

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 11 March 97 19:01
FROM Cicio, Kristen K.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Women's Convention [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Malley, Robert
CARBON_COPY Bass, Peter E.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Millison, Cathy L.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rim, Julie J.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Veit, Katherine M.

TEXT_BODY

Rob,

SRB notes..."Suspect I can tell you where Helms stands. I think we should raise visibility of the even if prospects slim. Let's discuss."

From: Malley, Robert

To: Berger, Samuel

CC: /R, Record at A1; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @LEGISLAT-Legislative

Affairs; @DEMOCRACY - Dem/Human Affairs

Subject: Women's Convention [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Tuesday, March 11, 1997 02:28 PM

Please pass to SRB

Sandy,

This e-mail is in response to your query regarding the women's convention, which we followed up with an inter-agency meeting in which State and

NSC/leg. participated:

I. STATUS OF WOMEN'S CONVENTION

The Convention, which was signed by the US in 1980, was submitted to the Senate that same year for advice and consent to ratification. It has been pending before the Senate since that time. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held two hearing -- one in 1988, the other in 1990 -- but neither Presidents Bush nor Reagan supported ratification, so no action was taken.

The Clinton Administration transmitted the package to the Committee in September 1994. The Committee voted 13 to 5 to report the Convention favorably (Helms, Kassebaum, Brown, Coverdell, and Gregg voted against). The resolution of ratification reported by the Committee contained the reservations, understandings and declarations proposed by the Administration as well as an additional understanding provided by Sen. Helms clarifying that the Convention did not create a right to abortion.

II. WHAT STEPS WOULD BE REQUIRED NOW

While the Convention has been pending before the Senate since that time, it has not been acted upon, though it has been at the top of the Administration's treaty priority list.

In order for the full Senate to consider it now, it would once again need to be reported out of Committee. While hearings are not a requirement, we should expect Sen. Helms to insist on them.

III. PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION

The inter-agency group proposed that State/H approach Helms to get a feeling about where he stands. It also would approach Biden to get his views and offer a briefing on the Convention to new Republican members. Talking points would be circulated and cleared. Based on the results of these conversations, and on other Administration priorities before the Committee, the inter-agency would assess the appropriateness of higher-level approaches -- e.g., at the Secretary's level.

(Meg Donovan, who was unable to attend the meeting, may modify this plan somewhat once she is briefed. She will get back to us by Friday.

(At this point, it was agreed that we should not engage in any further outreach to the NGO community or to the public, as any signal of interest from the Administration would provoke a far stronger reaction from groups opposed to the Convention.)

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 18 March 97 10:14
FROM Murray, Lori E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Berger points[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[BERGER1.DOC : 2617 in BERGER1.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 18 March 97 10:13
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** BERGER1.DOC

Suggested Points for Berger

-- We're coming close to the end of the process of trying to get the CWC ratified by the Senate.

-- We've worked hard with those on the other side of the aisle who oppose the treaty, trying to bridge the gap between us.

-- We hope that through the good offices of Sen. Daschle that a UC can be struck to conduct the floor debate by the week of April 14.

-- We appreciate all the hard work that your offices have put into making this happen. The Leader, Senator Biden, Senator Levin and others have been stalwart supporters from the beginning.

-- Before turning things over to Bob Bell of the NSC staff to explain where we are, I want to ask you to help us with our last push. We need at least a majority of the Republican caucus to tell their leadership that the Republican Party cannot afford to allow Senator Helms to block floor action. If you can talk to your colleagues on the other side of the aisle about how important this is and how we need their support, it would be very helpful.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 18 March 97 18:39
FROM Lindsay, James M.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Reorg Paper Version #11 ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

TO Brown, Nancy E.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By Y2 NARA, Date 2/7/2017
2006-1363-1(3)

CARBON_COPY Clarke, Richard A.
Danvers, William C.

TEXT_BODY

NOTE FOR DON:

Attached is the latest version of the reorganization paper. This versions incorporates (almost verbatim) the comments that ACDA, USAID, and USIA supplied yesterday and today. Whenever this paper goes out again, we will need to attach the general comments the three agencies have supplied.

[[REORG11.DOC : 4636 in REORG11.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

18 March 97 18:35

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

REORG11.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/CLOSE HOLD DRAFT -- 3/18/97 -- 7 PM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify on: 3/14/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/CLOSE HOLD

DRAFT -- 3/14/97 -- 6 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REORGANIZATION OPTIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS

I. Purpose and Summary

This paper presents the four main options available for

reorganizing
the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. They are:

1. Modernize without reorganizing
2. Merge one or two agencies into the State Department
 - 2A -- Merge USIA into State
 - 2B -- Merge ACDA into State
 - 2C -- Merge USAID into State
3. Integrate all four agencies into a new Department
 - 3A -- Simultaneously integrate all four agencies
 - 3B -- Phase in integration
4. Establish a process for developing a reorganization plan
 - 4A -- Presidential request for reorganization authority
 - 4B -- Commission Appointed by the President and Congress

The agencies' preferred options are:

- ☐ State: To Be Provided
- ☐ ACDA Option 1
- ☐ USAID: Option 4A
- ☐ USIA: Option 3A

The agencies' complete statements on these options are attached.

II. Background (Placeholder)

The current structure of our foreign policy apparatus evolved during
an era when the United States faced a single, overwhelming
challenge

-- containing communism. The four primary foreign policy
agencies
-- State, USAID, ACDA, and USIA -- successfully met that
challenge.

With the passing of the Cold War, America now faces a new set of
national security objectives for the twenty-first century. As a
result, we need to ensure that our foreign policy structures and
processes are appropriate for the new challenges and
opportunities

of the post-Cold War era. This requires us to review the
existing

apparatus with an eye toward eliminating obsolete structures and
practices, identifying ways to improve efficiency and
effectiveness,

and creating and strengthening institutional arrangements that
promote policy coherence and coordination.

III. Reorganization Options

OPTION #1 -- Modernize Without Reorganizing

The Administration could keep the current structure intact but accelerate ongoing reinvention efforts and undertake new ones.

The reinvention process would seek to focus each agency on its core missions, eliminate duplication across and within agencies and introduce more efficient management practices. It would also seek to improve coordination among agencies by creating a modern, "networked" Department of State that has tighter links to the three smaller agencies.

Specific reinvention efforts include:

- ☐ State: Shed selected technical activities; abolish individual executive director offices and Deputy Office Director positions; reduce the number of Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries; close low priority overseas posts; empower the Under Secretary for Management to control all aspects of State's administrative and operational support.
- ☐ ACDA: Complete the 1993 Presidential decision and 1994 legislative mandate to revitalize ACDA by assigning to ACDA arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament diplomatic and representational activities assumed by State's Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Though a distinct agency, ACDA would operate under the Secretary of State's overall foreign policy guidance and would be tasked directly by the Secretary of State for support for all arms control activities. Note that Reinventing Government Phase II has already led to the removal of remaining unnecessary duplication between ACDA and PM and to substantial personnel reductions in both agencies.
- ☐ USIA: Eliminate and reduce lower priority programs; further streamline headquarters bureaucracy.
- ☐ USAID: Complete the ICASS implementation in the field; modernize communication technologies between agencies overseas; expand use of information technologies among agencies (USIA and the Peace Corps plan to use USAID's new system); complete the shift from administrative paperwork control to real substantive policy direction.

Specific changes that would produce a networked Department of State include:

- ☐ merge desk operations of all agencies into State, creating the Washington, D.C., equivalent of the "country team";
- ☐ establish a unified foreign affairs budget and remove the legal ambiguities over budget accountability; and,
- ☐ establish common administrative services such as security clearances and informational technology.

Pros: Retains the separate identities of the four agencies and their "core competencies" while linking them more closely to our overall foreign policy objectives. Creates the Washington equivalent of what happens when an Ambassador manages a country team.

Cons: Risks subordinating the unique missions of each agency to the short-term, bilateral focus of traditional State Department diplomacy.

Agency views:

State: To Be Provided

ACDA: With completion of reinvention efforts, ACDA believes this option is the most effective and efficient structure to meet intensifying twenty-first century arms control challenges and to reduce the risk that arms control and nonproliferation priorities will be subordinated to country relations interests. This option also fully implements the Vice President's 1995 NPR decision and avoids the need to explain why the President's 1993 decision, as embraced in 1994 legislation, is being reversed.

USAID: There are several reasons USAID opposes this option:

- ☐ Merging desk operations into one desk violates our strong stand against integration of the development and diplomacy missions and is unnecessary. Our desk officers communicate daily with their State counterparts. Merging or co-locating desks would separate our people from their chain of command. We believe improved technology would enhance communication and coordination. For example, being able to e-mail between State and AID would benefit both agencies.
- ☐ If the proposed unified foreign affairs budget means consolidation of accounts, we would be opposed. We strongly support an account structure that protects development resources from being used for short-term political purposes. This option might also force the

Congress to realign its committee structure and would be strongly resisted on the Hill.

USIA: USIA gives qualified support to those reforms listed in the first set of bullets under "specific reinvention efforts," and then only if Option 3A (full and simultaneous integration) is not chosen.

USIA cannot endorse and will not endorse a complete merger of its desk operations into those of State, or the elimination of a separate budget line for public diplomacy.

OPTION #2 -- Merge One or Two Agencies into State

The Administration could propose a partial integration of the foreign policy apparatus. This option would entail one of the following three variants or some combination of them.

2A. Merge USIA into State

A merger of USIA into State would entail merging all public affairs functions in Washington since they are, de facto, merged already in country. Some functions could be placed within the Public Affairs bureau and some within the Democracy bureau. The broadcast functions could be merged, spun off to an independent agency, or privatized. The exchange programs could be merged or put into a separate foundation that can leverage private resources with public ones. This option does not preclude management reform or restructuring at the other two agencies or at State.

Pros: With an increasing number of democracies in the world and with an increase in the mass media, the business of understanding and influencing foreign publics will become a more important part of diplomacy than it has ever been before. Therefore, the expertise of USIA should be part and parcel of twenty-first century diplomacy.

Cons: The public mission does not fit well with traditional diplomacy which is why USIA was created as an independent agency in the first place. Privatization and the creation of an independent

broadcast agency would be inconsistent with the policy the Administration developed in 1994 on broadcast consolidation. State is primarily a policy agency rather than a program management agency.

Agency views:

State: To Be Provided

ACDA: No comment

USAID: No comment

USIA: This option lacks conceptual strength and energy, does not clearly embody foreign affairs purposes and will open the door to tinkering and political controversy that in the end will create more difficulty than a continuation of our present efforts -- which are not, in all cases, lightly to be dismissed.

2B. Merge ACDA into State

There are a variety of ways to merge ACDA into the State Department.

One variant would restructure the office of the Under Secretary for

Arms Control and International Security Affairs and create a set of

bureaus to replace the current Bureau of Political Military Affairs.

The unique and unduplicated legal and verification/compliance functions of ACDA would be preserved by assigning them directly to

the Under Secretary's office. To preserve the arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation advocacy function and the strong,

independent voice, the new Under Secretary/Director would lead the

arms control and nonproliferation interagency policy decision-making

process and would attend National Security meetings as the principal

advisor to the Secretary of State, the National Security Council and

the President on matters involving arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament. The model and precedent for the Under Secretary/Director's advisory role would be the relationship of the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President. (Alternatively, an Arms Control Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State could be recreated, based on the Paul Nitze role in the Reagan Administration.) Merger of ACDA into State would not preclude other management reform or restructuring at State or at the other two agencies. For example, the narcotics, crime and terrorism functions could be assigned to this Under Secretary in order to group programs on "new security threats," including WMD proliferation, under International Security Policy (T).

Pros: Preserves the arms control independent voice, the unique advocacy role at the highest levels of the Government and the core missions of ACDA; it efficiently marries ACDA's technical/historical expertise with State's and ACDA's representation/diplomatic efforts. It streamlines and matches the interagency decision-making process for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation with the overall foreign policy decision-making process.

Cons: After 36 years of ACDA's independence and major arms control successes such as NPT, NPT Indefinite Extension, CTBT and CWC, it will be a major challenge to define a new process or structure that can justify the elimination of the USG agency with primary responsibility for these achievements. Consolidation that denigrates the arms control role will lead concerned countries, NGOs and the public to conclude that the Administration is backing away from its historic accomplishments and strong commitment to the arms control/nonproliferation mission.

Agency views:

State: To Be Provided

ACDA: Though it strongly prefers Option 1, ACDA can accept 2B, but

only so long as its essential features -- including protection of a clearly defined independent advocacy role and ACDA's specialized capabilities -- are preserved. This approach can legitimately be defended as meeting demands for consolidation and still greater efficiency, but in a way that confirms the Administration's deep commitment to arms control and nonproliferation. Protection of the independent role will require minor but essential modifications to both the State organizational statute and the National Security Act.

USAID: No Comment

USIA: This option lacks conceptual strength and energy, does not clearly embody foreign affairs purposes and will open the door to tinkering and political controversy that in the end will create more difficulty than a continuation of our present efforts -- which are not, in all cases, lightly to be dismissed.

2C. Merge USAID into State

This option calls for merging USAID's regional bureaus with State's regional bureaus and assigning USAID's responsibility for managing global programs to State's functional bureaus. This option would not preclude management reform or internal restructuring at the other two agencies or at State.

Pros: The duplication of functions between USAID and State would be minimized; closer policy coordination and program implementation would be achieved; ties between development and relief programs on the one hand and diplomatic and economic policy initiatives on the other would be strengthened; development assistance and foreign policy goals would be aligned; resources would be used more efficiently in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Cons: Unique development focus could be lost. The ability of the United States to do long-term development work independently of short-term, bilateral constraints would be hampered. Because the State Department deals primarily to foreign governments, merging USAID into State might create pressure to expand

government-to-government programs at the expense of programs that involve NGOs and business. State is primarily a policy agency rather than a program management agency.

Agency views:

State: To Be Provided

ACDA: No comment

USAID: This "integrative" option is unacceptable because:

- ☐ It does not provide legal protection for development resources.
- ☐ It does not maintain management integrity and accountability over

USAID's programs. Instead, it distributes development over several State Department bureaus, i.e., regional bureaus and various global bureaus. It leaves no one place or person within the Department who would be accountable for achieving development results; there is no clear chain of command. Over the years, our institutional capacity to do development work would be lost under this proposal.

- ☐ This option would downgrade our mission diminishing the ability of

the United States to influence and leverage other donors and exercise leadership in the international development community which is discrete and separate from the diplomatic community. There would be no government unit or leader who would represent the United States in the development world.

- ☐ There would be little savings in exercising this option -- even in

the out years. USAID employees are development specialists with technical skills, rather than generalists with diplomatic skills.

Staffs of the two agencies are not interchangeable, so there would

not be personnel savings. Further, USAID's staff has been cut to the bone, and, unless programs were sacrificed, this option offers

no way of reducing costs.

- ☐ Most of USAID's support operations are designed to service a program agency while State is a policy/service agency. Functions like financial management and procurement could be co-located, but

they differ substantially and merger would be time-consuming and costly. See our comments on Options 3A and 3B.

USIA: This option lacks conceptual strength and energy, does not clearly embody foreign affairs purposes and will open the door to tinkering and political controversy that in the end will create

more
difficulty than a continuation of our present efforts -- which
are
not, in all cases, lightly to be dismissed.

OPTION #3 -- Integrate All Four Agencies

The Administration could propose integrating all four agencies
into
a new organization. The main issue this option raises is whether
all four agencies should be integrated simultaneously or in
steps.

3A. Simultaneous integration

The new Department would not merely collect existing agencies
under
a new banner but reinvent and integrate each of them into a new
streamlined organization that draws on the best people and
practices
of the old agencies. The resulting changes, which would be even
more profound for State than for the three smaller agencies,
would
create a "new diplomacy" for the twenty-first century by creating
a
new culture among our foreign affairs practitioners. The
structure
of the new Department would be modeled on the Department of
Defense,
where different services with distinct cultures serve under a
common
leadership under the direction of a Secretary of Defense. The
DOD
model of defense agencies such as DSAA could be emulated, or the
three smaller agencies could be transformed into bureaus within
the
larger Department. A variation on this theme is to integrate all
four agencies but to spin off core USAID programs into an
International Development Foundation (IDF) that would be a
public/private partnership.

Pros: Allows for the coherent and unified conduct of foreign
policy
under the Secretary of State and for the allocation of resources
according to foreign policy priorities. The institutional
structure
of the foreign affairs agencies should reflect the fact that
issues
such as sustainable development and nonproliferation are now more

central than ever to American foreign policy. Likely to produce budgetary savings in the out years, with the exact amount depending on the precise nature of the reorganization undertaken.

Cons: Risks subordinating the unique missions of each agency to the short-term bilateral focus of traditional diplomacy. (The creation of an IDF would insulate sustainable development from the pressures of short-term diplomacy.) Integration will initially require greater spending. May disrupt agency performance in the short term.

Agency views:

State: To Be Provided

ACDA: This option is potentially the most creative, but could also be time-consuming and would risk in the interim a loss of coherence in foreign policy decision-making and implementation. It would also call for reexamining issues which, as to ACDA, at least, have been studied intensively and repeatedly since 1992. In ACDA's view, it would still be essential, in any new organization, to preserve the key elements defined in options 1 and 2B.

USAID: USAID opposes options 3A and 3B for the same reasons as noted above for Option 2C. Both simultaneous and phased integration would compromise USAID's capacity to achieve strategic development goals. The development/humanitarian mission supports and complements the diplomatic mission, but it is also distinct. If the development/humanitarian mission is integrated directly with a different mission, our development approach will be subject to the natural pressures that are generated by a distinctly professional perspective.

The option of an International Development Foundation should not be considered. Putting long-term development outside the purview of

the executive branch would damage the ability of the United States to conduct effective development assistance programs because there would be no effective mechanism for either setting or achieving results in support of U.S. foreign policy goals. Second, experience has demonstrated that a mix of NGO and government interventions are critical to achieving development goals. NGOs cannot access government ministries easily. Finally, over time, the IDF budget would become an easy target thereby resulting in a diminution of resources for international affairs.

Option 3A might be workable assuming it uses the Defense Department model where different services with distinct cultures serve under common leadership. Using the model, each of the three agencies would become a separate agency within an expanded Department of State rather than being merged into State's existing structure of bureaus or under secretaries. This would have the advantage of retaining the clarity of missions and the separate cultures that support those missions. USAID, for example, could revert to pre-1979 organizational arrangements, in which the Administrator would retain his current title and level, while reporting directly to the Secretary of State. The heads of ACDA and USIA could also remain as Directors within State.

USIA: This is our preferred option. It is the only option that combines vision with a true sense of history. Thorough integration is demanded by changes in the environment in which all international affairs are conducted, by the substantive challenges facing American leadership in the world, and by the consequences of the Information Revolution and by the desire of the American people. In a newly-created, integrated foreign affairs structure, the three key functions of public diplomacy -- broadcasting, exchanges, and public affairs -- should maintain their separate, mutually-reinforcing organizational identities. There must be a distinct budget line for these functions to protect them against the depredations of crisis-managers and turf-invaders.

B. Phased integration over time

This option is similar to Option 3A, except that the agencies would be integrated sequentially rather than simultaneously.

Pros: Allows for the coherent and unified conduct of foreign policy under the Secretary of State and for the allocation of resources according to foreign policy priorities. The institutional structure of the foreign affairs agencies should reflect the fact that issues such as sustainable development and nonproliferation are now more central than ever to American foreign policy. Likely to produce budgetary savings in the out years, with the exact amount depending on the precise nature of the reorganization undertaken.

Cons: Risks subordinating the unique missions of each agency to the short-term bilateral focus of traditional diplomacy. Integration will initially require greater spending. May disrupt agency performance in the short term.

Agency views:

State: To Be Provided

ACDA: A phased approach could account for differing circumstances among the agencies. However, where operations differ qualitatively from those of the Department of State, as particularly in USAID, it is inadvisable to make the decision as to "whether" in advance of a careful examination as to "how." Therefore, it would be preferable to make choices under Option 2. ACDA's views on Option 3A also apply here. Also, it should be noted that a phased approach will bring additional uncertainty over the eventual structure and remaining functions resulting in a possible loss of skilled employees as well as the inability to fill political level positions.

USAID: USAID strongly opposes phased integration for the reasons described in our comments on options 2C and 3A. In addition, a phased integration, where portions of USAID are moved into State over time, would seriously disrupt and damage the continuity of U.S.

development work. Taking the agency apart piece by piece would result in years of chaos for both USAID and the State Department.

USIA: Comprehensive but sequential integration lacks boldness.

It

would also not be mission-driven, but turf-driven. All four

foreign

affairs agencies -- the large and the small -- must be dismantled and reintegrated to create a new and effective instrument.

OPTION #4 -- Establish a Process for Developing a Reorganization Plan

Rather than presenting the Congress with a specific plan for reorganization, the Administration could propose a process for devising a reorganization plan. There are at least two types of procedures the Administration could propose:

4A. Presidential request for 150 account reorganization authority

The President would submit legislation to the Congress asking for authority to propose a reorganization plan for the foreign affairs

agencies that would be submitted for Congressional approval.

Once

granted such authority, the President would direct OMB to coordinate

a comprehensive review of foreign affairs missions, organizational

structures, programs and activities undertaken within the 150 account as well as those undertaken with funding from other accounts. The review would be coordinated with the bottom-up review

of our military strategies to take place concurrently and would apply approaches adopted by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation enacted in 1986. The reorganization plan that results from these reviews would be submitted to the Congress along with the FY 1999 budget request. The Congress would vote up or down on a resolution of approval under expedited procedures.

If this option is chosen, the Administration would take two further

steps. First, it would establish a Presidential Advisory Panel composed of prestigious Americans drawn from both parties to supplement the OMB-led review and to provide additional advice and recommendations to the President.

Second, the President would issue a new Executive Order creating an interim International Affairs Policy Coordinating Council chaired by the Secretary of State (to be modified when Congress approves a reorganization plan). The Council would include all 150 account agencies and departments to ensure coordination of bilateral and multilateral development, trade related activities and public diplomacy. The Council's charge would be to provide stronger policy direction for international programs, ensure more coherent foreign affairs strategy, promote the more effective use of U.S. bilateral instruments through which the United States encourages international cooperation abroad and ensure that the bilateral and multilateral programs contribute to better complement each other. The Council would meet at least quarterly and would prepare an annual report on the status of coordination of civilian international programs of the U.S. government.

Pros: Would clarify the merits of the various reorganization proposals and help build political support for one version. Linking review of international affairs structures with review of military strategies would provide an overall post-Cold War national security review. The fact that the President would be acting under a grant of authority from the Congress would give the review additional credibility on the Hill. We would have nearly one year to conduct our review, our deliberations would not be tied to the pressure of the 1998 legislative calendar, and our FY 98 budget request would be considered in isolation from the reorganization issue.

Cons: The Congress might amend the initial legislation authorizing the OMB-led review to restrict reorganization options or to mandate unrealistic cost savings. Puts off a final decision for at least

one
year, keeping the agencies in limbo.

Agency Views:

State: To Be Provided

ACDA: This option is appealing for three reasons: (1) Reorganization authority has sound precedents, and can avoid or minimize Congressional rewriting of Administration decisions; (2) procedurally, it will allow the Administration the time necessary to arrive at sound judgments; and (3) a bottom-up review may bring to light areas of duplication and potential cost efficiencies outside of the 150 account agencies. Identification and elimination of such unnecessary efforts could strengthen, unify and clarify our foreign policy decision-making process and efforts.

USAID: USAID strongly favors a presidential request for reorganization authority. It gives the issue the sense of gravity it deserves. Properly structured, this review would provide a serious look at our foreign policy agencies in the years ahead and help define how to achieve them while bringing the best available expertise to bear. No "quick fix" reorganization option, whatever its content, can meet this test. Any review must address our problems of foreign affairs direction and management honestly and in a nonpartisan fashion, and it must seek the widest possible range of inputs. This option has the advantage of a simple up-and-down vote by the Congress and a clear end-date. It also keeps control of designing the plan in the hands of the Executive Branch.

USIA: This option lacks conceptual strength and energy, does not clearly embody foreign affairs purposes and will open the door to tinkering and political controversy that in the end will create more difficulty than a continuation of our present efforts -- which are not, in all cases, lightly to be dismissed.

4B. Commission Jointly Appointed by the President and the Congress

Senator Biden has proposed that the Administration work with the Congress to pass legislation creating a bipartisan commission on reorganization appointed jointly by the President and the Congress.

The commission would report its non-binding recommendations within three months after it begins operation.

Pros: The panel could clarify the merits of the various reorganization proposals and help build a political consensus around one version. Being a joint executive-legislative initiative would give the commission additional credibility on the Hill.

Cons: May not recommend a reorganization plan that meets Administration approval. The price of Senate support for a bipartisan commission is likely to be a promise by Senate Democrats to allow Senator Helms to hold a non-filibustered vote on his reform proposal. Risks being seen as ceding the President's authority to determine the organization of the executive branch.

Agency Views:

State: To Be Provided

ACDA: The Administration should make its own decision as to what foreign policy structure will best serve the President and the U.S. interests.

USAID: USAID believes three months would not allow enough time for outside participants to study the issues and develop a good plan.

We prefer Option 4A.

USIA: This option lacks conceptual strength and energy, does not clearly embody foreign affairs purposes and will open the door to tinkering and political controversy that in the end will create more difficulty than a continuation of our present efforts -- which are not, in all cases, lightly to be dismissed.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 March 97 13:27
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: CWC Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Murray, Lori E.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

lori: looks very good! you might want to give a short version of this to our press people with the president in case he gets asked about it during the press conference tomorrow.

From: Murray, Lori E.
To: @PRESS - Public Affairs
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; Bendick, Gordon L.; Danvers, William C.; Harris, Elisa D.; Bell, Robert at Trip; Blinken, Antony at Trip; Johnson, David at Trip
Subject: CWC Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, March 20, 1997 12:29 AM

<<Attached File: PGHELMS.DOC>>

The attached press guidance anticipates questions regarding tonights floor statement by Senator Helms on CWC. Comments welcome.

[Email did not print properly. Email re-constructed by Archives staff]

http://classifiedhttp://classified/email/data_source/msmail/record/cd005/mar1997/33328089.html

page 1 of 16

M S M a i l DATE-TIME 21 March 97 07:33

FROM Rubin, Eric S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT URGENT First Draft POTUS Q/As 3-21 0730 [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Black, Todd F.

Brennan, Steven A.

Brooks, Jennifer

Flessas, Dan

Florio, Elaine

Gerstner, Christina L.

Gladbach, Damon J.

Glinski, David L.

Hamilton, Roy A.

Harmon, Joyce A.

Harris, Karen

Harrison, Lyle M.

Higgins, David B.

Hofmann, Stephan D.

Huggins, Peter

Johnson, Natalie A.

Koehler, Marc

Lawrence, Cynthia

Martinez, Alejandro

Mueller, William (Doug) D.

O'loughlin, Kathrine

O'Shaughnessy, Patrick

Papadimitriou, Marianna

Rice, Sean P.

Robinson, Wylma

Sigler, Ralph

Simonalle, Eugene A.

Weber, Paul A.

Whitworth, Frank D.

Wright, Jay

Johnson, David T.

CARBON_COPY Rubin, Eric S.

TEXT_BODY

[[POTUS21.DOC : 1848 in POTUS21.DOC]]WHSR: Please pass to McCurry and Johnson in Helsinki via Roadrunner. Thanks.

HELSINKI: FOR DAVID JOHNSON ONLY

David: NESA will provide updated Q/A on bombing. I assume we do not need to give you Russia stuff. Sandy Kristoff will provide some Burma points shortly.

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 21 March 97 7:30

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME POTUS21.DOC
(3/21/97; 07:30 EST)

PRESIDENTIAL GUIDANCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

March 21, 1997

Lake/Tenet/NSC

China--VP Trip

China--Long Beach Shipping Terminal

Mexico Narcotics Certification

Middle East: Har Homa

National Security Priorities

Gulf War Illnesses

Bosnia -- Elections and US Withdrawal

Zaire

Albania

CWC

Security at U.S. facilities in the Gulf region

LAKE/TENET/NSC

This week you nominated Acting CIA Director George Tenet to be the next DCI. Was Mr. Tenet chosen simply because he could get through confirmation easily, and don't you think he will be grilled about stories such as Roger Tamraz and other access problems that took place while he was intelligence officer at the NSC and then at CIA?

First of all, let me say a few words about George Tenet. He worked for me for four years, while he was at the NSC and then at CIA. He has impeccable credentials and solid experience in the intelligence arena and has been well received within the

agency.

The fact that he has credibility on Capitol Hill is a plus. He was chosen because he has demonstrated enormous ability in the intelligence area. I think he will make a superb DCI.

As to his hearing, I can only say what I said about Tony Lake's hearing. These hearings must focus on the critical issues facing the agency and on the role of the CIA in helping to meet new challenges from proliferation to terrorism to drugs. These hearings must be an examination of judgment, not an endurance test.

But Mr. Tenet was Deputy DCI at the time that Don Fowler was allegedly calling up the CIA and getting reports sanitized on Roger Tamraz. Shouldn't he have to explain what he knew and did not know?

The Tamraz case is the subject of investigations by CIA General Counsel and WH Counsel. Indeed, Mr. Tenet has moved aggressively to make sure these investigations take place within the agency. Beyond that, I am not going to comment on the specifics of the case.

Do you think Mr. Lake was unfairly treated, and why do you presume Senator Shelby was so determined to do him in? And what about Senator Kerry whose support for Lake seemed to wane at the end?

I am not going to speculate on Senator Shelby's motives or speak for any Senator. I will only say that, in my view, too much time was spent in these hearings and in the run-up to them on issues such as raw FBI files when, as I said, we have important intelligence matters before us.

These recent cases involving Johnnie Chung, Roger Tamraz, and the FBI investigation into Chinese influence peddling in the US suggest that there are problems both with how the NSC interacts with the White House and other agencies and how much information does or does not flow to the top. You were Lake's deputy during these incidents. In retrospect, were you cut out?

Let me make a few points. First, the NSC is made up of enormously talented professionals who work 16, 17 hours a day carrying out US foreign policy. I trust the judgment of these people and don't for a minute think that I need to know about every call or meeting they have. In fact, I think, if you look back, it is hard not to conclude that they acted responsibly.

At the same time, I recognize that we have to draw some lessons from things that have happened in the past and that it is my responsibility to clarify the rules of the road for the NSC as to how it interacts both internally with the White House or other agencies and externally.

Sandy Berger has begun a serious review of procedures. In fact, he has had preliminary conversations with former National Security Advisers Brzezinski and Scowcroft and they have agreed to continue a dialogue about what was done in the past and what should be done in the future.

Do you think that Tony Lake built too high a wall between the NSC and the political side of the house?

I don't think this is a question of walls, but of balance. My own view is that we have to strike a balance between an NSC that is too insulated and one that is too open. We cannot cut off all contacts between the NSC and outsiders seeking to understand our foreign policy. And having a meeting with someone is not inherently sinister. But it should be based on foreign policy considerations, not on political considerations.

During the campaign, you chaired weekly political meetings which some argue blurred the lines between foreign policy and politics.

First of all these were meetings that were held during the campaign when it was necessary to coordinate our domestic and foreign policy messages. It would have been unwise, in my view, for our domestic communications strategy to be divorced completely from the themes we were articulating on foreign policy. I felt then and feel now

that it is important that there be a dialogue between the domestic and foreign policy sides of the administration to formulate a coherent message and so I saw nothing wrong with being part of those strategy sessions.

How rare or commonplace do you think events like the Tamraz case are at the NSC, where you have pressure from an outside group like the DNC for the NSC to approve something?

We have not done a scientific or quantitative review but my own sense is that these are anomalies, not commonplace occurrences.

Have all these reports of Chinese access and influence peddling hurt our relations with China? Have we altered our policy in light of these revelations? What about the Boeing deal?

The US and China have important mutual interests and an enormously complex agenda of issues to confront from proliferation to trade to human rights. We are pursuing an engagement strategy with Beijing which is in the US national interest and focuses on a strategic dialogue. That policy continues.

As to specific events, it is important, first of all, that we not get ahead of the facts. Investigations are underway, but it is far too early to make conclusions with respect to Chinese actions and I am not going to comment on these investigations.

CHINA

What is the status of China's leadership? What will the Vice President accomplish on his visit to China? How are you going to handle the UNHRC resolution issue in light of the human rights situation in China? What effect will the release of dissident Wang Dan have on the resolution?

We have an interest in a China that is integrating into international community, not moving toward isolation or nationalism.

Can exert greater influence if we are engaged with China, both to work on areas of common concern (e.g. Korea, environment), and to deal frankly with differences (e.g. human rights).

Vice President Gore will reaffirm our commitment to vigorous relations with China, emphasize areas of agreement and discuss clearly and directly areas of disagreement.

Recognize China is undergoing leadership change to post-Deng era. Planning for the Vice President's meetings in Beijing indicate China continues to have a strong interest in maintaining continuity in policy toward U.S.

Holding high-level meetings does not mean we are ignoring or overlooking areas of disagreement. To the contrary, opportunity to raise our differences, try to solve problems, expand areas of cooperation.

Human rights situation in China not satisfactory -- made this clear on numerous occasions, including during Secretary Albright's visit; will continue to urge more pluralistic, open, democratic society.

As have stated, our decision on UNHRC resolution will be based on China's human rights record. Moving ahead to consult with allies about such a resolution.

Thus far, there is only a Hong Kong press report on Wang Dan's release. If true, it would be a positive development and we would factor it into our decision on the UNHRC resolution.

[If asked about U.S. support for Hong Kong]:

Have expressed our concern about reports of changes being considered in Hong Kong laws, and are raising these issues in discussions with China. Important to keep in mind that vibrant Hong Kong not just in U.S. interest, it's in China's interest.

Maintaining rights of Hong Kong citizens very important. Will be following developments closely and will make our views known.
CHINA: LONG BEACH SHIPPING TERMINAL

Recent news reports incorrectly state that national security concerns raised by members of the California congressional delegation forced the Navy to delay plans to turnover Long Beach Naval Station to the City of Long Beach -- for use by China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO).

The naval station closed in 1994 as a result of the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) process. The City of Long Beach and the Port of Long Beach have proposed that (COSCO) -- which has been a tenant of the Port of Long Beach since 1981 -- serve as the prospective tenant for the property.

The Navy is currently conducting an environmental impact review and cannot dispose of the property until the review is concluded. (There is a pending request from Senators Boxer and Feinstein for the NSC to conduct a national security review of the proposed COSCO lease. Sandy Berger is examining the request but no decision has been made.)

Understand news accounts are in error -- that the Navy has not delayed plans to turnover the property, but that it is still conducting an environmental review as required by law.

MEXICAN DRUG CERTIFICATION

How can you justify certifying Mexico's cooperation in the fight against drugs? Almost half the Senate thinks you're wrong, they've had to arrest their own drug czar, and DEA says there's not a single police agency they can trust there. Doesn't your decision make the certification process a charade?

Welcome Senate action endorsing greater counterdrug cooperation with Mexico and other nations in the Americas. Bipartisan effort to support common goal of increasing cooperation to keep drugs out of our neighborhoods.

Senate action recognizes ongoing progress being made by President Zedillo and acknowledges that the problems are serious and require work on both sides of border. Working through the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control, we are

ready to continue our active collaboration.

Unprecedented cooperation with Mexico on fight against drugs:

- Created McCaffrey-led high-level joint working group as framework for cooperation.
- For first time, Mexico has extradited Mexicans to face charges in U.S.
- Expelled major drug lord to US; convicted and imprisoned.
- Worked together on 40 money-laundering cases.
- First time in history that U.S., Mexican military working together on drug fight.

No one knows better than President Zedillo what a critical issue drug fight is; it's the number one threat to Mexican national security. Shouldn't forget what he's accomplished:

- Seizures, eradication, arrests up sharply.
- New laws passed to address organized crime, money laundering.
- And more than 1,200 police, others arrested on corruption charges.

Issue is how best to fight drugs. Believe cooperation with neighbors is best. Zedillo has clearly shown the will to fight and is making it his highest national security priority. Decertification would only undermine Mexico's effort and make it more difficult for us to work together.

MIDDLE EAST

(NESA TO PROVIDE UPDATED Q/A ON TEL AVIV BOMBING)

Q: What's your reaction to the Israelis' breaking ground at Har Homa?

A: You know my views on construction at Har Homa -- would have preferred they not go ahead. Remains my view. What is essential now is an honest and credible negotiating process.

Q: What's your view on the Israeli proposal to accelerate permanent status negotiations?

A: We've seen the reports on this. If either side has proposals to make, should do so directly at the negotiating table. That's precisely the purpose of negotiations, and that's what the Israelis and Palestinians should be focussed on right now.

Q: You and your spokesman are disagreeing regularly with the Israeli Prime Minister. Do you think Netanyahu is making it up when he says the Israelis have evidence that the Palestinians are planning violence ?

A: Violence will resolve nothing and we've made it very clear that all sides should exercise maximum restraint. I've been in touch with Chairman Arafat on this. I believe he is well aware that violence will not benefit Palestinians and he has told us that he is doing all he can to ensure that it does not occur.

Q: What's going on now at the UN? Will you veto another resolution on Har Homa if it comes up?

A: Consultations underway at the U.N. Not going to speculate about any eventual result of those consultations.

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES CLINTON II

Broad strategic objectives for the second term build on the foundation set during the first term:

First: Complete the work of building -- for the first time in history -- a democratic, united Europe around an expanding NATO and a partnership with Russia.

Second: Continue to reconcile our history and our geography by building our bridge to the East as an Asia-Pacific nation.

Third: Deal with the cluster of new security challenges we face: drugs, terrorism, rogue states, and the environment.

Fourth: Continue to recognize that the United States, as the indispensable nation, must lead in the efforts to build peace where our interests and our values are engaged, whether that's in Bosnia, Haiti, the Middle East, Africa, or elsewhere.

Fifth: Build upon the President's historic work in creating a new economic architecture, regionally such as in Latin America as well as globally, one that creates American jobs by competing in the global economy.

Sixth: Sustaining modern and ready military forces and an effective diplomatic capability through

adequate resources.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What about the report that many more veterans may have been exposed to low levels of chemical agent as a result of the Khamisiyah demolitions?

My understanding is that all of the many projections that have been done are still preliminary and based on many remaining unknowns (e.g., weather, number of rockets, etc.) which CIA and DoD are working hard to resolve.

As soon as CIA and DoD have a meaningful projection, that projection will be published and any additional personnel who should be notified will be.

Finally, it's important to remember that the exposure levels involved in all of the projections are very low, and that all Gulf War veterans -- regardless of how close they were to Khamisiyah -- have the same entitlement to health examinations, medical care and compensation for undiagnosed illnesses.

Why does the Pentagon continue to "discover" material it already has about GWI and continue to "lose" material it needs to get to the bottom of what happened? How can your Presidential Advisory Committee lend credibility to an institution that's so hopelessly inept?

Presidential Advisory Committee has been key to fulfilling my pledge to leave no stone unturned to get to bottom of GWI. DoD has acknowledged its prior investigations lacked needed vigor, and significantly intensified its efforts; have begun to see results, including information that should have come to light years ago but we're now uncovering as result of my directive to DoD and CIA to review and declassify as much as possible.

Wish information on Khamisiyah, missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. Documents released recently disturbing -- should have known about them long ago. Directed

we do this in open manner; that's exactly what CIA and DoD are doing.

Consistent with strong resolve to get out the truth, previously extended Presidential Advisory Committee to provide independent oversight of DoD's investigation; subsequently asked the Committee to review recently-released information in assessing ongoing investigation. Also mindful of continuing Army IG, CIA IG, DoD IG, and other investigations.

Finally, important to remember Gulf War veterans must get medical care they need -- and that's happening. Shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low-level chemical exposure.

Today, taking important additional step by extending eligibility period for compensation claims for those Gulf War vets with undiagnosed illnesses to 2001. Will allow vets to get compensation they deserve; they stood by us when we needed them -- we can do no less.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings?

I have asked the PAC to take a careful look at the adequacy of the ongoing investigations and they are obviously doing so. The PAC hasn't formally communicated its preliminary findings to the White House. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for me to comment on them. I do look forward to receiving the PAC report by late April. It is important to remember while we sort out all the uncertainties that medical care is available to all the veterans who need it and that the research programs to look into the possible effects of low-level chemical exposure are being done. And finally, we need the veterans to provide us feedback on their experiences. It would be very helpful if veterans would answer the survey that DOD sent in January and/or call the 800 number(s) [800-472-6719] set up to communicate with the veterans.

Were there misrepresentations about what CIA knew when about

Khamisiyah?

I remain committed to getting out all the facts. As new information comes out I see it as consistent with my direction to leave no stone unturned. Your specific question falls under the purview of ongoing IG investigations and the PAC oversight responsibilities I assigned. I will await the results of those investigations.

BOSNIA

Are you, like Secretary Cohen, disappointed about the delay in Bosnia's municipal elections? Can you stick by Cohen's commitment that the troops are coming out in eighteen months, no matter what?

Believe that municipal elections important step in implementation of Dayton Agreement. Important that they be well prepared, take place under appropriate conditions, with effective international monitoring.

Disappointed that we couldn't get preparations in place in time for elections to take place in July, but committed to working with partners, Allies to ensure September elections take place as scheduled.

Believe we can meet my goal of withdrawing US forces by July '98. Believe that gives sufficient time needed for economic reconstruction, refugee return, and the progress in reconciliation required to create a self-sustaining peace.

ZAIRE

Q: Is the U.S. planning to evacuate citizens from Zaire?:

No, we are not evacuating from Zaire. I have asked the Department of Defense to do contingency planning so that we are ready to implement an evacuation if it becomes necessary. A planning team from the U.S. European Command has been in the region in recent days doing just that.

The State Department authorized the voluntary departure of Embassy employees and family members on March 10

Our Embassy in Kinshasa reports that the city is calm and that there have been no unusual security incidents over the past several days. Nothing has occurred in Kinshasa that would lead us to conclude that an evacuation is necessary at this point.

Meanwhile, we continue to strongly encourage all parties to this conflict to suspend hostilities immediately and enter into talks to reach a comprehensive negotiated settlement.

ALBANIA

With the evacuation of Americans nearly complete and our Embassy secured, our immediate objectives in Albania include: preventing and, if necessary, responding to a humanitarian crisis; warding off intensified conflict; and supporting the new coalition government and setting the stage for elections, return to democratic governance and economic recovery.

The security situation in the country is somewhat more stable but this could be short-lived. The humanitarian situation could deteriorate within the next ten days. We are working with the donor community to prepare international efforts; the big problem will be in delivery of supplies given the security situation in the country.

We are supporting the EU, which has taken upon itself a leading role in resolving the Albanian crisis.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

What is your reaction to << Senator Helms >> statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

<< Senator Helms>>, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

<< Senator Helms>> claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty, it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

We disagree with << Senator Helms>> that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with << Senator Helms>> and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with << Senator Helms>> proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues << Senator Helms>> has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

<< Senator Helms>> claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

SECURITY AT U.S. FACILITIES IN THE GULF REGION

Any response to the report written by your own NSC staffer stating that security at U.S. military and diplomatic facilities in the Persian Gulf region is inadequate?

We are keeping a close eye on the security of U.S. personnel in the Persian Gulf. The report described in the Washington Post article reflects this.

Complacency is dangerous. We take potential threats to our forces very seriously.

The U.S. military and the State Department are constantly evaluating their security posture and where possible enhancing it.

We will do everything we can to protect them without diminishing the ability of our military and diplomatic personnel to their jobs.

Host governments understand our concerns and have been very cooperative.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 March 97 08:26
FROM Bell, Robert G.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: CWC Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Murray, Lori E.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Looks good. One suggestion: instead of saying Helms has proposed 30 Conditions and we've proposed 20 -- say: " Helms has proposed 30 Conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two."

From: Murray, Lori E.

To: @PRESS - Public Affairs

CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; Bendick, Gordon L.; Danvers, William C.; Harris, Elisa D.; Bell, Robert at Trip; Blinken, Antony at Trip; Johnson, David at Trip

Subject: CWC Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Friday, March 21, 1997 12:35 AM

<<Attached File: PGHELMS.DOC>>

The attached press guidance anticipates questions regarding tonight's floor statement by Senator Helms on CWC. Comments welcome.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 March 97 10:18
FROM Lindsay, James M.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Clean Reorg Paper ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO Brown, Nancy E.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
CARBON_COPY Clarke, Richard A.
Danvers, William C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 17 NARA, Date 2/7/2011
2006-1367-F(3)

TEXT_BODY

NOTE FOR DON:

Attached are two clean versions of the reorganization paper. One is structured similar to the original paper with "pros" and "cons." The second collapses the "pros" and "cons" into something called "analysis."

[[CLEAN3.DOC : 2616 in CLEAN3.DOC]][[RAC-ALT.DOC : 2617 in RAC-ALT.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 March 97 10:11

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CLEAN3.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/CLOSE HOLD DRAFT -- 3/21/97 -- 10 AM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify on: 3/14/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/CLOSE HOLD

DRAFT -- 3/21/97 -- 10 AM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REORGANIZATION OPTIONS
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS

I. Purpose and Summary

There are four main options for reorganizing the U.S. foreign policy apparatus:

- A. Modernize without reorganizing
- B. Merge one or two agencies into the State Department
 - 1. Merge ACDA into State
 - 2. Merge USIA into State
 - 3. Merge USAID into State
- C. Integrate all four agencies into a new Department
- D. Establish a process for developing a reorganization plan

The agencies' comments on these options are attached.

II. Background (Placeholder)

With the passing of the Cold War, America faces a new set of national security objectives. We need to ensure that our foreign policy structures and processes are appropriate for these new challenges and opportunities. This requires us to eliminate obsolete structures and practices, improve agency effectiveness, and create and strengthen institutional arrangements that promote policy coherence and coordination. Moreover, the 50% real decline in international affairs spending since FY 1985 makes it imperative to use existing resources as efficiently as possible. Creating a more efficient foreign policy apparatus will increase our credibility with the Congress and help persuade members to fully fund the President's request for international programs.

Whichever reorganization option is chosen, the State Department should invigorate its reinvention process. State could produce appreciable savings by modernizing its procurement, logistics, and financial management systems.

III. Reorganization Options

A. Modernize Without Reorganizing

The Administration could build on agency expertise and minimize disruptions in agency performance by keeping the existing

institutional structure intact but accelerating ongoing reinvention efforts and undertaking new ones. The reinvention process would focus each agency on its core missions, eliminate duplication across and within agencies and introduce more efficient management practices. It would also improve agency coordination by creating a modern, "networked" Department of State that has tighter links to the three smaller agencies.

Pros: Reinvention within the existing structure would retain the "core competencies" of each agency while linking them more closely to our overall foreign policy objectives.

Cons: This option may subordinate each agency's unique mission to the short-term, bilateral focus of traditional diplomacy.

B. Merge One or Two Agencies into State

The new national security challenges the United States faces may have rendered obsolete the rationale for having three independent agencies, but it may still be appropriate to keep one or two independent. A partial integration entails one of the following three variants or some combination of them. (None of variants preclude other management reforms or restructuring at State or at the unaffected agencies.)

1. Merge ACDA into State

America's simultaneous involvement in several bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations during the Cold War era justified the existence of an independent arms control agency. With the focus of arms control in the post-Cold War era shifting to the implementation of existing agreements, ACDA's continued independence may make less sense.

If ACDA were merged into the State Department, State's Bureau of Political Military Affairs would be restructured into two separate bureaus and all ACDA personnel would be integrated accordingly. Both bureaus would report to the Under Secretary for International Security Policy (T).

Within this broad restructuring, the new T could be organized in several ways. One variant would assign ACDA's verification and compliance functions directly to the Under Secretary's office.

To

preserve ACDA's independent advocacy functions, the Under Secretary

could serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of State, the

National Security Council and the President for arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament. The model and precedent for the

Under Secretary's advisory role would be the relationship of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President. An alternative way to

preserve an independent arms control voice would be to recreate the

position of Arms Control Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State based on the Paul Nitze role in the Reagan Administration.

At the same time that ACDA and State are merged, State's crime, narcotics and terrorism functions could be placed under T. This would group programs on "new security threats," including WMD proliferation, under the same Under Secretary.

Pros: Merging ACDA into State would eliminate duplication between

the two agencies and match the interagency decision-making process

for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation with the overall

foreign policy decision-making process.

Cons: A merger might lead to arms control interests being subordinated to short-term, bilateral interests. A strong, independent voice for arms control could be lost.

2. Merge USIA into State

The increasing number of democracies in the world and the globalization of the mass media call into question the practice of

separating public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy. Merging USIA into State would entail merging all public affairs functions in

Washington since they are, de facto, merged already in country.

Some functions could be placed within the Public Affairs bureau and

some within the Democracy bureau. A new Under Secretary for Public

Diplomacy could be created. The broadcast functions could be merged, spun off to an independent agency or privatized. The exchange programs could be merged or put into a separate foundation that can leverage private resources with public ones.

Pros: A merger of USIA into the State Department would make public diplomacy more central to the practice of diplomacy.

Cons: Public diplomacy does not fit well with traditional diplomacy which is why USIA was created as an independent agency. Privatization and the creation of an independent broadcast agency runs contrary to the policy the Administration developed in 1994 on broadcast consolidation.

3. Merge USAID into State

Sustainable development is becoming more central to U.S. foreign policy and it should be managed by the government's lead foreign policy agency. If development assistance remains outside the State Department, it may be increasingly marginalized.

Merging USAID into State entails merging the two agencies' regional bureaus and assigning USAID's responsibility for managing global programs to State's functional bureaus.

Pros: The merger of USAID into State would eliminate duplication; achieve closer policy coordination and program implementation; strengthen ties between development and relief programs on the one hand and diplomatic and economic policy initiatives on the other; align development assistance and foreign policy goals; and use resources more efficiently.

Cons: The ability of the United States to do long-term development work independently of short-term, bilateral constraints could be hampered as a unique development focus is lost. Because the State Department deals primarily to foreign governments, merging USAID into State might create pressure to expand government-to-government

programs at the expense of programs that involve NGOs and business.

State is primarily a policy agency rather than a program management agency.

C. Integrate All Four Agencies in a new Department

The proliferation of agencies that made sense during the Cold War no longer does. As we enter the post-Cold War era we need a foreign policy structure that puts the new national security threats at the forefront of our diplomacy rather than isolates them. A new Department would not merely collect existing agencies under a new banner but reinvent and integrate each of them into a new streamlined organization that draws on the best people and practices of the old agencies.

One outstanding issue is how to integrate the agencies. One approach would be to emulate the DOD model of defense agencies such as DSAA. Another would be to transform ACDA, USAID and USIA into bureaus within the larger Department. A third would be to integrate all four agencies while spinning off core USAID programs into an International Development Foundation (IDF) that would be a public/private partnership.

The second outstanding issue is the pace of integration. One approach would be to integrate all four agencies simultaneously. The alternative would be to integrate them sequentially. Such a phased integration would take into account the relative differences in the complexity of the three smaller agencies.

Pros: Integration would improve the coherence of foreign policy and make it easier to allocate resources according to foreign policy priorities. The structure of the foreign affairs agencies should reflect the fact that issues such as sustainable development and nonproliferation are more central than ever to American foreign policy. Integration also will produce savings in the out years, with the exact amount depending on the precise nature of the reorganization undertaken.

Cons: Integration risks subordinating the unique missions of each

agency to the short-term bilateral focus of traditional diplomacy.

(The creation of an IDF would insulate sustainable development from the pressures of short-term diplomacy.) Integration will require greater spending in the short term and it may disrupt agency performance for a time.

D. Establish a Process for Developing a Reorganization Plan

The issue of which institutional structure best serves America's foreign policy interests is complicated, controversial and of great importance. Given this, the Administration may wish to forego presenting a specific reorganization plan in the next few weeks and instead propose a process that will carefully consider the issue and then devise a reorganization plan.

The Administration could proceed in one of two ways. The first would be to submit legislation to the Congress requesting reorganization authority. Once the Congress agreed, the President would direct OMB to coordinate a comprehensive review of structures, missions and programs. This review would produce a reorganization plan to be submitted to the Congress along with the FY 1999 budget request. The Congress would vote up or down on a resolution of approval under expedited procedures.

A second approach would be Senator Biden's proposal to create a bipartisan commission appointed jointly by the President and the Congress. The commission would report its non-binding recommendations within three months of beginning operation.

Pros: A review process could clarify the merits of the various reorganization proposals and help build a political consensus around one version. The fact that the Congress authorized the review/commission would give it credibility on the Hill.

Cons: The Congress may amend the legislation authorizing the review/commission to restrict reorganization options or mandate unrealistic cost savings. The bipartisan commission might recommend a reorganization plan that the Administration dislikes. The

price
of Senate support for a bipartisan commission is likely to be a
promise by Senate Democrats to allow Senator Helms to hold a
non-filibustered vote on his reform proposal. Granting the
Congress
the right to pick members of the bipartisan commission will be
seen
as ceding the President's authority to determine the organization
of
the executive branch.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 March 97 10:11

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

RAC-ALT.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/CLOSE HOLD DRAFTERAC -- 3/21/97 -- 10 AM
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5 (b, d)
Declassify on: 3/14/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/CLOSE HOLD

DRAFTERAC -- 3/21/97 -- 10 AM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REORGANIZATION OPTIONS
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS

I. Purpose and Summary

There are four main options for reorganizing the U.S. foreign
policy
apparatus:

- A. Modernize without reorganizing
- B. Merge one or two agencies into the State Department
 - 1. Merge ACDA into State
 - 2. Merge USIA into State
 - 3. Merge USAID into State
- C. Integrate all four agencies into a new Department
- D. Establish a process for developing a reorganization plan

The agencies' comments on these options are attached.

II. Background (Placeholder)

With the passing of the Cold War, America faces a new set of

national security objectives. We need to ensure that our foreign policy structures and processes are appropriate for these new challenges and opportunities. This requires us to eliminate obsolete structures and practices, improve agency effectiveness, and create and strengthen institutional arrangements that promote policy coherence and coordination. Moreover, the 50% real decline in international affairs spending since FY 1985 makes it imperative to use existing resources as efficiently as possible. Creating a more efficient foreign policy apparatus will increase our credibility with the Congress and help persuade members to fully fund the President's request for international programs.

Whichever reorganization option is chosen, the State Department should invigorate its reinvention process. State could produce appreciable savings by modernizing its procurement, logistics, and financial management systems.

III. Reorganization Options

A. Modernize Without Reorganizing

Option: The reinvention process would focus each agency on its core missions, eliminate duplication across and within agencies and introduce more efficient management practices. It would also improve policy coordination by creating a "networked" Department of State that has tighter links to the three smaller agencies.

Analysis: Modernizing without reorganizing could build on each agency's core expertise while linking them more closely to our overall foreign policy objectives. By forfeiting the chance to close agencies and reallocate missions, however, modernization guarantees that some unnecessary duplication will continue.

B. Merge One or Two Agencies into State

The new national security challenges the United States faces may have rendered obsolete the rationale for having three independent agencies, but it may still be appropriate to keep one or two independent. A partial integration entails one of the following three variants or some combination of them. (None of these options

preclude other management reforms or restructuring at State or at the unaffected agencies.)

1. Merge ACDA into State

Option: Merging ACDA into the State Department would require reorganizing State's Bureau of Political Military Affairs into two separate bureaus and integrating all ACDA personnel accordingly. Both bureaus would report to the Under Secretary for International Security Policy (T).

Within this broad restructuring, the new T could be organized in several ways. One variant would assign ACDA's verification and compliance functions directly to the Under Secretary's office.

To

preserve ACDA's independent advocacy functions, the Under Secretary

could serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of State, the

National Security Council and the President for arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament. The model and precedent for the

Under Secretary's advisory role would be the relationship of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President. An alternative way to

preserve an independent arms control voice would be to recreate the

position of Arms Control Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State based on the Paul Nitze role in the Reagan Administration.

If ACDA and State are merged, State's crime, narcotics and terrorism

functions could also be placed under T. This would group programs

on "new security threats," including WMD proliferation, under the same Under Secretary.

Analysis: The end of the Cold War has shifted the focus of arms control from prolonged bilateral and multilateral negotiations to implementing existing agreements. This shift is rendering ACDA's continued independence less necessary and creating an opportunity to

eliminate duplication between ACDA and State and to match the interagency decision-making process for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation with the overall foreign policy decision-making

process. A merger does risk subordinating arms control interests to short-term bilateral interests and losing an independent voice for arms control.

2. Merge USIA into State

Option: Merging USIA into State would entail merging all public affairs functions in Washington since they are, de facto, merged already in country. Some functions could be placed within the Public Affairs bureau and some within the Democracy bureau. A new

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy could be created. The broadcast functions could be merged, spun off to an independent agency or privatized. The exchange programs could be merged or put into a separate foundation that can leverage private resources with public ones.

Analysis: The increasing number of democracies in the world and the globalization of the mass media call into question the wisdom of separating public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy. Merging USIA and State would make public diplomacy more central to our foreign policy. Critics worry that public diplomacy does not fit well with traditional diplomacy, which is why USIA was created as an independent agency. Privatization and the creation of an independent broadcast agency also runs contrary to the Administration's 1994 policy on broadcast consolidation.

3. Merge USAID into State

Option: Merging USAID into State entails merging the two agencies' regional bureaus and assigning USAID's responsibility for managing global programs to State's functional bureaus.

Analysis: Sustainable development is becoming more central to U.S. foreign policy and it should be managed by the government's lead foreign policy agency. Moreover, merging USAID and State would produce several practical benefits: it would eliminate duplication and thereby save resources; achieve closer policy coordination and

program implementation; strengthen ties between development and relief programs on the one hand and diplomatic and economic policy initiatives on the other; and align development assistance and foreign policy goals.

The risk in merging USAID and State is that long-term development work might become subject to excessive short-term, bilateral constraints. State's primary mission is dealing with foreign governments, which might create pressure to expand government-to-government programs at the expense of programs that involve NGOs and business. Special care will need to be taken to ensure that these pressures do not overwhelm the development mission and that USAID's programmatic expertise is not lost in the merger.

C. Integrate All Four Agencies in a new Department

Option: A new Department would not merely collect existing agencies under a new banner but reinvent and integrate each of them into a new streamlined organization that draws on the best people and practices of the old agencies.

One outstanding issue is how to integrate the agencies. One approach would be to emulate the DOD model of defense agencies such as DSAA. Another would be to transform ACDA, USAID and USIA into bureaus within the larger Department. A third would be to integrate all four agencies while spinning off core USAID programs into an International Development Foundation (IDF) that would be a public/private partnership.

The second outstanding issue is the pace of integration. One approach would be to integrate all four agencies simultaneously. The alternative would be integrate agencies sequentially or in phases. Such a phased integration would seek to take into account the relative differences in the complexity of the three smaller agencies.

Analysis: ACDA, USAID and USIA were created or spun-out of the State Department during the Cold War because State was seen as too consumed by short-term Cold War priorities to give proper attention to development, public diplomacy and arms control. The end of

the Cold War has made these issues more central to our foreign policy but we continue to operate with an organizational structure designed to isolate them from the policy-making mainstream. The result is a fragmented policy-making process in which agencies are not allies but bureaucratic competitors.

Integration would end this fragmentation, improve the coherence of policy making, and make it easier to allocate resources according to policy priorities. Moreover, a thorough going integration that remade State's internal management structures and processes would produce significant savings in the out years.

The major risk with integration is that State's diplomatic mission would overwhelm all other missions, which is why it is essential that State be remade in the process. (The creation of an IDF would insulate sustainable development from the pressures of short-term diplomacy but at the cost of limiting the executive branch's ability to use it to promote foreign policy goals.) Integration will also require greater spending in the short term and it may disrupt agency performance for a time.

D. Establish a Process for Developing a Reorganization Plan

Option: Rather than presenting the Congress with a specific reorganization plan, the Administration could propose a process for developing one. This could be done in one of two ways. The first would be to submit legislation to the Congress requesting reorganization authority. Once the Congress agreed, the President would direct OMB to coordinate a comprehensive review of organizational structures, missions and programs. This review would produce a reorganization plan to be submitted to the Congress along with the FY 1999 budget request. The Congress would vote up or down on a resolution of approval under expedited procedures.

The second approach would be Senator Biden's proposal to create a bipartisan commission appointed jointly by the President and the Congress. The commission would report its non-binding recommendations within three months of beginning operation.

Analysis: A review or commission process offers an opportunity to clarify the merits of the various reorganization proposals and to build a political consensus around one version. The danger with such an approach is that Congress may amend the legislation authorizing the review/commission to restrict reorganization options or mandate unrealistic cost savings. Moreover, the bipartisan commission might be seen as ceding the President's authority to determine the organization of the executive branch and it might recommend a reorganization plan the Administration dislikes.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 March 97 19:45
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Abdulmalik, April B.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer
Brown, Nancy E.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya

Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Davis, William K.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Flessas, Dan
Florio, Elaine
Flynn, Stephen E.
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Gladbach, Damon J.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.

Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Martinez, Alejandro
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Mercier, Henry J.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick

Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Gwyn M. Parker
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Prendergast, John P.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Showalter, Victoria A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.

Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates **IN BOLD** to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Monday, March 24. Thank you.

[[MAR21GUI.DOC : 4896 in MAR21GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 March 97 18:17

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

MAR21GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 21, 1997

Trips and Visitors

Clinton-Yeltsin Summit

NATO

Russia Supercomputers

Persian Gulf

Middle East

Albania

Mexico

Korea

China UNHRC

Bosnia

Zaire

Northern Ireland

Gulf War Illnesses

CWC

Nazi Assets

Nicaragua

Cuba

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ President met with President Mubarak of Egypt on March 10; King Hussein of Jordan has decided to postpone his visit, scheduled for March 18, due to uncertainties surrounding his schedule, as well as the President's.

☐ POTUS and Yeltsin met in Helsinki March 20-21. POTUS will travel to Denmark in July in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Madrid.

☐ Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ President will travel to Mexico April 11-12, Latin America and the Caribbean, including a yet-to-be-formatted Venezuela stop, May 6-13.

☐ Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch.

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Denver Summit June 20-22.

☐ Irish Prime Minister Bruton was here for annual St. Patrick's Day celebration.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM Hashimoto visit to Washington this spring.

CLINTON-YELTSIN SUMMIT

The Road to Helsinki:
Building a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia

From the beginning of his Administration, President Clinton has sought to advance democratic and market reform in Russia, reduce the nuclear threat, and build a constructive relationship to work through problems and build up cooperation. A stable, democratic, market-oriented Russia enhances America's security, as does the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. An open and more secure Russia supports international stability and peace, and the 150 million Russian consumers offer an important market for American products.

The Helsinki Summit is an opportunity for Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, in the first meeting of their second terms, to set a course for our bilateral relationship for the next four years, and into the 21st century. The goals of the summit are to further reduce

the nuclear danger, to build a more stable and secure Europe, and to promote mutually advantageous trade and investment. In advancing these goals, President Clinton and President Yeltsin will build on a strong foundation of cooperation that they have put in place over the past four years.

Arms Control: Reducing the Danger of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The United States and Russia have recorded substantial achievements over the last four years in reducing the nuclear threat that have made the American and Russian people safer.

Reducing the Nuclear Threat:

☐ **Detargeting Missiles:** In January 1994, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to detarget strategic missiles. As a result, no Russian missiles are targeted on America and no American missiles are targeted on Russia.

☐ **Eliminating Bombers and Missiles:** The U.S., Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine entered the START I Treaty into force in December 1994 and have been implementing it since then. The U.S. also has ratified the START II Treaty. When ratified by Russia, the START II Treaty, together with the START I Treaty, will eliminate bombers and missiles that carried over 14,000 Russian and American nuclear warheads -- cutting our arsenals by two-thirds from their Cold War height.

☐ **Denuclearizing Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine:** The U.S. played a key role in negotiating the Trilateral Statement with Russia and Ukraine that provided for the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia and compensation to Ukraine. U.S. assistance facilitated the removal of nuclear weapons from Belarus and Kazakstan. As of the end of 1996, there were no nuclear warheads in any former Soviet republic other than Russia.

☐ **Ending Nuclear Testing:** President Clinton led the international effort to conclude the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and was the first world

leader to sign this historic agreement on September 24, 1996. By banning all nuclear explosions, the treaty will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, as well as end the development of advanced and new types of nuclear weapons. The U.S. worked closely with Russia to conclude this treaty, the longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history.

□ Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: U.S.-Russia diplomatic coordination was critical in securing the unconditional and indefinite extension by consensus of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- the cornerstone of our efforts to control nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear Security:

□ Unprecedented Cooperation to Improve Security of Nuclear Materials: The U.S. is engaged in unprecedented programs of cooperation with a number of countries, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine, to improve the security of nuclear materials and protect them from theft or diversion. In Russia alone, this program is protecting hundreds of tons of weapons-useable nuclear material at over forty facilities.

□ Controlling Weapon-Grade Uranium: The U.S. signed and began implementation of an agreement with Russia to purchase 500 metric tons of weapon-grade, highly-enriched uranium for dilution to safer, low-enriched uranium to be used in commercial power reactors. Nearly 900 bombs-worth of weapon-grade uranium have already been shipped to the U.S. under this agreement.

□ Transferring and Safeguarding Weapons: Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program, the U.S. is helping Russia to transport, safeguard and destroy its nuclear weapons and to build a national system to secure and safeguard

weapons-usable fissile material.

Missiles, Chemical and Biological Weapons:

☐ **Strengthening MTCR:** To help combat the proliferation of ballistic missiles, the U.S. has achieved stronger guidelines and expanded membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), including Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, South Africa, and Russia. In addition, Ukraine and China have agreed to abide by the MTCR guidelines.

Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies:

☐ **Wassenaar Arrangement:** In order to contribute to regional and international security, the U.S. helped establish the Wassenaar Arrangement, which will promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arm and related dual-use technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations of such items. Thirty-three countries are members of the Wassenaar Arrangement, including Russia.

Building an Undivided, Democratic, Peaceful Europe

European Security: U.S. and Russian Roles:

In their May 1995 Joint Statement, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin affirmed the "shared goal of a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe." They noted then their "determination to cooperate closely to ensure that in the future, all peoples of the Euro-Atlantic region shall enjoy the benefits of a stable, just and peaceful order."

NATO is the anchor of Europe's security. Over the past two years, the United States, together with our NATO allies, has worked with Russia to build a robust NATO-Russia relationship and make Russia a partner of the Alliance.

☐ **An Ongoing Dialogue:** NATO and Russian representatives maintain an ongoing dialogue at the ministerial, ambassadorial, and working levels.

☐ **Primakov-Solana:** Most recently, Russian Foreign Minister

Primakov had discussions with the sixteen NATO foreign ministers in December 1996. In January 1997, he began meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana to consider the possibility of a NATO-Russia charter that would institutionalize a strengthened relationship between the Alliance and Russia.

☐ NATO-Russia Consultations: NATO and Russia have held frequent and wide-ranging consultations on peacekeeping, civil preparedness and disaster relief, as well as environmental, scientific and nuclear issues. NATO and Russian experts regularly discuss dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction, multilateral arms control and nuclear non-proliferation.

☐ Adapting the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty: In February, NATO put forward a comprehensive proposal for adapting the 30-nation CFE Treaty to take account of the changes in Europe since the Treaty was signed in 1990. The proposal is designed to ensure that an adapted Treaty will continue to prevent any destabilizing build-up of forces in different regions of Europe.

☐ Partnership for Peace: Russia became a member of the Partnership for Peace in June 1994 and has since participated in the planning and conduct of multinational military exercises with NATO members and Partner countries.

☐ Dayton Peace Accords Implementation: NATO and Russia have worked together in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords: since December 1995, U.S. and Russian troops have been patrolling Bosnia's Inter-Entity Boundary Line side-by-side.

Democracy:

☐ Russia Elections: Russia held free and fair parliamentary elections in 1995 and presidential elections in 1996. By their vote in the July 3 presidential run-off which returned President Yeltsin to office, the Russian people made clear their rejection of a return to the past and their support for reform.

☐ Democratic Institution Building: U.S. assistance has furthered the development of democratic

institutions in Russia. U.S. assistance has helped Russia improve the transparency of its elections and contributed directly to the development of an independent judiciary.

□ Civic Development: The U.S., through direct grants and institutions like the Eurasia Foundation, has supported the development of hundreds of grassroots civic organizations in areas ranging from environmental advocacy to independent media to business associations; they are contributing to a new Russian civil society.

□ Leadership Development: Annually the U.S. sponsors over 1,500 Russians in programs ranging from long-term training to intensive three-week seminars; these are helping train Russia's future leaders and solidifying the foundations for future relations between our countries.

Expanding Trade and Investment

We have already helped Russia lay the foundation for a market economy. The Russian private sector now produces 70% of Russia's Gross Domestic Product, inflation has been sharply reduced, and the ruble has been stabilized. Our present challenge is to help Russia achieve the next stage of economic reforms to attract investment and stimulate economic growth. U.S. economic relations with Russia will focus on trade and investment -- which will advance the interests of both of our countries by strengthening Russian stability and prosperity, opening new markets and creating new job opportunities.

U.S. and International Assistance:

□ U.S. Bilateral Assistance: Since 1993, total U.S. bilateral assistance amounts to some \$4 billion, including \$2 billion for the Freedom Support Act, over \$1 billion for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and the rest for humanitarian aid.

□ IMF and World Bank Assistance: With strong U.S. backing, the IMF and World Bank have supported Russia's reforms with financing of over \$25 billion.

Economic Progress:

- ☐ Economic Reform: U.S. assistance has facilitated Russian economic reform. Inflation is down, the ruble is stabilized, and over 70% of Russian GDP is generated in the private sector.
- ☐ Economic Stabilization: Russia's adherence to a tough stabilization program has brought inflation down from 131% in 1995 to 22% in 1996 -- a level comparable to Poland and Hungary.
- ☐ Currency and Output: Russia's currency has remained stable; while official statistics show that GDP declined 6% in 1996, the economy may have ended its contraction if one counts the contributions of the "unofficial" business sector.
- ☐ Privatization: U.S. assistance has helped Russia privatize more property in a shorter time than any such effort in history. Over 120,000 large and small enterprises have been transferred to private hands, and real wages have begun to grow.
- ☐ Capital Markets: Russia's stock market has soared, rising from March 1996 lows of 119 on the Moscow Times Index to 589 in early March 1997. U.S. assistance was key to forming Russia's capital market infrastructure and the regulation of securities trade.

Trade and Investment:

- ☐ U.S. Investment: Bilateral trade and investment are growing, with total trade up 65 percent over the last three years. The U.S. is the largest foreign investor in Russia.
- ☐ Foreign Investment: With key policy reforms in the areas of tax, energy and commercial law reform, Russia has the potential to attract vast increases in foreign investment, including \$50-60 billion in the energy sector alone.
- ☐ Commercial Transactions: As of July 1996, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Trade and Development Agency supported

commercial transactions with Russia valued at over \$4 billion.

NATO -- CONVENTIONAL FORCE POSTURE

Q: This new language on stationed forces appears to go much further than language on conventional forces contained in the NATO enlargement study. Has NATO changed its military strategy, and if so, has it done so under pressure from Russia?

A: Many questions have been raised about the deployment of NATO forces in the context of the new security environment in Europe. These concerns have led some to draw conclusions that are not accurate.

This language does not reflect a change in NATO's military strategy. It simply reiterates what the Alliance has already undertaken.

The 1991 new NATO strategic concept established NATO policy on how NATO will evolve to meet the new security situation. This statement is derived from the strategic concept and captures in a few words NATO's existing policy on stationed forces.

This statement is reflected in NATO's enlargement study of Sept. 1995 which was presented to all potential new members.

This statement also reiterates the concept described in the administration's February 1997 Report to Congress on NATO enlargement.

The Chairman of the Military Committee reviewed this statement and saw no need for military review and advice.

Q: Is this a concession to Moscow to offset its concerns with NATO enlargement?

A: No. The statement reflects internal NATO decisions

reaching as far back as 1991.

Of course, this decision, like all such decisions, reflects NATO's understanding of the security situation in Europe as well as the concerns of all relevant parties.

We believe the statement will clarify NATO's intentions.

Q: Does this represent, along with the "three no's" nuclear language, another step in a series of concessions to Russia in order to secure their agreement to NATO enlargement?

A: No. As we have said previously, this is not a concession. This is a definitive statement made by the Alliance that reiterates its existing military strategy.

Q: Does this statement reflect a decision to give a type of second-class status to prospective NATO members. Does it portend a change in the U.S. commitment to NATO?

A: Of course not. As we have said on several occasions, new members will be full members of the Alliance in all respects.

Let me underscore that the United States recognizes the legitimate security concerns of all Europeans. The U.S. will continue to carry out its obligations for the Alliance as a whole.

This statement will not affect NATO's ability to respond quickly and decisively to any security threats to current and future members of the Alliance.

It is no way implies constraints on the development of new or upgraded infrastructure, nor does it affect NATO's ability to temporarily station forces in time of crisis or to support peacekeeping operations.

Q: What does NATO mean by substantial combat forces? Does this imply that NATO has cut a deal with Russia to forego stationing of large

numbers of forces on the territory of new member states?

A: We cannot agree to a ban on stationing forces permanently on the territory of new members.

To fulfill Alliance missions, NATO's new strategic concept relies on mobility, interoperability and reinforcement, not substantial combat forces being deployed forward on a permanent basis.

NATO enlargement will take place in a European security environment in which there is no current threat of large-scale conventional aggression and where any such threat would take years to develop. The defense posture associated with enlargement, therefore, will be oriented to providing security in that environment and reassurance to new members, as is currently enjoyed by current members.

It conveys decisions about military strategy that have been in place for a number of years. We will apply NATO's already existing concept of regional reinforcement to new areas in Europe and emphasize the capability of new members' forces to operate with and be reinforced by NATO units.

RUSSIA -- U.S. HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS

Did the Administration approve the sale of high performance computers to two Russian nuclear centers as Russian Minatom Director Mikaylov recently asserted?

☐ No, the Administration has not approved the export of any high performance computers to the two Russian nuclear centers, nor do we have any requests pending for such exports. However, we are aware of the recent press statements made by Minatom officials.

☐ The Commerce and Justice Departments are conducting a joint investigation into the export

of the Silicon Graphics and IBM systems to Minatom. Because there is an active investigation, however, further comment at this time would be inappropriate. The companies involved are cooperating, as is the Russian Government.

What about Minatom's statements that the Russians acquired these computers as part of a bilateral cooperation effort with the U.S. for maintenance of Russia's nuclear arsenal?

☐ The statement is not correct. The U.S. never promised to provide high performance computers to assist Russia in managing its inventory of nuclear weapons.

What is the impact of the export of these high performance computers to the Russian nuclear weapons program?

☐ As this matter is still under investigation, we can't definitively identify the impact of the systems that Minatom says it has obtained. Based on information in the press reports, it is not likely that the acquisition of those computers will have a significant effect on the strategic nuclear balance between the U.S. and Russia. However, the computers may be useful for nuclear weapon modeling simulations that could assist Russia to maintain its nuclear arsenal under a CTBT.

PERSIAN GULF

☐ We are keeping a close eye on the security of U.S. personnel in the Persian Gulf. The report described in the Washington Post article reflects this.

☐ Complacency is dangerous. We take potential threats to our forces very seriously.

☐ The U.S. military and the State Department are constantly evaluating their security posture and where possible enhancing it.

☐ We will do everything we can to protect them without

diminishing the ability of our military and diplomatic personnel to their jobs.

☐ Host governments understand our concerns and have been very cooperative.

MIDDLE EAST

TERRORIST ATTACK

Q: Your spokesman disagreed with Prime Minister Netanyahu's view that Arafat gave a green light to terror. Did he give a green light?

A: We're simply not in a position now to answer that question conclusively.

What I can say is that over the past several weeks we have repeatedly and at the highest levels warned Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority that they must do everything in their power to preempt and combat terror and violence and to make certain that those responsible are brought to justice.

The Palestinian Authority must do everything it can to leave no doubt in the minds of the friends or enemies of the peace process that it is unalterably committed to combating terror.

Q: What do you think about Arafat's decision to release Hamas terrorists, specifically Ibrahim Muqadmeh?

A: The Palestinian Authority must do everything in its power to make sure that those associated with terror pay the price.

We have made this clear to Chairman Arafat and expressed our serious concern about Muqadmeh's release.

The Palestinians have commitments and obligations to fight terror; they must continue to live up to them.

PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

Q: What's your view on the Israeli proposal to accelerate permanent status negotiations?

A: We've seen the reports on this. If either side has proposals to make, should do so directly at the negotiating table. That's precisely the purpose of negotiations, and that's what the Israelis and Palestinians should be focused on right now.

Q: Any reaction to the confrontation between Palestinian students and Israeli troops in Bethlehem today?

A: Confrontations leading to violence will resolve nothing and we've made it very clear that all sides should exercise maximum restraint.

HAR HOMA

Q: What's your reaction to the Israelis' breaking ground at Har Homa?

A: You know my views on construction at Har Homa -- would have preferred they not go ahead. Remains my view. What is essential now is an honest and credible negotiating process.

Q: You and your spokesman are disagreeing regularly with the Israeli Prime Minister. Do you think Netanyahu is making it up when he says they have evidence that the Palestinians are planning violence ?

A: Violence will resolve nothing and we've made it very clear that all sides should exercise maximum restraint. I've been in touch with Chairman Arafat on this. I believe he is well aware that violence will not benefit Palestinians and he has told us that he is doing all he can to ensure that it does not occur.

ALBANIA

Did Secretary Albright advocate military intervention in Albania?

☐ As the situation in Albania deteriorated last week, the top levels of the USG, including Secretaries Albright and Cohen, CJCS Shalikashvili and NSA Berger discussed options for evacuating U.S. citizens, including whether securing the Tirana airport was necessary to facilitate the evacuation and whether doing so could help stabilize the situation and promote a political settlement.

☐ Principals concluded that the circumstances did not warrant this step. The smoothness of the evacuation of Americans demonstrated that this was the correct decision.

What is the situation in Albania?

☐ Although random gunfire was reported in the area of the Embassy again last night, in the city of Tirana the situation remains relatively calm. However, conditions in the rest of the country remain very unstable.

☐ We continue to remain in contact with Prime Minister Fino, as well as leaders of other political parties.

☐ The evacuation continues at a much reduced level. U.S. forces have evacuated around 860 people, both American citizens and third country nationals.

☐ UNHCR Reports that 12,000 -13,000 Albanians have fled for neighboring countries.

☐ We are coordinating closely with the Italians regarding the evacuation, especially concerning Albanian citizens. However, the Italian government has not requested any specific assistance from the U.S.

☐ The EU team is in Rome working on their report of their visit to Albania. We expect to be

briefed on their report in the next 24 hours.

What is your reaction to the ultimatum from southern leaders calling for Berisha to resign?

- ☐ It is essential that all parties commit themselves to peaceful resolution of the current crisis.
- ☐ While it is clear that President Berisha is a focal point for the anger of many Albanians, particularly in the south, we feel that the key to Albania's recovery is consolidation of the authority of the new Government of National Reconciliation, and establishment of a political dialogue that includes the new government and the local insurgent leaders.

MEXICO

SENATE RESOLUTION

- ☐ Welcome Senate action endorsing greater counterdrug cooperation with Mexico and other nations in the Americas. Bipartisan effort to support common goal of increasing cooperation to keep drugs out of our neighborhoods.
- ☐ Senate action recognizes ongoing progress being made by President Zedillo and acknowledges that the problems are serious and require work on both sides of border. Working through the U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control, we are ready to continue our active collaboration.

MEETINGS WITH SENATORS

- ☐ NSA Berger, others, met March 17 with Senators interested in ways we can work together to move process forward; no decisions taken.
- ☐ President met last week with two groups of Senators to discuss Mexican certification issue. POTUS, VPOTUS, SecState, SecDef, SecTreas, DONDCP, NSA, UN Amb attended both briefings. Consultations with individual members ongoing.

☐ Purpose of meetings to exchange views. Senators got opportunity to hear, first-hand, President, his advisors' reasons for certification decision:

-Cooperation: Unprecedented, including joint money-laundering investigations, extradition of Mexican nationals for first time, creation of framework organization to work cooperation issues.

-Results: No one understands this threat better than Zedillo; eradication, interdiction, arrests of corrupt officials all up sharply.

-What's Best for Future Cooperation: Certification clearly sets the stage for better cooperation in the future. Any other option, including national interest certification, would hobble our joint efforts.

☐ Senators had opportunity to voice their views, concerns, let POTUS know how deeply they wanted to be involved in what is a joint fight against this threat to the health, safety of our children, and our own national security.

MEXICO CERTIFICATION

Q: What is the White House's views on Congress' efforts to overturn the President's decision to certify Mexico?

A: The President remains firmly committed to his decision to certify that Mexico has cooperated fully with the United States or has taken adequate steps on its own to fight narcotics trafficking. His decision was based on an objective review of Mexico's significant accomplishments over the past year (see rest of daily guidance).

The Administration strongly opposes legislation in the House and Senate that would overturn that decision because it would substantially and immediately impair the growing

level of cooperation we are achieving with Mexico and would help, not hinder, the narcotraffickers.

☐ Want to explain why President decided to certify Mexico -- and why it is so vital we prevent counter-productive effort to decertify.

☐ Zedillo fighting tough, uphill battle against drug cartels that corrupt Mexico's law enforcement agencies. Won't be won in day, month or year.

☐ But Zedillo taking responsibility and taking action against corruption.

_ Removed more than 1,200 police and other officials for corruption and related charges, expanded role of military in counternarcotics.

_ Immediately fired and arrested corrupt drug czar, ordered new AG to intensively vet and investigate all Mexico's counternarcotics officials, from top to bottom .

☐ And Mexico making broader, fundamental progress.

_ During the last year, drug seizures, arrests, crop eradication and the destruction of clandestine labs and runways have all increased.

_ Mexico has also passed new counternarcotics laws to combat organized crime, money laundering and chemical diversions.

☐ Zedillo has committed Mexico to unprecedented cooperation with U.S.

_ In 1996, Zedillo set important, successful precedent by extraditing two Mexican national fugitives and expelling drug kingpin Juan Guarcia Abrego, who was convicted in U.S. courts last November and put behind bars for life.

_ With High Level Contact Group led by McCaffrey, US and Mexico have built comprehensive framework to promote cooperation, resolve problems, raise public awareness. Military-to-military cooperation has improved dramatically as we work

together on counterdrug training and technical assistance.

☐ Certification reaffirms our commitment to work cooperatively with Mexico. We expect Mexico to work with us on series of objectives that have emerged from our cooperation.

_ increase arrests, extraditions to deny sanctuary to major drug traffickers on both sides of border

_ attack corruption by screening counternarcotics officials from top to bottom, and implementing laws against money laundering.

_ Examine ways to expand cooperation into new areas, from devoting more resources to stop drug shipments and block drug routes to controlling chemicals and combating money laundering.

☐ Decertifying Mexico would undermine progress already made and threaten future cooperation.

_ Decertification would make us more vulnerable to common threat by making Zedillo Administration the enemy, rather than drug lords.

_ Zedillo has will to fight drugs -- he is moving in right direction. He needs our support, not a slap in the face. This is a long-term challenge -- it will become even longer if we don't recognize and bolster his efforts

☐ President Clinton will make counternarcotics top-priority of meeting with Zedillo next month.

_ Even as we strengthen joint efforts, we will continue to press Mexican government to take tough actions necessary to protect both our peoples

KOREA

DPRK DEFECTOR IN BEIJING

Q: What's the situation with the North Korean defector?
Have we been asked by the ROK
to intervene with the PRC? Have we? Have we met with the
defector? Do we believe
the situation on the peninsula is unstable and North is
near collapse?

A: According to reports from Beijing, Hwang Yang-yop, has
been transferred from China
to a third country. We also note reports that indicate
Hwang arrived in the Philippines for
an undetermined amount of time. USG is pleased that the
case was resolved peacefully
and in accordance with international norms with respect to
asylum.

NORTH KOREA AGREES TO ATTEND U.S./ROK JOINT BRIEFING

Q: What do you expect the joint briefing on the four party
peace proposal on March 5 to
produce? Did you offer new incentives to North Korea to
engage in peace talks during
the U.S.-DPRK bilateral meeting on March 7?

A: The U.S., South Korea and North Korea met in New York on
5 March to discuss the
concept of, agenda for, and possible outcomes of four party
talks. We hope the North
will agree to attend four party talks shortly after the
joint briefing. Four party talks hold
promise of securing permanent, stable peace on peninsula.

We did not offer any incentives to North Korea as an
enticement to accept the offer of
four party talks. Nor have the United States and South
Korea offered North Korea food
aid in exchange for its attendance at the joint briefing.
The United States and South
Korea have responded to the UN WFP food aid appeal for
North Korea on a humanitarian
basis, as we did last year.

CHINA -- UNHRC

Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's

efforts to line up support for its position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and Western "hypocrisy" on the issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has sought to "buy" off votes of several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at members of the Commission. At the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the US and EU to prevail on the resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this year as compared to last. -- which itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.

In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade (and other forms of economic support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing out that this was in fact the very type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we have made clear that we would not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the resolution. As for our approach to the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution, barring significant improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of the vote (around April 14-18).

We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the Chinese on steps to improve their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a proposed resolution, coupled with demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit to support a "no-action" motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to oppose a resolution (which we would co-sponsor).

Points

- ☐ Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe members of the Commission should make decision based on human rights situation in China, not other factors.
- ☐ Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation warrants a resolution on China's human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have decided in principle to co-sponsor a resolution.
- ☐ We have made clear to China that in the absence of human

rights progress we would see no reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.

If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year

☐ At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to convey our views and are working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.

☐ Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the past, and, more importantly, our approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote, based on the human rights situation in China.

BOSNIA

Progress in Bosnia/Is Dayton Implementation Working?
(recent editorials)

☐ As we continue to work on the difficult long term challenges in Bosnia, we must not forget the enormous progress we have made.

☐ In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II continued to rage in Bosnia. Even as the United States envoy Richard Holbrooke undertook a new diplomatic initiative, few believed peace was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose in the post-Cold War era.

☐ Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace that provides the backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

☐ Our efforts in Bosnia have exceeded many expectations. The military aspects of Dayton were implemented with no combat casualties. National elections were successfully held in September and joint national institutions have been created and are starting to operate. The international Train and Equip program is helping build a stable military balance in Bosnia and facilitating the formation of joint Federation defense

structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation. More than 200,000 refugees have returned.

□ There has also been much progress on the economic reconstruction of Bosnia, especially in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The rebuilding of Sarajevo is perhaps most dramatic. Cut off and under siege for most of the war, Sarajevans risked sniper and mortar fire just to get some dirty water from the river running through the city or to gather some humanitarian rations. Today, Sarajevo is bustling with reconstruction activities and hundreds of cafes, shops, restaurants, banks, and other commercial endeavors have opened their doors. Overall, the Federation economy grew by about 35% in 1996 and unemployment went from 90% to 50%.

□ Of course, the process of reconciliation is a long term endeavor and much remains to be done. We must do more to rebuild the economic and societal infrastructures. We need greater cooperation from the parties on freedom of movement and the return of refugees and displaced persons. And we need greater political support for the fledgling political institutions.

□ The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian groups, will be responsible for this work. However, for the duration of its mission, SFOR will provide the stability and confidence necessary for the Bosnian people to continue to make progress toward these goals. We continue to believe that 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed on these issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

SFOR Mission Duration

□ We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months should give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:

☐ We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are focused on the important work we have to do between now and June 1998.

Return of Refugees/Burning of Homes in Gajevi

☐ Tensions and violence continue to hamper returns across ethnic lines. The recent burning of newly built Muslim homes in Gajevi is another unfortunate example. It is unacceptable for any party to use violence or intimidation against returning refugees and displaced persons.

☐ We will continue to insist that refugees and displaced persons that follow the agreed procedures are allowed to return to their homes. We hold the Bosnian Serb police and leadership responsible for allowing this incident to occur. We are also working with UNHCR and other key international agencies to carefully manage minority return efforts so as to allow minority returns and minimize the risk of violence.

☐ Both SFOR and the IPTF play an important role in general security, but only the parties themselves can reduce the climate of ethnic tensions that provoke violence over this issue and effectively create conditions where other ethnic groups can return to their homes.

☐ The repatriation of refugees and displaced persons will be a long term process, particularly for returns across ethnic lines. We have seen encouraging signs including small but symbolic returns in some minority areas and the overall return of 225,000-250,000 internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes in Bosnia.

Mostar

☐ We condemn the recent outbreaks of violence in Mostar and endorse the efforts of the IPTF and the Office of the High Representative to seek a lowering of tensions between the Bosnian Muslim and Croat communities. We have expressed our concern and called for restraint to all parties and urged them to redouble their efforts to work

together.

Brcko Decision

☐ The Brcko arbitration decision mandates that the office of the High Representative assume interim international supervision of the Brcko area. Implementation will be a gradual and long-term effort requiring sustained commitment by the parties and international community. The recent implementation conference in Vienna was the first step in this process.

War Criminals

☐ The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring peace.

☐ We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the ability of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to establish some sort of capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are studying the feasibility of these options but have made no decisions yet.

Train and Equip Program

☐ The international Train and Equip program is ongoing and is a key success and a major step toward establishing a stable military balance in Bosnia, which is one of the keys to establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint

Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

ZAIRE

EVACUATION PLANNING

Q: (If asked) Is the U.S. planning to evacuate citizens from Zaire?

A: No, we are not evacuating from Zaire.

As we announced last week, the Department of State authorized voluntary departure for Embassy employees and family members on March 10. There is no ordered evacuation of employees or dependents.

Our Embassy in Kinshasa reports that the city is calm and that there have been no unusual security incidents over the past several days. Nothing has occurred in Kinshasa that would lead us to conclude that an ordered evacuation is necessary.

We also issued a revised travel warning March 11, urging U.S. citizens to defer all travel to Zaire. We have encouraged Americans in Zaire to review their personal emergency planning during this period of uncertainty.

Meanwhile, we continue to strongly encourage all parties to this conflict to suspend hostilities immediately and enter into talks to reach a comprehensive negotiated settlement.

Q: (If asked) Does contingency planning for evacuation mean the U.S. has lost confidence in the current Government of Zaire?

A: No.

We are taking these steps as a precaution, which is our standard policy.

NORTHERN IRELAND

ON WHETHER IRA NEEDS TO DISARM BEFORE JOINING TALKS

☐ Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like British and Irish governments, have accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, which suggested decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.

MURDER OF CATHOLIC FATHER OF NINE IN BELFAST

If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:

☐ WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest terms.

☐ Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.

☐ [If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were involved, but are watching closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.

CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN ATTENDING ST. PATRICK'S DAY RECEPTION?

[If asked]: Don't know; will check. Will get back to you.

SINN FEIN/ST. PATRICK'S DAY RECEPTION

Background: Financial Times (2/28) and the Irish press contain headlines calling our St. Patrick's Day guest list a "snub" of Sinn Fein.

☐ The White House will again include some political leaders from Northern Ireland in the annual St. Patrick's Day reception. We expect the list of invitees from Northern Ireland to be similar

to last year's. Most guests, of course, will be American.

☐ [IF PRESSED on whether Adams/ Sinn Fein will be included]:
Point out that Sinn Fein was
not included last year, because the cease-fire had been
broken.

ADAMS VISA?

☐ Mr. Adams has not/not applied for a visa. Since there is
no application, the Administration
has made no decision.

☐ U.S. officials have been misquoted in the British press
about the alleged warning to Mr.
Adams.

☐ If pressed: As in the past, an application for a visa
waiver by Mr. Adams would be decided
on basis of whether it could contribute to search for
lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

CHANGE IN POLICY ON NEED FOR CEASE-FIRE?

Background: In Belfast Friday, members of Codel Gilman held
a joint press conference with
Gerry Adams and said Sinn Fein should be allowed into talks
without an IRA cease-fire.

☐ U.S. position has not changed. Like British and Irish
governments, our view is that Sinn Fein
can only participate in Belfast peace talks after an IRA
cease-fire.

☐ Take opportunity to commend the loyalists, who are
exercising restraint in face of
provocation of IRA violence.

BERGER/STEINBERG PHONE CALLS

☐ In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have
been in touch with British and
Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation
in Northern Ireland, exchange
views on how to move process forward.

☐ If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain

engaged in process; not going to
comment further on details of who/when.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article
alleging that GWI is contagious and that the
Blood Supply may be unsafe?

☐ We've been assured that there is no scientifically
supportive evidence that the undiagnosed
illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering
from is contagious.

☐ Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved
(DOD, HHS and VA) for any
additional particulars relating to precautions taken,
ongoing research, etc.

☐ With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red
Cross have stated they believe the
blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific
questions to the FDA.

What action has been taken in response to the initiatives
you announced during the roll-out of the
PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early
January 1997?

☐ We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted
its report.

☐ Leading examples:

☐ Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I
have accepted [?] -- to
initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility
period for Gulf War veterans
with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This
measure has been strongly

supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.

☐ The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed --
within the 60-day period I
requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC
recommendations from
its final report.

☐ Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a
Presidential Review Directive
(PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment
of Veterans and Their

Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective piece which will ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard the health of soldiers in future deployments.

What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?

- ☐ Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there seems little doubt we'll learn of additional information which should have been made public sooner.
- ☐ However, such developments should be understood in a broader context:
- ☐ Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to change our fundamental assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely impacted the health of our veterans.
- ☐ This new information is coming out precisely because of the "openness" process I directed and remain fully committed to.
- ☐ All of the information being developed will be used to improve policies so as to be better prepared for future deployments.
- ☐ Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway, we are concurrently working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical care and research programs.

Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover" material needed to get to the bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a cover-up? If not, how can your PAC lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?

- ☐ The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine the facts. Last year, DOD acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor needed, and significantly increased its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that effort. And to my knowledge, there is currently no evidence of a cover-up.
- ☐ We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the missing chemical warfare logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are disturbing -- the public should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do this in an open manner, and I

believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.

☐ Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I previously extended the PAC to provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more recently I asked the PAC to review the recently-released information in assessing the adequacy of the ongoing investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA IG, and DOD Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same questions.

☐ Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that our Gulf War veterans must receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We shouldn't lose sight of what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+ compensation claims approved, 90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including research into low level chemical exposure.

What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning" messages?

☐ First, the message content does not change the substance of our understanding of Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there conducted demolitions without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may have been exposed to chemical agents.

☐ DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the public in June 1996.

☐ The message content also does not change our health care and research postures. Gulf War veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're not sure why they're sick, and the research required to further investigate possible causes -- including low-level chemical exposure -- is in progress.

☐ As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered documents, we'll have to await the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.

Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?

☐ I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to await the outcome of pending investigations.

☐ Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to light earlier.

☐ Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as

part of DOD's and CIA's commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough investigations to do so.

☐ Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information involved. One recent estimate is that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information that may have some relevance to the various matters under investigation.

What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah Case Narrative?

☐ This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.

☐ The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most comprehensive account of everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the demolitions conducted there.

☐ Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other topics to follow -- is not the end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is publishing them as part of its commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information that Gulf War veterans or others may have on these topics.

Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?

☐ We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD last November and December cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have been affected... And all

Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health effects of service in the Gulf theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take full advantage of free medical exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility has been widely communicated by public service announcements and many other means...

☐ We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no documented cases of soldiers reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut evidence of a link between low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that research continues, however.

☐ Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data and most appropriate modeling approach.

☐ No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah incident believes that the "worst case" scenarios are very credible...

☐ Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the possibility of low-level chemical exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no evidence at the time of more significant acute symptoms.

What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:

- ☐ President asked them to take a careful look
- ☐ Obviously doing so
- ☐ Haven't seen preliminary findings
- ☐ Wouldn't comment on them anyway
- ☐ Look forward to getting PAC findings in April

Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about Khamisiyah?

- ☐ President committed to getting out all the facts
- ☐ As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our effort to leave no stone unturned
- ☐ Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC oversight we will await the results of those investigations

What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the CIA briefed the NSC staff in January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?

- ☐ My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified brief from CIA in January 1996 as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses issue.

☐ During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's declassification initiative -- the staffer was told that information had come to light about the possible presence of chemical munitions at Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with the understanding that this possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with DOD.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997 in extending the PAC to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered intelligence reports and the publication of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's commitment.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products. The Committee also found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed the federal research portfolio and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending increased emphasis in certain areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical exposure and stress.
- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+

free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 90+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

☐ We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review Directive (PRD) process to address many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the veterans and their families who make experience future deployments.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the Administration has delayed responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over the CWC?

A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work together to try to address the concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser Berger has led the Administration team which has met four times with the Majority Leader's task force. These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive senior staff sessions.

Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed about 30 conditions and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a compromise formulation that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a

reasonable alternative, leaving it to the Senate to decide between the two.

Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the members of his CWC task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the Convention prior to April 29, when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's statement on Thursday that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and that it is not his intention to stonewall on this.

Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies his key concerns over the Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the Administration needs to address his broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN reform, and the handling of other arms control treaties in the Senate.

A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do nothing to reduce the dangers of poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms and his staff, we have identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with Senator Helms' proposed conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed alternative conditions should be debated and voted upon.

While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the broader issues Senator Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription for inaction, which we cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this agreement.

Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little" deadline with no meaning and that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.

A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If Congress fails to act positively, we will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the ability to require other states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting

rid of our chemical weapons.

Without ratification the credibility of American leadership across the full range of proliferation issues will be undermined. The United States will also lose its seat on the governing body implementing the treaty.

American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their overseas competitors, as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.

NAZI ASSETS

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press guidance on the decision to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the historians' report on the postwar USG role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main Administration spokesman on this issue is U/S Stu Eizenstat.

☐ The team of historians and others who have been working to assess a huge amount of historical material discovered they needed a little more time than originally anticipated.. This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best possible understanding at this point of the events in question.

If asked about the President's role:

☐ The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians' report is being prepared at his behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.

If pressed:

☐ The President will of course see the report when it is completed.

NICARAGUA

Background: The meeting was about changes in the immigration bill that will have significant consequences not only for Nicaraguans, but for other aliens who have been here illegally for many years. (In a nutshell, the law severely limits the availability of "suspension of deportation," a form of relief for illegal aliens who have been in the U.S. for long periods of time).

Members of the community have been asking that the President or Attorney General to grant the tens of thousand of Nicaraguans in the U.S. some form of broad "amnesty" legalizing their presence here.

While such forward-leaning action is highly unlikely, if only because of strong Congressional opposition, we are working on ways to mitigate the impact of the new law on Nicaraguans and others (of whom most are from Central American and Mexico). The Administration currently is engaged in consultations with Members of Congress on how to address this situation more humanely.

Points

- ☐ Administration is concerned about the fate of citizens from Nicaragua and elsewhere who are living in the U.S., many of whom have developed deep roots in our communities.
- ☐ New immigration legislation contains harsh provisions which were adopted over Administration's objection. This includes restrictions on the remedy of suspension of deportation, including a ceiling of 4,000 suspensions per year.
- ☐ Our goal should be to enforce the law passed by the Congress and protect the integrity of our borders. At the same time, however, we need to do it in a way that is mindful of the human dimension and that minimizes hardship on affected communities.
- ☐ We are taking several steps to meet these goals:

-First, there will be no massive deportations and no targeting of any specific community. As always, our priority will be to deport criminal aliens.

-Second, Administration has decided that between now and October 30, 1997, no order of deportation will be issued to any person who would have qualified for suspension in the absence of the ceiling.

□ In the next seven months, Administration will work vigorously with the Congress in an effort to address this issue in a more humane way.

CUBA

DIPLOMATIC POUCH OPENED

Q: Is it true that the Cuban government opened a U.S. diplomatic pouch destined for the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana?

A: The Cuban government recently delayed the delivery of several of the Interests Section's unclassified pouches.

The Cubans claimed that one of the pouches arrived open and protested that its contents were "aggressive" and objectionable to the GOC. They apparently were referring to copies of the President's report to Congress on "Support for a Democratic Transition in Cuba."

USINT has confirmed that one pouch was opened and its contents were inspected.

Q: Did the USG apologize for the contents of the pouch, as the Washington Times reported?

A: Absolutely not. USINT earlier this week delivered a note to the Cuban government clearly and emphatically protesting the tampering with the pouch and rejecting any effort

to regulate the contents of the pouch.

The GOC's interference with our pouches is a blatant violation of its obligations under international law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It also violates the 1977 Agreement on the Establishment of Interests Sections.

The GOC has no authority to regulate the content of official communications between the USG and USINT.

The GOC's action is further evidence of its repressive policies and disregard for long-established international law and diplomatic practice.