

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 27 March 97 19:13  
**FROM** Murray, Lori E.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** CWC gameplan [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Blinken, Antony J.  
Harris, Elisa D.

**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

**TEXT\_BODY**  
[[ CWCGP.DOC : 4899 in CWCGP.DOC ]]  
Tony, Elisa--attached is a draft CWC gameplan which tries to integrate the most essential components of a CWC leg strategy and public diplomacy strategy into a three week breakdown. For your review and input. Danvers, Gordy all have copies too.

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 27 March 97 19:8

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** CWCGP.DOC

## CWC GAMEPLAN

Getting to the final vote on CWC will require a dedicated, focused and coordinated effort between now and a final vote the week of April 14.

We continue to face a determined and energized opposition in the Senate whose strategy includes personal member to member contact.

Senator Kyl and Senator Helms are aggressively working this issue and

Senator Helms' staff are also meeting with Republican members to keep them informed on the negotiations with the Administration.

At least one freshmen member who came in as a blank slate on this issue is now considered leaning against, mainly due to the personal efforts of Senator Kyl.

The opponents, led by Senator Kyl, have introduced an alternative

piece of legislation. Since this was dropped in just before the recess, we have an opportunity to help frame opinion on this issue.

We must act aggressively over the next three weeks in order to ensure a successful vote for this agreement. While we should continue to press our main themes, including military support/advantages, throughout the remaining weeks, two themes that we should emphasize in an effort to undercut the alternative are industry support and the long-term, sustained, bipartisan US leadership which resulted in the successful conclusion of this international agreement.

Key components to a legislative strategy include the following:

- ☐ concluding, before the end of the recess, a package of conditions with Senator Helms;
- ☐ negotiating a UC the week of April 7;
- ☐ Republican Senators actively seeking support for the package of conditions;
- ☐ Administration principals actively seeking support for conditions package; and
- ☐ coordinating closely with Bush Administration officials, industry and the NGOs;
- ☐ daily morning coordination meetings should begin at NSC (including White House leg) week of April 7 (POTUS drop by first one chaired by SRB to emphasize importance of mission to staff).

Week of March 24

- ☐ blast fax on Kyl alternative;
- ☐ Bell writes Kirkpatrick/Cheney letter signatories about concerned addressed in negotiations (especially those invited to White House event, (Haig, Wolfowitz)

Week of March 31

- ☐ complete negotiation on conditions package;
- ☐ Berger to McCain/Stevens/Lugar ask them to work individual members  
to explain how far the condition package goes to address concerns;
- ☐ complete point papers on conditions that will be debated;
- ☐ prepare draft, and POTUS works all President's letter for Ford library event (April 7);
- ☐ Cohen op-ed April 4, Washington Post;
- ☐ April 4 White House event; secure signatures on Scowcroft/Kassebaum-Baker-Boren letter;
- ☐ Two blast faxes: verifiability--White House event;
- ☐ Hold principals meeting to give out assignments on Senators and points;
- ☐ Bell/Murray meet with Webber/McInerney to discuss business/former military efforts;
- ☐ Bell/Murray meet with NGOs to debrief on Hill negotiations and discuss weeks of April 7-14;
- ☐ Debriefs for all supporters not attending White House event on Hill negotiations(could include Adelman, Lehman etc., by phone calls Bell, Murray);
- ☐ April 6 Sunday shows principals;

#### Week of April 7

- ☐ POTUS secures all Presidents letter April 7;
- ☐ All Democratic letter to Lott asking for UC;
- ☐ April 8 Plan floor statements on urgency of CWC;
- ☐ Secure UC agreement--debate begins April 14-vote April 19;
- ☐ Daily blast faxes begin--debunking myths/positive message;
- ☐ POTUS calls Bush and debriefs as to where we are after UC

concluded;

- ☐ POTUS calls Dole and tells him of negotiated conditions; hopes concerns addressed and asks support;
- ☐ POTUS meets with Lugar/Biden;
- ☐ Brown/Laird/ Carlucci op-ed April 9;
- ☐ SFRC hearing April 9--Cohen, Albright, Shali (may be out if town);
- ☐ Berger briefs Frosh Senators;
- ☐ Bell/Murray selectively brief Republican staff supporters and swing votes;
- ☐ Bell briefs Democratic staff;
- ☐ Bell/Murray begin briefings of Republican members (supporters and swings) on condition package;
- ☐ White House leg affairs calls all Dems and asks support;
- ☐ Berger/Cohen/Albright begin member calls about conditions agreed to and why CWC needs support/why alternative is not an alternative;
- ☐ Targeted business visits;
- ☐ Targeted former military/veteran group visits;
- ☐ Calls coordinated with Powell, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Laird, Baker;
- ☐ POTUS radio address April 12;
- ☐ Lugar hosts Scowcroft lunch for small group of swing Republican Senators.

Week of April 14

- ☐ Nightline April 14;
- ☐ Daily blast faxes continue;

- ☐ Vice President does targeted rounds/calls on Hill based on feedback Cohen/Albright;
- ☐ President does targeted calls on Hill based on feedback Cohen/Albright;
- ☐ Other principals continue targeted calls based on individual concerns of key Senators (Reno, Shali, Daley);
- ☐ Bush calls;
- ☐ Powell, Scowcroft, Eagleburger targeted calls continue;
- ☐ Eagleburger op-ed April 14;
- ☐ Former Chiefs op-ed Powell, Crowe, Jones (or letter).

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 27 March 97 20:18

**FROM** Wozniak, Natalie S.

**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT** March 27 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO** Babcock, Douglas W.  
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Jordan, Donald L.  
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**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

**TEXT\_BODY** [[ MAR27GUI.DOC : 5158 in MAR27GUI.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 27 March 97 12:59

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** MAR27GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 27, 1997

Middle East

Khobar

Iraq

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Zaire

Albania

Mexico

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Cuba

Peru

Indonesia

El Salvador

OECD/Encryption

MIDDLE EAST

Ross Trip to the Middle East

Q: Can you update us on the Ross trip?

A: He met today in Rabat with King Hassan and Chairman Arafat. He proceeds to Israel today. He'll come back this weekend and report to the President and Secretary Albright. Meanwhile, we're not going to be commenting on the substance of his meetings.

(FYI: Dennis didn't comment at all after his meeting with Arafat. He should be on plane for Israel now.)

Q: How would you characterize the situation on the ground in Gaza and the West Bank?

A: The situation on the ground remains tense.

We continue to urge all parties to do everything possible to avoid violent confrontations, and for the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government to work together to defuse tensions and lay the basis for moving forward in the talks.

#### RE-ARREST OF MUQADEMAH

Q: Has Hamas leader Ibrahim Muqademah been re-arrested?

A: We understand that the Palestinian Authority (PA) issued a warrant for Muqademah's arrest after the Friday bombing, but that he remains at large.

We remain extremely concerned about the situation and urge the PA to do everything possible to re-apprehend him.

#### PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian authority must comply with all its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in order for negotiations to resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to do everything it can to prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian authority must make certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process understand that violence and terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is to be restored and negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and terrorism? Shouldn't he be arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to prevent violence and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that those associated with violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem through its moving ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is absolutely essential for the Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very clearly in both words and deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will not be tolerated.

#### U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES

Q: Has the U.S. been in contact with the Israelis and Palestinians to solve this crisis?

A: We are in continuous contact with both parties now.

(If pressed): President Clinton spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu on Friday and the Secretary spoke to President Weizman on Saturday. We have also been in contact with the Palestinians.

#### KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten some cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

## IRAQ

### Albright Speech

Q: Why did the Secretary give this speech now?

A: Secretary Albright gave this speech now -- at the beginning of the second term -- to underscore the point that Iraq policy is a strategic priority for this administration.

We have just recently completed a senior level, interagency, top-to-bottom review of our Iraq policy, including our goals and objectives and how best to achieve them.

The Secretary's speech reflects that review and provides a clear picture of it.

Q: What were the main conclusions of the policy review?

A: The central finding of the review was the ongoing need to contain Iraq for as long as it takes Iraq to demonstrate by deeds and actions that it is no longer a threat to its neighbors or in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

At the same time, the review validated our ultimate objective of

seeing Iraq reintegrated  
back into the international community as a positive factor for  
regional peace and stability.  
The sooner that happens, the better.

☐ Current circumstances in Baghdad clearly do not make  
reintegration feasible at this  
time. Saddam Hussein remains a threat.

☐ Therefore, we must contain the threat that Iraq poses to its  
neighbors, to its people, to  
the free flow of oil and to our broader interests in the region,  
such as the Peace  
Process.

The review also reaffirmed as central elements of our containment  
policy:

☐ Active support for UN sanctions.

☐ Full backing for UNSCOM's efforts to account for Iraqi WMD  
programs.

☐ The maintenance of a military presence in the region which can  
deter Iraqi aggression  
or, if necessary, respond decisively to any provocations.

Q: What's really new about this speech?

A: You're looking through the wrong end of the telescope.

This speech is a reaffirmation and a reiteration of the salient  
points of U.S. policy  
toward Iraq.

The emphasis here is on continuity, not innovation.

And there is good reason for that. The assumptions about Saddam  
Hussein which  
guided the Administration in the first term are as valid today as  
they were four years ago.

We remain convinced that Saddam Hussein continues to be a threat  
to the region and to  
his people.

Therefore, the policy we pursued in the first term -- containment  
-- remains the correct  
one as we begin the second.

Q: But what about the references to working with a post-Saddam government. Isn't that new?

A: The Secretary did clarify certain aspects of the policy which have been implicit in our overall approach, but which we concluded needed to be made explicit.

The Secretary therefore stated with greater precision and clarity that a change in the Iraqi leadership could have an impact on perceptions of Iraqi intentions, and she expressed for the first time our readiness in principle to establish a dialogue with a post-Saddam government.

But in a sense, however, all the Secretary did was to make an obvious point: Saddam Hussein is an evil that we know all too well. It would be ridiculous to pretend that his departure would not make a difference to how we -- and the world -- would view Iraq.

Q: Aren't you calling for an uprising of the Iraqi people?

A: The Secretary's remarks should not be misinterpreted or misunderstood.

This is not a call to tell the Iraqi people what they should do or who should lead them. That is for them to decide, as the President said last fall.

What we have done is to make clearer than we have to date our view that Saddam Hussein's record and actions are an important factor in determining Iraq's intentions and that a change in leadership in Baghdad could make a difference in our policy.

One of the reasons we want to do this is because there have been repeated accusations that U.S. policy is really directed against the Iraqi people and not against Saddam Hussein.

Nothing could be further from the truth, as our support for UN Resolution 986 demonstrates.

Q: Given all the other pressing and important foreign policy

issues on the Secretary's plate,  
why would she give a speech on Iraq as her first major foreign  
policy speech?

A: In part, because Georgetown was kind enough to ask her to speak  
on Iraq at this time.

But let me be as clear as I can: Iraq and our policy toward it  
is a strategic priority for  
this Administration. It was that way in the first term. It will  
continue to be so in the  
second term.

Therefore, it was entirely appropriate for the Secretary to  
select this subject for her first  
major foreign policy speech.

Q: Weren't the Iraqis the model of cooperation during the last  
UNSCOM inspection?

A: The issue is not whether Iraq did or did not cooperate with  
UNSCOM on a particular  
inspection.

The fact is that for some six years now we have seen a consistent  
and systematic  
pattern of lying, cheating and deception on the part of Iraq in  
meeting its UN Security  
Council obligations, particularly with regard to weapons of mass  
destruction.

To the extent that there has been Iraqi cooperation, it has been  
grudging, piecemeal,  
selective and grossly inadequate.

□ For example, documentation revealed after Hussein Kamel's  
defection showed Iraq  
continues to conceal WMD programs.

□ UNSCOM Chief Rolfe Ekeus has publicly expressed his belief that  
Iraq retains an  
operational SCUD missile force, and chemical or biological  
warheads to go with them.

No one would be more pleased than we if Iraq met all its  
obligations to the UN,  
including those related to UNSCOM.

But that is clearly not the picture.

Q: Isn't the containment of Iraq really a failure? After all, Saddam Hussein is still in power with little prospect that that situation will change?

A: Look at the record:

□ Iraq's military threat is contained. The combination of significant U.S. forces deployed in the region and a demonstrated ability to reinforce those forces when necessary, has profoundly complicated Saddam's calculus of military options.

□ The area in which Saddam's military can operate inside Iraq has contracted dramatically over the past four years with the southern no-fly zone now extended to the suburbs of Baghdad and a "no-drive" zone imposed on Iraq's elite Republican Guard units below the 32nd parallel.

□ Iraq remains subject to the most comprehensive and effective sanctions regime in the history of the United Nations.

□ Saddam's authority within Iraq has narrowed. Contrary to some expectations at the time of his move against Irbil, Saddam has not been able to expand his authority in the north.

□ Finally, reliable reports depict growing lawlessness and a breakdown of central authority throughout Iraq, as Iraqis struggle to make ends meet. Such trends parallel the murderous divisions which have erupted within Saddam's own family.

In short, containment has worked.

Q: Hasn't your policy toward the Kurds failed?

A: There have been long-standing tensions and conflicts within the Kurdish community of Iraq.

The United States has long encouraged Kurdish leaders to resolve their outstanding differences peacefully and to focus on the threat which Saddam Hussein continues to pose.

Since Saddam's move against Irbil, the Kurdish parties have been working with the U.S. to find common ground, though admittedly rivalries remain.

Nonetheless, we are firmly engaged -- alongside Turkey and the United Kingdom -- in a process aimed at helping the inhabitants of northern Iraq find stability and political reconciliation within a unified, pluralistic Iraq.

The bottom line is that six years after the end of the Gulf war and Iraq's attacks on the Kurds, Saddam does not control the north.

Q: What exactly is your attitude toward the Iraq opposition and the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in particular? Haven't you sold the opposition out?

A: The United States has long supported the establishment of a unified, coherent Iraqi opposition, dedicated to the maintenance of Iraq's territorial integrity and a free, pluralistic Iraq at peace with its neighbors.

To the extent that the INC has been able to play a positive role in forging such an opposition, it has and will have our support.

IF PRESSED: Internal disputes have understandably prevented the INC from becoming the broadbased, coherent movement which it earlier showed promise of becoming.

### Iraqi Refugees

Background: The Los Angeles Times apparently will be running a story on the arrival of a group of Iraqis currently in Guam to California. Out of the 6,630 persons initially evacuated from Northern Iraq by the United States, roughly 2,000 remain on Guam pending their resettlement in the United States. All Iraqis are expected to have departed Guam by April 14, 1997. The INS has determined that 25 of the evacuees were ineligible for asylum. On March 27, they will be transferred to California where they will be detained at either a facility in Lancaster or near Bakersfield pending the outcome of their exclusion proceedings.

They will appear before an immigration judge.

Thirty-four accompanying family members also will be transferred with them and housed at an INS facility in Lancaster, pending completion of their processing and placement with appropriate sponsors.

#### Points [If Asked]

- ☐ Evacuation of Iraqi nationals from Northern Iraq was a humanitarian gesture in keeping with U.S. tradition.
- ☐ Persons evacuated were determined to be at risk based on their association with the United States.
- ☐ Roughly 8,000 evacuees will be resettled in the U.S. and placed with private sponsors.
- ☐ Background security checks were undertaken both before the evacuation and during processing on Guam.
- ☐ INS will deal with the 25 Iraqis found to be excludable according to usual immigration procedures.
- ☐ QUESTIONS RELATED TO STATUS OF THOSE FOUND EXCLUDABLE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO INS

#### RUSSIA/NIS

##### Current Items

##### Yeltsin March 3/26 Radio Address

- ☐ Yeltsin spoke to Russian people, outlining Helsinki results -- stated he and President Clinton signed "serious agreements" on START, ABM, economic cooperation; he noted disagreement over NATO enlargement, but put emphasis on positive -- saying NATO and Russia would sign document on relations at "highest level."

☐ Welcome Yeltsin's comments, as he made clear, Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues -- as he said, do not intend to return to path of hostility; "our choice is for cooperation."

#### Strikes Indicate Discontent with Russian Leadership?

☐ President Yeltsin recognized legitimacy of strikes to protest unpaid wages; Chernomyrdin committed to pay off government wage arrears, about 20% of total, over upcoming months; note that strikes appear peaceful; turnout less than some predicted.

#### Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ President Clinton announced that Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement in Summits; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Have noted that Seven will still discuss economic and financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

#### U.S. Diplomat Detained in Belarus

☐ Condemn in strongest terms Belarus Government's expulsion of U.S. diplomat carrying out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.

☐ Already decided to recall our ambassador for consultations; have cut off most aid, redirected remaining funds (about \$5 million) to NGOs, business groups, humanitarian purposes.

☐ On March 26, took two other measures: (1) advised Belarusian Embassy that first secretary and consul, Vladimir Gramyka, declared Persona Non-Grata in accordance with the Vienna Convention; (2) requested Government of Belarus to delay their Ambassador-designate to U.S., previously scheduled to arrive March 26.

☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by Lukashenko regime and government's rejection of internationally recognized human

rights, as shown in last November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of legitimacy."

(If asked -- why Gramyka?)

☐ Action taken to underscore our strong objection to expulsion of American diplomat; also note expulsion last week of American citizen who headed Soros Foundation in Minsk; Belarusian we identified of similar rank and status to our diplomat.

(If Asked -- How long will you hold Yalowitz in U.S., delay new Belarusian ambassador?)

☐ As long as it takes for us to be assured that it's in our interest to return our ambassador, allow theirs to come.

(If Raised -- Was this a CIA officer caught spying?)

☐ As a matter of policy do not comment on diplomatic status of officials; officer was carrying out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.

#### General Items

#### Russian-Iraqi Oil Deal Signed by Russian Energy Minister Rodionov

☐ Seen reports outlining agreement between Russia and Iraq to develop Iraq's Qurana oil field; understand Minister Rodionov stated large-scale implementation of \$3.7 billion project possible only after UN sanctions imposed on Iraq are lifted.

☐ UN sanctions remain in place; expect Russia will continue to honor UN sanctions regime.

☐ But concerned Iraq tries to interpret every international contract as proof it can have sanctions lifted without first complying fully with UN obligations. That is not true.

#### BOSNIA

Izetbegovic visit

□ President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of Bosnia, met with President Clinton Wednesday. They discussed a broad range of issues relating to the Bosnia peace process. (David Johnson provided read-out Wednesday)

If asked about Bosnian Membership in Partnership for Peace

□ Our long term goal is to help establish a stable and prosperous Bosnia that will be part of a greater Europe and play an important role in the international community of democratic nations.

□ At some point, this should include Bosnian membership in Partnership for Peace. However, further progress must first be made in several areas, including further strengthening of fledgling political institutions and the rebuilding of economic and societal infrastructures. The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work.

If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and equipping of the Bosnian military

□ We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation self-defense capability through the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a key part of building a stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting peace in the region.

□ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving substantial additional security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

□ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat

Federation.

Progress in Bosnia/Is Dayton Implementation Working? (recent editorials)

- ☐ As we continue to work on the difficult long term challenges in Bosnia, we must not forget the enormous progress we have made.
- ☐ In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Even as the President directed a new diplomatic initiative, few believed peace was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose in the post-Cold War era.
- ☐ Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides the backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.
- ☐ Our efforts in Bosnia have exceeded many expectations. The military aspects of Dayton were implemented with no combat casualties. National elections were successfully held in September and joint national institutions have been created and are starting to operate. The international Train and Equip program is helping build a stable military balance in Bosnia and facilitating the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation. More than 200,000 refugees have returned.
- ☐ There has also been much progress on the economic reconstruction of Bosnia, especially in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The rebuilding of Sarajevo is perhaps most dramatic. Cut off and under siege for most of the war, Sarajevans risked sniper and mortar fire just to get some dirty water from the river running through the city or to gather some humanitarian rations. Today, Sarajevo is bustling with reconstruction activities and hundreds of cafes, shops, restaurants, banks, and other commercial endeavors have opened their doors. Overall, the Federation economy grew by about 35% in 1996 and unemployment went from 90% to 50%.

☐ Of course, the process of reconciliation is a long term endeavor and much remains to be done. We must do more to rebuild the economic and societal infrastructures. We need greater cooperation from the parties on freedom of movement and the return of refugees and displaced persons. And we need greater political support for the fledgling political institutions.

☐ The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work. However, for the duration of its mission, SFOR will provide the stability and confidence necessary for the Bosnian people to continue to make progress toward these goals. We continue to believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed on these issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

#### Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

☐ Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

☐ Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

☐

To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence in

the Dayton process, gives them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume preparations for conflict that would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a Congressional threat to walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question U.S. credibility and commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe. To our troops on the ground and those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation unjustly questions the purpose and value of their service and sacrifice.

☐ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

#### FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

☐ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

#### SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

#### War Criminals

☐ The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring peace.

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

#### CHINA

#### GORE TRIP

Q: On what basis did the Vice President assert that the Administration's policy toward China would not change as a result of the current investigation into alleged illegal campaign contributions by Chinese officials?

A: The Vice President discussed this issue during his meeting in Beijing with Premier Li Peng; he also will raise it with President Jiang Zemin.

The Vice President explained that we regard these allegations very seriously. Were the FBI investigation to establish that China engaged in illegal acts, the potential consequences for sustaining the current positive momentum in U.S.-China relations could be jeopardized.

The FBI investigation is still ongoing, however, and we will not speculate on its outcome or allow it to deter the Administration's pursuit of our objectives with China, including improving market access for U.S. products, pressing for improvements in human rights practices and holding China to international standards on nonproliferation issues.

Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo. Also, what issues will he raise in Beijing?

A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice President affirmed the centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would maintain American force levels at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President urged Japan to implement fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework talks.

As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise a series of strategic issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and regional concerns, such as the Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be discussed. We do not believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to enable us to forego a UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.

(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign contributions will be part of the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our practices for investigating such allegations.

## UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

## Points

- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have

decided in principle to  
co-sponsor a resolution.

☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.

☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

#### TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ President met with President Mubarak of Egypt on March 10; King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.

☐ POTUS and Yeltsin met in Helsinki March 20-21. POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.

☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.

- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

#### If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

- ☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

#### ZAIRE

#### MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu? Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a national consensus on how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a seven-person committee of negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We are waiting to get more details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee designated immediately and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the rebel alliance, within the context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire.

Obviously, during this time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political figures to work together towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin

P. Smith,  
Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the

Congolese and  
Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

## ALBANIA

What is the situation in Albania?

- ☐ There have been no new developments in the situation on the ground in Albania. Tirana remains quiet but tense, with reports of sporadic gunfire being heard.
- ☐ Commercial flights have partially resumed--several flights arrived and departed from the airport in Tirana in the last 24 hours.
- ☐ There have been some limited commercial shipments into the port at Durres as well.
- ☐ Prime Minister Fino and members of his cabinet are in Rome today in consultations with the Foreign Ministers of the European Union.

What Happened at the EU meeting?

The General Affairs Council of the European Union met in Brussels, and released a set of conclusions. Among them:

- ☐ Agreement that the EU should play the major role in helping Albania return to political stability, restore internal security, and provide humanitarian assistance.
- ☐ Agreement that these EU activities should be conducted "within the coordinating framework of the OSCE."
- ☐ A plan to send an advance team to Tirana this week for a feasibility study on further assistance--which will include an assessment of the security environment.

## MEXICO

### SENATE RESOLUTION

- ☐ Welcome Senate action endorsing greater counterdrug cooperation with Mexico and other nations in the Americas. Bipartisan effort to support common goal of increasing cooperation to keep drugs out of our neighborhoods.
- ☐ Senate action recognizes ongoing progress being made by President Zedillo and acknowledges that the problems are serious and require work on both sides of border. Working through the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control, we are ready to continue our active collaboration.

## NORTHERN IRELAND

### Continued IRA Violence

- ☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.
- ☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

### On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

- ☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

### Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

### BERGER/STEINBERG PHONE CALLS

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.
- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

### GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

- ☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.
- ☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.
- ☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to

the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

- ☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.
- ☐ Leading examples:
- ☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
- ☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.
- ☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
- ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
- ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
- ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
- ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently

working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.

☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD

Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions

without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.

☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.

☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.

☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD

last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...

- ☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.
- ☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.
- ☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...
- ☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

- ☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses

issue.

☐

During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.

☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.

☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.

☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.

☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases;

depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.

☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Helms and CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina yesterday,

Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention

to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

## NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

## CUBA

### Diplomatic Pouch Opened

Q: Is it true that the Cuban government opened a U.S. diplomatic pouch destined for the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana?

A: The Cuban government recently delayed the delivery of several of the Interests Section's unclassified pouches.

The Cubans claimed that one of the pouches arrived open and protested that its contents were "aggressive" and objectionable to the GOC. They apparently were referring to copies of the President's report to Congress on "Support for a Democratic Transition in Cuba."

USINT has confirmed that one pouch was opened and its contents were inspected.

Q: Did the USG apologize for the contents of the pouch, as the Washington Times reported?

A: Absolutely not. USINT earlier this week delivered a note to the Cuban government clearly and emphatically protesting the tampering with the pouch and rejecting any effort to regulate the contents of the pouch.

The GOC's interference with our pouches is a blatant violation of its obligations under international law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It also violates the 1977 Agreement on the Establishment of Interests Sections.

The GOC has no authority to regulate the content of official communications between the USG and USINT.

The GOC's action is further evidence of its repressive policies and disregard for long-established international law and diplomatic practice.

## PERU

### Lima Hostage Crisis

Q: Has a deal been struck to resolve the 98-day-old hostage crisis in Lima?

A: The governments of Peru and Japan are continuing efforts to find a peaceful solution, which we support.

Talks between the Peruvian government and the MRTA continue. The

disagreement  
has been over the terrorists' demand for the release of fellow  
MRTA members in prison.

Understand that, at Peru and Japan's request, Cuba has agreed to  
accept the MRTA  
hostage-takers as part of a broader resolution. Dominican  
Republic has also expressed  
willingness to take them.

Cannot confirm, however, that resolution is imminent.

Q: Would the United States oppose a deal involving Cuba?

A: USG supports a peaceful resolution to this 98-day impasse  
without rewarding terrorists.

Do not want to comment on particular elements of a solution at  
this time.

Q: [If asked] Is there any truth to rumors that Japan offered to  
pardon some Cuban debt  
in return for cooperation?

A: Would refer you to the Japanese government.

#### INDONESIA: SALE OF PAKISTANI F-16S

Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia  
F-16s?

A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains  
committed to the sale, but  
the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the  
transfer at this time. Our  
decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations,  
including regional and  
bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.

We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter  
evolves.

#### EL SALVADOR -- ANDRADE/ZONA ROSA

☐ The Administration has been working with Congress since late

1995 to look into events surrounding the 1985 Zona Rosa murders and the 1990 parole into the United States of Pedro Antonio Andrade. At the request of the SSCI, Inspectors General from State, Justice, CIA and DoD undertook formal investigations of the Zona Rosa incident and its aftermath. The results of those investigations were briefed to interested agencies and reports were delivered to the SSCI in late September. At that time, the Administration asked for an unclassified summary of the four IG reports to be provided to Senator Shelby and others interested in this case.

☐ The IG's unclassified summary was released in December. The IG's concluded that no laws or regulations were violated in the Andrade parole, but did identify a failure to communicate and lack of coordination among agencies involved in the parole decision. The Department of Justice's IG recommended that the process for coordination of parole requests needs improvement. Therefore, to ensure appropriate high-level attention to sensitive cases, Justice has instructed the INS to work with the inter-agency to develop a mechanism for better coordination of parole requests in the future.

☐ I should note that the IG's also described the government-wide effort in the wake of the 1985 murders to ensure that the perpetrators were prosecuted and incarcerated.

☐ In addition to the unclassified summary, Senator Shelby requested declassification of the four reports themselves. The White House encouraged the four agencies concerned to undertake this declassification on an expedited basis and those reports were delivered to Senator Shelby today. They are available to the public at the National Archives.

☐ The INS exclusion process is a judicial proceeding in which the White House is not involved. The interests of the executive branch in this case are represented by the INS. Beyond that, it is our policy not to comment on asylum issues.

## OECD/ENCRYPTION

□ OECD guidelines reflect the consensus views of member countries, who have various approaches to commercial encryption. US views these guidelines as very useful for countries. They acknowledge the balance needed between competing constituencies for commerce, privacy, free choice, national security and public safety.

□ The Administration's draft legislation is a "middle of the road," market-driven approach, which still preserves the public safety and national security. While Americans will be able to choose any kind of encryption, it is estimated that 80% of businesses and organizations will use key recovery or data recovery systems. The Administration bill will set the rules for legitimate access to encryption keys under law and the Fourth Amendment. It will also support the growth of electronic commerce.

□ Stories in today's NY Times and Washington Post present an inaccurate impression of the Administration's encryption policy. While the Administration supports a market-driven approach to commercial encryption, like the past several administrations, we believe in protecting national security and public safety. Our balanced policy is not accurately reflected in these stories.

□ The Administration is working with industry, Congressional staff, privacy advocates, law enforcement and encryption manufacturers to craft our policy and draft legislation. Our "middle of the road" approach may not satisfy any stakeholder completely, but it will preserve our values in the best way possible, and sets an example for the rest of the world, which largely buys what American makers sell. We are seeing signs of growing international support for our approach, as Ambassador David Aaron, the President's Special Envoy for Cryptography Policy, meets with our trading partners.

NOTE: William Reinsch, Undersecretary of Commerce for Export

Administration, has the lead for backgrounding press on the encryption bill. The bill itself is still being finalized in the Interagency Working Group on Cryptography Policy (co-chaired by Ed Appel, NSC and Bruce McConnell, OMB).

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 27 March 97 20:21

**FROM** Wozniak, Natalie S.

**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT** DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO**

Branscum, Sean D.  
Abdulmalik, April B.  
Albert, Ronda A.  
Alijanil, Leyla  
Amiri, Rukhsana N.  
Andreasen, Steven P.  
Antholis, William J.  
Appel, Edward J.  
Armstrong, Fulton T.  
Atlas, Edwin L.  
Baker, Jane E.  
Baker, James E.  
Baldwin, Kenneth  
Barks-Ruggles, Erica  
Bass, Peter E.  
Battenfield, Pat  
Beers, Rand R.  
Behring, Deanna M.  
Bellamy, Ralph C.  
Bell, Robert G.  
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.  
Bendick, Gordon L.  
Benjamin, Daniel  
Birkland, Andrea L.  
Black, Todd F.  
Blinken, Antony J.  
Bolinski, Charlene C.  
Bouchard, Joseph F.  
Boynton, Peter J.  
Brennan, Steven A.  
Bresnahan, Gary E.  
Brooks, Jennifer  
Brown, Nancy E.  
Bryan, Lloyd D.  
Burrell, Christina L.  
Busick, Paul E.  
Caravelli, John M.  
Carter, Michael E.  
Cicio, Kristen K.

Clark, Bronya  
Clarke, Richard A.  
Cooper, Kathleen H.  
Danvers, William C.  
Darnes, Victoria J.  
Davies, Glyn T.  
Davis, William K.  
DeSouza, Patrick J.  
Dimel, Marsha L.  
Dobbins, James F.  
Dohse, Fred J.  
Dowling, J. Nicholas  
Dupuy, Shawn L.  
Durham, Robert J.  
Edwards, Joan  
Eggert, Tamara E.  
Epstein, Gerald L.  
Feeley, John F.  
Ficklin, John W.  
Florio, Elaine  
Flynn, Stephen E.  
Fort, Jane B.  
Fried, Daniel  
Friedrich, M. K.  
Fuhrman, Thomas A.  
George, Christopher  
Gerstner, Christina L.  
Gibney, James S.  
Glinski, David L.  
Gorsuch, Robert P.  
Gray, Wendy  
Grummon, Stephen R.  
Haines, Mary A.  
Hale, John E.  
Hall, James A.  
Hall, Wilma G.  
Hamilton, Roy A.  
Harding, Bruce D.  
Harmon, Joyce  
Harris, Elisa D.  
Harris, Karen  
Harrison, Lyle M.  
Hasman, Thomas M.  
Hawes, David J.  
Hawkins, Ardenia R.  
Helweg, M. Diana  
Higgins, David B.  
Hilliard, Brenda I.  
Hill, Roseanne M.  
Hofmann, Stephan D.

Huggins, Peter  
Hunerwadel, Joan S.  
Johnson, David T.  
Johnson, Natalie A.  
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.  
Joshi, M. Kay  
Kale, Dora A.  
Kelly, Sandra L.  
Kerrick, Donald L.  
Kessinger, Jodi  
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.  
Knepper, Charlotte  
Koehler, Marc  
Kreczko, Alan J.  
Kristoff, Sandra J.  
Kyle, Robert D.  
LaFleur, Vinca A.  
Langley, Janice M.  
Lawrence, Cynthia  
Leary, William H.  
LeBaron, Richard B.  
Lee, Malcolm R.  
Letts, Kelly J.  
Lindsay, James M.  
Lindsey, Christine J.  
Lorin, Matthew E.  
Lowry, Jay E.  
Luzzatto, Anne R.  
MacDonald, Bruce W.  
Malley, Robert  
Marshall, Betty A.  
Marsh, Thomas S.  
Matera, Michael A.  
Maxfield, Nancy H.  
McCarthy, Mary O.  
McCormick, Shawn H.  
McIntyre, Stuart H.  
Merchant, Brian  
Mercier, Henry J.  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Mitsler, Elaine M.  
Miyaoka, Lester H.  
Motherway, Daniel J.  
Mueller, William (Doug) D.  
Murray, Lori E.  
Naplan, Steven J.  
Natoli, Kim M.  
Neil, M. Elise  
O'loughlin, Kathrine  
Orr, Robert C.

O'Shaughnessy, Patrick  
Panerali, Kristen E.  
Papadimitriou, Marianna  
Gwyn M. Parker  
Parris, Mark R.  
Pascual, Carlos E.  
Peggins, John W.  
Peters, Mary A.  
Piccone, Theodore J.  
Pifer, Steven K.  
Porter, Gidell  
Prendergast, John P.  
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.  
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.  
Quinn, Mary E.  
Ragan, Richard F.  
Rajan, Nahla B.  
Rice, Susan E.  
Rice, Sean P.  
Rim, Julie J.  
Roach, Darren S.  
Robinson, Wylma  
Rosa, Frederick M.  
Roundtree, Beverly J.  
Rubin, Eric S.  
Rumer, Eugene B.  
Salvetti, Lisa M.  
Samore, Gary S.  
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.  
David B. Sandalow  
Schmelz, Angela  
Schmidt, John R.  
Schwartz, Eric P.  
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.  
Seaton, James B.  
Sheehan, Michael A.  
Sigler, Ralph  
Simonalle, Eugene A.  
Simon, Steven N.  
Simons, James R.  
Smith, Michael P.  
Snyder, Julie A.  
Sonenshine, Tara D.  
Sparks, John E.  
Suettinger, Robert L.  
Sulser, Jack A.  
Tucker, Maureen E.  
Uriu, Robert M.  
Van Tassel, David S.  
Veit, Katherine M.

Vershbow, Alexander R.  
Verville, Elizabeth G.  
Wadsworth, Valon J.  
Walsh, Helen C.  
Ward, JoAnn X.  
Wechsler, William F.  
Whitworth, Frank D.  
Willis, Robin M.  
Witkowsky, Anne A.  
Wozniak, Natalie S.  
Wright, Allison M.  
Wright, Jay  
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

**TEXT\_BODY**

Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 9AM Friday,  
March 28. Thank you.

[[ MAR27GUI.DOC : 5137 in MAR27GUI.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 27 March 97 20:18

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** MAR27GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 27, 1997

Middle East

Khobar

Iraq

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Zaire

Albania

Mexico

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Cuba

Peru

Indonesia

El Salvador

OECD/Encryption

#### MIDDLE EAST

Ross Trip to the Middle East

Q: Can you update us on the Ross trip?

A: He met today in Rabat with King Hassan and Chairman Arafat. He proceeds to Israel today. He'll come back this weekend and report to the President and Secretary Albright. Meanwhile, we're not going to be commenting on the substance of his meetings.

(FYI: Dennis didn't comment at all after his meeting with Arafat. He should be on plane for Israel now.)

Q: How would you characterize the situation on the ground in Gaza and the West Bank?

A: The situation on the ground remains tense.

We continue to urge all parties to do everything possible to avoid violent confrontations, and for the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government to

work together to defuse  
tensions and lay the basis for moving forward in the talks.

#### RE-ARREST OF MUQADEMAH

Q: Has Hamas leader Ibrahim Muqademah been re-arrested?

A: We understand that the Palestinian Authority (PA) issued a  
warrant for Muqademah's  
arrest after the Friday bombing, but that he remains at large.

We remain extremely concerned about the situation and urge the PA  
to do everything  
possible to re-apprehend him.

#### PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian  
authority must comply with all  
its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in  
order for negotiations to  
resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to  
do everything it can to  
prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian  
authority must make  
certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process  
understand that violence and  
terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is  
to be restored and  
negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and  
terrorism? Shouldn't he be  
arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all  
it can to prevent violence  
and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that  
those associated with  
violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem  
through its moving  
ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is absolutely essential for the Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very clearly in both words and deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will not be tolerated.

#### U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES

Q: Has the U.S. been in contact with the Israelis and Palestinians to solve this crisis?

A: We are in continuous contact with both parties now.

(If pressed): President Clinton spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu on Friday and the Secretary spoke to President Weizman on Saturday. We have also been in contact with the Palestinians.

#### KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing investigation?

A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do not comment on investigations in progress.

Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our diplomatic exchanges with other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under investigation.

Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: As I've said before, we have gotten some cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

## IRAQ

### Albright Speech

Q: Why did the Secretary give this speech now?

A: Secretary Albright gave this speech now -- at the beginning of the second term -- to underscore the point that Iraq policy is a strategic priority for this administration.

We have just recently completed a senior level, interagency, top-to-bottom review of our Iraq policy, including our goals and objectives and how best to achieve them.

The Secretary's speech reflects that review and provides a clear picture of it.

Q: What were the main conclusions of the policy review?

A: The central finding of the review was the ongoing need to contain Iraq for as long as it takes Iraq to demonstrate by deeds and actions that it is no longer a threat to its neighbors or in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

At the same time, the review validated our ultimate objective of seeing Iraq reintegrated back into the international community as a positive factor for regional peace and stability. The sooner that happens, the better.

☐ Current circumstances in Baghdad clearly do not make reintegration feasible at this time. Saddam Hussein remains a threat.

☐ Therefore, we must contain the threat that Iraq poses to its neighbors, to its people, to the free flow of oil and to our broader interests in the region, such as the Peace Process.

The review also reaffirmed as central elements of our containment policy:

☐ Active support for UN sanctions.

☐ Full backing for UNSCOM's efforts to account for Iraqi WMD programs.

☐ The maintenance of a military presence in the region which can deter Iraqi aggression or, if necessary, respond decisively to any provocations.

Q: What's really new about this speech?

A: You're looking through the wrong end of the telescope.

This speech is a reaffirmation and a reiteration of the salient points of U.S. policy toward Iraq.

The emphasis here is on continuity, not innovation.

And there is good reason for that. The assumptions about Saddam Hussein which guided the Administration in the first term are as valid today as they were four years ago.

We remain convinced that Saddam Hussein continues to be a threat to the region and to his people.

Therefore, the policy we pursued in the first term -- containment -- remains the correct one as we begin the second.

Q: But what about the references to working with a post-Saddam government. Isn't that new?

A: The Secretary did clarify certain aspects of the policy which have been implicit in our overall approach, but which we concluded needed to be made explicit.

The Secretary therefore stated with greater precision and clarity that a change in the Iraqi leadership could have an impact on perceptions of Iraqi intentions, and she expressed for the first time our readiness in principle to establish a dialogue with a post-Saddam government.

But in a sense, however, all the Secretary did was to make an obvious point: Saddam Hussein is an evil that we know all too well. It would be ridiculous to pretend that his departure would not make a difference to how we -- and the world -- would view Iraq.

Q: Aren't you calling for an uprising of the Iraqi people?

A: The Secretary's remarks should not be misinterpreted or misunderstood.

This is not a call to tell the Iraqi people what they should do or who should lead them.

That is for them to decide, as the President said last fall.

What we have done is to make clearer than we have to date our view that Saddam Hussein's record and actions are an important factor in determining Iraq's intentions and that a change in leadership in Baghdad could make a difference in our policy.

One of the reasons we want to do this is because there have been repeated accusations that U.S. policy is really directed against the Iraqi people and not against Saddam Hussein.

Nothing could be further from the truth, as our support for UN Resolution 986 demonstrates.

Q: Given all the other pressing and important foreign policy issues on the Secretary's plate, why would she give a speech on Iraq as her first major foreign policy speech?

A: In part, because Georgetown was kind enough to ask her to speak on Iraq at this time.

But let me be as clear as I can: Iraq and our policy toward it is a strategic priority for

this Administration. It was that way in the first term. It will continue to be so in the second term.

Therefore, it was entirely appropriate for the Secretary to select this subject for her first major foreign policy speech.

Q: Weren't the Iraqis the model of cooperation during the last UNSCOM inspection?

A: The issue is not whether Iraq did or did not cooperate with UNSCOM on a particular inspection.

The fact is that for some six years now we have seen a consistent and systematic pattern of lying, cheating and deception on the part of Iraq in meeting its UN Security Council obligations, particularly with regard to weapons of mass destruction.

To the extent that there has been Iraqi cooperation, it has been grudging, piecemeal, selective and grossly inadequate.

☐ For example, documentation revealed after Hussein Kamel's defection showed Iraq continues to conceal WMD programs.

☐ UNSCOM Chief Rolfe Ekeus has publicly expressed his belief that Iraq retains an operational SCUD missile force, and chemical or biological warheads to go with them.

No one would be more pleased than we if Iraq met all its obligations to the UN, including those related to UNSCOM.

But that is clearly not the picture.

Q: Isn't the containment of Iraq really a failure? After all, Saddam Hussein is still in power with little prospect that that situation will change?

A: Look at the record:

☐ Iraq's military threat is contained. The combination of significant U.S. forces deployed in the region and a demonstrated ability to reinforce those

forces when necessary, has profoundly complicated Saddam's calculus of military options.

□ The area in which Saddam's military can operate inside Iraq has contracted dramatically over the past four years with the southern no-fly zone now extended to the suburbs of Baghdad and a "no-drive" zone imposed on Iraq's elite Republican Guard units below the 32nd parallel.

□ Iraq remains subject to the most comprehensive and effective sanctions regime in the history of the United Nations.

□ Saddam's authority within Iraq has narrowed. Contrary to some expectations at the time of his move against Irbil, Saddam has not been able to expand his authority in the north.

□ Finally, reliable reports depict growing lawlessness and a breakdown of central authority throughout Iraq, as Iraqis struggle to make ends meet. Such trends parallel the murderous divisions which have erupted within Saddam's own family.

In short, containment has worked.

Q: Hasn't your policy toward the Kurds failed?

A: There have been long-standing tensions and conflicts within the Kurdish community of Iraq.

The United States has long encouraged Kurdish leaders to resolve their outstanding differences peacefully and to focus on the threat which Saddam Hussein continues to pose.

Since Saddam's move against Irbil, the Kurdish parties have been working with the U.S. to find common ground, though admittedly rivalries remain.

Nonetheless, we are firmly engaged -- alongside Turkey and the United Kingdom -- in a process aimed at helping the inhabitants of northern Iraq find stability and political

reconciliation within a unified, pluralistic Iraq.

The bottom line is that six years after the end of the Gulf war and Iraq's attacks on the Kurds, Saddam does not control the north.

Q: What exactly is your attitude toward the Iraq opposition and the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in particular? Haven't you sold the opposition out?

A: The United States has long supported the establishment of a unified, coherent Iraqi opposition, dedicated to the maintenance of Iraq's territorial integrity and a free, pluralistic Iraq at peace with its neighbors.

To the extent that the INC has been able to play a positive role in forging such an opposition, it has and will have our support.

IF PRESSED: Internal disputes have understandably prevented the INC from becoming the broadbased, coherent movement which it earlier showed promise of becoming.

### Iraqi Refugees

Background: The Los Angeles Times apparently will be running a story on the arrival of a group of Iraqis currently in Guam to California. Out of the 6,630 persons initially evacuated from Northern Iraq by the United States, roughly 2,000 remain on Guam pending their resettlement in the United States. All Iraqis are expected to have departed Guam by April 14, 1997. The INS has determined that 25 of the evacuees were ineligible for asylum. On March 27, they will be transferred to California where they will be detained at either a facility in Lancaster or near Bakersfield pending the outcome of their exclusion proceedings. They will appear before an immigration judge.

Thirty-four accompanying family members also will be transferred with them and housed at an INS facility in Lancaster, pending completion of their processing and placement with appropriate sponsors.

### Points [If Asked]

- ☐ Evacuation of Iraqi nationals from Northern Iraq was a humanitarian gesture in keeping with U.S. tradition.
- ☐ Persons evacuated were determined to be at risk based on their association with the United States.
- ☐ Roughly 8,000 evacuees will be resettled in the U.S. and placed with private sponsors.
- ☐ Background security checks were undertaken both before the evacuation and during processing on Guam.
- ☐ INS will deal with the 25 Iraqis found to be excludable according to usual immigration procedures.
- ☐ QUESTIONS RELATED TO STATUS OF THOSE FOUND EXCLUDABLE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO INS

### RUSSIA/NIS

#### Current Items

##### Yeltsin March 3/26 Radio Address

- ☐ Yeltsin spoke to Russian people, outlining Helsinki results -- stated he and President Clinton signed "serious agreements" on START, ABM, economic cooperation; he noted disagreement over NATO enlargement, but put emphasis on positive -- saying NATO and Russia would sign document on relations at "highest level."
- ☐ Welcome Yeltsin's comments, as he made clear, Helsinki confirmed U.S.-Russian intention to work together, work through tough issues -- as he said, do not intend to return to path of hostility; "our choice is for cooperation."

#### Strikes Indicate Discontent with Russian Leadership?

☐ President Yeltsin recognized legitimacy of strikes to protest unpaid wages; Chernomyrdin committed to pay off government wage arrears, about 20% of total, over upcoming months; note that strikes appear peaceful; turnout less than some predicted.

#### Yeltsin Claims Promise of Full G-8?

☐ President Clinton announced that Denver meeting will be Denver Summit of Eight; will build on increased Russian involvement in Summits; Yeltsin to arrive and depart with others; will be one press conference by leaders of the Eight.

☐ Have noted that Seven will still discuss economic and financial matters; expect this to be small part of agenda.

#### U.S. Diplomat Detained in Belarus

☐ Condemn in strongest terms Belarus Government's expulsion of U.S. diplomat carrying out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.

☐ Already decided to recall our ambassador for consultations; have cut off most aid, redirected remaining funds (about \$5 million) to NGOs, business groups, humanitarian purposes.

☐ On March 26, took two other measures: (1) advised Belarusian Embassy that first secretary and consul, Vladimir Gramyka, declared Persona Non-Grata in accordance with the Vienna Convention; (2) requested Government of Belarus to delay their Ambassador-designate to U.S., previously scheduled to arrive March 26.

☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by Lukashenko regime and government's rejection of internationally recognized human rights, as shown in last November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of legitimacy."

(If asked -- why Gramyka?)

☐ Action taken to underscore our strong objection to expulsion of American diplomat; also note expulsion last week of American citizen who headed Soros

Foundation in Minsk; Belarusian  
we identified of similar rank and status to our diplomat.

(If Asked -- How long will you hold Yalowitz in U.S., delay new  
Belarusian ambassador?)

☐ As long as it takes for us to be assured that it's in our  
interest to return our ambassador,  
allow theirs to come.

(If Raised -- Was this a CIA officer caught spying?)

☐ As a matter of policy do not comment on diplomatic status of  
officials; officer was carrying  
out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.

#### General Items

Russian-Iraqi Oil Deal Signed by Russian Energy Minister Rodionov

☐ Seen reports outlining agreement between Russia and Iraq to  
develop Iraq's Qurana oil field;  
understand Minister Rodionov stated large-scale implementation of  
\$3.7 billion project  
possible only after UN sanctions imposed on Iraq are lifted.

☐ UN sanctions remain in place; expect Russia will continue to  
honor UN sanctions regime.

☐ But concerned Iraq tries to interpret every international  
contract as proof it can have  
sanctions lifted without first complying fully with UN  
obligations. That is not true.

#### BOSNIA

##### Izetbegovic visit

☐ President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of  
Bosnia, met with President  
Clinton Wednesday. They discussed a broad range of issues  
relating to the Bosnia peace  
process. (David Johnson provided read-out Wednesday)

If asked about Bosnian Membership in Partnership for Peace

□ Our long term goal is to help establish a stable and prosperous Bosnia that will be part of a greater Europe and play an important role in the international community of democratic nations.

□ At some point, this should include Bosnian membership in Partnership for Peace. However, further progress must first be made in several areas, including further strengthening of fledgling political institutions and the rebuilding of economic and societal infrastructures. The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work.

If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and equipping of the Bosnian military

□ We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation self-defense capability through the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a key part of building a stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting peace in the region.

□ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving substantial additional security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

□ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Progress in Bosnia/Is Dayton Implementation Working? (recent editorials)

□ As we continue to work on the difficult long term challenges in Bosnia, we must not forget the enormous progress we have made.

□ In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Even as the President directed a new diplomatic initiative, few believed peace was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose in the post-Cold War era.

□ Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides the backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

□ Our efforts in Bosnia have exceeded many expectations. The military aspects of Dayton were implemented with no combat casualties. National elections were successfully held in September and joint national institutions have been created and are starting to operate. The international Train and Equip program is helping build a stable military balance in Bosnia and facilitating the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation. More than 200,000 refugees have returned.

□ There has also been much progress on the economic reconstruction of Bosnia, especially in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The rebuilding of Sarajevo is perhaps most dramatic. Cut off and under siege for most of the war, Sarajevans risked sniper and mortar fire just to get some dirty water from the river running through the city or to gather some humanitarian rations. Today, Sarajevo is bustling with reconstruction activities and hundreds of cafes, shops, restaurants, banks, and other commercial endeavors have opened their doors. Overall, the Federation economy grew by about 35% in 1996 and unemployment went from 90% to 50%.

□ Of course, the process of reconciliation is a long term endeavor and much remains to be done. We must do more to rebuild the economic and societal infrastructures. We need greater cooperation from the parties on freedom of movement and the return of refugees and displaced persons. And we need greater political support for the

fledgling political institutions.

☐ The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work. However, for the duration of its mission, SFOR will provide the stability and confidence necessary for the Bosnian people to continue to make progress toward these goals. We continue to believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed on these issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

#### Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

☐ Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

☐ Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

☐

To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence in the Dayton process, gives them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume preparations for conflict that would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a Congressional threat to walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question U.S. credibility and commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe. To our troops on the ground and

those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation unjustly questions the purpose and value of their service and sacrifice.

☐ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation not be pursued. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

#### FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

☐ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

#### SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

#### War Criminals

☐ The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring peace.

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

## CHINA

### GORE TRIP

Q: On what basis did the Vice President assert that the Administration's policy toward China would not change as a result of the current investigation into alleged illegal campaign contributions by Chinese officials?

A: The Vice President discussed this issue during his meeting in Beijing with Premier Li Peng; he also will raise it with President Jiang Zemin.

The Vice President explained that we regard these allegations very seriously. Were the FBI investigation to establish that China engaged in illegal acts, the potential consequences for sustaining the current positive momentum in U.S.-China relations could be jeopardized.

The FBI investigation is still ongoing, however, and we will not

speculate on its outcome or allow it to deter the Administration's pursuit of our objectives with China, including improving market access for U.S. products, pressing for improvements in human rights practices and holding China to international standards on nonproliferation issues.

Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo. Also, what issues will he raise in Beijing?

A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice President affirmed the centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would maintain American force levels at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President urged Japan to implement fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework talks.

As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise a series of strategic issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and regional concerns, such as the Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be discussed. We do not believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to enable us to forego a UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.

(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign contributions will be part of the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our practices for investigating such allegations.

## UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of

several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

#### Points

- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

## TRIPS AND VISITORS

- ☐ President met with President Mubarak of Egypt on March 10; King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.
- ☐ POTUS and Yeltsin met in Helsinki March 20-21. POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Madrid.
- ☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.
- ☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.
- ☐ President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10.
- ☐ President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela rescheduled to October 12-17.
- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

### If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

□ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

### ZAIRE

#### MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu? Do we endorse them?

A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a national consensus on how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a seven-person committee of negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We are waiting to get more details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.

We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee designated immediately and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the rebel alliance, within the context of the UN five-point plan.

Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?

A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire. Obviously, during this time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political figures to work together towards a peaceful settlement.

Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the U.S.?

A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special

Envoy Howard Wolpe is attending as an informal observer.

Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?

A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult dependents and eight temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of temporary duty (TDY) personnel continues to fluctuate.

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements

are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

## ALBANIA

What is the situation in Albania?

- ☐ There have been no new developments in the situation on the ground in Albania. Tirana remains quiet but tense, with reports of sporadic gunfire being heard.
- ☐ Commercial flights have partially resumed--several flights arrived and departed from the airport in Tirana in the last 24 hours.
- ☐ There have been some limited commercial shipments into the port at Durres as well.
- ☐ Prime Minister Fino and members of his cabinet are in Rome today in consultations with the Foreign Ministers of the European Union.

What Happened at the EU meeting?

The General Affairs Council of the European Union met in Brussels, and released a set of conclusions. Among them:

- ☐ Agreement that the EU should play the major role in helping Albania return to political stability, restore internal security, and provide humanitarian assistance.
- ☐ Agreement that these EU activities should be conducted "within the coordinating framework of the OSCE."
- ☐ A plan to send an advance team to Tirana this week for a feasibility study on further assistance--which will include an assessment of the security environment.

## MEXICO

## SENATE RESOLUTION

☐ Welcome Senate action endorsing greater counterdrug cooperation with Mexico and other nations in the Americas. Bipartisan effort to support common goal of increasing cooperation to keep drugs out of our neighborhoods.

☐ Senate action recognizes ongoing progress being made by President Zedillo and acknowledges that the problems are serious and require work on both sides of border. Working through the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control, we are ready to continue our active collaboration.

## NORTHERN IRELAND

### Continued IRA Violence

☐ Strongly condemn continued IRA violence in Northern Ireland and in Britain, urge immediate, unequivocal cease-fire.

☐ Belfast peace talks (now in recess until June) have best chance of long-term success if they are inclusive (that is, if Sinn Fein participates) but that can only happen after IRA cease-fire.

### On Whether Ira Needs to Disarm Before Joining Talks

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

### Murder of Catholic Father of Nine in Belfast

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.

- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

#### BERGER/STEINBERG PHONE CALLS

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.
- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

#### GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

- ☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.
- ☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.
- ☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

- ☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.
- ☐ Leading examples:

- ☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
- ☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.
- ☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
  - ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
  - ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
  - ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
  - ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC

lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.

☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick,

and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.

☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.

☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.

☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated

by public service announcements and many other means...

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.

☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in

January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐

During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with

DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical

exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they

need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+

compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with

undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and

(6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

### Helms and CWC

Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina yesterday, Senator Helms indicated that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?

A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects for Senate action on this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked closely with Senator Helms

and other members of the Steering Committee established by the Majority Leader to try to address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We look forward to a Senate vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party to the treaty.

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press

guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

- ☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

- ☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

- ☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

## CUBA

### Diplomatic Pouch Opened

Q: Is it true that the Cuban government opened a U.S. diplomatic pouch destined for the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana?

A: The Cuban government recently delayed the delivery of several of the Interests Section's unclassified pouches.

The Cubans claimed that one of the pouches arrived open and protested that its contents were "aggressive" and objectionable to the GOC. They apparently were referring to copies of the President's report to Congress on "Support for a Democratic Transition in Cuba."

USINT has confirmed that one pouch was opened and its contents

were inspected.

Q: Did the USG apologize for the contents of the pouch, as the Washington Times reported?

A: Absolutely not. USINT earlier this week delivered a note to the Cuban government clearly and emphatically protesting the tampering with the pouch and rejecting any effort to regulate the contents of the pouch.

The GOC's interference with our pouches is a blatant violation of its obligations under international law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It also violates the 1977 Agreement on the Establishment of Interests Sections.

The GOC has no authority to regulate the content of official communications between the USG and USINT.

The GOC's action is further evidence of its repressive policies and disregard for long-established international law and diplomatic practice.

PERU

Lima Hostage Crisis

Q: Has a deal been struck to resolve the 98-day-old hostage crisis in Lima?

A: The governments of Peru and Japan are continuing efforts to find a peaceful solution, which we support.

Talks between the Peruvian government and the MRTA continue. The disagreement has been over the terrorists' demand for the release of fellow MRTA members in prison.

Understand that, at Peru and Japan's request, Cuba has agreed to accept the MRTA hostage-takers as part of a broader resolution. Dominican Republic has also expressed willingness to take them.

Cannot confirm, however, that resolution is imminent.

Q: Would the United States oppose a deal involving Cuba?

A: USG supports a peaceful resolution to this 98-day impasse without rewarding terrorists.

Do not want to comment on particular elements of a solution at this time.

Q: [If asked] Is there any truth to rumors that Japan offered to pardon some Cuban debt in return for cooperation?

A: Would refer you to the Japanese government.

#### INDONESIA: SALE OF PAKISTANI F-16S

Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia F-16s?

A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains committed to the sale, but the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the transfer at this time. Our decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations, including regional and bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.

We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter evolves.

#### EL SALVADOR -- ANDRADE/ZONA ROSA

□ The Administration has been working with Congress since late 1995 to look into events surrounding the 1985 Zona Rosa murders and the 1990 parole into the United States of Pedro Antonio Andrade. At the request of the SSCI, Inspectors General from State, Justice, CIA and DoD undertook formal investigations of the Zona Rosa incident and its aftermath. The results of those investigations were briefed to interested agencies and reports were delivered

to the SSCI in late September. At that time, the Administration asked for an unclassified summary of the four IG reports to be provided to Senator Shelby and others interested in this case.

☐ The IG's unclassified summary was released in December. The IG's concluded that no laws or regulations were violated in the Andrade parole, but did identify a failure to communicate and lack of coordination among agencies involved in the parole decision. The Department of Justice's IG recommended that the process for coordination of parole requests needs improvement. Therefore, to ensure appropriate high-level attention to sensitive cases, Justice has instructed the INS to work with the inter-agency to develop a mechanism for better coordination of parole requests in the future.

☐ I should note that the IG's also described the government-wide effort in the wake of the 1985 murders to ensure that the perpetrators were prosecuted and incarcerated.

☐ In addition to the unclassified summary, Senator Shelby requested declassification of the four reports themselves. The White House encouraged the four agencies concerned to undertake this declassification on an expedited basis and those reports were delivered to Senator Shelby today. They are available to the public at the National Archives.

☐ The INS exclusion process is a judicial proceeding in which the White House is not involved. The interests of the executive branch in this case are represented by the INS. Beyond that, it is our policy not to comment on asylum issues.

## OECD/ENCRYPTION

☐ OECD guidelines reflect the consensus views of member countries, who have various approaches to commercial encryption. US views these guidelines as very useful for countries. They acknowledge the balance needed between competing

constituencies for commerce, privacy, free choice, national security and public safety.

□ The Administration's draft legislation is a "middle of the road," market-driven approach, which still preserves the public safety and national security. While Americans will be able to choose any kind of encryption, it is estimated that 80% of businesses and organizations will use key recovery or data recovery systems. The Administration bill will set the rules for legitimate access to encryption keys under law and the Fourth Amendment. It will also support the growth of electronic commerce.

□ Stories in today's NY Times and Washington Post present an inaccurate impression of the Administration's encryption policy. While the Administration supports a market-driven approach to commercial encryption, like the past several administrations, we believe in protecting national security and public safety. Our balanced policy is not accurately reflected in these stories.

□ The Administration is working with industry, Congressional staff, privacy advocates, law enforcement and encryption manufacturers to craft our policy and draft legislation. Our "middle of the road" approach may not satisfy any stakeholder completely, but it will preserve our values in the best way possible, and sets an example for the rest of the world, which largely buys what American makers sell. We are seeing signs of growing international support for our approach, as Ambassador David Aaron, the President's Special Envoy for Cryptography Policy, meets with our trading partners.

NOTE: William Reinsch, Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration, has the lead for backgrounding press on the encryption bill. The bill itself is still being finalized in the Interagency Working Group on Cryptography Policy (co-chaired by Ed Appel, NSC and Bruce McConnell, OMB).

## M S M a i l

**DATE-TIME** 28 March 97 12:01  
**FROM** Harris, Elisa D.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** fore senate calls [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Murray, Lori E.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY** [[ 2125.DOC : 3145 in 2125.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 27 March 97 17:33

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** 2125.DOC  
2125

## PROPOSED TALKING POINTS

-- Hope you will join other prominent former officials in supporting ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As you know, the treaty was negotiated under President Reagan and concluded and signed under President Bush. It enjoys strong bipartisan support.

-- In early January, the President and the Majority Leader agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of some members of the Republican caucus about the treaty. I have led the Administration team, which has met four times with a Republican task force established by the Majority Leader. In addition, there have been four lengthy senior staff sessions.

-- We have made real progress in these talks. Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott Group, has proposed about 30 conditions to the resolution of ratification, and in nearly every case we either have reached agreement on a compromise formulation or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

-- Given this progress, we are hopeful that the Majority Leader will work with us to ensure that the Senate has the opportunity to vote on the treaty before April 29, when it comes into force.

-- Like President Bush, Colin Powell, Larry Eagleburger and other members of the Bush foreign policy team, we strongly believe that this treaty is in our national security interest, and that it will help reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers and our citizens.

-- Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile. The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision.

-- Moreover, the elimination of our chemical weapons will not deny us a militarily useful tool. As JCS Chairman Shalikashvili has said, Desert Storm proved that we don't need chemical weapons to deter the use of chemical weapons against our forces.

-- The CWC will also help us deal with the threat of chemical terrorism. By eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.

-- We recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But we genuinely believe that it is a key element of any effective response. I hope we will have your support.

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 28 March 97 12:21  
**FROM** Murray, Lori E.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** Points for Principals [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Bell, Robert G.  
Bendick, Gordon L.  
Harris, Elisa D.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY** [[ PTSPR.DOC : 3078 in PTSPR.DOC ]]  
attached are the points for principals to use in their senate calls  
**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 28 March 97 12:19  
**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** PTSPR.DOC

## CWC Points for Senate Calls

- ☐ I am calling to urge your support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- ☐ In early January, the President and the Majority Leader agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- ☐ We have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and the group he has put together from his caucus. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Lott group. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.
- ☐ Senator Helms has participated as a member of the Lott group and has also been meeting separately with Senator Biden. Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

☐ We believe progress has been made and that we have a framework for a unanimous consent agreement. We believe there are more than 15 conditions where agreement is possible. We have identified a shorter list of conditions which will need to be debated and voted on.

☐ The Administration has been dedicated in its efforts to address the concerns of some of the members of the Republican caucus. We have agreed in these sessions to move well beyond the conditions in the resolution of ratification that was on the Senate calendar last September.

☐ Regarding the broader issues that Senator Helms has raised, the Administration has been working hard to address these concerns and we are prepared to continue to do so. Nonetheless, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

☐ Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force.

☐ We welcome Senator Lott's statement on March 20 that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

☐ Like President Bush, Colin Powell, Larry Eagleburger and other members of the Bush foreign policy team, we strongly believe that this treaty is in our national security interest, and that it will help reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers and our citizens.

☐ Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile. The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict international supervision.

☐ Moreover, the elimination of our chemical weapons will not deny us

a militarily useful tool. As JCS Chairman Shalikashvili has said, Desert Storm proved that we don't need chemical weapons to deter the use of chemical weapons against our forces.

□ The CWC will also help us deal with the threat of chemical terrorism. By eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.

□ We recognize that the CWC will not "solve" either the proliferation or terrorism problem. But we genuinely believe that it is a key element of any effective response. I hope we will have your support.

#### Contingency points on April 29 deadline

□ April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, Americans will be less secure. We will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

□ Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined.

□ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors. And, Americans now serving as head of key posts, including security, administration, and industrial inspections will be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified the Convention.

□ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Without ratification, the chemical industry

will feel the brunt of the treaty's sanctions, which they estimate could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

□ The Chemical Weapons Convention has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been over 13 hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings provided to both members and staff. These efforts have continued in this new Congress as well.

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 28 March 97 12:43  
**FROM** Harris, Elisa D.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** points [UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO** Bendick, Gordon L.  
Burrell, Christina L.  
Danvers, William C.  
Davis, William K.  
Murray, Lori E.

**CARBON\_COPY** Bell, Robert G.

**TEXT\_BODY** [[ PTSPR.DOC : 3079 in PTSPR.DOC ]]

lori: looks good: i made them a little more brief and got rid of some redundancy. thanks!

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 28 March 97 12:41

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** PTSPR.DOC

CWC Points for Senate Calls

☐ I am calling to urge your support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.

☐ In early January, the President and the Majority Leader agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

☐ We have been negotiating in good faith with Majority Leader Lott and the group he has put together from his caucus. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Lott group. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

☐ Senator Helms has participated as a member of the Lott group and has also been meeting separately with Senator Biden. Senator Helms has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case

we  
have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that  
can  
be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative,  
leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

☐ (confusing given previous point and redundant on UC issue,  
discussed below)

☐ The Administration has been dedicated in its efforts to address  
the concerns of some of the members of the Republican caucus. We  
have agreed in these sessions to move well beyond the conditions  
in the resolution of ratification that was on the Senate calendar  
last September. We believe progress has been made.

☐

☐ Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the  
members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in  
the  
Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention  
comes into force.

☐ (unnecessary, we are appealing to  
these folks for their vote, not their support on process)

Like President Bush, Colin Powell, Larry Eagleburger and other  
members of the Bush foreign policy team, we strongly believe that  
this treaty is in our national security interest, and that it  
will  
help reduce the chemical threat to our soldiers and our citizens.

☐ Well before the CWC was concluded, Congress directed the  
destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons  
stockpile.  
The CWC will require that others do the same, under strict  
international supervision.

☐ Moreover, the elimination of our chemical weapons will not deny  
us  
a militarily useful tool. As JCS Chairman Shalikashvili has  
said,  
Desert Storm proved that we don't need chemical weapons to deter  
the use of chemical weapons against our forces.

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terrorism. By eliminating existing stockpiles and restricting  
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flow of chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.

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☐ Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined.

☐ The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as

inspectors. And, Americans now serving as head of key posts, including security, administration, and industrial inspections will

be replaced by nationals from countries that have ratified the Convention.

☐ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their

overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in. Without ratification, the chemical industry

will feel the brunt of the treaty's sanctions, which they estimate

could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.

☐ The Chemical Weapons Convention has been before the Senate since November 1993. There have been over 13 hearings, hundreds of questions answered for the record and numerous briefings provided to both members and staff. These efforts have continued in this

new Congress as well.

Contingency point on linkage of CWC to reorganization etc.:

☐ Regarding the broader issues that Senator Helms has raised, the Administration has been working hard to address these concerns and we are prepared to continue to do so. Nonetheless, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

(I would make this contingency, rather than raise it.)