

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 31 January 97 19:32

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO

Abdulmalik, April B.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Andreasen, Steven P.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Bakke, Kyle D.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Bedell, Blair B.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Biernacki, Eileen V.
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer
Brown, Dallas
Brown, Nancy E.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya

Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davis, William K.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Flessas, Dan
Florio, Elaine
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Gladbach, Damon J.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Houck, Baerbel K.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.

Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Martinez, Alejandro
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Moffett, Julia
Moody, Angelyn D.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Gwyn M. Parker
Parris, Mark R.

Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Saunders, John W.
Schifter, Richard
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Showalter, Victoria A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.

Wadsworth, Valon J.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates **IN BOLD** to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Monday, February 3. Thank you.

[[JAN31GUI.DOC : 4914 in JAN31GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

31 January 97 19:31

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

JAN31GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

January 31, 1997

European Trips and Visitors

Northern Ireland

Marine Corps Hazing

Taiwan/North Korea

Eastern Slavonia

Serbia

Bosnia

Peru

Saudi Arabia

Haiti

Tony Lake

Iraq

UN/Richardson

Cuba

Algeria

Germany/Scientists

CWC

Russia

Middle East

Gulf War Illnesses

EUROPEAN TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ Do not yet know what else POTUS might do on that trip. Will be doing pro forma WH statement announcing visit Monday, just for the record.

☐ Fact that President will be in Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration is public -- there literally are no more details.

☐ Basic info on visits of Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres and Spanish President Aznar is in the announcement. Just don't have any more details yet.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 31, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Official Working Visit by Spanish President Aznar

President Clinton has invited the President of the Spanish Government, Jose Maria Aznar, to make an official working visit to the United States in the last week of April. The President will host a working luncheon in honor of the Spanish President on April 30, 1997.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 31, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Official Working Visit by Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres

The White House is pleased to announce that Prime Minister Antonio Guterres of Portugal has accepted President Clinton's invitation for an official working visit to Washington the first week of April. The President will meet with Prime Minister Guterres in the White House and continue discussions at a working luncheon in his honor on April 3, 1997.

#

NORTHERN IRELAND

Parades Commission Report

Background: Last summer after the civil unrest over marches in Drumcree, the British set up a panel headed by Oxford don Peter North to recommend how to handle parades in the future. The North report, just released, recommends that a commission be set up with, inter alia, the authority to make decisions on controversial parades. In its January 30 reaction to the report, the British Government neither accepted nor rejected the

recommendation for a commission with decision-making powers but initiated an 8-week consultation period on this aspect of the report.

☐ North Review offers valuable insights and recommendations to deal with the very controversial and divisive question of parades and marches in Northern Ireland, particularly during summer "marching season."

☐ Report recommends establishment of independent parades commission. Pleased that British Government moving to set one up. Very much hope it can be up and running in time to make a difference and help avoid a repeat of last summer's bitter confrontations.

☐ Last summer's events cost the people of Northern Ireland dearly, both economically and politically. Vital for future political progress in Northern Ireland that new ways be found to meet needs of both communities and avoid annual confrontations.

Adams Refused Visa?

Background: Two London newspapers reported over the weekend that the White House has advised Gerry Adams he will not get a visa until the IRA reinstates its cease-fire. One paper sourced "officials of the NSC"; the other diplomats in London.

☐ Mr. Adams has not/not applied for a visa. Since there is no application, the Administration has made no decision.

☐ If pressed: As in the past, an application for a visa waiver by Mr. Adams would be decided on basis of whether it could contribute to search for lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Loyalist Cease-fire Intact?

☐ Up to British and Irish governments and participating parties to decide who participates in talks.

☐ As President said in statement yesterday, we urge loyalists to maintain their cease-fire. There has been no claim of responsibility for car bomb attacks and there is no doubt loyalists have

shown restraint in response to escalating IRA violence.

Recent Attacks

- ☐ Condemn this latest attack. Thankfully, no serious injuries, but shows wanton disregard for human life.
- ☐ Call again on IRA to declare and implement immediate cease-fire in words and deeds. People of Ireland, North and South, clearly want peace, political settlement.

Belfast Talks

- ☐ Belfast talks, chaired by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, represent historic opportunity and best hope in decades for achieving lasting settlement. Talks will reconvene for bilateral consultations January 13, in plenary January 27.
- ☐ Must not squander progress of last months. Urge all political leaders to take responsibility for making these talks work. Need to move quickly into substantive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland.
- ☐ Continue to believe that participation of all elected parties, including Sinn Fein, would give talks best chance of success; that can only happen with cease-fire.
- ☐ Impressed with commitment and determination both governments have shown in search for peace. They and we share goal of inclusive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland, which can only happen if there is an IRA cease-fire.

Was 1994 IRA cease-fire "fake" as Prime Minister Major has alleged?

- ☐ Cease-fire from August 1994 to February 1996 saved hundreds of lives. I strongly condemned end of that cease-fire and I continue to call on IRA to declare new cease-fire immediately.

How Will You Know a New Cease-fire is Real?

- ☐ Will be up to British and Irish governments to evaluate new

cease-fire; but as both Taoiseach and Prime Minister Major have said, will depend on both words and actions on ground.

Deportation Proceedings Against Matt Morrison

☐ Have been assured by Justice that these proceedings being handled fairly. Judicial matter - don't want to comment further.

MARINE CORPS HAZING INCIDENTS

Background: NBC "Dateline" obtained videotapes of 1991 and 1993 "blood winging ceremonies" for Marines who qualified for their gold parachute wings at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. During these incidents, gold jump wings were physically pinned to a Marine's chest (not their uniforms).

☐ Hazing (as occurred in these incidents four and six years ago) is not tolerated in today's military. In recent years, the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense as a whole have taken aggressive steps to eliminate hazing through strong policy guidance, sound leadership and discipline for those who disregard the policy.

☐ Refer questions on specifics to DoD.

TAIWAN-NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR WASTE DEAL

☐ The U.S. believes that any international shipment and storage of nuclear waste must meet the relevant international standards, as defined by the IAEA.

☐ The nuclear waste involved in the proposed Taiwan-North Korea deal is not a proliferation concern, but could present an environmental hazard if not transported and stored properly.

☐ We encourage Taiwan and North Korea to work with the IAEA to satisfy the international community (especially concerned countries in the region) that this proposed deal meets

international standards.

☐ We note that strong concerns have been expressed within the region about this shipment, and believe these should be considered in reaching a final decision.

EASTERN SLAVONIA

☐ We strongly condemn today's attack on UNTAES soldiers by a Serbian gunman. We offer our deepest condolences to the family of the Belgian soldier killed in the incident and extend our hope for a speedy recovery to the other two soldiers injured in the attack.

☐ This appears to have been an isolated act perpetrated by a single individual. The suspected gunman has been arrested and is in police custody under UNTAES supervision.

☐ This was the first attack on UNTAES troops since they began operations in Eastern Slavonia over one year ago. UN military forces and the regional police force, under the supervision of the UN are working to insure that such incidents do not become a pattern. We would also expect the parties to do their part to reduce tensions and take actions to prevent further violence.

SERBIA

Serbian Elections -- General

☐ Although Serbian authorities have made announcements that appear to concede opposition victories in some municipalities, the regime continues to stall for time with legal tactics; we remain skeptical until the duly-elected members of the opposition are able to take their seats and begin work.

☐ It remains that Serbian authorities must implement the OSCE Gonzalez report

recommendations and recognize all opposition victories in the November 17 elections. Until Milosevic recognizes the will of the Serbian people, he will remain isolated.

□ We remain concerned about recent reports of the use of violence by Serbian police against demonstrators in Belgrade. We condemn any police interference with the rights of the Serbian people to voice their protests. The use of force by Serbian authorities will only further their international isolation.

□ We continue to hope that this situation can be resolved without violence. We and our allies remain engaged in seeking ways to gain Milosevic's acceptance of the election results as an essential step for the resolution of the situation in Serbia and are considering a number of possible steps to put additional pressure on Belgrade. We will not be satisfied until the people of Serbia are vindicated in their desire for the implementation of democratic norms and processes.

□ We are also moving forward with a plan of action to support democratization in Serbia. We are considering a number of actions ranging from economic and political measures to democracy building initiatives as well as continuing to support the important roles of international organizations such as the OSCE.

If asked about Sanctions:

□ We are not actively pursuing the reimposition of sanctions at this time, but are taking other steps to convince Milosevic to accept the will of the Serbian people.

BOSNIA

Situation in Gajevi

□ Calm has been restored to the area and we understand that settlers have begun to return and are following agreed procedures. We will continue to insist that

refugees and displaced persons that follow the agreed procedures are allowed to return to their homes.

☐ We remain concerned about the potential for the use of violence or intimidation against returning refugees and displaced persons and the possibility of further confrontations in the Zone of Separation. SFOR and the IPTF are taking additional security measures to avoid the potential for additional violence around Gajevi.

☐ We are continuing to monitor the situation and will continue to insist that the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes is respected. We are encouraged that Bosniaks appear to be returning peacefully and that the Bosnian Serb leadership joined us in condemning the recent attacks promised to take action against those responsible.

War Criminals

☐ We remain deeply concerned with lack of progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. Achieving justice is part of achieving an enduring peace.

☐ We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. One possible option is to set up a special police force to assist the Tribunal in apprehending indicted war criminals. Such a force would not include SFOR personnel. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.

☐ While international military forces in Bosnia will detain war criminals if, in the course of normal duties, they encounter those under indictment, it is not the role of SFOR to hunt down war criminals.

Brcko Arbitration

☐ The parties agreed at Dayton to binding arbitration of the disputed portion of the inter-entity boundary line in the Brcko area. The issue is in the hands of the Arbitral Tribunal, consisting of arbitrators from the two Bosnian entities and the

internationally-appointed arbiter Roberts Owen. There is no U.S. proposal for a Brcko solution; we support the arbitration process.

☐ A decision is to be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal by February 15. The Tribunal has been holding hearings in recent weeks including representatives of the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska.

☐ The U.S. and other Contact Group member states are aware of ideas under consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal, since the international community may need to move quickly to provide support for implementation of the Brcko solution. The Arbitral Tribunal is continuing its work, and we await the decision.

Iranian Influence in Bosnia

☐ Iranian influence in Bosnia has been an ongoing concern, but we have taken effective measures to cut Iranian links.

☐ We have enforced the Dayton agreement ban on foreign forces and insisted that Bosnian government sever all military and intelligence links with Iran as a condition of the train and equip program. As the President certified in June, those conditions have been met. There have been no indications since June that military or intelligence cooperation has resumed.

☐ Hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards have left Bosnia, Mujahadeen units have disbanded, and the Bosnians are looking to the U.S. and moderate Islamic states for security assistance.

☐ We remain concerned about Iranian influence and continue to watch the situation closely. Overall, we and the intelligence community assess that Iranian influence has substantially diminished since the implementation of Dayton and since we tied the issue to the train and equip program.

New Bosnia Mission/SFOR -- General

☐ The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission started December

20. SFOR's limited and focused mission will allow time to consolidate the peace built by the success of IFOR.

☐ The Stabilization Force is about half IFOR's size. U.S. share is less than half last year's commitment -- about 8500 troops inside Bosnia.

☐ The NATO plan for SFOR includes more limited set of military and supporting tasks than IFOR, reflecting the more narrow mission of this smaller force. With fewer troops, SFOR will focus more on security, including force protection, and will be less involved in civilian tasks.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ 18 months will give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

☐ We will review every 6 months to see if we can accomplish mission with fewer forces. SFOR will gradually shift responsibilities to civilian agencies and the parties themselves while moving from stabilization to deterrence to disengagement.

If pressed on whether this means that the U.S. has ruled out participation of U.S. forces after completion of SFOR mission:

☐ We believe that SFOR's mission can be completed in 18 months, and that the conditions will have been established in which stability and security can be maintained without an outside military presence.

If pressed whether the U.S. will insist that any force after 18 months will be European only:

☐ I'm not going to speculate about such scenarios. We believe the mission will be completed in 18 months.

If pressed whether every last soldier will be out of Bosnia in exactly 18 months:

☐ 18 months is the duration of the mission and the deployment, but not necessarily a deadline for withdrawal of the last SFOR soldier. Withdrawal at 18 months will occur in a timely fashion but may extend some days or weeks beyond the mission duration.

LA Times Cengic Inquiry ("Cengic has become unofficial Intelligence Chief to Izetbegovic"):

☐ We have no evidence that Cengic remains involved in any way with intelligence matters.

☐ We would caution that there are many false rumors that travel around Sarajevo spread by individuals with one motive or another.

☐ We can tell you our latest understanding that there are no Minister posts left in the Federation for Cengic, even though he had earlier been rumored for one.

Train and Equip Program (Post)

☐ The international Train and Equip program is ongoing and is a key success and a major step toward establishing a stable military balance in Bosnia, which is one of the keys to establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

☐ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

PERU

Q: Is Fujimori coming to Washington before/after his trip to Toronto to meet with U.S. officials?

A: Have no request from Peru on this; nothing on anyone's schedule.

Q: What's the situation in Peru at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence? What is the United States going to do about this situation?

A: We have continued our active and intense consultations with the Governments of Peru and Japan. The President's national security team has kept him fully informed as events there have developed.

This is a very serious situation and lives are obviously at risk. It simply isn't productive for me to address the other questions you have raised.

Q: Does the United States negotiate with hostages or condone those who do?

A: The United States does not condone making concessions to terrorists, but how to handle negotiations is a sovereign decision for the government involved.

SAUDI ARABIA

F-16 Sales to Saudi Arabia

- ☐ No official request has been received.
- ☐ When and if we do receive a Saudi request, it will be examined in the usual manner by State and Defense, who will make recommendations to the President.
- ☐ We have a long-standing arms supply relation with Saudi Arabia and their security is vitally important to us, but no decisions have been made at this time on any major new weapons sale.

Saudi Cooperation with FBI

Q: What are you doing to get Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the FBI on the Khobar Towers bombing investigation?

A: The FBI is in charge of that investigation for the U.S.

I understand that they are in a dialogue with the Saudis about what additional specific materials and cooperation they seek.

We have assurances from the highest levels in the Kingdom that we will get full cooperation and we expect that such assurances will be honored.

Q: What's your reaction to allegations that the al-Khobar bombing involved Iranians?

A: There is an investigation under way.

I'm not going to speculate about hypothetical outcomes to this investigation.

Nor am I going to speculate about hypothetical responses once this investigation is complete.

Q: Was there an Iranian or Syrian role?

A: We have reached no conclusions.

Q: If Iran was behind it, will we still attack Iran as Secretary Perry said last summer?

A: This is hypothetical and I'm not going to respond. But if you ask whether the U.S. responds to those who are proven to have attacked it, the record of this Administration is clear.

But I must stress that we have reached no conclusion about state sponsorship in the Khobar attack.

HAITI

Administration Efforts to Deal with Political Violence in Haiti

Broad Context

- ☐ From its first days in 1993, the Clinton Administration has sought to end political violence and restore democracy in Haiti.
- ☐ Political violence was a horrifying, frequent occurrence during the de facto regime; according to local and international human rights groups, thousands of people were killed, tortured, beaten or imprisoned.
- ☐ When international political and economic pressure failed to dislodge the de facto regime, the President decided to intervene militarily.
- ☐ As part of the preparatory effort, the President ordered a broad-gauged plan to support the restoration of democracy by helping to create a new security/public safety structure, supporting a renewal of democratic political institutions and elections, and assisting with the establishment of the foundation for a viable economy.
- ☐ Two years later, while many challenges remain, real progress has been made toward these goals. Former President Aristide returned peacefully. He abolished the repressive Armed Forces and worked to establish Haiti's first professional and apolitical police force. Three national elections occurred and were judged generally free and fair by international monitors (although logistical problems marred the first legislative contest). A new parliament is in place, and a democratically elected president succeeded another for the first time in Haitian history. Efforts to stabilize the economy continue with widespread international economic support.

Aggressively Targeting Political Violence

- ☐ Throughout this period, the Administration has pursued a diplomatic and intelligence effort to identify threats to democracy and stability in Haiti. While the primary threat to democracy immediately after the military intervention was deemed to be from the right, the Administration was alert to the possibility of continued

official involvement in political violence.

□ One important objective of this multi-faceted effort was to urge the Government of Haiti to investigate and remove individuals in the government reportedly involved in political violence or corruption.

□ As a result of its efforts, the US was able to identify a number of individuals associated with political violence and corruption, and senior US officials effectively pressed the Government of Haiti to remove the personnel identified.

□ President Clinton, Vice President Gore and other senior members of the Administration, including Secretary of State Christopher, US Permanent Representative to the UN Albright, National Security Advisor Lake, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott and others traveled to Haiti and raised these issues with senior levels of the Haitian Government.

□ By March 1996, most of those then identified within the government as having been implicated in political violence were removed from official positions.

Building Law Enforcement Institutions

□ The US has also played a major role in helping the Haitian Government create and train a wholly new police force, for the first time in Haiti's history. Although it still has a long way to go and requires much additional training and equipment, the new force's deployment represents a major departure from past practices.

□ Initially, the Administration took the lead in organizing and overseeing an interim security force and in creating and training a new Haitian National Police mostly from raw recruits. Both units were carefully screened by the U.S. and UN to keep out known human rights abusers and criminals. Despite these efforts, some problems persist with the force.

□ By June 1996, 5200 new police were trained and deployed through the ICITAP program of

the US Department of Justice. UN civilian police advisers provide on-the-job training.

□ With strong Administration encouragement, President Aristide established, and President Preval has strengthened, a Special Investigative Unit, with US and UN police advisers, to investigate possible political killings. This unit, while limited in effectiveness to date, provides an institutional mechanism to tackle the problem of official impunity.

□ Preval has also appointed, and the Haitian Senate has confirmed, a new Director-General of Haitian Police, Pierre Denize, who is untainted by charges of human rights abuses or corruption. Denize, in turn, has reappointed a tough-minded Inspector General, Eucher Joseph, who has recommended severe disciplinary measures on police officials involved in the abuse of authority.

□ The Government has adopted a new set of standards for apolitical and merit-based recruitment of mid-level supervisors. Requirements include appearance before an examinations board that include US and UN police representatives, passing a battery of tests and successful completion of a supervisory course at the Police Academy, which emphasizes respect for the due process of law and support for human rights. At present, 54 mid-level supervisors have completed this training.

□ As is to be expected with a brand-new civilian police force in a country which has never had one before, the Haitian Police face many problems. The Police Inspector General has been actively investigating reports of police misbehavior, such as a March 6 incident in a Port-au-Prince slum in which a shoot-out with gang members left a number of civilians dead. The Director General of the Police has given strong support to the Inspector General.

The Bertin Assassination

□ The US tried to prevent the tragic assassination of Madame Mireille Bertin in March 1995 and immediately after it launched a comprehensive effort to

identify and bring the perpetrators to justice.

□ When the Multinational Force(MNF) received information of a plot to kill Madame Bertin, US forces arrested and interrogated the alleged conspirators, and the MNF and Embassy asked Aristide and Justice Minister Exume to warn her of the threat, and we were subsequently assured that they had done so.

□ Mrs. Bertin acknowledged to others that she had been warned by Justice Minister Exume, although she said that he had warned her to leave the country lest she be arrested.

□ After Mrs. Bertin was assassinated, the Administration offered an FBI team to aid in the investigation and dispatched it within hours following a request by Aristide. The FBI assisted with the investigation within the constraints of Haiti's weak criminal justice system. When it became clear the FBI investigation was unlikely to progress further, we worked with the Haitian government to establish an indigenous investigative unit under the Haitian national police. Results of the FBI's Bertin investigation were handed off to this Special Investigations Unit in late 1995.

□ Due to a proliferation of threat reports reaching US officials, the State Department sent instructions to the Embassy in Port-au-Prince to ensure that individuals be warned in the future when there is credible information of a specific threat of physical violence against them.

Responded Rapidly to The Leroy and Florival Murders

□ Based on the circumstances in which opposition leaders Leroy and Florival were murdered on August 20, and given the public allegations of official involvement, we felt strongly that there had to a rapid and credible investigation.

□ APNSA Lake and Deputy Secretary Talbott delivered exactly that message when they traveled to Port-au-Prince on August 30 to meet with President Preval. Preval made clear his

conviction there could be no room in his security force for those linked to crime, corruption or violation of human rights.

□ President Preval also agreed that in order for an investigation to be credible, those individuals perhaps linked to the murders of August 20 would have to be suspended.

□ At the same time, Preval undertook a reorganization of his Presidential security force in order to bring it up to the same standards of professionalism that apply to the Haitian National Police.

□ To help President Preval carry out the vetting, reorganization and retraining of his security unit, we dispatched a team of 20 State Department Diplomatic Security officers and 12 DoD civilian security personnel to augment the State Department's existing advisory unit.

□ More than one third of the augmented team have completed their mission and returned home. Additional personnel will be withdrawn as the reorganization moves forward.

Results

□ Political violence has been much reduced since the restoration of democracy. Despite the inadequacy of the legal system and the inexperience of its police, violence in Haiti remains far below levels experienced during de facto military rule and the Duvalier era.

□ According to both local and international human rights organizations, Haiti suffered several thousand political murders during the three years of the de facto regime and countless additional beatings and other abuses. In contrast, a 1995 report by the UN/OAS human rights observer mission in Haiti estimated that the total number of killings with possible political or retributive motivation stood at about 24 since Aristide's return.

A Familiar Task

□ The U.S. experience in El Salvador, where we confronted a

much more serious problem of official human rights abuse, provides an instructive point of reference. There, as in Haiti, a fundamental objective of U.S. policy was strengthening democracy and supporting the rule of law. In El Salvador, the principles of democracy often ran up against the habits of violence and distrust bred by a long experience with dictatorship.

□ It took repeated interventions by the most senior officials of the Reagan and Bush administrations to convince the Salvadoran government to put an end to officially-sponsored political violence.

□ In 1984, Vice President Bush visited San Salvador personally to inform the government that aid would be cut off if the abuses did not stop. In response, the Salvadoran government established a new investigative unit and quietly dismissed or transferred abroad the military officers whom we had identified as possibly linked to political violence.

□ Five years later, amid an apparent resurgence of death squad activity, it was Vice President Quayle who traveled to San Salvador to deliver the message that the U.S. government would not tolerate such abuses.

□ We have profited from these experiences, and thanks to those lessons, have been able to come to grips with the problem of political violence in Haiti quickly and decisively.

□ We have also been fortunate that the government of Haiti itself has been more quick to respond to indications that its officials might be involved in political violence.

TONY LAKE

Stock

Q: What about new stories that Tony Lake held energy stock as late as January of this year, even though he was already under investigation for

having held such stock earlier?

A: The fact that Mr. Lake held stock in Williams Company, a natural gas pipeline company, was brought to Mr. Lake's attention when our lawyers noticed the stock on Mr. Lake's most recent financial disclosure form. Mr. Lake said that he was unaware such a stock had been purchased.

Our lawyers contacted Mr. Lake's financial manager, who confirmed that the stock had been purchased in error in September 1996, without Mr. Lake's knowledge, and that he had already sold it, again without Mr. Lake's knowledge, when he realized he should not have purchased the stock for Mr. Lake.

IF ASKED: We immediately brought this information to the attention of the Justice Department in connection with their ongoing investigation regarding potential conflicts of interest raised by Mr. Lake's previous holdings of energy stock.

Q: Why does Mr. Lake retain the financial advisor despite these mistakes?

A: That is a matter between Mr. Lake and his advisor.

Arms to Bosnia

Q: What is your reaction to the stories regarding Mr. Lake and Mr. Berger and arms to Bosnia?

A: First, there is nothing new in these stories. This matter has been thoroughly reviewed by any number of Committees. This particular report was concluded in October and fully briefed by the Republicans at that time and selectively leaked ever since.

We are proud of our policy in Bosnia, which has brought peace to that country. We did what we thought necessary at the time to preserve the Federation in Bosnia and give that country a chance for peace. We understand that some may disagree with that policy, but it is unfortunate and wrong that anyone would try to turn

policy disagreement into
criminal accusations in order to gain political advantage.

Mr. Lake is the President's nominee for Director of Central Intelligence. He is uniquely
qualified for the post. He will be good for the CIA, good
for the President, and good for
the country. It is time to put politics aside.

Q: What about the allegation that Mr. Lake was excessively
secret and kept the not only the
Congress, but also CIA in the dark about what was going on
in Bosnia? Is this the man
you want running the CIA?

A: As the President has said before, it would have been
better to have informed key
Members of Congress at the time of our instruction of "no
instructions" to Amb. Galbraith
in Croatia. Mr. Lake and the President are in agreement on
that.

IF ASKED:

Q: Is it true Sandy Berger said it would be "dynamite" to put
any of this in writing?

A: As the Republican report itself states, Mr. Berger does
not recall making this comment.
The concern at the time, as has been explained repeatedly,
is that a leak of this sensitive
diplomatic exchange would gravely damage our relationship
with our allies and undermine
NATO.

Q: Did Mr. Lake convey the instruction with a wink and a nod?

A: The instruction was "no instructions."

Q: The reports indicate that Mr. Lake refused to testify
under oath, doesn't that suggest
that he had something to hide?

A: Nonsense. Based on the constitutional separation of
powers it is long-standing practice
that the President's senior advisers do not testify, and
cannot be compelled testify, before
the Congress. While there have been some exceptions over
the years to this general rule,

the White House Counsel determined that a policy dispute such as this did not warrant an exception and instructed Mr. Lake accordingly.

Mr. Lake did make himself available to brief both the Senate and House committees looking into this matter.

Q: We are told that your staff, or the White House has classified the House report so that embarrassing details regarding this policy will not be revealed. Is that true?

A: No. At the request of the Congress, classification experts from the CIA, Defense Department, and State Department reviewed the document for classified information in both the Republican and Democrat House reports on this matter. Quite frankly, there are intelligence sources and methods that directly relate to the safety of our personnel in Bosnia revealed in the full reports.

Q: You seem to dismiss this matter, but hasn't it been referred to the Justice Department?

A: If the President had thought this was a problem for Mr. Lake, he would not have nominated him for the position of Director of Central Intelligence.

We are proud of our policy in Bosnia, which has brought peace to that country. We understand that some may disagree with that policy, but it is unfortunate and wrong that anyone would try to turn policy disagreement into criminal accusations in order to gain political advantage.

IRAQ

Possible Planned Invasion of Kuwait

Q: What is your reaction to the Washington Post story that Iraq is possibly ready to invade Kuwait again?

A: While Saddam Hussein does have military capabilities which

can threaten Kuwait and other neighbors, we have no evidence that Iraq is staging new moves to threaten its neighbors.

I can assure you that we maintain a very close watch over Iraqi military movements and adjust our own military presence in the gulf to counter potential threats.

Saddam Hussein has intimate familiarity with what we can and have done in response to his threatening military moves in the area. He would do well to keep it in the forefront of his thoughts.

UN/RICHARDSON

Q: Senator Helms alleged today (1/29) that the Administration is trying to bypass his Committee and force through a \$900 million emergency appropriation to repay UN arrears and refuses to condition that emergency appropriation on reforms at the UN. Is this true?

A: No. The Administration is not seeking an emergency appropriation. We want to work with Senator Helms and other members of Congress to develop a bipartisan, effective plan to encourage UN reform and pay off our arrears.

While the President believes that our arrears to the UN and its specialized agencies are an obligation that we should meet and are hurting our ability to lead at the United Nations, he has also said clearly, most recently when UN Secretary General Annan visited last week, that "as a practical matter, I know from consulting with the members of Congress that we won't be able to secure support in the Congress for paying the arrears unless they're convinced that reform is going forward."

The Administration is currently working with Congressional leaders and appropriators, as well as Senator Helms, to develop a plan to encourage UN reforms and to pay off our

arrears. The Administration has not yet discussed specifics with Senator Helms, but we look forward to doing so in the near future. As these discussions continue, we will have a better idea what kind of effective and appropriate benchmarks can be agreed upon.

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent visit to Washington demonstrated that goodwill exists on both sides of the aisle and on all sides of this issue. With Mr. Annan's leadership of the UN and his commitment to reform, I am convinced that we now have the best chance we've had in years to further the process of UN reform, get the UN on a firm financial footing, and pay off our arrears.

CUBA

REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN CUBA

What is this report?

☐ The President has transmitted to Congress a report, mandated by Title II of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD), that describes potential U.S. and other international assistance and other support for a transitional or democratic government in Cuba.

☐ The report communicates to the people of Cuba, including individuals in the Cuban government who support democracy, that the U.S. stands ready, along with other democratic nations, to help Cuba overcome the challenges it will face during the transition to democracy.

The Cuban government is calling this report a new violation of Cuba's sovereignty. Should the U.S. be planning Cuba's future?

☐ The report is premised on the fact that it is the Cuban people who must choose when and how a transition takes place, and what their new government's policies and priorities should

be.

☐ It emphasizes that the U.S. -- far from threatening Cuba's sovereignty as the Castro regime alleges-- wants to assist Cubans in building an independent, prosperous and free country.

Has the U.S. consulted other countries about their roles in supporting a transition in Cuba?

☐ No formal consultations have taken place, although we have discussed the issue informally with officials of other governments. We look forward to in-depth discussions with international donors at the appropriate time. We are confident they share our desire to provide Cuba with the help it will need.

Does the U.S. think a transition in Cuba is imminent? Is this report relevant now?

☐ We do not know. Certainly we have seen nothing in the behavior of the Castro regime which suggests that it is prepared to move in this direction. Nevertheless, we do expect a transition to occur at some point, as it has everywhere else in the Soviet empire and the Western Hemisphere, and we hope it will be soon.

☐ This report does not attempt to identify when or how that transition will come. It attempts to look past those uncertainties and discusses what kinds of support other transition and democratic governments typically have sought and what the international community is likely to provide.

Are you expecting this report to expedite a transition? How?

☐ Both the President and Congress want to send the Cuban people a message of hope for their future, and to counter the Cuban government's efforts to create a fear of change.

☐ We do not expect this or any other single step to prompt a transition to democracy in Cuba. Ultimately, it is for the Cuban people to decide when the time has come for democratic

change.

Where did the \$4 billion-8 billion figure come from? How much will come from the U.S.?

☐ The assistance total is a rough estimate designed to provide an "order of magnitude" to the U.S. Congress and the Cuban people. We will continue the process of planning for a transition as the situation there evolves.

☐ We cannot say at this point what percentage of assistance the U.S. will provide, but the U.S. can expect to take a lead role among donors, given our obvious geographic and historical ties to Cuba and interest in supporting a peaceful, democratic transition there.

What kind of reaction do you expect from Congress?

☐ We have worked particularly closely with Representative Robert Menendez of New Jersey, who has long advocated the need for a plan for assistance. We are also briefing other interested members of Congress.

☐ We believe that there is broad support for the report in Congress, and we will continue to work with interested Members on planning for a democratic transition in Cuba.

Would the U.S. provide assistance to a transition government that included Fidel or Raul Castro?
Helms-Burton says you can't.

☐ The LIBERTAD Act does contain that condition. We have no reason to entertain that possibility in any case. There is no reason to believe that Fidel and Raul Castro will undertake real reform.

Will the U.S. withhold assistance until property claims are resolved?

☐ As the report states, we believe that the prompt resolution of U.S. property claims in Cuba is essential. We would have to review at the time a transition was taking place how best to accomplish that, working closely with transition and democratic Cuban governments.

Is the U.S. planning for a violent transition? There's no mention of it here.

☐ Our policy is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy. This report does not address the form a transition would take; it focuses on the broader challenges any transition government could face, and what the U.S. and other donors could do to help.

Isn't this report months late? Were you waiting until after the elections?

☐ The LIBERTAD Act called for the report to be issued in September, but its preparation required consideration by numerous USG agencies that was not completed until recently. The U.S. elections had no effect on its release date.

Who prepared this report?

☐ The report was drafted by USAID, in collaboration with a number of other U.S. agencies, including the Department of State.

CNN REQUEST TO OPEN BUREAU

Background: After the Cuban government in November approved CNN's request to open a bureau in Havana, CNN renewed its application for a license from Treasury/OFAC license to do so. A half dozen other U.S. news media want to open bureaus, but the GOC has approved only CNN. (FYI ONLY: The Helms-Burton Act contains a provision suggesting that Congressional intent was that the USG not grant any licenses unless the GOC indicates willingness to allow TV/Radio Marti open offices in Cuba, but State and Treasury lawyers have concluded that we have parallel authority to do so.) While most U.S. media favor authorizing CNN's request, views on the Hill and in the Cuban-American community remain mixed. The application is still under active consideration.

Points

☐ CNN's application is still under review.

☐ Want to ensure that any decision is consistent with U.S. law and our commitment to promote peaceful, democratic transition in Cuba.

ALGERIA

Q: What is your view of the worsening violence in Algeria, marked yesterday (1/28) by the assassination of the Algerian labor leader Abdelhak ben Hamouda?

A: We strongly condemn the acts of terrorism and deplore the loss of life. Our condolences go out to the families of the victims, particularly in this holy month of Ramadan. All elements of Algerian society need to work to end this violence.

If asked about planned elections:

We hope the legislative elections planned for May will contribute to ending the violence, to widen political participation, and to national reconciliation.

Q: What do you think about the request that the U.S. become a mediator in the Algerian crisis?

A: We have not been asked by the government of Algeria to play such a role. The focus should be on the Algerian efforts to end the violence and proceed with political and economic development.

GERMANY AND SCIENTOLOGISTS

[BACKGROUND: The Washington Post reported (1/27) that the State Department's Human Rights Reports -- due to be released on Thursday -- will be highly critical of German

discrimination against Scientologists.

USG POSITION: While there are allegations that the Church engages in cult-like practices, and that it uses measures such as blackmail and harassment to keep members in the organization, our position has been that methods used by Germany to address these concerns have been excessive and inconsistent with freedom of religion and expression. State has raised this issue on several occasions with its German counterparts. The OSCE has also expressed concern.

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: The reports have noted German abuses over the past several years.

This year's report devotes a significantly larger section to this issue as Germany has stepped up its efforts against Scientologists: language calling for wide ranging surveillance and restrictive measures has appeared in the CDU party platform, and the German Federal Minister of Labor has taken a strong position against scientology. Likewise, discriminatory measures at the state level have been tightened in 1996. NSC/Europe reviewed the 1996 report on Germany and found it fair; it believes that our ongoing discussions with the Germans on this issue have prepared them for this report. It was also vetted by State/EUR.

INTEREST IN THE US: Over the past several months, various members of Congress have written to express their concern about Germany's discriminatory practices. They include Reps. Payne, McKinney, and other Congressional Black Caucus members.]

POINTS

- ☐ Human rights report for 1996 does include somewhat expanded section on Scientology, reflecting increased intensity of German actions affecting the organization and its members.
- ☐ Since report has not even been conveyed to Congress, urge you to read it when it is published in February.
- ☐ Overall, report on Germany paints picture of a thriving democracy with a superlative record on human rights -- where free speech is respected,

judiciary is independent, ethnic minorities are treated fairly and where more refugees and asylum-seekers live in freedom than in any other nation in Western Europe.

☐ If pressed: Overall report outlines what we view as unsettling pattern of discrimination against Scientologists. Notes new developments in 1996 such as boycott in some German states of "Mission Impossible." Also notes resolution by one of members of governing coalition urging government to place organization under observation.

☐ Have been positive developments too. Ministry of Interior, under which Germany's FBI-equivalent falls, issued report noting there is no legal basis, no evidence, which would allow Scientologists to be placed under observation.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

☐ The President is committed to working with the Senate to secure the ratification of the CWC.

☐ We have been actively and regularly working with interest groups and the general public to educate them on the importance of this treaty.

☐ The meeting with Senator Lott was useful. He has committed to organizing a meeting with members in order to begin discussions on how we might bridge the gap between those who support the treaty and those who have difficulties with it. (IF ASKED: Specifically, we will discuss possible amendments to the resolution of ratification -- not to the treaty itself.)

☐ You would have to ask the Senator about the Senate calendar. We emphasized to him the importance of an early vote.

☐ As to whether or not he supports the treaty, I would, again, direct you to his office and to remarks he made at his Tuesday press conference.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Health/Clinton-Yeltsin Meeting/Chernomyrdin Suggests Moscow Venue

- ☐ President and Yeltsin agreed in December 5 phone conversation to meet in March timeframe; have not yet fixed specific date or venue for meeting. Expect this to be topic on Gore-Chernomyrdin agenda February 5-8.

What if Yeltsin Unable to Meet for Reasons of Health?

- ☐ Have nothing about Yeltsin's health other than what Russian government spokesman stated; he continues to recover from November surgery, recent illness.
- ☐ Have heard nothing to indicate Yeltsin unable to meet in March timeframe.
- ☐ Personal contact between two leaders important, as we look ahead to work with Russia on wide range of issues -- American investment, arms control, European security structures. Our agenda very comprehensive.
- ☐ But we work this agenda at wide variety of levels, throughout two governments; will continue to do that.

Duma Vote Last Week on Yeltsin "Incapacity," to Govern, Prolonged Absence

- ☐ Our understanding these resolutions (on health determinations) have no legal, constitutional validity; second vote (on another version of resolution) did not pass.
- ☐ Not appropriate for me to speculate on parliamentary activities in Russia.

Elections in Chechnya

- ☐ Reports indicate voting went smoothly, no violence. Understand OSCE representative in Chechnya has praised conduct of election, saying it was

mostly orderly, fair, apparently without serious irregularities.

☐ Welcome fact that election proceeded in smooth, apparently fair manner. Hope this will contribute to process between Moscow and Chechnya of finding peaceful and durable resolution of their differences.

Russian Delays on Space Station Project

☐ Understand Russians encountering some delays. We continue to work closely with them and with our other partners on this important mutual endeavor.

☐ If necessary, we have capability to complete all key aspects of this project ourselves.

☐ We will continue to maintain ongoing dialogue with Russia and our other partners on pace and progress of space station program.

NATO-Russia Talks

☐ In preparing for upcoming meetings between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, and between Vice President and Chernomyrdin, we are exploring several ideas to develop strong NATO-Russia relationship,

☐ NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov had good discussion on January 20 on future NATO-Russia relations.

☐ Talbott-Fuerth in Moscow January 22-24; had extensive discussions on European security and other U.S.-Russian issues in preparation for Gore-Chernomyrdin and Clinton-Yeltsin meetings. Positive tone.

General Issues

Russia-NATO

☐ Understand enlargement difficult issue for Russia, but U.S., NATO and Russia have interests in developing NATO-Russia relationship and broadening cooperation.

☐ Serious dialogue on NATO-Russia relationship underway.

☐ U.S. determined to proceed with NATO enlargement. Believe that is in interests of European security and stability. Equally determined to manage enlargement process in manner that does not threaten Russia and to do all that we can to build strong NATO-Russia relationship.

Prospects for Russian Ratification of START II Treaty

☐ Treaty faces ratification vote in Duma; parliamentary prerogative to debate its merits. While some may oppose Treaty, Russian government committed to ratification.

☐ START II in best interests of both countries, should be ratified by Russia.

If asked: is Administration planning to leap ahead" to START III:

☐ As Secretary Perry made clear last fall in Moscow, U.S. prepared to begin negotiations on further reductions in nuclear forces once START II has entered into force.

☐ Have no intention, however, of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with negotiations on "START III." Entry into force of START II remains essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

MIDDLE EAST

VISITS BY LEADERS TO CONSULT ON PEACE PROCESS

-- As the President noted in his press conference on January 28, four Middle Eastern leaders will be coming to Washington over the next two months to consult with him on the peace process.

-- The schedule of visits is:

- Prime Minister Netanyahu - February 13
- Chairman Arafat - March 3
- President Mubarak - March 10
- King Hussein - March 18

-- Background Only: Visit by Prince Sultan (Saudi Arabia) should not be referred to in same category as these visits; he's being invited by Cohen (DOD) for Feb. 25th. Will meet President while here.

ISRAEL/OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Background: In October 1995, the GOI requested the extradition of Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook to stand trial in Israel for manslaughter, murder, grievous harm and wounding, harm with aggravating intent, harm and wounding under aggravating circumstances, and conspiracy to commit a felony, in violation of the Israel Penal Code. Abu Marzook is the head of the political bureau of Hamas.

Abu Marzook was found extraditable by a U.S. court in New York on May 8, 1996. Further proceedings in the extradition case were stayed while he exercised his right to challenge the finding of extraditability. Press reports this week indicate that he may now withdraw his legal challenges. If he does so, the extradition process will resume.

Q: What is the status of the extradition Matter of Abu Marzook?

A: We have seen press reports that Mr. Abu Marzook has withdrawn his legal challenge to the order finding him extraditable. This is within Mr. Abu Marzook's rights and entirely his own choice. We would refer you to the Justice Department for any further comments.

Q: What about Hamas threats against U.S.? Will Marzook be treated humanely if extradited?

A: We, of course, reject any such threats. As in all cases, our extraditions take place based on the rule of law and assurances from the requesting government on appropriate treatment.

SETTLEMENTS AN "OBSTACLE TO PEACE"?

Q: President Clinton seemed to say December 16 that settlements are an obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Is that the U.S. position?

A: The U.S. position is that settlement activity complicates the negotiating process and increases tension.

We have previously expressed concern that when one party to a negotiation says things or does things which are seen to preempt the negotiating process, it makes it that much harder for negotiations to succeed.

In that vein, the President was making the obvious point that when one party does something that is seen by the other as preempting negotiations it can become a problem or an obstacle to progress in those negotiations.

So, yes we are troubled by some of the recent settlement activity, and we've said so. The President's response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity. It's important to focus on that concern.

[If asked]:

Q: Does the President's response indicate a change in policy?

A: As I said, his response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity. It's important to focus on that concern. The comments did not signal a fundamental change in the nature of that concern.

LEGALITY OF SETTLEMENTS

Q: Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that he subscribes to the view that as a matter of legal right, Jews and Israelis have a legal right to settle on the West Bank? Is that your understanding of the legalities?

A: I'm not going to get drawn into a discussion of the legal aspects of what is obviously a highly political issue. It is an issue, furthermore, that the Israelis and Palestinians recognize is difficult and therefore left for their

permanent status negotiations. It is abundantly clear, however, that settlement activity, and even announcements of plans for possible future settlement activity, complicates the climate and the process of negotiation.

When either party says things or does things that are perceived as prejudging the outcome of a negotiation, it makes it that much more difficult to achieve progress.

Q: But what about the precise question of the legality of settlement activity?

A: As I said, I'm not going down that road. We need to keep our focus on assisting the parties in their negotiations.

Q: Do you or don't you differentiate between new and old settlements?

A: I've just explained what our position is and I referred to "settlement activity." I'm not going to comment further.

Q: The Israelis claim that you didn't complain about settlement activity during the Rabin Government, so why are you making this an issue now?

A: We said the same thing during the time of the Labor government.

JERUSALEM

Q: What is your reaction to Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement that Israel will not negotiate over the status of Jerusalem?

A: Our views have not changed. Israel and the Palestinians have agreed that Jerusalem is one of the issues for permanent status negotiations.

(If pressed) Our position on the status of Jerusalem is well-known.

Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and volatile issues in the peace process. We remain convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing these sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which Israel and

the Palestinians themselves have formally agreed to discuss only in the context of direct, permanent status negotiations.

PEACE PROCESS

□ There has been no change in the U.S. position on land-for-peace or anything else as a result of the Israeli elections. We have supported this principle and will continue to do so. At the same time, our experience makes clear that agreements are reached not through recitation of abstract principles, but through the hard work of direct negotiation. Syria and Israel agreed at Madrid to negotiate on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. They should resume those negotiations to overcome their differences.

□ Obviously, if progress is to be made, if differences are to be overcome, each side must take into account the needs and interests of the other.

□ Peace is not an abstraction. Peace is closely tied to security and only the parties directly concerned can make the critical decisions which affect their future. The United States can't make these decisions for them. We will not try to impose decisions upon Israel or any other party to the peace process.

□ That doesn't mean that the US, as the facilitator of the peace process, does not have views. It has been and remains our view that the land-for-peace formula offers the most promise for a workable solution to the problems of war and peace in the Middle East. But agreements will come not as a result of our views, but as a result of negotiations between the parties.

PALESTINIAN COMPLIANCE ON REVOCATION OF PALESTINIAN COVENANT

□ We have welcomed the decision taken by the Palestinian National Council to cancel the provisions of the Covenant which contradict the formal undertakings made between the PLO and the Israeli government.

U.S. EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV

☐ Recognize what is required by the law passed by Congress requiring that the U.S. Embassy be transferred to Jerusalem. But at the same time, the President has made it clear that he will take no step that will undermine the peace process or jeopardize the negotiations. In this regard, the legislation provides a waiver provision that may be used by the President as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that could preempt or jeopardize the peace process.

ORIENT HOUSE

☐ Our position regarding U.S. contacts at Orient House has not changed. We do business with the Palestinian Authority only in Gaza and Jericho, not in Jerusalem. Would encourage all parties to concentrate on the negotiations, not on issues that may polarize the situation.

SYRIA

☐ We believe that a comprehensive peace requires negotiations and agreements on all tracks, including with Syria and Lebanon. But we recognize that -- as in the past -- some negotiations will move at a faster pace than others.

☐ Prime Minister Netanyahu told me that he agrees on the importance of talks with Syria.

☐ We have never had any illusions about Syrian associations with groups involved in terrorism.

☐ We consider this a serious issue, and we have made that clear both in our diplomatic contacts at the highest levels and in our annual report on terrorism.

☐ We would like to see Syria's ties to terrorist groups definitively broken.

☐ But it is important to distinguish between states that work to subvert the peace process -- like Iran -- and those who have shown a willingness to engage in it actively and seriously -- like Syria.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

Has there been a cover-up?

- ☐ No -- There is currently no evidence nor any indication of a cover-up.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee concurs in this assessment.
- ☐ The fact that U.S. troops inadvertently destroyed Iraqi chemical weapons after the war came to light as part of our effort to learn all that we can; that effort has since been intensified.
- ☐ We're awaiting the outcomes of Army IG, DOD Intel Oversight & CIA IG investigations.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 2, 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the Presidential Advisory Committee found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision taken by the President when he extended the Presidential Advisory Committee to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products.
- ☐ Stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War

illnesses.

☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 80+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 03 February 97 20:43
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO

Abdulmalik, April B.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Andreasen, Steven P.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Bakke, Kyle D.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Bedell, Blair B.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Biernacki, Eileen V.
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer
Brown, Dallas
Brown, Nancy E.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya

Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davis, William K.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Flessas, Dan
Florio, Elaine
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Gladbach, Damon J.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Houck, Baerbel K.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.

Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Martinez, Alejandro
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Mercier, Henry J.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Moffett, Julia
Moody, Angelyn D.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Gwyn M. Parker

Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Saunders, John W.
Schifter, Richard
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Showalter, Victoria A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.
Vershbow, Alexander R.

Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Tuesday, February 4. Thank you.

[[FEB03GUI.DOC : 5196 in FEB03GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

3 February 97 20:41

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

FEB03GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

February 3, 1997

Hong Kong

Peru

Bangladesh

Clearance for White House Visitors

European Trips and Visitors

Northern Ireland

North Korea

Marine Corps Hazing

Eastern Slavonia

Serbia

Bosnia

Saudi Arabia

Haiti

Tony Lake

Iraq

UN/Richardson

Cuba

Algeria

Germany/Scientists

CWC

Russia

Middle East

Gulf War Illnesses

HONG KONG

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the decision made by the Hong Kong Preparatory Committee to agree with proposals to roll back laws related to civil liberties in Hong Kong?

A: As we have said, the protection of civil liberties is an important element of the 1984 Joint Declaration and the Basic Law for Hong Kong, agreed to by China and the UK. It is vital to continuing confidence in Hong Kong, and to the continued economic success of Hong Kong. Whether civil liberties are protected in Hong Kong will significantly affect our overall relationship with China.

We remain deeply concerned over attempts to weaken civil liberties and basic freedoms in Hong Kong. Recommendations of the kind passed by the

Preparatory Committee do
not help foster confidence.

We note that the full Preparatory Committee did not accept fully
the recommendations of
the legal sub-committee in regard to some of the rights-related
legislation. But our
concern remains the same -- that the people of Hong Kong be able
to make decisions
affecting their future and continue to enjoy the political and
economic freedoms that have
made Hong Kong unique and successful, buttressed by a fair and
independent legal
system.

We will continue to convey to Chinese authorities in Beijing and
to future Hong Kong
Government officials as well, the importance the United States
attaches to China's actions
in upholding the commitments expressed in the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law.
NSC Senior Director Sandra Kristoff underscored this point in
recent discussions with
Chinese foreign ministry officials.

Q: Will the recommendations, if implemented, constitute a breach
of the Joint Declaration?

A: As we have said before, the United States generally does not
offer legal interpretations
of those agreements to which it is not a party. The Joint
Declaration is a matter between
the UK and China.

The important point is that China made certain commitments to
uphold the economic
and political freedoms of the people of Hong Kong in those
agreements, and we have
certain expectations about what those commitments mean.

In particular, we believe strongly that China must honor its
pledge to preserve Hong
Kong's human rights, press and individual freedoms after the
transition to Chinese
sovereignty. These are essential to the people of Hong Kong and
to the preservation of
Hong Kong's unique political and business environment.

Q: What about restrictions on social groups ties with foreign
organizations; will this

restrict activities of such groups as the League of Women Voters?

A: Any restriction of the civil liberties enjoyed by the people of Hong Kong is a matter of serious concern, including restrictions on freedom of association.

We note that none of the Preparatory Committee's recommendations have the force of law, and that, even if they are passed by China's legislature, implementation will be the responsibility of the Hong Kong Government. We strongly urge China and the future government of Hong Kong to ensure that the people of Hong Kong have a decisive voice in such matters and that their basic freedoms are respected.

There has already been an active debate of this and other issues in the Hong Kong press -- a process we believe is important and should continue. We urge both the PRC and future Hong Kong government to take full account of the views of Hong Kong people in these matters.

PERU

Background: On Saturday, the Miami Herald reported that Fujimori said there will be no concessions to Lori Berenson, convicted last year on terrorism and treason charges stemming from her involvement with the MRTA. Fuji said: "Now you Americans see what the MRTA is. It's a very dangerous group. When the judges condemned [Berenson], they were not mistaken." He also said: "Lori Berenson was going to participate in an assault on the Peruvian Congress, taking hostages. And if she hadn't been caught and condemned, then she would be inside the Japanese compound right now. Now I hope the American people will understand that we were right in capturing and condemning her... You are American. You also have the danger of terrorism. So be very careful with people like Berenson. They are able to take bloody and dangerous actions."

Points

☐ Subject was discussed. Noted that we hope President Fujimori will take another look at her case after the hostage crisis is resolved.

[IF ASKED]

☐ Before hostage crisis, Embassy Lima decided to switch to quarterly visits to LB. Consular access has, therefore, not been requested, nor denied. Supplies are being provided through her Peruvian lawyer.

Q: What's the situation in Peru at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence? What is the United States going to do about this situation?

A: We have continued our active and intense consultations with the Governments of Peru and Japan. The President's national security team has kept him fully informed as events there have developed.

This is a very serious situation and lives are obviously at risk. It simply isn't productive for me to address the other questions you have raised.

Q: Does the United States negotiate with hostages or condone those who do?

A: The United States does not condone making concessions to terrorists, but how to handle negotiations is a sovereign decision for the government involved.

BANGLADESH

FLOTUS Meeting with Bangladeshi Prime Minister

☐ The First Lady will be meeting with Sheikh Hasina Wajed (WAHjhed), Prime Minister of Bangladesh, at a White House tea on Monday, February 3.

☐ Sheikh Hasina is in town for the micro-credit summit.

☐ They first met in Bangladesh during the First Lady's trip to

South Asia.

□ The meeting is to congratulate the Prime Minister on her June electoral victory as well as to applaud and further encourage Bangladesh's commitment to democracy, their recent moves towards liberalizing the economy and their continuing contributions to international peacekeeping operations.

[Note to briefer: A Presidential drop-by is planned, but may not be on his public schedule.]

CLEARANCE FOR WHITE HOUSE VISITORS

Q: What role did the NSC have in screening persons who called on the President?

A: The NSC would from time to time be asked whether we were aware of any information that might bear on whether the President should meet with a particular person or not. In almost all cases, the question would be raised in the context of a meeting or event the President might attend with foreign persons. In response, the NSC would review the name in question with the appropriate directorates and, in most cases, and on an informal basis, with the State Department and CIA. I believe we were clear in our responses as to the strength or limitations of the information provided in the time allotted.

Q: Would the NSC recommend, did the NSC recommend, against the President seeing a particular individual?

A: We would make it clear where we thought it important that the President meet with a foreign person, if for example, it would serve a foreign policy purpose as well as when we thought it better that he not do so from a foreign policy perspective. I should note, however, that in many if not the majority of cases we would in fact not have pertinent information, or the information we did have would be inconclusive.

Q: What you are saying is the White House had no formal process for vetting persons.
Shouldn't you have had such a process?

A: As you know, the Chief of Staff has recently directed that such a formal process for reviewing names be implemented. The details of how this will be done are under review.

EUROPEAN TRIPS AND VISITORS

☐ President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and Marshall Plan commemoration event. No details yet.

☐ Do not yet know what else POTUS might do on that trip.

☐ Announced on Friday that Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and working lunch April 3. Do not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.

☐ Also announced that Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and working lunch. Again, no details available.

If asked about Bruton visit:

☐ Yes, we expect Irish Prime Minister here for annual St. Patrick's Day celebration.

If asked about Simitis visit:

Note: President Clinton met with Greek Prime Minister Simitis in Oval Office on April 9, 1996.
Simitis intends to attend an event in New York in early March and has informally inquired about a meeting. We have not responded in any way.

☐ We are not aware of any invitation to Greek Prime Minister Simitis.

☐ The President had a good meeting with the Prime Minister here in Washington in April of last year.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release February 3, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Clinton to Visit the Netherlands

President Clinton has accepted an invitation to visit the Netherlands on May 28, 1997 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan and to participate in the United States-European Union summit.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release February 3, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Canadian Prime Minister Chretien to Make Official Visit

In response to an invitation from the President, Canadian Prime Minister Chretien will make his first Official Visit to Washington April 8. Mrs. Chretien will accompany the Prime Minister.

The President and the Prime Minister intend to discuss the full range of bilateral and international issues, focusing on how our exceptionally close ties can be deepened as we approach the next century.

The President paid a State Visit to Ottawa in February 1995.
Prime
Minister Chretien and the President have met on several other
occasions outside of the United States, most recently at the
November
1996 APEC Leaders Meeting.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 31, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Official Working Visit by Spanish President Aznar

President Clinton has invited the President of the Spanish
Government, Jose Maria Aznar, to make an official working visit
to the
United States in the last week of April. The President will host
a
working luncheon in honor of the Spanish President on April 30,
1997.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 31, 1997

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Official Working Visit by Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres

The White House is pleased to announce that Prime Minister

Antonio

Guterres of Portugal has accepted President Clinton's invitation for an official working visit to Washington the first week of April. The President will meet with Prime Minister Guterres in the White House and continue discussions at a working luncheon in his honor on April 3, 1997.

#

NORTHERN IRELAND

Visa Waiver for Sean O'Callaghan)

- ☐ Yes, Administration has granted visa waiver for Sean O'Callaghan. He is a former IRA operative who was convicted of terrorist crimes and served a prison sentence. He is therefore ineligible for visa and needs waiver.
- ☐ Issuance of visa waivers is a discretionary decision by the Administration.
- ☐ In making decision, Administration took into account Mr. O'Callaghan's unequivocal repudiation of terrorism and violence. He has severed his connection with the IRA and is an advocate of a non-violent solution to the problems of Northern Ireland..
- ☐ Mr. O'Callaghan is now a columnist for the London Sunday Times, which is sponsoring his trip to the U.S.

Parades Commission Report

Background: Last summer after the civil unrest over marches in Drumcree, the British set up a panel headed by Oxford don Peter North to recommend how to handle parades in the future. The North report, just released, recommends that a commission be set up with, inter alia, the authority to make decisions on controversial parades. In its January 30 reaction to the report,

the British Government neither accepted nor rejected the recommendation for a commission with decision-making powers but initiated an 8-week consultation period on this aspect of the report.

☐ North Review offers valuable insights and recommendations to deal with the very controversial and divisive question of parades and marches in Northern Ireland, particularly during summer "marching season."

☐ Report recommends establishment of independent parades commission. Pleased that British Government moving to set one up. Very much hope it can be up and running in time to make a difference and help avoid a repeat of last summer's bitter confrontations.

☐ Last summer's events cost the people of Northern Ireland dearly, both economically and politically. Vital for future political progress in Northern Ireland that new ways be found to meet needs of both communities and avoid annual confrontations.

Adams Refused Visa?

Background: Two London newspapers reported over the weekend that the White House has advised Gerry Adams he will not get a visa until the IRA reinstates its cease-fire. One paper sourced "officials of the NSC"; the other diplomats in London.

☐ Mr. Adams has not/not applied for a visa. Since there is no application, the Administration has made no decision.

☐ If pressed: As in the past, an application for a visa waiver by Mr. Adams would be decided on basis of whether it could contribute to search for lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Loyalist Cease-fire Intact?

☐ Up to British and Irish governments and participating parties to decide who participates in talks.

☐ As President said in statement yesterday, we urge loyalists to maintain their cease-fire. There has been no claim of responsibility for car bomb attacks and

there is no doubt loyalists have shown restraint in response to escalating IRA violence.

Recent Attacks

- ☐ Condemn this latest attack. Thankfully, no serious injuries, but shows wanton disregard for human life.
- ☐ Call again on IRA to declare and implement immediate cease-fire in words and deeds. People of Ireland, North and South, clearly want peace, political settlement.

Belfast Talks

- ☐ Belfast talks, chaired by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, represent historic opportunity and best hope in decades for achieving lasting settlement. Talks will reconvene for bilateral consultations January 13, in plenary January 27.
- ☐ Must not squander progress of last months. Urge all political leaders to take responsibility for making these talks work. Need to move quickly into substantive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland.
- ☐ Continue to believe that participation of all elected parties, including Sinn Fein, would give talks best chance of success; that can only happen with cease-fire.
- ☐ Impressed with commitment and determination both governments have shown in search for peace. They and we share goal of inclusive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland, which can only happen if there is an IRA cease-fire.

Was 1994 IRA cease-fire "fake" as Prime Minister Major has alleged?

- ☐ Cease-fire from August 1994 to February 1996 saved hundreds of lives. I strongly condemned end of that cease-fire and I continue to call on IRA to declare new cease-fire immediately.

How Will You Know a New Cease-fire is Real?

☐ Will be up to British and Irish governments to evaluate new cease-fire; but as both Taoiseach and Prime Minister Major have said, will depend on both words and actions on ground.

Deportation Proceedings Against Matt Morrison

☐ Have been assured by Justice that these proceedings being handled fairly. Judicial matter - don't want to comment further.

NORTH KOREA

Postponement of Joint Briefing

☐ Last week the North Koreans informed us that they were unprepared to attend the joint briefing as originally scheduled for 29 January and then postponed to 5 February.

☐ We have noted press reporting indicating the North will participate in the joint briefing when it "gets a good result from the Cargill talks."

☐ The discussions that the DPRK holds with U.S. commercial firms are private ones to which the U.S. government is not a party.

☐ We are disappointed, but the U.S. and ROK proposal for four-party peace talks and a joint U.S.-ROK briefing to the DPRK remain valid.

Food Shortages

☐ We believe that there is a serious food problem in North Korea, as there was last year.

☐ Our policy is to review requests for assistance from international organizations as a humanitarian issue and on a case-by-case basis.

☐

Taiwan-North Korea Nuclear Waste Deal

☐ The U.S. believes that any international shipment and storage of nuclear waste must meet the relevant international standards, as defined by the IAEA.

- ☐ The nuclear waste involved in the proposed Taiwan-North Korea deal is not a proliferation concern, but could present an environmental hazard if not transported and stored properly.
- ☐ We encourage Taiwan and North Korea to work with the IAEA to satisfy the international community (especially concerned countries in the region) that this proposed deal meets international standards.
- ☐ We note that strong concerns have been expressed within the region about this shipment, and believe these should be considered in reaching a final decision.

MARINE CORPS HAZING INCIDENTS

Background: NBC "Dateline" obtained videotapes of 1991 and 1993 "blood winging ceremonies" for Marines who qualified for their gold parachute wings at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. During these incidents, gold jump wings were physically pinned to a Marine's chest (not their uniforms).

- ☐ Hazing (as occurred in these incidents four and six years ago) is not tolerated in today's military. In recent years, the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense as a whole have taken aggressive steps to eliminate hazing through strong policy guidance, sound leadership and discipline for those who disregard the policy.
- ☐ Refer questions on specifics to DoD.

EASTERN SLAVONIA

- ☐ We strongly condemn last Friday's attack on UNTAES soldiers by a Serbian gunman. We offer our deepest condolences to the family of the Belgian soldier killed in the incident and extend our hope for a speedy recovery to the other two soldiers injured in the attack.

- This appears to have been an isolated act perpetrated by a single individual. The suspected gunman has been arrested and is in police custody under UNTAES supervision.
- This was the first attack on UNTAES troops since they began operations in Eastern Slavonia over one year ago. UN military forces and the regional police force, under the supervision of the UN are working to insure that such incidents do not become a pattern. We would also expect the parties to do their part to reduce tensions and take actions to prevent further violence.

SERBIA/KOSOVO

Serbian Elections -- General

- We condemn the aggressive use of force by Serbian police against demonstrators in Belgrade in recent days. The use of violent tactics by Serbian authorities will only further their international isolation. We continue to hope that this situation can be resolved without violence and that the people of Serbia will be vindicated in their desire for the implementation of democratic norms and processes.
- Although Serbian authorities have made announcements that appear to concede opposition victories in some municipalities, the regime continues to stall for time with legal tactics; we remain skeptical until the duly-elected members of the opposition are able to take their seats and begin work.
- It remains that Serbian authorities must implement the OSCE Gonzalez report recommendations and recognize all opposition victories in the November 17 elections. Until Milosevic recognizes the will of the Serbian people, he will remain isolated.
- We and our allies remain engaged in seeking ways to gain Milosevic's acceptance of the

election results as an essential step for the resolution of the situation in Serbia and are considering a number of possible steps to put additional pressure on Belgrade. We will not be satisfied until the people of Serbia are vindicated in their desire for the implementation of democratic norms and processes.

☐ We are also moving forward with a plan of action to support democratization in Serbia. We are considering a number of actions ranging from economic and political measures to democracy building initiatives as well as continuing to support the important roles of international organizations such as the OSCE.

If asked about Sanctions:

☐ We are not actively pursuing the reimposition of sanctions at this time, but are taking other steps to convince Milosevic to accept the will of the Serbian people.

Kosovo

☐ We remain concerned about the tense situation in Kosovo and have urged all parties to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid violence.

☐ We deplore the continuing Serbian government repression and are calling for the restoration of full human and political rights for the people of Kosovo. We have actively worked to help the people of Kosovo, by providing direct humanitarian assistance and by pressuring the Serbian government to reverse its repressive policies.

☐ We have maintained the outer wall of sanctions, which is directly linked to the restoration of full human and political rights in Kosovo.

☐ At the same time, we do not support the independence of Kosovo and do not recognize the unofficial parallel institutions that have been created.

BOSNIA

Brcko Arbitration

☐ The parties agreed at Dayton to binding arbitration of the disputed portion of the inter-entity boundary line in the Brcko area. The issue is in the hands of the Arbitral Tribunal, consisting of arbitrators from the two Bosnian entities and the internationally-appointed arbiter Roberts Owen. There is no U.S. proposal for a Brcko solution; we support the arbitration process.

☐ A decision is to be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal by February 15. The Tribunal has been holding hearings in recent weeks including representatives of the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska.

☐ The U.S. and other Contact Group member states are aware of ideas under consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal, since the international community may need to move quickly to provide support for implementation of the Brcko solution. The Arbitral Tribunal is continuing its work, and we await the decision.

If asked whether a decision by the Tribunal is likely to trigger confrontations in the ZOS

☐ The parties agreed at Dayton to binding arbitration of the disputed portion of the inter-entity boundary line in the Brcko area. At tribunal hearings in recent weeks, views of all parties have been exchanged and will be taken into consideration in the Tribunal's decision. We recognize that the decision may cause an increase in tensions, but we will insist and expect the parties to peacefully cooperate with the Tribunal's decision.

If asked whether SFOR, which is smaller than IFOR, will be able to quell unrest should it erupt

☐ In developing SFOR's mission, NATO commanders established SFOR force requirements based on the forces that will be needed to fully perform its mission, which includes deterring a resumption of hostilities and providing a secure environment for greater progress on civilian implementation. SFOR planners were well aware of the tensions surrounding the Brcko

decision in developing the force requirements.

Situation in Gajevi

- ☐ Calm has been restored to the area and we understand that settlers have begun to return and are following agreed procedures. We will continue to insist that refugees and displaced persons that follow the agreed procedures are allowed to return to their homes.
- ☐ We remain concerned about the potential for the use of violence or intimidation against returning refugees and displaced persons and the possibility of further confrontations in the Zone of Separation. SFOR and the IPTF are taking additional security measures to avoid the potential for additional violence around Gajevi.
- ☐ We are continuing to monitor the situation and will continue to insist that the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes is respected. We are encouraged that Bosniaks appear to be returning peacefully and that the Bosnian Serb leadership joined us in condemning the recent attacks promised to take action against those responsible.

War Criminals

- ☐ We remain deeply concerned with lack of progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. Achieving justice is part of achieving an enduring peace.
- ☐ We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. One possible option is to set up a special police force to assist the Tribunal in apprehending indicted war criminals. Such a force would not include SFOR personnel. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.
- ☐ While international military forces in Bosnia will detain war criminals if, in the course of normal duties, they encounter those under indictment, it is not the role of SFOR to hunt down war criminals.

Iranian Influence in Bosnia

- ☐ Iranian influence in Bosnia has been an ongoing concern, but we have taken effective measures to cut Iranian links.
- ☐ We have enforced the Dayton agreement ban on foreign forces and insisted that Bosnian government sever all military and intelligence links with Iran as a condition of the train and equip program. As the President certified in June, those conditions have been met. There have been no indications since June that military or intelligence cooperation has resumed.
- ☐ Hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards have left Bosnia, Mujahadeen units have disbanded, and the Bosnians are looking to the U.S. and moderate Islamic states for security assistance.
- ☐ We remain concerned about Iranian influence and continue to watch the situation closely. Overall, we and the intelligence community assess that Iranian influence has substantially diminished since the implementation of Dayton and since we tied the issue to the train and equip program.

New Bosnia Mission/SFOR -- General

- ☐ The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission started December 20. SFOR's limited and focused mission will allow time to consolidate the peace built by the success of IFOR.
- ☐ The Stabilization Force is about half IFOR's size. U.S. share is less than half last year's commitment -- about 8500 troops inside Bosnia.
- ☐ The NATO plan for SFOR includes more limited set of military and supporting tasks than IFOR, reflecting the more narrow mission of this smaller force. With fewer troops, SFOR will focus more on security, including force protection, and will be less involved in civilian tasks.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ 18 months will give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

☐ We will review every 6 months to see if we can accomplish mission with fewer forces. SFOR will gradually shift responsibilities to civilian agencies and the parties themselves while moving from stabilization to deterrence to disengagement.

If pressed on whether this means that the U.S. has ruled out participation of U.S. forces after completion of SFOR mission:

☐ We believe that SFOR's mission can be completed in 18 months, and that the conditions will have been established in which stability and security can be maintained without an outside military presence.

If pressed whether the U.S. will insist that any force after 18 months will be European only:

☐ I'm not going to speculate about such scenarios. We believe the mission will be completed in 18 months.

If pressed whether every last soldier will be out of Bosnia in exactly 18 months:

☐ 18 months is the duration of the mission and the deployment, but not necessarily a deadline for withdrawal of the last SFOR soldier. Withdrawal at 18 months will occur in a timely fashion but may extend some days or weeks beyond the mission duration.

Train and Equip Program (Post)

☐ The international Train and Equip program is ongoing and is a key success and a major step toward establishing a stable military balance in Bosnia, which is one of the keys to establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S. contracted trainers, funded by international donations, and additional offers of training

assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states.

☐ The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

SAUDI ARABIA

F-16 Sales to Saudi Arabia

- ☐ No official request has been received.
- ☐ When and if we do receive a Saudi request, it will be examined in the usual manner by State and Defense, who will make recommendations to the President.
- ☐ We have a long-standing arms supply relation with Saudi Arabia and their security is vitally important to us, but no decisions have been made at this time on any major new weapons sale.

Saudi Cooperation with FBI

Q: What are you doing to get Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the FBI on the Khobar Towers bombing investigation?

A: The FBI is in charge of that investigation for the U.S.

I understand that they are in a dialogue with the Saudis about what additional specific materials and cooperation they seek.

We have assurances from the highest levels in the Kingdom that we will get full cooperation and we expect that such assurances will be honored.

Q: What's your reaction to allegations that the al-Khobar bombing involved Iranians?

A: There is an investigation under way.

I'm not going to speculate about hypothetical outcomes to this investigation.

Nor am I going to speculate about hypothetical responses once this investigation is complete.

Q: Was there an Iranian or Syrian role?

A: We have reached no conclusions.

Q: If Iran was behind it, will we still attack Iran as Secretary Perry said last summer?

A: This is hypothetical and I'm not going to respond. But if you ask whether the U.S. responds to those who are proven to have attacked it, the record of this Administration is clear.

But I must stress that we have reached no conclusion about state sponsorship in the Khobar attack.

HAITI

Administration Efforts to Deal with Political Violence in Haiti

Broad Context

□ From its first days in 1993, the Clinton Administration has sought to end political violence and restore democracy in Haiti.

□ Political violence was a horrifying, frequent occurrence during the de facto regime; according to local and international human rights groups, thousands of people were killed, tortured, beaten or imprisoned.

□ When international political and economic pressure failed to dislodge the de facto regime, the President decided to intervene militarily.

□ As part of the preparatory effort, the President ordered a broad-gauged plan to support the restoration of democracy by helping to create a new security/public safety structure, supporting a renewal of democratic political institutions and elections, and assisting with the establishment of the foundation for a viable economy.

□ Two years later, while many challenges remain, real progress has been made toward these goals. Former President Aristide returned peacefully. He abolished the repressive Armed Forces and worked to establish Haiti's first professional and apolitical police force. Three national elections occurred and were judged generally free and fair by international monitors (although logistical problems marred the first legislative contest). A new parliament is in place, and a democratically elected president succeeded another for the first time in Haitian history. Efforts to stabilize the economy continue with widespread international economic support.

Aggressively Targeting Political Violence

□ Throughout this period, the Administration has pursued a diplomatic and intelligence effort to identify threats to democracy and stability in Haiti. While the primary threat to democracy immediately after the military intervention was deemed to be from the right, the Administration was alert to the possibility of continued official involvement in political violence.

□ One important objective of this multi-faceted effort was to urge the Government of Haiti to investigate and remove individuals in the government reportedly involved in political violence or corruption.

□ As a result of its efforts, the US was able to identify a number of individuals associated with political violence and corruption, and senior US officials effectively pressed the Government of Haiti to remove the personnel identified.

□ President Clinton, Vice President Gore and other senior

members of the Administration, including Secretary of State Christopher, US Permanent Representative to the UN Albright, National Security Advisor Lake, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott and others traveled to Haiti and raised these issues with senior levels of the Haitian Government.

□ By March 1996, most of those then identified within the government as having been implicated in political violence were removed from official positions.

Building Law Enforcement Institutions

□ The US has also played a major role in helping the Haitian Government create and train a wholly new police force, for the first time in Haiti's history. Although it still has a long way to go and requires much additional training and equipment, the new force's deployment represents a major departure from past practices.

□ Initially, the Administration took the lead in organizing and overseeing an interim security force and in creating and training a new Haitian National Police mostly from raw recruits. Both units were carefully screened by the U.S. and UN to keep out known human rights abusers and criminals. Despite these efforts, some problems persist with the force.

□ By June 1996, 5200 new police were trained and deployed through the ICITAP program of the US Department of Justice. UN civilian police advisers provide on-the-job training.

□ With strong Administration encouragement, President Aristide established, and President Preval has strengthened, a Special Investigative Unit, with US and UN police advisors, to investigate possible political killings. This unit, while limited in effectiveness to date, provides an institutional mechanism to tackle the problem of official impunity.

□ Preval has also appointed, and the Haitian Senate has confirmed, a new Director-General of Haitian Police, Pierre Denize, who is untainted by charges of human rights abuses or

corruption. Denize, in turn, has reappointed a tough-minded Inspector General, Eucher Joseph, who has recommended severe disciplinary measures on police officials involved in the abuse of authority.

□ The Government has adopted a new set of standards for apolitical and merit-based recruitment of mid-level supervisors. Requirements include appearance before an examinations board that include US and UN police representatives, passing a battery of tests and successful completion of a supervisory course at the Police Academy, which emphasizes respect for the due process of law and support for human rights. At present, 54 mid-level supervisors have completed this training.

□ As is to be expected with a brand-new civilian police force in a country which has never had one before, the Haitian Police face many problems. The Police Inspector General has been actively investigating reports of police misbehavior, such as a March 6 incident in a Port-au-Prince slum in which a shoot-out with gang members left a number of civilians dead. The Director General of the Police has given strong support to the Inspector General.

The Bertin Assassination

□ The US tried to prevent the tragic assassination of Madame Mireille Bertin in March 1995 and immediately after it launched a comprehensive effort to identify and bring the perpetrators to justice.

□ When the Multinational Force(MNF) received information of a plot to kill Madame Bertin, US forces arrested and interrogated the alleged conspirators, and the MNF and Embassy asked Aristide and Justice Minister Exume to warn her of the threat, and we were subsequently assured that they had done so.

□ Mrs. Bertin acknowledged to others that she had been warned by Justice Minister Exume, although she said that he had warned her to leave the country lest she be arrested.

□ After Mrs. Bertin was assassinated, the Administration offered an FBI team to aid in the investigation and dispatched it within hours following a request by Aristide. The FBI assisted with the investigation within the constraints of Haiti's weak criminal justice system. When it became clear the FBI investigation was unlikely to progress further, we worked with the Haitian government to establish an indigenous investigative unit under the Haitian national police. Results of the FBI's Bertin investigation were handed off to this Special Investigations Unit in late 1995.

□ Due to a proliferation of threat reports reaching US officials, the State Department sent instructions to the Embassy in Port-au-Prince to ensure that individuals be warned in the future when there is credible information of a specific threat of physical violence against them.

Responded Rapidly to The Leroy and Florival Murders

□ Based on the circumstances in which opposition leaders Leroy and Florival were murdered on August 20, and given the public allegations of official involvement, we felt strongly that there had to be a rapid and credible investigation.

□ APNSA Lake and Deputy Secretary Talbott delivered exactly that message when they traveled to Port-au-Prince on August 30 to meet with President Preval. Preval made clear his conviction there could be no room in his security force for those linked to crime, corruption or violation of human rights.

□ President Preval also agreed that in order for an investigation to be credible, those individuals perhaps linked to the murders of August 20 would have to be suspended.

□ At the same time, Preval undertook a reorganization of his Presidential security force in order to bring it up to the same standards of professionalism that apply to the Haitian National Police.

□ To help President Preval carry out the vetting,

reorganization and retraining of his security unit, we dispatched a team of 20 State Department Diplomatic Security officers and 12 DoD civilian security personnel to augment the State Department's existing advisory unit.

☐ More than one third of the augmented team have completed their mission and returned home. Additional personnel will be withdrawn as the reorganization moves forward.

Results

☐ Political violence has been much reduced since the restoration of democracy. Despite the inadequacy of the legal system and the inexperience of its police, violence in Haiti remains far below levels experienced during de facto military rule and the Duvalier era.

☐ According to both local and international human rights organizations, Haiti suffered several thousand political murders during the three years of the de facto regime and countless additional beatings and other abuses. In contrast, a 1995 report by the UN/OAS human rights observer mission in Haiti estimated that the total number of killings with possible political or retributive motivation stood at about 24 since Aristide's return.

A Familiar Task

☐ The U.S. experience in El Salvador, where we confronted a much more serious problem of official human rights abuse, provides an instructive point of reference. There, as in Haiti, a fundamental objective of U.S. policy was strengthening democracy and supporting the rule of law. In El Salvador, the principles of democracy often ran up against the habits of violence and distrust bred by a long experience with dictatorship.

☐ It took repeated interventions by the most senior officials of the Reagan and Bush administrations to convince the Salvadoran government to put an end to officially-sponsored political violence.

☐ In 1984, Vice President Bush visited San Salvador

personally to inform the government that aid would be cut off if the abuses did not stop. In response, the Salvadoran government established a new investigative unit and quietly dismissed or transferred abroad the military officers whom we had identified as possibly linked to political violence.

□ Five years later, amid an apparent resurgence of death squad activity, it was Vice President Quayle who traveled to San Salvador to deliver the message that the U.S. government would not tolerate such abuses.

□ We have profited from these experiences, and thanks to those lessons, have been able to come to grips with the problem of political violence in Haiti quickly and decisively.

□ We have also been fortunate that the government of Haiti itself has been more quick to respond to indications that its officials might be involved in political violence.

TONY LAKE

Stock

Q: What about new stories that Tony Lake held energy stock as late as January of this year, even though he was already under investigation for having held such stock earlier?

A: The fact that Mr. Lake held stock in Williams Company, a natural gas pipeline company, was brought to Mr. Lake's attention when our lawyers noticed the stock on Mr. Lake's most recent financial disclosure form. Mr. Lake said that he was unaware such a stock had been purchased.

Our lawyers contacted Mr. Lake's financial manager, who confirmed that the stock had been purchased in error in September 1996, without Mr. Lake's knowledge, and that he had already sold it, again without Mr. Lake's knowledge, when he realized he should not

have purchased the stock for Mr. Lake.

IF ASKED: We immediately brought this information to the attention of the Justice Department in connection with their ongoing investigation regarding potential conflicts of interest raised by Mr. Lake's previous holdings of energy stock.

Q: Why does Mr. Lake retain the financial advisor despite these mistakes?

A: That is a matter between Mr. Lake and his advisor.

Arms to Bosnia

Q: What is your reaction to the stories regarding Mr. Lake and Mr. Berger and arms to Bosnia?

A: First, there is nothing new in these stories. This matter has been thoroughly reviewed by any number of Committees. This particular report was concluded in October and fully briefed by the Republicans at that time and selectively leaked ever since.

We are proud of our policy in Bosnia, which has brought peace to that country. We did what we thought necessary at the time to preserve the Federation in Bosnia and give that country a chance for peace. We understand that some may disagree with that policy, but it is unfortunate and wrong that anyone would try to turn policy disagreement into criminal accusations in order to gain political advantage.

Mr. Lake is the President's nominee for Director of Central Intelligence. He is uniquely qualified for the post. He will be good for the CIA, good for the President, and good for the country. It is time to put politics aside.

Q: What about the allegation that Mr. Lake was excessively secret and kept the not only the Congress, but also CIA in the dark about what was going on in Bosnia? Is this the man you want running the CIA?

A: As the President has said before, it would have been

better to have informed key Members of Congress at the time of our instruction of "no instructions" to Amb. Galbraith in Croatia. Mr. Lake and the President are in agreement on that.

IF ASKED:

Q: Is it true Sandy Berger said it would be "dynamite" to put any of this in writing?

A: As the Republican report itself states, Mr. Berger does not recall making this comment. The concern at the time, as has been explained repeatedly, is that a leak of this sensitive diplomatic exchange would gravely damage our relationship with our allies and undermine NATO.

Q: Did Mr. Lake convey the instruction with a wink and a nod?

A: The instruction was "no instructions."

Q: The reports indicate that Mr. Lake refused to testify under oath, doesn't that suggest that he had something to hide?

A: Nonsense. Based on the constitutional separation of powers it is long-standing practice that the President's senior advisers do not testify, and cannot be compelled to testify, before the Congress. While there have been some exceptions over the years to this general rule, the White House Counsel determined that a policy dispute such as this did not warrant an exception and instructed Mr. Lake accordingly.

Mr. Lake did make himself available to brief both the Senate and House committees looking into this matter.

Q: We are told that your staff, or the White House has classified the House report so that embarrassing details regarding this policy will not be revealed. Is that true?

A: No. At the request of the Congress, classification experts from the CIA, Defense Department, and State Department reviewed the document for

classified information in both the Republican and Democrat House reports on this matter. Quite frankly, there are intelligence sources and methods that directly relate to the safety of our personnel in Bosnia revealed in the full reports.

Q: You seem to dismiss this matter, but hasn't it been referred to the Justice Department?

A: If the President had thought this was a problem for Mr. Lake, he would not have nominated him for the position of Director of Central Intelligence.

We are proud of our policy in Bosnia, which has brought peace to that country. We understand that some may disagree with that policy, but it is unfortunate and wrong that anyone would try to turn policy disagreement into criminal accusations in order to gain political advantage.

IRAQ

Possible Planned Invasion of Kuwait

Q: What is your reaction to the Washington Post story that Iraq is possibly ready to invade Kuwait again?

A: While Saddam Hussein does have military capabilities which can threaten Kuwait and other neighbors, we have no evidence that Iraq is staging new moves to threaten its neighbors.

I can assure you that we maintain a very close watch over Iraqi military movements and adjust our own military presence in the gulf to counter potential threats.

Saddam Hussein has intimate familiarity with what we can and have done in response to his threatening military moves in the area. He would do well to keep it in the forefront of his thoughts.

UN/RICHARDSON

Q: Senator Helms alleged today (1/29) that the Administration is trying to bypass his Committee and force through a \$900 million emergency appropriation to repay UN arrears and refuses to condition that emergency appropriation on reforms at the UN. Is this true?

A: No. The Administration is not seeking an emergency appropriation. We want to work with Senator Helms and other members of Congress to develop a bipartisan, effective plan to encourage UN reform and pay off our arrears.

While the President believes that our arrears to the UN and its specialized agencies are an obligation that we should meet and are hurting our ability to lead at the United Nations, he has also said clearly, most recently when UN Secretary General Annan visited last week, that "as a practical matter, I know from consulting with the members of Congress that we won't be able to secure support in the Congress for paying the arrears unless they're convinced that reform is going forward."

The Administration is currently working with Congressional leaders and appropriators, as well as Senator Helms, to develop a plan to encourage UN reforms and to pay off our arrears. The Administration has not yet discussed specifics with Senator Helms, but we look forward to doing so in the near future. As these discussions continue, we will have a better idea what kind of effective and appropriate benchmarks can be agreed upon.

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent visit to Washington demonstrated that goodwill exists on both sides of the aisle and on all sides of this issue. With Mr. Annan's leadership of the UN and his commitment to reform, I am convinced that we now have the best chance we've had in years to further the process of UN reform, get the UN on a firm financial footing, and pay off our arrears.

CUBA

OIG REPORT ON OFFICE OF CUBA BROADCASTING

Background: The Office of the Inspector General for State, USIA and ACDA has completed its investigation into allegations that management of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) took reprisals against employees critical of OCB policies. The report, scheduled to be delivered to the Hill today (Monday, 2/3), says OIG found there is "insufficient credible evidence" to support the reprisals charge but notes that the OIG found a "pattern of personnel mismanagement" during the 1992-94 period it investigated.

Points

- ☐ We welcome the completion by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for USIA of its investigation into allegations of management reprisal against five employees in the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), as well as the recommendations made in the report.
- ☐ The OIG found that there was insufficient evidence to support the OCB employees' allegations of reprisal.
- ☐ The OIG, however, found a pattern of personnel mismanagement for the period in question (1992-94). These deficiencies involved primarily procedures for hiring, evaluating and reassigning staff.
- ☐ We are concerned about such problems and are working hard to identify the additional steps necessary to resolve those that may remain.
- ☐ We are committed to OCB's central task -- getting accurate, balanced and timely news to Radio Marti's large audience in Cuba. Radio Marti is an invaluable channel through which we provide news and information that the Castro regime tries so hard to deny the Cuban people.

REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN CUBA

What is this report?

☐ The President has transmitted to Congress a report, mandated by Title II of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD), that describes potential U.S. and other international assistance and other support for a transitional or democratic government in Cuba.

☐ The report communicates to the people of Cuba, including individuals in the Cuban government who support democracy, that the U.S. stands ready, along with other democratic nations, to help Cuba overcome the challenges it will face during the transition to democracy.

The Cuban government is calling this report a new violation of Cuba's sovereignty. Should the U.S. be planning Cuba's future?

☐ The report is premised on the fact that it is the Cuban people who must choose when and how a transition takes place, and what their new government's policies and priorities should be.

☐ It emphasizes that the U.S. -- far from threatening Cuba's sovereignty as the Castro regime alleges-- wants to assist Cubans in building an independent, prosperous and free country.

Has the U.S. consulted other countries about their roles in supporting a transition in Cuba?

☐ No formal consultations have taken place, although we have discussed the issue informally with officials of other governments. We look forward to in-depth discussions with international donors at the appropriate time. We are confident they share our desire to provide Cuba with the help it will need.

Does the U.S. think a transition in Cuba is imminent? Is this report relevant now?

☐ We do not know. Certainly we have seen nothing in the

behavior of the Castro regime which suggests that it is prepared to move in this direction. Nevertheless, we do expect a transition to occur at some point, as it has everywhere else in the Soviet empire and the Western Hemisphere, and we hope it will be soon.

☐ This report does not attempt to identify when or how that transition will come. It attempts to look past those uncertainties and discusses what kinds of support other transition and democratic governments typically have sought and what the international community is likely to provide.

Are you expecting this report to expedite a transition?
How?

☐ Both the President and Congress want to send the Cuban people a message of hope for their future, and to counter the Cuban government's efforts to create a fear of change.

☐ We do not expect this or any other single step to prompt a transition to democracy in Cuba. Ultimately, it is for the Cuban people to decide when the time has come for democratic change.

Where did the \$4 billion-8 billion figure come from? How much will come from the U.S.?

☐ The assistance total is a rough estimate designed to provide an "order of magnitude" to the U.S. Congress and the Cuban people. We will continue the process of planning for a transition as the situation there evolves.

☐ We cannot say at this point what percentage of assistance the U.S. will provide, but the U.S. can expect to take a lead role among donors, given our obvious geographic and historical ties to Cuba and interest in supporting a peaceful, democratic transition there.

What kind of reaction do you expect from Congress?

☐ We have worked particularly closely with Representative Robert Menendez of New Jersey, who has long advocated the need for a plan for assistance.

We are also briefing other interested members of Congress.

☐ We believe that there is broad support for the report in Congress, and we will continue to work with interested Members on planning for a democratic transition in Cuba.

Would the U.S. provide assistance to a transition government that included Fidel or Raul Castro?
Helms-Burton says you can't.

☐ The LIBERTAD Act does contain that condition. We have no reason to entertain that possibility in any case. There is no reason to believe that Fidel and Raul Castro will undertake real reform.

Will the U.S. withhold assistance until property claims are resolved?

☐ As the report states, we believe that the prompt resolution of U.S. property claims in Cuba is essential. We would have to review at the time a transition was taking place how best to accomplish that, working closely with transition and democratic Cuban governments.

Is the U.S. planning for a violent transition? There's no mention of it here.

☐ Our policy is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy. This report does not address the form a transition would take; it focuses on the broader challenges any transition government could face, and what the U.S. and other donors could do to help.

Isn't this report months late? Were you waiting until after the elections?

☐ The LIBERTAD Act called for the report to be issued in September, but its preparation required consideration by numerous USG agencies that was not completed until recently.
The U.S. elections had no effect on its release date.

Who prepared this report?

☐ The report was drafted by USAID, in collaboration with a

number of other U.S. agencies,
including the Department of State.

CNN REQUEST TO OPEN BUREAU

Background: After the Cuban government in November approved CNN's request to open a bureau in Havana, CNN renewed its application for a license from Treasury/OFAC license to do so. A half dozen other U.S. news media want to open bureaus, but the GOC has approved only CNN. (FYI ONLY: The Helms-Burton Act contains a provision suggesting that Congressional intent was that the USG not grant any licenses unless the GOC indicates willingness to allow TV/Radio Marti open offices in Cuba, but State and Treasury lawyers have concluded that we have parallel authority to do so.) While most U.S. media favor authorizing CNN's request, views on the Hill and in the Cuban-American community remain mixed. The application is still under active consideration.

Points

- ☐ CNN's application is still under review.
- ☐ Want to ensure that any decision is consistent with U.S. law and our commitment to promote peaceful, democratic transition in Cuba.

ALGERIA

Q: What is your view of the worsening violence in Algeria, marked yesterday (1/28) by the assassination of the Algerian labor leader Abdelhak ben Hamouda?

A: We strongly condemn the acts of terrorism and deplore the loss of life. Our condolences go out to the families of the victims, particularly in this holy month of Ramadan. All elements of Algerian society need to work to end this violence.

If asked about planned elections:

We hope the legislative elections planned for May will contribute to ending the violence, to widen political participation, and to national reconciliation.

Q: What do you think about the request that the U.S. become a mediator in the Algerian crisis?

A: We have not been asked by the government of Algeria to play such a role. The focus should be on the Algerian efforts to end the violence and proceed with political and economic development.

GERMANY AND SCIENTOLOGISTS

[BACKGROUND: The Washington Post reported (1/27) that the State Department's Human Rights Reports -- due to be released on Thursday -- will be highly critical of German discrimination against Scientologists.

USG POSITION: While there are allegations that the Church engages in cult-like practices, and that it uses measures such as blackmail and harassment to keep members in the organization, our position has been that methods used by Germany to address these concerns have been excessive and inconsistent with freedom of religion and expression. State has raised this issue on several occasions with its German counterparts. The OSCE has also expressed concern.

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: The reports have noted German abuses over the past several years.

This year's report devotes a significantly larger section to this issue as Germany has stepped up its efforts against Scientologists: language calling for wide ranging surveillance and restrictive measures has appeared in the CDU party platform, and the German Federal Minister of Labor has taken a strong position against scientology. Likewise, discriminatory measures at the state level have been tightened in 1996. NSC/Europe reviewed the 1996

report on Germany and found it fair; it believes that our ongoing discussions with the Germans on this issue have prepared them for this report. It was also vetted by State/EUR.

INTEREST IN THE US: Over the past several months, various members of Congress have written to express their concern about Germany's discriminatory practices. They include Reps. Payne, McKinney, and other Congressional Black Caucus members.]

POINTS

- ☐ Human rights report for 1996 does include somewhat expanded section on Scientology, reflecting increased intensity of German actions affecting the organization and its members.

- ☐ Since report has not even been conveyed to Congress, urge you to read it when it is published in February.

- ☐ Overall, report on Germany paints picture of a thriving democracy with a superlative record on human rights -- where free speech is respected, judiciary is independent, ethnic minorities are treated fairly and where more refugees and asylum-seekers live in freedom than in any other nation in Western Europe.

- ☐ If pressed: Overall report outlines what we view as unsettling pattern of discrimination against Scientologists. Notes new developments in 1996 such as boycott in some German states of "Mission Impossible." Also notes resolution by one of members of governing coalition urging government to place organization under observation.

- ☐ Have been positive developments too. Ministry of Interior, under which Germany's FBI-equivalent falls, issued report noting there is no legal basis, no evidence, which would allow Scientologists to be placed under observation.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

- ☐ The President is committed to working with the Senate to secure the ratification of the CWC.
- ☐ We have been actively and regularly working with interest groups and the general public to educate them on the importance of this treaty.
- ☐ The meeting with Senator Lott was useful. He has committed to organizing a meeting with members in order to begin discussions on how we might bridge the gap between those who support the treaty and those who have difficulties with it.
(IF ASKED: Specifically, we will discuss possible amendments to the resolution of ratification -- not to the treaty itself.)
- ☐ You would have to ask the Senator about the Senate calendar. We emphasized to him the importance of an early vote.
- ☐ As to whether or not he supports the treaty, I would, again, direct you to his office and to remarks he made at his Tuesday press conference.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Health/CClinton-Yeltsin Meeting/Chernomyrdin Suggests Moscow Venue

- ☐ President and Yeltsin agreed in December 5 phone conversation to meet in March timeframe; have not yet fixed specific date or venue for meeting. Expect this to be topic on Gore-Chernomyrdin agenda February 5-8.

What if Yeltsin Unable to Meet for Reasons of Health?

- ☐ As Russian government spokesman stated; he continues to recover from November surgery, recent illness. Note French president Chirac's comments after visiting him in Moscow February 2 -- "Yeltsin doing very well."
- ☐ Have heard nothing to indicate Yeltsin unable to meet in March timeframe.

☐ Personal contact between two leaders important, as we look ahead to work with Russia on wide range of issues -- American investment, arms control, European security structures. Our agenda very comprehensive.

☐ But we work this agenda at wide variety of levels, throughout two governments; will continue to do that.

Recent Duma Vote on Yeltsin "Incapacity," to Govern, Prolonged Absence

☐ Our understanding these resolutions (on health determinations) have no legal, constitutional validity; second vote (on another version of resolution) did not pass.

☐ Not appropriate for me to speculate on parliamentary activities in Russia.

Elections in Chechnya

☐ OCSE announced elections conducted fairly. Welcome fact that election proceeded in smoothly, without violence. Hope this will contribute to process between Moscow and Chechnya of finding peaceful and durable resolution of their differences.

NATO-Russia Talks

☐ In preparing for upcoming meetings between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, and between Vice President and Chernomyrdin, we are exploring several ideas to develop strong NATO-Russia relationship,

☐ NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov had good discussion last month on future NATO-Russia relations; to meet again week of February 20 in Brussels.

☐ Talbott-Fuerth in Moscow January 22-24; had extensive discussions on European security and other U.S.-Russian issues in preparation for Gore-Chernomyrdin and Clinton-Yeltsin meetings. Positive tone.

General Issues

Russia-NATO

- ☐ Understand enlargement difficult issue for Russia, but U.S., NATO and Russia have interests in developing NATO-Russia relationship and broadening cooperation.
- ☐ Serious dialogue on NATO-Russia relationship underway.
- ☐ U.S. determined to proceed with NATO enlargement. Believe that is in interests of European security and stability. Equally determined to manage enlargement process in manner that does not threaten Russia and to do all that we can to build strong NATO-Russia relationship.

Prospects for Russian Ratification of START II Treaty

- ☐ Treaty faces ratification vote in Duma; parliamentary prerogative to debate its merits. While some may oppose Treaty, Russian government committed to ratification.
- ☐ START II in best interests of both countries, should be ratified by Russia.

If asked: is Administration planning to leap ahead" to START III:

- ☐ As Secretary Perry made clear last fall in Moscow, U.S. prepared to begin negotiations on further reductions in nuclear forces once START II has entered into force.
- ☐ Have no intention, however, of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with negotiations on "START III." Entry into force of START II remains essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

MIDDLE EAST

VISITS BY LEADERS TO CONSULT ON PEACE PROCESS

-- As the President noted in his press conference on January 28, four Middle Eastern leaders will be coming to Washington over the next two months to consult with him on the peace process.

-- The schedule of visits is:

- Prime Minister Netanyahu - February 13
- Chairman Arafat - March 3
- President Mubarak - March 10
- King Hussein - March 18

-- Background Only: Visit by Prince Sultan (Saudi Arabia) should not be referred to in same category as these visits; he's being invited by Cohen (DOD) for Feb. 25th. Will meet President while here.

ISRAEL/OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Background: In October 1995, the GOI requested the extradition of Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook to stand trial in Israel for manslaughter, murder, grievous harm and wounding, harm with aggravating intent, harm and wounding under aggravating circumstances, and conspiracy to commit a felony, in violation of the Israel Penal Code. Abu Marzook is the head of the political bureau of Hamas.

Abu Marzook was found extraditable by a U.S. court in New York on May 8, 1996. Further proceedings in the extradition case were stayed while he exercised his right to challenge the finding of extraditability. Press reports this week indicate that he may now withdraw his legal challenges. If he does so, the extradition process will resume.

Q: What is the status of the extradition Matter of Abu Marzook?

A: We have seen press reports that Mr. Abu Marzook has withdrawn his legal challenge to the order finding him extraditable. This is within Mr. Abu Marzook's rights and entirely his own choice. We would refer you to the Justice Department for any further comments.

Q: What about Hamas threats against U.S.? Will Marzook be treated humanely if extradited?

A: We, of course, reject any such threats. As in all cases, our extraditions take place based on the rule of law and assurances from the requesting government on appropriate treatment.

SETTLEMENTS AN "OBSTACLE TO PEACE"?

Q: President Clinton seemed to say December 16 that settlements are an obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Is that the U.S. position?

A: The U.S. position is that settlement activity complicates the negotiating process and increases tension.

We have previously expressed concern that when one party to a negotiation says things or does things which are seen to preempt the negotiating process, it makes it that much harder for negotiations to succeed.

In that vein, the President was making the obvious point that when one party does something that is seen by the other as preempting negotiations it can become a problem or an obstacle to progress in those negotiations.

So, yes we are troubled by some of the recent settlement activity, and we've said so. The President's response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity. It's important to focus on that concern.

[If asked]:

Q: Does the President's response indicate a change in policy?

A: As I said, his response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity. It's important to focus on that concern. The comments did not signal a fundamental change in the nature of that concern.

LEGALITY OF SETTLEMENTS

Q: Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that he subscribes to the view that as a matter of legal right, Jews and Israelis have a legal right to settle on the West Bank? Is that your understanding of the legalities?

A: I'm not going to get drawn into a discussion of the legal aspects of what is obviously a highly political issue. It is an issue, furthermore, that the Israelis and Palestinians recognize is difficult and therefore left for their permanent status negotiations. It is abundantly clear, however, that settlement activity, and even announcements of plans for possible future settlement activity, complicates the climate and the process of negotiation. When either party says things or does things that are perceived as prejudging the outcome of a negotiation, it makes it that much more difficult to achieve progress.

Q: But what about the precise question of the legality of settlement activity?

A: As I said, I'm not going down that road. We need to keep our focus on assisting the parties in their negotiations.

Q: Do you or don't you differentiate between new and old settlements?

A: I've just explained what our position is and I referred to "settlement activity." I'm not going to comment further.

Q: The Israelis claim that you didn't complain about settlement activity during the Rabin Government, so why are you making this an issue now?

A: We said the same thing during the time of the Labor government.

JERUSALEM

Q: What is your reaction to Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement that Israel will not negotiate over the status of Jerusalem?

A: Our views have not changed. Israel and the Palestinians have agreed that Jerusalem is one of the issues for permanent status negotiations.

(If pressed) Our position on the status of Jerusalem is well-known.

Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and volatile issues in the peace process. We remain convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing these sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which Israel and the Palestinians themselves have formally agreed to discuss only in the context of direct, permanent status negotiations.

PEACE PROCESS

☐ There has been no change in the U.S. position on land-for-peace or anything else as a result of the Israeli elections. We have supported this principle and will continue to do so. At the same time, our experience makes clear that agreements are reached not through recitation of abstract principles, but through the hard work of direct negotiation. Syria and Israel agreed at Madrid to negotiate on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. They should resume those negotiations to overcome their differences.

☐ Obviously, if progress is to be made, if differences are to be overcome, each side must take into account the needs and interests of the other.

☐ Peace is not an abstraction. Peace is closely tied to security and only the parties directly concerned can make the critical decisions which affect their future. The United States can't make these decisions for them. We will not try to impose decisions upon Israel or any other party to the peace process.

☐ That doesn't mean that the US, as the facilitator of the peace process, does not have views. It has been and remains our view that the land-for-peace formula offers the most promise for a workable solution to the problems of war and peace in the Middle East. But agreements will come not as a result of our views, but as a result of

negotiations between the parties.

PALESTINIAN COMPLIANCE ON REVOCATION OF PALESTINIAN COVENANT

☐ We have welcomed the decision taken by the Palestinian National Council to cancel the provisions of the Covenant which contradict the formal undertakings made between the PLO and the Israeli government.

U.S. EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV

☐ Recognize what is required by the law passed by Congress requiring that the U.S. Embassy be transferred to Jerusalem. But at the same time, the President has made it clear that he will take no step that will undermine the peace process or jeopardize the negotiations. In this regard, the legislation provides a waiver provision that may be used by the President as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that could preempt or jeopardize the peace process.

ORIENT HOUSE

☐ Our position regarding U.S. contacts at Orient House has not changed. We do business with the Palestinian Authority only in Gaza and Jericho, not in Jerusalem. Would encourage all parties to concentrate on the negotiations, not on issues that may polarize the situation.

SYRIA

☐ We believe that a comprehensive peace requires negotiations and agreements on all tracks, including with Syria and Lebanon. But we recognize that -- as in the past -- some negotiations will move at a faster pace than others.

☐ Prime Minister Netanyahu told me that he agrees on the importance of talks with Syria.

☐ We have never had any illusions about Syrian associations with groups involved in terrorism.

☐ We consider this a serious issue, and we have made that clear both in our diplomatic contacts

at the highest levels and in our annual report on terrorism.

☐ We would like to see Syria's ties to terrorist groups definitively broken.

☐ But it is important to distinguish between states that work to subvert the peace process -- like Iran -- and those who have shown a willingness to engage in it actively and seriously -- like Syria.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

Has there been a cover-up?

☐ No -- There is currently no evidence nor any indication of a cover-up.

☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee concurs in this assessment.

☐ The fact that U.S. troops inadvertently destroyed Iraqi chemical weapons after the war came to light as part of our effort to learn all that we can; that effort has since been intensified.

☐ We're awaiting the outcomes of Army IG, DOD Intel Oversight & CIA IG investigations.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

☐ The CIA's thorough August 2, 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.

☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the Presidential Advisory Committee found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

☐ Yes, and that's the decision taken by the President when he extended the Presidential Advisory Committee to provide independent oversight.

☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.

☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products.
- ☐ Stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 80+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.
- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.