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DATE-TIME 14 February 97 19:45

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CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT February 14 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

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TEXT_BODY [[FEB14GUI.DOC : 4912 in FEB14GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 14 February 97 19:44

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FILE NAME** FEB14GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

February 14, 1997

WTO: Telecom and Cuba

Vatican

Netanyahu Visit

Middle East

France

China/Golden Venture

Korea

F-16/727 Incident

Northern Ireland

START/ABM

Russia/Computers

Russia

CWC

Bosnia

Serbia

Trips and Visitors

Greece

Greece/Turkey

Peru

Saudi Arabia

Gulf War Illnesses

WTO

WTO Telecom Negotiations

Q: What is the status of WTO telecommunications talks?

A. February 15 is the deadline for WTO negotiations to liberalize world trade in telecommunications services, currently an almost \$600 billion market. U.S. firms are the most competitive in the world, and the United States would benefit greatly from a strong market opening agreement.

There is some positive momentum, but we are still working hard in Geneva, in

Washington and in capitals throughout the world to get the commitments we expect of our trading partners. The agreement has to be balanced. We refused to accept a deal last April because it was not.

Q: There appears to be a dispute on the Hill about whether you will need legislation to implement the US offer. How are you going to handle this?

A: We are aware of the concerns expressed by some Members of Congress that implementing legislation may be necessary if we reach agreement. USTR and FCC have worked to ensure that the U.S. offer is consistent with U.S. law. We will continue to consult with Congress to address any concerns.

Helms-Burton WTO Case

Q: The New York Times today (2/13) said that the EU had delayed its WTO case on Helms-Burton, based on U.S. threats that it would invoke the national security exception. Is that true?

A: We are gratified the EU has postponed a decision on proceeding with their WTO case.

We recognize we have differences of opinion over the best way to bring about a transition to democracy in Cuba. But we do not think foreign policy differences of that kind can be resolved in a trade forum like the WTO.

Both we and the Europeans worked hard to put the WTO in place and it serves us all greatly. We are encouraged that our European allies are working with us to find a way to discuss our differences without jeopardizing what we worked so hard to build.

Q: Are you willing to jeopardize the WTO for a weak claim that our Cuba trade policy is necessary to our national security?

A: Naturally, if the Europeans go forward with their case the U.S. would defend its position with the greatest possible vigor, and I think our

European friends understand that. This is not the place to get into the specifics of how we would do so.

I should point out that whatever the outcome, the WTO has no power to change U.S. laws. Only Congress can do that.

[If pressed]:

We have not ruled out any rights we have under the WTO. In the past, we have invoked the national security provisions of the GATT to justify our trade embargo against Cuba.

VATICAN

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms's request that Ambassador Flynn be recalled?

A: Ambassador Flynn has served as Ambassador to the Vatican for over three years.

We understand he plans to leave his post and return to the U.S. this summer.

[Only if asked]:

The Department has received the report of the Office of the Inspector General and has taken appropriate action.

NETANYAHU VISIT

☐ President and PM Netanyahu met yesterday afternoon, part of time over a light lunch.

☐ Topics covered included:

☐ taking advantage of current momentum to move forward on the Palestinian track;
exchanging views on re-starting talks with Syria; discussing

expansion of Israel's ties
with other Arab states; discussing our cooperation to assure
Israel's security.

MIDDLE EAST

POSSIBLE ISRAELI LAUNCHES IN U.S. (For use on background)

- ☐ Israel Aircraft Industries has informed us it is considering bidding on launches of U.S. commercial payloads from U.S. launch sites.
- ☐ In that connection, Administration currently reviewing request for a site survey at a U.S. facility by IAI.
- ☐ It's a complex issue involving a number of considerations, among them non-proliferation, commercial space policy, and foreign policy.
- ☐ Not going to comment further while it is under review.

VISITS BY LEADERS TO CONSULT ON PEACE PROCESS

-- As the President noted in his press conference on January 28, four Middle Eastern leaders will be coming to Washington over the next two months to consult with him on the peace process.

-- The schedule of visits is:

- Prime Minister Netanyahu - February 13
- Chairman Arafat - March 3
- President Mubarak - March 10
- King Hussein - March 18

-- Background Only: Visit by Prince Sultan (Saudi Arabia) should not be referred to in same category as these visits; he's being invited by Cohen (DOD) for Feb. 25th. Will meet President while here.

SETTLEMENTS AN "OBSTACLE TO PEACE"?

Q: President Clinton seemed to say December 16 that settlements

are an obstacle to peace
in the Middle East. Is that the U.S. position?

A: The U.S. position is that settlement activity complicates the negotiating process and increases tension.

We have previously expressed concern that when one party to a negotiation says things or does things which are seen to preempt the negotiating process, it makes it that much harder for negotiations to succeed.

In that vein, the President was making the obvious point that when one party does something that is seen by the other as preempting negotiations it can become a problem or an obstacle to progress in those negotiations.

So, yes we are troubled by some of the recent settlement activity, and we've said so.
The President's response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity.
It's important to focus on that concern.

[If asked]:

Q: Does the President's response indicate a change in policy?

A: As I said, his response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity.
It's important to focus on that concern. The comments did not signal a fundamental change in the nature of that concern.

LEGALITY OF SETTLEMENTS

Q: Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that he subscribes to the view that as a matter of legal right, Jews and Israelis have a legal right to settle on the West Bank? Is that your understanding of the legalities?

A: I'm not going to get drawn into a discussion of the legal aspects of what is obviously a highly political issue. It is an issue, furthermore, that the Israelis and Palestinians recognize is difficult and therefore left for their permanent status negotiations. It is abundantly clear, however, that settlement activity, and even

announcements of plans for possible future settlement activity, complicates the climate and the process of negotiation. When either party says things or does things that are perceived as prejudging the outcome of a negotiation, it makes it that much more difficult to achieve progress.

Q: But what about the precise question of the legality of settlement activity?

A: As I said, I'm not going down that road. We need to keep our focus on assisting the parties in their negotiations.

Q: Do you or don't you differentiate between new and old settlements?

A: I've just explained what our position is and I referred to "settlement activity." I'm not going to comment further.

Q: The Israelis claim that you didn't complain about settlement activity during the Rabin Government, so why are you making this an issue now?

A: We said the same thing during the time of the Labor government.

JERUSALEM

Q: What is your reaction to Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement that Israel will not negotiate over the status of Jerusalem?

A: Our views have not changed. Israel and the Palestinians have agreed that Jerusalem is one of the issues for permanent status negotiations.

(If pressed) Our position on the status of Jerusalem is well-known.

Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and volatile issues in the peace process. We remain convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing these sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which Israel and the Palestinians themselves have formally agreed to discuss only in the context of direct,

permanent status negotiations.

PEACE PROCESS

☐ There has been no change in the U.S. position on land-for-peace or anything else as a result of the Israeli elections. We have supported this principle and will continue to do so. At the same time, our experience makes clear that agreements are reached not through recitation of abstract principles, but through the hard work of direct negotiation. Syria and Israel agreed at Madrid to negotiate on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. They should resume those negotiations to overcome their differences.

☐ Obviously, if progress is to be made, if differences are to be overcome, each side must take into account the needs and interests of the other.

☐ Peace is not an abstraction. Peace is closely tied to security and only the parties directly concerned can make the critical decisions which affect their future. The United States can't make these decisions for them. We will not try to impose decisions upon Israel or any other party to the peace process.

☐ That doesn't mean that the US, as the facilitator of the peace process, does not have views. It has been and remains our view that the land-for-peace formula offers the most promise for a workable solution to the problems of war and peace in the Middle East. But agreements will come not as a result of our views, but as a result of negotiations between the parties.

PALESTINIAN COMPLIANCE ON REVOCATION OF PALESTINIAN COVENANT

☐ We have welcomed the decision taken by the Palestinian National Council to cancel the provisions of the Covenant which contradict the formal undertakings made between the PLO and the Israeli government.

U.S. EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV

☐ Recognize what is required by the law passed by Congress

requiring that the U.S. Embassy be transferred to Jerusalem. But at the same time, the President has made it clear that he will take no step that will undermine the peace process or jeopardize the negotiations. In this regard, the legislation provides a waiver provision that may be used by the President as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that could preempt or jeopardize the peace process.

ORIENT HOUSE

☐ Our position regarding U.S. contacts at Orient House has not changed. We do business with the Palestinian Authority only in Gaza and Jericho, not in Jerusalem. Would encourage all parties to concentrate on the negotiations, not on issues that may polarize the situation.

SYRIA

☐ We believe that a comprehensive peace requires negotiations and agreements on all tracks, including with Syria and Lebanon. But we recognize that -- as in the past -- some negotiations will move at a faster pace than others.

☐ Prime Minister Netanyahu told me that he agrees on the importance of talks with Syria.

☐ We have never had any illusions about Syrian associations with groups involved in terrorism.

☐ We consider this a serious issue, and we have made that clear both in our diplomatic contacts at the highest levels and in our annual report on terrorism.

☐ We would like to see Syria's ties to terrorist groups definitively broken.

☐ But it is important to distinguish between states that work to subvert the peace process -- like Iran -- and those who have shown a willingness to engage in it actively and seriously -- like Syria.

FRANCE -- PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PHILIPPE SEGUIN

- President saw Philippe Seguin, President of the National Assembly of France, Thursday afternoon. Seguin was President Chirac's personal representative to the funeral of Ambassador Pamela Harriman, held Thursday morning at the National Cathedral.
- President grateful for the presence of Mr. Seguin; looks forward to seeing him privately. They discussed importance of U.S.-French relations and contribution made by Ambassador Harriman.
- Also grateful for other honors bestowed by France on Ambassador Harriman, especially France' highest decoration, the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor.

CHINA -- GOLDEN VENTURE DETAINEES

Background: In 1993, some 282 Chinese nationals tried to enter the United States illegally aboard the Golden Venture. Most were caught and placed in exclusion or deportation proceedings. Fifty-three currently remain in detention pending the outcome of their asylum cases which involve claims of fear of return to China's coercive family planning practices. The Administration has been criticized in the press and by some Members of Congress for its decision to maintain the aliens in detention for over 3 and a half years. The Administration defended its position by pointing out that the length of detention resulted from the detainees' many court challenges to the exclusion decision and, more importantly, that this detention policy served as an effective deterrent to alien smuggling.

The Administration has now decided to release the migrants. The decision reflects humanitarian concerns given the exceptional length of detention and the fact that the new immigration law (which takes effect on April 1, 1997) will strengthen our deterrence of alien smuggling by making it possible to exclude aliens within a matter of weeks.

Releasing the migrants therefore will not undermine our deterrence strategy. The releases will occur over the next week or so, after the INS has gone through each case to review possible criminal background and to set reasonable conditions of supervision. The released aliens will remain in exclusion proceedings.

Points

- ☐ Administration has decided to release the remaining Golden Venture detainees.
- ☐ Decision reflects humanitarian concern for people who have been in detention for over 3 and a half years.
- ☐ To date, detention policy has been successful in deterring alien smuggling.
- ☐ However, new immigration bill strengthens our deterrence policy by making possible in the future expedited exclusion of smuggled aliens -- within a matter of weeks of their arrival in U.S.
- ☐ As a result, release of remaining Golden Venture detainees will not undermine our policy, and Administration has decided that it is now appropriate.
- ☐ The releases will take place over a period of several days, to allow INS to review each case. Persons with criminal backgrounds will not be released. INS also will determine reasonable conditions of supervised release. The process should be completed by March 1, 1997.
- ☐ The aliens will remain in exclusion proceedings and those found not to be entitled to asylum will be deported.

KOREA

DPRK DEFECTOR IN BEIJING

Background: FYI not to be discussed with the Press: The issue now is two-fold: How will the North react to such a senior level official defecting; how much

pressure will they put on China
not to allow the defector to travel to Seoul and what kind of
pressure, if any, will the South try
to put on us to intervene with the Chinese to allow the defector
to leave Beijing.

Q: What is the significance of such a senior member of the north
Korean government
defecting? Does this indicate that conditions in North Korea are
even more severe than
we believe?

A: A senior member of the North Korean government has reportedly
sought asylum in the
South Korean Embassy in Beijing. We are in close contact with
the South Koreans. We
have a single interest in this case: that it be handled in
accordance with normal
international asylum practices.

If asked:

Q: Have the South Koreans asked for our help in getting the
Chinese to allow the defector
to leave China?

A: The Republic of Korea has relations with China and is
discussing the issue directly with
Chinese officials.

VISIT OF SOUTH KOREAN NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

□ Ban Ki Moon, Senior Secretary for Foreign and National Security
Affairs (National Security
Advisor), met with National Security Advisor Berger on Tuesday.
The two consulted on a
number of issues, including North Korea.

□ This was the first opportunity Ban has had to visit Washington
since assuming his duties last
October.

UN FOOD APPEAL

Q: Will the UN WFP food Aid appeal cause the U.S. a dilemma in its
relationship with
South Korea?

A: We anticipate the UN will issue an appeal similar to the one
that was made last year.

When the appeal is issued we will consider it as we do all humanitarian appeals. You may recall that the United States participated in last year's appeal by providing a total of \$8.2 million. We have had no indication that South Korea is opposed to humanitarian assistance to the North.

Q: Is it true that the South Korean government opposes U.S. participation in UN WFP appeals and that participation is linked to North Korean attendance at the joint briefing?

A: The U.S. has not linked possible humanitarian food aid in response to an international appeal to the North's attendance at the joint briefing. Contrary to what has recently been reported, the USG did not promise, privately or otherwise, North Korea food aid in return for attendance at the joint briefing. U.S. policy is to review requests for humanitarian assistance independent of political considerations. That holds true in the case of North Korea.

If there is any interest regarding what South Korea is doing to provide humanitarian assistance in comparison to the U.S.:

☐ South Korea's Red Cross said on Wednesday it had shipped 700 tons of flour to famine-stricken North Korea, the second such shipment in a week. The aid shipment is the second since Pyongyang apologized last December for a submarine incursion that plunged ties to a new low. On Friday, the relief organization shipped 300 tons of flour and 15,000 pairs of socks, worth a total of about \$153,000, from Incheon.

☐ South Korea is allowing its relief organizations to restart their programs in a modest way. The current shipments are based on an on-going need and not on the latest appeal for food aid.

If asked:

☐ The United States supports the efforts of the ICRC and other NGOs to respond to the humanitarian needs of North Korea and takes note of the recent

shipment of flour and socks by the South Korean Red Cross. The United States will review official requests from international organizations for humanitarian aid on a case by case basis.

TAIWAN-NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR WASTE DEAL

- ☐ The U.S. believes that any international shipment and storage of nuclear waste must meet the relevant international standards, as defined by the IAEA.
- ☐
- ☐ We encourage Taiwan and North Korea to work with the IAEA to satisfy the international community (especially concerned countries in the region) that this proposed deal meets international standards.
- ☐ We note that strong concerns have been expressed within the region about this shipment, and believe these should be considered in reaching a final decision.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD F-16 INCIDENTS

The following actions were taken in response to two recent incidents involving Air National Guard F-16 fighters along the East Coast:

- ☐ The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating both incidents;
- ☐ General Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force Chief of Staff, suspended all operations of active duty, Reserve and Air National Guard aircraft in designated warning areas along the East Coast and the Gulf region until units have reviewed the applicable memoranda of agreement and operating procedures with the controlling agencies and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA);
- ☐ The FAA undertook a thorough review of internal procedures and applicable memoranda of agreement between the FAA and the various air control centers involved.

NORTHERN IRELAND

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release February 13, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Killing of British Soldier in Northern Ireland

I am grieved and outraged by the callous killing of a British soldier in Northern Ireland yesterday. The First Lady and I extend our deepest sympathy to the soldier's family and to the British government and people on the loss of this young man. We wish the authorities success in bringing the murderers swiftly to justice.

All those who care about the future of Northern Ireland must join me in condemning this cowardly crime. I remain convinced that the people of both of Northern Ireland's traditions want to take the path of peace and reconciliation, not hatred and violence.

The Belfast talks chaired by Senator Mitchell continue to have my full support. I urge all those taking part, who share a commitment to democratic values, to move as rapidly as possible into substantive negotiation about the future of Northern Ireland.

The loyalists and their leaders have shown great courage and restraint in not allowing themselves to be drawn into an escalating spiral of violence. I urge them to remain steadfast.

#

NORTHERN IRELAND

Ambassador Smith to be Recalled?

(Background: The Washington Times picked up a story out of London that the WH is going to "recall" Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith because we intend to change our policy toward Northern Ireland and she is regarded as too pro-Sinn Fein.)

☐ No truth to report that Ambassador Smith is going to be "recalled" because of change of White House policy toward Northern Ireland or dissatisfaction with Ambassador Smith's performance. She has played invaluable role in Administration support for Northern Ireland peace process.

☐ Our policy has not changed. We support efforts of British and Irish governments to bring about just and lasting settlement; see Belfast talks as historic opportunity. Continue to believe those talks have best chance of success with participation of all elected parties, including Sinn Fein, but that can only happen after cease-fire.

Parades Commission Report

Background: Last summer after the civil unrest over marches in Drumcree, the British set up a panel headed by Oxford don Peter North to recommend how to handle parades in the future.

The North report, just released, recommends that a commission be set up with, inter alia, the authority to make decisions on controversial parades. In its January 30 reaction to the report, the British Government neither accepted nor rejected the recommendation for a commission with decision-making powers but initiated an 8-week consultation period on this aspect of the report.

☐ North Review offers valuable insights and recommendations to deal with the very controversial and divisive question of parades and marches in Northern Ireland, particularly during summer "marching season."

☐ Report recommends establishment of independent parades commission. Pleased that British Government moving to set one up. Very much hope it can be up and running in time to make a difference and help avoid a repeat of last summer's bitter

confrontations.

☐ Last summer's events cost the people of Northern Ireland dearly, both economically and politically. Vital for future political progress in Northern Ireland that new ways be found to meet needs of both communities and avoid annual confrontations.

Adams Refused Visa?

Background: Two London newspapers reported over the weekend that the White House has advised Gerry Adams he will not get a visa until the IRA reinstates its cease-fire. One paper sourced "officials of the NSC"; the other diplomats in London.

☐ Mr. Adams has not/not applied for a visa. Since there is no application, the Administration has made no decision.

☐ If pressed: As in the past, an application for a visa waiver by Mr. Adams would be decided on basis of whether it could contribute to search for lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Loyalist Cease-fire Intact?

☐ Up to British and Irish governments and participating parties to decide who participates in talks.

☐ As President said in statement yesterday, we urge loyalists to maintain their cease-fire. There has been no claim of responsibility for car bomb attacks and there is no doubt loyalists have shown restraint in response to escalating IRA violence.

Belfast Talks

☐ Belfast talks, chaired by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, represent historic opportunity and best hope in decades for achieving lasting settlement..

☐ Must not squander progress of last months. Urge all political leaders to take responsibility for making these talks work. Need to move quickly into substantive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland.

☐ Continue to believe that participation of all elected parties,

including Sinn Fein, would give talks best chance of success; that can only happen with cease-fire.

☐ Impressed with commitment and determination both governments have shown in search for peace. They and we share goal of inclusive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland, which can only happen if there is an IRA cease-fire.

Deportation Proceedings Against Matt Morrison

☐ Have been assured by Justice that these proceedings being handled fairly. Judicial matter - don't want to comment further.

START/ABM

Q: The Vice President mentioned Friday that he and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed "guidelines" for a possible START III agreement. Does this signal the Administration has given up on START II ratification in Russia and is now prepared to move on to START III?

A: As the Vice President said, we have begun discussions on possible guidelines for START III that our two Presidents might consider in March.

Such guidelines would underscore the value of START II ratification and point the way toward further reductions that would increase our mutual security and decrease costs.

We have no intention, however, of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with the conclusion of a "START III."

The ratification of START II by Russia remains an essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces, and we are currently working with the Russian government to achieve Russian ratification of START II.

[If asked: Did the Vice President and Prime Minister discuss a specific "target" for further

reductions under START III? What else is under discussion in the context of START III guidelines? Have any agreements been reached?]

A: We are not going to comment on specifics. As the Vice President said, while some progress was made, we have only started these discussions and there are complex issues involved for both our two countries.

[If asked: Are you prepared to commit to the elimination of nuclear weapons, as called for by the former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Lee Butler?]

A: The President said at the United Nations this fall that the United States looks forward to a new century "in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated."

[If asked: Were issues related to the ABM Treaty and ABM/TMD demarcation discussed by the President and Prime Minister?]

A: Both the ABM Treaty and ABM/TMD demarcation were discussed. Both sides remain committed to the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability, and to resolving the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation.

U.S. HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS AT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SITES

Q: In response to recent press inquiries, the Administration has stated that it has not approved high performance computers to Russian facilities that have been associated in the past with the Russian nuclear weapons program. Yet Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhaylov, has been quoted as saying that Russia bought two supercomputers which are installed at the Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear centers. What's the story?

A: The Administration has not approved the export of any high performance computers to the two Russian nuclear centers, nor do we have any requests

pending for such exports.

However, we are aware of statements made by Minister Mikhaylov on January 13.

The Commerce Department is investigating this matter, and we are pleased to say that the Russian Government has offered its full cooperation in the investigation. Because there is an active investigation, however, further comment at this time would be inappropriate.

Q: In early 1996, the Administration liberalized its controls on computer exports. What level of computers were liberalized to Russia?

A: In January 1996, the Administration implemented the following computer export policy to Russia:

- ☐ Computers at any level require an export license when the exporter knows, or has reason to know, that the shipment is being made to a facility engaged in, among other activities, the design, development, production or stockpiling of nuclear weapons.
- ☐ Computers up to 2000 MTOPS may be sold to all other end users in Russia, including military end-users, without a license.
- ☐ Computers up to 7000 MTOPS may be sold to strictly civilian end users for civilian uses, without a license.
- ☐ Computers above 7000 MTOPS, for all end users/end-uses, require a license.

Q: Isn't it difficult for a company to know in every case whether an end-user is civilian, or military, or engaged in proliferation activities?

A: It can be. That is why U.S. exporters have been clearly instructed to contact the government (i.e., the Commerce Department) when they are uncertain about an end-user.

Q: Would you expect U.S. exporters to know that the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) was engaged in nuclear weapons work? Did the

government let exporters
know that these two sites were end users of concern?

A: Minatom and the sites at Arzamas and Chelyabinsk have been long associated with the Russian nuclear weapons program. In fact, there have been several recent press reports about these facilities.

We expect U.S. exporters to know their customers. In fact, U.S. companies have contacted the Commerce Department to ask if shipments to these two entities would be approved. This indicates that U.S. exporters doing business with Minatom have understood their obligations to seek export licenses before making any shipments.

If an exporter had any doubts about the activities of Minatom, however, that company had an obligation to resolve those doubts or to contact the government for assistance.

Q: What has the Administration done to ensure that more U.S. supercomputers don't go to these sites without an export license?

A: The relevant companies have been contacted, and we are satisfied that they are aware that computer shipments to these end users require an export license.

Q: If shipments to Arzamas and Chelyabinsk did occur, doesn't this show that the Administration's computer policy was a mistake, and has allowed a serious breach to our national security - namely that U.S. supercomputers are now helping the Russians refine their nuclear weapons?

A: The Administration's computer policy recognized the growing worldwide availability of high performance computers. It also recognized that U.S.-origin computers should not be shipped to certain end users without explicit U.S. authorization.

This was, and is, a reasonable balance to our security and economic interests that was carefully considered and supported by all of the national security agencies involved in the

export policy development process, including Defense, Energy, State and Commerce.

If a U.S. company has violated that policy by shipping computers to the Russian nuclear weapons program without proper authorization, then that is a matter for our enforcement officials. In order to determine if any U.S. export regulations have been violated, an investigation has been initiated.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Radio Address -- if Asked

Have not seen text, aware Yeltsin spoke today to Russian people.

(If asked about possible killing of UN observer in Tajikistan)

☐ Saw report, but have no confirmation of any death; press reports have, in fact, been conflicting.

(FYI: Reports so far NOT conclusive -- we will keep tracking.)

Waiver of Immunity for Georgian Diplomat

☐ State Department confirmed U.S. Attorney has formally requested Georgia to waive diplomatic immunity for Embassy counselor Makharadze.

☐ Refer you to State Department for further information.

Clinton-Yeltsin Meeting

☐ President and Yeltsin to meet in Helsinki March 20-21.

☐ We look ahead to progress with Russia on wide range of issues -- American investment, arms control, European security structures. Our agenda very comprehensive.

GCC

☐ Vice President Gore and PM Chernomyrdin Vice President Gore had excellent meetings last week during eighth session of Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. Full agenda of ongoing commission business, including business development issues, energy and agriculture reform, protection of the environment and defense conversion.

☐ VP and Chernomyrdin also prepared for upcoming meeting of two Presidents. They discussed arms control issues, development of a NATO-Russia relationship, and economic reforms that will stimulate investment and growth in Russia.

☐ Friday VP and Chernomyrdin reported on discussions to President Clinton. Saturday they traveled to Chicago for meeting with U.S. business community

If asked about Russian Criticism of Solana Travels to Caucasus, Moldova

☐ See no basis for Russian reaction; since break-up of former Soviet Union, NATO Secretary Generals have traveled widely in New Independent States, as well as throughout Central Europe -- nothing novel about Solana's trip.

General Issues

Russia-Iran Missile Technology

☐ The United States regularly exchanges information with the intelligence services of friendly governments. We find these exchanges to be valuable. Beyond that, it would be inappropriate to comment on the substance or origins of intelligence reports and assessments.

☐ We know that Iran is pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Clearly the international community needs to be concerned about that and try to prevent it.

☐ The United States believes any such cooperation or assistance is very dangerous and has conveyed its views to Russia on these issues regularly, in a variety of forums and communications. We will continue to investigate and follow-up on

all reports as warranted.

☐ If asked: The Vice President and the Prime Minister routinely discuss a wide range of security issues, including non-proliferation concerns; we cannot comment on any specifics of their private discussions.

NATO-Russia

☐ Exploring several ideas to develop strong NATO-Russia relationship,

☐ NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov had good discussion last month on future NATO-Russia relations; to meet again week of February 20 in Brussels.

☐ VP and Chernomyrdin had extensive discussions on European security, bilateral issues in preparation for the Clinton-Yeltsin meeting. Good exchange of views, positive tone; as Vice President said Friday, believe we've "narrowed range of differences on NATO-Russia".

☐ Understand enlargement difficult issue for Russia, but U.S., NATO and Russia have interests in developing NATO-Russia relationship and broadening cooperation.

☐ U.S. determined to proceed with NATO enlargement. Believe that is in interests of European security and stability. Equally determined to manage enlargement process in manner that does not threaten Russia and to do all that we can to build strong NATO-Russia relationship.

Prospects for Russian Ratification of START II Treaty

☐ Treaty faces ratification vote in Duma; parliamentary prerogative to debate its merits. While some may oppose Treaty, Russian government committed to ratification.

☐ START II in best interests of both countries, should be ratified by Russia.

If asked: is Administration planning to leap ahead" to START III:

- ☐ As Vice President stated, U.S. prepared to begin negotiations on further reductions in nuclear forces once START II has entered into force; VP said we're ready to consider what under "guidelines" to enter into negotiations. (FYI: VP carefully avoided saying "negotiations.")
- ☐ No intention of setting aside START II.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Chemical Weapons Convention

- ☐ The President is committed to working with the Senate to secure the ratification of the CWC.
- ☐ We have been working with the Senate on a bipartisan basis to take up the CWC on its merits.
- ☐ We will continue to work with the Senate to achieve this goal at the earliest possible time.

BOSNIA

Brcko Decision

- ☐ The decision mandates that the office of the High Representative assume interim international supervision of the Brcko area.
- ☐ The Arbitrator will retain jurisdiction and will review the issue in approximately one year.
- ☐ The Parties should remember that they are committed to implement the decision in full and must show restraint.
- ☐ The international community stands behind the decision and will support its full implementation.
- ☐ Implementation of the decision will require an integrated

approach, including increased reconstruction assistance, international oversight under the auspices of the OHR, and an expanded security presence to ensure the reduction of tensions.

☐ The decision is a result of lengthy and careful deliberation, due to the complexities of the situation, it does not make a black and white judgment but rather makes a good-faith effort to balance the conflicting concerns of the parties, and render a decision that will allow for the peaceful reintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

☐ Implementation will be a gradual and long-term effort requiring sustained commitment by the parties and international community. The implementation conference in early March will be the first step in this process.

Brcko Q's and A's

Q: What did the Brcko Arbitration Panel adjudicate?

☐ Both the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska lay claim to the town of Brcko, located at a crossroads in Northern Bosnia which is politically strategic and economically important.

☐ Under the terms of the Dayton Agreement, the Panel was charged with deciding whether the boundary line near Brcko separating the Federation and the Republika Srpska should be moved in accordance with the wishes of one or the other side. The Panel also was to determine which entity will control the town of Brcko itself.

Q: Who made the decision?

☐ The presiding arbitrator is Roberts Owen, an American citizen and former State Department Legal Advisor. He was appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

☐ Two other arbitrators--one Muslim and one Serb--make up the rest of the panel. According to the Dayton Agreement, if the three arbitrators cannot agree, the presiding arbitrator then has the authority to make the decision.

☐ Following final consultations with the other two arbitrators, Owen announced his decision in Rome on February 14th.

Q: What are the outlines of the decision?

☐ The decision mandates that the office of the High Representative assume interim international supervision of the Brcko area.

☐ There will be no change in the boundary line between the Federation and Republika Srpska.

☐ Because of the lack of progress in implementing the Dayton Agreement in the Brcko area, Owen determined that increased international supervision is required.

☐ A Deputy High Representative for Brcko will work with local authorities to set up the necessary procedures to implement the agreement.

☐ The Arbitrator will retain jurisdiction over the question and will review the issue in approximately one year, at the end of the interim international implementation period.

☐ The decision also calls for accelerated reconstruction efforts in the Brcko area; an expanded international Police presence, which would help ensure free transit in the Brcko area; and a managed process for the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Q: Who will implement the decision? Who will enforce it and who will pay?

☐ The Gradual implementation of the decision will begin after the adoption of an implementation strategy by the international community at a Brcko implementation conference in early March.

☐ The Deputy High Representative for Brcko will determine when the necessary conditions exist to begin implementation and will oversee the process.

☐ The office of the High Representative, in consultation with the parties and the international community, will monitor the compliance by the parties and determine whether other measures

or procedures to fulfill the decision are needed.

- ☐ The parties are ultimately responsible for ensuring that the decision is implemented in full.
- ☐ The U.S. and Contact Group are committed to effective and full implementation of the decision as part of the overall peace process.
- ☐ While SFOR has taken a number of steps to ensure a secure environment in the Brcko area, its mission will not expand beyond the current responsibility to provide such a secure environment.
- ☐ SFOR is prepared to handle any eventuality.
- ☐ Additional international police are likely to be necessary and some IPTF monitors will be redeployed to Brcko this week from elsewhere in Bosnia to augment the international police presence.

Q: Is this an American decision?

- ☐ Absolutely not. Although the presiding arbitrator is an American citizen, the Tribunal is an independent body. The decision is solidly backed by the international community.

Q: What role will the United States play in Implementation?

- ☐ We will pursue an active diplomacy in the weeks ahead to lower tensions and reduce the risk of confrontations between the parties.
- ☐ The United States will strongly support implementation of this decision using existing resources already dedicated to Bosnia, which will be reallocated to address new economic assistance and security needs. There will be no need for any additional funding.
- ☐ Although the Europeans are taking the lead on over-all civilian implementation in Bosnia, the Deputy High Representative for Brcko will be an American, signaling our determination to see that the decision is implemented in full.

Q: Does this decision permanently award Brcko to the Bosnian

Serbs?

- ☐ No. The Decision mandates that the Office of the High Representative assume interim international supervision of the Brcko area.
- ☐ The arbitrator will retain jurisdiction and will review the issue in approximately one year.

Mostar

- ☐ We condemn the acts of violence that took place in Mostar. We have called for restraint by all parties and urged them to redouble their efforts to work together.
- ☐ We have protested the incident to the Bosnian Croat Leadership. We have also raised our concerns with the government of Croatia.
- ☐ We have called upon the Bosnian Croat authorities to condemn publicly this brutal act and to see that those responsible are brought to justice.
- ☐ We are also working with the High Representative, IPTF, SFOR and other international agencies to maintain the peace.

War Criminals

- ☐ We remain deeply concerned with lack of progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. Achieving justice is part of achieving an enduring peace.
- ☐ We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.
- ☐ We also continue to press the parties to live up to their responsibilities to detain war criminals. We have been consulting with our allies for some time on ways to press the countries involved to turn indicted war criminals over to the tribunal.
- ☐ While international military forces in Bosnia will detain war criminals if, in the course of normal duties, they encounter those under indictment, it is not the role of SFOR to hunt down

war criminals.

If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:

☐ One possible option is to set up a special police force to assist the Tribunal in apprehending indicted war criminals. Such a force would not include SFOR personnel. This is only one of a number of options under consideration. No decisions have been made.

Return of Refugees

☐ The recent explosion in Gajevi and the arson attack in Stolac underscore our continuing concerns about the potential for violence or intimidation against returning refugees and displaced persons and the possibility of further confrontations in the Zone of Separation. SFOR and the IPTF are investigating these attacks and taking additional security measures to avoid the potential for additional violence.

☐ The situation in Gajevi remains calm and preparations continue for the return of displaced Bosniaks in accordance with agreed procedures. We are continuing to monitor the situation and will continue to insist that refugees and displaced persons that follow the agreed procedures are allowed to return to their homes.

☐ We are encouraged that Bosniaks appear to be returning peacefully and are encouraged that the Bosnian Serb leadership recently joined us in condemning similar attacks. We expect further action in response to last week's explosion.

☐ The repatriation of refugees and displaced persons will be a long term process and we will continue to encourage the parties and assist international agencies to ensure the expeditious return of these persons to their former homes. We have seen encouraging signs including the return of 225,000-250,000 internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes in Bosnia.

Iranian Influence in Bosnia

☐ Iranian influence in Bosnia has been an ongoing concern, but we have taken effective measures to cut Iranian links.

☐ We have enforced the Dayton agreement ban on foreign forces and insisted that Bosnian government sever all military and intelligence links with Iran as a condition of the train and equip program. As the President certified in June, those conditions have been met. There have been no indications since June that military or intelligence cooperation has resumed.

☐ We remain concerned about Iranian influence and continue to watch the situation closely. Overall, we and the intelligence community assess that Iranian influence has substantially diminished since the implementation of Dayton and since we tied the issue to the train and equip program.

Train and Equip Program

☐ The international Train and Equip program is ongoing and is a key success and a major step toward establishing a stable military balance in Bosnia, which is one of the keys to establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

☐ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

New Bosnia Mission/SFOR -- General

☐ The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission started December 20. SFOR's limited and focused mission will allow time to consolidate the peace

built by the success of IFOR.

☐ The Stabilization Force is about half IFOR's size. U.S. share is less than half last year's commitment -- about 8500 troops inside Bosnia.

☐ The NATO plan for SFOR includes more limited set of military and supporting tasks than IFOR, reflecting the more narrow mission of this smaller force. With fewer troops, SFOR will focus more on security, including force protection, and will be less involved in civilian tasks.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ 18 months will give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

☐ We will review every 6 months to see if we can accomplish mission with fewer forces. SFOR will gradually shift responsibilities to civilian agencies and the parties themselves while moving from stabilization to deterrence to disengagement.

If pressed on whether this means that the U.S. has ruled out participation of U.S. forces after completion of SFOR mission:

☐ We believe that SFOR's mission can be completed in 18 months, and that the conditions will have been established in which stability and security can be maintained without an outside military presence.

If pressed whether the U.S. will insist that any force after 18 months will be European only:

☐ I'm not going to speculate about such scenarios. We believe the mission will be completed in 18 months.

SERBIA/KOSOVO

Serbian Elections/Milosevic's Announcement

☐ We are encouraged by the passage of a law in the Serbian assembly implementing the Gonzalez recommendations and recognizing opposition victories. We urge rapid implementation of its provisions and steps so that the opposition can take its duly-elected seats.

☐ We remain cautious until Serbian authorities fully implement the OSCE Gonzalez report recommendations and recognize all opposition victories in the November 17 elections.

☐ We are continuing to move forward with a plan of action to support democratization in Serbia. We are considering a number of actions ranging from economic and political measures to democracy building initiatives as well as continuing to support the important roles of international organizations such as the OSCE.

If asked whether the opposition should give up their demonstrations

☐ It is up to the opposition and the will of the Serbian people to determine how to express their political rights. It is our hope that implementation of the Gonzalez recommendations will put Serbia on the path to democracy.

☐ We continue to condemn any use of force by Serbian police against demonstrators.

Kosovo

☐ We remain concerned about the tense situation in Kosovo and have urged all parties to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid violence.

☐ We deplore the continuing Serbian government repression and are calling for the restoration of full human and political rights for the people of Kosovo. We have actively worked to help the people of Kosovo, by providing direct humanitarian assistance and by pressuring the Serbian government to reverse its repressive policies.

☐ We have maintained the outer wall of sanctions, which is

directly linked to the restoration of full human and political rights in Kosovo.

☐ At the same time, we do not support the independence of Kosovo and do not recognize the unofficial parallel institutions that have been created.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ VP and PM Chernomyrdin announced that POTUS and Yeltsin will meet in Helsinki March 20-21.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ Chilean President Frei arrives February 26 for a state visit.

☐ President will travel to Mexico April 11-12, Latin America and the Caribbean May 6-13.

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Announced that Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Also announced that Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch. Again, no details available.

If asked about Bruton visit:

☐ Yes, we expect Irish Prime Minister here for annual St. Patrick's Day celebration.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance this morning in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April.

The Japanese are saying,
"The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and
the two governments have
begun consultations."

- ☐ We have seen reports indicating that PM Hashimoto wishes to visit Washington this spring.
- ☐ Nothing on the President's schedule yet.

GREECE/TURKEY

GREECE-U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEES

- ☐ We would be deeply concerned about any instability in the south Balkans that triggered refugee flows into Greece and would consult closely with the Greek government about the situation.

GREECE/TURKEY

NDU's Institute of Strategic Studies Map

Background: NDU's Institute for National Strategic Studies issued its 1997 Strategic Assessment this week, which contains a map that does not show Greek/Turkish borders and notes Turkey's claim to the continental shelf without noting Greece's 6-mile claim to territorial waters.

Q: Does the NDU map reflect an official U.S. government position?

A: The NDU map does not reflect an official U.S. government position on the issue of the Greek/Turkish border in the Aegean.

We have said repeatedly that the dispute between Greece and Turkey over ownership of Imia/Kardak islet should be submitted to the ICJ for adjudication.

We have similarly called for Greece and Turkey to settle their territorial differences without force or the threat of force, with respect for the territorial integrity of the other, and in accordance with all relevant international agreements.

PERU

Q: What's the situation in Peru at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence? What is the United States going to do about this situation?

A: President Clinton met with President Fujimori on February 3 to express our support for his handling of the hostage situation at the Japanese Ambassador's residence. President Clinton fully endorsed the joint statement made by President Fujimori and Prime Minister Hashimoto in Toronto on February 1 and reiterated our support for a peaceful resolution without concessions to terrorists..

This is a very serious situation and lives are obviously at risk. It simply isn't productive for me to address the other questions you have raised.

Q: Does the United States negotiate with hostages or condone those who do?

A: The United States does not condone making concessions to terrorists, but how to handle negotiations is a sovereign decision for the government involved.

Q: Were other issues discussed in the meeting with President Fujimori?

A: President Clinton told President Fujimori how much he appreciated Peru's contribution to our joint counternarcotics efforts. He also expressed support for pushing forward with finding a definitive resolution to the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador.

SAUDI ARABIA

F-16 Sales to Saudi Arabia

- ☐ No official request has been received.
- ☐ When and if we do receive a Saudi request, it will be examined in the usual manner by State and Defense, who will make recommendations to the President.
- ☐ We have a long-standing arms supply relation with Saudi Arabia and their security is vitally important to us, but no decisions have been made at this time on any major new weapons sale.

Saudi Cooperation with FBI

Q: What are you doing to get Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the FBI on the Khobar Towers bombing investigation?

A: The FBI is in charge of that investigation for the U.S.

I understand that they are in a dialogue with the Saudis about what additional specific materials and cooperation they seek.

We have assurances from the highest levels in the Kingdom that we will get full cooperation and we expect that such assurances will be honored.

Q: What's your reaction to allegations that the al-Khobar bombing involved Iranians?

A: There is an investigation under way.

I'm not going to speculate about hypothetical outcomes to this investigation.

Nor am I going to speculate about hypothetical responses once this investigation is complete.

Q: Was there an Iranian or Syrian role?

A: We have reached no conclusions.

Q: If Iran was behind it, will we still attack Iran as Secretary Perry said last summer?

A: This is hypothetical and I'm not going to respond. But if you ask whether the U.S.

responds to those who are proven to have attacked it, the record of this Administration is clear.

But I must stress that we have reached no conclusion about state sponsorship in the Khobar attack.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

Has there been a cover-up?

- ☐ No -- There is currently no evidence nor any indication of a cover-up.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee concurs in this assessment.
- ☐ The fact that U.S. troops inadvertently destroyed Iraqi chemical weapons after the war came to light as part of our effort to learn all that we can; that effort has since been intensified.
- ☐ We're awaiting the outcomes of Army IG, DOD Intel Oversight & CIA IG investigations.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 2, 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the Presidential Advisory Committee found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision taken by the President when he extended the Presidential Advisory Committee to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to

the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products.
- ☐ Stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 80+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.
- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 14 February 97 19:48

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO

Abdulmalik, April B.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Andreasen, Steven P.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Bedell, Blair B.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Biernacki, Eileen V.
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer
Brown, Nancy E.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.

Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davis, William K.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Flessas, Dan
Florio, Elaine
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Gladbach, Damon J.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Houck, Baerbel K.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.

Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Martinez, Alejandro
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Mercier, Henry J.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Moffett, Julia
Moody, Angelyn D.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Gwyn M. Parker
Parris, Mark R.

Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Petchel, Beverly L.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Prendergast, John P.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Schifter, Richard
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Showalter, Victoria A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.
Vershbow, Alexander R.

Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Tuesday, February 18. Thank you.

[[FEB14GUI.DOC : 4898 in FEB14GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 February 97 19:45

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

FEB14GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

February 14, 1997

WTO: Telecom and Cuba

Vatican

Netanyahu Visit

Middle East

France

China/Golden Venture

Korea

F-16/727 Incident

Northern Ireland

START/ABM

Russia/Computers

Russia

CWC

Bosnia

Serbia

Trips and Visitors

Greece

Greece/Turkey

Peru

Saudi Arabia

Gulf War Illnesses

WTO

WTO Telecom Negotiations

Q: What is the status of WTO telecommunications talks?

A. February 15 is the deadline for WTO negotiations to liberalize world trade in telecommunications services, currently an almost \$600 billion market. U.S. firms are the most competitive in the world, and the United States would benefit greatly from a strong market opening agreement.

There is some positive momentum, but we are still working hard in Geneva, in Washington and in capitals throughout the world to get the commitments we expect of our trading partners. The agreement has to be balanced. We refused to accept a deal last April because it was not.

Q: There appears to be a dispute on the Hill about whether you will need legislation to

implement the US offer. How are you going to handle this?

A: We are aware of the concerns expressed by some Members of Congress that implementing legislation may be necessary if we reach agreement. USTR and FCC have worked to ensure that the U.S. offer is consistent with U.S. law. We will continue to consult with Congress to address any concerns.

Helms-Burton WTO Case

Q: The New York Times today (2/13) said that the EU had delayed its WTO case on Helms-Burton, based on U.S. threats that it would invoke the national security exception. Is that true?

A: We are gratified the EU has postponed a decision on proceeding with their WTO case.

We recognize we have differences of opinion over the best way to bring about a transition to democracy in Cuba. But we do not think foreign policy differences of that kind can be resolved in a trade forum like the WTO.

Both we and the Europeans worked hard to put the WTO in place and it serves us all greatly. We are encouraged that our European allies are working with us to find a way to discuss our differences without jeopardizing what we worked so hard to build.

Q: Are you willing to jeopardize the WTO for a weak claim that our Cuba trade policy is necessary to our national security?

A: Naturally, if the Europeans go forward with their case the U.S. would defend its position with the greatest possible vigor, and I think our European friends understand that. This is not the place to get into the specifics of how we would do so.

I should point out that whatever the outcome, the WTO has no power to change U.S. laws. Only Congress can do that.

[If pressed]:

We have not ruled out any rights we have under the WTO. In the past, we have invoked the national security provisions of the GATT to justify our trade embargo against Cuba.

VATICAN

Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms's request that Ambassador Flynn be recalled?

A: Ambassador Flynn has served as Ambassador to the Vatican for over three years.

We understand he plans to leave his post and return to the U.S. this summer.

[Only if asked]:

The Department has received the report of the Office of the Inspector General and has taken appropriate action.

NETANYAHU VISIT

☐ President and PM Netanyahu met yesterday afternoon, part of time over a light lunch.

☐ Topics covered included:

☐ taking advantage of current momentum to move forward on the Palestinian track;
exchanging views on re-starting talks with Syria; discussing expansion of Israel's ties with other Arab states; discussing our cooperation to assure Israel's security.

MIDDLE EAST

POSSIBLE ISRAELI LAUNCHES IN U.S. (For use on background)

- ☐ Israel Aircraft Industries has informed us it is considering bidding on launches of U.S. commercial payloads from U.S. launch sites.
- ☐ In that connection, Administration currently reviewing request for a site survey at a U.S. facility by IAI.
- ☐ It's a complex issue involving a number of considerations, among them non-proliferation, commercial space policy, and foreign policy.
- ☐ Not going to comment further while it is under review.

VISITS BY LEADERS TO CONSULT ON PEACE PROCESS

-- As the President noted in his press conference on January 28, four Middle Eastern leaders will be coming to Washington over the next two months to consult with him on the peace process.

-- The schedule of visits is:

- Prime Minister Netanyahu - February 13
- Chairman Arafat - March 3
- President Mubarak - March 10
- King Hussein - March 18

-- Background Only: Visit by Prince Sultan (Saudi Arabia) should not be referred to in same category as these visits; he's being invited by Cohen (DOD) for Feb. 25th. Will meet President while here.

SETTLEMENTS AN "OBSTACLE TO PEACE"?

Q: President Clinton seemed to say December 16 that settlements are an obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Is that the U.S. position?

A: The U.S. position is that settlement activity complicates the negotiating process and increases tension.

We have previously expressed concern that when one party to a

negotiation says things
or does things which are seen to preempt the negotiating process,
it makes it that much
harder for negotiations to succeed.

In that vein, the President was making the obvious point that
when one party does
something that is seen by the other as preempting negotiations it
can become a problem or
an obstacle to progress in those negotiations.

So, yes we are troubled by some of the recent settlement
activity, and we've said so.
The President's response reflected his concern about the impact
of settlement activity.
It's important to focus on that concern.

[If asked]:

Q: Does the President's response indicate a change in policy?

A: As I said, his response reflected his concern about the impact
of settlement activity.
It's important to focus on that concern. The comments did not
signal a fundamental
change in the nature of that concern.

LEGALITY OF SETTLEMENTS

Q: Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that he subscribes
to the view that as a
matter of legal right, Jews and Israelis have a legal right to
settle on the West Bank? Is
that your understanding of the legalities?

A: I'm not going to get drawn into a discussion of the legal
aspects of what is obviously a
highly political issue. It is an issue, furthermore, that the
Israelis and Palestinians
recognize is difficult and therefore left for their permanent
status negotiations. It is
abundantly clear, however, that settlement activity, and even
announcements of plans for
possible future settlement activity, complicates the climate and
the process of negotiation.
When either party says things or does things that are perceived
as prejudging the outcome
of a negotiation, it makes it that much more difficult to achieve
progress.

Q: But what about the precise question of the legality of settlement activity?

A: As I said, I'm not going down that road. We need to keep our focus on assisting the parties in their negotiations.

Q: Do you or don't you differentiate between new and old settlements?

A: I've just explained what our position is and I referred to "settlement activity." I'm not going to comment further.

Q: The Israelis claim that you didn't complain about settlement activity during the Rabin Government, so why are you making this an issue now?

A: We said the same thing during the time of the Labor government.

JERUSALEM

Q: What is your reaction to Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement that Israel will not negotiate over the status of Jerusalem?

A: Our views have not changed. Israel and the Palestinians have agreed that Jerusalem is one of the issues for permanent status negotiations.

(If pressed) Our position on the status of Jerusalem is well-known.

Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and volatile issues in the peace process. We remain convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing these sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which Israel and the Palestinians themselves have formally agreed to discuss only in the context of direct, permanent status negotiations.

PEACE PROCESS

☐ There has been no change in the U.S. position on land-for-peace or anything else as a result of the Israeli elections. We have supported this principle and will continue to do so. At the

same time, our experience makes clear that agreements are reached not through recitation of abstract principles, but through the hard work of direct negotiation. Syria and Israel agreed at Madrid to negotiate on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. They should resume those negotiations to overcome their differences.

☐ Obviously, if progress is to be made, if differences are to be overcome, each side must take into account the needs and interests of the other.

☐ Peace is not an abstraction. Peace is closely tied to security and only the parties directly concerned can make the critical decisions which affect their future. The United States can't make these decisions for them. We will not try to impose decisions upon Israel or any other party to the peace process.

☐ That doesn't mean that the US, as the facilitator of the peace process, does not have views. It has been and remains our view that the land-for-peace formula offers the most promise for a workable solution to the problems of war and peace in the Middle East. But agreements will come not as a result of our views, but as a result of negotiations between the parties.

PALESTINIAN COMPLIANCE ON REVOCATION OF PALESTINIAN COVENANT

☐ We have welcomed the decision taken by the Palestinian National Council to cancel the provisions of the Covenant which contradict the formal undertakings made between the PLO and the Israeli government.

U.S. EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV

☐ Recognize what is required by the law passed by Congress requiring that the U.S. Embassy be transferred to Jerusalem. But at the same time, the President has made it clear that he will take no step that will undermine the peace process or jeopardize the negotiations. In this regard, the legislation provides a waiver provision that may be used by the President as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that

could preempt or jeopardize the peace process.

ORIENT HOUSE

☐ Our position regarding U.S. contacts at Orient House has not changed. We do business with the Palestinian Authority only in Gaza and Jericho, not in Jerusalem. Would encourage all parties to concentrate on the negotiations, not on issues that may polarize the situation.

SYRIA

☐ We believe that a comprehensive peace requires negotiations and agreements on all tracks, including with Syria and Lebanon. But we recognize that -- as in the past -- some negotiations will move at a faster pace than others.

☐ Prime Minister Netanyahu told me that he agrees on the importance of talks with Syria.

☐ We have never had any illusions about Syrian associations with groups involved in terrorism.

☐ We consider this a serious issue, and we have made that clear both in our diplomatic contacts at the highest levels and in our annual report on terrorism.

☐ We would like to see Syria's ties to terrorist groups definitively broken.

☐ But it is important to distinguish between states that work to subvert the peace process -- like Iran -- and those who have shown a willingness to engage in it actively and seriously -- like Syria.

FRANCE -- PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PHILIPPE SEGUIN

☐ President saw Philippe Seguin, President of the National Assembly of France, Thursday afternoon. Seguin was President Chirac's personal representative to the funeral of Ambassador Pamela Harriman, held Thursday morning at the National Cathedral.

□ President grateful for the presence of Mr. Seguin; looks forward to seeing him privately. They discussed importance of U.S.-French relations and contribution made by Ambassador Harriman.

□ Also grateful for other honors bestowed by France on Ambassador Harriman, especially France' highest decoration, the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor.

CHINA -- GOLDEN VENTURE DETAINEES

Background: In 1993, some 282 Chinese nationals tried to enter the United States illegally aboard the Golden Venture. Most were caught and placed in exclusion or deportation proceedings. Fifty-three currently remain in detention pending the outcome of their asylum cases which involve claims of fear of return to China's coercive family planning practices. The Administration has been criticized in the press and by some Members of Congress for its decision to maintain the aliens in detention for over 3 and a half years. The Administration defended its position by pointing out that the length of detention resulted from the detainees' many court challenges to the exclusion decision and, more importantly, that this detention policy served as an effective deterrent to alien smuggling.

The Administration has now decided to release the migrants. The decision reflects humanitarian concerns given the exceptional length of detention and the fact that the new immigration law (which takes effect on April 1, 1997) will strengthen our deterrence of alien smuggling by making it possible to exclude aliens within a matter of weeks. Releasing the migrants therefore will not undermine our deterrence strategy. The releases will occur over the next week or so, after the INS has gone through each case to review possible criminal background and to set reasonable conditions of supervision. The released aliens will remain in exclusion proceedings.

Points

- ☐ Administration has decided to release the remaining Golden Venture detainees.
- ☐ Decision reflects humanitarian concern for people who have been in detention for over 3 and a half years.
- ☐ To date, detention policy has been successful in deterring alien smuggling.
- ☐ However, new immigration bill strengthens our deterrence policy by making possible in the future expedited exclusion of smuggled aliens -- within a matter of weeks of their arrival in U.S.
- ☐ As a result, release of remaining Golden Venture detainees will not undermine our policy, and Administration has decided that it is now appropriate.
- ☐ The releases will take place over a period of several days, to allow INS to review each case. Persons with criminal backgrounds will not be released. INS also will determine reasonable conditions of supervised release. The process should be completed by March 1, 1997.
- ☐ The aliens will remain in exclusion proceedings and those found not to be entitled to asylum will be deported.

KOREA

DPRK DEFECTOR IN BEIJING

Background: FYI not to be discussed with the Press: The issue now is two-fold: How will the North react to such a senior level official defecting; how much pressure will they put on China not to allow the defector to travel to Seoul and what kind of pressure, if any, will the South try to put on us to intervene with the Chinese to allow the defector to leave Beijing.

Q: What is the significance of such a senior member of the north Korean government

defecting? Does this indicate that conditions in North Korea are even more severe than we believe?

A: A senior member of the North Korean government has reportedly sought asylum in the South Korean Embassy in Beijing. We are in close contact with the South Koreans. We have a single interest in this case: that it be handled in accordance with normal international asylum practices.

If asked:

Q: Have the South Koreans asked for our help in getting the Chinese to allow the defector to leave China?

A: The Republic of Korea has relations with China and is discussing the issue directly with Chinese officials.

VISIT OF SOUTH KOREAN NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

□ Ban Ki Moon, Senior Secretary for Foreign and National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor), met with National Security Advisor Berger on Tuesday. The two consulted on a number of issues, including North Korea.

□ This was the first opportunity Ban has had to visit Washington since assuming his duties last October.

UN FOOD APPEAL

Q: Will the UN WFP food Aid appeal cause the U.S. a dilemma in its relationship with South Korea?

A: We anticipate the UN will issue an appeal similar to the one that was made last year. When the appeal is issued we will consider it as we do all humanitarian appeals. You may recall that the United States participated in last year's appeal by providing a total of \$8.2 million. We have had no indication that South Korea is opposed to humanitarian assistance to the North.

Q: Is it true that the South Korean government opposes U.S. participation in UN WFP appeals and that participation is linked to North Korean attendance at the joint briefing?

A: The U.S. has not linked possible humanitarian food aid in response to an international appeal to the North's attendance at the joint briefing. Contrary to what has recently been reported, the USG did not promise, privately or otherwise, North Korea food aid in return for attendance at the joint briefing. U.S. policy is to review requests for humanitarian assistance independent of political considerations. That holds true in the case of North Korea.

If there is any interest regarding what South Korea is doing to provide humanitarian assistance in comparison to the U.S.:

□ South Korea's Red Cross said on Wednesday it had shipped 700 tons of flour to famine-stricken North Korea, the second such shipment in a week. The aid shipment is the second since Pyongyang apologized last December for a submarine incursion that plunged ties to anew low. On Friday, the relief organization shipped 300 tons of flour and 15,000 pairs of socks, worth a total of about \$153,000, from Incheon.

□ South Korea is allowing its relief organizations to restart their programs in a modest way. The current shipments are based on an on-going need and not on the latest appeal for food aid.

If asked:

□ The United States supports the efforts of the ICRC and other NGOs to respond to the humanitarian needs of North Korea and takes note of the recent shipment of flour and socks by the South Korean Red Cross. The United States will review official requests from international organizations for humanitarian aid on a case by case basis.

TAIWAN-NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR WASTE DEAL

- ☐ The U.S. believes that any international shipment and storage of nuclear waste must meet the relevant international standards, as defined by the IAEA.
- ☐
- ☐ We encourage Taiwan and North Korea to work with the IAEA to satisfy the international community (especially concerned countries in the region) that this proposed deal meets international standards.
- ☐ We note that strong concerns have been expressed within the region about this shipment, and believe these should be considered in reaching a final decision.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD F-16 INCIDENTS

The following actions were taken in response to two recent incidents involving Air National Guard F-16 fighters along the East Coast:

- ☐ The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating both incidents;
- ☐ General Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force Chief of Staff, suspended all operations of active duty, Reserve and Air National Guard aircraft in designated warning areas along the East Coast and the Gulf region until units have reviewed the applicable memoranda of agreement and operating procedures with the controlling agencies and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA);
- ☐ The FAA undertook a thorough review of internal procedures and applicable memoranda of agreement between the FAA and the various air control centers involved.

NORTHERN IRELAND

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release February 13, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Killing of British Soldier in Northern Ireland

I am grieved and outraged by the callous killing of a British soldier in Northern Ireland yesterday. The First Lady and I extend our deepest sympathy to the soldier's family and to the British government and people on the loss of this young man. We wish the authorities success in bringing the murderers swiftly to justice.

All those who care about the future of Northern Ireland must join me in condemning this cowardly crime. I remain convinced that the people of both of Northern Ireland's traditions want to take the path of peace and reconciliation, not hatred and violence.

The Belfast talks chaired by Senator Mitchell continue to have my full support. I urge all those taking part, who share a commitment to democratic values, to move as rapidly as possible into substantive negotiation about the future of Northern Ireland.

The loyalists and their leaders have shown great courage and restraint in not allowing themselves to be drawn into an escalating spiral of violence. I urge them to remain steadfast.

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NORTHERN IRELAND

Ambassador Smith to be Recalled?

(Background: The Washington Times picked up a story out of London that the WH is going to "recall" Ambassador Jean Kennedy Smith because we intend to change our policy toward Northern Ireland and she is regarded as too pro-Sinn Fein.)

☐ No truth to report that Ambassador Smith is going to be "recalled" because of change of White House policy toward Northern Ireland or dissatisfaction with Ambassador Smith's performance. She has played invaluable role in Administration support for Northern Ireland peace process.

☐ Our policy has not changed. We support efforts of British and Irish governments to bring about just and lasting settlement; see Belfast talks as historic opportunity. Continue to believe those talks have best chance of success with participation of all elected parties, including Sinn Fein, but that can only happen after cease-fire.

Parades Commission Report

Background: Last summer after the civil unrest over marches in Drumcree, the British set up a panel headed by Oxford don Peter North to recommend how to handle parades in the future.

The North report, just released, recommends that a commission be set up with, inter alia, the authority to make decisions on controversial parades. In its January 30 reaction to the report, the British Government neither accepted nor rejected the recommendation for a commission with decision-making powers but initiated an 8-week consultation period on this aspect of the report.

☐ North Review offers valuable insights and recommendations to deal with the very controversial and divisive question of parades and marches in Northern Ireland, particularly during summer "marching season."

☐ Report recommends establishment of independent parades commission. Pleased that British Government moving to set one up. Very much hope it can be up and running in time to make a difference and help avoid a repeat of last summer's bitter confrontations.

☐ Last summer's events cost the people of Northern Ireland dearly, both economically and politically. Vital for future political progress in Northern Ireland that new ways be found to meet needs of both communities and avoid annual confrontations.

Adams Refused Visa?

Background: Two London newspapers reported over the weekend that the White House has advised Gerry Adams he will not get a visa until the IRA reinstates its cease-fire. One paper sourced "officials of the NSC"; the other diplomats in London.

☐ Mr. Adams has not/not applied for a visa. Since there is no application, the Administration has made no decision.

☐ If pressed: As in the past, an application for a visa waiver by Mr. Adams would be decided on basis of whether it could contribute to search for lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Loyalist Cease-fire Intact?

☐ Up to British and Irish governments and participating parties to decide who participates in talks.

☐ As President said in statement yesterday, we urge loyalists to maintain their cease-fire. There has been no claim of responsibility for car bomb attacks and there is no doubt loyalists have shown restraint in response to escalating IRA violence.

Belfast Talks

☐ Belfast talks, chaired by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, represent historic opportunity and best hope in decades for achieving lasting settlement.

☐ Must not squander progress of last months. Urge all political leaders to take responsibility for making these talks work. Need to move quickly into substantive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland.

☐ Continue to believe that participation of all elected parties, including Sinn Fein, would give talks best chance of success; that can only happen with cease-fire.

☐ Impressed with commitment and determination both governments have shown in search for peace. They and we share goal of inclusive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland,

which can only happen if there is an IRA cease-fire.

Deportation Proceedings Against Matt Morrison

☐ Have been assured by Justice that these proceedings being handled fairly. Judicial matter - don't want to comment further.

START/ABM

Q: The Vice President mentioned Friday that he and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed "guidelines" for a possible START III agreement. Does this signal the Administration has given up on START II ratification in Russia and is now prepared to move on to START III?

A: As the Vice President said, we have begun discussions on possible guidelines for START III that our two Presidents might consider in March.

Such guidelines would underscore the value of START II ratification and point the way toward further reductions that would increase our mutual security and decrease costs.

We have no intention, however, of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with the conclusion of a "START III."

The ratification of START II by Russia remains an essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces, and we are currently working with the Russian government to achieve Russian ratification of START II.

[If asked: Did the Vice President and Prime Minister discuss a specific "target" for further reductions under START III? What else is under discussion in the context of START III guidelines? Have any agreements been reached?]

A: We are not going to comment on specifics. As the Vice President said, while some progress was made, we have only started these discussions and there are complex issues

involved for both our two countries.

[If asked: Are you prepared to commit to the elimination of nuclear weapons, as called for by the former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Lee Butler?]

A: The President said at the United Nations this fall that the United States looks forward to a new century "in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated."

[If asked: Were issues related to the ABM Treaty and ABM/TMD demarcation discussed by the President and Prime Minister?]

A: Both the ABM Treaty and ABM/TMD demarcation were discussed. Both sides remain committed to the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability, and to resolving the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation.

U.S. HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS AT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SITES

Q: In response to recent press inquiries, the Administration has stated that it has not approved high performance computers to Russian facilities that have been associated in the past with the Russian nuclear weapons program. Yet Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhaylov, has been quoted as saying that Russia bought two supercomputers which are installed at the Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear centers. What's the story?

A: The Administration has not approved the export of any high performance computers to the two Russian nuclear centers, nor do we have any requests pending for such exports. However, we are aware of statements made by Minister Mikhaylov on January 13.

The Commerce Department is investigating this matter, and we are pleased to say that the Russian Government has offered its full cooperation in the investigation. Because

there is an active investigation, however, further comment at this time would be inappropriate.

Q: In early 1996, the Administration liberalized its controls on computer exports. What level of computers were liberalized to Russia?

A: In January 1996, the Administration implemented the following computer export policy to Russia:

- ☐ Computers at any level require an export license when the exporter knows, or has reason to know, that the shipment is being made to a facility engaged in, among other activities, the design, development, production or stockpiling of nuclear weapons.
- ☐ Computers up to 2000 MTOPS may be sold to all other end users in Russia, including military end-users, without a license.
- ☐ Computers up to 7000 MTOPS may be sold to strictly civilian end users for civilian uses, without a license.
- ☐ Computers above 7000 MTOPS, for all end users/end-uses, require a license.

Q: Isn't it difficult for a company to know in every case whether an end-user is civilian, or military, or engaged in proliferation activities?

A: It can be. That is why U.S. exporters have been clearly instructed to contact the government (i.e., the Commerce Department) when they are uncertain about an end-user.

Q: Would you expect U.S. exporters to know that the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) was engaged in nuclear weapons work? Did the government let exporters know that these two sites were end users of concern?

A: Minatom and the sites at Arzamas and Chelyabinsk have been long associated with the Russian nuclear weapons program. In fact, there have been several recent press reports about these facilities.

We expect U.S. exporters to know their customers. In fact, U.S. companies have contacted the Commerce Department to ask if shipments to these two entities would be approved. This indicates that U.S. exporters doing business with Minatom have understood their obligations to seek export licenses before making any shipments.

If an exporter had any doubts about the activities of Minatom, however, that company had an obligation to resolve those doubts or to contact the government for assistance.

Q: What has the Administration done to ensure that more U.S. supercomputers don't go to these sites without an export license?

A: The relevant companies have been contacted, and we are satisfied that they are aware that computer shipments to these end users require an export license.

Q: If shipments to Arzamas and Chelyabinsk did occur, doesn't this show that the Administration's computer policy was a mistake, and has allowed a serious breach to our national security - namely that U.S. supercomputers are now helping the Russians refine their nuclear weapons?

A: The Administration's computer policy recognized the growing worldwide availability of high performance computers. It also recognized that U.S.-origin computers should not be shipped to certain end users without explicit U.S. authorization.

This was, and is, a reasonable balance to our security and economic interests that was carefully considered and supported by all of the national security agencies involved in the export policy development process, including Defense, Energy, State and Commerce.

If a U.S. company has violated that policy by shipping computers to the Russian nuclear weapons program without proper authorization, then that is a matter for our enforcement officials. In order to determine if any U.S. export regulations

have been violated, an investigation has been initiated.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Radio Address -- if Asked

Have not seen text, aware Yeltsin spoke today to Russian people.

(If asked about possible killing of UN observer in Tajikistan)

☐ Saw report, but have no confirmation of any death; press reports have, in fact, been conflicting.

(FYI: Reports so far NOT conclusive -- we will keep tracking.)

Waiver of Immunity for Georgian Diplomat

☐ State Department confirmed U.S. Attorney has formally requested Georgia to waive diplomatic immunity for Embassy counselor Makharadze.

☐ Refer you to State Department for further information.

Clinton-Yeltsin Meeting

☐ President and Yeltsin to meet in Helsinki March 20-21.

☐ We look ahead to progress with Russia on wide range of issues -- American investment, arms control, European security structures. Our agenda very comprehensive.

GCC

☐ Vice President Gore and PM Chernomyrdin Vice President Gore had excellent meetings last week during eighth session of Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. Full agenda of ongoing commission business, including business development issues, energy and agriculture reform, protection of the environment and defense conversion.

☐ VP and Chernomyrdin also prepared for upcoming meeting of two Presidents. They discussed arms control issues, development of a NATO-Russia relationship, and economic reforms that will stimulate investment and growth in Russia.

☐ Friday VP and Chernomyrdin reported on discussions to President Clinton. Saturday they traveled to Chicago for meeting with U.S. business community

If asked about Russian Criticism of Solana Travels to Caucasus, Moldova

☐ See no basis for Russian reaction; since break-up of former Soviet Union, NATO Secretary Generals have traveled widely in New Independent States, as well as throughout Central Europe -- nothing novel about Solana's trip.

General Issues

Russia-Iran Missile Technology

☐ The United States regularly exchanges information with the intelligence services of friendly governments. We find these exchanges to be valuable. Beyond that, it would be inappropriate to comment on the substance or origins of intelligence reports and assessments.

☐ We know that Iran is pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Clearly the international community needs to be concerned about that and try to prevent it.

☐ The United States believes any such cooperation or assistance is very dangerous and has conveyed its views to Russia on these issues regularly, in a variety of forums and communications. We will continue to investigate and follow-up on all reports as warranted.

☐ If asked: The Vice President and the Prime Minister routinely discuss a wide range of security issues, including non-proliferation concerns; we cannot comment on any specifics of their private discussions.

NATO-Russia

- ☐ Exploring several ideas to develop strong NATO-Russia relationship,
- ☐ NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov had good discussion last month on future NATO-Russia relations; to meet again week of February 20 in Brussels.
- ☐ VP and Chernomyrdin had extensive discussions on European security, bilateral issues in preparation for the Clinton-Yeltsin meeting. Good exchange of views, positive tone; as Vice President said Friday, believe we've "narrowed range of differences on NATO-Russia".
- ☐ Understand enlargement difficult issue for Russia, but U.S., NATO and Russia have interests in developing NATO-Russia relationship and broadening cooperation.
- ☐ U.S. determined to proceed with NATO enlargement. Believe that is in interests of European security and stability. Equally determined to manage enlargement process in manner that does not threaten Russia and to do all that we can to build strong NATO-Russia relationship.

Prospects for Russian Ratification of START II Treaty

- ☐ Treaty faces ratification vote in Duma; parliamentary prerogative to debate its merits. While some may oppose Treaty, Russian government committed to ratification.
- ☐ START II in best interests of both countries, should be ratified by Russia.

If asked: is Administration planning to leap ahead" to START III:

- ☐ As Vice President stated, U.S. prepared to begin negotiations on further reductions in nuclear forces once START II has entered into force; VP said we're ready to consider what under "guidelines" to enter into negotiations. (FYI: VP carefully avoided saying "negotiations.")
- ☐ No intention of setting aside START II.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Chemical Weapons Convention

- ☐ The President is committed to working with the Senate to secure the ratification of the CWC.
- ☐ We have been working with the Senate on a bipartisan basis to take up the CWC on its merits.
- ☐ We will continue to work with the Senate to achieve this goal at the earliest possible time.

BOSNIA

Brcko Decision

- ☐ The decision mandates that the office of the High Representative assume interim international supervision of the Brcko area.
- ☐ The Arbitrator will retain jurisdiction and will review the issue in approximately one year.
- ☐ The Parties should remember that they are committed to implement the decision in full and must show restraint.
- ☐ The international community stands behind the decision and will support its full implementation.
- ☐ Implementation of the decision will require an integrated approach, including increased reconstruction assistance, international oversight under the auspices of the OHR, and an expanded security presence to ensure the reduction of tensions.
- ☐ The decision is a result of lengthy and careful deliberation, due to the complexities of the situation, it does not make a black and white judgment but rather

makes a good-faith effort to balance the conflicting concerns of the parties, and render a decision that will allow for the peaceful reintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

☐ Implementation will be a gradual and long-term effort requiring sustained commitment by the parties and international community. The implementation conference in early March will be the first step in this process.

Brcko Q's and A's

Q: What did the Brcko Arbitration Panel adjudicate?

☐ Both the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska lay claim to the town of Brcko, located at a crossroads in Northern Bosnia which is politically strategic and economically important.

☐ Under the terms of the Dayton Agreement, the Panel was charged with deciding whether the boundary line near Brcko separating the Federation and the Republika Srpska should be moved in accordance with the wishes of one or the other side. The Panel also was to determine which entity will control the town of Brcko itself.

Q: Who made the decision?

☐ The presiding arbitrator is Roberts Owen, an American citizen and former State Department Legal Advisor. He was appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

☐ Two other arbitrators--one Muslim and one Serb--make up the rest of the panel. According to the Dayton Agreement, if the three arbitrators cannot agree, the presiding arbitrator then has the authority to make the decision.

☐ Following final consultations with the other two arbitrators, Owen announced his decision in Rome on February 14th.

Q: What are the outlines of the decision?

☐ The decision mandates that the office of the High Representative

assume interim international supervision of the Brcko area.

☐ There will be no change in the boundary line between the Federation and Republika Srpska.

☐ Because of the lack of progress in implementing the Dayton Agreement in the Brcko area, Owen determined that increased international supervision is required.

☐ A Deputy High Representative for Brcko will work with local authorities to set up the necessary procedures to implement the agreement.

☐ The Arbitrator will retain jurisdiction over the question and will review the issue in approximately one year, at the end of the interim international implementation period.

☐ The decision also calls for accelerated reconstruction efforts in the Brcko area; an expanded international Police presence, which would help ensure free transit in the Brcko area; and a managed process for the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Q: Who will implement the decision? Who will enforce it and who will pay?

☐ The Gradual implementation of the decision will begin after the adoption of an implementation strategy by the international community at a Brcko implementation conference in early March.

☐ The Deputy High Representative for Brcko will determine when the necessary conditions exist to begin implementation and will oversee the process.

☐ The office of the High Representative, in consultation with the parties and the international community, will monitor the compliance by the parties and determine whether other measures or procedures to fulfill the decision are needed.

☐ The parties are ultimately responsible for ensuring that the decision is implemented in full.

☐ The U.S. and Contact Group are committed to effective and full implementation of the decision as part of the overall peace process.

☐ While SFOR has taken a number of steps to ensure a secure environment in the Brcko area, its mission will not expand beyond the current responsibility to provide such a secure environment.

☐ SFOR is prepared to handle any eventuality.

☐ Additional international police are likely to be necessary and some IPTF monitors will be redeployed to Brcko this week from elsewhere in Bosnia to augment the international police presence.

Q: Is this an American decision?

☐ Absolutely not. Although the presiding arbitrator is an American citizen, the Tribunal is an independent body. The decision is solidly backed by the international community.

Q: What role will the United States play in Implementation?

☐ We will pursue an active diplomacy in the weeks ahead to lower tensions and reduce the risk of confrontations between the parties.

☐ The United States will strongly support implementation of this decision using existing resources already dedicated to Bosnia, which will be reallocated to address new economic assistance and security needs. There will be no need for any additional funding.

☐ Although the Europeans are taking the lead on over-all civilian implementation in Bosnia, the Deputy High Representative for Brcko will be an American, signaling our determination to see that the decision is implemented in full.

Q: Does this decision permanently award Brcko to the Bosnian Serbs?

☐ No. The Decision mandates that the Office of the High Representative assume interim international supervision of the Brcko area.

☐ The arbitrator will retain jurisdiction and will review the issue in approximately one year.

Mostar

- ☐ We condemn the acts of violence that took place in Mostar. We have called for restraint by all parties and urged them to redouble their efforts to work together.
- ☐ We have protested the incident to the Bosnian Croat Leadership. We have also raised our concerns with the government of Croatia.
- ☐ We have called upon the Bosnian Croat authorities to condemn publicly this brutal act and to see that those responsible are brought to justice.
- ☐ We are also working with the High Representative, IPTF, SFOR and other international agencies to maintain the peace.

War Criminals

- ☐ We remain deeply concerned with lack of progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. Achieving justice is part of achieving an enduring peace.
 - ☐ We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.
 - ☐ We also continue to press the parties to live up to their responsibilities to detain war criminals. We have been consulting with our allies for some time on ways to press the countries involved to turn indicted war criminals over to the tribunal.
 - ☐ While international military forces in Bosnia will detain war criminals if, in the course of normal duties, they encounter those under indictment, it is not the role of SFOR to hunt down war criminals.
- If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to arrest war criminals:
- ☐ One possible option is to set up a special police force to assist the Tribunal in apprehending indicted war criminals. Such a force would not include SFOR

personnel. This is only one of a number of options under consideration. No decisions have been made.

Return of Refugees

☐ The recent explosion in Gajevi and the arson attack in Stolac underscore our continuing concerns about the potential for violence or intimidation against returning refugees and displaced persons and the possibility of further confrontations in the Zone of Separation. SFOR and the IPTF are investigating these attacks and taking additional security measures to avoid the potential for additional violence.

☐ The situation in Gajevi remains calm and preparations continue for the return of displaced Bosniaks in accordance with agreed procedures. We are continuing to monitor the situation and will continue to insist that refugees and displaced persons that follow the agreed procedures are allowed to return to their homes.

☐ We are encouraged that Bosniaks appear to be returning peacefully and are encouraged that the Bosnian Serb leadership recently joined us in condemning similar attacks. We expect further action in response to last week's explosion.

☐ The repatriation of refugees and displaced persons will be a long term process and we will continue to encourage the parties and assist international agencies to ensure the expeditious return of these persons to their former homes. We have seen encouraging signs including the return of 225,000-250,000 internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes in Bosnia.

Iranian Influence in Bosnia

☐ Iranian influence in Bosnia has been an ongoing concern, but we have taken effective measures to cut Iranian links.

☐ We have enforced the Dayton agreement ban on foreign forces and insisted that Bosnian government sever all military and intelligence links with Iran as a condition of the train and

equip program. As the President certified in June, those conditions have been met. There have been no indications since June that military or intelligence cooperation has resumed.

☐ We remain concerned about Iranian influence and continue to watch the situation closely. Overall, we and the intelligence community assess that Iranian influence has substantially diminished since the implementation of Dayton and since we tied the issue to the train and equip program.

Train and Equip Program

☐ The international Train and Equip program is ongoing and is a key success and a major step toward establishing a stable military balance in Bosnia, which is one of the keys to establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

☐ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

New Bosnia Mission/SFOR -- General

☐ The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission started December 20. SFOR's limited and focused mission will allow time to consolidate the peace built by the success of IFOR.

☐ The Stabilization Force is about half IFOR's size. U.S. share is less than half last year's commitment -- about 8500 troops inside Bosnia.

☐ The NATO plan for SFOR includes more limited set of military and supporting tasks than

IFOR, reflecting the more narrow mission of this smaller force. With fewer troops, SFOR will focus more on security, including force protection, and will be less involved in civilian tasks.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ 18 months will give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

☐ We will review every 6 months to see if we can accomplish mission with fewer forces. SFOR will gradually shift responsibilities to civilian agencies and the parties themselves while moving from stabilization to deterrence to disengagement.

If pressed on whether this means that the U.S. has ruled out participation of U.S. forces after completion of SFOR mission:

☐ We believe that SFOR's mission can be completed in 18 months, and that the conditions will have been established in which stability and security can be maintained without an outside military presence.

If pressed whether the U.S. will insist that any force after 18 months will be European only:

☐ I'm not going to speculate about such scenarios. We believe the mission will be completed in 18 months.

SERBIA/KOSOVO

Serbian Elections/Milosevic's Announcement

☐ We are encouraged by the passage of a law in the Serbian assembly implementing the Gonzalez recommendations and recognizing opposition victories. We urge rapid implementation of its provisions and steps so that the opposition can take its duly-elected

seats.

☐ We remain cautious until Serbian authorities fully implement the OSCE Gonzalez report recommendations and recognize all opposition victories in the November 17 elections.

☐ We are continuing to move forward with a plan of action to support democratization in Serbia. We are considering a number of actions ranging from economic and political measures to democracy building initiatives as well as continuing to support the important roles of international organizations such as the OSCE.

If asked whether the opposition should give up their demonstrations

☐ It is up to the opposition and the will of the Serbian people to determine how to express their political rights. It is our hope that implementation of the Gonzalez recommendations will put Serbia on the path to democracy.

☐ We continue to condemn any use of force by Serbian police against demonstrators.

Kosovo

☐ We remain concerned about the tense situation in Kosovo and have urged all parties to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid violence.

☐ We deplore the continuing Serbian government repression and are calling for the restoration of full human and political rights for the people of Kosovo. We have actively worked to help the people of Kosovo, by providing direct humanitarian assistance and by pressuring the Serbian government to reverse its repressive policies.

☐ We have maintained the outer wall of sanctions, which is directly linked to the restoration of full human and political rights in Kosovo.

☐ At the same time, we do not support the independence of Kosovo and do not recognize the unofficial parallel institutions that have been created.

TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ VP and PM Chernomyrdin announced that POTUS and Yeltsin will meet in Helsinki March 20-21.

☐ Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official visit to Washington on April 8.

☐ Chilean President Frei arrives February 26 for a state visit.

☐ President will travel to Mexico April 11-12, Latin America and the Caribbean May 6-13.

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Announced that Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Also announced that Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch. Again, no details available.

If asked about Bruton visit:

☐ Yes, we expect Irish Prime Minister here for annual St. Patrick's Day celebration.

If asked about Hashimoto Visit

Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance this morning in reaction to a leaked story in Tokyo about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The Japanese are saying, "The Prime Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two governments have begun consultations."

☐ We have seen reports indicating that PM Hashimoto wishes to visit Washington this spring.

☐ Nothing on the President's schedule yet.

GREECE/TURKEY

GREECE-U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEES

☐ We would be deeply concerned about any instability in the south Balkans that triggered refugee flows into Greece and would consult closely with the Greek government about the situation.

GREECE/TURKEY

NDU's Institute of Strategic Studies Map

Background: NDU's Institute for National Strategic Studies issued its 1997 Strategic Assessment this week, which contains a map that does not show Greek/Turkish borders and notes Turkey's claim to the continental shelf without noting Greece's 6-mile claim to territorial waters.

Q: Does the NDU map reflect an official U.S. government position?

A: The NDU map does not reflect an official U.S. government position on the issue of the Greek/Turkish border in the Aegean.

We have said repeatedly that the dispute between Greece and Turkey over ownership of Imia/Kardak islet should be submitted to the ICJ for adjudication.

We have similarly called for Greece and Turkey to settle their territorial differences without force or the threat of force, with respect for the territorial integrity of the other, and in accordance with all relevant international agreements.

PERU

Q: What's the situation in Peru at the Japanese Ambassador's

Residence? What is the
United States going to do about this situation?

A: President Clinton met with President Fujimori on February 3 to express our support for his handling of the hostage situation at the Japanese Ambassador's residence. President Clinton fully endorsed the joint statement made by President Fujimori and Prime Minister Hashimoto in Toronto on February 1 and reiterated our support for a peaceful resolution without concessions to terrorists..

This is a very serious situation and lives are obviously at risk. It simply isn't productive for me to address the other questions you have raised.

Q: Does the United States negotiate with hostages or condone those who do?

A: The United States does not condone making concessions to terrorists, but how to handle negotiations is a sovereign decision for the government involved.

Q: Were other issues discussed in the meeting with President Fujimori?

A: President Clinton told President Fujimori how much he appreciated Peru's contribution to our joint counternarcotics efforts. He also expressed support for pushing forward with finding a definitive resolution to the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador.

SAUDI ARABIA

F-16 Sales to Saudi Arabia

- ☐ No official request has been received.
- ☐ When and if we do receive a Saudi request, it will be examined in the usual manner by State and Defense, who will make recommendations to the President.
- ☐ We have a long-standing arms supply relation with Saudi Arabia and their security is vitally

important to us, but no decisions have been made at this time on any major new weapons sale.

Saudi Cooperation with FBI

Q: What are you doing to get Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the FBI on the Khobar Towers bombing investigation?

A: The FBI is in charge of that investigation for the U.S.

I understand that they are in a dialogue with the Saudis about what additional specific materials and cooperation they seek.

We have assurances from the highest levels in the Kingdom that we will get full cooperation and we expect that such assurances will be honored.

Q: What's your reaction to allegations that the al-Khobar bombing involved Iranians?

A: There is an investigation under way.

I'm not going to speculate about hypothetical outcomes to this investigation.

Nor am I going to speculate about hypothetical responses once this investigation is complete.

Q: Was there an Iranian or Syrian role?

A: We have reached no conclusions.

Q: If Iran was behind it, will we still attack Iran as Secretary Perry said last summer?

A: This is hypothetical and I'm not going to respond. But if you ask whether the U.S. responds to those who are proven to have attacked it, the record of this Administration is clear.

But I must stress that we have reached no conclusion about state sponsorship in the Khobar attack.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

Has there been a cover-up?

- ☐ No -- There is currently no evidence nor any indication of a cover-up.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee concurs in this assessment.
- ☐ The fact that U.S. troops inadvertently destroyed Iraqi chemical weapons after the war came to light as part of our effort to learn all that we can; that effort has since been intensified.
- ☐ We're awaiting the outcomes of Army IG, DOD Intel Oversight & CIA IG investigations.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 2, 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the Presidential Advisory Committee found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision taken by the President when he extended the Presidential Advisory Committee to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents;

vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products.

☐ Stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 80+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.