

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Robert Bell and Steven Pifer. Subject: RE: Arms Control Transition Paper. (9 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)
002. email	Alan Kreczko to John Scott. Subject: RE: Armscor/Fuchs. (1 page)	01/21/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/24/1996-01/24/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5618

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 December 96 11:25
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT December 18 McCurry Press Briefing [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Fetig, James L.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
Johnson, David T.
Moffett, Julia
Naplan, Steven J.
Showalter, Victoria A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[MIKE1218.doc : 2907 in MIKE1218.doc]]
**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 24 December 96 11:22
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** MIKE1218.doc

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 18, 1996

PRESS BRIEFING BY
MIKE MCCURRY

The Briefing Room

2:00 P.M. EST

MR. MCCURRY: What else do you want to know about?

Q Why would the President miss the end?

MR. MCCURRY: He wanted to see whether Erskine was up to it, and he obviously was. The President happened to be on his way back over to the Residence, so he's just spending a moment with the newly appointed --

Q Why is he going to the Residence? Who's there?

MR. MCCURRY: He goes over there and has lunch sometimes.

Q Why didn't he come out and do this himself?

MR. MCCURRY: The President -- we thought about doing that, but there were some strong recommendations to address the issue of Peru the way we have addressed it today. I may be -- when we're off camera I can tell you some more.

Q Mike, I think there were further questions for Mr. Bowles. Do we have a new custom here on how news conferences and briefings end?

MR. MCCURRY: I wasn't here for it, so I don't know --

Q One of your staffers cut it off.

Q Is that going to be -- from now on that if you have someone in the audience here who says "thank you" as if he were a journalist, or was that just a one time only procedure?

MR. MCCURRY: No, Barry came in from the side door because we had the other people going in. Do you have something else you need to ask him? I'll be happy to relay the question.

Q What can you tell us on camera just about the President's personal involvement in the Peru issue and how he is keeping up to date on that?

MR. MCCURRY: He has been following very carefully since last night developments, been apprised of communications we've had with the governments of Peru and Japan, has been accepting recommendations

from his national security advisors as to his what his own role should be. He has dispatched messages to Prime Minister Hashimoto and to President Fujimori to express our concern and to, of course, advise them of our willingness to be of help in any way the United States government can be of help.

Q Have we made an offer of material and equipment? Have we gotten an answer on that?

MR. MCCURRY: As did Mr. Berger, I decline to comment on that.

Q One thing that Erskine said was kind of puzzling. He said he simply doesn't know about the situation with Mr. Trie. Is he just begging for a little more time to get up to speed, or has he really taken that little interest and paid so little attention to something that's a pretty big problem?

MR. MCCURRY: He's been working on other matters. He certainly will be responsible for that type of issue when he formally takes his position January 20th, and he will be, of course, well briefed on that and other related matters. But he's been concentrating on other issues while others who have responsibility for that matter are here.

Q Mike, will you release a list of the people who attended the party Friday night, the DNC's invitees?

MR. MCCURRY: No.

Q Why not?

MR. MCCURRY: Because they were personal guests of the President in the Residence and we do not normally do that. We didn't release the press -- the list of those who attended the press reception last night, either.

Q When you say personal --

Q -- talk by telephone?

Q When you say personal friends, if I may follow up, could you at least -- is there some way of finding out who really are friends and who are friends because they're donors?

Q Or is everybody who is a donor a personal friend?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I think we -- I described to you the dinners he had Thursday and Friday night as being expressions of gratitude to staff, to campaign staff, to supporters and to friends and to some others that were invited by the President and First Lady to be there. It's not -- that was not an atypical dinner particularly for the holiday season.

Q You also said the list was made up by the DNC, Mike. It seems to be at variance, at odds with your description of these people as personal friends and invited by the President.

MR. MCCURRY: They easily overlap --

Q I'm sure there is.

MR. MCCURRY: The DNC obviously provided some help on members of their staff who have been helpful and supportive during the campaign period, contributors to the DNC and others.

Q Mike, do you know of any investigation either internally by the White House or by any law enforcement agencies or investigative bodies into the connection between what's been described as a cult and the donations that were given to the legal fund?

MR. MCCURRY: Not that I'm aware of, but I would not be the proper place to ask that question. You should ask those who are presumably already looking into matters related to the contributions issue, specifically the Department of Justice and relevant congressional committees.

Q What is the level of concern, if any, here about that possibility

that they were involved and were trying to influence the President or people around him by this involvement?

MR. MCCURRY: In the case of Mr. Trie?

Q No, this cult group, the Taiwan based group.

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I think the specific involvement of Mr. Trie does not raise any concerns here at the White House immediately, because he's a known individual and I think people were familiar with who he is and what his interests were and they don't intersect or collide with the advancement of policy related interests.

Q My question is about this group, not about --

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know enough about the group to know, nor do I know enough about what the legal expense trust established in their own investigative work. You'd have to ask Mr. Cardozo.

Q Mike, I gather that Mr. Cardozo explained the other day and has since continued to explain that they didn't feel any need to refer this matter to any law enforcement authorities. And I think you said yesterday that so far as you knew that the White House hadn't either. I guess I just would query again --

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know that I said that about the White House. I said that Mr. Cardozo, to my knowledge, did not refer this to any law enforcement --

Q Well, let me ask another way. Has enough been adduced here now about this series of money orders and apparent sort of potential case of, you know, fraud of some kind or another, that the White House feels now, even though you're not the relevant -- I realize you're not the relevant body -- but has the White House or the White House Legal Counsel's Office or the President's campaign counsel or any ancillary lawyers in the White House universe referred this matter now to law enforcement authorities?

MR. MCCURRY: Again, let's establish what happened. You were briefed, news organizations were briefed Monday on the results of investigative work done by the Presidential Legal Expense Trust. That is an independently maintained entity which is established for all the reasons you're familiar with. They are the ones that did some investigative work related to the contributions that were attempted to be delivered to the trust, and they really have to speak to what their own judgments were based on the result of that investigative work.

Q Yes, but, Mike, you had a matter that did involve the President to the extent that he was informed about it. His concurrence was received about the matter. This is not something that happened on Mars. This happened right here in Washington, D.C. and it was something he was a part of. As the spokesman for the President --

MR. MCCURRY: Brit, I did not suggest otherwise. I was asked a very specific question about whether there were any allegations of perhaps criminal wrongdoing that we felt we should refer to any other law enforcement entity. The body that conducted the investigative work that would have to make that judgement is the trust because they're familiar with the report of it. I can check further to see if there has been any follow up tie in response to your question, but none that I am aware of at this point.

Q You accept their judgment at the moment of their view on what that was?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I don't know that we -- I wouldn't say we accept their judgment. We make no judgment as -- I mean, they've explained what they have done. The steps they have taken and been very factually specific in how they judge the matter of the contributions that were attempted to be delivered by Mr. Trie.

Q Do you make no judgment, as you began to say, Mike?

MR. MCCURRY: We're not in a position to make judgment because we were not original fact finders as to the specifics of those attempting contributions.

Q Well, "judgment" is a fairly tough word. We talked about "concerns" briefly yesterday. Is there nothing in what transpired with Mr. Trie's donations that causes you concern that there might be something that is a legal problem?

MR. MCCURRY: I answered that question at length yesterday about our concerns.

Q What would you see the President doing the remainder of the day about our situation in Peru?

MR. MCCURRY: He will be monitoring the reports we're getting from Ambassador Jett, also getting some reports further from the national security team that's keeping track of this. There's an interagency working group that's been looking at this, as well as, I think, a task force over at State, that's being run out of State Ops. They're getting information in and he's been asked to --

Q Did he talk to Hashimoto and Fujimori personally?

MR. MCCURRY: I said that he had directed a communication to them upon a specific recommendation of his National Security Advisor.

Q Can I just follow up? And how would you describe U.S. Peruvian relations going into this situation? Do we have a relationship such that we can work effectively in a crisis like this?

MR. MCCURRY: We have a good working relationship that grows out of our common regional interests and a bilateral working relationship on a number of issues specifically related to law enforcement that is good, and that we have remained in contact with them. But they currently have the lead in dealing with this situation and they are apprising the public of the steps they are taking.

Q Is it safe to say while this situation is still ongoing that we're not going to see the President in public addressing it?

MR. MCCURRY: That's a safe and correct judgment.

Q There were reports that Ambassador Jett made it out of the Embassy just moments before the attack happened. Was that just coincidental? Was he aware something was happening, or did he get taken out?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't have any information that can allow me to respond. Based on what I have been told, my understanding is the Ambassador and Charge had just departed from this reception at the Embassy just prior to this incident. I'm not -- don't believe that was based on any knowledge that they had, as far as I know, but I'd have to direct that inquiry directly to Embassy Lima.

Q Mike, how was the Japanese Prime Minister and the Peruvian President given the message from the President, and does he plan to follow up with telephone calls or anything?

MR. MCCURRY: I believe through normal diplomatic channels. We can find out, but presumably delivered by our embassies.

Q No personal conversation between the President and either of these two men?

MR. MCCURRY: Not at this point, no.

Q What was your answer to Ron, that the President would not make any public appearances while -- you mean the Peruvian situation?

MR. MCCURRY: He does not plan to address this publicly.

Q Has the Japanese government made any requests --

MR. MCCURRY: And, again, if it's useful maybe we can talk a little bit about that on background later.

Q Has the Japanese government made any requests to the American government for help in the situation?

MR. MCCURRY: We are in close contact with them. I'm not aware of

any requests, but we are in a position to receive a request if one is needed. We are in a position to respond if one is made.

Q Would you expect that anyone at the White House would have anything to say after the President's meeting with the mayors this afternoon or if there's anything --

MR. MCCURRY: My understanding is, the mayors themselves, many of the mayors are going to be available afterwards, and we can certainly provide some follow up afterwards.

Q On a related topic, can you give us any kind of readout on the budget meetings? Have they already occurred? How many are there?

MR. MCCURRY: There are a number of them underway and they will continue tomorrow and likely on Friday as well. I'm going to decline any commentary while the deliberations are underway, but remember, they all go into the public presentation of a budget document that's not expected until early February. So we will be somewhat circumspect in talking about some of the discussions until we see how it all goes together.

Q They're all internal meetings?

Q But, Mike, are they still on track? I mean, he was supposed to finish his decision making this week.

MR. MCCURRY: Pretty much on track. Barry would have a better idea. Yes, they seem to be moving on track, Barry?

Q Mike, Senator Helms and Congressman Gilman wrote a letter to Netanyahu today that would seem to undercut what the President said two days ago. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. MCCURRY: I haven't seen the letter, no.

Q Mike, what's on the agenda for tomorrow's talks between the President and the Chinese Minister?

MR. MCCURRY: Is that happening tomorrow?

MR. JOHNSON: Tomorrow, yes.

MR. MCCURRY: They're going to follow up on discussions that Mr. Berger is having with Liu Huaqiu today. They are following a pattern established by Tony Lake. They are having kind of an ongoing intense review of aspects of the bilateral relationship covering all of the different issues upon which there is cooperation, agreement and common purpose between our two governments and also a review of those issues upon which there are substantial differences. This is part of a working process of managing the relationship that grew out of Tony's work with his counterpart and has led to this series of high level contacts, including the recent meeting between the two Presidents that you are familiar with now.

Q Mike, Erskine Bowles said that neither he nor his staff aides will have any problem or feel any concern in terms of relating to the liberal link of the party. Since the Cabinet selections and White House staff selections have been underway, have you guys gotten any static from the liberals that you may be veering a little bit too far away from them, and is the President at all concerned that that might pose problems?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, when it comes to affected constituencies within the Democratic Party, static is kind of the common environment in which deliberations occur. Whether it's right or left or center, people advance their own arguments and their own beliefs and their own interests regularly. But we have maintained very good outreach to those normally associated with the liberal wing of the party, good conversations, take in a lot of input, and I think some of the President's decision making reflects the kinds of consultations that he has done personally and that the team has done collectively, and I'm not aware that we have anything other than good, harmonious relations with all elements of the party.

Q But there is a conservative tone to these --

Q Just to follow up, if the liberals were to act --

MR. MCCURRY: Do you think there was a conservative tone, Helen?

Q Yes. I think that --

MR. MCCURRY: I think there is a vital centrist tone.

Q -- if Rahm contributed to the immigration provisions in the welfare bill and so forth, yes, I do.

MR. MCCURRY: All right. You're entitled to an opinion, obviously.

Q Mike, if liberals were to ask where the ideological diversity is in the new team of the new Cabinet, to whom would you point?

MR. MCCURRY: To people who were just introduced.

Yes?

Q One of the possible grounds of compromise --

MR. MCCURRY: And the other appointments, the Cabinet appoints made by the President, obviously.

Q One of the possible grounds of compromise on the budget next year appears to be in the corporate welfare area. Yet, Senator McCain has talked about introducing legislation to establish an independent commission. Where does the administration stand on that?

MR. MCCURRY: I would have to check and see. I don't know that we've taken a position on that, but our interest in those provisions has been expressed in prior deliberations, and no doubt they will be an element in future deliberations.

Q Can we expect a full scale Cabinet unveiling tomorrow with the President in OEOP 450?

MR. MCCURRY: Not tomorrow, to my knowledge.

Q I mean, Friday. I mean, Friday.

MR. MCCURRY: Friday? There will be -- I think I just heard Mr. Bowles promise some announcements on Friday, so there will be some --

Q Anything on your public schedule tomorrow?

MR. MCCURRY: We've got a TV meeting -- TV ratings issue the President expects to address tomorrow.

Q Is he going to have them here with him?

Q How is he handling that and who is here?

Q Yes, how is that going to work?

Q Is he endorsing the package?

MR. MCCURRY: Mary Ellen can do that. We'll do that in a minute.

Q I don't know if you have addressed the issue before. I don't recall -- Kofi Annan is apparently calling for an expansion of the Security Council to include Japan, Germany, other countries. Does the U.S. have a position on that?

MR. MCCURRY: We do. We have been supportive of an expansion of the council on specifically the addition of Japan and Germany to membership in the Security Council. And I'm reaching back in my memory on other related issues on the size and expansion. But we have definitely taken the position that it should be those two additions to the council.

By the way, on Kofi and on the President -- did we ever do a statement last night? Okay, the President had a very warm, congratulatory call with Mr. Kofi Annan last night. Madeleine Albright was also on the line. I believe she was in New York. She reported to the President that he had delivered a very well received acceptance speech and talked about the need for reform at the U.N. and to embracing change at the U.N. as one of the necessary ingredients of making that institution viable and effective in the 21st century. The President complimented him on those sentiments, told him how important it was for him to press forward on the

issue
of reform. The President briefly mentioned our desire to address
the
question of the arrears and said he looked forward to working
with
the new Secretary General on that point, and he also suggested
that
-- the President also suggested that he make an effort to
describe
his commitment to reform particularly in discussions with members
of
Congress.

Q Has the White House made a decision yet on Proposition 209?

MR. MCCURRY: No. We're getting an update, I believe, from
Justice
later this week on it. It has not come here yet, to my
knowledge.

Q Later today, to your knowledge?

MR. MCCURRY: Not to my knowledge.

Q Mike, Mr. Bowles didn't talk about any changes in the White
House
Legislative Affairs Office or DPC since Rasco was announced as
leaving. Can you say anything today about whether Bruce is going
to
get that job at the DPC and whether John Hilley is going to
remain in
Legislative Affairs?

MR. MCCURRY: No and no. I mean, both of them, both Bruce Reed
and
John Hilley are enormously well thought of around the White House
and
by the President specifically. The Domestic Policy Council
itself
is a very important integral element of our policy development at
the
White House. I expect the President might have more to say on
that
on Friday, as a matter of fact.

Q How did it come to be that the mayors meeting is closed? Whose
idea was that?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know.

Q The mayors didn't want their picture taken with the President?
(Laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: The mayors will be here later and the mayors will be
out and talk to you.

Q Did they pass a hat in there. (Laughter.)

Q You said you had something on background, not on camera, on Peru?

MR. MCCURRY: Maybe or maybe some senior official can talk about
that a little bit.

Q Talk about what?

Q Peru.

Q Why don't we say the briefing's over.

Q Can she do TV ratings real quick?

MR. MCCURRY: Yes, let's do it. Mary Ellen will do TV ratings.

MS. GLYNN: The President is going to meet with representatives
of
the industry tomorrow and some of the networks executives to get
a
briefing on the TV rating system just after they unveil it, I
think,
at the National Press Club.

Q -- will be there with the President?

MS. GLYNN: Yes. And the Vice President is meeting today with
some
of the children's television groups to talk about their concerns
and
some of the -- I'm not sure, the Parent Teacher Association and
things like that. And that's about it.

Q And then will the President come out and talk about it?

MS. GLYNN: Yes, we'll do a pool spray at the top.

Q But, Mary Ellen, the President has not changed his view
expressed
in the news conference last week that --

MS. GLYNN: Not at all. It's a good start. People have talked

about this for 10 years and this is a great place to start.

Q Do you have a time on that, Mary Ellen?

MR. MCCURRY: Mary Ellen, how is there going to be any news left at this thing if the President already addressed it at the news conference?

Q Good question.

MS. GLYNN: That's true, but there will be just a little smidgen for everybody.

Q Why wouldn't the President's meet with parents' groups?

MS. GLYNN: This is what the industry had suggested. As I say, the Vice President is meeting with parents' groups today to talk about their reservations with the system.

Q Is the President actually meeting with parents' groups?

MS. GLYNN: Not that I know of.

Q Do you have a time on that, Mary Ellen?

MS. GLYNN: I think it is mid morning, right after the Valenti press conference at the National Press Club. The Vice President and Mrs. Gore and the First Lady will also be at this briefing.

MR. MCCURRY: Thank you.

END

2:20 P.M. EST

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 30 December 96 14:38

FROM Lorin, Matthew E.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: B'casting Package [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Letts, Kelly J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Malley, Robert
Ragan, Richard F.
Schwartz, Eric P.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

O.K folks. This is what Fulton and I did on Tuesday. Dobbins and Soderberg approved.

From: Armstrong, Fulton T.
To: Lorin, Matthew
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: B'casting Package [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, December 24, 1996 03:31 PM

[[8229A.DOC : 3625 in 8229A.DOC]][[8229B.DOC : 3626 in 8229B.DOC]]

Matt: Tried to page you several times. No luck. ... Nancy wanted to go ahead with package a.s.a.p., so I did. Attached is what I've sent forward. Hope nothing makes you ill. I couldn't do attachments (lists of board members) in your absence. --Fulton

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 24 December 96 15:22

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 8229A.DOC
8229

December 24, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

BOB NASH

THROUGH: JAMES F. DOBBINS

FROM: FULTON T. ARMSTRONG
MATTHEW E. LORIN

SUBJECT: Personnel Appointments Related to International
Broadcasting

At Tab A is a Memorandum to Leon Panetta and Erskine Bowles recommending a strategy to update the membership of the Presidential Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting, the directorship of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and the directorship of the International Broadcasting Board.

It recommends filling vacancies on the Advisory Board and adopting a phased approach to replace sitting members, including Chairman Jorge Mas Canosa. The memo seeks the Chief of Staff's authorization to begin this effort as well as the process to identify a new Director of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (position currently vacant) and a new Chairman of the International Broadcasting Board (to replace Geoff Cowan).

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum to the Chief of Staff

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

24 December 96 15:26

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

8229B.DOC
8229
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR LEON E. PANETTA
ERSKINE BOWLES

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER
BOB NASH

SUBJECT: Personnel Appointments Related to International
Broadcasting

Purpose

To determine a strategy for updating membership of the
Presidential
Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting, the Directorship of Office
of
Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) and the Directorship of International
Broadcasting Bureau (IBB).

Background

President Clinton on April 30, 1994, signed the International
Broadcasting Act of 1994, which reorganized the USG's
international
broadcasting operations, including Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty RFE/RL. With savings projected to surpass \$240 million,
the
President touted the reorganization as one of our more
significant
re-engineering accomplishments.

Under the new law, the Bureau of International Broadcasting (BIB)
was abolished and replaced by a new bipartisan Broadcasting Board
of
Governors placed within USIA. This new Board was given the power
to
"direct and supervise all broadcasting activities including those
under the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, and the Television
Broadcasting to Cuba Act," as well as "to review, evaluate and
supervise grants for broadcasting and related activities ... and
to
allocate funds appropriated for international broadcasting..."
(The

Act also declared the sense of Congress that funding of RFE/RL should be assumed by the private sector not later than December 31, 1999.)

USIA, State Department and we believe that the advent of the second administration provides an opportunity to review the various Board memberships, fill vacancies on the Cuban Broadcasting Advisory Board, and lay the groundwork for more effective processes for membership renewal. The apparent conflict in authorities created by the Broadcasting Act and interpersonal tensions between the BBG, USIA and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting have brought Cuba broadcasting problems to the fore over the past year.

It is also an appropriate time to fill the Directorship of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, vacant for the past year and a half after Director Lobo left in amid staff allegations that he permitted Presidential Advisory Board Chairman Jorge Mas Canosa to exert "undue influence" on personnel and programming decisions at OCB. (A Federal arbitration judge has exonerated OCB of the charges concerning personnel irregularities, but the State Inspector General is still investigating alleged improprieties regarding programming.)

We understand that Senator Helms and other Members of Congress are preparing legislation that they believe will diminish the tensions between broadcast entities. They have concluded that BBG was given too much authority under the International Broadcasting Act of 1994 and seek to rescind the BBG's administrative authorities and reduce its status to that of an advisory board. We believe it is premature, in light of President Clinton's strong support for the Act, to endorse such an initiative. Action on pending personnel issues should help contribute to greater effectiveness and harmony among broadcasting entities. Once these personnel are in place, we should work with the Congress on such legislative adjustment as may

prove
desirable.

Issue #1: Renewal of the Cuba Advisory Board

The Presidential Advisory Board for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba was formed in 1984 to review the effectiveness of activities carried out under the Cuba Broadcasting Act and make recommendations to the President and the Director of USIA. The current nine-member board (including Chairman Jorge Mas Canosa) was appointed for a three-year term by President Reagan in 1984. President Bush did not renew any member's term after 1989, but the Board and its Chairman continue to serve, until such time as new appointments are made, as authorized by the law. Two members have died, and the terms of the seven others technically expired several years ago.

We recommend that you authorize Presidential Personnel to begin the process of identifying candidates to fill vacancies on the Board and replace sitting members in a phased fashion. A sudden clean sweep of the Chairman and the entire Board is not as important as establishing a reliable mechanism for rotating new members in and out. Although a controversial figure in many circles, for example, Mr. Mas is indisputably the most influential Cuban-American leader and has tremendous experience in Cuba broadcasting -- suggesting that an unceremonious and precipitous removal may be counterproductive. We recommend that Mr. Mas's mandate as Chairman be extended for one or two years, after which he can serve as "Chairman Emeritus" and ex officio member of the Board, an arrangement which would in the future also be extended to subsequent retiring chairmen.

To prepare for this transition, we recommend that Presidential Personnel be authorized to undertake to appoint a new member of

the
Board to be designated as Deputy Chair who will assume the
chairmanship for a full three-year term upon Mr. Mas's departure
as a
fulltime member of the Board. We would make the position of
Deputy
Chair permanent, with the incumbent rotating into the
Chairmanship
after each three-year period.

Issue #2: Appointment of Director of Office of Cuba Broadcasting

The absence of a permanent Director of the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting for the past 18 months has given rise to problems
typical
of prolonged management absences. It has also fueled the
allegations that Mr. Mas has "undue influence" over the TV and
Radio
Marti's day-to-day operations because the Acting Director,
Rolando
Bonachea, is widely seen as a personal friend of Mr. Mas. The
allegations remain unproved but have undermined Marti's public
image
and led some on-island listeners to give credence to Cuban
government
propaganda that Radio Marti is merely a political tool of Mr. Mas
and the Cuban-American National Foundation he heads.

We recommend that you authorize Presidential Personnel to
identify
an individual to assume the post of OCB Director. We understand
that
USIA Director Duffey and BBG Chairman David Burke both have
preferred candidates that Personnel may desire to take into
consideration.

Issue #3: Appointment of Director of International Broadcasting Board

The Director of the International Broadcasting Board (IBB), Geoff
Cowan, retired last month. Mr. Cowan, who served concurrently as
Director of the Voice of America, was the primary interface and
implementing agent of the BBG. The 1994 International
Broadcasting
Act provides that this position be chosen by the Chairman of the
BBG
with concurrence of the majority of the Board. However, Mr.
Burke,
himself a Presidential appointment, should be amenable to
cooperating

with the administration on personnel issues. We understand that Mr. Burke is considering Mr. Sandy Unger for the position.

We recommend that you encourage Mr. Burke to move expeditiously and in close consultation with Presidential Personnel and other interested parties to hire a new IBB Director or make the Director of the Voice of America double-hatted as Chairman of the IBB as Mr. Cowan was.

Need to Improve Cooperation

At this juncture, we do not see a need to alter the membership of the Broadcast Board of Governors, which was appointed only 16 months ago, and its staff. Differing legal interpretations of the BBG's exact mandate (see attached USIA and BBG legal counsel opinions) have made for a difficult transition, and personality issues and personnel conflicts have exacerbated tensions. We are hopeful that the aforementioned personnel changes, coupled with improved cooperation between the BBG, IBB and USIA will obviate the need for additional personnel changes, such as replacement of Mr. Burke as Chairman of the BBG. There is some possibility that Mr. Burke might chose to resign if a decision is made to extend Mr. Mas's tenure as Chairman of the Advisory Board, in which case a replacement would need to be identified.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize consultations with the Cuban-American community, Mr. Burke and Mr. Duffey on the proposals outlined above; and, assuming that these consultations go well, that you authorize Presidential Personnel to begin identifying candidates to serve on the Presidential Advisory Board on Cuba Broadcasting, including one as a Deputy Chairman to assume the chairmanship in one or two years; to identify a new Director of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting; and to work with BBG to identify a new Director of IBB or appoint Evelyn Lieberman to serve concurrently as Director of VOA and IBB.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 31 December 96 11:41
FROM Harris, Elisa D.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT urgent package for berger [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Gibney, James S.
Gray, Wendy
Moffett, Julia
Naplan, Steven J.
Samore, Gary S.
Showalter, Victoria A.

CARBON_COPY Kelly, Sandra L.

TEXT_BODY to follow-up on sandy's call to scowcroft this a.m., pls clear on the
attached as soon as possible. thanks, and happy new year!

[[8215.DOC : 2818 in 8215.DOC]][[8215B.DOC : 2819 in 8215B.DOC]][[
8215C.DOC : 2820 in 8215C.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 31 December 96 11:33

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 8215.DOC
8215

December 31, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL/GARY SAMORE/BILL DANVERS

FROM: ELISA D. HARRIS

SUBJECT: CWC Call to Senator Lott

In a recent conversation with John Holum (see Tab II), Senator Lugar recommended that the President speak with Majority Leader Lott as soon as possible about the CWC. Lugar's advice mirrors that of Brent Scowcroft, whom you spoke with on Tuesday. A proposed memorandum for the President and talking points are at Tab I.

Concurrence by: Tony Blinken

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Talking Points
Tab II Incoming from Holum

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

31 December 96 11:24

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

8215B.DOC
8215
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: CWC Call to Senator Lott

Purpose

To secure Senator Lott's agreement to schedule a Senate vote on the CWC before the end of April and to work with us to find mutually-agreeable ways of addressing his concerns about the treaty.

Background

Following your conversation with former President Bush, we spoke with Brent Scowcroft about Bush's participation in the CWC ratification kick-off event in January. Scowcroft told Sandy that he and Bush wanted to be supportive of our ratification efforts. Scowcroft strongly recommended, however, that we engage again with Majority Leader Lott before making any public announcement about the event. It was clear from the conversation that Bush probably would not agree to participate in a White House kick-off ceremony unless we had a dialogue underway with the Majority Leader. Dick Lugar, who also strongly supports the treaty, made a similar recommendation in a recent conversation with John Holum.

Given the importance of Bush's participation in the January event and Lott's control over the Senate schedule, we strongly recommend that you talk with the Majority Leader again about working together on the treaty, and that you do this as soon as possible. Proposed talking points are at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Proposed Talking Points

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

31 December 96 11:38

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

8215C.DOC
8215

TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO SENATOR LOTT

☐ I hope that we will be able to arrange a foreign policy meeting soon to discuss a range of issues, including resources and Bosnia.

I would like to start the New Year working together, on a bipartisan basis, to forge a consensus on the foreign policy issues which are vital to our national security.

☐ One of those issues is the Chemical Weapons Convention. I am glad that we had an opportunity to begin to discuss the treaty when we spoke the day after Christmas. I would like to continue that discussion today.

☐ Clearly, we need to ensure that the Senate votes on the CWC before the treaty enters into force at the end of April. You understand as well as I do what the consequences would be for our nonproliferation and antiterrorism efforts, as well as for the well-being of our chemical industry, if we don't act before then.

☐ But I want to work with you on more than the timing of the Senate vote, as important as that is. I also want to understand your concerns about the CWC, so that we can explore ways of addressing those concerns.

☐ I know that you have an open mind, and that you recognize, as you indicated on the Senate floor last June, that the CWC is "very important" and deserves proper consideration by the Senate.

☐ I realize that we won't be able to convince Senator Helms or Senator Kyl to support the treaty, but I would like to get your support.

☐ Can we agree that, in addition to scheduling the vote before the 29th of April, we will begin a dialogue aimed at understanding and finding mutually agreeable ways of addressing your concerns?

☐ I know that you have heard a fair amount of criticism of the treaty, including perhaps from your own staff. But I agree with President Bush, Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell and others that this

treaty really is a net plus from a national security point of view.

☐ I am going to ask Sandy Berger, my new national security advisor, to meet with you as soon as possible to begin this dialogue. I want to stay in close touch with you on this.

MS Mail

DATE-TIME 07 January 97 17:35

FROM Kessinger, Jodi

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT IBB [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Armstrong, Fulton T.
Dobbins, James F.
Lorin, Matthew E.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Nancy has made considerable changes to the attached memo. She would like you to review her changes and let us know if there are any problems.

[[8229B.DOC : 4431 in 8229B.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 7 January 97 17:32

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 8229B.DOC
8229
cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR LEON E. PANETTA
ERSKINE BOWLES
HAROLD ICKES

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER
BOB NASH
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: Personnel Appointments Related to International

Broadcasting

Purpose

To determine a strategy for updating membership of the Presidential Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting, the Directorship of Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) and the Directorship of International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB).

Background

President Clinton on April 30, 1994, signed the International Broadcasting Act of 1994, which reorganized the USG's international broadcasting operations, including Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty RFE/RL. With savings projected to surpass \$240 million, the President touted the reorganization as one of our more significant re-engineering accomplishments.

Under the new law, the Bureau of International Broadcasting (BIB) was abolished and replaced by a new bipartisan Broadcasting Board of Governors placed within USIA. This new Board was given the power to "direct and supervise all broadcasting activities including those under the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, and the Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act," as well as "to review, evaluate and supervise grants for broadcasting and related activities ... and to allocate funds appropriated for international broadcasting..." (The Act also declared the sense of Congress that funding of RFE/RL should be assumed by the private sector not later than December 31, 1999.)

USIA, State Department and we believe that the advent of the second administration provides an opportunity to review the various Board memberships, fill vacancies on the Cuban Broadcasting Advisory Board, and lay the groundwork for more effective processes for membership renewal. The apparent conflict in authorities created by the

Broadcasting Act and interpersonal tensions between the BBG, USIA and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting have brought Cuba broadcasting problems to the fore over the past year.

It is also an appropriate time to fill the Directorship of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, vacant for the past year and a half after Director Lobo left in amid staff allegations that he permitted Presidential Advisory Board Chairman Jorge Mas Canosa to exert "undue influence" on personnel and programming decisions at OCB. (A Federal arbitration judge has exonerated OCB of the charges concerning personnel irregularities, but the State Inspector General is still investigating alleged improprieties regarding programming.)

We understand that Senator Helms and other Members of Congress are preparing legislation that they believe will diminish the tensions between broadcast entities. They have concluded that BBG was given too much authority under the International Broadcasting Act of 1994 and seek to rescind the BBG's administrative authorities and reduce its status to that of an advisory board. We believe it is premature, in light of President Clinton's strong support for the Act, to endorse such an initiative. Action on pending personnel issues should help contribute to greater effectiveness and harmony among broadcasting entities. Once these personnel are in place, we should work with the Congress on such legislative adjustment as may prove desirable.

Issue #1: Renewal of the Cuba Advisory Board

The Presidential Advisory Board for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba was formed in 1984 to review the effectiveness of activities carried out under the Cuba Broadcasting Act and make recommendations to the President and the Director of USIA. The current nine-member board (including Chairman Jorge Mas Canosa) was appointed for a three-year

terms by President Reagan in 1984. President Bush did not renew any member's terms after 1989, but the Board and its Chairman continue to serve, until such time as new appointments are made, as authorized by the law. Two members have died, and the terms of the seven others technically expired several years ago.

We recommend that you authorize Presidential Personnel to begin the process of identifying candidates to fill vacancies on the Board and replace sitting members in a phased fashion. A sudden clean sweep of the Chairman and the entire Board is not as important as establishing a reliable mechanism for rotating new members in and out.

Although a controversial figure in many circles, for example, Mr.

Mas is indisputably the most influential Cuban-American leader and has tremendous experience in Cuba broadcasting -- suggesting that an unceremonious and precipitous removal may be counterproductive. We

recommend that Mr. Mas be offered a post serving as "Chairman Emeritus" and ex officio member of the Board, an arrangement which would in the future also be extended to subsequent retiring chairmen.

To prepare for this transition, we recommend that Presidential Personnel be authorized to undertake to appoint a Chair who will serve for a three-year term upon Mr. Mas's departure as a fulltime member of the Board. In consulting on replacements, we would be flexible regarding the timing of the change.

Issue #2: Appointment of Director of Office of Cuba Broadcasting

The absence of a permanent Director of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting for the past 18 months has given rise to problems typical

of prolonged management absences. It has also fueled the allegations that Mr. Mas has "undue influence" over the TV and Radio

Marti's day-to-day operations because the Acting Director, Rolando

Bonachea, is widely seen as a personal friend of Mr. Mas. The allegations remain unproved but have undermined Marti's public

image
and led some on-island listeners to give credence to Cuban
government
propaganda that Radio Marti is merely a political tool of Mr. Mas
and the Cuban-American National Foundation he heads.

We recommend that you authorize Presidential Personnel to
identify
an individual to assume the post of OCB Director. We understand
that
USIA Director Duffey and BBG Chairman David Burke both have
preferred candidates that Personnel may desire to take into
consideration.

Issue #3: Appointment of Director of International Broadcasting Board

The Director of the International Broadcasting Board (IBB), Geoff
Cowan, retired last month. Mr. Cowan, who served concurrently as
Director of the Voice of America, was the primary interface and
implementing agent of the BBG. The 1994 International
Broadcasting
Act provides that this position be chosen by the Chairman of the
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with concurrence of the majority of the Board. However, Mr.
Burke,
himself a Presidential appointment, should be amenable to
cooperating
with the administration on personnel issues. We understand that
Mr.
Burke is considering Mr. Sandy Unger for the position.

We recommend that you encourage Mr. Burke to move expeditiously
and
in close consultation with Presidential Personnel and other
interested parties to hire a new IBB Director or make the
Director of
the Voice of America double-hatted as Chairman of the IBB as
Mr. Cowan was.

Need to Improve Cooperation

At this juncture, we do not see a need to alter the membership of
the Broadcast Board of Governors, which was appointed only 16
months
ago, and its staff. Differing legal interpretations of the BBG's
exact mandate (see attached USIA and BBG legal counsel opinions)
have
made for a difficult transition, and personality issues and
personnel conflicts have exacerbated tensions. We are hopeful

that
the aforementioned personnel changes, coupled with improved cooperation between the BBG, IBB and USIA will obviate the need for additional personnel changes, such as replacement of Mr. Burke as Chairman of the BBG. There is some possibility that Mr. Burke might chose to resign if a decision is made to extend Mr. Mas's tenure as Chairman of the Advisory Board, in which case a replacement would need to be identified.

Keeping Burke will draw opposition from Joe Duffey and some members of the hill. Following Burke's controversial 60 minutes interview in which he criticized Mr. Mas and TV Marti, several members of Congress, including Torricelli and Menendez, wrote to the President asking for Burke's resignation. Tab A includes a memo from Penn Kemble which outlines the problems.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize consultations with the Cuban-American community, Mr. Burke and Mr. Duffey on the proposals outlined above; and, assuming that these consultations go well, that you authorize Presidential Personnel to begin identifying candidates to serve on the Presidential Advisory Board on Cuba Broadcasting, including one to assume the chairmanship; to make Mr. Mas and subsequest chairs "Chairman Emeritus" and ex officio members of the board; to identify a new Director of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting; and to work with BBG to identify a new Director of IBB (or appoint the Director of the Voice of America to serve concurrently as Director of VOA and IBB).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Letter from Penn Kemble

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Robert Bell and Steven Pifer. Subject: RE: Arms Control Transition Paper. (9 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/24/1996-01/24/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5618

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Alan Kreczko to John Scott. Subject: RE: Armscor/Fuchs. (1 page)	01/21/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/24/1996-01/24/1997]

2006-1363-F
vz5618

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 January 97 13:15
FROM Sestak, Joseph A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Biden [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bendick, Gordon L.
CARBON_COPY Baker, James E.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Kreczko, Alan J.
Sparks, John E.

TEXT_BODY

Gordy,
We are working points for what you requested with the below input. We will have final points for you this afternoon; Hold off until we get it back to you. Thanks. r,Joe

From: Kreczko, Alan J.
To: Bendick, Gordon L.; Sestak, Joseph A.
CC: /R, Record at A1; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Subject: Biden [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, January 21, 1997 12:19 PM

Gordie,

Don't know how much you are looking for, but suggest you draw on following points:

-- Biden will also be interested in the procedural handling of the CFE flank agreement, and the ABM-related agreements on demarcation and succession. While his staff said Biden had not formed particular views when we met with them last week, we expect that Biden will press for Senate (as opposed to Congressional action) in order to protect the SFRC's institutional equities.

CFE

-- The CFE flank agreement changes the map which was submitted to the Senate when it gave its advice and consent to the CFE treaty. The map, however, was not technically a part of the CFE treaty package; instead, we explained that the CFE treaty would be implemented consistent with the map. We need to bring the CFE treaty into force by (date), or face a real risk that the Russians will walk away from the CFE treaty altogether.

-- Our legal position is that the change in the map is not an amendment to the CFE treaty, because the map was not part of the CFE treaty.

-- However, we do acknowledge that by changing the map we are changing a "shared understanding" with the Senate concerning the CFE treaty.

-- By virtue of the "Biden condition" which has routinely been attached to disarmament treaties in the aftermath of the Sofaer re-interpretation of the ABM treaty, changes in shared understandings require the advice and consent of the Senate or Congressional authorization.

-- Last year, we decided to pursue the second alternative -- Congressional authorization -- and we submitted the flank agreement to both houses of Congress.

-- Biden may urge us to revisit that decision, (as Trent Lott has). He will concede that Congressional approval is a Constitutionally available option. However, he will argue that the Senate's expectation is that deviations from shared understandings with the Senate will be resubmitted to the Senate.

-- This may be one on which we can accomodate Biden and Lott. Bob Bell has already let the House International relations and National Security Committees and the SFRC know that we were reconsidering submitting the CFE package to the Senate.

-- However, the House side reacted negatively to this suggestion. They like the added institutional role accorded to the House in our decision last year to submit the CFE package to both houses. The HIRC staff has sent a STAFFDEL out to assess the flank agreement, and promised quick hearings and action on a resolution of approval. They say that they can then attach the resolution of approval to a conference item, where the Senate can approve without having had the flank agreement go through the SFRC (where, they suggested, Sen. Helms might bottle it up.)

-- You might tell Biden that we are considering resubmitting the CFE flank agreement to the Senate, and ask his view of the prospects of Sen. Helms allowing prompt action on it.

ABM

-- We have negotiated, but not signed, three agreements concerning the ABM treaty: (1)a succession MOU; (2)an Agreed Statement on demarcation; and (3)a confidence building agreement.

-- We have informed the House and Senate that we believe the President has authority to conclude the succession MOU without any further Senate or Congressional action. This is consistent with numerous other cases where we have recognized successor States to the soviet union as party to our agreements with the Soviet Union. Biden's staff asked for more

information on the precedents, but did not challenge our legal position.

-- The ASD is more complicated. We have acknowledged that the ASD substantively modifies our obligations under the ABM treaty (by changing the criteria by which ABM compliance is measured).

-- In a formal written opinion we have shared with the COngress, DOJ/OLC advised that the Congress (not just the Senate) can authorize the President to enter into agreements which modify pre-existing treaty obligations. We have also said, without reaching a definitive conclusion, that a provision in the 1996 DOD authorization may have "pre-authorized" the ASD which we negotiated. Were we to conclude this pre-authorization existed, we would not need further action by the Congress or the Senate.

-- Biden's staff probed us on the DOJ conclusion, without staking out their own Constitutional view. They also asked us to explain the "preauthorization" argument, again without taking their own view. They predicted, however, that Biden would argue (either legally or politically) that any substantive modification to a treaty approved by the Senate should come back to the Senate, rather than the Congress.

-- We have told the House and Senate that it is premature for us to make a decision on how to proceed on the ASD, since it has been signed and the Russians may not agree to its entry into force anytime soon. We have also committed to consult closely before making such a decision.

-- W

-- The

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 January 97 16:13
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Meeting with Sen. Biden [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Biernacki, Eileen V.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sens, Andrew D.
Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Fried, Daniel
Kelly, Sandra L.
Lindsay, James M.
Moody, Angelyn D.
Mulligan, George D.
Pifer, Steven K.
Seaton, James B.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
Witkowski, Anne A.

TEXT_BODY

Note for Sandy:

You are scheduled to meet with Sen. Biden tomorrow. The meeting was at your request.

He will raise CWC, ABM demarcation, CFE/NATO flank issue and NATO enlargement.

-- On CWC, he will want to know how involved the President intends to be in getting it through the Senate. He may ask whether or not there will be a White House "event" and to what extent we are working with leadership-- Republican and Democratic.

On the first point, I suggest that you indicate that an event is under consideration but you don't know precisely when it might take place-- a lot has been going on with the inauguration, preparing for the State of the Union, etc.

On the second point, you should debrief him on the Lott (Smith, Kyl, Nickles) meeting. He could be particularly helpful in getting a resolution that we could live with out of SFRC. You may also want to indicate to him that the White House wants and needs the Dems to play an active role in securing CWC ratification. We understand that Daschle is in the process of forming a parallel group to work the treaty. Members include: Daschle, Biden, Levin, Dorgan, Dodd, Lieberman, Glenn, Kerrey and Sarbanes.

-- On ABM demarcation, the issue that many Senators on both sides of the aisle are concerned about is whether changes to the treaty have been preauthorized. Alan Kreczko has prepared some talking points for you on the legal arguments of whether we need to get Hill approval for changes to the treaty. (Alan will be attending the meeting with Senator Biden tomorrow.)

-- On CFE/flank issue, in addition to any substantive problems the Hill may have with our altering the treaty, there is the issue of whether we will submit changes to the treaty for Senate ratification or try to get both the House and the Senate to pass legislation to permit the changes. Anne Witkowsky has prepared some points for you on this.

-- On NATO enlargement, he has been a supporter and suggested that Slovenia should be on the short list of nations to be tentatively admitted in the first round. He will want to know that we will be engaged in a public and Hill effort to secure support for enlargement.

-- You may also want to raise with him the issue of a more funds for the 150 account. He may, however, want to talk about more money for resources in exchange for some consolidation of foreign affairs agencies. You may also want to raise with him the need to get Hill support for a program for dealing with UN arrears. I expect he will be willing to work with us in getting a proposal through Congress.

POINTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION (We have not attached talking points on NATO enlargement and the 150 account.):

[[ABMTMD.DOC : 4105 in ABMTMD.DOC]] [[CWCSBID.DOC : 4106 in CWCSBID.DOC]]
]] [[CFECONG.DOC : 4107 in CFECONG.DOC]]

FILE DATE 21 January 97 14:41

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** ABMTMD.DOC

ABM/TMD DEMARCATION AND MULTILATERALIZATION

BACKGROUND

☐ We have negotiated, but not signed, three agreements concerning the ABM treaty: (1) a succession MOU; (2) an Agreed Statement on demarcation; and (3) a confidence building agreement.

☐ We have informed the House and Senate that we believe the President has authority to conclude the succession MOU without any further Senate or Congressional action (in the Livingston Report and a follow-up letter by Jack Quinn). This is consistent with numerous other cases where we have recognized successor States to the Soviet Union as party to our agreements with the Soviet Union.

[FYI: Biden's staff asked for more information on the precedents, but did not challenge our legal position.]

☐ The ASD is more complicated. We have acknowledged (again, in the Livingston Report and a follow-up letter by Jack Quinn) that the ASD substantively modifies our obligations under the ABM treaty (by changing the criteria by which ABM compliance is measured).

☐ In a formal written opinion we have shared with the Congress, DOJ/OLC advised that the Congress (not just the Senate) can authorize the President to enter into agreements which modify pre-existing treaty obligations. We have also said, without reaching a definitive conclusion, that a provision in the 1996 DOD authorization may have "pre-authorized" the ASD which we negotiated. Were we to conclude this pre-authorization existed, we would not need further action by the Congress or the Senate.

☐ Biden's staff probed us on the DOJ conclusion, without staking out their own Constitutional view. They also asked us to explain the "preauthorization" argument, again without taking their own view.

They predicted, however, that Biden would argue that any substantive modification to a treaty approved by the Senate should come back to the Senate, rather than the Congress.

☐ If Biden maintains that the Treaty modification should come back to the Senate, his argument may well be political rather than legal (i.e., while not legally required, the Administration would be aided in what it is asking the Senate to do on other important matters by maintaining comity with the Senate by asking for its advice and consent on this issue.)

Talking Points

We recommend that you inform Senator Biden what we have told the House and Senate:

- ☐ It is premature for us to make a decision on how to proceed on the Agreed Statement on demarcation, since it has not been signed and the Russians may not agree to its entry into force anytime soon.
- ☐ We are committed to consult closely before making such a decision.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 January 97 15:23

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCSBID.DOC

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

- ☐ As you know, this is a top priority for the President for the first months of 1997
- ☐ Ratification is essential in April, or we won't be a Party to the Convention at entry into force, which will have grave national security and economic consequences. This will certainly hurt all U.S. chemical companies
- ☐ The President is committed to ratification of the CWC. He has talked to Sen. Lott twice. Two weeks ago I met with Lott and other Republicans to discuss the way ahead
- ☐ The meeting resulted in Lott agreeing to set up a group of Senators to work with us to see if we can arrive at agreements on the CWC. The Lott Group consists of Senators Helms, Kyl, Smith, Thurman, Warner, McCain, Stevens, Nickles, and Shelby

- ☐ We will make a good faith effort to work with this group and create a process that culminates in ratification.
- ☐ We very much want to work with you and other key Senators. We hope that you will agree to play a key leadership role both in your Committee and when the CWC goes to the floor.
- ☐ We are still hoping to do a ratification rollout event at the White House in the near future to underscore the widespread support for the Convention among the business community, retired military (flag) officers and veterans, the NGOs and others. The exact timing is still being worked, given the Inaugural, State of the Union, and other demands on the President's time. The President and his new foreign policy team remain determined to see this Convention through a successful conclusion.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 January 97 16:10

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CFECONG.DOC

CFE Flank Agreement

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When we transmitted the flank package on August 1, we decided to

pursue the second alternative -- approval by both houses. We did so because we did not believe we could obtain a two-thirds Senate vote, in particular because of our concern that Helms' opposition would prevent us from meeting the December 15 deadline for approval. Provisional application of the agreement has been extended, giving us now until May 15 to obtain approval, which we must have by that time. If we do not, we risk failure to agree on extending provisional application a third time and the subsequent unravelling of the deal along with a halt to any hope of early progress on CFE adaptation.

Biden may urge us to revisit the decision to seek legislative approval (as Trent Lott has). He will concede that Congressional approval is a Constitutionally available option but will argue that the Senate's expectation is that deviations from shared understandings with the Senate will be resubmitted to the Senate.

We are reconsidering our options internally, but have not made a decision yet on which route stands the greatest chance of success by May 15. Upon learning this, the House International Relations and National Security Committees have reacted negatively to the idea that we might take this to the Senate only. They like the added institutional role accorded to the House; the HIRC staff has promised quick hearings and action on a resolution of approval. They say that they can then attach the resolution of approval to a conference item, where the Senate can approve without having had the flank agreement go through the SFRC (where, they suggested, Senator Helms might bottle it up.)

Points

☐ We believe that the change in the CFE map is not an amendment, but that by changing the map we are changing a "shared understanding" with the Senate concerning the treaty. In accordance with the "Biden condition," we have two options for obtain approval to a shared understanding -- two-thirds vote of the Senate or legislative approval by both houses.

☐ We chose the legislative approval route when we submitted the document to Congress on August 1.

☐ As you (Senator Biden) are aware from Secretary-designate's testimony (questions for the record), however, the Administration is revisiting the issue of the method of approval for the CFE flank agreement. We expect to make an early decision on how to proceed. We are particularly concerned about timely action.

☐ We would be interested in your recommendation on this matter and in particular the likelihood of prompt action on the agreement if we were to bring it to the Senate for a two-thirds vote.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 January 97 20:13

FROM Cicio, Kristen K.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: Meeting with Sen. Biden [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Danvers, William C.
Harris, Elisa D.
Witkowski, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bass, Peter E.
Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Caravelli, John M.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Davis, William K.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Edwards, Joan
Feeley, John F.
Fried, Daniel
Hall, Wilma G.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Moody, Angelyn D.
Mulligan, George D.
Peters, Mary A.
Quinn, Mary E.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Schmidt, John R.
Seaton, James B.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Veit, Katherine M.
Vershbow, Alexander R.

TEXT_BODY

Bill,

SRB wants to prep for his meeting w/Senator Biden at 10:30 on Wednesday. He wants someone here that can address each issue mentioned below. Please call me so I can invite the right people. Thx.

From: Danvers, William C.
To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1; Fried, Daniel; Lindsay, James M.; Pifer, Steven K.;
Vershbow, Alexander R.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @DEFENSE -
Defense
Policy
Subject: Meeting with Sen. Biden [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, January 21, 1997 04:13 PM

[[ABMTMD.DOC : 5208 in ABMTMD.DOC]][[CWCSBID.DOC : 5209 in
CWCSBID.DOC
]][[CFECONG.DOC : 5210 in CFECONG.DOC]]

Note for Sandy:

You are scheduled to meet with Sen. Biden tomorrow. The meeting was at your request.

He will raise CWC, ABM demarcation, CFE/NATO flank issue and NATO enlargement.

-- On CWC, he will want to know how involved the President intends to be in getting it through the Senate. He may ask whether or not there will be a White House "event" and to what extent we are working with leadership-- Republican and Democratic.

On the first point, I suggest that you indicate that an event is under consideration but you don't know precisely when it might take place-- a lot has been going on with the inauguration, preparing for the State of the Union, etc.

On the second point, you should debrief him on the Lott (Smith, Kyl, Nickles) meeting. He could be particularly helpful in getting a resolution that we could live with out of SFRC. You may also want to indicate to him that the White House wants and needs the Dems to play an active role in securing CWC ratification. We understand that Daschle is in the process of forming a parallel group to work the treaty. Members include: Daschle, Biden, Levin, Dorgan, Dodd, Lieberman, Glenn, Kerrey and Sarbanes.

-- On ABM demarcation, the issue that many Senators on both sides of the aisle are concerned about is whether changes to the treaty have been preauthorized. Alan Kreczko has prepared some talking points for you on the legal arguments of whether we need to get Hill approval for changes to the treaty. (Alan will be attending the meeting with Senator Biden tomorrow.)

-- On CFE/flank issue, in addition to any substantive problems the Hill may have with our altering the treaty, there is the issue of whether we will

submit changes to the treaty for Senate ratification or try to get both the House and the Senate to pass legislation to permit the changes. Anne Witkowski has prepared some points for you on this.

-- On NATO enlargement, he has been a supporter and suggested that Slovenia should be on the short list of nations to be tentatively admitted in the first round. He will want to know that we will be engaged in a public and Hill effort to secure support for enlargement.

-- You may also want to raise with him the issue of a more funds for the 150 account. He may, however, want to talk about more money for resources in exchange for some consolidation of foreign affairs agencies. You may also want to raise with him the need to get Hill support for a program for dealing with UN arrears. I expect he will be willing to work with us in getting a proposal through Congress.

POINTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION (We have not attached talking points on NATO enlargement and the 150 account.):

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 January 97 14:41

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

ABMTMD.DOC

ABM/TMD DEMARCATION AND MULTILATERALIZATION

BACKGROUND

☐ We have negotiated, but not signed, three agreements concerning the ABM treaty: (1)a succession MOU; (2)an Agreed Statement on demarcation; and (3)a confidence building agreement.

☐ We have informed the House and Senate that we believe the President has authority to conclude the succession MOU without any further Senate or Congressional action (in the Livingston Report and a follow-up letter by Jack Quinn). This is consistent with numerous other cases where we have recognized successor States to the soviet union as party to our agreements with the Soviet Union.

[FYI: Biden's staff asked for more information on the precedents, but did not challenge our legal position.]

☐ The ASD is more complicated. We have acknowledged (again, in the Livingston Report and a follow-up letter by Jack Quinn) that the ASD substantively modifies our obligations under the ABM treaty

(by changing the criteria by which ABM compliance is measured).

☐ In a formal written opinion we have shared with the Congress, DOJ/OLC advised that the Congress (not just the Senate) can authorize the President to enter into agreements which modify pre-existing treaty obligations. We have also said, without reaching a definitive conclusion, that a provision in the 1996 DOD

authorization may have "pre-authorized" the ASD which we negotiated. Were we to conclude this pre-authorization existed, we

would not need further action by the Congress or the Senate.

☐ Biden's staff probed us on the DOJ conclusion, without staking out their own Constitutional view. They also asked us to explain the "preauthorization" argument, again without taking their own view.

They predicted, however, that Biden would argue that any substantive modification to a treaty approved by the Senate should

come back to the Senate, rather than the Congress.

☐ If Biden maintains that the Treaty modification should come back to the Senate, his argument may well be political rather than legal (i.e., while not legally required, the Administration would be aided in what it is asking the Senate to do on other important matters by maintaining comity with the Senate by asking for its advice and consent on this issue.)

Talking Points

We recommend that you inform Senator Biden what we have told the House and Senate:

☐ It is premature for us to make a decision on how to proceed on the Agreed Statement on demarcation, since it has not been signed and the Russians may not agree to its entry into force anytime soon.

☐ We are committed to consult closely before making such a decision.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

21 January 97 15:23

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CWCSBID.DOC

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 January 97 20:20
FROM Cicio, Kristen K.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Meeting with Sen. Biden [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Fried, Daniel
CARBON_COPY Bendick, Gordon L.
 Burrell, Christina L.
 Danvers, William C.
 Davis, William K.
 Dowling, J. Nicholas
 Feeley, John F.
 Lindsey, Christine J.
 Marshall, Betty A.
 Maxfield, Nancy H.
 Peters, Mary A.
 Schmidt, John R.
 Vershbow, Alexander R.

TEXT_BODY

SRB said he didn't think he did need points but if you are available please come to the 10:30 pre-brief. Thx.

From: Fried, Daniel
 To: Bass, Peter E.; Cicio, Kristen K.
 CC: /R, Record at A1; Schmidt, John R.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
 Subject: FW: Meeting with Sen. Biden [UNCLASSIFIED]
 Date: Tuesday, January 21, 1997 04:29 PM

[[ABMTMD.DOC : 5189 in ABMTMD.DOC]][[CWCSBID.DOC : 5190 in CWCSBID.DOC]][[CFECONG.DOC : 5191 in CFECONG.DOC]]

Does Sandy need talkers on NATO enlargement?

From: Danvers, William C.
 To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
 CC: /R, Record at A1; Fried, Daniel; Lindsay, James M.; Pifer, Steven K.; Vershbow, Alexander R.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
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- ☐ We would be interested in your recommendation on this matter and in particular the likelihood of prompt action on the agreement if we were to bring it to the Senate for a two-thirds vote.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 23 January 97 15:54
FROM Naplan, Steven J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT UN Strategy [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Sonenshine, Tara D.
CARBON_COPY Naplan, Steven J.
TEXT_BODY
disparate documents merged into attachement.

Still waiting on paper from OMB's Gordon Adams (ph: 5-4657).

[[UNPAPER.DOC : 3882 in UNPAPER.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 23 January 97 15:53
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** UNPAPER.DOC

UN ARREARS

GOAL

The immediate goal of our diplomatic, legislative and public affairs strategy on UN arrears is to obtain a Congressional supplemental advance appropriation by May in order to address our \$1 billion arrearage with the UN. Additionally, we seek to persuade other nations to a 10% reduction in charges to the USG by the UN and other international organizations. Throughout, we seek to improve the public and Congressional perceptions of the United Nations by stressing the importance of American leadership in the world body, our commitment to the international community, and the necessity of American engagement to achieving our own foreign policy objectives.

The influential community is supportive and poised to organize an effort on our behalf. Media interest has never been higher. And, we have a strong team of Administration officials who are ready to

make
persuasive, public arguments.

STRATEGY

1. Diplomacy:

- a) Negotiate with the UN for a lower USG assessment rate and smaller UN agency budgets by holding out the threat of withdrawal from certain organizations.
- b) Look to Secretary General Annan for budget cuts to the UN and its specialized agencies and to actively support USG efforts to lower our assessment rates.
- c) Issue worldwide demarches and work with UN specialized agencies to develop their 1998-99 biennial budgets.

2. Legislative:

- a) Brief Congressional leaders on our UN arrears proposal for a \$1 billion supplemental advance appropriation for FY 99 in exchange for a reduction in USG assessments plus other UN reforms.

While there is no love lost for the UN on Capitol Hill, there exists at present a relatively friendly atmosphere for this proposal. This plan will only work, however, if it receives high level Administration and Hill attention. The President has to make this matter a priority with Congressional leadership.

- b) In addition to working with the leadership and authorizers such as Sen. Helms, we also have to spend a great deal of time working with the appropriators who, after all, have the power of the purse. It is with them that the deal will ultimately be struck.

Despite the fact that last year's "grand bargain" with Congress (UN reform in exchange for Congressional funding of arrears) collapsed

amid election year politics, it is still a good plan. As such, we need to begin the process of detailing to Hill principals what reforms we are prepared to seek at the UN. NSC will launch this process with assistance from State.

3) The White House, NSC, State Department and OMB are already working hard with key members of Congress to form an Executive/Legislative working group to hammer out the details in time for Senate passage of the advance appropriation before individual U.N. agencies begin to formulate their biennial budgets (beginning in April).

3. Public Affairs:

Our public affairs effort must capitalize on the existing momentum, using a combination of both "retail" and "wholesale" communications strategies.

a) The President, and other principals, must articulate to the American people, as part of our resources argument, the necessity of American leadership within the UN.

b) USG leadership must explain the importance and price of American leadership in ways that Americans can understand and appreciate with a mind toward targeting our message for greatest legislative impact.

c) Take advantage of the existing broad-based public coalition in support of resources to promote public and Congressional support of the payment-of-arrears-for-UN-reform-trade-off.

The calendar which follows describes key legislative and public affairs events that need to occur between now and mid-April in order for this plan to succeed.

CALENDAR

JAN. 15-31:

1. POTUS-HILL MEETINGS: The President uses a variety of Congressional meetings -- Leadership, Foreign Policy, Budget -- to signal that the resources budget is a priority. (around 1/23)

FEB. 1-15:

1. POTUS-SOTU: Have President mention the proposal in the State of the Union. (2/4)

2. POTUS-HILL MEETINGS: President needs to stress this in meetings with leadership; Hill foreign policy leadership; and key appropriators and budget committee members. At the leadership meeting, President should suggest formation of House and Senate working groups on how to handle arrears. (White House LA/NSC lead)

3. ADMINISTRATION-HILL LEADERSHIP MEETINGS/CALLS: by NSC, White House and State with leadership (Gingrich, Lott, Daschle, Gephardt) on UN arrears. (NSC/State lead)

4. OMB/NSC CALLS TO APPROPRIATORS: (Livingston, Obey, Stevens, Byrd and key staff) to raise awareness of arrears initiative. (OMB/NSC lead)

5. STATE PRINCIPALS CALLS TO HIRC/SFRC: State Department principals calls to key members of House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee to raise awareness of arrears initiative. (State)

6. BUDGET RELEASE: President's Budget released coupled with strong statement on need for increased resources, followed by briefings by Administration officials for members, staff and press on UN arrears supplemental as part of Function 150 discussion. (State lead) (2/6)

7. POTUS-CONSTITUENCY OUTREACH: The President drops-by high level constituency/influentials briefing(s) around the budget

submission.
(around 2/6)

8. CABINET AND SUB-CABINET OUTREACH: Cabinet and sub-cabinet officials will "fan out" with speaking and event schedules following the budget submission. (2/6-12)

9. SECSTATE OUTREACH: Secretary Albright will begin a high profile media tour after her swearing-in. This is a key opportunity for her to begin making the resources case nationally.

10. SECSTATE ADDRESS: Secretary Albright plans a major address.(February)

11. CONSTITUENCY BRIEFINGS: Briefings for important constituency groups will take place around the budget submission on February 6th at the White House and agencies.

12. MEDIA OUTREACH: The budget submission will generate a handful of major national stories and editorials on the resources battle.

The New York Times has already begun a piece. We will work with individual outlets writing this story, and, in other cases, we will generate stories. This will continue as necessary.

13. INFLUENTIALS OUTREACH: Smaller meetings and breakfasts will be held for key members of the influential community around the budget submission on February 6.

14. OPINION OUTREACH: A large-scale editorial board, op-ed and columnist strategy will also be implemented around the budget submission. An organized, aggressive effort will continue through April.

FEB. 16-28:

1. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUPS: State/NSC/OMB working groups established to develop acceptable conditions for advance appropriations with Congress.

2. ADMINISTRATION-HILL: Begin meetings with Hill working groups.

3. MATERIALS FOR HILL: State and USUN to prepare fact sheets on the UN and UN reforms for distribution on the Hill.

4. BRIEFINGS FOR HILL COALITIONS: Begin briefings of various House organizations-- Blue Dogs, Chowder Society, etc.-- on UN and UN reforms.

5. LEGISLATIVE TARGETING: State, USUN, NSC to develop target list of Senators for Amb. Richardson to meet with to discuss UN, arrears and UN reforms.

MARCH 1-15:

1. HILL TESTIMONY: Possible hearings in House and Senate followed by House appropriation committee mark up.

2. ADMINISTRATION-HILL: Continue meetings with House and Senate working groups.

3. MATERIALS DISTRO TO HILL: Distribute fact sheets, etc. on Hill. Continue House and Senate meetings.

4. WORKING GROUP UN VISIT: Arrange a visit of working groups to UN-- if not members then staff.

5. POTUS RADIO ADDRESS: The President uses a Saturday radio address to underscore the importance of American leadership and the need for adequate resources. This can be done in conjunction with the issuing of a report that details the adverse ramifications of continued decreased funding. (date tbd in March)

6. POTUS EVENT: Identify one additional presidential resources-related event or speaking opportunity in March.

7. CONTINUED OUTREACH TO SUPPORT GROUPS: After the initial push around the budget submission, regular briefings, meetings and conference calls will be arranged to sustain the momentum throughout the legislative process. A consistent outreach apparatus will be

put
in place to be in contact with these important groups, i.e.,
weekly
faxes.

MARCH 16-31:

1. **ADMINISTRATION-HILL:** Continue House and Senate meetings.
2. **UN BRIEFINGS ON HILL:** Arrange for key UN official to come down and brief members working groups and met with key Senators and Members about status of reforms.
3. **HAC VOTE:** Possible full House Appropriations Committee approval of supplemental followed by House floor action.

APRIL 1-15:

1. **SENATE COMMITTEE AND FLOOR ACTION:** Possible Senate full committee markup and Senate floor passage, followed by House/Senate Conference and final passage by each chamber of Conference Report.
2. **POTUS EVENT:** The President participates in an event (tbd) prior to the Congressional Adoption of the Budget Resolution. (pre-4/15)
3. **POTUS LATIN AMERICA EVENT:** The President participates in an event (tbd) with the Peace Corps during his Latin America trip. (April)
4. **PRINCIPAL AND SUB-PRINCIPAL OUTREACH:** All relevant principles and sub-principles will have a regular "resources" speaking schedule through April. Specific, high profile, speaking engagements will also be designed around key moments, i.e., budget submission, April 15 congressional decisions or the U.N. arrears agreement.
5. **POTUS STATEMENT UPON AGREEMENT:** The President makes a statement when a U.N. arrears agreement is reached. (date tbd)
6. **MEDIA OUTREACH UPON AGREEMENT:** We will devise thorough press plans around the announcement of a U.N. arrears agreement

A regular effort to target regional press--radio, editorials, op-eds, internet, mailings -- will operate in conjunction with the congressional strategy.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 January 97 19:46

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO

Abdulmalik, April B.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Andreasen, Steven P.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Bakke, Kyle D.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Bedell, Blair B.
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Biernacki, Eileen V.
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer
Brown, Dallas
Brown, Nancy E.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya

Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davis, William K.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Flessas, Dan
Florio, Elaine
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Gladbach, Damon J.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Houck, Baerbel K.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.

Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Martinez, Alejandro
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Moffett, Julia
Moody, Angelyn D.
Moran, Betsy Q.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Gwyn M. Parker

Parramore, Carl W.
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Saunders, John W.
Schifter, Richard
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sens, Andrew D.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Showalter, Victoria A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
Van Tassel, David S.

Veit, Katherine M.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Monday, January 27. Thank you.

[[JAN24GUI.DOC : 4876 in JAN24GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 24 January 97 12:55

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** JAN24GUI.DOC

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

January 24, 1997

Latin America

Economic Consolidation

UN Secretary General

Warheads

Thailand/AMRAAM

Eastern Slavonia

China/Hong Kong

Colombia

Sudan

North Korea

Serbia

Cuba

South Africa/Syria

CWC

Russia

Middle East

Bosnia

Cyprus

Peru

Northern Ireland

Saudi Arabia

Gulf War Illnesses

LATIN AMERICA -- ANTI-DRUG PLANES

Background: Dallas Morning News has a story this morning (1/24) on U.S. efforts to create "anti-drug air force" among Latin American countries.

Points

- ☐ There is an ongoing effort using aircraft for counter-drug purposes in the Latin American region.
- ☐ This effort includes most recently a drawdown of helicopters and C-26 aircraft from the Defense Department for transfer to a number of countries in the region for counter-narcotics purposes, including Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Barbados. Earlier, A-37 aircraft had been provided to a number of countries which they have used for counter-drug purposes.

☐ There is a continuing inter-agency process to evaluate our counterdrug efforts and consider options that would enhance our efforts. The plan mentioned in the article was one of a number of options that are part of that process.

PROPOSAL TO CONSOLIDATE EX-IM, OPIC AND TDA

(ONLY IF RAISED): There was a meeting on this at the White House Thursday morning.

Consensus view was that while interesting, the Administration is not going to move forward with anything like this. We will, however, look at ways to improve efficiency and agency coordination, and the NEC has asked us to report back in one month on suggestions.

UN SECRETARY GENERAL

Q: Today's Washington Post today portrays Annan as reversing himself and agreeing to "consultations" with the Congress. Aren't you concerned that such consultations encroach upon Presidential prerogatives?

A: The term "consultations" came from the Washington Post, not from Senator Helms or Secretary General Annan. On the contrary, Helms and Annan both spoke in more general terms of the need to improve the relationship between the UN and Capitol Hill and to keep up a healthy and constructive dialogue so that each party understands the legitimate concerns of the other. We wholeheartedly support these activities and do not see them in any way as affecting the President's authority to conduct U.S. foreign policy.

Q: CNN said yesterday that Annan has received "promises" that the U.S. will pay the \$1 billion it owes the UN. No doubt this "promise" has come as something of a surprise to Congressional appropriators. Were such promises made?

A: No. In his discussions with Secretary General Annan, President Clinton reaffirmed his personal desire to pay our arrears, and told Mr. Annan that we are currently working with the Congress to develop bipartisan support for a plan to pay our arrears, put the UN on a firm financial footing, and encourage further UN reforms. The President will submit his budget on February 6, right after the State of the Union. We will be happy to discuss the details at that time. In the interim, we will be continuing our discussions with Congress.

Q: On NPR yesterday morning, Annan said he would not accept UN reforms as a precondition to payment of US arrears. This sounds a lot like Boutros-Ghali. Are we going to pay without any conditions?

A: The Kofi Annan you just saw in the Roosevelt Room sounded nothing like Boutros-Ghali. President Clinton sympathizes with Secretary General Annan's position that our payments to the UN are legally binding obligations and should be paid on time and in full. President Clinton also impressed upon the Secretary General, however, the importance of fundamentally changing the way the UN does business so that it can do more with less. Furthermore, as someone who went to college in the United States and spent a great deal of time in this country, Secretary General Annan understands that the Congress holds the power of the purse and that it too is very concerned with reforming the UN.

STUDY OF NUCLEAR WARHEAD CUTS

Q: Is the Pentagon studying the possibility of seeking an agreement with Russia on new cuts in strategic nuclear arms, below those called for in "START II," as reported in today's [January 23] Washington Post?"

A: Lifting the threat of nuclear weapons destruction and limiting

their dangerous spread
remains at the top of my foreign policy agenda.

Over the past four years, we have accomplished a great deal in this area, including the detargeting of U.S. and Russian missiles; the entry into force of the START I Treaty; the complete denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; Senate ratification of the START II Treaty; and the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

We are currently working with the Russian government to achieve Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. And we are prepared to work on further reductions in strategic nuclear arms once START II enters into force.

Within our own government, we are doing the necessary planning within Defense and other agencies to support those negotiations, so that we can move quickly once START II enters into force.

[If asked: Are you prepared to "leapfrog" START II and move on to negotiations on START III?]

We have no intention of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with negotiations on a "START III." The ratification of START II by Russia remains an essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

[If asked: Are you prepared to commit to the elimination of nuclear weapons, as called for by the former head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Lee Butler?]

I said at the United Nations this fall that the United States looks forward to a new century "in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced, and ultimately eliminated."

[If asked: Is the Administration prepared to enter into negotiations on a "START III" framework, or agree now to a target for deeper cuts, as an inducement for Russia to ratify

START II?]

President Yeltsin and I asked our experts some time ago to conduct a dialogue on how we might adapt our nuclear forces to the changed international security situation, including the possibility of further reductions.

We have no intention, however, of setting aside START II, and moving ahead instead with the conclusion of a START III agreement. Ratification of START II by Russia remains an essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.

THAILAND -- SALE OF F/A-18S

Q: Can you comment on the status of our sale of F/A-18s to Thailand, rumored to include advanced air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs).*

A: In making any decision to sell the F/A-18s to Thailand we would balance the security and self-defense needs of an important treaty ally with our non-proliferation concerns.

Under our non-proliferation and conventional arms transfer guidelines, our policy is not to introduce new levels of weapons technology into regions that do not already have the technology.

We wanted Thailand to remain equipped with U.S. fighter aircraft to meet its legitimate defense and security needs.

The U.S. will not be the first to introduce into Southeast Asia an advanced missile system such as the AMRAAM.

* Advanced medium range air-to-air missile

EASTERN SLAVONIA

Q: How do you respond to yesterday's (1/21) New York Times report

that tensions are
rising in Eastern Slavonia?

A: The peaceful re-integration of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia has been an important objective of U.S. foreign policy toward the region and was a critical part of the negotiations in Dayton.

We seek peaceful right of return for ethnic Croats who were driven from their homes at the beginning of the hostilities in the region, as well as the full respect for the human rights of those Serbs who remain in the area.

We urge the parties to work together to prevent mass migrations out of the area when it returns to Croatian control this year. Thus far, we have been pleased with the accomplishments of Jaques Klein, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, in dealing with this vexing issue.

CHINA/HONG KONG

Background: A Chinese-appointed panel on Sunday called for the amendment or repeal of some 25 civil liberties laws in Hong Kong. Press reaction has been decidedly negative, but we should refrain from overreacting until we have more details on the exact nature of the proposed reforms. There may be an element of political bluster in this announcement; it is not yet clear how strongly the PRC will hold to this line; and we are not sure how Governor Tung will react.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to China's proposed changes to civil liberties statutes in Hong Kong?

A: The U.S. is deeply concerned with any attempts to weaken basic freedoms and civil liberties in Hong Kong. We consider maintenance of these freedoms to be vital to confidence in Hong Kong's future. We hope that China and the future government of Hong Kong will carefully consider the impact these actions.

COLOMBIA

☐ The decision on Friday to impose light sentences on the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers dramatically demonstrates the need for reforming Colombia's laws to increase penalties for drug traffickers.

☐ USG again urges the Colombian Government and Congress to increase penalties on drug traffickers and prevent them from doing drug business from jail.

[IF ASKED]

☐ USG will take these developments very seriously as it prepares the next certification review.

SUDAN/SANCTIONS

Q: How can you say you are serious about terrorism and then exempt Syria and Sudan from sanctions?

A: It was this Administration that put Sudan on the Terrorism List in 1993. Sudan was immediately made ineligible for most foreign assistance as well as any equipment sales that might increase its military potential.

This Administration also lead the effort in the UN to obtain sanctions against Sudan and has worked effectively with Sudan's neighbors to contain Sudan's aggressive ambitions.

In addition, there have been long standing comprehensive embargoes on five of the seven nations the U.S. lists as state sponsors of terrorism: Libya, Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea.

Such total embargoes have never been applied by any U.S. Administration or Congress to the other two nations on that list, Syria and Sudan. We have,

however, placed sanctions on them for their support of terrorism. Syria, like Sudan, is not eligible for arms transfers or U.S. foreign assistance.

The new anti-terrorism legislation, which went into effect last year, is intended to ban the transfers of funds that would support acts of terrorism in this country. Treasury, in consultation with the State Department, interpreted the law as we believe it was intended, to prohibit the transfer of money from terrorist states to the U.S. which could be used for terrorist actions here. It does not ban commercial transactions. If the individual transactions are found not to pose a risk of funding terrorism, then they may be permitted, but financial transfers between the U.S. and Syria and Sudan are closely reviewed. These regulations were put in place in August of 1996.

We have and will continue to lead the world in vigorous efforts to oppose support for terrorism, including by Syria and Sudan.

NORTH KOREA

FOUR-PARTY TALKS

Background: Yesterday's (1/14) Washington Times reports that there will be a joint briefing "to plan for a four-nation conference on a peace settlement on the Korean peninsula." It also reports that North Korea will be represented by Kim Gye Gwan.

Background NOT for release: We are in the final stages of negotiations with North Korea to determine location and level of participants for the Joint Briefing. In all likelihood, we will agree on New York as the venue. The sticking point is level of participation. Following the joint briefing there will be a "high-level" bilateral meeting between the U.S. and the DPRK. North Korean Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan will represent the North at this bilateral meeting. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charles Kartman will represent the

United States. The South Koreans want the North to attend the joint briefing at the same level as they attend the bilateral meeting with the U.S. The North currently indicates that they will attend the joint briefing at a level below Kim Gye Gwan.

Q: Are the United States, North Korea and South Korea meeting 29 January to make PLANS for a four-nation peace conference?

A: North Korea agreed to attend a Joint Briefing on 29 January given by the United States and South Korea to explain (not plan) Presidents Clinton and Kim's proposal of 16 April 1996 for Four-Party peace talks which would involve North and South Korea, the United States and China. North Korea has not yet determined who they will send to lead their delegation. The location of the joint briefing has not been agreed upon yet.

SERBIA

Serbian Elections -- General

☐ Serbian authorities have made announcements that appear to concede opposition victories in some municipalities, but the regime continues to stall for time with legal tactics; we remain skeptical until the duly-elected members of the opposition are able to take their seats and begin work.

☐ It remains that Serbian authorities must implement the OSCE Gonzalez report recommendations and recognize all opposition victories in the November 17 elections. Until Milosevic recognizes the will of the Serbian people, he will remain isolated.

☐ We hope that this situation can be resolved without violence and that the people of Serbia will be vindicated in their desire for the implementation of democratic norms and processes. We condemn any police interference with the rights of the Serbian people to voice their protests.

Any use of force by Serbian authorities will only further their international isolation.

□ We and our allies remain engaged in seeking ways to gain Milosevic's acceptance of the election results as an essential step for the resolution of the situation in Serbia. Last week, Contact Group members discussed a number of possible steps to put additional pressure on Belgrade.

□ We are also moving forward with a plan of action to support democratization in Serbia. We are considering a number of actions ranging from economic and political measures to democracy building initiatives as well as continuing to support the important roles of international organizations such as the OSCE.

□ The freedom of independent media is an essential part of the democratization process in Serbia. We urge the Serbian authorities to respect this freedom. We condemn any police interference with the rights of the Serbian people to have access to independent radio and TV broadcasts. Actions to muzzle independent media by Serbian authorities will only further their international isolation.

If asked about Sanctions:

We are not actively pursuing the reimposition of sanctions at this time, but are taking other steps to convince Milosevic to accept the will of the Serbian people.

CUBA

Cuba: Results of Axworthy Visit

Background: Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy and Cuban Foreign Minister Robaina yesterday released a joint statement on agreements reached during the Canadian's two-day visit to Havana. The communique, lays out 14 areas in which the two countries have agreed to increase cooperation, including: creation of a "Citizen's

Complaints Commission" under the Cuban National Assembly (a watered-down version of the independent Ombudsman's Office that Canada originally hoped for); various bilateral exchanges aimed at "broadening and deepening cooperation on human rights"; and unspecified steps to "support the activities" of Canadian and Cuban NGOs.

Q: What is your reaction to the Canada/Cuba joint communiqu , issued yesterday, and the remarks which accompanied it?

A: We welcome Canada's effort to advance a human rights agenda with Cuba, but we are skeptical that the steps agreed to by the Cuban Government will lead to meaningful improvements.

We see nothing in the communiqu , which suggests an openness to fundamental reform on the part of the Cuban Government.

Given that attitude on the part of the Cuban regime, we do not believe high-level contacts of this sort to be an effective device for promoting democracy.

Q: What did Axworthy and his Cuban counterpart agree to?

A: They announced a series of initiatives focused mostly on increasing cooperation in areas unrelated to human rights and democracy.

Regarding human rights, the two sides agreed to hold seminars and exchanges aimed at "deepening cooperation" and strengthening a "Citizens' Complaint Commission" that Cuba will establish under its National Assembly.

They also agreed to support the activities of Cuban and Canadian NGOs in Cuba.

Q: What's wrong with these initiatives?

A: Most increase cooperation in areas unrelated to human rights and democratization. We would hope that such cooperation would be conditioned on specific progress in advancing respect for fundamental freedoms.

There is no reason to expect that exchanges and seminars on human rights with leaders of the current regime are going to yield positive results. The harassment and detention of human rights activists before and during Foreign Minister Axworthy's visit underscores this.

A "complaint commission" under a National Assembly totally dominated by the Communist Party holds little promise of becoming an objective advocate for human rights.

Likewise, cooperation with a Cuban judicial system that is an extension of the government's totalitarian apparatus tends to give it legitimacy, and is unlikely to lead to fundamental reform.

The promotion of NGO activities "in accordance with the laws and regulations of each country" fails to address the fact that those are precisely the repressive laws and regulations that are used against human rights groups and independent Cuban non-governmental groups and associations. Cuban laws need to be changed, not enforced.

Q: Is it true that Canada and Cuba have agreed to work together to counter the Helms-Burton Act?

A: The communiqu   says that they intend to negotiate a "Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement." We have no details on what that would entail.

Q: Did the Canadians consult with you prior to Axworthy's visit?

A: They informed us of their intentions. As Foreign Minister Axworthy made clear during his visit, Canada follows an independent policy in Cuba, and one at variance with that of the United States.

We value our relationship with Canada, but this is one area where we strongly disagree.

We are making our views known through diplomatic channels.

We will continue our dialogue with the government of Canada on Cuba democratization and will press for more forceful action.

CNN Request to Open Bureau

Background: After the Cuban government in November approved CNN's request to open a bureau in Havana, CNN renewed its application for a license from Treasury/OFAC license to do so. A half dozen other U.S. news media want to open bureaus, but the GOC has approved only CNN. (FYI ONLY: The Helms-Burton Act contains a provision suggesting that Congressional intent was that the USG not grant any licenses unless the GOC indicates willingness to allow TV/Radio Marti open offices in Cuba, but State and Treasury lawyers have concluded that we have parallel authority to do so.) While most U.S. media favor authorizing CNN's request, views on the Hill and in the Cuban-American community remain mixed. The application is still under active consideration.

Points

- ☐ CNN's application is still under review.
- ☐ Want to ensure that any decision is consistent with U.S. law and our commitment to promote peaceful, democratic transition in Cuba.

SOUTH AFRICA: REPORTED ARMS SALES TO SYRIA

Q: What action did the Government of South Africa take yesterday on the proposed sale of arms to Syria? Any reaction from us?

A: On January 22, the South African cabinet did not discuss whether or not to approve the issuance of a marketing license for the marketing of certain weapon systems to Syria. They are pursuing further consultations on the matter as stated

by Deputy President Mbeki.

We continue to consult closely with the South African Government on this issue through diplomatic channels, and are confident our concerns are well understood.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the possible South African sales of arms to Syria? Is the sale going forward?

A: As we stated previously, we are deeply concerned about this possibility of weapons sale by any country to states which support terrorist activities.

[IF PRESSED}

We have urged the government of South Africa and will urge any others contemplating similar arrangements not to proceed towards a sale. The South African government is deliberating and consulting on this issue. We have confidence that the government of South Africa understands the seriousness of this issue and will make its decisions accordingly.

(IF RAISED)

Q: What impact would the sale have on bilateral relations were it to go through? Would we terminate our assistance programs?

A: The transfer of military equipment to any of the countries listed by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism may require us to cease certain assistance under U.S. law. The South African government has made it clear that it does not support terrorism.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

☐ The President is committed to working with the Senate to secure the ratification of the CWC.

☐ We have been actively and regularly working with interest groups and the general public to educate them on the importance of this treaty.

☐ The meeting with Senator Lott was useful. He has committed to organizing a meeting with members in order to begin discussions on how we might bridge the gap between those who support the treaty and those who have difficulties with it. (IF ASKED: Specifically, we will discuss possible amendments to the resolution of ratification -- not to the treaty itself.)

☐ You would have to ask the Senator about the Senate calendar. We emphasized to him the importance of an early vote.

☐ As to whether or not he supports the treaty, I would, again, direct you to his office and to remarks he made at his Tuesday press conference.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Duma Votes on Yeltsin "Incapacity," to Govern, Prolonged Absence

☐ Our understanding these resolutions have no legal, constitutional validity; besides, apparently many members of parliament did not participate; and second vote (on another version of resolution) did not pass.

☐ Beyond continuing to wish President Yeltsin rapid, complete recovery, not appropriate for me to speculate on parliamentary maneuvers, internal politics in Russia.

NATO-Russia Talks

☐ In preparing for upcoming meetings between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, and between Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, we are exploring variety of ideas designed to strengthen partnership with Russia, and respond to some

Russian concerns over NATO enlargement.

☐ NATO Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister Primakov had lengthy discussion Monday on future NATO-Russia relations; press statement said talks went "successfully," further meetings would be held.

☐ Welcome reports on meeting; as said previously, U.S. very pleased Russia and NATO beginning serious dialogue on ways to structure permanent NATO-Russia relationship.

☐ Support that effort, in our bilateral exchanges with Russia as well as in Alliance.

☐ Obviously, we stay in close contact with Allies on these issues; Deputy Secretary Talbott's European trip was part of that process of consultations. Talbott leading delegation to Moscow this week for similar meetings with Russians.

(NOTE to Briefer: Talbott delegation met Wednesday (1/22) and yesterday (1/23) with top Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Primakov, Defense Rodionov, Yeltsin Chief of Staff Chubais, Minister of Economy, others. Public readout on meetings indicates serious talks.)

Lebed's Attendance at Inauguration, Appearances in New York

If asked about 1/23 NYTimes story of meetings with American businessmen

☐ Press accounts indicate Lebed having interesting, useful visit to U.S.; we're in favor of American and Russian citizens' establishing good contacts, private as well as official.

If asked about WashTimes article on Lebed's calling for Yeltsin resignation

☐ Saw report of Lebed press conference at UN; his statements appeared consistent with previously-expressed views on various ways to improve conditions in Russia, including Lebed's own interest in being elected president; seemed to be nothing new in comments.

If asked about NYTimes interview in which Lebed quoted as praising American democracy

- ☐ Understand Lebed complimentary of U.S. political, electoral process; appreciate his views on that, share them.

Yeltsin's Health

- ☐ President Yeltsin's release from hospital Monday good news, understand he'll continue to recover from at country house near Moscow, went to Kremlin for Wednesday meeting with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.
- ☐ President recently sent Yeltsin get-well message, expressing best wishes for his quick recovery.

Accident Involving Georgian Diplomat

- ☐ Georgian Embassy DCM Makharadze involved in traffic accident late January 3 in which 16-year-old girl was killed.
- ☐ In January 10 statement in Tbilisi, President Shevardnadze said Georgia prepared to waive Makharadze's diplomatic immunity; he will remain in U.S. until case completed.
- ☐ We appreciate Georgia's sensitive handling of this tragic incident.
- ☐ The President wants to compliment President Shevardnadze on his decision and Secretary Christopher's personal and careful handling of this issue.

(If asked about Makharadze's previous unreported traffic violations)

- ☐ This is properly matter for State Department; refer you there.

(If asked about 1/16 CNN report Shevardnadze asked diplomat be allowed to return to Georgia to face charges there)

- ☐ Georgian Ambassador broached this idea , but President Shevardnadze has made no such

request and we are proceeding on basis of President Shevardnadze's statement.

General Issues

Clinton-Yeltsin Meeting in Early 1997

- ☐ President and Yeltsin agreed in their December 5 phone conversation to meet in March, though we have not yet fixed specific date or venue for meeting.
- ☐ Personal contact between two leaders important, as we look ahead to work with Russia on wide range of issues -- American investment, arms control, European security structures. Our agenda very comprehensive.

(Note: our guidance to date has said meeting would probably be in U.S.)

(Yeltsin Unable to Meet?)

- ☐ We have nothing to indicate Yeltsin would be unable to meet in March.

Russian Concerns about NATO

- ☐ Understand enlargement difficult issue for Russia, but U.S., NATO and Russia have interests in developing NATO-Russia relationship and broadening cooperation.
- ☐ Serious dialogue on NATO-Russia relationship underway.
- ☐ U.S. determined to proceed with NATO enlargement. Believe that is in interests of European security and stability. Equally determined to manage enlargement process in manner that does not threaten Russia and to do all that we can to build strong NATO-Russia relationship.

Prospects for Russian Ratification of START II Treaty

- ☐ Treaty faces ratification vote in Duma; parliamentary prerogative to debate its merits. While some may oppose Treaty, Russian government committed to ratification.

If asked: is Administration planning to "leap ahead" to START

III to circumvent opposition to
START II in Russia:

- ☐ As Secretary Perry made clear last fall in Moscow, U. S. prepared to begin negotiations on further reductions in nuclear forces once START II has entered into force.
- ☐ Have no intention, however, of setting aside START II and moving ahead instead with negotiations on "START III." Entry into force of START II remains essential prerequisite to further reductions in nuclear forces.
- ☐ START II is the best interests of both countries, should be ratified by Russia.

MIDDLE EAST

Middle East Visitors

Q: Any dates yet for visits by leaders from the Middle East?

A: Nothing to report on that; we're working on the schedule and we would expect to see Prime Minister Netanyahu, King Hussein, President Mubarak, and Chairman Arafat in Washington over the next two months. We'll keep you posted.

Settlements an "Obstacle to Peace"?

Q: President Clinton seemed to say December 16 that settlements are an obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Is that the U.S. position?

A: The U.S. position is that settlement activity complicates the negotiating process and increases tension.

We have previously expressed concern that when one party to a negotiation says things or does things which are seen to preempt the negotiating process, it makes it that much harder for negotiations to succeed.

In that vein, the President was making the obvious point that

when one party does something that is seen by the other as preempting negotiations it can become a problem or an obstacle to progress in those negotiations.

So, yes we are troubled by some of the recent settlement activity, and we've said so.

The President's response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity.

It's important to focus on that concern.

[If asked]:

Q: Does the President's response indicate a change in policy?

A: As I said, his response reflected his concern about the impact of settlement activity.

It's important to focus on that concern. The comments did not signal a fundamental change in the nature of that concern.

Legality of Settlements

Q: Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that he subscribes to the view that as a matter of legal right, Jews and Israelis have a legal right to settle on the West Bank? Is that your understanding of the legalities?

A: I'm not going to get drawn into a discussion of the legal aspects of what is obviously a highly political issue. It is an issue, furthermore, that the Israelis and Palestinians recognize is difficult and therefore left for their permanent status negotiations. It is abundantly clear, however, that settlement activity, and even announcements of plans for possible future settlement activity, complicates the climate and the process of negotiation. When either party says things or does things that are perceived as prejudging the outcome of a negotiation, it makes it that much more difficult to achieve progress.

Q: But what about the precise question of the legality of settlement activity?

A: As I said, I'm not going down that road. We need to keep our focus on assisting the parties in their negotiations.

Q: Do you or don't you differentiate between new and old settlements?

A: I've just explained what our position is and I referred to "settlement activity." I'm not going to comment further.

Q: The Israelis claim that you didn't complain about settlement activity during the Rabin Government, so why are you making this an issue now?

A: We said the same thing during the time of the Labor government.

Jerusalem

Q: What is your reaction to Prime Minister Netanyahu's statement that Israel will not negotiate over the status of Jerusalem?

A: Our views have not changed. Israel and the Palestinians have agreed that Jerusalem is one of the issues for permanent status negotiations.

(If pressed) Our position on the status of Jerusalem is well-known.

Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and volatile issues in the peace process. We remain convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing these sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which Israel and the Palestinians themselves have formally agreed to discuss only in the context of direct, permanent status negotiations.

Peace Process

☐ There has been no change in the U.S. position on land-for-peace or anything else as a result of the Israeli elections. We have supported this principle and will continue to do so. At the same time, our experience makes clear that agreements are reached not through recitation of abstract principles, but through the hard work of direct negotiation. Syria and Israel agreed at Madrid to negotiate on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338. They should resume those negotiations to overcome their differences.

☐ Obviously, if progress is to be made, if differences are to be overcome, each side must take into account the needs and interests of the other.

☐ Peace is not an abstraction. Peace is closely tied to security and only the parties directly concerned can make the critical decisions which affect their future. The United States can't make these decisions for them. We will not try to impose decisions upon Israel or any other party to the peace process.

☐ That doesn't mean that the US, as the facilitator of the peace process, does not have views. It has been and remains our view that the land-for-peace formula offers the most promise for a workable solution to the problems of war and peace in the Middle East. But agreements will come not as a result of our views, but as a result of negotiations between the parties.

Palestinian Compliance on Revocation of Palestinian Covenant

☐ We have welcomed the decision taken by the Palestinian National Council to cancel the provisions of the Covenant which contradict the formal undertakings made between the PLO and the Israeli government.

U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv

☐ Recognize what is required by the law passed by Congress requiring that the U.S. Embassy be transferred to Jerusalem. But at the same time, the President has made it clear that he will take no step that will undermine the peace process or jeopardize the negotiations. In this regard, the legislation provides a waiver provision that may be used by the President as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that could preempt or jeopardize the peace process.

Orient House

☐ Our position regarding U.S. contacts at Orient House has not changed. We do business with the Palestinian Authority only in Gaza and Jericho, not in Jerusalem. Would encourage all parties to concentrate on the negotiations, not on issues that

may polarize the situation.

Syria

- ☐ We believe that a comprehensive peace requires negotiations and agreements on all tracks, including with Syria and Lebanon. But we recognize that -- as in the past -- some negotiations will move at a faster pace than others.
- ☐ Prime Minister Netanyahu told me that he agrees on the importance of talks with Syria.
- ☐ We have never had any illusions about Syrian associations with groups involved in terrorism.
- ☐ We consider this a serious issue, and we have made that clear both in our diplomatic contacts at the highest levels and in our annual report on terrorism.
- ☐ We would like to see Syria's ties to terrorist groups definitively broken.
- ☐ But it is important to distinguish between states that work to subvert the peace process -- like Iran -- and those who have shown a willingness to engage in it actively and seriously -- like Syria.

BOSNIA

SFOR Mission Duration/Secretary-designate Cohen Remarks

- ☐ 18 months will give sufficient extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic reconstruction, refugee return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.
- ☐ We will review every 6 months to see if we can accomplish mission with fewer forces. SFOR will gradually shift responsibilities to civilian agencies and the parties themselves while moving from stabilization to deterrence to disengagement.

If pressed on whether this means that the U.S. has ruled out participation of U.S. forces after completion of SFOR mission:

☐ We believe that SFOR's mission can be completed in 18 months, and that the conditions will have been established in which stability and security can be maintained without an outside military presence.

If pressed whether the U.S. will insist that any force after 18 months will be European only:

☐ I'm not going to speculate about such scenarios. We believe the mission will be completed in 18 months.

If pressed whether every last soldier will be out of Bosnia in exactly 18 months:

☐ 18 months is the duration of the mission and the deployment, but not necessarily a deadline for withdrawal of the last SFOR soldier. Withdrawal at 18 months will occur in a timely fashion but may extend some days or weeks beyond the mission duration.

Refugees Returning to Gajevi/RS Mining Roads

☐ We continue to be concerned about the use of violence or intimidation against returning refugees and displaced persons and the potential for confrontation in the Zone of Separation. SFOR has reported finding a number of anti-personnel mines near Gajevi in the Zone of Separation where displaced Bosnians have been returning in recent days.

☐ SFOR and the IPTF are taking additional security measures to avoid the potential for violence around Gajevi. The situation remains calm and we understand the returning Bosniacs are following agreed procedures.

Brcko Arbitration

☐ The parties agreed at Dayton to binding arbitration of the disputed portion of the inter-entity boundary line in the Brcko area. The issue is in the hands of the Arbitral Tribunal, consisting of arbitrators from the two Bosnian entities and the

internationally-appointed arbiter Roberts Owen. There is no U.S. proposal for a Brcko solution; we support the arbitration process.

☐ A decision is to be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal by February 15. The Tribunal has been holding hearings in recent weeks including representatives of the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska.

☐ The U.S. and other Contact Group member states are aware of ideas under consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal, since the international community may need to move quickly to provide support for implementation of the Brcko solution. The Arbitral Tribunal is continuing its work, and we await the decision.

Iranian Influence in Bosnia

☐ Iranian influence in Bosnia has been an ongoing concern, but we have taken effective measures to cut Iranian links.

☐ We have enforced the Dayton agreement ban on foreign forces and insisted that Bosnian government sever all military and intelligence links with Iran as a condition of the train and equip program. As the President certified in June, those conditions have been met. There have been no indications since June that military or intelligence cooperation has resumed.

☐ Hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards have left Bosnia, Mujahadeen units have disbanded, and the Bosnians are looking to the U.S. and moderate Islamic states for security assistance.

☐ We remain concerned about Iranian influence and continue to watch the situation closely.

☐ Overall, we and the intelligence community assess that Iranian influence has substantially diminished since the implementation of Dayton and since we tied the issue to the train and equip program.

New Bosnia Mission/SFOR -- General

- ☐ The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission started December 20. SFOR's limited and focused mission will allow time to consolidate the peace built by the success of IFOR.
- ☐ The Stabilization Force is about half IFOR's size. U.S. share is less than half last year's commitment -- about 8500 troops inside Bosnia.
- ☐ The NATO plan for SFOR includes more limited set of military and supporting tasks than IFOR, reflecting the more narrow mission of this smaller force. With fewer troops, SFOR will focus more on security, including force protection, and will be less involved in civilian tasks.

CYPRUS MISSILE PURCHASE

Background: Cyprus Government announced on Saturday (1/4) signature of a contract to purchase Russian SA-10 missiles. State favors waiting till Monday to issue a formal statement (in tandem with new demarches, efforts to jin up EU statements and demarches, calls to Sarbanes, Manatos, etc.).

Points (if asked)

- ☐ The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean remains unsettled. All parties in the region bear a responsibility to take steps to decrease tensions.
- ☐ In this connection, we have made clear to the GOC and others in the region in recent weeks that this purchase could seriously exacerbate tensions in the area and make more difficult a negotiated solution to the Cyprus dispute.
- ☐ Cyprus' announcement that it will delay deployment of any missile system is a step in the right direction.

PERU

Q: What's the situation in Peru at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence? What is the United States going to do about this situation?

A: We have continued our active and intense consultations with the Governments of Peru and Japan. The President's national security team has kept him fully informed as events there have developed.

This is a very serious situation and lives are obviously at risk. It simply isn't productive for me to address the other questions you have raised.

Q: Does the United States negotiate with hostages or condone those who do?

A: The United States does not condone making concessions to terrorists, but how to handle negotiations is a sovereign decision for the government involved.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Adams Refused Visa?

Background: Two London newspapers reported over the weekend that the White House has advised Gerry Adams he will not get a visa until the IRA reinstates its cease-fire. One paper sourced "officials of the NSC"; the other diplomats in London.

☐ Mr. Adams has not/not applied for a visa. Since there is no application, the Administration has made no decision.

☐ If pressed: As in the past, an application for a visa waiver by Mr. Adams would be decided on basis of whether it could contribute to search for lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Loyalist Cease-fire Intact?

☐ Up to British and Irish governments and participating parties to decide who participates in talks.

☐ As President said in statement yesterday, we urge loyalists to maintain their cease-fire. There has been no claim of responsibility for car bomb attacks and there is no doubt loyalists have shown restraint in response to escalating IRA violence.

Recent Attacks

☐ Condemn this latest attack. Thankfully, no serious injuries, but shows wanton disregard for human life.

☐ Call again on IRA to declare and implement immediate cease-fire in words and deeds. People of Ireland, North and South, clearly want peace, political settlement.

Belfast Talks

☐ Belfast talks, chaired by Senator Mitchell and his colleagues, represent historic opportunity and best hope in decades for achieving lasting settlement. Talks will reconvene for bilateral consultations January 13, in plenary January 27.

☐ Must not squander progress of last months. Urge all political leaders to take responsibility for making these talks work. Need to move quickly into substantive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland.

☐ Continue to believe that participation of all elected parties, including Sinn Fein, would give talks best chance of success; that can only happen with cease-fire.

☐ Impressed with commitment and determination both governments have shown in search for peace. They and we share goal of inclusive negotiations on future of Northern Ireland, which can only happen if there is an IRA cease-fire.

Was 1994 IRA cease-fire "fake" as Prime Minister Major has alleged?

☐ Cease-fire from August 1994 to February 1996 saved hundreds of lives. I strongly condemned end of that cease-fire and I continue to call on IRA to declare new cease-fire immediately.

How Will You Know a New Cease-fire is Real?

☐ Will be, up to British and Irish governments to evaluate new cease-fire; but as both Taoiseach and Prime Minister Major have said, will depend on both words and actions on ground.

Deportation Proceedings Against Matt Morrison

☐ Have been assured by Justice that these proceedings being handled fairly. Judicial matter - don't want to comment further.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KHOBAR BOMBING

Saudi Cooperation with FBI

Q: What are you doing to get Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the FBI on the Khobar Towers bombing investigation?

A: The FBI is in charge of that investigation for the U.S.

I understand that they are in a dialogue with the Saudis about what additional specific materials and cooperation they seek.

We have assurances from the highest levels in the Kingdom that we will get full cooperation and we expect that such assurances will be honored..

Q: What's your reaction to allegations that the al-Khobar bombing involved Iranians?

A: There is an investigation under way.

I'm not going to speculate about hypothetical outcomes to this investigation.

Nor am I going to speculate about hypothetical responses once this investigation is complete.

Q: Was there an Iranian or Syrian role?

A: We have reached no conclusions.

Q: If Iran was behind it, will we still attack Iran as Secretary Perry said last summer?

A: This is hypothetical and I'm not going to respond. But if you ask whether the U.S. responds to those who are proven to have attacked it, the record of this Administration is clear.

But I must stress that we have reached no conclusion about state sponsorship in the Khobar attack.

GULF WAR ILLNESSES

Has there been a cover-up?

- ☐ No -- There is currently no evidence nor any indication of a cover-up.
- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee concurs in this assessment.
- ☐ The fact that U.S. troops inadvertently destroyed Iraqi chemical weapons after the war came to light as part of our effort to learn all that we can; that effort has since been intensified.
- ☐ We're awaiting the outcomes of Army IG, DOD Intel Oversight & CIA IG investigations.

Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf War?

- ☐ The CIA's thorough August 2, 1996 report on this issue concluded no Iraqi use of CBW.
- ☐ Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the Presidential Advisory Committee found it unlikely that exposure to CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.

Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even with independent oversight?

- ☐ Yes, and that's the decision taken by the President when he

extended the Presidential Advisory Committee to provide independent oversight.

- ☐ DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a thorough & open process.

- ☐ DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation of a new Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative resources (including more than 100 additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than 20,000 Gulf War veterans who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical demolitions occurred.

Why are Gulf War veterans sick?

- ☐ I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the many experts -- at DOD, HHS and VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf War illnesses.

- ☐ The Presidential Advisory Committee carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors and concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides; chemical warfare agents; biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB); infectious diseases; depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum products.

- ☐ Stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf War illnesses.

- ☐ Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War illnesses is required and is now in progress.

What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are sick?

- ☐ Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans are receiving the care they need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.

- ☐ To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free medical exams; (3) 26,000+ compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying disability for Gulf veterans with undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and (6) 80+ federally-sponsored research projects underway.

Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future deployments?

- ☐ DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning future deployments.

- ☐ Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance System for Deployments is near completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.

