintegrated back into the international community as a positive factor for regional peace and stability. The sooner that happens, the better.

☐ Current circumstances in Baghdad clearly do not make reintegration feasible at this time. Saddam Hussein remains a threat.

☐ Therefore, we must contain the threat that Iraq poses to its neighbors, to its people, to the free flow of oil and to our broader interests in the region, such as the Peace Process.

The review also reaffirmed as central elements of our containment

policy:

- ☐ Active support for UN sanctions.
- ☐ Full backing for UNSCOM's efforts to account for Iraqi WMD programs.
- ☐ The maintenance of a military presence in the region which can deter Iraqi aggression or, if necessary, respond decisively to any provocations.

Q: What's really new about this speech?

A: You're looking through the wrong end of the telescope.

This speech is a reaffirmation and a reiteration of the salient points of U.S. policy toward Iraq.

The emphasis here is on continuity, not innovation.

And there is good reason for that. The assumptions about Saddam Hussein which guided the Administration in the first term are as valid today as they were four years ago.

We remain convinced that Saddam Hussein continues to be a threat to the region and to his people.

Therefore, the policy we pursued in the first term -- containment -- remains the correct one as we begin the second.

Q: But what about the references to working with a post-Saddam government. Isn't that new?

A: The Secretary did clarify certain aspects of the policy which have been implicit in our overall approach, but which we concluded needed to be made explicit.

The Secretary therefore stated with greater precision and clarity that a change in the Iraqi leadership could have an impact on perceptions of Iraqi intentions, and she expressed for the first time our readiness in principle to establish a dialogue with a post-Saddam government.

But in a sense, however, all the Secretary did was to make an obvious point: Saddam Hussein is an evil that we know all too well. It would be ridiculous to pretend that his departure would not make a difference to how we -- and the world -- would view Iraq.

Q: Aren't you calling for an uprising of the Iraqi people?

A: The Secretary's remarks should not be misinterpreted or misunderstood.

This is not a call to tell the Iraqi people what they should do or who should lead them. That is for them to decide, as the President said last fall.

What we have done is to make clearer than we have to date our view that Saddam Hussein's record and actions are an important factor in determining Iraq's intentions and that a change in leadership in Baghdad could make a difference in our policy.

One of the reasons we want to do this is because there have been repeated accusations that U.S. policy is really directed against the Iraqi people and not against Saddam Hussein.

Nothing could be further from the truth, as our support for UN Resolution 986 demonstrates.

Q: Given all the other pressing and important foreign policy issues on the Secretary's plate, why would she give a speech on Iraq as her first major foreign policy speech?

A: In part, because Georgetown was kind enough to ask her to speak on Iraq at this time.

But let me be as clear as I can: Iraq and our policy toward it is a strategic priority for this Administration. It was that way in the first term. It will continue to be so in the second term.

Therefore, it was entirely appropriate for the Secretary to select this subject for her first major foreign policy speech.

Q: Weren't the Iraqis the model of cooperation during the last UNSCOM inspection?

A: The issue is not whether Iraq did or did not cooperate with UNSCOM on a particular inspection.

The fact is that for some six years now we have seen a consistent and systematic pattern of lying, cheating and deception on the part of Iraq in meeting its UN Security Council obligations, particularly with regard to weapons of mass destruction.

To the extent that there has been Iraqi cooperation, it has been grudging, piecemeal, selective and grossly inadequate.

☐ For example, documentation revealed after Hussein Kamel's defection showed Iraq continues to conceal WMD programs.

☐ UNSCOM Chief Rolfe Ekeus has publicly expressed his belief that Iraq retains an operational SCUD missile force, and chemical or biological warheads to go with them.

No one would be more pleased than we if Iraq met all its obligations to the UN, including those related to UNSCOM.

But that is clearly not the picture.

Q: Isn't the containment of Iraq really a failure? After all, Saddam Hussein is still in power with little prospect that that situation will change?

A: Look at the record:

☐ Iraq's military threat is contained. The combination of significant U.S. forces deployed in the region and a demonstrated ability to reinforce those forces when necessary, has profoundly complicated Saddam's calculus of military options.

☐ The area in which Saddam's military can operate inside Iraq has contracted dramatically over the past four years with the southern no-fly zone now extended to

the suburbs of Baghdad and a "no-drive" zone imposed on Iraq's elite Republican Guard units below the 32nd parallel.

□ Iraq remains subject to the most comprehensive and effective sanctions regime in the history of the United Nations.

□ Saddam's authority within Iraq has narrowed. Contrary to some expectations at the time of his move against Irbil, Saddam has not been able to expand his authority in the north.

□ Finally, reliable reports depict growing lawlessness and a breakdown of central authority throughout Iraq, as Iraqis struggle to make ends meet. Such trends parallel the murderous divisions which have erupted within Saddam's own family.

In short, containment has worked.

Q: Hasn't your policy toward the Kurds failed?

A: There have been long-standing tensions and conflicts within the Kurdish community of Iraq.

The United States has long encouraged Kurdish leaders to resolve their outstanding differences peacefully and to focus on the threat which Saddam Hussein continues to pose.

Since Saddam's move against Irbil, the Kurdish parties have been working with the U.S. to find common ground, though admittedly rivalries remain.

Nonetheless, we are firmly engaged -- alongside Turkey and the United Kingdom -- in a process aimed at helping the inhabitants of northern Iraq find stability and political reconciliation within a unified, pluralistic Iraq.

The bottom line is that six years after the end of the Gulf war and Iraq's attacks on the Kurds, Saddam does not control the north.

Q: What exactly is your attitude toward the Iraq opposition and

the Iraqi National Congress
(INC) in particular? Haven't you sold the opposition out?

A: The United States has long supported the establishment of a unified, coherent Iraqi opposition, dedicated to the maintenance of Iraq's territorial integrity and a free, pluralistic Iraq at peace with its neighbors.

To the extent that the INC has been able to play a positive role in forging such an opposition, it has and will have our support.

IF PRESSED: Internal disputes have understandably prevented the INC from becoming the broadbased, coherent movement which it earlier showed promise of becoming.

Iraqi Refugees

Background: The Los Angeles Times apparently will be running a story on the arrival of a group of Iraqis currently in Guam to California. Out of the 6,630 persons initially evacuated from Northern Iraq by the United States, roughly 2,000 remain on Guam pending their resettlement in the United States. All Iraqis are expected to have departed Guam by April 14, 1997. The INS has determined that 25 of the evacuees were ineligible for asylum. On March 27, they will be transferred to California where they will be detained at either a facility in Lancaster or near Bakersfield pending the outcome of their exclusion proceedings. They will appear before an immigration judge.

Thirty-four accompanying family members also will be transferred with them and housed at an INS facility in Lancaster, pending completion of their processing and placement with appropriate sponsors.

Points [If Asked]

- ☐ Evacuation of Iraqi nationals from Northern Iraq was a humanitarian gesture in keeping with U.S. tradition.
- ☐ Persons evacuated were determined to be at risk based on their

association with the United States.

☐ Roughly 8,000 evacuees will be resettled in the U.S. and placed with private sponsors.

☐ Background security checks were undertaken both before the evacuation and during processing on Guam.

☐ INS will deal with the 25 Iraqis found to be excludable according to usual immigration procedures.

☐ QUESTIONS RELATED TO STATUS OF THOSE FOUND EXCLUDABLE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO INS

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin March 3/26 Radio Address

☐ Yeltsin spoke to Russian people, outlining Helsinki results -- stated he and President Clinton signed "serious agreements" on START, ABM, economic cooperation; he noted disagreement over NATO enlargement, but put emphasis on positive -- saying NATO and Russia would sign document on relations at "highest level."

☐ Welcome Yeltsin's comments, as he made clear, Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues -- as he said, do not intend to return to path of hostility; "our choice is for cooperation."

Strikes Indicate Discontent with Russian Leadership?

☐ President Yeltsin recognized legitimacy of strikes to protest unpaid wages; Chernomyrdin committed to pay off government wage arrears, about 20% of total, over upcoming months; note that strikes were peaceful; turnout less than some predicted.

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

- ☐ President Clinton announced that Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement in Summits; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.
- ☐ Have noted that Seven will still discuss economic and financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

U.S. Recalls Ambassador to Belarus after American Diplomat Detained, Expelled

- ☐ Condemned Belarussian government's expulsion of U.S. diplomat engaged in normal diplomatic duties; have recalled our ambassador for consultations, cut off most aid, redirected remaining funds (about \$5 million) to NGOs, business groups, humanitarian purposes.
- ☐ Also this week, advised Belarusian Embassy that first secretary and consul, Vladimir Gramyka, declared Persona Non-Grata in accordance with the Vienna Convention; requested Belarus delay planned March 26 arrival of Ambassador-designate to U.S.
- ☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by Lukashenko regime and government's rejection of internationally recognized human rights, as shown in last November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of legitimacy."

WSJ Report Motorola Pulls Out of Ukraine Deal Citing Arbitrary Regulatory Environment

- ☐ No further information on circumstances as of now; always regrettable if/when commercial , bureaucratic situation does not make for healthy competitive situation for investment -- by international firms including American companies.

BOSNIA

Izetbegovic visit

□ President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of Bosnia, met with President Clinton Wednesday. They discussed a broad range of issues relating to the Bosnia peace process. (David Johnson provided read-out Wednesday)

If asked about Bosnian Membership in Partnership for Peace

□ Our long term goal is to help establish a stable and prosperous Bosnia that will be part of a greater Europe and play an important role in the international community of democratic nations.

□ At some point, this should include Bosnian membership in Partnership for Peace. However, further progress must first be made in several areas, including further strengthening of fledgling political institutions and the rebuilding of economic and societal infrastructures. The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work.

If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and equipping of the Bosnian military

□ We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation self-defense capability through the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a key part of building a stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting peace in the region.

□ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving substantial additional security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

□ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Progress in Bosnia/Is Dayton Implementation Working? (recent editorials)

□ As we continue to work on the difficult long term challenges in Bosnia, we must not forget the enormous progress we have made.

□ In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Even as the President directed a new diplomatic initiative, few believed peace was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose in the post-Cold War era.

□ Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides the backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

□ Our efforts in Bosnia have exceeded many expectations. The military aspects of Dayton were implemented with no combat casualties. National elections were successfully held in September and joint national institutions have been created and are starting to operate. The international Train and Equip program is helping build a stable military balance in Bosnia and facilitating the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation. More than 200,000 refugees have returned.

□ There has also been much progress on the economic reconstruction of Bosnia, especially in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The rebuilding of Sarajevo is perhaps most dramatic. Cut off and under siege for most of the war, Sarajevans risked sniper and mortar fire just to get some dirty water from the river running through the city or to gather some humanitarian rations. Today, Sarajevo is bustling with reconstruction activities and hundreds of cafes, shops,

restaurants, banks, and other commercial endeavors have opened their doors. Overall, the Federation economy grew by about 35% in 1996 and unemployment went from 90% to 50%.

☐ Of course, the process of reconciliation is a long term endeavor and much remains to be done. We must do more to rebuild the economic and societal infrastructures. We need greater cooperation from the parties on freedom of movement and the return of refugees and displaced persons. And we need greater political support for the fledgling political institutions.

☐ The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work. However, for the duration of its mission, SFOR will provide the stability and confidence necessary for the Bosnian people to continue to make progress toward these goals. We continue to believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed on these issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

☐ Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

☐ Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

□

To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence in the Dayton process, gives them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume preparations for conflict that would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a Congressional threat to walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question U.S. credibility and commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe. To our troops on the ground and those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation unjustly questions the purpose and value of their service and sacrifice.

□ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

□ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

□ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

□ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

SFOR Mission Duration

□ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient

extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

War Criminals

☐ The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring peace.

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

CHINA

GORE TRIP

Q: On what basis did the Vice President assert that the Administration's policy toward China would not change as a result of the current investigation into alleged illegal campaign contributions by Chinese officials?

A: The Vice President discussed this issue during his meeting in Beijing with Premier Li Peng; he also will raise it with President Jiang Zemin.

The Vice President explained that we regard these allegations very seriously. Were the FBI investigation to establish that China engaged in illegal acts, the potential consequences for sustaining the current positive momentum in U.S.-China relations could be jeopardized.

The FBI investigation is still ongoing, however, and we will not speculate on its outcome or allow it to deter the Administration's pursuit of our objectives with China, including improving market access for U.S. products, pressing for improvements in human rights practices and holding China to international standards on nonproliferation issues.

Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo. Also, what issues will he raise in Beijing?

A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice President affirmed the centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would maintain American force levels at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President urged Japan to implement fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework talks.

As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise a series of strategic issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and regional concerns, such as the Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be discussed. We do not believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to enable us to forego a UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.

(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign contributions will be part of the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our

practices for investigating such allegations.

UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

Points

☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.

☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution.

☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.

☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ President met with President Mubarak of Egypt on March 10; King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.

☐ POTUS and Yeltsin met in Helsinki March 20-21. POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.

- ☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.
- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

- ☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

ZAIRE

MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu? Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a national consensus on how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a seven-person committee of negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We are waiting to get more details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee designated immediately and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the rebel alliance, within the context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire. Obviously, during this time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political figures to work together towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our

European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

ALBANIA

Any Update on Albania?

- ☐ The OSCE has approved a permanent mission to Albania headed by former Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky. The Vranitzky will coordinate international efforts to improve the situation there and prepare for new parliamentary elections.
- ☐ We strongly support this effort which we hope will buttress the Fino government and lead to the restoration of civil society within the country.
- ☐ The OSCE also took note of the desire of some European countries to put together a force that could provide protection for the ongoing humanitarian relief effort.
- ☐ The matter is now before the UN Security Council for its consideration.
- ☐ While we have been supportive of the idea of deploying such a force if its mission is properly defined, we have no intention of participating in such a force ourselves.

MEXICO

SENATE RESOLUTION

- ☐ Welcome Senate action endorsing greater counterdrug cooperation

with Mexico and other nations in the Americas. Bipartisan effort to support common goal of increasing cooperation to keep drugs out of our neighborhoods.

☐ Senate action recognizes ongoing progress being made by President Zedillo and acknowledges that the problems are serious and require work on both sides of border. Working through the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control, we are ready to continue our active collaboration.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Continued IRA Violence

☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.

☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.

☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.

☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

BERGER/STEINBERG PHONE CALLS

☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.

☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.

☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.

☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to

initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans

with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly

supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I

requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive

(PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their

Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will

ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.

☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:

☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.

☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.

☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.

☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the

bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC

lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine

the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.

☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD

Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level

chemical exposure -- is in progress.

☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.

☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.

☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.

☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all

Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated

by public service announcements and many other means...

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no

documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

- ☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.
- ☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...
- ☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

- ☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐

During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.

☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.

☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.

☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.

☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.

☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War

illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Helms and CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina yesterday, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to

address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do

nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the

historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

CUBA

Diplomatic Pouch Opened

Q: Is it true that the Cuban government opened a U.S. diplomatic pouch destined for the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana?

A: The Cuban government recently delayed the delivery of several of the Interests Section's unclassified pouches.

The Cubans claimed that one of the pouches arrived open and protested that its contents were "aggressive" and objectionable to the GOC. They apparently were referring to copies of the President's report to Congress on "Support for a Democratic Transition in Cuba."

USINT has confirmed that one pouch was opened and its contents were inspected.

Q: Did the USG apologize for the contents of the pouch, as the Washington Times reported?

A: Absolutely not. USINT earlier this week delivered a note to the Cuban government clearly and emphatically protesting the tampering with the pouch and rejecting any effort to regulate the contents of the pouch.

The GOC's interference with our pouches is a blatant violation of its obligations under international law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It also violates the 1977 Agreement on the Establishment of Interests Sections.

The GOC has no authority to regulate the content of official communications between the USG and USINT.

The GOC's action is further evidence of its repressive policies and disregard for long-established international law and diplomatic practice.

PERU

Lima Hostage Crisis

Q: Has a deal been struck to resolve the 98-day-old hostage crisis in Lima?

A: The governments of Peru and Japan are continuing efforts to find a peaceful solution, which we support.

Talks between the Peruvian government and the MRTA continue. The disagreement has been over the terrorists' demand for the release of fellow MRTA members in prison.

Understand that, at Peru and Japan's request, Cuba has agreed to accept the MRTA hostage-takers as part of a broader resolution. Dominican Republic has also expressed willingness to take them.

Cannot confirm, however, that resolution is imminent.

Q: Would the United States oppose a deal involving Cuba?

A: USG supports a peaceful resolution to this 98-day impasse without rewarding terrorists.

Do not want to comment on particular elements of a solution at this time.

Q: [If asked] Is there any truth to rumors that Japan offered to pardon some Cuban debt in return for cooperation?

A: Would refer you to the Japanese government.

INDONESIA

Freeport/McMoRan

Q: What is your reaction to the Indonesian government suspension of Bre-X's (partner with Freeport--Jim Moffett) license to mine good in Busang?

A: We have no reason to believe that this story is other than what it purports to be, namely a report on Jakarta's suspension of Bre-X's mining license as a result of concerns about the extent of estimated gold reserves. This is a commercial and contractual issue between the involved companies and the Indonesian government.

Sale of Pakistani F-16s

Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia F-16s?

A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains committed to the sale, but the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the transfer at this time. Our decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations, including regional and bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.

We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter evolves.

EL SALVADOR -- ANDRADE/ZONA ROSA

□ The Administration has been working with Congress since late 1995 to look into events surrounding the 1985 Zona Rosa murders and the 1990 parole into the United States of Pedro Antonio Andrade. At the request of the SSCI, Inspectors General from State, Justice, CIA and DoD undertook formal investigations of the Zona Rosa incident and its aftermath. The results of those investigations were briefed to interested agencies and reports were delivered to the SSCI in late September. At that time, the Administration asked for an unclassified summary of the four IG reports to be provided to Senator Shelby and others interested in this case.

□ The IG's unclassified summary was released in December. The IG's concluded that no laws or regulations were violated in the Andrade parole, but did identify a failure to communicate and lack of coordination among agencies involved in the parole decision. The Department of Justice's IG recommended that the process for coordination of parole requests needs improvement. Therefore, to ensure appropriate high-level attention to sensitive cases, Justice has instructed the INS to work with the inter-agency to develop a mechanism for better coordination of parole requests in the future.

□ I should note that the IG's also described the government-wide effort in the wake of the 1985 murders to ensure that the perpetrators were prosecuted and incarcerated.

□ In addition to the unclassified summary, Senator Shelby requested declassification of the four reports themselves. The White House encouraged the four agencies concerned to undertake this declassification on an expedited basis and those reports were delivered to Senator Shelby today. They are available to the public at the National Archives.

□ The INS exclusion process is a judicial proceeding in which the White House is not involved.

The interests of the executive branch in this case are represented by the INS. Beyond that, it is our policy not to comment on asylum issues.

OECD/ENCRYPTION

□ OECD guidelines reflect the consensus views of member countries, who have various approaches to commercial encryption. US views these guidelines as very useful for countries. They acknowledge the balance needed between competing constituencies for commerce, privacy, free choice, national security and public safety.

□ The Administration's draft legislation is a "middle of the road," market-driven approach, which still preserves the public safety and national security. While Americans will be able to choose any kind of encryption, it is estimated that 80% of businesses and organizations will use key recovery or data recovery systems. The Administration bill will set the rules for legitimate access to encryption keys under law and the Fourth Amendment. It will also support the growth of electronic commerce.

□ Stories in today's NY Times and Washington Post present an inaccurate impression of the Administration's encryption policy. While the Administration supports a market-driven approach to commercial encryption, like the past several administrations, we believe in protecting national security and public safety. Our balanced policy is not accurately reflected in these stories.

□ The Administration is working with industry, Congressional staff, privacy advocates, law enforcement and encryption manufacturers to craft our policy and draft legislation. Our "middle of the road" approach may not satisfy any stakeholder completely, but it will preserve our values in the best way possible, and sets an example for the rest of the world, which largely buys what American makers sell. We are seeing signs of growing international

support for our approach, as Ambassador David Aaron, the President's Special Envoy for Cryptography Policy, meets with our trading partners.

NOTE: William Reinsch, Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration, has the lead for backgrounding press on the encryption bill. The bill itself is still being finalized in the Interagency Working Group on Cryptography Policy (co-chaired by Ed Appel, NSC and Bruce McConnell, OMB).

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 28 March 97 18:11
FROM Murray, Lori E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CWC principal points [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Harris, Elisa D.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[PTSPR.DOC : 4625 in PTSPR.DOC]]
Attached are revised principal points for Senate calls-- these are the ones that should be used, thanks.
ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 28 March 97 18:9
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME PTSPR.DOC

CWC Points for Senate Calls

- ☐ I am calling to urge your support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- ☐ In early January, the President and the Majority Leader agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- ☐ We have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and the group he has put together from his caucus. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Lott group. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.
- ☐ Senator Helms has participated as a member of the Lott group and has also been meeting separately with Senator Biden. Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions and in close to 20 cases we have reached agreement and on the remaining issues we have identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

☐ We believe real progress has been made and that we have a framework for a unanimous consent agreement. The Administration has

been dedicated in its efforts to address the concerns of some of the members of the Republican caucus. We have agreed in these sessions to move well beyond the conditions in the resolution of ratification that was on the Senate calendar last September.

☐ Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the

Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force.

☐ We welcome Senator Lott's statement on March 20 that he is working

a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

☐ Like President Bush, Colin Powell, Larry Eagleburger and other members of the Bush foreign policy team, we strongly believe that this treaty is in our national security interest, and that it will

help reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers and our citizens.

☐ Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile.

The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision.

☐ Moreover, the elimination of our chemical weapons will not deny us

a militarily useful tool. As JCS Chairman Shalikashvili has said,

Desert Storm proved that we don't need chemical weapons to deter the use of chemical weapons against our forces.

☐ The CWC will also help us deal with the threat of chemical terrorism. By eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the

flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.

☐ We recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But we genuinely believe

that
it is a key element of any effective response. I hope we will
have your support.

Contingency points on April 29 deadline

- ☐ April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, Americans will be less secure. We will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.
- ☐ Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined.
- ☐ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And, Americans now serving as head of key posts, including security, administration, and industrial inspections will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified the Convention.
- ☐ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Without ratification, the chemical industry will feel the brunt of the treaty's sanctions, which they estimate could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.
- ☐ The Chemical Weapons Convention has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been over 13 hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings provided to both members and staff. These efforts have continued in this new Congress as well.

Contingency point on linkage of CWC to State reorganization, etc.

- ☐ Regarding the broader issues that Senator Helms has raised, the

Administration has been working hard to address these concerns and we are prepared to continue to do so. Nonetheless, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 28 March 97 18:26
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Akers, Dale W.
Branscum, Sean D.
Hale, John E.
Lowry, Jay E.
Abdulmalik, April B.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer
Brown, Nancy E.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.

Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Davis, William K.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Florio, Elaine
Flynn, Stephen E.
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.

Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Knepper, Charlotte
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Mercier, Henry J.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.

O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Gwyn M. Parker
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Prendergast, John P.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.

Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY

NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates **IN BOLD** to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Monday, March 31. Thank you.

[[MAR28GUI.DOC : 4630 in MAR28GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

28 March 97 18:25

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

MAR28GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 28, 1997

Middle East

Khobar

Korea

Baltics

Nuclear Cuts/Targeting

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Zaire

Albania

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Indonesia

El Salvador

MIDDLE EAST

Ross Update

Q: Anything on the Ross trip?

A: Ambassador Ross met today with PM Netanyahu and other senior Israeli officials. He will depart the region today and will be briefing the President and Secretary Albright after his return.

During his trip, he had good, thorough exchanges with both the Palestinian and Israeli leadership. Not going to get into substance of his exchanges; he was sent out to talk to the parties and assess the situation, and he will report back to the President and Secretary.

PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian authority must comply with all its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in order for negotiations to resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to do everything it can to

prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian authority must make certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process understand that violence and terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is to be restored and negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and terrorism? Shouldn't he be arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to prevent violence and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that those associated with violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem through its moving ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is absolutely essential for the Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very clearly in both words and deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will not be tolerated.

KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing

investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

Q: But the Canadians charged this guy last night with participating in the bombing and the papers they filed indicate he has links to Syria and Iran. Do you concur with the Canadian assessment of his culpability? Does this mean we're going to finally take action against Iran? Will it be military action?

A: Canada did make some specific allegations in the papers the Canadian government filed with its own courts. As you know, we, too, have an investigation ongoing.

At this time in our own investigation, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make specific public charges or allegations. The FBI, the agency in our government that is in charge of this investigation and the agency that has been working with Canada, will follow all leads and will take them to their appropriate conclusion.

We are treating this as a criminal, law enforcement investigation. I'm not going to speculate about the outcome of the investigation or any actions that outcome might require.

Q: So you're ruling out any military action against Iran based on the clear and convincing evidence Canada's authorities have submitted to their courts?

A: I'm declining to speculate on the outcome of the case. Nothing more, nothing less.

KOREA -- FOUR PARTY PEACE TALKS

Q: At the working level meeting between the U.S., South and North Korea in New York on Wednesday, did the North agree to come to the Four Party Peace Talks in exchange for food assistance?

A: The talks in New York were at the working level and no formal requests were made by either side. The North and South Korean representatives took the opportunity to clarify each other's concerns. The meeting can best be described as a working level follow-on to the official Joint Briefing that was conducted in New York on 5 March. In that regard, it was extremely useful for all parties to discuss their views and work together to realize the Peace Talks that Presidents Clinton and Kim offered in April 1996.

Q: South Korea indicated that the North "conditionally accepted the Four Party Talks." Is that accurate?

A: A wide range of subjects were discussed, but there were no agreements reached in New York on Wednesday. We remain hopeful that the North will accept the offer of Peace Talks and are waiting for their formal response to the Presidents offer as it was briefed on 5 March.

BALTICS

U.S. Offer of "Security" Pact for Baltic States

Q: Has the U.S. offered a "security pact" to the Baltic states to compensate for lack of NATO membership?

A: The U.S. is working actively with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to advance their integration with the Transatlantic community and its institutions. We have a number of initiatives, both bilateral and regional, well underway.

As part of this process, we have discussed with the Baltic governments the possibility of a joint document outlining our shared commitment to the sovereignty, independence and security of the Baltic states.

Any joint document would not be a "substitute" or "compensation" for NATO membership, but rather a supplement to ongoing efforts to advance Baltic integration.

As President Clinton has repeatedly made clear, the process of NATO enlargement is and will remain open for all of Europe's new democracies, including the Baltic states.

U.S. NUCLEAR CUTS

Q: The President of the Sandia National Laboratories has suggested that as the United States makes further reductions in its nuclear forces it may move to targeting civilians and population centers. Is this true?

A: No.

First, as of May, 1994, all U.S. nuclear missiles have been "detargeted," as per the agreement between President Clinton and President Yeltsin earlier that year.

Second, the United States has not targeted civilian population centers as part of its deterrent strategy for decades.

Third, reductions to 2,000-2,500 warheads agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin

in Helsinki will not precipitate such a change.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin March 3/26 Radio Address

☐ Yeltsin spoke to Russian people, outlining Helsinki results -- stated he and President Clinton signed "serious agreements" on START, ABM, economic cooperation; he noted disagreement over NATO enlargement, but put emphasis on positive -- saying NATO and Russia would sign document on relations at "highest level."

☐ Welcome Yeltsin's comments, as he made clear, Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues -- as he said, do not intend to return to path of hostility; "our choice is for cooperation."

Strikes Indicate Discontent with Russian Leadership?

☐ President Yeltsin recognized legitimacy of strikes to protest unpaid wages; Chernomyrdin committed to pay off government wage arrears, about 20% of total, over upcoming months; note that strikes were peaceful; turnout less than some predicted.

Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ President Clinton announced that Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement in Summits; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Have noted that Seven will still discuss economic and financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

U.S. Recalls Ambassador to Belarus after American Diplomat Detained, Expelled

- ☐ Condemned Belarussian government's expulsion of U.S. diplomat engaged in normal diplomatic duties; have recalled our ambassador for consultations, cut off most aid, redirected remaining funds (about \$5 million) to NGOs, business groups, humanitarian purposes.
- ☐ Also this week, advised Belarusian Embassy that first secretary and consul, Vladimir Gramyka, declared Persona Non-Grata in accordance with the Vienna Convention; requested Belarus delay planned March 26 arrival of Ambassador-designate to U.S.
- ☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by Lukashenko regime and government's rejection of internationally recognized human rights, as shown in last November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of legitimacy."

WSJ Report Motorola Pulls Out of Ukraine Deal Citing Arbitrary Regulatory Environment

- ☐ No further information on circumstances as of now; always regrettable if/when commercial , bureaucratic situation does not make for healthy competitive situation for investment -- by international firms including American companies.

BOSNIA

Izetbegovic visit

- ☐ President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of Bosnia, met with President Clinton Wednesday. They discussed a broad range of issues relating to the Bosnia peace process. (David Johnson provided read-out Wednesday)

If asked about Bosnian Membership in Partnership for Peace

- ☐ Our long term goal is to help establish a stable and prosperous Bosnia that will be part of a

greater Europe and play an important role in the international community of democratic nations.

☐ At some point, this should include Bosnian membership in Partnership for Peace. However, further progress must first be made in several areas, including further strengthening of fledgling political institutions and the rebuilding of economic and societal infrastructures. The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work.

If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and equipping of the Bosnian military

☐ We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation self-defense capability through the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a key part of building a stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving substantial additional security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

☐ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

☐ Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in

Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

□

Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

□ To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence in the Dayton process, gives them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume preparations for conflict that would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a Congressional threat to walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question U.S. credibility and commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe. To our troops on the ground and those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation unjustly questions the purpose and value of their service and sacrifice.

□ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

□ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

□ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual

states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- ☐ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

SFOR Mission Duration

- ☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

- ☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

War Criminals

- ☐ The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring peace.
- ☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

- ☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these

options but have made no decisions yet.

CHINA

GORE TRIP

Q: On what basis did the Vice President assert that the Administration's policy toward China would not change as a result of the current investigation into alleged illegal campaign contributions by Chinese officials?

A: The Vice President discussed this issue during his meeting in Beijing with Premier Li Peng; he also will raise it with President Jiang Zemin.

The Vice President explained that we regard these allegations very seriously. Were the FBI investigation to establish that China engaged in illegal acts, the potential consequences for sustaining the current positive momentum in U.S.-China relations could be jeopardized.

The FBI investigation is still ongoing, however, and we will not speculate on its outcome or allow it to deter the Administration's pursuit of our objectives with China, including improving market access for U.S. products, pressing for improvements in human rights practices and holding China to international standards on nonproliferation issues.

Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo. Also, what issues will he raise in Beijing?

A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice President affirmed the centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would maintain American force levels at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President urged Japan to implement fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework

talks.

As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise a series of strategic issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and regional concerns, such as the Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be discussed. We do not believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to enable us to forego a UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.

(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign contributions will be part of the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our practices for investigating such allegations.

UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the

Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

Points

- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

- ☐ King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.
- ☐ POTUS and Yeltsin met in Helsinki March 20-21. POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Madrid.

- ☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.
- ☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.
- ☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.
- ☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.
- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

- ☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

ZAIRE

MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRES/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu? Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a national consensus on how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a seven-person committee of negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We are waiting to get more details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee designated immediately and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the rebel alliance, within the context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire. Obviously, during this time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political figures to work together towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of

American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and

several fixed wing aircraft
and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in
Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking
similar measures. Are these
efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our
European allies, some of
whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the
Congolesse and
Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and
throughout the day on
Saturday.

ALBANIA

Any Update on Albania?

☐ The OSCE has approved a permanent mission to Albania headed by
former Austrian
Chancellor Vranitzky. The Vranitzky will coordinate
international efforts to improve the
situation there and prepare for new parliamentary elections.

☐ We strongly support this effort which we hope will buttress the
Fino government and lead to
the restoration of civil society within the country.

☐ The OSCE also took note of the desire of some European countries
to put together a force
that could provide protection for the ongoing humanitarian relief
effort.

☐ The matter is now before the UN Security Council for its
consideration.

☐ While we have been supportive of the idea of deploying such a

force if its mission is properly defined, we have no intention of participating in such a force ourselves.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Continued IRA Violence

- ☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.
- ☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

- ☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

BERGER/STEINBERG PHONE CALLS

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and

Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.

☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.

☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.

☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to

initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans

with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly

supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I

requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from

its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.

☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:

☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.

☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.

☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.

☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the

bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.

☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are

disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

- ☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.
- ☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.
- ☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

- ☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.
- ☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.
- ☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...
- ☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.
- ☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.
- ☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah

incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

☐ President asked them to take a careful look
☐ Obviously doing so
☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in

January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even

with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.

- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.

- ☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.

- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

- ☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.

- ☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.

- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free

medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.
- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
- ☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Helms and CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina yesterday, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated..

This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

INDONESIA

Freeport/McMoRan

Q: What is your reaction to the Indonesian government suspension of Bre-X's (partner with Freeport--Jim Moffett) license to mine gold in Busang?

A: We have no reason to believe that this story is other than what it purports to be, namely a report on Jakarta's suspension of Bre-X's mining license as a result of concerns about the extent of estimated gold reserves. This is a commercial and contractual issue between the involved companies and the Indonesian government.

Sale of Pakistani F-16s

Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia F-16s?

A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains committed to the sale, but the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the transfer at this time. Our decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations, including regional and bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.

We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter evolves.

EL SALVADOR -- ANDRADE/ZONA ROSA

☐ The Administration has been working with Congress since late 1995 to look into events surrounding the 1985 Zona Rosa murders and the 1990 parole into the United States of Pedro Antonio Andrade. At the request of the SSCI, Inspectors General from State, Justice, CIA and DoD undertook formal investigations of the Zona Rosa incident and its aftermath. The results of those investigations were briefed to interested agencies and reports were delivered to the SSCI in late September. At that time, the Administration asked for an unclassified summary of the four IG reports to be provided to Senator Shelby and others interested in this case.

☐ The IG's unclassified summary was released in December. The IG's concluded that no laws or regulations were violated in the Andrade parole, but did identify a failure to communicate and lack of coordination among agencies involved in the parole decision. The Department of Justice's IG recommended that the process for coordination of parole requests needs improvement. Therefore, to ensure appropriate high-level attention to sensitive cases, Justice has instructed the INS to work with the inter-agency to develop a mechanism for better coordination of parole requests in the future.

☐ I should note that the IG's also described the government-wide effort in the wake of the 1985 murders to ensure that the perpetrators were prosecuted and incarcerated.

☐ In addition to the unclassified summary, Senator Shelby requested declassification of the four reports themselves. The White House encouraged the four agencies concerned to undertake this declassification on an expedited basis and those reports were delivered to Senator Shelby today. They are available to the public at the National Archives.

☐ The INS exclusion process is a judicial proceeding in which the White House is not involved.

The interests of the executive branch in this case are represented by the INS. Beyond that, it is our policy not to comment on asylum issues.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 31 March 97 12:18
FROM Cicio, Kristen K.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: points [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bendick, Gordon L.
Harris, Elisa D.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Johnson, David T.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Mulligan, George D.
Murray, Lori E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Rubin, Eric S.
Seaton, James B.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY

Elisa/Gordy,

SRB notes..."presupposes substantial knowledge. Suggest following organization (1) why CWC is needed (2) procedural situation (briefer) (3) major qs & as. Need to turn around Monday."

From: Bendick, Gordon L.
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: FW: points [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, March 28, 1997 01:09 PM

[[PTSPR.DOC : 3074 in PTSPR.DOC]]

Please pass to Jim S

Attached for your review and concurrence are TPs that we plan to get to Principals (SRB, MKA, Cohen, Shali, Daley, Holum) to make calls to key

Senators that we need to get to "yes" on the CWC vote.

With your concurrence on these TPs, we will forward to the respective agencies for Principal calls in the next week.

Gordy

From: Harris, Elisa D.
To: Murray, Lori E.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; Bell, Robert G.
Subject: points [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, March 28, 1997 12:43 PM

lori: looks good: i made them a little more brief and got rid of some redundancy. thanks!

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

28 March 97 12:56

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

PTSPR.DOC

CWC Points for Senate Calls

- ☐ I am calling to urge your support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- ☐ In early January, the President and the Majority Leader agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- ☐ We have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and the group he has put together from his caucus. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Lott group. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.
- ☐ Senator Helms has participated as a member of the Lott group and has also been meeting separately with Senator Biden. Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can

be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

☐ The Administration has been dedicated in its efforts to address the concerns of some of the members of the Republican caucus. We have agreed in these sessions to move well beyond the conditions in the resolution of ratification that was on the Senate calendar last September. We believe progress has been made.

☐ Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force.

☐ Like President Bush, Colin Powell, Larry Eagleburger and other members of the Bush foreign policy team, we strongly believe that this treaty is in our national security interest, and that it will help reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers and our citizens.

☐ Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile. The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision.

☐ Moreover, the elimination of our chemical weapons will not deny us a militarily useful tool. As JCS Chairman Shalikashvili has said, Desert Storm proved that we don't need chemical weapons to deter the use of chemical weapons against our forces.

☐ The CWC will also help us deal with the threat of chemical terrorism. By eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.

☐ We recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But we genuinely believe that it is a key element of any effective response. I hope we will have your support.

Contingency points on April 29 deadline

- ☐ April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, Americans will be less secure. We will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.
- ☐ Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined.
- ☐ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And, Americans now serving as head of key posts, including security, administration, and industrial inspections will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified the Convention.
- ☐ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Without ratification, the chemical industry will feel the brunt of the treaty's sanctions, which they estimate could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.
- ☐ The Chemical Weapons Convention has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been over 13 hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings provided to both members and staff. These efforts have continued in this new Congress as well.

Contingency point on linkage of CWC to reorganization etc.:

- ☐ Regarding the broader issues that Senator Helms has raised, the Administration has been working hard to address these concerns and we are prepared to continue to do so. Nonetheless, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot

afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

(I would make this contingency, rather than raise it.)