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**ATTACHMENT
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NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

January 24, 1997

Latin America

Economic Consolidation

UN Secretary General

Warheads

Thailand/AMRAAM

Eastern Slavonia

China/Hong Kong

Colombia

Sudan

North Korea

Serbia

Cuba

South Africa/Syria

CWC

Russia

Middle East

Bosnia

Cyprus

Peru

Northern Ireland

Saudi Arabia

Gulf War Illnesses

LATIN AMERICA -- ANTI-DRUG PLANES

Background: Dallas Morning News has a story this morning (1/24) on U.S. efforts to create "anti-drug air force" among Latin American countries.

Points

- ☐ There is an ongoing effort using aircraft for counter-drug purposes in the Latin American region.
- ☐ This effort includes most recently a drawdown of helicopters and C-26 aircraft from the Defense Department for transfer to a number of countries in the

region for counter-narcotics purposes, including Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Barbados. Earlier, A-37 aircraft had been provided to a number of countries which they have used for counter-drug purposes.

☐ There is a continuing inter-agency process to evaluate our counterdrug efforts and consider options that would enhance our efforts. The plan mentioned in the article was one of a number of options that are part of that process.

PROPOSAL TO CONSOLIDATE EX-IM, OPIC AND TDA

(ONLY IF RAISED): There was a meeting on this at the White House Thursday morning.

Consensus view was that while interesting, the Administration is not going to move forward with anything like this. We will, however, look at ways to improve efficiency and agency coordination, and the NEC has asked us to report back in one month on suggestions.

UN SECRETARY GENERAL

Q: Today's Washington Post today portrays Annan as reversing himself and agreeing to "consultations" with the Congress. Aren't you concerned that such consultations encroach upon Presidential prerogatives?

A: The term "consultations" came from the Washington Post, not from Senator Helms or Secretary General Annan. On the contrary, Helms and Annan both spoke in more general terms of the need to improve the relationship between the UN and Capitol Hill and to keep up a healthy and constructive dialogue so that each party understands the legitimate concerns of the other. We wholeheartedly support these activities and do not see them in any way as affecting the President's authority to conduct U.S. foreign policy.

Q: CNN said yesterday that Annan has received "promises" that the

U.S. will pay the \$1 billion it owes the UN. No doubt this "promise" has come as something of a surprise to Congressional appropriators. Were such promises made?

A: No. In his discussions with Secretary General Annan, President Clinton reaffirmed his personal desire to pay our arrears, and told Mr. Annan that we are currently working with the Congress to develop bipartisan support for a plan to pay our arrears, put the UN on a firm financial footing, and encourage further UN reforms. The President will submit his budget on February 6, right after the State of the Union. We will be happy to discuss the details at that time. In the interim, we will be continuing our discussions with Congress.

Q: On NPR yesterday morning, Annan said he would not accept UN reforms as a precondition to payment of US arrears. This sounds a lot like Boutros-Ghali. Are we going to pay without any conditions?

A: The Kofi Annan you just saw in the Roosevelt Room sounded nothing like Boutros-Ghali. President Clinton sympathizes with Secretary General Annan's position that our payments to the UN are legally binding obligations and should be paid on time and in full. President Clinton also impressed upon the Secretary General, however, the importance of fundamentally changing the way the UN does business so that it can do more with less. Furthermore, as someone who went to college in the United States and spent a great deal of time in this country, Secretary General Annan understands that the Congress holds the power of the purse and that it too is very concerned with reforming the UN.

STUDY OF NUCLEAR WARHEAD CUTS

Q: Is the Pentagon studying the possibility of seeking an agreement with Russia on new

cuts in strategic nuclear arms, below those called for in "START II," as reported in today's [January 23] Washington Post?"

A: Lifting the threat of nuclear weapons destruction and limiting their dangerous spread remains at the top of my foreign policy agenda.

Over the past four years, we have accomplished a great deal in this area, including the detargeting of U.S. and Russian missiles; the entry into force of the START I Treaty; the complete denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan; the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; Senate ratification of the START II Treaty; and the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

We are currently working with the Russian government to achieve Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. And we are prepared to work on further reductions in strategic nuclear arms once START II enters into force.

Within our own government, we are doing the necessary planning within Defense and other agencies to support those negotiations, so that we can move quickly once START II enters into force.

[If asked: Are you prepared to "leapfrog" START II and move on to negotiations on START III?]

We have no intention of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with negotiations on a "START III." The ratification of START II by Russia remains an essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

[If asked: Are you prepared to commit to the elimination of nuclear weapons, as called for by the former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Lee Butler?]

I said at the United Nations this fall that the United States looks forward to a new century "in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated."

[If asked: Is the Administration prepared to enter into negotiations on a "START III" framework, or agree now to a target for deeper cuts, as an inducement for Russia to ratify START II?]

President Yeltsin and I asked our experts some time ago to conduct a dialogue on how we might adapt our nuclear forces to the changed international security situation, including the possibility of further reductions.

We have no intention, however, of setting aside START II, and moving ahead instead with the conclusion of a START III agreement. Ratification of START II by Russia remains an essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

THAILAND -- SALE OF F/A-18S

Q: Can you comment on the status of our sale of F/A-18s to Thailand, rumored to include advanced air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs).*

A: In making any decision to sell the F/A-18s to Thailand we would balance the security and self-defense needs of an important treaty ally with our non-proliferation concerns.

Under our non-proliferation and conventional arms transfer guidelines, our policy is not to introduce new levels of weapons technology into regions that do not already have the technology.

We wanted Thailand to remain equipped with U.S. fighter aircraft to meet its legitimate defense and security needs.

The U.S. will not be the first to introduce into Southeast Asia an advanced missile system such as the AMRAAM.

* Advanced medium range air-to-air missile

EASTERN SLAVONIA

Q: How do you respond to yesterday's (1/21) New York Times report that tensions are rising in Eastern Slavonia?

A: The peaceful re-integration of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia has been an important objective of U.S. foreign policy toward the region and was a critical part of the negotiations in Dayton.

We seek peaceful right of return for ethnic Croats who were driven from their homes at the beginning of the hostilities in the region, as well as the full respect for the human rights of those Serbs who remain in the area.

We urge the parties to work together to prevent mass migrations out of the area when it returns to Croatian control this year. Thus far, we have been pleased with the accomplishments of Jaques Klein, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, in dealing with this vexing issue.

CHINA/HONG KONG

Background: A Chinese-appointed panel on Sunday called for the amendment or repeal of some 25 civil liberties laws in Hong Kong. Press reaction has been decidedly negative, but we should refrain from overreacting until we have more details on the exact nature of the proposed reforms. There may be an element of political bluster in this announcement; it is not yet clear how strongly the PRC will hold to this line; and we are not sure how Governor Tung will react.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to China's proposed changes to civil liberties statutes in Hong Kong?

A: The U.S. is deeply concerned with any attempts to weaken basic freedoms and civil

liberties in Hong Kong. We consider maintenance of these freedoms to be vital to confidence in Hong Kong's future. We hope that China and the future government of Hong Kong will carefully consider the impact these actions.

COLOMBIA

☐ The decision on Friday to impose light sentences on the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers dramatically demonstrates the need for reforming Colombia's laws to increase penalties for drug traffickers.

☐ USG again urges the Colombian Government and Congress to increase penalties on drug traffickers and prevent them from doing drug business from jail.

[IF ASKED]

☐ USG will take these developments very seriously as it prepares the next certification review.

SUDAN/SANCTIONS

Q: How can you say you are serious about terrorism and then exempt Syria and Sudan from sanctions?

A: It was this Administration that put Sudan on the Terrorism List in 1993. Sudan was immediately made ineligible for most foreign assistance as well as any equipment sales that might increase its military potential.

This Administration also lead the effort in the UN to obtain sanctions against Sudan and has worked effectively with Sudan's neighbors to contain Sudan's aggressive ambitions.

In addition, there have been long standing comprehensive embargoes on five of the seven nations the U.S. lists as state sponsors of terrorism: Libya, Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and

North Korea.

Such total embargoes have never been applied by any U.S. Administration or Congress to the other two nations on that list, Syria and Sudan. We have, however, placed sanctions on them for their support of terrorism. Syria, like Sudan, is not eligible for arms transfers or U.S. foreign assistance.

The new anti-terrorism legislation, which went into effect last year, is intended to ban the transfers of funds that would support acts of terrorism in this country. Treasury, in consultation with the State Department, interpreted the law as we believe it was intended, to prohibit the transfer of money from terrorist states to the U.S. which could be used for terrorist actions here. It does not ban commercial transactions. If the individual transactions are found not to pose a risk of funding terrorism, then they may be permitted, but financial transfers between the U.S. and Syria and Sudan are closely reviewed. These regulations were put in place in August of 1996.

We have and will continue to lead the world in vigorous efforts to oppose support for terrorism, including by Syria and Sudan.

NORTH KOREA

FOUR-PARTY TALKS

Background: Yesterday's (1/14) Washington Times reports that there will be a joint briefing "to plan for a four-nation conference on a peace settlement on the Korean peninsula." It also reports that North Korea will be represented by Kim Gye Gwan.

Background NOT for release: We are in the final stages of negotiations with North Korea to determine location and level of participants for the Joint Briefing. In all likelihood, we will agree on New York as the venue. The sticking point is level of participation. Following the joint

briefing there will be a "high-level" bilateral meeting between the U.S. and the DPRK. North Korean Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan will represent the North at this bilateral meeting. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charles Kartman will represent the United States. The South Koreans want the North to attend the joint briefing at the same level as they attend the bilateral meeting with the U.S. The North currently indicates that they will attend the joint briefing at a level below Kim Gye Gwan.

Q: Are the United States, North Korea and South Korea meeting 29 January to make PLANS for a four-nation peace conference?

A: North Korea agreed to attend a Joint Briefing on 29 January given by the United States and South Korea to explain (not plan) Presidents Clinton and Kim's proposal of 16 April 1996 for Four-Party peace talks which would involve North and South Korea, the United States and China. North Korea has not yet determined who they will send to lead their delegation. The location of the joint briefing has not been agreed upon yet.

SERBIA

Serbian Elections -- General

☐ Serbian authorities have made announcements that appear to concede opposition victories in some municipalities, but the regime continues to stall for time with legal tactics; we remain skeptical until the duly-elected members of the opposition are able to take their seats and begin work.

☐ It remains that Serbian authorities must implement the OSCE Gonzalez report recommendations and recognize all opposition victories in the November 17 elections. Until Milosevic recognizes the will of the Serbian people, he will remain isolated.

☐ We hope that this situation can be resolved without violence and

that the people of Serbia will be vindicated in their desire for the implementation of democratic norms and processes. We condemn any police interference with the rights of the Serbian people to voice their protests. Any use of force by Serbian authorities will only further their international isolation.

□ We and our allies remain engaged in seeking ways to gain Milosevic's acceptance of the election results as an essential step for the resolution of the situation in Serbia. Last week, Contact Group members discussed a number of possible steps to put additional pressure on Belgrade.

□ We are also moving forward with a plan of action to support democratization in Serbia. We are considering a number of actions ranging from economic and political measures to democracy building initiatives as well as continuing to support the important roles of international organizations such as the OSCE.

□ The freedom of independent media is an essential part of the democratization process in Serbia. We urge the Serbian authorities to respect this freedom. We condemn any police interference with the rights of the Serbian people to have access to independent radio and TV broadcasts. Actions to muzzle independent media by Serbian authorities will only further their international isolation.

If asked about Sanctions:

We are not actively pursuing the reimposition of sanctions at this time, but are taking other steps to convince Milosevic to accept the will of the Serbian people.

CUBA

Cuba: Results of Axworthy Visit

Background: Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy and Cuban Foreign Minister Robaina

yesterday released a joint statement on agreements reached during the Canadian's two-day visit to Havana. The communiqu  , lays out 14 areas in which the two countries have agreed to increase cooperation, including: creation of a "Citizen's Complaints Commission" under the Cuban National Assembly (a watered-down version of the independent Ombudsman's Office that Canada originally hoped for); various bilateral exchanges aimed at "broadening and deepening cooperation on human rights"; and unspecified steps to "support the activities" of Canadian and Cuban NGOs.

Q: What is your reaction to the Canada/Cuba joint communiqu  , issued yesterday, and the remarks which accompanied it?

A: We welcome Canada's effort to advance a human rights agenda with Cuba, but we are skeptical that the steps agreed to by the Cuban Government will lead to meaningful improvements.

We see nothing in the communiqu  , which suggests an openness to fundamental reform on the part of the Cuban Government.

Given that attitude on the part of the Cuban regime, we do not believe high-level contacts of this sort to be an effective device for promoting democracy.

Q: What did Axworthy and his Cuban counterpart agree to?

A: They announced a series of initiatives focused mostly on increasing cooperation in areas unrelated to human rights and democracy.

Regarding human rights, the two sides agreed to hold seminars and exchanges aimed at "deepening cooperation" and strengthening a "Citizens' Complaint Commission" that Cuba will establish under its National Assembly.

They also agreed to support the activities of Cuban and Canadian NGOs in Cuba.

Q: What's wrong with these initiatives?

A: Most increase cooperation in areas unrelated to human rights and democratization. We would hope that such cooperation would be conditioned on specific progress in advancing respect for fundamental freedoms.

There is no reason to expect that exchanges and seminars on human rights with leaders of the current regime are going to yield positive results. The harassment and detention of human rights activists before and during Foreign Minister Axworthy's visit underscores this.

A "complaint commission" under a National Assembly totally dominated by the Communist Party holds little promise of becoming an objective advocate for human rights.

Likewise, cooperation with a Cuban judicial system that is an extension of the government's totalitarian apparatus tends to give it legitimacy, and is unlikely to lead to fundamental reform.

The promotion of NGO activities "in accordance with the laws and regulations of each country" fails to address the fact that those are precisely the repressive laws and regulations that are used against human rights groups and independent Cuban non-governmental groups and associations. Cuban laws need to be changed, not enforced.

Q: Is it true that Canada and Cuba have agreed to work together to counter the Helms-Burton Act?

A: The communiqu   says that they intend to negotiate a "Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement." We have no details on what that would entail.

Q: Did the Canadians consult with you prior to Axworthy's visit?

A: They informed us of their intentions. As Foreign Minister Axworthy made clear during his visit, Canada follows an independent policy in Cuba, and one

at variance with that of
the United States.

We value our relationship with Canada, but this is one area where
we strongly disagree.
We are making our views known through diplomatic channels.

We will continue our dialogue with the government of Canada on
Cuba democratization
and will press for more forceful action.

CNN Request to Open Bureau

Background: After the Cuban government in November approved
CNN's request to open a
bureau in Havana, CNN renewed its application for a license from
Treasury/OFAC license to do
so. A half dozen other U.S. news media want to open bureaus, but
the GOC has approved only
CNN. (FYI ONLY: The Helms-Burton Act contains a provision
suggesting that Congressional
intent was that the USG not grant any licenses unless the GOC
indicates willingness to allow
TV/Radio Marti open offices in Cuba, but State and Treasury
lawyers have concluded that we
have parallel authority to do so.) While most U.S. media favor
authorizing CNN's request, views
on the Hill and in the Cuban-American community remain mixed.
The application is still under
active consideration.

Points

- ☐ CNN's application is still under review.
- ☐ Want to ensure that any decision is consistent with U.S. law and
our commitment to promote
peaceful, democratic transition in Cuba.

SOUTH AFRICA: REPORTED ARMS SALES TO SYRIA

Q: What action did the Government of South Africa take yesterday
on the proposed sale of
arms to Syria? Any reaction from us?

A: On January 22, the South African cabinet did not discuss whether or not to approve the issuance of a marketing license for the marketing of certain weapon systems to Syria. They are pursuing further consultations on the matter as stated by Deputy President Mbeki.

We continue to consult closely with the South African Government on this issue through diplomatic channels, and are confident our concerns are well understood.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the possible South African sales of arms to Syria? Is the sale going forward?

A: As we stated previously, we are deeply concerned about this possibility of weapons sale by any country to states which support terrorist activities.

[IF PRESSED]

We have urged the government of South Africa and will urge any others contemplating similar arrangements not to proceed towards a sale. The South African government is deliberating and consulting on this issue. We have confidence that the government of South Africa understands the seriousness of this issue and will make its decisions accordingly.

(IF RAISED)

Q: What impact would the sale have on bilateral relations were it to go through? Would we terminate our assistance programs?

A: The transfer of military equipment to any of the countries listed by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism may require us to cease certain assistance under U.S. law. The South African government has made it clear that it does not support terrorism.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

- ☐ The President is committed to working with the Senate to secure the ratification of the CWC.
- ☐ We have been actively and regularly working with interest groups and the general public to educate them on the importance of this treaty.
- ☐ The meeting with Senator Lott was useful. He has committed to organizing a meeting with members in order to begin discussions on how we might bridge the gap between those who support the treaty and those who have difficulties with it. (IF ASKED: Specifically, we will discuss possible amendments to the resolution of ratification -- not to the treaty itself.)
- ☐ You would have to ask the Senator about the Senate calendar. We emphasized to him the importance of an early vote.
- ☐ As to whether or not he supports the treaty, I would, again, direct you to his office and to remarks he made at his Tuesday press conference.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Duma Votes on Yeltsin "Incapacity," to Govern, Prolonged Absence

- ☐ Our understanding these resolutions have no legal, constitutional validity; besides, apparently many members of parliament did not participate; and second vote (on another version of resolution) did not pass.
- ☐ Beyond continuing to wish President Yeltsin rapid, complete recovery, not appropriate for me to speculate on parliamentary maneuvers, internal politics in Russia.

NATO-Russia Talks

- ☐ In preparing for upcoming meetings between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, and between Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, we are exploring variety of ideas designed to strengthen partnership with Russia, and respond to some Russian concerns over NATO enlargement.
- ☐ NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov had lengthy discussion Monday on future NATO-Russia relations; press statement said talks went "successfully," further meetings would be held.
- ☐ Welcome reports on meeting; as said previously, U.S. very pleased Russia and NATO beginning serious dialogue on ways to structure permanent NATO-Russia relationship.
- ☐ Support that effort, in our bilateral exchanges with Russia as well as in Alliance.
- ☐ Obviously, we stay in close contact with Allies on these issues; Deputy Secretary Talbott's European trip was part of that process of consultations. Talbott leading delegation to Moscow this week for similar meetings with Russians.

(NOTE to Briefer: Talbott delegation met Wednesday (1/22) and yesterday (1/23) with top Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Primakov, Defense Rodionov, Yeltsin Chief of Staff Chubais, Minister of Economy, others. Public readout on meetings indicates serious talks.)

Lebed's Attendance at Inauguration, Appearances in New York

If asked about 1/23 NYTimes story of meetings with American businessmen

- ☐ Press accounts indicate Lebed having interesting, useful visit to U.S.; we're in favor of American and Russian citizens' establishing good contacts, private as well as official.

If asked about WashTimes article on Lebed's calling for Yeltsin resignation

- ☐ Saw report of Lebed press conference at UN; his statements

appeared consistent with previously-expressed views on various ways to improve conditions in Russia, including Lebed's own interest in being elected president; seemed to be nothing new in comments.

If asked about NYTimes interview in which Lebed quoted as praising American democracy

☐ Understand Lebed complimentary of U.S. political, electoral process; appreciate his views on that, share them.

Yeltsin's Health

☐ President Yeltsin's release from hospital Monday good news, understand he'll continue to recover from at country house near Moscow, went to Kremlin for Wednesday meeting with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

☐ President recently sent Yeltsin get-well message, expressing best wishes for his quick recovery.

Accident Involving Georgian Diplomat

☐ Georgian Embassy DCM Makharadze involved in traffic accident late January 3 in which 16-year-old girl was killed.

☐ In January 10 statement in Tbilisi, President Shevardnadze said Georgia prepared to waive Makharadze's diplomatic immunity; he will remain in U.S. until case completed.

☐ We appreciate Georgia's sensitive handling of this tragic incident.

☐ The President wants to compliment President Shevardnadze on his decision and Secretary Christopher's personal and careful handling of this issue.

(If asked about Makharadze's previous unreported traffic violations)

☐ This is properly matter for State Department; refer you there.

(If asked about 1/16 CNN report Shevardnadze asked diplomat be

allowed to return to Georgia to face charges there)

☐ Georgian Ambassador broached this idea , but President Shevardnadze has made no such request and we are proceeding on basis of President Shevardnadze's statement.

General Issues

Clinton-Yeltsin Meeting in Early 1997

☐ President and Yeltsin agreed in their December 5 phone conversation to meet in March, though we have not yet fixed specific date or venue for meeting.

☐ Personal contact between two leaders important, as we look ahead to work with Russia on wide range of issues -- American investment, arms control, European security structures. Our agenda very comprehensive.

(Note: our guidance to date has said meeting would probably be in U.S.)

(Yeltsin Unable to Meet?)

☐ We have nothing to indicate Yeltsin would be unable to meet in March.

Russian Concerns about NATO

☐ Understand enlargement difficult issue for Russia, but U.S., NATO and Russia have interests in developing NATO-Russia relationship and broadening cooperation.

☐ Serious dialogue on NATO-Russia relationship underway.

☐ U.S. determined to proceed with NATO enlargement. Believe that is in interests of European security and stability. Equally determined to manage enlargement process in manner that does not threaten Russia and to do all that we can to build strong NATO-Russia relationship.

Prospects for Russian Ratification of START II Treaty

☐ Treaty faces ratification vote in Duma; parliamentary

prerogative to debate its merits. While some may oppose Treaty, Russian government committed to ratification.

If asked: is Administration planning to "leap ahead" to START III to circumvent opposition to START II in Russia:

- ☐ As Secretary Perry made clear last fall in Moscow, U. S. prepared to begin negotiations on further reductions in nuclear forces once START II has entered into force.
- ☐ Have no intention, however, of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with negotiations on "START III." Entry into force of START II remains essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.
- ☐ START II is the best interests of both countries, should be ratified by Russia.

MIDDLE EAST

Middle East Visitors

Q: Any dates yet for visits by leaders from the Middle East?

A: Nothing to report on that; we're working on the schedule and we would expect to see Prime Minister Netanyahu, King Hussein, President Mubarak, and Chairman Arafat in Washington over the next two months. We'll keep you posted.

Settlements an "Obstacle to Peace"?

Q: President Clinton seemed to say December 16 that settlements are an obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Is that the U.S. position?

A: The U.S. position is that settlement activity complicates the negotiating process and increases tension.

We have previously expressed concern that when one party to a negotiation says things

or does things which are seen to preempt the negotiating process, it makes it that much harder for negotiations to succeed.

In that vein, the President was making the obvious point that when one party does something that is seen by the other as preempting negotiations it can become a problem or an obstacle to progress in those negotiations.

So, yes we are troubled by some of the recent settlement activity, and we've said so. The President's response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity. It's important to focus on that concern.

[If asked]:

Q: Does the President's response indicate a change in policy?

A: As I said, his response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity. It's important to focus on that concern. The comments did not signal a fundamental change in the nature of that concern.

Legality of Settlements

Q: Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that he subscribes to the view that as a matter of legal right, Jews and Israelis have a legal right to settle on the West Bank? Is that your understanding of the legalities?

A: I'm not going to get drawn into a discussion of the legal aspects of what is obviously a highly political issue. It is an issue, furthermore, that the Israelis and Palestinians recognize is difficult and therefore left for their permanent status negotiations. It is abundantly clear, however, that settlement activity, and even announcements of plans for possible future settlement activity, complicates the climate and the process of negotiation. When either party says things or does things that are perceived as prejudging the outcome of a negotiation, it makes it that much more difficult to achieve progress.

Q: But what about the precise question of the legality of

settlement activity?

A: As I said, I'm not going down that road. We need to keep our focus on assisting the parties in their negotiations.

Q: Do you or don't you differentiate between new and old settlements?

A: I've just explained what our position is and I referred to "settlement activity." I'm not going to comment further.

Q: The Israelis claim that you didn't complain about settlement activity during the Rabin Government, so why are you making this an issue now?

A: We said the same thing during the time of the Labor government.

Jerusalem

Q: What is your reaction to Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement that Israel will not negotiate over the status of Jerusalem?

A: Our views have not changed. Israel and the Palestinians have agreed that Jerusalem is one of the issues for permanent status negotiations.

(If pressed) Our position on the status of Jerusalem is well-known.

Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and volatile issues in the peace process. We remain convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing these sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which Israel and the Palestinians themselves have formally agreed to discuss only in the context of direct, permanent status negotiations.

Peace Process

□ There has been no change in the U.S. position on land-for-peace or anything else as a result of the Israeli elections. We have supported this principle and will continue to do so. At the same time, our experience makes clear that agreements are reached not through recitation of

abstract principles, but through the hard work of direct negotiation. Syria and Israel agreed at Madrid to negotiate on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. They should resume those negotiations to overcome their differences.

☐ Obviously, if progress is to be made, if differences are to be overcome, each side must take into account the needs and interests of the other.

☐ Peace is not an abstraction. Peace is closely tied to security and only the parties directly concerned can make the critical decisions which affect their future. The United States can't make these decisions for them. We will not try to impose decisions upon Israel or any other party to the peace process.

☐ That doesn't mean that the US, as the facilitator of the peace process, does not have views. It has been and remains our view that the land-for-peace formula offers the most promise for a workable solution to the problems of war and peace in the Middle East. But agreements will come not as a result of our views, but as a result of negotiations between the parties.

Palestinian Compliance on Revocation of Palestinian Covenant

☐ We have welcomed the decision taken by the Palestinian National Council to cancel the provisions of the Covenant which contradict the formal undertakings made between the PLO and the Israeli government.

U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv

☐ Recognize what is required by the law passed by Congress requiring that the U.S. Embassy be transferred to Jerusalem. But at the same time, the President has made it clear that he will take no step that will undermine the peace process or jeopardize the negotiations. In this regard, the legislation provides a waiver provision that may be used by the President as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that could preempt or jeopardize the peace process.

Orient House

☐ Our position regarding U.S. contacts at Orient House has not changed. We do business with the Palestinian Authority only in Gaza and Jericho, not in Jerusalem. Would encourage all parties to concentrate on the negotiations, not on issues that may polarize the situation.

Syria

☐ We believe that a comprehensive peace requires negotiations and agreements on all tracks, including with Syria and Lebanon. But we recognize that -- as in the past -- some negotiations will move at a faster pace than others.

☐ Prime Minister Netanyahu told me that he agrees on the importance of talks with Syria.

☐ We have never had any illusions about Syrian associations with groups involved in terrorism.

☐ We consider this a serious issue, and we have made that clear both in our diplomatic contacts at the highest levels and in our annual report on terrorism.

☐ We would like to see Syria's ties to terrorist groups definitively broken.

☐ But it is important to distinguish between states that work to subvert the peace process -- like Iran -- and those who have shown a willingness to engage in it actively and seriously -- like Syria.

BOSNIA

SFOR Mission Duration/Secretary-designate Cohen Remarks

☐ 18 months will give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

☐ We will review every 6 months to see if we can accomplish mission with fewer forces. SFOR will gradually shift responsibilities to civilian agencies and the parties themselves while

moving from stabilization to deterrence to disengagement.

If pressed on whether this means that the U.S. has ruled out participation of U.S. forces after completion of SFOR mission:

☐ We believe that SFOR's mission can be completed in 18 months, and that the conditions will have been established in which stability and security can be maintained without an outside military presence.

If pressed whether the U.S. will insist that any force after 18 months will be European only:

☐ I'm not going to speculate about such scenarios. We believe the mission will be completed in 18 months.

If pressed whether every last soldier will be out of Bosnia in exactly 18 months:

☐ 18 months is the duration of the mission and the deployment, but not necessarily a deadline for withdrawal of the last SFOR soldier. Withdrawal at 18 months will occur in a timely fashion but may extend some days or weeks beyond the mission duration.

Refugees Returning to Gajevi/RS Mining Roads

☐ We continue to be concerned about the use of violence or intimidation against returning refugees and displaced persons and the potential for confrontation in the Zone of Separation. SFOR has reported finding a number of anti-personnel mines near Gajevi in the Zone of Separation where displaced Bosnians have been returning in recent days.

☐ SFOR and the IPTF are taking additional security measures to avoid the potential for violence around Gajevi. The situation remains calm and we understand the returning Bosniacs are following agreed procedures.

Brcko Arbitration

- ☐ The parties agreed at Dayton to binding arbitration of the disputed portion of the inter-entity boundary line in the Brcko area. The issue is in the hands of the Arbitral Tribunal, consisting of arbitrators from the two Bosnian entities and the internationally-appointed arbiter Roberts Owen. There is no U.S. proposal for a Brcko solution; we support the arbitration process.
- ☐ A decision is to be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal by February 15. The Tribunal has been holding hearings in recent weeks including representatives of the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska.
- ☐ The U.S. and other Contact Group member states are aware of ideas under consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal, since the international community may need to move quickly to provide support for implementation of the Brcko solution. The Arbitral Tribunal is continuing its work, and we await the decision.

Iranian Influence in Bosnia

- ☐ Iranian influence in Bosnia has been an ongoing concern, but we have taken effective measures to cut Iranian links.
- ☐ We have enforced the Dayton agreement ban on foreign forces and insisted that Bosnian government sever all military and intelligence links with Iran as a condition of the train and equip program. As the President certified in June, those conditions have been met. There have been no indications since June that military or intelligence cooperation has resumed.
- ☐ Hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards have left Bosnia, Mujahadeen units have disbanded, and the Bosnians are looking to the U.S. and moderate Islamic states for security assistance.
- ☐ We remain concerned about Iranian influence and continue to watch the situation closely.
- ☐ Overall, we and the intelligence community assess that Iranian

influence has substantially diminished since the implementation of Dayton and since we tied the issue to the train and equip program.

New Bosnia Mission/SFOR -- General

☐ The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission started December 20. SFOR's limited and focused mission will allow time to consolidate the peace built by the success of IFOR.

☐ The Stabilization Force is about half IFOR's size. U.S. share is less than half last year's commitment -- about 8500 troops inside Bosnia.

☐ The NATO plan for SFOR includes more limited set of military and supporting tasks than IFOR, reflecting the more narrow mission of this smaller force. With fewer troops, SFOR will focus more on security, including force protection, and will be less involved in civilian tasks.

CYPRUS MISSILE PURCHASE

Background: Cyprus Government announced on Saturday (1/4) signature of a contract to purchase Russian SA-10 missiles. State favors waiting till Monday to issue a formal statement (in tandem with new demarches, efforts to jin up EU statements and demarches, calls to Sarbanes, Manatos, etc.).

Points (if asked)

☐ The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean remains unsettled. All parties in the region bear a responsibility to take steps to decrease tensions.

☐ In this connection, we have made clear to the GOC and others in the region in recent weeks that this purchase could seriously exacerbate tensions in the area and make more difficult a negotiated solution to the Cyprus dispute.

☐ Cyprus' announcement that it will delay deployment of any missile system is a step in the right direction.

PERU

Q: What's the situation in Peru at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence? What is the United States going to do about this situation?

A: We have continued our active and intense consultations with the Governments of Peru and Japan. The President's national security team has kept him fully informed as events there have developed.

This is a very serious situation and lives are obviously at risk. It simply isn't productive for me to address the other questions you have raised.

Q: Does the United States negotiate with hostages or condone those who do?

A: The United States does not condone making concessions to terrorists, but how to handle negotiations is a sovereign decision for the government involved.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Adams Refused Visa?

Background: Two London newspapers reported over the weekend that the White House has advised Gerry Adams he will not get a visa until the IRA reinstates its cease-fire. One paper sourced "officials of the NSC"; the other diplomats in London.

☐ Mr. Adams has not/not applied for a visa. Since there is no application, the Administration has made no decision.

☐ If pressed: As in the past, an application for a visa waiver by

Mr. Adams would be decided on basis of whether it could contribute to search for lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Loyalist Cease-fire Intact?

☐ Up to British and Irish governments and participating parties to decide who participates in talks.

☐ As President said in statement yesterday, we urge loyalists to maintain their cease-fire. There has been no claim of responsibility for car bomb attacks and there is no doubt loyalists have shown restraint in response to escalating IRA violence.

Recent Attacks

☐ Condemn this latest attack. Thankfully, no serious injuries, but shows wanton disregard for human life.

☐ Call again on IRA to declare and implement immediate cease-fire in words and deeds. People of Ireland, North and South, clearly want peace, political settlement.

Belfast Talks

☐ Belfast talks, chaired by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, represent historic opportunity and best hope in decades for achieving lasting settlement. Talks will reconvene for bilateral consultations January 13, in plenary January 27.

☐ Must not squander progress of last months. Urge all political leaders to take responsibility for making these talks work. Need to move quickly into substantive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland.

☐ Continue to believe that participation of all elected parties, including Sinn Fein, would give talks best chance of success; that can only happen with cease-fire.

☐ Impressed with commitment and determination both governments have shown in search for peace. They and we share goal of inclusive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland,

which can only happen if there is an IRA cease-fire.

Was 1994 IRA cease-fire "fake" as Prime Minister Major has alleged?

☐ Cease-fire from August 1994 to February 1996 saved hundreds of lives. I strongly condemned end of that cease-fire and I continue to call on IRA to declare new cease-fire immediately.

How Will You Know a New Cease-fire is Real?

☐ Will be up to British and Irish governments to evaluate new cease-fire; but as both Taoiseach and Prime Minister Major have said, will depend on both words and actions on ground.

Deportation Proceedings Against Matt Morrison

☐ Have been assured by Justice that these proceedings being handled fairly. Judicial matter - don't want to comment further.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KHOBAR BOMBING

Saudi Cooperation with FBI

Q: What are you doing to get Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the FBI on the Khobar Towers bombing investigation?

A: The FBI is in charge of that investigation for the U.S.

I understand that they are in a dialogue with the Saudis about what additional specific materials and cooperation they seek.

We have assurances from the highest levels in the Kingdom that we will get full cooperation and we expect that such assurances will be honored..

Q: What's your reaction to allegations that the al-Khobar bombing involved Iranians?

A: There is an investigation under way.

I'm not going to speculate about hypothetical outcomes to this investigation.

Nor am I going to speculate about hypothetical responses once this investigation is complete.

Q: Was there an Iranian or Syrian role?

A: We have reached no conclusions.

Q: If Iran was behind it, will we still attack Iran as Secretary Perry said last summer?

A: This is hypothetical and I'm not going to respond. But if you ask whether the U.S. responds to those who are proven to have attacked it, the record of this Administration is clear.

But I must stress that we have reached no conclusion about state sponsorship in the Khobar attack.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

Has there been a cover-up?

- ☐ No -- There is currently no evidence nor any indication of a cover-up.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee concurs in this assessment.
- ☐ The fact that U.S. troops inadvertently destroyed Iraqi chemical weapons after the war came to light as part of our effort to learn all that we can; that effort has since been intensified.
- ☐ We're awaiting the outcomes of Army IG, DOD Intel Oversight & CIA IG investigations.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 2, 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the Presidential Advisory Committee found it unlikely that

exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision taken by the President when he extended the Presidential Advisory Committee to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products.
- ☐ Stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 80+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 28 January 97 12:00
FROM Wechsler, William F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: TASKING - Richardson Q&As [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Davis, William K.
CARBON_COPY Albert, Ronda A.
 Baldwin, Kenneth
 Bedell, Blair B.
 Beers, Rand R.
 Bendick, Gordon L.
 Boynton, Peter J.
 Brown, Dallas
 Burrell, Christina L.
 Clarke, Richard A.
 Danvers, William C.
 Lindsay, James M.
 Orr, Robert C.
 Rice, Susan E.
 Roundtree, Beverly J.
 Schwartz, Eric P.
 Sheehan, Michael A.
 Simon, Steven N.
 Verville, Elizabeth G.
 Wechsler, William F.

TEXT_BODY

Enjoy.

[[RICHQ&A.DOC : 3150 in RICHQ&A.DOC]]

From: Davis, William K.
 To: @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia; @AFRICA - African Affairs
 CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
 Subject: FW: TASKING - Richardson Q&As [UNCLASSIFIED]
 Date: Tuesday, January 28, 1997 09:55 AM

Global, Africa & NESA - you folks are the delinquents - please see tasking below and get me input soonest. thanks

From: Davis, William K.
 To: Sandalow, David B.; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy;

@INTERAM - Inter-American; @AFRICA - African Affairs; @NESASIA - NE/South

Asia

CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs

Subject: TASKING - Richardson Q&As [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Monday, January 27, 1997 11:41 AM

Resulting from Bill Richardson's briefs this morning, Bill Danvers has requested that several Q&As need to be prepared by OPEN OF BUSINESS tomorrow for Richardson's briefing book. The assignments are as follows:

GLOBAL

- What is the cause for the difference between the way the Congress calculates our UN arrears versus the way the Executive Branch calculates them (Rep. Livingston cited a difference of \$825M vice \$1 billion)?
- What are the Helms benchmarks for paying arrears?
- How would you describe the advance appropriations deal to be proposed in the President's budget?
- What is the status of our intel sharing relationship with the UN?

DEFENSE

- What is our policy regarding Command and Control and the Spec. New case?

INTER-AMERICAN

- What are we doing with regard to violence in Haiti?
- Describe the agreement reached between the Administration and the Congress regarding release of assistance for Haiti.
- Why does the Administration describe our Haiti policy as a success?
- What are your intentions on the Title III waiver?
- What are you going to do on Title IV - will you request a waiver?
- What are you doing on Title II?
- What is your reaction to the Canadian Foreign Minister's visits to Havana.

AFRICA

- What is the status of the ACRF?

- What is the status of the multi-national force in Zaire?

- What is the Administration doing with regard to ARMSCOR and the South African's arms deal with Syria?

NESA - Tara Sonenshine mentioned that she needed the paper from you that had been previously tasked

SANDALOW - Tara Sonenshine mentioned that she needed the paper from you that had been previously tasked

THANKS

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

28 January 97 11:58

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

RICHQ&A.DOC

Q: Can't we agree on how much we owe to the UN? Why does Congress calculate one amount for our UN arrears, the Executive Branch calculate another amount, and the UN calculate an even higher amount? Which is right?

☐ The main difference is because we legislated a reduction in our peacekeeping assessment rate from 31% to 25% a few years ago. Both the administration and the Congress calculate US arrears on the basis of the lower assessment rate, and thus we owe less. The UN and its member states do not recognize this reduction, and they continue to bill us at the old, higher rate, therefore their calculation of our arrears is higher. The main difference between the administration and some in the Congress is because the administration began calculating with the lower assessment rate on October 1, 1995. Some members of Congress apply the law retroactively, and therefore they calculate lower arrears.

☐ There are other reasons as well: differing UN and American budgeting calendars result in U.S. bills being paid almost a year later than the UN would prefer; the Congressionally-targeted withholdings on a few specific peacekeeping operations for

policy reasons; and the Congressionally-targeted withholdings from UN specialized agencies that are seen as underperforming. Furthermore, some Congressional arrears numbers don't account for arrears to non-UN system agencies, such as the Organization of American States and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Q: What are the Helms benchmarks for paying arrears?

☐ The administration has not yet discussed specifics with Senator Helms. The administration is currently working with Congressional leaders and appropriators, as well as Senator Helms, to develop a plan to encourage UN reforms and to pay off our arrears. As those discussions continue, we will have a better idea what kind of effective and appropriate benchmarks can be agreed upon.

☐ United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent visit to Washington demonstrated that goodwill exists on both sides of the aisle and on all sides of this issue. With Mr. Annan's leadership of the UN and his commitment to reform, I am convinced that we now have the best chance we've had in years to pay off our arrears, get the UN on a firm financial footing, and further the process of UN reform.

Q: How would you describe the advance appropriations deal to be proposed in the President's budget?

☐ The President will submit his budget on February 6, after the State of the Union. The details of his proposal will be made public then.

☐ I can say, however, that the President's position is that our arrears to the UN and its specialized agencies are an obligation that we should meet. The fact that we owe such arrears is hurting our ability to lead at the United Nations, especially our ability to promote reform. Furthermore, I agree with the President, who stated publicly when he met with Secretary General Annan that "as a practical matter, I know from consulting with the members of Congress that we won't be able to secure support in the Congress for paying the arrears unless

they're convinced that reform is going forward."

Q: What is the status of our intelligence sharing relationship with the UN?

□ We make the decision to share our intelligence products on a case-by-case basis. On occasion, when confronted with special circumstances, and after we are convinced that the United Nations has established effective and appropriate control mechanisms, we may decide to share an intelligence product with the UN.

□ In 1994 the DCI promulgated guidelines on this matter. His guidance established four criteria:

- (1) The multilateral effort conforms with U.S. foreign policy and national objectives, and that intelligence support is consistent with those objectives;
- (2) The risk to sources and methods is acceptable;
- (3) The intelligence community has information which can make a meaningful contribution to the overall success of the endeavor;
- (4) The multinational organization requests and then accepts the offer of intelligence support and U.S. security guidelines.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 29 January 97 18:29

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT January 29 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Babcock, Douglas W.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Bujold, Noelle D.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, JoAnne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Moore, Lori A.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Szasz, Nicholas J.
Wise, William M.
Woolston, Ann E.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[JAN29GUI.DOC : 4685 in JAN29GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 29 January 97 15:43

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** JAN29GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

January 29, 1997

Tony Lake

Iraq

Quadrennial Defense Review

UN/Richardson

Cuba

Algeria

Germany/Scientists

Latin America

Warheads

Serbia

South Africa/Syria

CWC

Russia

Middle East

Bosnia

Peru

Northern Ireland

Saudi Arabia

Gulf War Illnesses

TONY LAKE

Stock

Q: What about new stories that Tony Lake held energy stock as late as January of this year, even though he was already under investigation for having held such stock earlier?

A: The fact that Mr. Lake held stock in Williams Company, a natural gas pipeline company, was brought to Mr. Lake's attention when our lawyers noticed the stock on Mr. Lake's most recent financial disclosure form. Mr. Lake said that he was unaware such a stock had been purchased.

Our lawyers contacted Mr. Lake's financial manager, who confirmed

that the stock had been purchased in error in September 1996, without Mr. Lake's knowledge, and that he had already sold it, again without Mr. Lake's knowledge, when he realized he should not have purchased the stock for Mr. Lake.

IF ASKED: We immediately brought this information to the attention of the Justice Department in connection with their ongoing investigation regarding potential conflicts of interest raised by Mr. Lake's previous holdings of energy stock.

Q: Why does Mr. Lake retain the financial advisor despite these mistakes?

A: That is a matter between Mr. Lake and his advisor.

Arms to Bosnia

Q: What is your reaction to the stories regarding Mr. Lake and Mr. Berger and arms to Bosnia?

A: First, there is nothing new in these stories. This matter has been thoroughly reviewed by any number of Committees. This particular report was concluded in October and fully briefed by the Republicans at that time and selectively leaked ever since.

We are proud of our policy in Bosnia, which has brought peace to that country. We did what we thought necessary at the time to preserve the Federation in Bosnia and give that country a chance for peace. We understand that some may disagree with that policy, but it is unfortunate and wrong that anyone would try to turn policy disagreement into criminal accusations in order to gain political advantage.

Mr. Lake is the President's nominee for Director of Central Intelligence. He is uniquely qualified for the post. He will be good for the CIA, good for the President, and good for the country. It is time to put politics aside.

Q: What about the allegation that Mr. Lake was excessively secret and kept the not only the

Congress, but also CIA in the dark about what was going on in Bosnia? Is this the man you want running the CIA?

A: As the President has said before, it would have been better to have informed key Members of Congress at the time of our instruction of "no instructions" to Amb. Galbraith in Croatia. Mr. Lake and the President are in agreement on that.

IF ASKED:

Q: Is it true Sandy Berger said it would be "dynamite" to put any of this in writing?

A: As the Republican report itself states, Mr. Berger does not recall making this comment. The concern at the time, as has been explained repeatedly, is that a leak of this sensitive diplomatic exchange would gravely damage our relationship with our allies and undermine NATO.

Q: Did Mr. Lake convey the instruction with a wink and a nod?

A: The instruction was "no instructions."

Q: The reports indicate that Mr. Lake refused to testify under oath, doesn't that suggest that he had something to hide?

A: Nonsense. Based on the constitutional separation of powers it is long-standing practice that the President's senior advisers do not testify, and cannot be compelled testify, before the Congress. While there have been some exceptions over the years to this general rule, the White House Counsel determined that a policy dispute such as this did not warrant an exception and instructed Mr. Lake accordingly.

Mr. Lake did make himself available to brief both the Senate and House committees looking into this matter.

Q: We are told that your staff, or the White House has classified the House report so that embarrassing details regarding this policy will not be revealed. Is that true?

A: No. At the request of the Congress, classification experts from the CIA, Defense Department, and State Department reviewed the document for classified information in both the Republican and Democrat House reports on this matter. Quite frankly, there are intelligence sources and methods that directly relate to the safety of our personnel in Bosnia revealed in the full reports.

Q: You seem to dismiss this matter, but hasn't it been referred to the Justice Department?

A: If the President had thought this was a problem for Mr. Lake, he would not have nominated him for the position of Director of Central Intelligence.

We are proud of our policy in Bosnia, which has brought peace to that country. We understand that some may disagree with that policy, but it is unfortunate and wrong that anyone would try to turn policy disagreement into criminal accusations in order to gain political advantage.

IRAQ

Possible Planned Invasion of Kuwait

Q: What is your reaction to the Washington Post story that Iraq is possibly ready to invade Kuwait again?

A: While Saddam Hussein does have military capabilities which can threaten Kuwait and other neighbors, we have no evidence that Iraq is staging new moves to threaten its neighbors.

I can assure you that we maintain a very close watch over Iraqi military movements and adjust our own military presence in the gulf to counter potential threats.

Saddam Hussein has intimate familiarity with what we can and have

done in response to his threatening military moves in the area. He would do well to keep it in the forefront of his thoughts.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

Background

In 1995, Secretary Perry endorsed the recommendation of the Congressionally-mandated Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (chaired by John White prior to his designation as Deputy Secretary of Defense) to conduct a quadrennial review of the defense program at the beginning of each newly elected Presidential administration. Previous assessments by the Bush Administration (the "Base Force" study) and the Clinton Administration ("Bottom-Up Review") reassessed the force structure of the Armed Forces in light of the changing realities of the post-Cold War world. The QDR is intended to reevaluate the requirements of our military posture to meet the threats to the United States in the 21st Century.

Congress endorsed the concept of a quadrennial defense review in the Lieberman Amendment of the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Act. The Amendment, the Armed Forces Force Structure Review Act of 1996, directed two actions: (1) A defense review by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which examines force structure and modernization, infrastructure and other elements of defense policy to determine the defense strategy of the United States and establish a revised defense program through the year 2005, and (2) the establishment of an independent, nonpartisan National Defense Panel (NDP) to provide an assessment of the QDR to the Secretary of Defense and Congress, and to conduct an independent assessment of possible force structures through the year 2010 and beyond (the Alternative Force Structure Assessment).

The Secretary was directed to establish, in consultation with

Congress, the nine-member NDP by December 1, 1996, from individuals in the private sector who are recognized experts in national security matters (the names are presently under consultation with Congress). The Secretary is to apprise the NDP on an ongoing basis of the work being done by the QDR, while the NDP is to provide the Secretary both a mid-term and final assessment of the defense review. In addition, the CJCS is to provide the Secretary his own independent assessment of the final results of the QDR. The Defense Secretary is to submit the QDR report, along with the NDP and CJCS comments, to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Committee on National Security by May 15, 1997. And, by December 1, 1997, the NDP is to provide the results of its own Alternative Force Structure Assessment to the Secretary, who will forward it to Congress with his comments by December 15. John White is still consulting with Congress on the make-up of the NDP Panel.

Why the QDR

The focus of outside commentary going into the QDR was captured in the recent Washington Post headline: "Two-War Scenario: A Strategy Straining the Pentagon". The Bottom-Up Review's central assumption that the United States needed to be able to fight two regional conflicts (MRCs) nearly simultaneously has served as the Pentagon's key measure for how best to size and shape U.S. forces since the Soviet Union dissolved. But with defense spending likely to remain at most flat into the next decade, and with U.S. forces becoming increasingly involved in the more likely smaller-scale contingencies such as peace operations, the notion that the Pentagon can continue to prepare for two regional wars has come under attack as no longer feasible.

These commentators argue that the cost of maintaining the force structure necessary to fight two major regional conflicts is too high when: (1) we need to properly configure and equip U.S. forces to deal with the growing fact of post-Cold War life that American forces will be used

increasingly not for combat operations but for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance actions, and (2) we must begin to modernize our forces not to deal with regional threats from failed/diminished military opponents such as North Korea and Iraq, but against the emergence of future -- including "near-peer" -- competitors who might use asymmetric strategies (e.g., WMD, information warfare) to challenge U.S. "niche" vulnerabilities given our conventional force dominance. In addition, these commentators question the Administration's assertion that under its defense budget U.S. forces even now are sufficiently large and equipped to meet the two-war objective first set under President Bush.

Organizational Approach to the QDR

The Defense Department commenced its QDR work in early November with the establishment of six OSD/Joint Staff co-chaired working panels:

- ☐ Strategy
- ☐ Readiness
- ☐ Force Assessment (force structure)
- ☐ Modernization
- ☐ Infrastructure
- ☐ Human Resources (Quality of Life)
- ☐ Intelligence/Information Warfare

The Panels ongoing efforts are to be continuously assessed/guided by an Integration Group, co-chaired by OSD and the Joint Staff. The Integration Group reports to the QDR Senior Steering Group, chaired by John White with the VCJCS as vice-chair. The Secretary of Defense chairs the entire QDR effort through the Defense Resources Board. NSC attends meetings of these groups.

UN/RICHARDSON

Q: Senator Helms alleged today (1/29) that the Administration is trying to bypass his Committee and force through a \$900 million emergency appropriation to repay UN arrears and refuses to condition that emergency appropriation on reforms

at the UN. Is this true?

A: No. The Administration is not seeking an emergency appropriation. We want to work with Senator Helms and other members of Congress to develop a bipartisan, effective plan to encourage UN reform and pay off our arrears.

While the President believes that our arrears to the UN and its specialized agencies are an obligation that we should meet and are hurting our ability to lead at the United Nations, he has also said clearly, most recently when UN Secretary General Annan visited last week, that "as a practical matter, I know from consulting with the members of Congress that we won't be able to secure support in the Congress for paying the arrears unless they're convinced that reform is going forward."

The Administration is currently working with Congressional leaders and appropriators, as well as Senator Helms, to develop a plan to encourage UN reforms and to pay off our arrears. The Administration has not yet discussed specifics with Senator Helms, but we look forward to doing so in the near future. As these discussions continue, we will have a better idea what kind of effective and appropriate benchmarks can be agreed upon.

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent visit to Washington demonstrated that goodwill exists on both sides of the aisle and on all sides of this issue. With Mr. Annan's leadership of the UN and his commitment to reform, I am convinced that we now have the best chance we've had in years to further the process of UN reform, get the UN on a firm financial footing, and pay off our arrears.

CUBA

REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN CUBA

What is this report?

☐ The President has transmitted to Congress a report, mandated by Title II of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD), that describes potential U.S. and other international assistance and other support for a transitional or democratic government in Cuba.

☐ The report communicates to the people of Cuba, including individuals in the Cuban government who support democracy, that the U.S. stands ready, along with other democratic nations, to help Cuba overcome the challenges it will face during the transition to democracy.

The Cuban government is calling this report a new violation of Cuba's sovereignty. Should the U.S. be planning Cuba's future?

☐ The report is premised on the fact that it is the Cuban people who must choose when and how a transition takes place, and what their new government's policies and priorities should be.

☐ It emphasizes that the U.S. -- far from threatening Cuba's sovereignty as the Castro regime alleges-- wants to assist Cubans in building an independent, prosperous and free country.

Has the U.S. consulted other countries about their roles in supporting a transition in Cuba?

☐ No formal consultations have taken place, although we have discussed the issue informally with officials of other governments. We look forward to in-depth discussions with international donors at the appropriate time. We are confident they share our desire to provide Cuba with the help it will need.

Does the U.S. think a transition in Cuba is imminent? Is this report relevant now?

☐ We do not know. Certainly we have seen nothing in the behavior of the Castro regime which suggests that it is prepared to move in this direction. Nevertheless, we do expect a transition to occur at some point, as it has everywhere else in the Soviet

empire and the Western Hemisphere, and we hope it will be soon.

☐ This report does not attempt to identify when or how that transition will come. It attempts to look past those uncertainties and discusses what kinds of support other transition and democratic governments typically have sought and what the international community is likely to provide.

Are you expecting this report to expedite a transition? How?

☐ Both the President and Congress want to send the Cuban people a message of hope for their future, and to counter the Cuban government's efforts to create a fear of change.

☐ We do not expect this or any other single step to prompt a transition to democracy in Cuba. Ultimately, it is for the Cuban people to decide when the time has come for democratic change.

Where did the \$4 billion-8 billion figure come from? How much will come from the U.S.?

☐ The assistance total is a rough estimate designed to provide an "order of magnitude" to the U.S. Congress and the Cuban people. We will continue the process of planning for a transition as the situation there evolves.

☐ We cannot say at this point what percentage of assistance the U.S. will provide, but the U.S. can expect to take a lead role among donors, given our obvious geographic and historical ties to Cuba and interest in supporting a peaceful, democratic transition there.

What kind of reaction do you expect from Congress?

☐ We have worked particularly closely with Representative Robert Menendez of New Jersey, who has long advocated the need for a plan for assistance. We are also briefing other interested members of Congress.

☐ We believe that there is broad support for the report in Congress, and we will continue to

work with interested Members on planning for a democratic transition in Cuba.

Would the U.S. provide assistance to a transition government that included Fidel or Raul Castro?
Helms-Burton says you can't.

☐ The LIBERTAD Act does contain that condition. We have no reason to entertain that possibility in any case. There is no reason to believe that Fidel and Raul Castro will undertake real reform.

Will the U.S. withhold assistance until property claims are resolved?

☐ As the report states, we believe that the prompt resolution of U.S. property claims in Cuba is essential. We would have to review at the time a transition was taking place how best to accomplish that, working closely with transition and democratic Cuban governments.

Is the U.S. planning for a violent transition? There's no mention of it here.

☐ Our policy is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy. This report does not address the form a transition would take; it focuses on the broader challenges any transition government could face, and what the U.S. and other donors could do to help.

Isn't this report months late? Were you waiting until after the elections?

☐ The LIBERTAD Act called for the report to be issued in September, but its preparation required consideration by numerous USG agencies that was not completed until recently.
The U.S. elections had no effect on its release date.

Who prepared this report?

☐ The report was drafted by USAID, in collaboration with a number of other U.S. agencies, including the Department of State.

CNN REQUEST TO OPEN BUREAU

Background: After the Cuban government in November approved CNN's request to open a bureau in Havana, CNN renewed its application for a license from Treasury/OFAC license to do so. A half dozen other U.S. news media want to open bureaus, but the GOC has approved only CNN. (FYI ONLY: The Helms-Burton Act contains a provision suggesting that Congressional intent was that the USG not grant any licenses unless the GOC indicates willingness to allow TV/Radio Marti open offices in Cuba, but State and Treasury lawyers have concluded that we have parallel authority to do so.) While most U.S. media favor authorizing CNN's request, views on the Hill and in the Cuban-American community remain mixed. The application is still under active consideration.

Points

- ☐ CNN's application is still under review.
- ☐ Want to ensure that any decision is consistent with U.S. law and our commitment to promote peaceful, democratic transition in Cuba.

ALGERIA

Q: What is your view of the worsening violence in Algeria, marked yesterday (1/28) by the assassination of the Algerian labor leader Abdelhak ben Hamouda?

A: We strongly condemn the acts of terrorism and deplore the loss of life. Our condolences go out to the families of the victims, particularly in this holy month of Ramadan. All elements of Algerian society need to work to end this violence.

If asked about planned elections:

We hope the legislative elections planned for May will contribute to ending the violence, to widen political participation, and to national reconciliation.

Q: What do you think about the request that the U.S. become a mediator in the Algerian crisis?

A: We have not been asked by the government of Algeria to play such a role. The focus should be on the Algerian efforts to end the violence and proceed with political and economic development.

GERMANY AND SCIENTOLOGISTS

[BACKGROUND: The Washington Post reported (1/27) that the State Department's Human Rights Reports -- due to be released on Thursday -- will be highly critical of German discrimination against Scientologists.

USG POSITION: While there are allegations that the Church engages in cult-like practices, and that it uses measures such as blackmail and harassment to keep members in the organization, our position has been that methods used by Germany to address these concerns have been excessive and inconsistent with freedom of religion and expression. State has raised this issue on several occasions with its German counterparts. The OSCE has also expressed concern.

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: The reports have noted German abuses over the past several years.

This year's report devotes a significantly larger section to this issue as Germany has stepped up its efforts against Scientologists: language calling for wide ranging surveillance and restrictive measures has appeared in the CDU party platform, and the German Federal Minister of Labor has taken a strong position against scientology. Likewise, discriminatory measures at the state level have been tightened in 1996. NSC/Europe reviewed the 1996 report on Germany and found it fair; it believes that our ongoing discussions with the Germans on this issue have prepared them for this report. It was also vetted by State/EUR.

INTEREST IN THE US: Over the past several months, various members of Congress have written to express their concern about Germany's discriminatory practices. They include Reps. Payne, McKinney, and other Congressional Black Caucus members.]

POINTS

- ☐ Human rights report for 1996 does include somewhat expanded section on Scientology, reflecting increased intensity of German actions affecting the organization and its members.
- ☐ Since report has not even been conveyed to Congress, urge you to read it when it is published in February.
- ☐ Overall, report on Germany paints picture of a thriving democracy with a superlative record on human rights -- where free speech is respected, judiciary is independent, ethnic minorities are treated fairly and where more refugees and asylum-seekers live in freedom than in any other nation in Western Europe.
- ☐ If pressed: Overall report outlines what we view as unsettling pattern of discrimination against Scientologists. Notes new developments in 1996 such as boycott in some German states of "Mission Impossible." Also notes resolution by one of members of governing coalition urging government to place organization under observation.
- ☐ Have been positive developments too. Ministry of Interior, under which Germany's FBI-equivalent falls, issued report noting there is no legal basis, no evidence, which would allow Scientologists to be placed under observation.

LATIN AMERICA -- ANTI-DRUG PLANES

**** IF ASKED ****

Background: Dallas Morning News has a story this morning (1/24) on U.S. efforts to create

"anti-drug air force" among Latin American countries.

Points

- ☐ There is a long standing U.S. program to provide nations aircraft for counter-drug purposes in the Latin American region.
- ☐ This effort includes most recently a drawdown of helicopters and C-26 aircraft from the Defense Department for transfer to a number of countries in the region for counter-narcotics purposes, including Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Barbados. Earlier, A-37 aircraft had been provided to a number of countries which they have used for counter-drug purposes.
- ☐ The State Department also maintains a number of USG owned aircraft which we provide to Latin American governments for drug crop eradication.
- ☐ There is a continuing internal USG process to evaluate our counterdrug efforts and consider options that would enhance our efforts, including the possibility of providing more aircraft for counternarcotics purposes through one or both of these channels.
- ☐ Of course, any such effort to expand counterdrug cooperation with other countries in the region would be conducted after consultation and approval from those governments that decide it is in their national interest to cooperate.
- ☐ The Administration has no plans to create a U.S.-led Latin American air force.

Panama Post-99 Negotiations

- ☐ In September, 1995, Panama and the United States agreed to explore their mutual interest in a possible post-1999 U.S. military presence. Since then we have had informal exchanges in diplomatic channels.
- ☐ The Government of Panama has proposed the creation of a Multinational Counternarcotics Center (MCC) in Panama. The USG is studying this proposal and discussing details of the concept with Panama through diplomatic channels.

□ Ambassador John Negroponte has represented the USG in the informal exchanges on the MCC concept.

STUDY OF NUCLEAR WARHEAD CUTS

Q: Is the Pentagon studying the possibility of seeking an agreement with Russia on new cuts in strategic nuclear arms, below those called for in "START II," as reported in [January 23] Washington Post?"

A: Lifting the threat of nuclear weapons destruction and limiting their dangerous spread remains at the top of my foreign policy agenda.

Over the past four years, we have accomplished a great deal in this area, including the detargeting of U.S. and Russian missiles; the entry into force of the START I Treaty; the complete denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan; the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; Senate ratification of the START II Treaty; and the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

We are currently working with the Russian government to achieve Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. And we are prepared to work on further reductions in strategic nuclear arms once START II enters into force.

Within our own government, we are doing the necessary planning within Defense and other agencies to support those negotiations, so that we can move quickly once START II enters into force.

[If asked: Are you prepared to "leapfrog" START II and move on to negotiations on START III?]

We have no intention of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with negotiations on a "START III." The ratification of START II by Russia remains an essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

[If asked: Are you prepared to commit to the elimination of nuclear weapons, as called for by the former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Lee Butler?]

I said at the United Nations this fall that the United States looks forward to a new century "in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated."

[If asked: Is the Administration prepared to enter into negotiations on a "START III" framework, or agree now to a target for deeper cuts, as an inducement for Russia to ratify START II?]

President Yeltsin and I asked our experts some time ago to conduct a dialogue on how we might adapt our nuclear forces to the changed international security situation, including the possibility of further reductions.

We have no intention, however, of setting aside START II, and moving ahead instead with the conclusion of a START III agreement. Ratification of START II by Russia remains an essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

SERBIA

Serbian Elections -- General

☐ Although Serbian authorities have made announcements that appear to concede opposition victories in some municipalities, the regime continues to stall for time with legal tactics; we remain skeptical until the duly-elected members of the opposition are able to take their seats and begin work.

☐ It remains that Serbian authorities must implement the OSCE Gonzalez report recommendations and recognize all opposition victories in the November 17 elections. Until Milosevic recognizes the will of the Serbian people, he will

remain isolated.

☐ We remain concerned about recent reports of the use of violence by Serbian police against demonstrators in Belgrade. We condemn any police interference with the rights of the Serbian people to voice their protests. The use of force by Serbian authorities will only further their international isolation.

☐ We continue to hope that this situation can be resolved without violence. We and our allies remain engaged in seeking ways to gain Milosevic's acceptance of the election results as an essential step for the resolution of the situation in Serbia and are considering a number of possible steps to put additional pressure on Belgrade. We will not be satisfied until the people of Serbia are vindicated in their desire for the implementation of democratic norms and processes.

☐ We are also moving forward with a plan of action to support democratization in Serbia. We are considering a number of actions ranging from economic and political measures to democracy building initiatives as well as continuing to support the important roles of international organizations such as the OSCE.

If asked about Sanctions:

☐ We are not actively pursuing the reimposition of sanctions at this time, but are taking other steps to convince Milosevic to accept the will of the Serbian people.

SOUTH AFRICA: REPORTED ARMS SALES TO SYRIA

Q: What action did the Government of South Africa take yesterday on the proposed sale of arms to Syria? Any reaction from us?

A: On January 22, the South African cabinet did not discuss whether or not to approve the issuance of a marketing license for the marketing of certain

weapon systems to Syria.

They are pursuing further consultations on the matter as stated by Deputy President Mbeki.

We continue to consult closely with the South African Government on this issue through diplomatic channels, and are confident our concerns are well understood.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the possible South African sales of arms to Syria? Is the sale going forward?

A: As we stated previously, we are deeply concerned about this possibility of weapons sale by any country to states which support terrorist activities.

[IF PRESSED}

We have urged the government of South Africa and will urge any others contemplating similar arrangements not to proceed towards a sale. The South African government is deliberating and consulting on this issue. We have confidence that the government of South Africa understands the seriousness of this issue and will make its decisions accordingly.

(IF RAISED)

Q: What impact would the sale have on bilateral relations were it to go through? Would we terminate our assistance programs?

A: The transfer of military equipment to any of the countries listed by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism may require us to cease certain assistance under U.S. law. The South African government has made it clear that it does not support terrorism.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

- ☐ The President is committed to working with the Senate to secure the ratification of the CWC.
- ☐ We have been actively and regularly working with interest groups and the general public to educate them on the importance of this treaty.
- ☐ The meeting with Senator Lott was useful. He has committed to organizing a meeting with members in order to begin discussions on how we might bridge the gap between those who support the treaty and those who have difficulties with it. (IF ASKED: Specifically, we will discuss possible amendments to the resolution of ratification -- not to the treaty itself.)
- ☐ You would have to ask the Senator about the Senate calendar. We emphasized to him the importance of an early vote.
- ☐ As to whether or not he supports the treaty, I would, again, direct you to his office and to remarks he made at his Tuesday press conference.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Health/Clinton-Yeltsin Meeting in Early 1997

- ☐ President and Yeltsin agreed in their December 5 phone conversation to meet; have not yet fixed specific date or venue for meeting; expect this to be topic on Gore-Chernomyrdin agenda February 6-8.
 - ☐ March timeframe for meeting discussed -- nothing from Russian side to date to change this.
- (FYI ONLY -- Last Friday Yeltsin press spokesman ambiguous about dates, still indicated March/April)

What if Yeltsin Unable to Meet for Reasons of Health?

Know nothing about Yeltsin's health other than what Russian government spokesman stated;

he continues to recover from November surgery, recent illness.

☐ Heard nothing to indicate Yeltsin unable to meet in March timeframe.

☐ Personal contact between two leaders important, as we look ahead to work with Russia on wide range of issues -- American investment, arms control, European security structures. Our agenda very comprehensive.

☐ But, we work this agenda at wide variety of levels, throughout two governments, will continue to do that.

(If asked about internal implications, political maneuvers in Russia)

☐ As I said yesterday, internal politics best left to Russian people.

Duma Vote Last Week on Yeltsin "Incapacity," to Govern, Prolonged Absence

☐ Our understanding these resolutions (on health determinations) have no legal, constitutional validity; besides, apparently many members of parliament did not participate; and second vote (on another version of resolution) did not pass.

☐ Not appropriate for me to speculate on parliamentary activities in Russia.

Elections in Chechnya

☐ Early reports indicate voting went smoothly, no violence; that's welcome news.

☐ Await official announcement of results; sizable contingent of OSCE observers in Chechnya; look forward to their formal assessment of process, results.

☐ Understand OSCE representative in Chechnya has praised conduct of election, saying it was mostly orderly, fair, apparently without serious irregularities.

Russian Delays on Space Station Project

☐ We understand Russians are encountering some delays. We continue to work closely with

them and with our other partners on this important mutual endeavor.

- ☐ If necessary, we have capability to complete all key aspects of this project ourselves.
- ☐ We will continue to maintain an ongoing dialogue with Russia and our other partners on the pace and progress of the space station program.

(BACKGROUND/NOT FOR PUBLIC USE: The Department of the Navy is working on the portions of the project that may be subject to Russian delays. Currently, this work is on an interim basis, but it can be completed by the Navy if Russian delays prove insurmountable).

NATO-Russia Talks

- ☐ In preparing for upcoming meetings between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, and between Vice President and Chernomyrdin, we are exploring several ideas to enhance partnership with Russia, in context of developing strong NATO-Russia relationship,
- ☐ NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov had good discussion on January 20 on future NATO-Russia relations.
- ☐ Talbott-Fuerth in Moscow last week; had extensive discussions on European security and other U.S.-Russian issues in preparation for Gore-Chernomyrdin and Clinton-Yeltsin meetings. Positive tone.

General Issues

Russia-NATO

- ☐ Understand enlargement difficult issue for Russia, but U.S., NATO and Russia have interests in developing NATO-Russia relationship and broadening cooperation.
- ☐ Serious dialogue on NATO-Russia relationship underway.
- ☐ U.S. determined to proceed with NATO enlargement. Believe that is in interests of European security and stability. Equally determined to manage enlargement

process in manner that
does not threaten Russia and to do all that we can to build
strong NATO-Russia relationship.

Prospects for Russian Ratification of START II Treaty

☐ Treaty faces ratification vote in Duma; parliamentary prerogative to debate its merits. While some may oppose Treaty, Russian government committed to ratification.

☐ START II is the best interests of both countries, should be ratified by Russia.

If asked: is Administration planning to leap ahead" to START III to circumvent opposition to START II in Russia:

☐ As Secretary Perry made clear last fall in Moscow, U. S. prepared to begin negotiations on further reductions in nuclear forces once START II has entered into force.

☐ Have no intention, however, of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with negotiations on "START III." Entry into force of START II remains essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

MIDDLE EAST

VISITS BY LEADERS TO CONSULT ON PEACE PROCESS

-- As the President noted in his press conference on January 28, four Middle Eastern leaders will be coming to Washington over the next two months to consult with him on the peace process.

-- The schedule of visits is:

-Prime Minister Netanyahu - February 13

-Chairman Arafat - March 3

-President Mubarak - March 10
-King Hussein - March 18

-- Background Only: Visit by Prince Sultan (Saudi Arabia) should not be referred to in same category as these visits; he's being invited by Cohen (DOD) for Feb. 25th. Will meet President while here.

ISRAEL/OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Background: In October 1995, the GOI requested the extradition of Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook to stand trial in Israel for manslaughter, murder, grievous harm and wounding, harm with aggravating intent, harm and wounding under aggravating circumstances, and conspiracy to commit a felony, in violation of the Israel Penal Code. Abu Marzook is the head of the political bureau of Hamas.

Abu Marzook was found extraditable by a U.S. court in New York on May 8, 1996. Further proceedings in the extradition case were stayed while he exercised his right to challenge the finding of extraditability. Press reports this week indicate that he may now withdraw his legal challenges. If he does so, the extradition process will resume.

Q: What is the status of the extradition Matter of Abu Marzook?

A: We have seen press reports that Mr. Abu Marzook intends to withdraw his legal challenge to the order finding him extraditable. Any such legal decision would be within Mr. Abu Marzook's rights and entirely his own choice. We would refer you to the Justice Department for any further comments.

SETTLEMENTS AN "OBSTACLE TO PEACE"?

Q: President Clinton seemed to say December 16 that settlements are an obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Is that the U.S. position?

A: The U.S. position is that settlement activity complicates the negotiating process and increases tension.

We have previously expressed concern that when one party to a negotiation says things or does things which are seen to preempt the negotiating process, it makes it that much harder for negotiations to succeed.

In that vein, the President was making the obvious point that when one party does something that is seen by the other as preempting negotiations it can become a problem or an obstacle to progress in those negotiations.

So, yes we are troubled by some of the recent settlement activity, and we've said so. The President's response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity. It's important to focus on that concern.

[If asked]:

Q: Does the President's response indicate a change in policy?

A: As I said, his response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity. It's important to focus on that concern. The comments did not signal a fundamental change in the nature of that concern.

LEGALITY OF SETTLEMENTS

Q: Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that he subscribes to the view that as a matter of legal right, Jews and Israelis have a legal right to settle on the West Bank? Is that your understanding of the legalities?

A: I'm not going to get drawn into a discussion of the legal aspects of what is obviously a highly political issue. It is an issue, furthermore, that the Israelis and Palestinians recognize is difficult and therefore left for their permanent status negotiations. It is abundantly clear, however, that settlement activity, and even announcements of plans for possible future settlement activity, complicates the climate and the process of negotiation. When either party says things or does things that are perceived as prejudging the outcome of a negotiation, it makes it that much more difficult to achieve progress.

Q: But what about the precise question of the legality of settlement activity?

A: As I said, I'm not going down that road. We need to keep our focus on assisting the parties in their negotiations.

Q: Do you or don't you differentiate between new and old settlements?

A: I've just explained what our position is and I referred to "settlement activity." I'm not going to comment further.

Q: The Israelis claim that you didn't complain about settlement activity during the Rabin Government, so why are you making this an issue now?

A: We said the same thing during the time of the Labor government.

JERUSALEM

Q: What is your reaction to Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement that Israel will not negotiate over the status of Jerusalem?

A: Our views have not changed. Israel and the Palestinians have agreed that Jerusalem is one of the issues for permanent status negotiations.

(If pressed) Our position on the status of Jerusalem is well-known.

Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and volatile issues in the peace process. We remain convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing these sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which Israel and the Palestinians themselves have formally agreed to discuss only in the context of direct, permanent status negotiations.

PEACE PROCESS

☐ There has been no change in the U.S. position on land-for-peace or anything else as a result of the Israeli elections. We have supported this principle and will continue to do so. At the

same time, our experience makes clear that agreements are reached not through recitation of abstract principles, but through the hard work of direct negotiation. Syria and Israel agreed at Madrid to negotiate on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. They should resume those negotiations to overcome their differences.

☐ Obviously, if progress is to be made, if differences are to be overcome, each side must take into account the needs and interests of the other.

☐ Peace is not an abstraction. Peace is closely tied to security and only the parties directly concerned can make the critical decisions which affect their future. The United States can't make these decisions for them. We will not try to impose decisions upon Israel or any other party to the peace process.

☐ That doesn't mean that the US, as the facilitator of the peace process, does not have views. It has been and remains our view that the land-for-peace formula offers the most promise for a workable solution to the problems of war and peace in the Middle East. But agreements will come not as a result of our views, but as a result of negotiations between the parties.

PALESTINIAN COMPLIANCE ON REVOCATION OF PALESTINIAN COVENANT

☐ We have welcomed the decision taken by the Palestinian National Council to cancel the provisions of the Covenant which contradict the formal undertakings made between the PLO and the Israeli government.

U.S. EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV

☐ Recognize what is required by the law passed by Congress requiring that the U.S. Embassy be transferred to Jerusalem. But at the same time, the President has made it clear that he will take no step that will undermine the peace process or jeopardize the negotiations. In this regard, the legislation provides a waiver provision that may be used by the President as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that could preempt or jeopardize

the peace process.

ORIENT HOUSE

☐ Our position regarding U.S. contacts at Orient House has not changed. We do business with the Palestinian Authority only in Gaza and Jericho, not in Jerusalem. Would encourage all parties to concentrate on the negotiations, not on issues that may polarize the situation.

SYRIA

☐ We believe that a comprehensive peace requires negotiations and agreements on all tracks, including with Syria and Lebanon. But we recognize that -- as in the past -- some negotiations will move at a faster pace than others.

☐ Prime Minister Netanyahu told me that he agrees on the importance of talks with Syria.

☐ We have never had any illusions about Syrian associations with groups involved in terrorism.

☐ We consider this a serious issue, and we have made that clear both in our diplomatic contacts at the highest levels and in our annual report on terrorism.

☐ We would like to see Syria's ties to terrorist groups definitively broken.

☐ But it is important to distinguish between states that work to subvert the peace process -- like Iran -- and those who have shown a willingness to engage in it actively and seriously -- like Syria.

BOSNIA

LA Times Cengic Inquiry ("Cengic has become unofficial Intelligence Chief to Izetbegovic"):

☐ We have no evidence that Cengic remains involved in any way with intelligence matters.

☐ We would caution that there are many false rumors that travel around Sarajevo spread by

individuals with one motive or another.

☐ We can tell you our latest understanding that there are no Minister posts left in the Federation for Cengic, even though he had earlier been rumored for one.

Train and Equip Program (Post)

☐ The international Train and Equip program is ongoing and is a key success and a major step toward establishing a stable military balance in Bosnia, which is one of the keys to establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The program's extensive training effort involves U.S. contracted trainers and international training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states, including Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

☐ As Ambassador Jim Pardew announced in Sarajevo today, the program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Situation in Gajevi

☐ We join others in the international community in condemning the Bosnian Serb attacks on Bosniak construction workers in Gajevi. This incident underscores our continuing concern about the use of violence or intimidation against returning refugees and displaced persons and the potential for further confrontations in the Zone of Separation. We are encouraged that the Bosnian Serb leadership has also condemned the attacks, but we hold them and the local police responsible for ensuring that procedures are followed and returns can proceed peacefully.

☐ SFOR and the IPTF are taking additional security measures to avoid the potential for additional violence around Gajevi. Calm has been restored to the area and we understand

that the returning Bosniaks are following agreed procedures and will return to Gajevi in the next day or so. We will insist that refugees and displaced persons that follow the agreed procedures are allowed to return to their homes.

War Criminals

- ☐ We remain deeply concerned with lack of progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. Achieving justice is part of achieving an enduring peace.
- ☐ We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. One possible option is to set up a special police force to assist the Tribunal in apprehending indicted war criminals. Such a force would not include SFOR personnel. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.
- ☐ While international military forces in Bosnia will detain war criminals if, in the course of normal duties, they encounter those under indictment, it is not the role of SFOR to hunt down war criminals.

Brcko Arbitration

- ☐ The parties agreed at Dayton to binding arbitration of the disputed portion of the inter-entity boundary line in the Brcko area. The issue is in the hands of the Arbitral Tribunal, consisting of arbitrators from the two Bosnian entities and the internationally-appointed arbiter Roberts Owen. There is no U.S. proposal for a Brcko solution; we support the arbitration process.
- ☐ A decision is to be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal by February 15. The Tribunal has been holding hearings in recent weeks including representatives of the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska.
- ☐ The U.S. and other Contact Group member states are aware of ideas under consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal, since the international community may need to move quickly to provide support for implementation of the Brcko solution. The Arbitral

Tribunal is continuing its work, and we await the decision.

Iranian Influence in Bosnia

- ☐ Iranian influence in Bosnia has been an ongoing concern, but we have taken effective measures to cut Iranian links.
- ☐ We have enforced the Dayton agreement ban on foreign forces and insisted that Bosnian government sever all military and intelligence links with Iran as a condition of the train and equip program. As the President certified in June, those conditions have been met. There have been no indications since June that military or intelligence cooperation has resumed.
- ☐ Hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards have left Bosnia, Mujahadeen units have disbanded, and the Bosnians are looking to the U.S. and moderate Islamic states for security assistance.
- ☐ We remain concerned about Iranian influence and continue to watch the situation closely.
- ☐ Overall, we and the intelligence community assess that Iranian influence has substantially diminished since the implementation of Dayton and since we tied the issue to the train and equip program.

New Bosnia Mission/SFOR -- General

- ☐ The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission started December 20. SFOR's limited and focused mission will allow time to consolidate the peace built by the success of IFOR.
- ☐ The Stabilization Force is about half IFOR's size. U.S. share is less than half last year's commitment -- about 8500 troops inside Bosnia.
- ☐ The NATO plan for SFOR includes more limited set of military and supporting tasks than IFOR, reflecting the more narrow mission of this smaller force. With fewer troops, SFOR will focus more on security, including force protection, and will be less involved in civilian

tasks.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ 18 months will give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

☐ We will review every 6 months to see if we can accomplish mission with fewer forces. SFOR will gradually shift responsibilities to civilian agencies and the parties themselves while moving from stabilization to deterrence to disengagement.

If pressed on whether this means that the U.S. has ruled out participation of U.S. forces after completion of SFOR mission:

☐ We believe that SFOR's mission can be completed in 18 months, and that the conditions will have been established in which stability and security can be maintained without an outside military presence.

If pressed whether the U.S. will insist that any force after 18 months will be European only:

☐ I'm not going to speculate about such scenarios. We believe the mission will be completed in 18 months.

If pressed whether every last soldier will be out of Bosnia in exactly 18 months:

☐ 18 months is the duration of the mission and the deployment, but not necessarily a deadline for withdrawal of the last SFOR soldier. Withdrawal at 18 months will occur in a timely fashion but may extend some days or weeks beyond the mission duration.

PERU

Q: What's the situation in Peru at the Japanese Ambassador's

Residence? What is the
United States going to do about this situation?

A: We have continued our active and intense consultations with the
Governments of Peru
and Japan. The President's national security team has kept him
fully informed as events
there have developed.

This is a very serious situation and lives are obviously at risk.
It simply isn't productive
for me to address the other questions you have raised.

Q: Does the United States negotiate with hostages or condone those
who do?

A: The United States does not condone making concessions to
terrorists, but how to
handle negotiations is a sovereign decision for the government
involved.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Adams Refused Visa?

Background: Two London newspapers reported over the weekend that
the White House has
advised Gerry Adams he will not get a visa until the IRA
reinstates its cease-fire. One paper
sourced "officials of the NSC"; the other diplomats in London.

☐ Mr. Adams has not/not applied for a visa. Since there is no
application, the Administration
has made no decision.

☐ If pressed: As in the past, an application for a visa waiver by
Mr. Adams would be decided
on basis of whether it could contribute to search for lasting
peace in Northern Ireland.

Loyalist Cease-fire Intact?

☐ Up to British and Irish governments and participating parties to
decide who participates in
talks.

☐ As President said in statement yesterday, we urge loyalists to

maintain their cease-fire. There has been no claim of responsibility for car bomb attacks and there is no doubt loyalists have shown restraint in response to escalating IRA violence.

Recent Attacks

- ☐ Condemn this latest attack. Thankfully, no serious injuries, but shows wanton disregard for human life.
- ☐ Call again on IRA to declare and implement immediate cease-fire in words and deeds. People of Ireland, North and South, clearly want peace, political settlement.

Belfast Talks

- ☐ Belfast talks, chaired by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, represent historic opportunity and best hope in decades for achieving lasting settlement. Talks will reconvene for bilateral consultations January 13, in plenary January 27.
 - ☐ Must not squander progress of last months. Urge all political leaders to take responsibility for making these talks work. Need to move quickly into substantive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland.
 - ☐ Continue to believe that participation of all elected parties, including Sinn Fein, would give talks best chance of success; that can only happen with cease-fire.
 - ☐ Impressed with commitment and determination both governments have shown in search for peace. They and we share goal of inclusive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland, which can only happen if there is an IRA cease-fire.
- Was 1994 IRA cease-fire "fake" as Prime Minister Major has alleged?
- ☐ Cease-fire from August 1994 to February 1996 saved hundreds of lives. I strongly condemned end of that cease-fire and I continue to call on IRA to declare new cease-fire immediately.

How Will You Know a New Cease-fire is Real?

☐ Will be up to British and Irish governments to evaluate new cease-fire; but as both Taoiseach and Prime Minister Major have said, will depend on both words and actions on ground.

Deportation Proceedings Against Matt Morrison

☐ Have been assured by Justice that these proceedings being handled fairly. Judicial matter - don't want to comment further.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KHOBAR BOMBING

Saudi Cooperation with FBI

Q: What are you doing to get Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the FBI on the Khobar Towers bombing investigation?

A: The FBI is in charge of that investigation for the U.S.

I understand that they are in a dialogue with the Saudis about what additional specific materials and cooperation they seek.

We have assurances from the highest levels in the Kingdom that we will get full cooperation and we expect that such assurances will be honored.

Q: What's your reaction to allegations that the al-Khobar bombing involved Iranians?

A: There is an investigation under way.

I'm not going to speculate about hypothetical outcomes to this investigation.

Nor am I going to speculate about hypothetical responses once this investigation is complete.

Q: Was there an Iranian or Syrian role?

A: We have reached no conclusions.

Q: If Iran was behind it, will we still attack Iran as Secretary Perry said last summer?

A: This is hypothetical and I'm not going to respond. But if you ask whether the U.S. responds to those who are proven to have attacked it, the record of this Administration is clear.

But I must stress that we have reached no conclusion about state sponsorship in the Khobar attack.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

Has there been a cover-up?

- ☐ No -- There is currently no evidence nor any indication of a cover-up.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee concurs in this assessment.
- ☐ The fact that U.S. troops inadvertently destroyed Iraqi chemical weapons after the war came to light as part of our effort to learn all that we can; that effort has since been intensified.
- ☐ We're awaiting the outcomes of Army IG, DOD Intel Oversight & CIA IG investigations.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 2, 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the Presidential Advisory Committee found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision taken by the President when he extended the Presidential Advisory Committee to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War

Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products.
- ☐ Stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 80+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.
- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 29 January 97 18:38
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO

Abdulmalik, April B.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Andreasen, Steven P.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Bakke, Kyle D.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Bedell, Blair B.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Biernacki, Eileen V.
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer
Brown, Dallas
Brown, Nancy E.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya

Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davis, William K.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Flessas, Dan
Florio, Elaine
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Gladbach, Damon J.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Houck, Baerbel K.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.

Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Martinez, Alejandro
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoaka, Lester H.
Moffett, Julia
Moody, Angelyn D.
Moran, Betsy Q.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Gwyn M. Parker

Parramore, Carl W.
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Saunders, John W.
Schifter, Richard
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sens, Andrew D.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Showalter, Victoria A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.

Veit, Katherine M.
Vershow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowski, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Thursday, January 30. Thank you.

[[JAN29GUI.DOC : 4661 in JAN29GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

29 January 97 18:30

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

JAN29GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

January 29, 1997

Tony Lake

Iraq

Quadrennial Defense Review

UN/Richardson

Cuba

Algeria

Germany/Scientists

Latin America

Warheads

Serbia

South Africa/Syria

CWC

Russia

Middle East

Bosnia

Peru

Northern Ireland

Saudi Arabia

Gulf War Illnesses

TONY LAKE

Stock

Q: What about new stories that Tony Lake held energy stock as late as January of this year, even though he was already under investigation for having held such stock earlier?

A: The fact that Mr. Lake held stock in Williams Company, a natural gas pipeline company, was brought to Mr. Lake's attention when our lawyers noticed the stock on Mr. Lake's most recent financial disclosure form. Mr. Lake said that he was unaware such a stock had been purchased.

Our lawyers contacted Mr. Lake's financial manager, who confirmed that the stock had been purchased in error in September 1996, without Mr. Lake's knowledge, and that he had already sold it, again without Mr. Lake's knowledge, when he realized he should not have purchased the stock for Mr. Lake.

IF ASKED: We immediately brought this information to the attention of the Justice Department in connection with their ongoing investigation regarding potential conflicts of interest raised by Mr. Lake's previous holdings of energy stock.

Q: Why does Mr. Lake retain the financial advisor despite these mistakes?

A: That is a matter between Mr. Lake and his advisor.

Arms to Bosnia

Q: What is your reaction to the stories regarding Mr. Lake and Mr. Berger and arms to Bosnia?

A: First, there is nothing new in these stories. This matter has been thoroughly reviewed by any number of Committees. This particular report was concluded in October and fully briefed by the Republicans at that time and selectively leaked ever since.

We are proud of our policy in Bosnia, which has brought peace to that country. We did what we thought necessary at the time to preserve the Federation in Bosnia and give that country a chance for peace. We understand that some may disagree with that policy, but it is unfortunate and wrong that anyone would try to turn policy disagreement into criminal accusations in order to gain political advantage.

Mr. Lake is the President's nominee for Director of Central Intelligence. He is uniquely qualified for the post. He will be good for the CIA, good for the President, and good for the country. It is time to put politics aside.

Q: What about the allegation that Mr. Lake was excessively secret and kept the not only the Congress, but also CIA in the dark about what was going on in Bosnia? Is this the man you want running the CIA?

A: As the President has said before, it would have been better to have informed key

Members of Congress at the time of our instruction of "no instructions" to Amb. Galbraith in Croatia. Mr. Lake and the President are in agreement on that.

IF ASKED:

Q: Is it true Sandy Berger said it would be "dynamite" to put any of this in writing?

A: As the Republican report itself states, Mr. Berger does not recall making this comment. The concern at the time, as has been explained repeatedly, is that a leak of this sensitive diplomatic exchange would gravely damage our relationship with our allies and undermine NATO.

Q: Did Mr. Lake convey the instruction with a wink and a nod?

A: The instruction was "no instructions."

Q: The reports indicate that Mr. Lake refused to testify under oath, doesn't that suggest that he had something to hide?

A: Nonsense. Based on the constitutional separation of powers it is long-standing practice that the President's senior advisers do not testify, and cannot be compelled testify, before the Congress. While there have been some exceptions over the years to this general rule, the White House Counsel determined that a policy dispute such as this did not warrant an exception and instructed Mr. Lake accordingly.

Mr. Lake did make himself available to brief both the Senate and House committees looking into this matter.

Q: We are told that your staff, or the White House has classified the House report so that embarrassing details regarding this policy will not be revealed. Is that true?

A: No. At the request of the Congress, classification experts from the CIA, Defense Department, and State Department reviewed the document for classified information in both the Republican and Democrat House reports on this matter.

Quite frankly, there are intelligence sources and methods that directly relate to the safety of our personnel in Bosnia revealed in the full reports.

Q: You seem to dismiss this matter, but hasn't it been referred to the Justice Department?

A: If the President had thought this was a problem for Mr. Lake, he would not have nominated him for the position of Director of Central Intelligence.

We are proud of our policy in Bosnia, which has brought peace to that country. We understand that some may disagree with that policy, but it is unfortunate and wrong that anyone would try to turn policy disagreement into criminal accusations in order to gain political advantage.

IRAQ

Possible Planned Invasion of Kuwait

Q: What is your reaction to the Washington Post story that Iraq is possibly ready to invade Kuwait again?

A: While Saddam Hussein does have military capabilities which can threaten Kuwait and other neighbors, we have no evidence that Iraq is staging new moves to threaten its neighbors.

I can assure you that we maintain a very close watch over Iraqi military movements and adjust our own military presence in the gulf to counter potential threats.

Saddam Hussein has intimate familiarity with what we can and have done in response to his threatening military moves in the area. He would do well to keep it in the forefront of his thoughts.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

Background

In 1995, Secretary Perry endorsed the recommendation of the Congressionally-mandated Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (chaired by John White prior to his designation as Deputy Secretary of Defense) to conduct a quadrennial review of the defense program at the beginning of each newly elected Presidential administration. Previous assessments by the Bush Administration (the "Base Force" study) and the Clinton Administration ("Bottom-Up Review") reassessed the force structure of the Armed Forces in light of the changing realities of the post-Cold War world. The QDR is intended to reevaluate the requirements of our military posture to meet the threats to the United States in the 21st Century.

Congress endorsed the concept of a quadrennial defense review in the Lieberman Amendment of the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Act. The Amendment, the Armed Forces Force Structure Review Act of 1996, directed two actions: (1) A defense review by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which examines force structure and modernization, infrastructure and other elements of defense policy to determine the defense strategy of the United States and establish a revised defense program through the year 2005, and (2) the establishment of an independent, nonpartisan National Defense Panel (NDP) to provide an assessment of the QDR to the Secretary of Defense and Congress, and to conduct an independent assessment of possible force structures through the year 2010 and beyond (the Alternative Force Structure Assessment).

The Secretary was directed to establish, in consultation with Congress, the nine-member NDP by December 1, 1996, from individuals in the private sector who are recognized experts in national security matters (the names are presently under consultation with Congress). The Secretary is to apprise the NDP on an ongoing basis of the work being done by

the QDR, while the NDP is to provide the Secretary both a mid-term and final assessment of the defense review. In addition, the CJCS is to provide the Secretary his own independent assessment of the final results of the QDR. The Defense Secretary is to submit the QDR report, along with the NDP and CJCS comments, to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Committee on National Security by May 15, 1997. And, by December 1, 1997, the NDP is to provide the results of its own Alternative Force Structure Assessment to the Secretary, who will forward it to Congress with his comments by December 15. John White is still consulting with Congress on the make-up of the NDP Panel.

Why the QDR

The focus of outside commentary going into the QDR was captured in the recent Washington Post headline: "Two-War Scenario: A Strategy Straining the Pentagon". The Bottom-Up Review's central assumption that the United States needed to be able to fight two regional conflicts (MRCs) nearly simultaneously has served as the Pentagon's key measure for how best to size and shape U.S. forces since the Soviet Union dissolved. But with defense spending likely to remain at most flat into the next decade, and with U.S. forces becoming increasingly involved in the more likely smaller-scale contingencies such as peace operations, the notion that the Pentagon can continue to prepare for two regional wars has come under attack as no longer feasible.

These commentators argue that the cost of maintaining the force structure necessary to fight two major regional conflicts is too high when: (1) we need to properly configure and equip U.S. forces to deal with the growing fact of post-Cold War life that American forces will be used increasingly not for combat operations but for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance actions, and (2) we must begin to modernize our forces not to deal with regional threats from failed/diminished military opponents such as North Korea and Iraq, but against the emergence of

future -- including "near-peer" -- competitors who might use asymmetric strategies (e.g., WMD, information warfare) to challenge U.S. "niche" vulnerabilities given our conventional force dominance. In addition, these commentators question the Administration's assertion that under its defense budget U.S. forces even now are sufficiently large and equipped to meet the two-war objective first set under President Bush.

Organizational Approach to the QDR

The Defense Department commenced its QDR work in early November with the establishment of six OSD/Joint Staff co-chaired working panels:

- ☐ Strategy
- ☐ Readiness
- ☐ Force Assessment (force structure)
- ☐ Modernization
- ☐ Infrastructure
- ☐ Human Resources (Quality of Life)
- ☐ Intelligence/Information Warfare

The Panels ongoing efforts are to be continuously assessed/guided by an Integration Group, co-chaired by OSD and the Joint Staff. The Integration Group reports to the QDR Senior Steering Group, chaired by John White with the VCJCS as vice-chair. The Secretary of Defense chairs the entire QDR effort through the Defense Resources Board. NSC attends meetings of these groups.

UN/RICHARDSON

Q: Senator Helms alleged today (1/29) that the Administration is trying to bypass his Committee and force through a \$900 million emergency appropriation to repay UN arrears and refuses to condition that emergency appropriation on reforms at the UN. Is this true?

A: No. The Administration is not seeking an emergency appropriation. We want to work with Senator Helms and other members of Congress to develop a bipartisan, effective plan

to encourage UN reform and pay off our arrears.

While the President believes that our arrears to the UN and its specialized agencies are an obligation that we should meet and are hurting our ability to lead at the United Nations, he has also said clearly, most recently when UN Secretary General Annan visited last week, that "as a practical matter, I know from consulting with the members of Congress that we won't be able to secure support in the Congress for paying the arrears unless they're convinced that reform is going forward."

The Administration is currently working with Congressional leaders and appropriators, as well as Senator Helms, to develop a plan to encourage UN reforms and to pay off our arrears. The Administration has not yet discussed specifics with Senator Helms, but we look forward to doing so in the near future. As these discussions continue, we will have a better idea what kind of effective and appropriate benchmarks can be agreed upon.

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent visit to Washington demonstrated that goodwill exists on both sides of the aisle and on all sides of this issue. With Mr. Annan's leadership of the UN and his commitment to reform, I am convinced that we now have the best chance we've had in years to further the process of UN reform, get the UN on a firm financial footing, and pay off our arrears.

CUBA

REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN CUBA

What is this report?

☐ The President has transmitted to Congress a report, mandated by Title II of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD), that describes potential U.S. and other international assistance and other support for a transitional or

democratic government in Cuba.

☐ The report communicates to the people of Cuba, including individuals in the Cuban government who support democracy, that the U.S. stands ready, along with other democratic nations, to help Cuba overcome the challenges it will face during the transition to democracy.

The Cuban government is calling this report a new violation of Cuba's sovereignty. Should the U.S. be planning Cuba's future?

☐ The report is premised on the fact that it is the Cuban people who must choose when and how a transition takes place, and what their new government's policies and priorities should be.

☐ It emphasizes that the U.S. -- far from threatening Cuba's sovereignty as the Castro regime alleges-- wants to assist Cubans in building an independent, prosperous and free country.

Has the U.S. consulted other countries about their roles in supporting a transition in Cuba?

☐ No formal consultations have taken place, although we have discussed the issue informally with officials of other governments. We look forward to in-depth discussions with international donors at the appropriate time. We are confident they share our desire to provide Cuba with the help it will need.

Does the U.S. think a transition in Cuba is imminent? Is this report relevant now?

☐ We do not know. Certainly we have seen nothing in the behavior of the Castro regime which suggests that it is prepared to move in this direction. Nevertheless, we do expect a transition to occur at some point, as it has everywhere else in the Soviet empire and the Western Hemisphere, and we hope it will be soon.

☐ This report does not attempt to identify when or how that transition will come. It attempts to look past those uncertainties and discusses what kinds of support

other transition and democratic governments typically have sought and what the international community is likely to provide.

Are you expecting this report to expedite a transition? How?

☐ Both the President and Congress want to send the Cuban people a message of hope for their future, and to counter the Cuban government's efforts to create a fear of change.

☐ We do not expect this or any other single step to prompt a transition to democracy in Cuba. Ultimately, it is for the Cuban people to decide when the time has come for democratic change.

Where did the \$4 billion-8 billion figure come from? How much will come from the U.S.?

☐ The assistance total is a rough estimate designed to provide an "order of magnitude" to the U.S. Congress and the Cuban people. We will continue the process of planning for a transition as the situation there evolves.

☐ We cannot say at this point what percentage of assistance the U.S. will provide, but the U.S. can expect to take a lead role among donors, given our obvious geographic and historical ties to Cuba and interest in supporting a peaceful, democratic transition there.

What kind of reaction do you expect from Congress?

☐ We have worked particularly closely with Representative Robert Menendez of New Jersey, who has long advocated the need for a plan for assistance. We are also briefing other interested members of Congress.

☐ We believe that there is broad support for the report in Congress, and we will continue to work with interested Members on planning for a democratic transition in Cuba.

Would the U.S. provide assistance to a transition government that included Fidel or Raul Castro?
Helms-Burton says you can't.

☐ The LIBERTAD Act does contain that condition. We have no reason to entertain that possibility in any case. There is no reason to believe that Fidel and Raul Castro will undertake real reform.

Will the U.S. withhold assistance until property claims are resolved?

☐ As the report states, we believe that the prompt resolution of U.S. property claims in Cuba is essential. We would have to review at the time a transition was taking place how best to accomplish that, working closely with transition and democratic Cuban governments.

Is the U.S. planning for a violent transition? There's no mention of it here.

☐ Our policy is to promote a peaceful transition to democracy. This report does not address the form a transition would take; it focuses on the broader challenges any transition government could face, and what the U.S. and other donors could do to help.

Isn't this report months late? Were you waiting until after the elections?

☐ The LIBERTAD Act called for the report to be issued in September, but its preparation required consideration by numerous USG agencies that was not completed until recently. The U.S. elections had no effect on its release date.

Who prepared this report?

☐ The report was drafted by USAID, in collaboration with a number of other U.S. agencies, including the Department of State.

CNN REQUEST TO OPEN BUREAU

Background: After the Cuban government in November approved CNN's request to open a bureau in Havana, CNN renewed its application for a license from Treasury/OFAC license to do so. A half dozen other U.S. news media want to open bureaus, but

the GOC has approved only CNN. (FYI ONLY: The Helms-Burton Act contains a provision suggesting that Congressional intent was that the USG not grant any licenses unless the GOC indicates willingness to allow TV/Radio Marti open offices in Cuba, but State and Treasury lawyers have concluded that we have parallel authority to do so.) While most U.S. media favor authorizing CNN's request, views on the Hill and in the Cuban-American community remain mixed. The application is still under active consideration.

Points

- ☐ CNN's application is still under review.
- ☐ Want to ensure that any decision is consistent with U.S. law and our commitment to promote peaceful, democratic transition in Cuba.

ALGERIA

Q: What is your view of the worsening violence in Algeria, marked yesterday (1/28) by the assassination of the Algerian labor leader Abdelhak ben Hamouda?

A: We strongly condemn the acts of terrorism and deplore the loss of life. Our condolences go out to the families of the victims, particularly in this holy month of Ramadan. All elements of Algerian society need to work to end this violence.

If asked about planned elections:

We hope the legislative elections planned for May will contribute to ending the violence, to widen political participation, and to national reconciliation.

Q: What do you think about the request that the U.S. become a mediator in the Algerian crisis?

A: We have not been asked by the government of Algeria to play such a role. The focus should be on the Algerian efforts to end the violence and proceed with political and economic development.

GERMANY AND SCIENTOLOGISTS

[BACKGROUND: The Washington Post reported (1/27) that the State Department's Human Rights Reports -- due to be released on Thursday -- will be highly critical of German discrimination against Scientologists.

USG POSITION: While there are allegations that the Church engages in cult-like practices, and that it uses measures such as blackmail and harassment to keep members in the organization, our position has been that methods used by Germany to address these concerns have been excessive and inconsistent with freedom of religion and expression. State has raised this issue on several occasions with its German counterparts. The OSCE has also expressed concern.

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: The reports have noted German abuses over the past several years.

This year's report devotes a significantly larger section to this issue as Germany has stepped up its efforts against Scientologists: language calling for wide ranging surveillance and restrictive measures has appeared in the CDU party platform, and the German Federal Minister of Labor has taken a strong position against scientology. Likewise, discriminatory measures at the state level have been tightened in 1996. NSC/Europe reviewed the 1996 report on Germany and found it fair; it believes that our ongoing discussions with the Germans on this issue have prepared them for this report. It was also vetted by State/EUR.

INTEREST IN THE US: Over the past several months, various members of Congress have written to express their concern about Germany's discriminatory practices. They include Reps. Payne, McKinney, and other Congressional Black Caucus members.]

POINTS

- ☐ Human rights report for 1996 does include somewhat expanded section on Scientology, reflecting increased intensity of German actions affecting the organization and its members.
- ☐ Since report has not even been conveyed to Congress, urge you to read it when it is published in February.
- ☐ Overall, report on Germany paints picture of a thriving democracy with a superlative record on human rights -- where free speech is respected, judiciary is independent, ethnic minorities are treated fairly and where more refugees and asylum-seekers live in freedom than in any other nation in Western Europe.
- ☐ If pressed: Overall report outlines what we view as unsettling pattern of discrimination against Scientologists. Notes new developments in 1996 such as boycott in some German states of "Mission Impossible." Also notes resolution by one of members of governing coalition urging government to place organization under observation.
- ☐ Have been positive developments too. Ministry of Interior, under which Germany's FBI-equivalent falls, issued report noting there is no legal basis, no evidence, which would allow Scientologists to be placed under observation.

LATIN AMERICA -- ANTI-DRUG PLANES

**** IF ASKED ****

Background: Dallas Morning News has a story this morning (1/24) on U.S. efforts to create "anti-drug air force" among Latin American countries.

Points

- ☐ There is a long standing U.S. program to provide nations aircraft for counter-drug purposes

in the Latin American region.

☐ This effort includes most recently a drawdown of helicopters and C-26 aircraft from the Defense Department for transfer to a number of countries in the region for counter-narcotics purposes, including Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Barbados. Earlier, A-37 aircraft had been provided to a number of countries which they have used for counter-drug purposes.

☐ The State Department also maintains a number of USG owned aircraft which we provide to Latin American governments for drug crop eradication.

☐ There is a continuing internal USG process to evaluate our counterdrug efforts and consider options that would enhance our efforts, including the possibility of providing more aircraft for counternarcotics purposes through one or both of these channels.

☐ Of course, any such effort to expand counterdrug cooperation with other countries in the region would be conducted after consultation and approval from those governments that decide it is in their national interest to cooperate.

☐ The Administration has no plans to create a U.S.-led Latin American air force.

Panama Post-99 Negotiations

☐ In September, 1995, Panama and the United States agreed to explore their mutual interest in a possible post-1999 U.S. military presence. Since then we have had informal exchanges in diplomatic channels.

☐ The Government of Panama has proposed the creation of a Multinational Counternarcotics Center (MCC) in Panama. The USG is studying this proposal and discussing details of the concept with Panama through diplomatic channels.

☐ Ambassador John Negroponte has represented the USG in the informal exchanges on the MCC concept.

STUDY OF NUCLEAR WARHEAD CUTS

Q: Is the Pentagon studying the possibility of seeking an agreement with Russia on new cuts in strategic nuclear arms, below those called for in "START II," as reported in [January 23] Washington Post?"

A: Lifting the threat of nuclear weapons destruction and limiting their dangerous spread remains at the top of my foreign policy agenda.

Over the past four years, we have accomplished a great deal in this area, including the detargeting of U.S. and Russian missiles; the entry into force of the START I Treaty; the complete denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan; the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; Senate ratification of the START II Treaty; and the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

We are currently working with the Russian government to achieve Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. And we are prepared to work on further reductions in strategic nuclear arms once START II enters into force.

Within our own government, we are doing the necessary planning within Defense and other agencies to support those negotiations, so that we can move quickly once START II enters into force.

[If asked: Are you prepared to "leapfrog" START II and move on to negotiations on START III?]

We have no intention of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with negotiations on a "START III." The ratification of START II by Russia remains an essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

[If asked: Are you prepared to commit to the elimination of nuclear weapons, as called for by the former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Lee Butler?]

I said at the United Nations this fall that the United States looks forward to a new century "in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated."

[If asked: Is the Administration prepared to enter into negotiations on a "START III" framework, or agree now to a target for deeper cuts, as an inducement for Russia to ratify START II?]

President Yeltsin and I asked our experts some time ago to conduct a dialogue on how we might adapt our nuclear forces to the changed international security situation, including the possibility of further reductions.

We have no intention, however, of setting aside START II, and moving ahead instead with the conclusion of a START III agreement. Ratification of START II by Russia remains an essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

SERBIA

Serbian Elections -- General

□ Although Serbian authorities have made announcements that appear to concede opposition victories in some municipalities, the regime continues to stall for time with legal tactics; we remain skeptical until the duly-elected members of the opposition are able to take their seats and begin work.

□ It remains that Serbian authorities must implement the OSCE Gonzalez report recommendations and recognize all opposition victories in the November 17 elections. Until Milosevic recognizes the will of the Serbian people, he will remain isolated.

□ We remain concerned about recent reports of the use of violence by Serbian police against demonstrators in Belgrade. We condemn any police interference with the rights of the

Serbian people to voice their protests. The use of force by Serbian authorities will only further their international isolation.

☐ We continue to hope that this situation can be resolved without violence. We and our allies remain engaged in seeking ways to gain Milosevic's acceptance of the election results as an essential step for the resolution of the situation in Serbia and are considering a number of possible steps to put additional pressure on Belgrade. We will not be satisfied until the people of Serbia are vindicated in their desire for the implementation of democratic norms and processes.

☐ We are also moving forward with a plan of action to support democratization in Serbia. We are considering a number of actions ranging from economic and political measures to democracy building initiatives as well as continuing to support the important roles of international organizations such as the OSCE.

If asked about Sanctions:

☐ We are not actively pursuing the reimposition of sanctions at this time, but are taking other steps to convince Milosevic to accept the will of the Serbian people.

SOUTH AFRICA: REPORTED ARMS SALES TO SYRIA

Q: What action did the Government of South Africa take yesterday on the proposed sale of arms to Syria? Any reaction from us?

A: On January 22, the South African cabinet did not discuss whether or not to approve the issuance of a marketing license for the marketing of certain weapon systems to Syria. They are pursuing further consultations on the matter as stated by Deputy President Mbeki.

We continue to consult closely with the South African Government

on this issue
through diplomatic channels, and are confident our concerns are
well understood.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the possible South African sales
of arms to Syria? Is the
sale going forward?

A: As we stated previously, we are deeply concerned about this
possibility of weapons sale
by any country to states which support terrorist activities.

[IF PRESSED}

We have urged the government of South Africa and will urge any
others contemplating
similar arrangements not to proceed towards a sale. The South
African government is
deliberating and consulting on this issue. We have confidence
that the government of
South Africa understands the seriousness of this issue and will
make its decisions
accordingly.

(IF RAISED)

Q: What impact would the sale have on bilateral relations were it
to go through? Would we
terminate our assistance programs?

A: The transfer of military equipment to any of the countries
listed by the United States as
a state sponsor of terrorism may require us to cease certain
assistance under U.S. law.
The South African government has made it clear that it does not
support terrorism.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

☐ The President is committed to working with the Senate to secure
the ratification of the CWC.

☐ We have been actively and regularly working with interest groups
and the general public to
educate them on the importance of this treaty.

- ☐ The meeting with Senator Lott was useful. He has committed to organizing a meeting with members in order to begin discussions on how we might bridge the gap between those who support the treaty and those who have difficulties with it. (IF ASKED: Specifically, we will discuss possible amendments to the resolution of ratification -- not to the treaty itself.)
- ☐ You would have to ask the Senator about the Senate calendar. We emphasized to him the importance of an early vote.
- ☐ As to whether or not he supports the treaty, I would, again, direct you to his office and to remarks he made at his Tuesday press conference.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Health/Clinton-Yeltsin Meeting in Early 1997

- ☐ President and Yeltsin agreed in their December 5 phone conversation to meet; have not yet fixed specific date or venue for meeting; expect this to be topic on Gore-Chernomyrdin agenda February 6-8.
 - ☐ March timeframe for meeting discussed -- nothing from Russian side to date to change this.
- (FYI ONLY -- Last Friday Yeltsin press spokesman ambiguous about dates, still indicated March/April)

What if Yeltsin Unable to Meet for Reasons of Health?

Know nothing about Yeltsin's health other than what Russian government spokesman stated; he continues to recover from November surgery, recent illness.

- ☐ Heard nothing to indicate Yeltsin unable to meet in March timeframe.
- ☐ Personal contact between two leaders important, as we look ahead

to work with Russia on
wide range of issues -- American investment, arms control,
European security structures.
Our agenda very comprehensive.

☐ But, we work this agenda at wide variety of levels, throughout
two governments, will
continue to do that.

(If asked about internal implications, political maneuvers in
Russia)

☐ As I said yesterday, internal politics best left to Russian
people.

Duma Vote Last Week on Yeltsin "Incapacity," to Govern, Prolonged
Absence

☐ Our understanding these resolutions (on health determinations)
have no legal, constitutional
validity; besides, apparently many members of parliament did not
participate; and second
vote (on another version of resolution) did not pass.

☐ Not appropriate for me to speculate on parliamentary activities
in Russia.

Elections in Chechnya

☐ Early reports indicate voting went smoothly, no violence; that's
welcome news.

☐ Await official announcement of results; sizable contingent of
OSCE observers in Chechnya;
look forward to their formal assessment of process, results.

☐ Understand OSCE representative in Chechnya has praised conduct
of election, saying it was
mostly orderly, fair, apparently without serious irregularities.

Russian Delays on Space Station Project

☐ We understand Russians are encountering some delays. We
continue to work closely with
them and with our other partners on this important mutual
endeavor.

☐ If necessary, we have capability to complete all key aspects of
this project ourselves.

☐ We will continue to maintain an ongoing dialogue with Russia and our other partners on the pace and progress of the space station program.

(BACKGROUND/NOT FOR PUBLIC USE: The Department of the Navy is working on the portions of the project that may be subject to Russian delays. Currently, this work is on an interim basis, but it can be completed by the Navy if Russian delays prove insurmountable).

NATO-Russia Talks

☐ In preparing for upcoming meetings between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, and between Vice President and Chernomyrdin, we are exploring several ideas to enhance partnership with Russia, in context of developing strong NATO-Russia relationship,

☐ NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov had good discussion on January 20 on future NATO-Russia relations.

☐ Talbott-Fuerth in Moscow last week; had extensive discussions on European security and other U.S.-Russian issues in preparation for Gore-Chernomyrdin and Clinton-Yeltsin meetings. Positive tone.

General Issues

Russia-NATO

☐ Understand enlargement difficult issue for Russia, but U.S., NATO and Russia have interests in developing NATO-Russia relationship and broadening cooperation.

☐ Serious dialogue on NATO-Russia relationship underway.

☐ U.S. determined to proceed with NATO enlargement. Believe that is in interests of European security and stability. Equally determined to manage enlargement process in manner that does not threaten Russia and to do all that we can to build strong NATO-Russia relationship.

Prospects for Russian Ratification of START II Treaty

☐ Treaty faces ratification vote in Duma; parliamentary prerogative to debate its merits. While some may oppose Treaty, Russian government committed to ratification.

☐ START II is the best interests of both countries, should be ratified by Russia.

If asked: is Administration planning to leap ahead" to START III to circumvent opposition to START II in Russia:

☐ As Secretary Perry made clear last fall in Moscow, U. S. prepared to begin negotiations on further reductions in nuclear forces once START II has entered into force.

☐ Have no intention, however, of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with negotiations on "START III." Entry into force of START II remains essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

MIDDLE EAST

VISITS BY LEADERS TO CONSULT ON PEACE PROCESS

-- As the President noted in his press conference on January 28, four Middle Eastern leaders will be coming to Washington over the next two months to consult with him on the peace process.

-- The schedule of visits is:

- Prime Minister Netanyahu - February 13
- Chairman Arafat - March 3
- President Mubarak - March 10
- King Hussein - March 18

-- Background Only: Visit by Prince Sultan (Saudi Arabia) should not be referred to in same category as these visits; he's being invited by Cohen (DOD)

for Feb. 25th. Will
meet President while here.

ISRAEL/OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Background: In October 1995, the GOI requested the extradition of Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook to stand trial in Israel for manslaughter, murder, grievous harm and wounding, harm with aggravating intent, harm and wounding under aggravating circumstances, and conspiracy to commit a felony, in violation of the Israel Penal Code. Abu Marzook is the head of the political bureau of Hamas.

Abu Marzook was found extraditable by a U.S. court in New York on May 8, 1996. Further proceedings in the extradition case were stayed while he exercised his right to challenge the finding of extraditability. Press reports this week indicate that he may now withdraw his legal challenges. If he does so, the extradition process will resume.

Q: What is the status of the extradition Matter of Abu Marzook?

A: We have seen press reports that Mr. Abu Marzook intends to withdraw his legal challenge to the order finding him extraditable. Any such legal decision would be within Mr. Abu Marzook's rights and entirely his own choice. We would refer you to the Justice Department for any further comments.

SETTLEMENTS AN "OBSTACLE TO PEACE"?

Q: President Clinton seemed to say December 16 that settlements are an obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Is that the U.S. position?

A: The U.S. position is that settlement activity complicates the negotiating process and increases tension.

We have previously expressed concern that when one party to a negotiation says things or does things which are seen to preempt the negotiating process, it makes it that much harder for negotiations to succeed.

In that vein, the President was making the obvious point that when one party does something that is seen by the other as preempting negotiations it can become a problem or an obstacle to progress in those negotiations.

So, yes we are troubled by some of the recent settlement activity, and we've said so. The President's response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity. It's important to focus on that concern.

[If asked]:

Q: Does the President's response indicate a change in policy?

A: As I said, his response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity. It's important to focus on that concern. The comments did not signal a fundamental change in the nature of that concern.

LEGALITY OF SETTLEMENTS

Q: Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that he subscribes to the view that as a matter of legal right, Jews and Israelis have a legal right to settle on the West Bank? Is that your understanding of the legalities?

A: I'm not going to get drawn into a discussion of the legal aspects of what is obviously a highly political issue. It is an issue, furthermore, that the Israelis and Palestinians recognize is difficult and therefore left for their permanent status negotiations. It is abundantly clear, however, that settlement activity, and even announcements of plans for possible future settlement activity, complicates the climate and the process of negotiation. When either party says things or does things that are perceived as prejudging the outcome of a negotiation, it makes it that much more difficult to achieve progress.

Q: But what about the precise question of the legality of settlement activity?

A: As I said, I'm not going down that road. We need to keep our focus on assisting the

parties in their negotiations.

Q: Do you or don't you differentiate between new and old settlements?

A: I've just explained what our position is and I referred to "settlement activity." I'm not going to comment further.

Q: The Israelis claim that you didn't complain about settlement activity during the Rabin Government, so why are you making this an issue now?

A: We said the same thing during the time of the Labor government.

JERUSALEM

Q: What is your reaction to Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement that Israel will not negotiate over the status of Jerusalem?

A: Our views have not changed. Israel and the Palestinians have agreed that Jerusalem is one of the issues for permanent status negotiations.

(If pressed) Our position on the status of Jerusalem is well-known.

Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and volatile issues in the peace process. We remain convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing these sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which Israel and the Palestinians themselves have formally agreed to discuss only in the context of direct, permanent status negotiations.

PEACE PROCESS

☐ There has been no change in the U.S. position on land-for-peace or anything else as a result of the Israeli elections. We have supported this principle and will continue to do so. At the same time, our experience makes clear that agreements are reached not through recitation of abstract principles, but through the hard work of direct negotiation. Syria and Israel agreed at Madrid to negotiate on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. They should resume those

negotiations to overcome their differences.

☐ Obviously, if progress is to be made, if differences are to be overcome, each side must take into account the needs and interests of the other.

☐ Peace is not an abstraction. Peace is closely tied to security and only the parties directly concerned can make the critical decisions which affect their future. The United States can't make these decisions for them. We will not try to impose decisions upon Israel or any other party to the peace process.

☐ That doesn't mean that the US, as the facilitator of the peace process, does not have views. It has been and remains our view that the land-for-peace formula offers the most promise for a workable solution to the problems of war and peace in the Middle East. But agreements will come not as a result of our views, but as a result of negotiations between the parties.

PALESTINIAN COMPLIANCE ON REVOCATION OF PALESTINIAN COVENANT

☐ We have welcomed the decision taken by the Palestinian National Council to cancel the provisions of the Covenant which contradict the formal undertakings made between the PLO and the Israeli government.

U.S. EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV

☐ Recognize what is required by the law passed by Congress requiring that the U.S. Embassy be transferred to Jerusalem. But at the same time, the President has made it clear that he will take no step that will undermine the peace process or jeopardize the negotiations. In this regard, the legislation provides a waiver provision that may be used by the President as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that could preempt or jeopardize the peace process.

ORIENT HOUSE

☐ Our position regarding U.S. contacts at Orient House has not changed. We do business with

the Palestinian Authority only in Gaza and Jericho, not in Jerusalem. Would encourage all parties to concentrate on the negotiations, not on issues that may polarize the situation.

SYRIA

- ☐ We believe that a comprehensive peace requires negotiations and agreements on all tracks, including with Syria and Lebanon. But we recognize that -- as in the past -- some negotiations will move at a faster pace than others.
- ☐ Prime Minister Netanyahu told me that he agrees on the importance of talks with Syria.
- ☐ We have never had any illusions about Syrian associations with groups involved in terrorism.
- ☐ We consider this a serious issue, and we have made that clear both in our diplomatic contacts at the highest levels and in our annual report on terrorism.
- ☐ We would like to see Syria's ties to terrorist groups definitively broken.
- ☐ But it is important to distinguish between states that work to subvert the peace process -- like Iran -- and those who have shown a willingness to engage in it actively and seriously -- like Syria.

BOSNIA

LA Times Cengic Inquiry ("Cengic has become unofficial Intelligence Chief to Izetbegovic"):

- ☐ We have no evidence that Cengic remains involved in any way with intelligence matters.
- ☐ We would caution that there are many false rumors that travel around Sarajevo spread by individuals with one motive or another.
- ☐ We can tell you our latest understanding that there are no Minister posts left in the Federation for Cengic, even though he had earlier been rumored for one.

Train and Equip Program (Post)

☐ The international Train and Equip program is ongoing and is a key success and a major step toward establishing a stable military balance in Bosnia, which is one of the keys to establishing a lasting peace in the region.

☐ The program's extensive training effort involves U.S. contracted trainers and international training assistance from our allies in Europe and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery of U.S. equipment from our \$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is receiving security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic states, including Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

☐ As Ambassador Jim Pardew announced in Sarajevo today, the program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the formation of joint Federation defense structures that will be critical to strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Situation in Gajevi

☐ We join others in the international community in condemning the Bosnian Serb attacks on Bosniak construction workers in Gajevi. This incident underscores our continuing concern about the use of violence or intimidation against returning refugees and displaced persons and the potential for further confrontations in the Zone of Separation. We are encouraged that the Bosnian Serb leadership has also condemned the attacks, but we hold them and the local police responsible for ensuring that procedures are followed and returns can proceed peacefully.

☐ SFOR and the IPTF are taking additional security measures to avoid the potential for additional violence around Gajevi. Calm has been restored to the area and we understand that the returning Bosniaks are following agreed procedures and will return to Gajevi in the next day or so. We will insist that refugees and displaced persons that follow the agreed procedures are allowed to return to their homes.

War Criminals

- ☐ We remain deeply concerned with lack of progress on war crimes front in Bosnia. Achieving justice is part of achieving an enduring peace.
- ☐ We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice. One possible option is to set up a special police force to assist the Tribunal in apprehending indicted war criminals. Such a force would not include SFOR personnel. We have made no decisions on how to assist the Tribunal. We are reviewing many different options.
- ☐ While international military forces in Bosnia will detain war criminals if, in the course of normal duties, they encounter those under indictment, it is not the role of SFOR to hunt down war criminals.

Brcko Arbitration

- ☐ The parties agreed at Dayton to binding arbitration of the disputed portion of the inter-entity boundary line in the Brcko area. The issue is in the hands of the Arbitral Tribunal, consisting of arbitrators from the two Bosnian entities and the internationally-appointed arbiter Roberts Owen. There is no U.S. proposal for a Brcko solution; we support the arbitration process.
- ☐ A decision is to be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal by February 15. The Tribunal has been holding hearings in recent weeks including representatives of the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska.
- ☐ The U.S. and other Contact Group member states are aware of ideas under consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal, since the international community may need to move quickly to provide support for implementation of the Brcko solution. The Arbitral Tribunal is continuing its work, and we await the decision.

Iranian Influence in Bosnia

- ☐ Iranian influence in Bosnia has been an ongoing concern, but we

have taken effective measures to cut Iranian links.

☐ We have enforced the Dayton agreement ban on foreign forces and insisted that Bosnian government sever all military and intelligence links with Iran as a condition of the train and equip program. As the President certified in June, those conditions have been met. There have been no indications since June that military or intelligence cooperation has resumed.

☐ Hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards have left Bosnia, Mujahadeen units have disbanded, and the Bosnians are looking to the U.S. and moderate Islamic states for security assistance.

☐ We remain concerned about Iranian influence and continue to watch the situation closely.

☐ Overall, we and the intelligence community assess that Iranian influence has substantially diminished since the implementation of Dayton and since we tied the issue to the train and equip program.

New Bosnia Mission/SFOR -- General

☐ The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission started December 20. SFOR's limited and focused mission will allow time to consolidate the peace built by the success of IFOR.

☐ The Stabilization Force is about half IFOR's size. U.S. share is less than half last year's commitment -- about 8500 troops inside Bosnia.

☐ The NATO plan for SFOR includes more limited set of military and supporting tasks than IFOR, reflecting the more narrow mission of this smaller force. With fewer troops, SFOR will focus more on security, including force protection, and will be less involved in civilian tasks.

SFOR Mission Duration

☐ 18 months will give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on

economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.

☐ We will review every 6 months to see if we can accomplish mission with fewer forces. SFOR will gradually shift responsibilities to civilian agencies and the parties themselves while moving from stabilization to deterrence to disengagement.

If pressed on whether this means that the U.S. has ruled out participation of U.S. forces after completion of SFOR mission:

☐ We believe that SFOR's mission can be completed in 18 months, and that the conditions will have been established in which stability and security can be maintained without an outside military presence.

If pressed whether the U.S. will insist that any force after 18 months will be European only:

☐ I'm not going to speculate about such scenarios. We believe the mission will be completed in 18 months.

If pressed whether every last soldier will be out of Bosnia in exactly 18 months:

☐ 18 months is the duration of the mission and the deployment, but not necessarily a deadline for withdrawal of the last SFOR soldier. Withdrawal at 18 months will occur in a timely fashion but may extend some days or weeks beyond the mission duration.

PERU

Q: What's the situation in Peru at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence? What is the United States going to do about this situation?

A: We have continued our active and intense consultations with the Governments of Peru and Japan. The President's national security team has kept him

fully informed as events
there have developed.

This is a very serious situation and lives are obviously at risk.
It simply isn't productive
for me to address the other questions you have raised.

Q: Does the United States negotiate with hostages or condone those
who do?

A: The United States does not condone making concessions to
terrorists, but how to
handle negotiations is a sovereign decision for the government
involved.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Adams Refused Visa?

Background: Two London newspapers reported over the weekend that
the White House has
advised Gerry Adams he will not get a visa until the IRA
reinstates its cease-fire. One paper
sourced "officials of the NSC"; the other diplomats in London.

☐ Mr. Adams has not/not applied for a visa. Since there is no
application, the Administration
has made no decision.

☐ If pressed: As in the past, an application for a visa waiver by
Mr. Adams would be decided
on basis of whether it could contribute to search for lasting
peace in Northern Ireland.

Loyalist Cease-fire Intact?

☐ Up to British and Irish governments and participating parties to
decide who participates in
talks.

☐ As President said in statement yesterday, we urge loyalists to
maintain their cease-fire. There
has been no claim of responsibility for car bomb attacks and
there is no doubt loyalists have
shown restraint in response to escalating IRA violence.

Recent Attacks

☐ Condemn this latest attack. Thankfully, no serious injuries, but shows wanton disregard for human life.

☐ Call again on IRA to declare and implement immediate cease-fire in words and deeds. People of Ireland, North and South, clearly want peace, political settlement.

Belfast Talks

☐ Belfast talks, chaired by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, represent historic opportunity and best hope in decades for achieving lasting settlement. Talks will reconvene for bilateral consultations January 13, in plenary January 27.

☐ Must not squander progress of last months. Urge all political leaders to take responsibility for making these talks work. Need to move quickly into substantive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland.

☐ Continue to believe that participation of all elected parties, including Sinn Fein, would give talks best chance of success; that can only happen with cease-fire.

☐ Impressed with commitment and determination both governments have shown in search for peace. They and we share goal of inclusive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland, which can only happen if there is an IRA cease-fire.

Was 1994 IRA cease-fire "fake" as Prime Minister Major has alleged?

☐ Cease-fire from August 1994 to February 1996 saved hundreds of lives. I strongly condemned end of that cease-fire and I continue to call on IRA to declare new cease-fire immediately.

How Will You Know a New Cease-fire is Real?

☐ Will be up to British and Irish governments to evaluate new cease-fire; but as both Taoiseach and Prime Minister Major have said, will depend on both words and actions on ground.

Deportation Proceedings Against Matt Morrison

☐ Have been assured by Justice that these proceedings being handled fairly. Judicial matter - don't want to comment further.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KHOBAR BOMBING

Saudi Cooperation with FBI

Q: What are you doing to get Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the FBI on the Khobar Towers bombing investigation?

A: The FBI is in charge of that investigation for the U.S.

I understand that they are in a dialogue with the Saudis about what additional specific materials and cooperation they seek.

We have assurances from the highest levels in the Kingdom that we will get full cooperation and we expect that such assurances will be honored.

Q: What's your reaction to allegations that the al-Khobar bombing involved Iranians?

A: There is an investigation under way.

I'm not going to speculate about hypothetical outcomes to this investigation.

Nor am I going to speculate about hypothetical responses once this investigation is complete.

Q: Was there an Iranian or Syrian role?

A: We have reached no conclusions.

Q: If Iran was behind it, will we still attack Iran as Secretary Perry said last summer?

A: This is hypothetical and I'm not going to respond. But if you ask whether the U.S. responds to those who are proven to have attacked it, the record of this Administration is clear.

But I must stress that we have reached no conclusion about state sponsorship in the Khobar attack.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

Has there been a cover-up?

- ☐ No -- There is currently no evidence nor any indication of a cover-up.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee concurs in this assessment.
- ☐ The fact that U.S. troops inadvertently destroyed Iraqi chemical weapons after the war came to light as part of our effort to learn all that we can; that effort has since been intensified.
- ☐ We're awaiting the outcomes of Army IG, DOD Intel Oversight & CIA IG investigations.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 2, 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the Presidential Advisory Committee found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision taken by the President when he extended the Presidential Advisory Committee to provide independent oversight.
- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.
- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products.
- ☐ Stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.
- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 80+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.
- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.