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**ATTACHMENT
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NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 24, 1997

Middle East

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Helsinki Summit Results

Summary of Helsinki Joint Statements

START/ABM

Zaire

Albania

Mexico

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Cuba

MIDDLE EAST

Q: How would you characterize the situation on the ground in Gaza and the West Bank?

A: The situation on the ground remains tense.

We continue to urge all parties to do everything possible to avoid violent confrontations, and for the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government to work together to defuse tensions and lay the basis for moving forward in the talks.

RE-ARREST OF MUQADEMAH

Q: Has Hamas leader Ibrahim Muqademah been re-arrested?

A: We understand that the Palestinian Authority (PA) issued a warrant for Muqademah's arrest after the Friday bombing, but that he remains at large.

We remain extremely concerned about the situation and urge the PA.

to do everything
possible to re-apprehend him.

PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian authority must comply with all its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in order for negotiations to resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to do everything it can to prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian authority must make certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process understand that violence and terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is to be restored and negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and terrorism? Shouldn't he be arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to prevent violence and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that those associated with violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem through its moving ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is

absolutely essential for the
Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very
clearly in both words and
deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will
not be tolerated.

U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES

Q: Has the U.S. been in contact with the Israelis and Palestinians
to solve this crisis?

A: We are in continuous contact with both parties now.

(If pressed): President Clinton spoke to Prime Minister
Netanyahu on Friday and the
Secretary spoke to President Weizman on Saturday. We have also
been in contact with
the Palestinians.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

U.S. Diplomat Detained in Belarus

- ☐ Condemn in strongest terms Belarus Government's detention,
subsequent expulsion from
Belarus of U.S. diplomat carrying out normal diplomatic function
of observing opposition
rally.
- ☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by
Lukashenko regime and
government's rejection of internationally recognized human
rights, as shown in last
November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of
legitimacy."

(If Raised -- Do you plan to retaliate?)

- ☐ Considering appropriate actions and will advise government of
Belarus when we have made
decision.

(If Raised -- Was this a CIA officer caught spying?)

☐ As a matter of policy do not comment on diplomatic status of officials; officer was carrying out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.

BOSNIA

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

☐ In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Even as the President directed a new diplomatic initiative, few believed peace was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose in the post-Cold War era.

☐ Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides the backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

☐ Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

☐ To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence in the Dayton process, gives them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume preparations for conflict that would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a Congressional threat to walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question

U.S. credibility and
commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe.

☐ For all of these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation be withdrawn. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

☐ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

☐ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

Progress in Bosnia/Is Dayton Implementation Working? (recent editorials)

☐ As we continue to work on the difficult long term challenges in Bosnia, we must not forget the enormous progress we have made.

☐ In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Even as the President directed a new diplomatic initiative, few believed peace was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose in the post-Cold War era.

☐ Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a

peace that provides the backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

□ Our efforts in Bosnia have exceeded many expectations. The military aspects of Dayton were implemented with no combat casualties. National elections were successfully held in September and joint national institutions have been created and are starting to operate. The international Train and Equip program is helping build a stable military balance in Bosnia and facilitating the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation. More than 200,000 refugees have returned.

□ There has also been much progress on the economic reconstruction of Bosnia, especially in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The rebuilding of Sarajevo is perhaps most dramatic. Cut off and under siege for most of the war, Sarajevans risked sniper and mortar fire just to get some dirty water from the river running through the city or to gather some humanitarian rations. Today, Sarajevo is bustling with reconstruction activities and hundreds of cafes, shops, restaurants, banks, and other commercial endeavors have opened their doors. Overall, the Federation economy grew by about 35% in 1996 and unemployment went from 90% to 50%.

□ Of course, the process of reconciliation is a long term endeavor and much remains to be done. We must do more to rebuild the economic and societal infrastructures. We need greater cooperation from the parties on freedom of movement and the return of refugees and displaced persons. And we need greater political support for the fledgling political institutions.

□ The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work. However, for the duration of its mission, SFOR will provide the stability and confidence necessary for the Bosnian people to continue to make progress toward these

goals. We continue to believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed on these issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

War Criminals

☐ The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring peace.

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

CHINA

GORE TRIP

Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo. Also, what issues will he raise in Beijing?

A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice President affirmed the centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would maintain American force levels at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President urged Japan to implement fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework talks.

As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise a series of strategic issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and regional concerns, such as the Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be discussed. We do not believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to enable us to forego a UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.

(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign contributions will be part of the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our practices for investigating such allegations.

UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

Points

- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote,

based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

- ☐ President met with President Mubarak of Egypt on March 10; King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.
- ☐ POTUS and Yeltsin met in Helsinki March 20-21. POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Madrid.
- ☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.
- ☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.
- ☐ President's planned travel to Mexico April 11-12, Latin America and the Caribbean May 6-13, is being reviewed in light of his limited mobility.
- ☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.
- ☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.
- ☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.
- ☐ Irish Prime Minister Bruton was here for annual St. Patrick's Day celebration.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

- ☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

HELSINKI SUMMIT RESULTS

Overview

- ☐ Very successful summit. President and Yeltsin continued excellent working relationship; tackled tough issues and produced decisions that take account of both sides' interests.
- ☐ Presidents' decisions reenergize U.S.-Russian relationship, lay firm basis for relations into 21st century, and contribute to development of more stable, secure and undivided Europe.
- ☐ Joint statements issued by President and Yeltsin mean we:
- ☐ have turned corner with Russia on developing NATO-Russia relationship, despite disagreement over NATO enlargement;
- ☐ resolved ABM/TMD demarcation issue;
- ☐ have formula that will allow Russia to ratify START II, so that we can bring Treaty into force and launch START III negotiations to achieve further nuclear reductions;
- ☐ have agreed path to complete Russia's transition to market economy, further integration into global economic system.

European Security

- ☐ Presidents discussed Europe, NATO-Russia. Disagree over NATO enlargement, but did not expect to change Yeltsin's mind.
- ☐ President made clear enlargement to proceed on schedule.
- ☐ Key thing is Yeltsin committed to work with President and NATO to develop cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. This will contribute to European

security, avoid isolating Russia.

☐ Further, as Russia works more closely with NATO, believe Russia can come to see that enlarged NATO poses no threat.

☐ In joint statement on Europe, President and Yeltsin:

☐ reaffirm commitment to stable, secure, integrated, undivided and democratic Europe;

☐ agree that European security structures should evolve in accordance with OSCE principles;

☐ note that, despite disagreement on NATO enlargement, they will work with NATO on document to establish cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia;

☐ support conclusion of a framework agreement on elements of adaptation of CFE Treaty by mid-year;

☐ note President's assurance that NATO contemplates nothing that would lead to potentially threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces nearer Russia; and

☐ refer to NATO's policy of no intention, plan or reason to deploy nuclear weapons on territory of new member states.

Nuclear Arms Control

☐ ABM/TMD. President and Yeltsin worked hard to come up with mutually acceptable formulation for dealing with ABM/TMD demarcation, specifically higher-velocity TMD systems.

☐ Joint statement on ABM Treaty records resolution of all outstanding issues to clarify demarcation between strategic missile defenses covered by ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses not covered by ABM Treaty. Basic elements:

☐ limit on velocity (five kilometers/second) and range (3500 kilometers) of target missiles used in TMD testing;

- ☐ ban on space-based TMD interceptors; and
- ☐ information exchange on TMD programs,
- ☐ Sides stated they have no plans to flight test "higher velocity" TMD systems through April 1999 or to develop TMD systems with speeds exceeding certain velocities. Consistent with all planned U.S. TMD programs.
- ☐ Sides also committed to exploring cooperation on early warning support for TMDs, technology cooperation related to TMD, and expansion of ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.
- ☐ Nuclear Arms Reductions. President and Yeltsin laid out path to bring START II into force, following prompt Duma ratification of START II, and launch START III negotiations that will provide for further nuclear arms reductions.
- ☐ Joint statement on nuclear arms reductions issued by President and Yeltsin:
- ☐ outlines basic elements for START III Treaty, including ceiling of 2000-2500 strategic nuclear warheads (30-45 percent below START II);
- ☐ records commitment to extend time Russia has to destroy bombers, missile silos and submarines under START II by five years, to 2007, although warheads must be removed from these systems no later than 2003 (will need Senate approval -- but only once Duma has ratified START II).
- ☐ commits to include measures on warhead transparency and warhead destruction in START III (a first in strategic arms control); and
- ☐ agrees to explore possible measures related to other, short-range nuclear forces (where Russia has clear, numerical advantage over United States).

Economic Initiative

- ☐ President and Yeltsin defined path forward to stimulate

investment and growth in Russia,
advance Russia's integration into international economic
institutions.

□ This good for Russian economic growth and prosperity and for
America, as will mean more
jobs and opportunities for American business to tap into Russia's
rich economic potential.

□ In their joint statement on economic interaction:

□ Presidents underscore importance of creating climate attractive
to investment to complete
Russia's historic transformation to market economy:

□ Yeltsin commits to work toward comprehensive tax reform,
enacting energy development
and tough anti-crime laws, and ratification of U.S.-Russia
Bilateral Investment Treaty --
and to substantially complete this agenda in 1997;

□ President commits to make available financing (OPIC, EXIM
support) for U.S.
investment in Russia and notes high priority he attaches to
greater assistance for Russia
and other NIS; and

□ Both Presidents agree to set target and make best efforts for
Russia to join Paris Club in
1997 and WTO in 1998, provided it can meet commercial terms, and
make progress
toward joining OECD.

Other

□ Chemical Weapons. President and Yeltsin issued joint statement
stressing commitment to
eliminate chemical weapons, to expedite ratification of CWC, and
to continue cooperation in
bilateral chemical disarmament efforts.

□ G-7/Eight. President announced will substantially increase
Russia's role at Denver Summit of
the Eight.

At the March 20-21 summit in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed five joint statements on U.S.-Russian relations.

European Security: The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to a stable, secure, integrated, undivided and democratic Europe. They agreed that European security structures should evolve in accordance with OSCE principles, including respect for the sovereignty of all states. Despite their disagreement on the issue of NATO enlargement, the Presidents will work together with NATO on a document to establish a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, as part of the European security system. This document, as an enduring, high-level political commitment reflecting both the transformation of NATO and the new realities in Russia, would define the terms of the relationship.

Both leaders agreed that a framework agreement on elements of CFE adaptation should be concluded by mid-year. President Clinton reiterated NATO's March 14 policy statement that it did not contemplate "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces" nearer Russia. He also recalled NATO policy of "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, now or in future.

Economic Initiative: The Presidents' initiative will encourage investment and growth in Russia, deepen bilateral economic ties and accelerate Russia's integration into international economic organizations. President Yeltsin committed to work toward comprehensive tax reform, promotion of foreign investment, particularly in the energy sector, anti-crime laws, and ratification of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty.

President Clinton stressed enhanced OPIC and EXIM support for American investment in Russia. Also for 1998, he seeks \$900 million in U.S. assistance for Russia and the NIS, up from the current \$625 million, with the new funds destined for facilitating trade and investment, stimulating growth and doubling exchange programs between the two

countries.

The Presidents agreed that Russia should join the Paris Club in 1997 and the World Trade Organization in 1998, provided it can meet the commercial terms commonly applied to new members, and should make progress toward joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces: The statement outlines the basic elements for a future START III Treaty, including a ceiling of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads (30-45 percent below START II) and a commitment to extend the time Russia has to destroy bombers, missile silos and submarines under START II by five years, to 2007 (although warheads must be removed from these systems no later than 2003). Together, these provisions directly address the Duma's concerns about costs of implementing the START II Treaty, thus providing the basis for President Yeltsin to seek prompt ratification of START II. There is also a commitment to include measures on warhead transparency and warhead destruction in START III (a first in strategic arms control), as well as to explore possible measures related to other, short-range nuclear forces (where Russia has a clear, numerical advantage over the United States).

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: The statement on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty resolves all outstanding issues in the three-year negotiation to clarify the demarcation between strategic missile defenses covered by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses (TMD) not covered by the Treaty. Basic elements include a limit on the velocity (5 km/sec) and range (3500 km) of target missiles used in TMD testing, a ban on space-based TMD interceptors, an information exchange on TMD programs and a commitment to continued consultations on the ABM Treaty. The sides also state they have no plans to flight test a "higher velocity" TMD system through April 1999 or to develop TMD systems with speeds exceeding certain velocities. The agreement is consistent with all planned U.S. TMD programs. The

sides also commit to exploring cooperation on early warning support for TMDs, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

Chemical Weapons Convention: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin stressed their commitment to the elimination from national arsenals of this class of weapons of mass destruction, and their determination to expedite ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by both the United States and Russia. The CWC will make the production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons illegal. Parties that possess chemical weapons will be required to destroy their stockpiles and destroy or convert under international safeguards their chemical weapons production facilities. Parties will also be required not to assist or encourage any other country's chemical weapons program. Compliance will be monitored through on-site inspections.

The Convention, already signed by 161 countries and ratified by seventy, will enter into force on April 29, 1997.

START/ABM HELSINKI

START

Q: Does not extending the START II reductions period in effect slow down the disarmament process? How can you extend the period by which Russian missiles will be pointed at America? Why would you think the Senate would approve such an accord?

A: We have agreed to extend the START II reductions period by five years -- to 2007 -- so as to ease the economic burden on Russia.

Important also to note that START I was signed over four years ago -- some adjustment in timelines was appropriate given the long, unanticipated delay in entry into

force.

At the same time, we have agreed to deactivate systems that are to be eliminated under START II by the end of 2003 -- only one year after the original destruction timelines under START II -- by taking warheads off of missiles or through other agreed measures.

Have also agreed to further reduce strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000-2,500 by 2007 in a START III. Believe this package is in America's national security interests.

As to Senate approval, the U.S. Senate voted overwhelmingly by a vote of 87-4 to approve this treaty just over a year ago. Expect there will be a debate, but confident the Senate will approve this extension, as the treaty is in America's interests.

Q: A START III target of 2,000-2,500 weapons still leaves both countries with a substantial nuclear force. How does this square with the recent call by military leaders from around the globe for the U.S. and Russia to eliminate their nuclear arsenals?

A: As the President said at the United Nations, the United States looks forward to a new century where the roles and risks of nuclear weapons are reduced, and ultimately, eliminated.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin have made substantial progress in reducing the nuclear threat during the past four years. Detargeting, the entry into force of START I and the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, indefinite extension of the NPT and signature of the CTBT.

All these steps have made our people safer. The joint statement issued in Helsinki represents a significant step in the direction of reducing the nuclear danger. Will substantially reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and work to control warheads and fissile material.

As to the call by retired Generals and Admirals to work towards nuclear elimination, the joint statement today is consistent with a number of their recommendations, although we certainly don't agree on every point. That's not surprising. But we share their goals, and we are working hard on this.

Q: Would the START II ban on MIRVed ICBMs be carried over into START III?

A: Yes.

Q: You have included a reference to making the current START Treaties unlimited in duration. Why is this necessary?

A: The existing START Treaties have a 15 year duration. Our commitment to indefinitely extend the START Treaties sends a strong message that the United States and Russia are committed to a permanent reduction in the nuclear threat.

Q: You also refer to measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems. Do you have in mind numerical and geographic limits, in particular in Europe, or something else?

A: The purpose of this element is to underscore our joint commitment to discuss concerns with respect to theater nuclear forces on both sides.

This could include, for example, with a discussion of the status of our unilateral initiatives relating to non-strategic forces, and various transparency initiatives already underway.

Any specific measures would have to be discussed and agreed. We are not now proposing limits on numbers or geography.

Q: Are you prepared to consider a "zero option" -- that is, a nuclear-free zone in Western and Central Europe?

A: No.

ABM ISSUES

Q: You've agreed to ban space-based TMDs in this joint statement. Doesn't that run directly counter to missile defense programs favored by the Congress?

A: Neither side has plans for space-based TMD interceptors.

Banning space-based TMD interceptors is a logical corollary to the ABM Treaty's ban on space-based ABMs, as experts agree that any such interceptor would have ABM capabilities.

With respect to Congress, current legislation is focused on mandating the deployment of defenses by a date certain that would be compliant with the ABM Treaty.

Thus, our disagreements are more related to IF and WHEN defenses should be deployed, not over whether we should return to a "Star Wars" system in space.

Believe Congress will recognize the agreement we have reached today is a good agreement that protects both the ABM Treaty and our ability to deploy effective theater missile defense systems.

Q: It appears you have agreed to limit the interceptor velocity of TMD systems.

A: No. We have agreed neither side has plans for TMD interceptors with velocities greater than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based TMD systems, or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based TMD systems. This is not a ban.

Q: It appears you have agreed to a moratorium on flight tests of higher velocity TMD systems through 1999.

A: No. We have agreed we have no plans now, through April 1999, to flight test a higher-velocity TMD against a target. This is not a moratorium, but a statement of plans.

ZAIRE

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between

the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

ALBANIA

Q: What is the situation in Albania? What is happening in the South?

A: An uneasy clam still prevails in Tirana.

Most of the country continues to exist without central government control. Many cities are reportedly in states of anarchy. The extent to which the rebel councils are actually in charge is questionable.

There was a meeting between the coalition government and a rebel committee in Vlore over the weekend. They report that some progress was made toward the restoration of the legitimate city council.

The Embassy continues to be in close contact with the Government of National Reconciliation. We are also working close consultation with our European partners to devise a cohesive humanitarian, economic and political response.

We believe that OSCE should take the lead in devising an active strategy. This should be in cooperation with other organizations such as the EU. We are seeking an active political effort under a senior leader such as Chancellor Vranitzky. We are working with the OSCE to outline follow-up efforts for the two successful missions led by former Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky.

The European Union General Affairs Council is meeting in Brussels today and reviewing the report of last week's EU mission led by Dutch Diplomat D'Sansebourg.

Q: Does the U.S. support the idea of an EU military force to distribute aid and restore order?

A: We understand that limited military measures are being contemplated by some European countries to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Albania. However, it is important that any such ideas mesh with a broader political strategy. At this time, we

support the efforts of the OSCE to coordinate -- with the EU and others -- the development of such a strategy.

Q: What is the U.S.'s reaction to PM Fino's claim that June elections may be impossible?

A: We understand that Prime Minister Fino expressed concerns about a June election date in the current situation. Under the circumstances, we think these concerns are reasonable. However, we hope that new elections will be held as soon as feasible.

MEXICO

SENATE RESOLUTION

□ Welcome Senate action endorsing greater counterdrug cooperation with Mexico and other nations in the Americas. Bipartisan effort to support common goal of increasing cooperation to keep drugs out of our neighborhoods.

□ Senate action recognizes ongoing progress being made by President Zedillo and acknowledges that the problems are serious and require work on both sides of border. Working through the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control, we are ready to continue our active collaboration.

NORTHERN IRELAND

ON WHETHER IRA NEEDS TO DISARM BEFORE JOINING TALKS

□ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

MURDER OF CATHOLIC FATHER OF NINE IN BELFAST

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

- ☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.
- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

BERGER/STEINBERG PHONE CALLS

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.
- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

- ☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.
- ☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.
- ☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to

the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

- ☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.
- ☐ Leading examples:
- ☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
- ☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.
- ☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
- ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
- ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
- ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
- ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently

working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

- ☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.
- ☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.
- ☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.
- ☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

- ☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions

without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.

☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.

☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.

☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD

last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.

☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in

January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

- ☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses

issue.

☐

During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.

☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.

☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.

☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.

☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases;

depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.

☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over

the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of

historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated..

This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

CUBA

Diplomatic Pouch Opened

Q: Is it true that the Cuban government opened a U.S. diplomatic pouch destined for the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana?

A: The Cuban government recently delayed the delivery of several of the Interests Section's unclassified pouches.

The Cubans claimed that one of the pouches arrived open and protested that its contents were "aggressive" and objectionable to the GOC. They apparently were referring to copies of the President's report to Congress on "Support for a Democratic Transition in Cuba."

USINT has confirmed that one pouch was opened and its contents were inspected.

Q: Did the USG apologize for the contents of the pouch, as the Washington Times reported?

A: Absolutely not. USINT earlier this week delivered a note to the Cuban government clearly and emphatically protesting the tampering with the pouch

and rejecting any effort
to regulate the contents of the pouch.

The GOC's interference with our pouches is a blatant violation of
its obligations under
international law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. It
also violates the 1977 Agreement on the Establishment of
Interests Sections.

The GOC has no authority to regulate the content of official
communications between
the USG and USINT.

The GOC's action is further evidence of its repressive policies
and disregard for
long-established international law and diplomatic practice.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 March 97 19:46
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Abdulmalik, April B.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer
Brown, Nancy E.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya

Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Davis, William K.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Flessas, Dan
Florio, Elaine
Flynn, Stephen E.
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Gladbach, Damon J.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.

Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Martinez, Alejandro
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Mercier, Henry J.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick

Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Gwyn M. Parker
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Prendergast, John P.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Showalter, Victoria A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.

Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates **IN BOLD** to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Tuesday, March 25. Thank you.

[[MAR24GUI.DOC : 4927 in MAR24GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 24 March 97 19:44

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** MAR24GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 24, 1997

Middle East

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Helsinki Summit Results

Summary of Helsinki Joint Statements

START/ABM

Zaire

Albania

Mexico

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Cuba

MIDDLE EAST

Q: How would you characterize the situation on the ground in Gaza and the West Bank?

A: The situation on the ground remains tense.

We continue to urge all parties to do everything possible to avoid violent confrontations, and for the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government to work together to defuse tensions and lay the basis for moving forward in the talks.

RE-ARREST OF MUQADEMAH

Q: Has Hamas leader Ibrahim Muqademah been re-arrested?

A: We understand that the Palestinian Authority (PA) issued a warrant for Muqademah's arrest after the Friday bombing, but that he remains at large.

We remain extremely concerned about the situation and urge the PA to do everything possible to re-apprehend him.

PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian authority must comply with all

its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in order for negotiations to resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to do everything it can to prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian authority must make certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process understand that violence and terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is to be restored and negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and terrorism? Shouldn't he be arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to prevent violence and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that those associated with violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem through its moving ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is absolutely essential for the Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very clearly in both words and deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will not be tolerated.

U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES

Q: Has the U.S. been in contact with the Israelis and Palestinians to solve this crisis?

A: We are in continuous contact with both parties now.

(If pressed): President Clinton spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu on Friday and the Secretary spoke to President Weizman on Saturday. We have also been in contact with the Palestinians.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

U.S. Diplomat Detained in Belarus

☐ Condemn in strongest terms Belarus Government's detention, subsequent expulsion from Belarus of U.S. diplomat carrying out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.

☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by Lukashenko regime and government's rejection of internationally recognized human rights, as shown in last November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of legitimacy."

(If Raised -- Do you plan to retaliate?)

☐ Considering appropriate actions and will advise government of Belarus when we have made decision.

(If Raised -- Was this a CIA officer caught spying?)

☐ As a matter of policy do not comment on diplomatic status of officials; officer was carrying out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.

BOSNIA

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

- ☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.
- ☐ In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Even as the President directed a new diplomatic initiative, few believed peace was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose in the post-Cold War era.
- ☐ Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides the backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.
- ☐ Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.
- ☐ To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence in the Dayton process, gives them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume preparations for conflict that would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a Congressional threat to walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question U.S. credibility and commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe.
- ☐ For all of these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation be withdrawn. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain

engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

- ☐ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.
- ☐ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- ☐ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

Progress in Bosnia/Is Dayton Implementation Working? (recent editorials)

- ☐ As we continue to work on the difficult long term challenges in Bosnia, we must not forget the enormous progress we have made.
- ☐ In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Even as the President directed a new diplomatic initiative, few believed peace was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose in the post-Cold War era.
- ☐ Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides the backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.
- ☐ Our efforts in Bosnia have exceeded many expectations. The military aspects of Dayton

were implemented with no combat casualties. National elections were successfully held in September and joint national institutions have been created and are starting to operate. The international Train and Equip program is helping build a stable military balance in Bosnia and facilitating the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation. More than 200,000 refugees have returned.

☐ There has also been much progress on the economic reconstruction of Bosnia, especially in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The rebuilding of Sarajevo is perhaps most dramatic. Cut off and under siege for most of the war, Sarajevans risked sniper and mortar fire just to get some dirty water from the river running through the city or to gather some humanitarian rations. Today, Sarajevo is bustling with reconstruction activities and hundreds of cafes, shops, restaurants, banks, and other commercial endeavors have opened their doors. Overall, the Federation economy grew by about 35% in 1996 and unemployment went from 90% to 50%.

☐ Of course, the process of reconciliation is a long term endeavor and much remains to be done. We must do more to rebuild the economic and societal infrastructures. We need greater cooperation from the parties on freedom of movement and the return of refugees and displaced persons. And we need greater political support for the fledgling political institutions.

☐ The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work. However, for the duration of its mission, SFOR will provide the stability and confidence necessary for the Bosnian people to continue to make progress toward these goals. We continue to believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed on these issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months

should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

War Criminals

☐ The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring peace.

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

CHINA

GORE TRIP

Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo. Also, what issues will he raise in Beijing?

A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice President affirmed the centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would maintain American force levels at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President urged Japan to implement fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework talks.

As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise a series of strategic issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and regional concerns, such as the Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be discussed. We do not believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to enable us to forego a UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.

(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign contributions will be part of the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our practices for investigating such allegations.

UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would

not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

Points

- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

- ☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with European partners on a proposed resolution.
- ☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ President met with President Mubarak of Egypt on March 10; King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.

☐ POTUS and Yeltsin met in Helsinki March 20-21. POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ President's planned travel to Mexico April 11-12, Latin America and the Caribbean May 6-13, is being reviewed in light of his limited mobility.

☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

☐ Irish Prime Minister Bruton was here for annual St. Patrick's Day celebration.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

HELSINKI SUMMIT RESULTS

Overview

- ☐ Very successful summit. President and Yeltsin continued excellent working relationship; tackled tough issues and produced decisions that take account of both sides' interests.
- ☐ Presidents' decisions reenergize U.S.-Russian relationship, lay firm basis for relations into 21st century, and contribute to development of more stable, secure and undivided Europe.
- ☐ Joint statements issued by President and Yeltsin mean we:
 - ☐ have turned corner with Russia on developing NATO-Russia relationship, despite disagreement over NATO enlargement;
 - ☐ resolved ABM/TMD demarcation issue;
 - ☐ have formula that will allow Russia to ratify START II, so that we can bring Treaty into force and launch START III negotiations to achieve further nuclear reductions;
 - ☐ have agreed path to complete Russia's transition to market economy, further integration into global economic system.

European Security

- ☐ Presidents discussed Europe, NATO-Russia. Disagree over NATO enlargement, but did not expect to change Yeltsin's mind.
- ☐ President made clear enlargement to proceed on schedule.
- ☐ Key thing is Yeltsin committed to work with President and NATO to develop cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. This will contribute to European security, avoid isolating Russia.
- ☐ Further, as Russia works more closely with NATO, believe Russia can come to see that enlarged NATO poses no threat.
- ☐ In joint statement on Europe, President and Yeltsin:

- ☐ reaffirm commitment to stable, secure, integrated, undivided and democratic Europe;
- ☐ agree that European security structures should evolve in accordance with OSCE principles;
- ☐ note that, despite disagreement on NATO enlargement, they will work with NATO on document to establish cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia;
- ☐ support conclusion of a framework agreement on elements of adaptation of CFE Treaty by mid-year;
- ☐ note President's assurance that NATO contemplates nothing that would lead to potentially threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces nearer Russia; and
- ☐ refer to NATO's policy of no intention, plan or reason to deploy nuclear weapons on territory of new member states.

Nuclear Arms Control

- ☐ ABM/TMD. President and Yeltsin worked hard to come up with mutually acceptable formulation for dealing with ABM/TMD demarcation, specifically higher-velocity TMD systems.
- ☐ Joint statement on ABM Treaty records resolution of all outstanding issues to clarify demarcation between strategic missile defenses covered by ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses not covered by ABM Treaty. Basic elements:
 - ☐ limit on velocity (five kilometers/second) and range (3500 kilometers) of target missiles used in TMD testing;
 - ☐ ban on space-based TMD interceptors; and
 - ☐ information exchange on TMD programs,
- ☐ Sides stated they have no plans to flight test "higher velocity" TMD systems through April

1999 or to develop TMD systems with speeds exceeding certain velocities. Consistent with all planned U.S. TMD programs.

☐ Sides also committed to exploring cooperation on early warning support for TMDs, technology cooperation related to TMD, and expansion of ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

☐ Nuclear Arms Reductions. President and Yeltsin laid out path to bring START II into force, following prompt Duma ratification of START II, and launch START III negotiations that will provide for further nuclear arms reductions.

☐ Joint statement on nuclear arms reductions issued by President and Yeltsin:

☐ outlines basic elements for START III Treaty, including ceiling of 2000-2500 strategic nuclear warheads (30-45 percent below START II);

☐ records commitment to extend time Russia has to destroy bombers, missile silos and submarines under START II by five years, to 2007, although warheads must be removed from these systems no later than 2003 (will need Senate approval -- but only once Duma has ratified START II).

☐ commits to include measures on warhead transparency and warhead destruction in START III (a first in strategic arms control); and

☐ agrees to explore possible measures related to other, short-range nuclear forces (where Russia has clear, numerical advantage over United States).

Economic Initiative

☐ President and Yeltsin defined path forward to stimulate investment and growth in Russia, advance Russia's integration into international economic institutions.

☐ This good for Russian economic growth and prosperity and for America, as will mean more jobs and opportunities for American business to tap into Russia's

rich economic potential.

- ☐ In their joint statement on economic interaction:
- ☐ Presidents underscore importance of creating climate attractive to investment to complete Russia's historic transformation to market economy:
- ☐ Yeltsin commits to work toward comprehensive tax reform, enacting energy development and tough anti-crime laws, and ratification of U.S.-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty -- and to substantially complete this agenda in 1997;
- ☐ President commits to make available financing (OPIC, EXIM support) for U.S. investment in Russia and notes high priority he attaches to greater assistance for Russia and other NIS; and
- ☐ Both Presidents agree to set target and make best efforts for Russia to join Paris Club in 1997 and WTO in 1998, provided it can meet commercial terms, and make progress toward joining OECD.

Other

- ☐ Chemical Weapons. President and Yeltsin issued joint statement stressing commitment to eliminate chemical weapons, to expedite ratification of CWC, and to continue cooperation in bilateral chemical disarmament efforts.
- ☐ G-7/Eight. President announced will substantially increase Russia's role at Denver Summit of the Eight.

SUMMARY OF HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENTS

At the March 20-21 summit in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed five joint statements on U.S.-Russian relations.

European Security: The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to

a stable, secure, integrated, undivided and democratic Europe. They agreed that European security structures should evolve in accordance with OSCE principles, including respect for the sovereignty of all states. Despite their disagreement on the issue of NATO enlargement, the Presidents will work together with NATO on a document to establish a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, as part of the European security system. This document, as an enduring, high-level political commitment reflecting both the transformation of NATO and the new realities in Russia, would define the terms of the relationship.

Both leaders agreed that a framework agreement on elements of CFE adaptation should be concluded by mid-year. President Clinton reiterated NATO's March 14 policy statement that it did not contemplate "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces" nearer Russia. He also recalled NATO policy of "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, now or in future.

Economic Initiative: The Presidents' initiative will encourage investment and growth in Russia, deepen bilateral economic ties and accelerate Russia's integration into international economic organizations. President Yeltsin committed to work toward comprehensive tax reform, promotion of foreign investment, particularly in the energy sector, anti-crime laws, and ratification of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty.

President Clinton stressed enhanced OPIC and EXIM support for American investment in Russia. Also for 1998, he seeks \$900 million in U.S. assistance for Russia and the NIS, up from the current \$625 million, with the new funds destined for facilitating trade and investment, stimulating growth and doubling exchange programs between the two countries.

The Presidents agreed that Russia should join the Paris Club in 1997 and the World Trade Organization in 1998, provided it can meet the commercial terms commonly applied to new members, and should make progress toward joining the Organization

for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces: The statement outlines the basic elements for a future START III Treaty, including a ceiling of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads (30-45 percent below START II) and a commitment to extend the time Russia has to destroy bombers, missile silos and submarines under START II by five years, to 2007 (although warheads must be removed from these systems no later than 2003). Together, these provisions directly address the Duma's concerns about costs of implementing the START II Treaty, thus providing the basis for President Yeltsin to seek prompt ratification of START II. There is also a commitment to include measures on warhead transparency and warhead destruction in START III (a first in strategic arms control), as well as to explore possible measures related to other, short-range nuclear forces (where Russia has a clear, numerical advantage over the United States).

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: The statement on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty resolves all outstanding issues in the three-year negotiation to clarify the demarcation between strategic missile defenses covered by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses (TMD) not covered by the Treaty. Basic elements include a limit on the velocity (5 km/sec) and range (3500 km) of target missiles used in TMD testing, a ban on space-based TMD interceptors, an information exchange on TMD programs and a commitment to continued consultations on the ABM Treaty. The sides also state they have no plans to flight test a "higher velocity" TMD system through April 1999 or to develop TMD systems with speeds exceeding certain velocities. The agreement is consistent with all planned U.S. TMD programs. The sides also commit to exploring cooperation on early warning support for TMDs, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

Chemical Weapons Convention: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin

stressed their commitment to the elimination from national arsenals of this class of weapons of mass destruction, and their determination to expedite ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by both the United States and Russia. The CWC will make the production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons illegal. Parties that possess chemical weapons will be required to destroy their stockpiles and destroy or convert under international safeguards their chemical weapons production facilities. Parties will also be required not to assist or encourage any other country's chemical weapons program. Compliance will be monitored through on-site inspections.

The Convention, already signed by 161 countries and ratified by seventy, will enter into force on April 29, 1997.

START/ABM HELSINKI

START

Q: Does not extending the START II reductions period in effect slow down the disarmament process? How can you extend the period by which Russian missiles will be pointed at America? Why would you think the Senate would approve such an accord?

A: We have agreed to extend the START II reductions period by five years -- to 2007 -- so as to ease the economic burden on Russia.

Important also to note that START I was signed over four years ago -- some adjustment in timelines was appropriate given the long, unanticipated delay in entry into force.

At the same time, we have agreed to deactivate systems that are to be eliminated under START II by the end of 2003 -- only one year after the original destruction timelines under START II -- by taking warheads off of missiles or through

other agreed measures.

Have also agreed to further reduce strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000-2,500 by 2007 in a START III. Believe this package is in America's national security interests.

As to Senate approval, the U.S. Senate voted overwhelmingly by a vote of 87-4 to approve this treaty just over a year ago. Expect there will be a debate, but confident the Senate will approve this extension, as the treaty is in America's interests.

Q: A START III target of 2,000-2,500 weapons still leaves both countries with a substantial nuclear force. How does this square with the recent call by military leaders from around the globe for the U.S. and Russia to eliminate their nuclear arsenals?

A: As the President said at the United Nations, the United States looks forward to a new century where the roles and risks of nuclear weapons are reduced, and ultimately, eliminated.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin have made substantial progress in reducing the nuclear threat during the past four years. Detargeting, the entry into force of START I and the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan, indefinite extension of the NPT and signature of the CTBT.

All these steps have made our people safer. The joint statement issued in Helsinki represents a significant step in the direction of reducing the nuclear danger. Will substantially reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and work to control warheads and fissile material.

As to the call by retired Generals and Admirals to work towards nuclear elimination, the joint statement today is consistent with a number of their recommendations, although we certainly don't agree on every point. That's not surprising. But we share their goals, and

we are working hard on this.

Q: Would the START II ban on MIRVed ICBMs be carried over into START III?

A: Yes.

Q: You have included a reference to making the current START Treaties unlimited in duration. Why is this necessary?

A: The existing START Treaties have a 15 year duration. Our commitment to indefinitely extend the START Treaties sends a strong message that the United States and Russia are committed to a permanent reduction in the nuclear threat.

Q: You also refer to measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems. Do you have in mind numerical and geographic limits, in particular in Europe, or something else?

A: The purpose of this element is to underscore our joint commitment to discuss concerns with respect to theater nuclear forces on both sides.

This could include, for example, with a discussion of the status of our unilateral initiatives relating to non-strategic forces, and various transparency initiatives already underway.

Any specific measures would have to be discussed and agreed. We are not now proposing limits on numbers or geography.

Q: Are you prepared to consider a "zero option" -- that is, a nuclear-free zone in Western and Central Europe?

A: No.

ABM ISSUES

Q: You've agreed to ban space-based TMDs in this joint statement. Doesn't that run directly counter to missile defense programs favored by the Congress?

A: Neither side has plans for space-based TMD interceptors.

Banning space-based TMD interceptors is a logical corollary to the ABM Treaty's ban on space-based ABMs, as experts agree that any such interceptor would have ABM capabilities.

With respect to Congress, current legislation is focused on mandating the deployment of defenses by a date certain that would be compliant with the ABM Treaty.

Thus, our disagreements are more related to IF and WHEN defenses should be deployed, not over whether we should return to a "Star Wars" system in space.

Believe Congress will recognize the agreement we have reached today is a good agreement that protects both the ABM Treaty and our ability to deploy effective theater missile defense systems.

Q: It appears you have agreed to limit the interceptor velocity of TMD systems.

A: No. We have agreed neither side has plans for TMD interceptors with velocities greater than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based TMD systems, or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based TMD systems. This is not a ban.

Q: It appears you have agreed to a moratorium on flight tests of higher velocity TMD systems through 1999.

A: No. We have agreed we have no plans now, through April 1999, to flight test a higher-velocity TMD against a target. This is not a moratorium, but a statement of plans.

ZAIRE

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel

leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on Saturday.

ALBANIA

Q: What is the situation in Albania? What is happening in the South?

A: An uneasy clam still prevails in Tirana.

Most of the country continues to exist without central government control. Many cities are reportedly in states of anarchy. The extent to which the rebel councils are actually in charge is questionable.

There was a meeting between the coalition government and a rebel committee in Vlore over the weekend. They report that some progress was made toward the restoration of the legitimate city council.

The Embassy continues to be in close contact with the Government of National Reconciliation. We are also working close consultation with our European partners to devise a cohesive humanitarian, economic and political response.

We believe that OSCE should take the lead in devising an active strategy. This should be in cooperation with other organizations such as the EU. We are seeking an active political effort under a senior leader such as Chancellor Vranitzky. We are working with the OSCE to outline follow-up efforts for the two successful missions led by former Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky.

The European Union General Affairs Council is meeting in Brussels today and reviewing the report of last week's EU mission led by Dutch Diplomat D'Sansembourg.

Q: Does the U.S. support the idea of an EU military force to distribute aid and restore order?

A: We understand that limited military measures are being contemplated by some European countries to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Albania. However, it is important that any such ideas mesh with a broader political strategy. At this time, we support the efforts of the OSCE to coordinate -- with the EU and others -- the development of such a strategy.

Q: What is the U.S.'s reaction to PM Fino's claim that June elections may be impossible?

A: We understand that Prime Minister Fino expressed concerns about a June election date in the current situation. Under the circumstances, we think these concerns are reasonable. However, we hope that new elections will be held as soon as feasible.

MEXICO

SENATE RESOLUTION

☐ Welcome Senate action endorsing greater counterdrug cooperation with Mexico and other nations in the Americas. Bipartisan effort to support common goal of increasing cooperation to keep drugs out of our neighborhoods.

☐ Senate action recognizes ongoing progress being made by President Zedillo and acknowledges that the problems are serious and require work on both sides of border. Working through the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control, we are ready to continue our active collaboration.

NORTHERN IRELAND

ON WHETHER IRA NEEDS TO DISARM BEFORE JOINING TALKS

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

MURDER OF CATHOLIC FATHER OF NINE IN BELFAST

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest

terms.

- ☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
- ☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

BERGER/STEINBERG PHONE CALLS

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.
- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

- ☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.
- ☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.
- ☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

- ☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its

report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to

initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans

with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly

supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the 60-day period I

requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from

its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive

(PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their

Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will

ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in

future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.

☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:

☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.

☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.

☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.

☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the

bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC

lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD

acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased

its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that

effort. And to my knowledge, there

is currently no evidence of a cover-up.

☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare

logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public

should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do

this in an open manner, and I

believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to

provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to

review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing

investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD

Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must

receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of

what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved,

90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of

Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions

without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War

veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.

☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.

☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.

☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical

exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated

by public service announcements and many other means...

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.

☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in

January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with

the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.

☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.

☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.

☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.

☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.

☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending

increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

□ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

CUBA

Diplomatic Pouch Opened

Q: Is it true that the Cuban government opened a U.S. diplomatic pouch destined for the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana?

A: The Cuban government recently delayed the delivery of several of the Interests Section's unclassified pouches.

The Cubans claimed that one of the pouches arrived open and protested that its contents were "aggressive" and objectionable to the GOC. They apparently were referring to copies of the President's report to Congress on "Support for a Democratic Transition in Cuba."

USINT has confirmed that one pouch was opened and its contents were inspected.

Q: Did the USG apologize for the contents of the pouch, as the Washington Times reported?

A: Absolutely not. USINT earlier this week delivered a note to the Cuban government clearly and emphatically protesting the tampering with the pouch and rejecting any effort to regulate the contents of the pouch.

The GOC's interference with our pouches is a blatant violation of its obligations under international law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It

also violates the 1977 Agreement on the Establishment of Interests Sections.

The GOC has no authority to regulate the content of official communications between the USG and USINT.

The GOC's action is further evidence of its repressive policies and disregard for long-established international law and diplomatic practice.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 25 March 97 20:04

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT March 25 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Babcock, Douglas W.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Bujold, Noelle D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, JoAnne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Kuipers, Keelin G.
Moore, Lori A.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Szasz, Nicholas J.
Wise, William M.
Woolston, Ann E.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[MAR25GUI.DOC : 5192 in MAR25GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 25 March 97 17:55

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** MAR25GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 25, 1997

Middle East

Khobar

Russia/NIS

Bosnia

China

Trips and Visitors

Helsinki Summit Results

Summary of Helsinki Joint Statements

START/ABM

Zaire

Albania

Mexico

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Cuba

Peru

Indonesia

MIDDLE EAST

Q: How would you characterize the situation on the ground in Gaza and the West Bank?

A: The situation on the ground remains tense.

We continue to urge all parties to do everything possible to avoid violent confrontations, and for the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government to work together to defuse tensions and lay the basis for moving forward in the talks.

RE-ARREST OF MUQADEMAH

Q: Has Hamas leader Ibrahim Muqademah been re-arrested?

A: We understand that the Palestinian Authority (PA) issued a warrant for Muqademah's arrest after the Friday bombing, but that he remains at large.

We remain extremely concerned about the situation and urge the PA to do everything possible to re-apprehend him.

PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS

Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian authority must comply with all its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in order for negotiations to resume?

A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to do everything it can to prevent further terror and violence.

There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian authority must make certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process understand that violence and terror are unacceptable.

This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is to be restored and negotiations resumed.

Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and terrorism? Shouldn't he be arresting more members of extremist organizations?

A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to prevent violence and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that those associated with violence and terror are brought to justice.

Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem through its moving ahead with the Har Homa development?

A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har Homa decision, nothing can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be tolerated.

Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must stop giving extremists a green light and give them a red light?

A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is absolutely essential for the Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very clearly in both words and deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will not be tolerated.

U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES

Q: Has the U.S. been in contact with the Israelis and Palestinians to solve this crisis?

A: We are in continuous contact with both parties now.

(If pressed): President Clinton spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu on Friday and the Secretary spoke to President Weizman on Saturday. We have also been in contact with the Palestinians.

KHOBAR BOMBING

Q: What's the status of the Khobar investigation? Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect detained by Canada?

A: Because the investigation is ongoing, I'm not going to make a substantive comment on it.

As I've said before, we have gotten some cooperation from the Saudis and we've been assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more cooperation will be forthcoming.

As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may have information about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Russian-Iraqi Oil Deal

Q: What is the USG's reaction to the oil deal signed during Russian Energy Minister Rodionov's recent visit to Baghdad?

A: We have seen the press reports outlining the agreement signed between Russia and Iraq to develop Iraq's Qurana oil field. We are seeking additional information on those reports.

We understand that Minister Rodionov has stated that large-scale implementation of this \$3.7 billion project will be possible only after UN sanctions imposed on Iraq are lifted.

UN sanctions remain in place, and we expect that Russia will continue to honor the UN sanctions regime.

We remain concerned that Iraq continues to interpret every international contract as a demonstration that it can have sanctions lifted without first complying fully with its UN obligations. That is not the case.

U.S. Diplomat Detained in Belarus

- ☐ Condemn in strongest terms Belarus Government's detention, subsequent expulsion from Belarus of U.S. diplomat carrying out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.
- ☐ Have decided to recall our ambassador for consultations; already have taken actions to cut off most aid and redirect remaining funds (about \$5 million) to NGOs, business groups, humanitarian purposes.
- ☐ Are reviewing other appropriate actions and will advise government of Belarus when we have

made decision.

☐ Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by Lukashenko regime and government's rejection of internationally recognized human rights, as shown in last November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of legitimacy."

(If Raised -- Was this a CIA officer caught spying?)

☐ As a matter of policy do not comment on diplomatic status of officials; officer was carrying out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.

BOSNIA

Izetbegovic visit

☐ President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of Bosnia, will meet with President Clinton Wednesday. They are expected to discuss a broad range of issues relating to the Bosnia peace process.

If asked about Bosnian Membership in Partnership for Peace

☐ Our long term goal is to help establish a stable and prosperous Bosnia that will be part of a greater Europe and play an important role in the international community of democratic nations.

☐ At some point, this should include Bosnian membership in Partnership for Peace. However, further progress must first be made in several areas, including further strengthening of fledgling political institutions and the rebuilding of economic and societal infrastructures. The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work.

If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and equipping of the Bosnian military

☐ We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation

self-defense capability through the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a key part of building a stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting peace in the region.

□ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving substantial additional security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

□ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Progress in Bosnia/Is Dayton Implementation Working? (recent editorials)

□ As we continue to work on the difficult long term challenges in Bosnia, we must not forget the enormous progress we have made.

□ In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Even as the President directed a new diplomatic initiative, few believed peace was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose in the post-Cold War era.

□ Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides the backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

□ Our efforts in Bosnia have exceeded many expectations. The military aspects of Dayton were implemented with no combat casualties. National elections were successfully held in September and joint national institutions have been created and are starting to operate. The

international Train and Equip program is helping build a stable military balance in Bosnia and facilitating the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation. More than 200,000 refugees have returned.

☐ There has also been much progress on the economic reconstruction of Bosnia, especially in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The rebuilding of Sarajevo is perhaps most dramatic. Cut off and under siege for most of the war, Sarajevans risked sniper and mortar fire just to get some dirty water from the river running through the city or to gather some humanitarian rations. Today, Sarajevo is bustling with reconstruction activities and hundreds of cafes, shops, restaurants, banks, and other commercial endeavors have opened their doors. Overall, the Federation economy grew by about 35% in 1996 and unemployment went from 90% to 50%.

☐ Of course, the process of reconciliation is a long term endeavor and much remains to be done. We must do more to rebuild the economic and societal infrastructures. We need greater cooperation from the parties on freedom of movement and the return of refugees and displaced persons. And we need greater political support for the fledgling political institutions.

☐ The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work. However, for the duration of its mission, SFOR will provide the stability and confidence necessary for the Bosnian people to continue to make progress toward these goals. We continue to believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed on these issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia

☐ The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was signed at Dayton.

□ Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides a secure environment for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

□ Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops could lead to a resumption of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and an abdication of U.S. credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This bill throws into question Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and leadership in NATO -- sending a very troubling message all involved.

□ To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence in the Dayton process, gives them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume preparations for conflict that would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a Congressional threat to walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question U.S. credibility and commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe. To our troops on the ground and those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation unjustly questions the purpose and value of their service and sacrifice.

□ For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation be withdrawn. We recognize and share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in Bosnia. If we remain engaged and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement

□ The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation agreement with the Serb Republic is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with the Constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

□ The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that clearly belong to the individual

states, including culture and education to foreign policy and immigration. It also creates a basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to happen without the expressed consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- ☐ The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

SFOR Mission Duration

- ☐ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

- ☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

War Criminals

- ☐ The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring peace.
- ☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

- ☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these

options but have made no decisions yet.

CHINA

GORE TRIP

Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo. Also, what issues will he raise in Beijing?

A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minister Hashimoto and Foreign Minister Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice President affirmed the centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would maintain American force levels at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President urged Japan to implement fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework talks.

As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise a series of strategic issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and regional concerns, such as the Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be discussed. We do not believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to enable us to forego a UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.

(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign contributions will be part of the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our practices for investigating such allegations.

UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and

Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

Points

- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights progress we would see no

reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.

☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ President met with President Mubarak of Egypt on March 10; King Hussein of Jordan has been rescheduled for April 1.

☐ POTUS and Yeltsin met in Helsinki March 20-21. POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ Re President's planned travel to Mexico and Latin America and the Caribbean (see attached press release).

☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

☐ Irish Prime Minister Bruton was here for annual St. Patrick's

Day celebration.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 25, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Postponement of Presidential Travel to Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela

The President's trips to Latin America have been adjusted in connection with his recovery from knee surgery.

The President's visit to Mexico has been postponed to May 6-7. The regional summit meetings in Bridgetown, Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled during the week of May 6-10. The President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela have been rescheduled to October 12-17.

The Administration is committed to moving forward on the broad hemispheric agenda set out by the region's democratic leaders at the 1994 Miami Summit, including the creation of a Free Trade Area of the

Americas. Building on the February 26 State visit of Chilean President Frei, the President will use the April 8 State visit of Canadian Prime Minister Chretien; his travel in May to Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean; and his fall visit to South America to ensure solid progress at the March 1998 Summit of the Americas in Santiago.

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HELSINKI SUMMIT RESULTS

Overview

- ☐ Very successful summit. President and Yeltsin continued excellent working relationship; tackled tough issues and produced decisions that take account of both sides' interests.
- ☐ Presidents' decisions reenergize U.S.-Russian relationship, lay firm basis for relations into 21st century, and contribute to development of more stable, secure and undivided Europe.
- ☐ Joint statements issued by President and Yeltsin mean we:
 - ☐ have turned corner with Russia on developing NATO-Russia relationship, despite disagreement over NATO enlargement;
 - ☐ resolved ABM/TMD demarcation issue;
 - ☐ have formula that will allow Russia to ratify START II, so that we can bring Treaty into force and launch START III negotiations to achieve further nuclear reductions;
 - ☐ have agreed path to complete Russia's transition to market economy, further integration into global economic system.

European Security

- ☐ Presidents discussed Europe, NATO-Russia. Disagree over NATO enlargement, but did not expect to change Yeltsin's mind.

- ☐ President made clear enlargement to proceed on schedule.
- ☐ Key thing is Yeltsin committed to work with President and NATO to develop cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. This will contribute to European security, avoid isolating Russia.
- ☐ Further, as Russia works more closely with NATO, believe Russia can come to see that enlarged NATO poses no threat.
- ☐ In joint statement on Europe, President and Yeltsin:
- ☐ reaffirm commitment to stable, secure, integrated, undivided and democratic Europe;
- ☐ agree that European security structures should evolve in accordance with OSCE principles;
- ☐ note that, despite disagreement on NATO enlargement, they will work with NATO on document to establish cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia;
- ☐ support conclusion of a framework agreement on elements of adaptation of CFE Treaty by mid-year;
- ☐ note President's assurance that NATO contemplates nothing that would lead to potentially threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces nearer Russia; and
- ☐ refer to NATO's policy of no intention, plan or reason to deploy nuclear weapons on territory of new member states.

Nuclear Arms Control

- ☐ ABM/TMD. President and Yeltsin worked hard to come up with mutually acceptable formulation for dealing with ABM/TMD demarcation, specifically higher-velocity TMD systems.
- ☐ Joint statement on ABM Treaty records resolution of all outstanding issues to clarify demarcation between strategic missile defenses covered by ABM

Treaty and theater missile defenses not covered by ABM Treaty. Basic elements:

- ☐ limit on velocity (five kilometers/second) and range (3500 kilometers) of target missiles used in TMD testing;
- ☐ ban on space-based TMD interceptors; and
- ☐ information exchange on TMD programs,
- ☐ Sides stated they have no plans to flight test "higher velocity" TMD systems through April 1999 or to develop TMD systems with speeds exceeding certain velocities. Consistent with all planned U.S. TMD programs.
- ☐ Sides also committed to exploring cooperation on early warning support for TMDs, technology cooperation related to TMD, and expansion of ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.
- ☐ Nuclear Arms Reductions. President and Yeltsin laid out path to bring START II into force, following prompt Duma ratification of START II, and launch START III negotiations that will provide for further nuclear arms reductions.
- ☐ Joint statement on nuclear arms reductions issued by President and Yeltsin:
- ☐ outlines basic elements for START III Treaty, including ceiling of 2000-2500 strategic nuclear warheads (30-45 percent below START II);
- ☐ records commitment to extend time Russia has to destroy bombers, missile silos and submarines under START II by five years, to 2007, although warheads must be removed from these systems no later than 2003 (will need Senate approval -- but only once Duma has ratified START II).
- ☐ commits to include measures on warhead transparency and warhead destruction in START III (a first in strategic arms control); and
- ☐ agrees to explore possible measures related to other,

short-range nuclear forces (where Russia has clear, numerical advantage over United States).

Economic Initiative

- ☐ President and Yeltsin defined path forward to stimulate investment and growth in Russia, advance Russia's integration into international economic institutions.
- ☐ This good for Russian economic growth and prosperity and for America, as will mean more jobs and opportunities for American business to tap into Russia's rich economic potential.
- ☐ In their joint statement on economic interaction:
- ☐ Presidents underscore importance of creating climate attractive to investment to complete Russia's historic transformation to market economy:
- ☐ Yeltsin commits to work toward comprehensive tax reform, enacting energy development and tough anti-crime laws, and ratification of U.S.-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty -- and to substantially complete this agenda in 1997;
- ☐ President commits to make available financing (OPIC, EXIM support) for U.S. investment in Russia and notes high priority he attaches to greater assistance for Russia and other NIS; and
- ☐ Both Presidents agree to set target and make best efforts for Russia to join Paris Club in 1997 and WTO in 1998, provided it can meet commercial terms, and make progress toward joining OECD.

Other

- ☐ Chemical Weapons. President and Yeltsin issued joint statement stressing commitment to eliminate chemical weapons, to expedite ratification of CWC, and to continue cooperation in bilateral chemical disarmament efforts.
- ☐ G-7/Eight. President announced will substantially increase Russia's role at Denver Summit of the Eight.

SUMMARY OF HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENTS

At the March 20-21 summit in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed five joint statements on U.S.-Russian relations.

European Security: The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to a stable, secure, integrated, undivided and democratic Europe. They agreed that European security structures should evolve in accordance with OSCE principles, including respect for the sovereignty of all states. Despite their disagreement on the issue of NATO enlargement, the Presidents will work together with NATO on a document to establish a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, as part of the European security system. This document, as an enduring, high-level political commitment reflecting both the transformation of NATO and the new realities in Russia, would define the terms of the relationship.

Both leaders agreed that a framework agreement on elements of CFE adaptation should be concluded by mid-year. President Clinton reiterated NATO's March 14 policy statement that it did not contemplate "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces" nearer Russia. He also recalled NATO policy of "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, now or in future.

Economic Initiative: The Presidents' initiative will encourage investment and growth in Russia, deepen bilateral economic ties and accelerate Russia's integration into international economic organizations. President Yeltsin committed to work toward comprehensive tax reform, promotion of foreign investment, particularly in the energy sector, anti-crime laws, and ratification of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty.

President Clinton stressed enhanced OPIC and EXIM support for

American investment in Russia.

Also for 1998, he seeks \$900 million in U.S. assistance for Russia and the NIS, up from the current \$625 million, with the new funds destined for facilitating trade and investment, stimulating growth and doubling exchange programs between the two countries.

The Presidents agreed that Russia should join the Paris Club in 1997 and the World Trade Organization in 1998, provided it can meet the commercial terms commonly applied to new members, and should make progress toward joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces: The statement outlines the basic elements for a future START III Treaty, including a ceiling of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads (30-45 percent below START II) and a commitment to extend the time Russia has to destroy bombers, missile silos and submarines under START II by five years, to 2007 (although warheads must be removed from these systems no later than 2003). Together, these provisions directly address the Duma's concerns about costs of implementing the START II Treaty, thus providing the basis for President Yeltsin to seek prompt ratification of START II. There is also a commitment to include measures on warhead transparency and warhead destruction in START III (a first in strategic arms control), as well as to explore possible measures related to other, short-range nuclear forces (where Russia has a clear, numerical advantage over the United States).

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: The statement on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty resolves all outstanding issues in the three-year negotiation to clarify the demarcation between strategic missile defenses covered by the ABM Treaty and theater missile defenses (TMD) not covered by the Treaty. Basic elements include a limit on the velocity (5 km/sec) and range (3500 km) of target missiles used in TMD testing, a ban on space-based TMD interceptors, an information exchange on TMD programs and a commitment to continued

consultations on the ABM Treaty.

The sides also state they have no plans to flight test a "higher velocity" TMD system through April 1999 or to develop TMD systems with speeds exceeding certain velocities. The agreement is consistent with all planned U.S. TMD programs. The sides also commit to exploring cooperation on early warning support for TMDs, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

Chemical Weapons Convention: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin stressed their commitment to the elimination from national arsenals of this class of weapons of mass destruction, and their determination to expedite ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by both the United States and Russia. The CWC will make the production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons illegal. Parties that possess chemical weapons will be required to destroy their stockpiles and destroy or convert under international safeguards their chemical weapons production facilities. Parties will also be required not to assist or encourage any other country's chemical weapons program. Compliance will be monitored through on-site inspections.

The Convention, already signed by 161 countries and ratified by seventy, will enter into force on April 29, 1997.

START/ABM HELSINKI

START

Q: Does not extending the START II reductions period in effect slow down the disarmament process? How can you extend the period by which Russian missiles will be pointed at America? Why would you think the Senate would approve such an accord?

A: We have agreed to extend the START II reductions period by five years -- to 2007 -- so

as to ease the economic burden on Russia.

Important also to note that START I was signed over four years ago -- some adjustment in timelines was appropriate given the long, unanticipated delay in entry into force.

At the same time, we have agreed to deactivate systems that are to be eliminated under START II by the end of 2003 -- only one year after the original destruction timelines under START II -- by taking warheads off of missiles or through other agreed measures.

Have also agreed to further reduce strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000-2,500 by 2007 in a START III. Believe this package is in America's national security interests.

As to Senate approval, the U.S. Senate voted overwhelmingly by a vote of 87-4 to approve this treaty just over a year ago. Expect there will be a debate, but confident the Senate will approve this extension, as the treaty is in America's interests.

Q: A START III target of 2,000-2,500 weapons still leaves both countries with a substantial nuclear force. How does this square with the recent call by military leaders from around the globe for the U.S. and Russia to eliminate their nuclear arsenals?

A: As the President said at the United Nations, the United States looks forward to a new century where the roles and risks of nuclear weapons are reduced, and ultimately, eliminated.

President Clinton and President Yeltsin have made substantial progress in reducing the nuclear threat during the past four years. Detargeting, the entry into force of START I and the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan, indefinite extension of the NPT and signature of the CTBT.

All these steps have made our people safer. The joint statement

issued in Helsinki
represents a significant step in the direction of reducing the
nuclear danger. Will
substantially reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and work
to control warheads and
fissile material.

As to the call by retired Generals and Admirals to work towards
nuclear elimination, the
joint statement today is consistent with a number of their
recommendations, although we
certainly don't agree on every point. That's not surprising.
But we share their goals, and
we are working hard on this.

Q: Would the START II ban on MIRVed ICBMs be carried over into
START III?

A: Yes.

Q: You have included a reference to making the current START
Treaties unlimited in
duration. Why is this necessary?

A: The existing START Treaties have a 15 year duration. Our
commitment to indefinitely
extend the START Treaties sends a strong message that the United
States and Russia are
committed to a permanent reduction in the nuclear threat.

Q: You also refer to measures relating to nuclear long-range
sea-launched cruise missiles
and tactical nuclear systems. Do you have in mind numerical and
geographic limits, in
particular in Europe, or something else?

A: The purpose of this element is to underscore our joint
commitment to discuss concerns
with respect to theater nuclear forces on both sides.

This could include, for example, with a discussion of the status
of our unilateral
initiatives relating to non-strategic forces, and various
transparency initiatives already
underway.

Any specific measures would have to be discussed and agreed. We
are not now
proposing limits on numbers or geography.

Q: Are you prepared to consider a "zero option" -- that is, a nuclear-free zone in Western and Central Europe?

A: No.

ABM ISSUES

Q: You've agreed to ban space-based TMDs in this joint statement. Doesn't that run directly counter to missile defense programs favored by the Congress?

A: Neither side has plans for space-based TMD interceptors.

Banning space-based TMD interceptors is a logical corollary to the ABM Treaty's ban on space-based ABMs, as experts agree that any such interceptor would have ABM capabilities.

With respect to Congress, current legislation is focused on mandating the deployment of defenses by a date certain that would be compliant with the ABM Treaty.

Thus, our disagreements are more related to IF and WHEN defenses should be deployed, not over whether we should return to a "Star Wars" system in space.

Believe Congress will recognize the agreement we have reached today is a good agreement that protects both the ABM Treaty and our ability to deploy effective theater missile defense systems.

Q: It appears you have agreed to limit the interceptor velocity of TMD systems.

A: No. We have agreed neither side has plans for TMD interceptors with velocities greater than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based TMD systems, or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based TMD systems. This is not a ban.

Q: It appears you have agreed to a moratorium on flight tests of higher velocity TMD systems through 1999.

A: No. We have agreed we have no plans now, through April 1999, to flight test a higher-velocity TMD against a target. This is not a moratorium, but a statement of plans.

ZAIRE

Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to Central Africa?

A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several hundred American forces under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency planning for a possible evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has been made.

The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We remain concerned, however, that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of American citizens and some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in the region is simply a prudent, precautionary step.

American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in Zaire.

The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to ensure the security of U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a commitment by the U.S. to any particular course of action.

The deployment includes command and support elements for a forward Joint Task Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin P. Smith, Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task Force Commander.

U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. They come from elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the

Southern European Task Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements are from U.S. based units.

Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between the government and rebel leaders?

A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire, representatives of the rebel leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun, the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South Africa to bring about a cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.

(IF ASKED)

Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?

A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units will deploy with communications gear, airport control, support equipment and several fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?

A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in Kinshasa.

Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking similar measures. Are these efforts coordinated?

A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our European allies, some of whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.

We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the Congolese and Gabonese governments in this effort.

Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?

A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and throughout the day on

Saturday.

ALBANIA

What is the situation in Albania?

- ☐ There have been no new developments in the situation on the ground in Albania. Tirana remains quiet but tense, with reports of sporadic gunfire being heard.
- ☐ Commercial flights have partially resumed--several flights arrived and departed from the airport in Tirana in the last 24 hours.
- ☐ There have been some limited commercial shipments into the port at Durres as well.
- ☐ Prime Minister Fino and members of his cabinet are in Rome today in consultations with the Foreign Ministers of the European Union.

What Happened at the EU meeting yesterday?

The General Affairs Council of the European Union met in Brussels yesterday, and released a set of conclusions. Among them:

- ☐ Agreement that the EU should play the major role in helping Albania return to political stability, restore internal security, and provide humanitarian assistance.
- ☐ Agreement that these EU activities should be conducted "within the coordinating framework of the OSCE."
- ☐ A plan to send an advance team to Tirana this week for a feasibility study on further assistance--which will include an assessment of the security environment.

MEXICO

SENATE RESOLUTION

☐ Welcome Senate action endorsing greater counterdrug cooperation with Mexico and other nations in the Americas. Bipartisan effort to support common goal of increasing cooperation to keep drugs out of our neighborhoods.

☐ Senate action recognizes ongoing progress being made by President Zedillo and acknowledges that the problems are serious and require work on both sides of border. Working through the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control, we are ready to continue our active collaboration.

NORTHERN IRELAND

ON WHETHER IRA NEEDS TO DISARM BEFORE JOINING TALKS

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

MURDER OF CATHOLIC FATHER OF NINE IN BELFAST

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.

☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.

☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

BERGER/STEINBERG PHONE CALLS

- ☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in touch with British and Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in Northern Ireland, exchange views on how to move process forward.
- ☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged in process; not going to comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging that GWI is contagious and that the Blood Supply may be unsafe?

- ☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive evidence that the undiagnosed illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is contagious.
- ☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD, HHS and VA) for any additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing research, etc.
- ☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross have stated they believe the blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you announced during the roll-out of the PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January 1997?

- ☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its report.
- ☐ Leading examples:
- ☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have accepted [?] -- to initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period for Gulf War veterans with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure has been strongly supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
- ☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the

60-day period I requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC recommendations from its final report.

- ☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of Veterans and Their Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
- ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
- ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
- ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
- ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

- ☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.

- ☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.
- ☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.
- ☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

- ☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.
- ☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.
- ☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.
- ☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

- ☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.
- ☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.
- ☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.
- ☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

- ☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.
- ☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.
- ☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...
- ☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.
- ☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data

and most appropriate modeling approach.

☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

☐ President asked them to take a careful look

☐ Obviously doing so

☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings

☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway

☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

☐ President committed to getting out all the facts

☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned

☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in

January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996

as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐

During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's

declassification initiative -- the staffer was

told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at

Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this

possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.

☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to

CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.

☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.

☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.

☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.

☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans

are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.
- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
- ☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions

and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who

seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

CUBA

Diplomatic Pouch Opened

Q: Is it true that the Cuban government opened a U.S. diplomatic pouch destined for the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana?

A: The Cuban government recently delayed the delivery of several of the Interests Section's unclassified pouches.

The Cubans claimed that one of the pouches arrived open and protested that its contents were "aggressive" and objectionable to the GOC. They apparently were referring to copies of the President's report to Congress on "Support for a Democratic Transition in Cuba."

USINT has confirmed that one pouch was opened and its contents were inspected.

Q: Did the USG apologize for the contents of the pouch, as the Washington Times reported?

A: Absolutely not. USINT earlier this week delivered a note to the Cuban government clearly and emphatically protesting the tampering with the pouch and rejecting any effort to regulate the contents of the pouch.

The GOC's interference with our pouches is a blatant violation of its obligations under international law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It also violates the 1977 Agreement on the Establishment of Interests Sections.

The GOC has no authority to regulate the content of official communications between the USG and USINT.

The GOC's action is further evidence of its repressive policies and disregard for long-established international law and diplomatic practice.

PERU

Lima Hostage Crisis

Q: Has a deal been struck to resolve the 98-day-old hostage crisis in Lima?

A: The governments of Peru and Japan are continuing efforts to find a peaceful solution, which we support.

Talks between the Peruvian government and the MRTA continue. The disagreement has been over the terrorists' demand for the release of fellow MRTA members in prison.

Understand that, at Peru and Japan's request, Cuba has agreed to accept the MRTA hostage-takers as part of a broader resolution. Dominican Republic has also expressed willingness to take them.

Cannot confirm, however, that resolution is imminent.

Q: Would the United States oppose a deal involving Cuba?

A: USG supports a peaceful resolution to this 98-day impasse without rewarding terrorists.

Do not want to comment on particular elements of a solution at this time.

Q: [If asked] Is there any truth to rumors that Japan offered to pardon some Cuban debt in return for cooperation?

A: Would refer you to the Japanese government.

INDONESIA: SALE OF PAKISTANI F-16S

Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia F-16s?

A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains

committed to the sale, but the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the transfer at this time. Our decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations, including regional and bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.

We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter evolves.