

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Laura Sepucha to Robert Bell and Gordon Bendick. Subject: Clearance Ltr II to Lugar. (11 pages)	08/29/1996	P1/b(1)
002. email	Laura Sepucha to Steven Andreasen, Robert Bell, Gordon Bendick et al. Subject: Letter to Lott for Clearance. (16 pages)	09/09/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/15/1996-09/09/1996]

2006-1363-F

vz5616

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 15 August 96 19:21
FROM Verville, Elizabeth G.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bass, Peter E.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[CNFUNDS.DOC : 4889 in CNFUNDS.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 15 August 96 19:21
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CNFUNDS.DOC

COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING

Counternarcotics Budget Requests 1993-96

□ Administration counternarcotics funding requests have risen from \$12.7 billion for FY93 to \$15 billion for FY97, an increase of almost 25%.

Congress has underfunded the Administration request by an average of \$860 million in each year from 1993 to 1996, except for FY95, in which Congress exceeded our request by \$85million.

For these figures on the overall counternarcotics budget, see Table 1 of Tab A.

(Note, however, Table 2 of Tab A and the ONDCP graphs at Tab B show that when you break down the elements of the counternarcotics budget, Administration requests for interdiction and international programs went down significantly after 1993. This is due to the change

in
Administration policy emphasis from the transit zone to the
source
country in stemming the flow of drugs into the United States from
outside the country.

Nevertheless, even at lower request levels, Congress consistently
underfunded Administration international programs requests from
FY93-96 and underfunded interdiction requests in FY93 and FY94.

In
FY95 and FY96, Congress exceeded interdiction requests by
\$88million
and \$61million, respectively).

Additional Administration Congressional Counternarcotics Requests

The Administration for FY96 requested from Congress

☐ approval to transfer 20 helicopters to Mexico under Section 517
of
the Foreign assistance Act (Excess defense Articles)

Senator Helms has put a hold on this request. Failure to deliver
the helos to Mexico is impeding our counterdrug progress with
Mexico through the High Level Contact Group.

☐ \$250 million in supplemental appropriations for counterdrug
programs, to be fully offset by rescissions from the FY96 Defense
budget.

Congress failed to approve the supplemental in FY96; however, it
agreed to consider an increase in funding during deliberations on
the
FY97 budget. These deliberations are still ongoing with regard
to
the amount of funding to be provided and the distribution between
the
Administration's priorities and Congress' own preferred programs.

ONDCP does not yet have figures from all the agencies on how well

the non-DOD portion of the \$250 million request fared in the
Conference. However, we have figures for the DOD portion.

Of the \$250 million supplemental the President originally
requested
for FY96, \$132 million was intended for Defense. Presently, the
FY97

DOD Authorization Bill has finished Conference. The House has voted favorably on it, and the Senate is expected to do so upon its return from the summer recess. The bill provides an increase of \$154 million, with \$108 million of the Administration's priorities funded.

The Defense Appropriations bill is presently in Conference. The Senate bill would provide \$147 million, \$119 million of which would go for programs DOD requested. The House Appropriations bill would provide \$132 million as requested, but \$98 million would be for its members preferred programs, not the P-3s, DOD's highest priority.

(House members may not easily yield on items of personal interest which replaced our P-3 request).

Proposed Future Administration Counternarcotics Funding Requests

Assuming decision is taken to move forward with FY 96 \$75 million drawdown package, propose September event at which the President announces the package. Also propose we consider announcing at the September event President's intention to make a similar \$75 million drawdown for FY97.

☐ Request to drawdown \$75 million of defense articles and services for FY 96 under Section 506 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act to support counterdrug programs.

ONDCP Director McCaffrey is leading interagency effort the week of August 12 to develop a full drawdown package and legislative strategy.

☐ Consider Making Request to drawdown \$75 million of defense articles and services for FY97 under Section 506 (a) in early October.

McCaffrey might be asked to develop this as well. It could be based on requests from agencies over and above the \$250 million package or the FY96 \$75 million drawdown. We believe there is approximately \$175 million of such requests, at least some of

which
would meet the drawdown criteria. ONDCP-led legislative group
should
consider strategy for this package in addition to FY96 package,
including timing. Bill wants to throw out a word of caution
about
not overloading the circuit by asking for too much at one time.
He
believes we may be lucky to get the FY96 \$75 million for now.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 15 August 96 17:38
FROM Sestak, Joseph A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Drug money memo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Verville, Elizabeth G.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[CNFUND1.DOC : 4371 in CNFUND1.DOC]]

From: Verville, Elizabeth G.
To: Danvers, William C.; Sestak, Joseph A.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: Drug money memo [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, August 15, 1996 02:51 PM

<<Attached File: CNFUNDS.DOC>>

Here's what the draft looks like now. Pls give it a sanity check. Can we say the Congress committed to doing the \$250 in 97 or is that language too strong?

I've got a call in to someone named Cichetti at OMB who may know more about the non-DOD part of the \$250 million than OMB, but he hasn't called me back.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 15 August 96 17:36
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** CNFUND1.DOC

COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING

Counternarcotics Budget Requests 1993-96

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Congress has consistently underfunded Administration counternarcotics budget requests in these years. With the exception of FY95, in which Congress exceeded the Administration's request by \$85,000, Congress has underfunded by an average of \$860 million in each year from 1993 to 1996.

For these figures on the overall counternarcotics budget, see Table 1 of Tab A.

(Note, however, Table 2 of Tab A shows that when you break down the elements of the counternarcotics budget, Administration counternarcotics requests for interdiction and international programs went down significantly after 1993. This is due to the change in Administration policy emphasis from the transit zone to the source country in stemming the flow of drugs into the United States from outside the country.

Nevertheless, even at lower request levels, Congress consistently underfunded Administration international programs requests in these years and underfunded interdiction requests in FY93 and FY94. In FY95 and FY96, Congress exceeded interdiction requests by \$88,000 and \$61,000, respectively).

Additional Administration Counternarcotics Funding Requests

In addition, the Administration for FY96 requested from Congress

☐ approval to transfer 20 helicopters to Mexico under Section 517 of the Foreign assistance Act (Excess defense Articles)

Senator Helms has put a hold on this request. Failure to deliver the helos to Mexico is impeding our counterdrug progress with Mexico through the High Level Contact Group.

☐ \$250 million in supplemental appropriations for counterdrug programs, to be fully offset by rescissions from the FY1996 Defense budget

While Congress failed to approve the supplemental in FY96, it agreed to consider an increase in funding during the deliberations of the FY97 budget. These deliberations are still ongoing with regard to the amount of funding to be provided and the distribution between the Administration's priorities and Congress' preferred programs.

Of the \$250 million the President originally requested as an increase to the budget, \$132 million was intended for Defense. Presently, the FY 1997 DoD Authorization bill has finished Conference. The House has voted favorably on it and the Senate is expected to do so upon its return from the summer recess. The bill provides an increase of \$154 million, with the majority of the Administration's priorities funded.

The Defense Appropriations Bill is presently in Conference. The Senate bill would provide \$147 million, \$119 million of which would go for programs DOD requested. The House Appropriations bill would provide \$132 million as requested, but \$98 million would be for its members preferred programs, not the P-3s, DOD's highest priority. (House members may not easily yield on items of personal interest which replaced our P-3 request).

Proposed Future Administration Counternarcotics Funding Requests

Proposed September event at which the President announces \$75 million drawdown request for FY96 and his intention to submit in October a similar request for FY97.

☐ Request to drawdown \$75 million of defense articles and services for FY 96 under Section 506 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act to support counterdrug programs.

ONDCP Director McCaffrey is leading interagency effort the week of August 12 to develop a full drawdown package and legislative strategy.

☐ Request to drawdown \$75 million of defense articles and services for FY97 under Section 506 (a) to be made in early October.

McCaffrey might be asked to develop this as well. It could be based on requests from agencies over and above the \$250 million package or the FY96 \$75 million drawdown. We believe there is approximately \$175 million of such requests, at least some of which would meet the drawdown criteria.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 26 August 96 18:33
FROM Fetig, James L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: 10 Oct Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

From: Cullin, Brian P.
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
CC: @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: 10 Oct Guidance[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, October 10, 1995 12:58 PM

[[10OCTGUI.DOC : 4674 in 10OCTGUI.DOC]]

` Guidance for clearance. Brian

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 10 October 95 12:34
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 10OCTGUI.DOC

FOREIGN AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

October 10, 1995

EUROPE
Bosnia/Croatia
Macedonia Bombing
Ireland
NATO Enlargement
Russia
CFE

NEAR EAST

Syria

Peace Process

LATIN AMERICA

Cuba

Honduras

Columbia

Mexico

EAST ASIA/PACIFIC

China

MISCELLANEOUS

Export Control Reform

Defense

Nuclear Materials Security (PDD 41)

CCW

BOSNIA/CROATIA

Diplomatic Track: Next Steps

- ☐ Last Thursday the Parties in Bosnia signed a cease-fire agreement for the territory within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition the parties agreed to attend Proximity Peace Talks to be held in the United States, and an international Peace Conference subsequently.
- ☐ The parties agreed that the cease-fire will become effective at 0001 hours on October 10 provided that full gas and electric utility service shall have been restored to the city of Sarajevo. Otherwise the cease-fire will become effective at 0001 hours on the day following such restoration.
- ☐ The UN met with the parties at Sarajevo airport yesterday and determined there would be a delay due to problems being worked out with respect to restoration of gas.
- ☐ The Russian Foreign Ministry indicates the gas is flowing from Russia to Bosnia through the Hungarian pipeline and was expected to arrive in Sarajevo today.

- ☐ The parties are to meet again this evening and, barring any new difficulties, the ceasefire should take effect at 1901 EDT today (one midnight past midnight tomorrow Sarajevo time).
 - ☐ We urge both sides to exercise maximum restraint and concentrate on working out differences at the bargaining table on the basis of agreed principles adopted in Geneva and New York.
 - ☐ This cease-fire will last for 60 days or until completion of Proximity Peace Talks and Peace Conference, whichever is later.
 - ☐ On the effective date the parties will ensure all military commanders issue and compel compliance with clear orders precluding all offensive operations, patrol and reconnaissance activities forward of friendly positions, all offensive weapon' firing including sniper fire, the laying of additional mines, and the creation of additional barriers and obstacles.
 - ☐ All parties will immediately, upon the effective date, ensure all civilians and prisoners will be treated humanely and that all prisoners of war will be exchanged.
 - ☐ The parties will cooperate with the cease-fire monitoring activities of UNPROFOR.
 - ☐ All parties will provide free passage and unimpeded road access between Sarajevo and Gorazde along two primary routes for all non-military and UNPROFOR traffic.
 - ☐ The parties agreed to begin proximity talks on or about October 25. These talks will be followed by a peace conference in France. There may be other meetings after the peace conference before a final peace settlement is reached.
- (If asked about the location of the proximity talks:
- ☐ The U.S. location for the talks is still to be determined. The talks will not be in Washington D. C.)

- ☐ As has been the recent practice, the talks will be co-chaired by A/S Holbrooke and EU negotiator Bildt. Each party will send a delegation able to make prompt decisions and commitments.
- ☐ We have not reached our goal of obtaining a serious and lasting peace in Bosnia. But this cease-fire greatly increases our chances to end the war.
- ☐ September 26 's New York meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia produced another important step toward a peace settlement in Bosnia.
- ☐ In a set of "further agreed basic principles" for a settlement, the three Foreign Ministers have spelled out in greater detail the constitutional structures of Bosnia, including the establishment of a national parliament, Presidency and Constitutional Court. The new document builds on the September 8 agreement in Geneva.
- ☐ In the new document, they also committed to holding free democratic elections under international supervision.
- ☐ The parties have agreed that central government will have responsibility for conduct of foreign policy of Bosnia after a settlement. They are still negotiating on other functions of the central institutions --e.g. its role in foreign trade, monetary policy, crime enforcement, etc.
- ☐ While many more issues remain to be resolved before we have a final peace agreement, last Tuesday's result underscores once again that the political settlement will preserve Bosnia as a single state, with continuing international recognition.
- ☐ As the President has said, we will strongly oppose the partition of Bosnia.
- ☐ The September 26 agreement and the agreement on a ceasefire are further testament to the international community's resolve and persistent diplomacy by our team, supported by our Contact Group partners.

Peace Plan Implementation

- ☐ While many issues remain to be resolved in the negotiations, we have accelerated our internal preparations for the implementation of a possible peace settlement.
- ☐ Just as American leadership is critical to the achievement of a peace settlement, so will our leadership be critical to ensuring that the agreement is implemented successfully so that the conflict is ended for good.
- ☐ Implementation will have many aspects -- a military implementation force (IFOR) to ensure that the parties maintain a ceasefire and withdraw their forces according to the requirements of the agreement; civilian efforts to safeguard human rights, assist in the return of refugees, help establish political institutions and deliver humanitarian aid; and a regional economic reconstruction program.
- ☐ A range of organizations will be involved in the non-military aspects - the UN and its agencies, the OSCE, the European Union, and the International Financial Institutions.
- ☐ We believe that, to be effective, the military implementation mission should be led by NATO, with a single chain of command and robust rules of engagement. A strong and decisive NATO presence on the ground at an early stage will provide the best deterrent against violations of the agreement and the resumption of hostilities.
- ☐ We and our Allies agree that the implementation force would operate under a UNSC Chapter VII mandate, but operational control would be exercised by NATO (i.e. no dual key).
- ☐ The IFOR would likely include forces from non-NATO countries, who would need to connect to the NATO command structure through liaison arrangements that are still being developed. We hope Russia and other members of the Partnership for Peace will form part of the IFOR.

☐ On Saturday Secretary of Defense Perry met with Russian Minister of Defense Grachev to discuss ways that Russia can contribute to IFOR. A number of approaches were discussed.

☐ While some areas of common ground emerged, there are still important differences to be overcome, especially on the command-and-control arrangements.

☐ Russia will be sending a military team to SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) to participate in peace implementation force planning.

☐ NATO planners are now developing a detailed OPLAN, building on previous planning for earlier peace plans and for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

☐ Until the planning is completed, and until there is a clearer sense of the actual provisions of the peace settlement, it would be premature to speculate on the size of the overall force or the U.S. contribution. (If pressed: The total number could be in the 50-70,000 range cited by Secretary Perry, including supporting forces as well as ground forces deployed to Bosnia. But it is, as we have stressed, premature to predict the actual force size.)

☐ Similarly, it is too soon to predict what will be the cost of the U.S. contribution.

☐ But the President stands by his commitment -- first made in 1993 -- to contribute a substantial number of U.S. ground forces to a NATO-led force to assist in implementation of a Bosnia peace settlement, subject to consultations with the Congress.

☐ Last Monday, NATO Secretary General Claes met with the President to discuss the situation in the Former Yugoslavia.

☐ SYG Claes reported that NATO planning for implementation was developing quickly, and that the U.S. leadership was critical to bringing peace to the region.

(If asked about the \$1 billion estimate in the 9/27 Washington Post or the \$2 billion estimate referred to in USA Today interview with Perry

☐ That figure has no real standing until planning is completed, the NATO military authorities decide on force requirements, and the U.S. contribution has been determined.

(Reaction to Dole letter charging lack of consultations with Congress?)

☐ NATO commissioned planning by the NATO Military Authorities last week, so the process is still at an early stage.

☐ We fully intend to consult with the Congress as NATO planning -- and our own thinking -- evolve.

☐ The President met with Congressional leaders September 29 to discuss U.S. negotiating strategy and thinking on implementation of a settlement. Secretary of Defense Perry and Vice Chairman of the JCS Admiral Owens briefed on the status of military planning.

☐ While many questions cannot yet be answered, we were encouraged by the response of the members present.

(Dole Comments on Peace Enforcement vs. Peacekeeping)

☐ It is our position that the implementation force would only be deployed if there is a settlement accepted by the parties. We are not planning to impose peace.

☐ However, even after a settlement, there will be tensions among the parties and the possibility of violations of the agreement by local elements.

☐ Therefore, we believe the NATO-led force must have a Chapter VII mandate and robust rules of engagement to ensure that the terms of the settlement are upheld, as well as to provide for the security and self-defense of the force itself.

Air Strikes

☐ Yesterday, F/A-18s and F-16s destroyed a Serbian command post near Tuzla, at UNPROFOR request, following Serb artillery attacks which killed two civilians and one Norwegian UN

peacekeeper. As a precaution the Sarajevo airlift was suspended.

☐ We continue to urge all parties to exercise restraint. The brutal Bosnian Serb attacks of recent days clearly worsen the chances of bringing the ceasefire into affect.

☐ But as President has said: renewed attacks on Sarajevo or the other safe areas, or any Serb non-compliance with their other commitments, will trigger a resumption of NATO air strikes.

☐ All parties should now turn from the battlefield to the bargaining table and complete a political settlement. The time has come to end the fighting for good and begin the task of reconciliation and reconstruction in the Balkans.

Reports of Mass Graves

☐ Very concerned by reports of mass graves found in formerly Serb-held areas of western Bosnia.

☐ We fully support an international investigation of these sites.

☐ We are committed to seeing the perpetrators brought to justice by the War Crimes Tribunal.

Bosnian Serb Violations of No-Fly Zone?

☐ NATO air patrols continue. NATO aircraft are authorized to intercept any violators of the no-fly zone or to respond to Serb air defense installations displaying hostile intent.

September 8 Geneva Meeting

☐ Important progress was made at the September 8 Geneva meeting between the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, and Contact Group representatives. Ambassador Holbrooke and EU negotiator Carl Bildt co-chaired the meeting.

-- In specific, the three foreign ministers announced they had agreed to basic principles for further negotiations toward final settlement. The principles are the following:

-- For the first time, all agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina will

continue as a single state, with its present borders, and with continuing international recognition.

-- Consistent with the Contact Group plan, all three agreed that under the terms of a settlement, Bosnia-Herzegovina will consist of two entities: the Federation established under last year's Washington Agreements, and a Bosnian Serb republic.

-- The 51-49 parameter of the Contact Group's territorial proposal will be the basis for a settlement, subject to any adjustments the parties make by mutual agreement.

-- The two entities will have the right to establish relationships with neighboring states, but these must be consistent with Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

-- The parties pledged to adhere to human rights standards, to ensure freedom of movement and the right of the displaced to return to their homes, and to collaborate on joint economic projects that will promote links among all of Bosnia's peoples.

☐ As the President said, this was an important milestone on the path to peace.

(If asked whether the new diplomatic effort divides Bosnia)

-- We have not partitioned Bosnia, nor do we intend to.

-- It cannot be emphasized too strongly that according to the Geneva agreements, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a single state, retaining its seat in international organizations and its bilateral diplomatic relations with other countries in the world, including the U.S.

-- The United States strongly condemns the assassination attempt against President Gligorov.

-- President Gligorov is a good friend of the United States and has been a major source of stability in a very turbulent region.

-- I have sent a message wishing him a full and speedy recovery. (Note: Gligorov, who is 78, received shrapnel wounds to his head, which penetrated his skull. He underwent brain surgery and reportedly lost an eye. His condition remains stable, with no long term prognosis whether his mental faculties will be impaired by his injuries.)

-- The United States has provided medical assistance for President Gligorov. Sent only Navy neurosurgeon in Europe flown in from Spain as part of 15 member surgical team.

-- We do want to speculate at this time on who was responsible for the assassination attempt. The U.S. is providing assistance in the investigation, which is ongoing.

IRELAND

U.S. Role

- ☐ We are committed to working with the two governments and the parties to help in the search for peace.
- ☐ Thankful there has been a year in which the guns and bombs are silent.
- ☐ First time in a generation there is real hope for a lasting peace and a more prosperous future. People of Belfast are finally living a normal life.
- ☐ One can literally say that there are individuals walking the streets in Belfast alive today who would not be had we not gotten involved. American engagement has been an

essential ingredient in the search for peace.

U.S. Meetings

- ☐ We have had a number of contacts over the last several weeks about how to move the peace process forward.
- ☐ Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams recently met with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. The Vice President joined them for part of the meeting.
- ☐ The Vice President and Mr. Lake met with UK Minister of State for Northern Ireland Michael Ancram.
- ☐ On September 29, I saw the Irish Deputy Prime Minister, Dick Spring, who was at the White House for a meeting with the Vice President.
- ☐ We are hopeful a way can be found to move things forward. Contacts with all the parties are continuing. I am not prepared to go into any detail.

Twin Track

- ☐ We see a basis for progress in the "twin-track" proposal to begin inclusive talks between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties and to establish an international body to address the issue of decommissioning the paramilitaries' weapons.
- ☐ We will continue to encourage all sides to be flexible and find a way to move the process forward.

British Stalling on Talks?

- ☐ As we have said, we hope that momentum will have been restored to the process by the time I visit Northern Ireland at the end of November.
- ☐ I believe Prime Minister Major is committed to achieving a lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Position on Decommissioning:

☐ On decommissioning of weapons, I have said that parties observing the cease-fire "must take the next step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have made clear to Sinn Fein and loyalists that we expect movement on this issue.

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

☐ The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet made a decision.

☐ It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there is a formal decision.

Election of hard-line Unionist David Trimble a setback?

☐ Looking forward to working with Mr. Trimble as we have with the Unionists over the past year.

Deportations [Irish groups mounting a campaign against deportation of former IRA members, some who are married to U.S. citizens and/or have U.S. children. U.S. law provides no flexibility in prohibiting permanent residency to those linked to terrorism. We are looking into possible legislative waivers.]

☐ Issue recently brought to my attention.

☐ Law provides me no flexibility on many cases.

☐ Have asked staff to review the issue.

NATO ENLARGEMENT STUDY AND RUSSIA

Reaction to NATO enlargement study?

-- We welcome NATO approval on September 20 of its landmark study on enlarging the Alliance.

-- The study, which sets out the "how" and "why" of enlargement, was presented on

Thursday (September 28) in Brussels to members of the Partnership for Peace (composed of CEE and NIS countries, including Russia). The general reaction was highly favorable.

-- Individual presentations will also be made to members who request them. NATO will assess the presentations and decide on next steps at its December 5 ministerial meeting in Brussels.

-- The study was commissioned by NATO Foreign Ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in December 1994.

-- The study is part of a gradual, deliberate process leading to the enlargement of the Alliance.

-- Our goal is to extend the security and stability represented by NATO into the new democracies that have arisen in Europe in the wake of the end of the Cold War.

-- By integrating them into NATO we hope to ensure the survival of their democratic and market economic reforms.

-- No decisions have yet been taken on whom to invite. Nor is there any timetable for when this will occur. Enlargement will only occur when NATO is satisfied that prospective members can contribute to the overall security of the Alliance.

-- The "how" part of the study sets out a number of steps that interested potential members must take in order to be considered for membership. These include political and military steps that contribute to the democratic goals and overall security of the Alliance.

-- We should stress that no Partnership for Peace members are a priori excluded from the possibility of becoming NATO members.

Russian Reaction to NATO Enlargement

-- In addition to enlargement, NATO is also pursuing establishment of a parallel

relationship with Russia. This is being done in recognition of the important role Russia has to play in European security.

-- We are aware that Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Russian Ambassador Churkin repeated these concerns following the enlargement briefing in Brussels on Thursday (September 28). We will continue working to overcome these concerns, which we believe are misplaced.

-- NATO enlargement is not aimed at Russia. NATO is a purely defensive organization. Our goal is to extend stability to areas of historic instability to ensure their future security.

-- Our purpose is to end the division of Europe, not to create new divisions.

-- At the same time, we have made clear to Moscow that enlargement will proceed in a gradual and transparent manner.

-- We strongly disagree with those who believe NATO should enlarge immediately just because Russia has concerns about enlargement.

-- Enlargement must be a deliberate process that takes into account our interests as well as those of our European partners and Allies.

NATO Adopts Go-Slow Approach on Enlargement

Can you comment on press reports from Williamsburg that NATO has adopted a go-slow approach to enlargement due to concerns over Russia? Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev even welcomed the reports.

-- As Secretary Perry made clear yesterday (October 5), this is a false report. NATO has not adopted a go-slow approach to enlargement but is pursuing the "gradual, deliberate and transparent process" leading to enlargement that was foreseen by the Alliance from the very beginning.

-- There has been no acceleration or deceleration to the process.

-- NATO's approach to enlargement is spelled out clearly in the NATO enlargement study which was approved by NATO on September 20 and presented to members of the Partnership for Peace in Brussels on September 28.

-- No timetable exists at present, but NATO is committed to moving ahead.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Reaction to Decision to Use Multiple Routes for Exporting Caspian Oil

-- Welcome decision by Azerbaijan International Oil Company (AIOC) to develop multiple export routes from Caspian for transport of early oil extracted by AIOC.

-- Believe multiple routes will enhance AIOC's ability to export oil to Western and traditional markets by promoting competitive business practices in oil transport, increasing export capacity, and encouraging increased oil production.

-- All countries in region benefit from decision. Expect it to foster greater cooperation among countries in region, improving prospects for development and stability.

AIOC Decision a Loss for Russia?

-- Not at all. See this as win-win situation. Considerable early oil will be transported from Caspian through Russia. And multiple routes will ensure no bottlenecks in Russian pipelines that would hold back development and export of Russian oil.

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's Decision Not to Run for President

-- Have seen reports that Chernomyrdin has said he will not run for President in next June's Russian election. Obviously, his decision to make. Just as obviously,

inappropriate for us to comment on internal Russian political matter.

-- Vice President Gore had useful and productive working meeting with Chernomyrdin in Maine on October 7.

Russian Threat to Invade Baltics if They Join NATO?

-- Russian press reports allude to new draft defense doctrine, which allegedly states Russia should deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and Kaliningrad and occupy Baltic states should those states join NATO.

-- Status of this irresponsible and inflammatory alleged doctrine is unclear. Foreign Minister Kozyrev told press he was unaware of any new Russian military doctrine. Other senior Russian officials have said document has no official endorsement.

-- U.S. supports independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Also support good relations between Baltic states and Russia.

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Transformation underway will be complex, protracted. Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

-- Engagement producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working

hard to resolve these.

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests. It helps reformers succeed in building a democracy and a market economy, and it helps reduce nuclear threat to U.S.
Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Intend to manage enlargement process in deliberate, transparent manner that threatens no country and strengthens security and stability of Europe as a whole.

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to develop NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members.
Robust NATO-Russia relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have begun serious dialogue that is continuing.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Chechnya

-- Have seen reports that Russians have suspended peace process over recent Chechen attacks, including this weekend's attempt to assassinate Russian force commander in Grozny. Condemn attacks like that, whose purpose is to undermine the fragile effort to find negotiated settlement.

-- Dispute in Chechnya can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides to work together to implement military agreement and to find political solution.

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

□ The United States and our NATO Allies have for some time been looking at ways to address Russian and Ukrainian concerns about the Treaty's "flank" limits.

□ Last [week] month NATO presented a proposal to Russia in Brussels for a new approach to resolving this issue. Russia has reacted cautiously and will study the offer further.

□ The strategic picture has changed dramatically since the Treaty was signed in 1990. Neither the Warsaw Pact nor the Soviet Union exist. Forces once deployed by the USSR as far west as Eastern Germany have withdrawn to Russia. We are looking at ways to respond to those changes, while maintaining the key elements of the Treaty.

□ NATO has developed this proposal as it prepares for the CFE Review Conference, established by the Treaty for May, 1996. Our goal is to preserve the viability of the Treaty, which remains a cornerstone of European security.

□ The "flank" issue does not concern the overall equipment limit for Russia and Ukraine, but the restrictions which the Treaty places on the amount of equipment permitted in certain regions. Russia and Ukraine have participated fully in the Treaty's implementation over the past three years, destroying thousands of pieces of Treaty-limited equipment and submitting to hundreds of inspections under the terms of the Treaty.

□ We and our Allies continue to reject completely the Russian idea of an "exclusion zone" in its Caucasus region. There is no basis for such an "exclusion zone" in the Treaty.

□ Any solution must be acceptable to all Treaty parties. The forum for negotiation will be the CFE Joint Consultative Group in Vienna.

(If asked about statement by Senator Helms staff that Treaty

changes are not likely to be approved "anytime soon":)

☐ Any agreement along the lines of the NATO proposal would require the approval of Congress.

ASAD PHONE CALL

☐ President spoke with President Asad last week.

☐ President called to share with President his impressions of the recent meetings with Middle East leaders here in Washington.

☐ President reaffirmed his view that comprehensive peace in the Middle East will not be attained until Syria and Israel reach an agreement.

☐ President reaffirmed his strong support for efforts by the two parties to achieve that objective.

☐ President Asad expressed appreciation for the President's call and assured him of Syria's continuing strong interest in reaching agreement with Israel.

☐ We agreed that we will continue to work on making progress.

ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT

Background on Agreement

Israel and the Palestinians signed the Interim Agreement provided for in the September 13, 1993 Declaration of Principles, on Thursday, September 28, at the White House. The Interim Agreement extends Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank, will result in the phased elimination of the Israeli Civil Administration and military occupation, and provides for elections to a Palestinian Council. Implementation will be in phases extending into early 1997.

Israel will initially turn over about 30 percent of the West Bank

to full Palestinian control "Zone A" and to divided control "Zone B". Remaining territory will be under exclusive Israeli control "Zone C". The ultimate disposition of settlements and IDF facilities in Zone C will be resolved in the final status discussions to begin in May 1996.

Points

-- We believe the Agreement is a major step forward toward a lasting peace for Israelis and Palestinians alike and has our full support.

-- The negotiators and their leaders have prevailed over the enemies of peace. This is a good omen for good steps in the future.

-- U.S. played a key role throughout process which led to this historic agreement.

-- In closing days and hours of the negotiations, we engaged in around the clock "diplomacy by telephone" to assist and encourage resolution of final outstanding issues.

-- I was in constant contact with my peace team throughout this process and spoke with Rabin, Arafat, Hussein, Mubarak and Hassan to review the significance of the Agreement and discuss plans for the Washington Summit for Middle East Peace.

-- Met with Rabin, Arafat, Hussein and Mubarak separately and in groundbreaking five-way meeting to discuss how best to support Agreement, move forward to comprehensive peace. Issued joint Declaration affirming concrete steps to realize these goals.

-- Reiterated our commitment to work for Syria-Israel and Lebanon-Israel settlements.

CUBA TALKING POINTS

-- I decided to take a series of steps to invigorate the Cuban Democracy Act's (CDA) goal of promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

-- These steps are consistent with the spirit and the letter of the CDA and implement precisely what it calls for: Use the embargo effectively to put pressure on the Castro government and help those people and forces in Cuba that are struggling for democratic change.

-- Nothing in these decisions reflects a weakening of my commitment to the embargo. On the contrary: Every element of the embargo remains in place and the means to enforce it will be strengthened. At the same time, this Administration will reenergize its efforts to reach out to the Cuban people through the free flow of ideas and information and by strengthening the island's fledgling civil society.

ENFORCING THE EMBARGO

-- I directed that the office in charge of enforcing the embargo, the Office of Foreign Assets Control be significantly beefed up, both here and in Miami.

-- I also will consult with the Attorney General on how best to enforce the provisions of the embargo.

-- If we are serious about going after those who violate the embargo, then we ought to make sure that we have rules that can be complied with. Today, many Cuban-Americans circumvent the travel rules and go to Cuba without a license. They do not do it to flout the law or because they do not believe in the embargo. They do it because of the time it takes to get the license and because in many instances time is of the essence. Therefore, the President has decided to provide a general license for Cuban-Americans to make an annual visit to Cuba for humanitarian reasons. This will help those who really need to travel on an urgent basis. It will cut down on violations of the embargo. And it will make enforcement of the law fairer and easier.

REACHING OUT TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE

-- I also shares the CDA's belief that the U.S. can promote democracy in Cuba through the power of ideas and by reaching out to the Cuban people.

-- The other decisions that will be announced tomorrow are designed to strengthen those on the island who can be agents of change: Human rights activists, dissidents, independent organizations.

-- First, we will authorize the establishment of reciprocal news bureaus in Cuba and the U.S. Of course, we will not approve Cuban bureaus until a full range of US news bureaus are granted entry to Cuba. This decision will significantly increase the flow of news to and from Cuba, thereby helping the Cuban people escape their state's monopoly over information.

-- Second, we will allow U.S. NGOs to help their counterparts in Cuba in a variety of ways.

-- US NGOs will be authorized to provide support to human rights organizations and other NGOs in Cuba.

-- The USG will be providing a grant to Freedom House to work with Cuban NGOs to advance the cause of democracy.

-- We will allow the sale and donation of communications equipment -- such as fax machines, copiers, computers, etc. -- to Cuban NGOs who promote democratic values and respect for human rights.

-- Third, travel regulations will be amended to clarify who can and cannot go to Cuba. Under these new regulations, transactions to finance tourist travel to Cuba remain prohibited. Like other elements of the embargo, this ban will be more strictly enforced than before. At the same time, the rules will make clear that travel for scientific, news-gathering, educational, cultural, religious purposes, or for the purpose of helping independent activities on the island, is permitted.

WESTERN UNION

-- Finally, I have decided to authorize Western Union to set up offices here and in Cuba to send wire transfers more simply and at a lower cost to those who need to pay emigration fees or for

family emergencies. The rules on remittances remain the same -- Western Union simply will make transfers easier and cheaper.

Q's and A's

Q.: What prompted you to take these decisions now? Is there any connection to the pending Helms/Burton legislation?

A.: No. The Administration for some time has been reviewing ways to increase the effectiveness of the economic embargo and to reinforce our policy of support for the Cuban people. I believe the time has come to re-energize our efforts to promote democratic change in Cuba, and firmly believes these measures will advance that goal.

Q.: Was any of this negotiated with the Cuban government?

A.: No. These decisions were not made to please the Cuban government. They were made because we firmly believe that they will promote democratic change on the island.

Q.: Do these decisions require an executive order or legislation?

A.: No. They simply require amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations issued by the Treasury Department.

Q.: When will these decisions be effective?

A.: Immediately.

Q.: Don't these changes represent a softening of the embargo? You are allowing more travel to Cuba, reciprocal news bureaus, assistance to Cuban NGOs, etc. Aren't all of these signs of an opening up to Cuba?

A.: Absolutely not -- we are opening up to the Cuban people, not to the Cuban regime. I am committed to maintaining the embargo unless and until significant movement is made toward democracy. In fact, the steps announced today will strengthen the embargo: The Attorney General will step up prosecution of embargo violators and the office responsible for monitoring

the embargo will be significantly beefed up.

The other measures are designed to reinforce Cuba's fledgling civil society, to expand the free flow of ideas, to provide assistance and breathing space to human rights organizations, independent groups, dissidents and free thinkers. This is precisely the sort of thing that the Cuban Democracy Act called for in order to strengthen those in Cuba who could act as agents for peaceful change.

Q.: By allowing Cuban-Americans to visit their relatives once a year, aren't you rescinding the August 1994 sanctions?

A.: No. Under the August 1994 decision, persons could travel to Cuba to visit relatives only on humanitarian grounds. That remains the case.

The only change concerns the licensing procedures. Since August 1994 and prior to today's announcement, persons who wished to visit a relative in Cuba for humanitarian reasons were required to apply for a specific license. That took a long time and caused serious hardships to Cuban-Americans who urgently needed to visit a sick or dying relative. It also led many Cuban-Americans to violate the regulations in order to hasten their trip. Under the new regulations, transactions related to travel to Cuba to visit relatives in humanitarian cases will be allowed once a year without requiring a specific license. This will significantly shorten the time required to travel, thereby both addressing a pressing humanitarian concern and reducing the incentive to violate the law. But the basis for travel to Cuba of this kind remains the same: Serious humanitarian circumstances involving a close relative.

Q.: Do the changes regarding academic or educational travel take us back to the rules in place prior to August 1994?

A4.: No. For example, professional researchers still need to apply for a specific license. What the changes seek to do, first, is clarify the rules to make it clear who can and who cannot engage in travel related transactions -- that will make it easier both to comply with and to enforce the law.

Second, the changes are designed to expand exchanges between the American and the Cuban people to increase the free flow of ideas without allowing tourism. Specific categories of travel-related transactions that will now be permitted include:

- Transactions for travel by persons acting on behalf of an organization with an established interest in international relations to collect information related to Cuba;
- Transactions for travel by a US student sponsored by a US college or university or for participation in a formal course of study at a Cuban academic institution; the regulations will allow American and Cuban undergraduates to study in each other's countries;
- Transactions for travel by US national to participate in public exhibition or performance in Cuba;
- Transactions for travel to support Cuban NGOs or individuals that promote independent activity on the island.

Q.: What are acceptable payments of travel expenses for tourism, scientific, scholarly, cultural or religious visits?

A.: There is no change to these rules. Authorized transactions include principally transportation-related transactions and payment of living expenses up to \$100 per day. Details are provided in the Treasury regulations.

Q: The other major element of the August 1994 sanctions concerned remittances to in Cuba. Have these rules changed as is reported in the Washington Post?

A5.: No. Transfers of money to Cuba are allowed to pay for emigration fees up to \$500 and to help a close relative in Cuba in cases of humanitarian need (these include serious illness or severe medical emergency). The decision to authorize Western Union to open offices in the US and Cuba simply will facilitate the transfer of such monies and make them cheaper.

Q.: Which US news organizations will be allowed to open bureaus in

Cuba?

A.: My decision to authorize the establishment and operation of reciprocal news bureaus will have tremendous benefits for the Cuban people. It will meet their hunger for uncensored information and permit wider reporting of events in Cuba.

We do not know which US organizations will be allowed to establish bureaus in Cuba once they apply. But we will not approve Cuban news bureaus until a range of US news bureaus -- including print, electronic, national and regional -- are permitted entry into Cuba.

Q. Will you insist on inclusion of Radio and TV Marti?

A. We believe that Radio and TV Marti are effective institutions and need to be strengthened. We do not contemplate at this time requiring their inclusion as conditions for reciprocity.

Q. Won't the opening of news bureaus in Cuba require Castro's approval? Will you negotiate with him?

A. No. My decision to authorize reciprocal bureaus is a unilateral U.S. decision. US news organizations are now in a position to try to get approval from the Cuban government to open bureaus in Cuba. As for the opening of Cuban news bureaus in the US, this will depend on the range of US news organizations the Cuban government permits to operate in Cuba.

Q. Do these decisions affect mail delivery?

A. No

Q. You say you are going to step up enforcement of the embargo. What does that mean?

A. The hardships caused by the strict humanitarian visitation policy and the confusion caused by restrictions on non-tourist travel accounted for some of the violations of the embargo rules that have been occurring. Now that we have addressed the humanitarian concern of Cuban-Americans wishing to visit relatives, clarified the regulations and expanded the scope of

permissible exchanges between Cuba and the US, the justifications for flouting the law are gone and we are in a position to crack down on those who choose to violate the rules. The increased staffing of the office in charge of monitoring the embargo (OFAC) will make this possible.

Q. Is this a first step towards lifting the embargo?

A. No. Our policy remains dictated by the Cuban Democracy Act: We will not lift the embargo or change the nature of our relationship with the Castro regime unless and until significant movement is made toward democracy. Significant movement includes holding free and fair elections, freeing all political prisoners, showing respect for basic civil liberties and human rights.

But we are also prepared to consider other, calibrated responses if Cuba demonstrates its true commitment to political or economic reform. The obstacle to improved relations between the US and Cuban government is how the Cuban regime behaves toward its own people. When that behavior changes, so will our policy toward Cuba.

Q. What kind of assistance to Cuban NGOs will be allowed?

A. Our aim is to strengthen those in Cuba who can act as agents of peaceful change, to nurture independent thinking and activities. Non-governmental groups need additional breathing space and resources to increase their effectiveness and independence from the central state. The changes we are announcing will help accomplish this goal. They will authorize assistance to Cuban human rights organizations and other individuals or NGOs striving to promote democracy and respect for human rights on the island.

Forms of assistance might include sending fax machines, copiers, or computers to Cuban NGOs; providing training to Cuban human rights activists; helping independent Cuban organizations set up offices, etc.

Q. What do you mean when you refer to Cuban NGOs?

A. We mean Cuban organizations genuinely independent from the

state, such as human rights organizations, dissident groups, the church and some labor groups.

Honduras

Background

The Honduran human rights ombudsman is conducting investigations into reported abuses which took place in Honduras in the 1980s. In conjunction with his investigation he has requested access to U.S. government files which may have relevant information.

Points

- ☐ Dr. Balladares, the human rights ombudsman for Honduras, has requested that certain U.S. government documents relevant to his investigation be made available.
- ☐ State Department, which initially received the request, will shortly begin reviewing appropriate documents for declassification and release to Dr. Balladares.
- ☐ We anticipate other agencies will work with State Department to provide similar assistance to Dr. Balladares.
- ☐ On September 12 the DCI confirmed that the CIA was currently conducting a review of what happened in Honduras during the 1980's. (Deutch National Press Club quote: "I expect that we will learn lessons from that review -- lessons about how to not do things while I'm Director and in the future.")

COLUMBIA

Background

Colombian Legislator Carlos Alonso Darjo yesterday released transcripts of alleged conversations between the head of DEA in Embassy Bogota and DEA and Justice

Department officials in Washington. He cited the tapes, in which the U.S. officials are quoted saying unflattering things about the Colombian people, government and President Samper, as evidence of "U.S. aggression." Darjo -- who is known to have at least a social relationship with leaders of the Cali Cartel -- claimed that Colombia's problems with the United States over narcotics are in large measure caused by the "enormous DEA bureaucracy."

Points

- ☐ Cannot comment on the accuracy of the transcripts of the alleged conversations between officials of the U.S. government, nor on legality under Colombian law.
- ☐ Call on the Colombian Government to provide a prompt and complete explanation of this unfriendly act toward a friendly government with which Colombia is formally committed in a joint struggle against the scourge of narcotics trafficking.

MEXICO

General Readout Points

- ☐ Zedillo demonstrated strong leadership in economics and politics with impressive results.
- ☐ Both U.S./Mexico have benefited from bold decisions made last winter to stem Mexico's liquidity crisis.
- ☐ NAFTA is a success: side agreements on labor and environment working.
- ☐ Welcome early repayment, recognize difficulty of recession, urge Zedillo to stay course.
- ☐ Recognize significant progress on range of tough issues
- ☐ Transfer this week of 12 U.S. helicopters positive step (counter-drug). Zedillo proposed reforms of judicial system also critical.

- ☐ We urge intensified efforts against cartels joint development of long-term training and increased cooperation with us.
- ☐ Extradition of Mexican nationals would deny Mexico as safehaven for criminals.
- ☐ Welcome actions against criminal smuggling of illegal immigrants, fulfillment of other "Zacatecas" commitments, recent agreement on interior repatriation program.
- ☐ Urge stepped up enforcement of existing laws against migrant smuggling. Propose two governments consider concrete measures to stem border criminality, violence, ask senior staffs to work quickly to take action.
- ☐ Urge broader commitment to economic development along the border, including infrastructure, legal crossing points, environmental protection -- complement to NAFTA.
- ☐ Committed to NAFTA and prompt action on bilateral trade irritants i.e. tariff acceleration and small package delivery regulations would enhance success. (Zedillo discussed with Mickey Kantor, Mack McLarty.)

Trade

- ☐ Understand impact of financial crisis on jobs/income in U.S. and Mexico would have been much worse without NAFTA. Appreciate Mexico continues to honor NAFTA commitments. Appreciate resolution of tire certification and Metalclad issues.
- ☐ To show NAFTA working, Mexico must be more forthcoming in addressing outstanding bilateral trade issues: speeding tariff cuts in wine, flat glass industries and small pkg delivery.

Law Enforcement/Counternarcotics

- ☐ Shared concerns on threat of organized crime, narcotraffickers pose to national security of both nations.
- ☐ Recent cooperation impressive. Three binational task forces

targeting cartels, recent payment to Mexico of \$6 million in asset-forfeiture funds, delivery of 12 helicopters serve mutual interests.

- ☐ Need to improve reliability of local-level law enforcement -- corruption problems in both countries.
- ☐ Capture and when appropriate extradition of major traffickers would send strong signal.

Migration

- ☐ Strongly oppose anti-immigrant legislation. Recognize responsibility to respect rights of all individuals, including those who are not U.S. citizens.
- ☐ Understand that immigration driven by market forces.
- ☐ Both countries need a border that works: controls illegal crossings, stops criminality, well-functioning ports of entry and conducive to commercial activities.
- ☐ Last year apprehensions of illegal immigrants along the U.S.-Mexico border increased 26 percent, and may see seasonal increase this February-May.
- ☐ Mexico has taken good first steps -- augmented police forces along the border, stopped port runners and closed tunnels in Nogales used by criminals to enter the U.S.
- ☐ Welcome concrete actions to break up alien smuggling rings, to defuse danger of border violence resulting from congregations of unemployed near border.
- ☐ Do not want this to escalate as partisan political issue into which Mexico will be drawn. Must find cooperative ways to deal more effectively with this issue.

Alien Smuggling

- ☐ Appreciate help in landing interdicted Chinese migrants and repatriating them from Mexico. (U.S. reimbursed Mexico \$785,000 for April repatriation.)
- ☐ Brutal smuggling rings result in gross abuses against migrants.

Appreciate continued cooperation in temporarily landing migrants should future incidents arise.

Border/Environment

☐ Environmental cooperation along border is improving but population growth outstripping our efforts.

☐ Pleased NAFTA-associated Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and NADBANK off to good start. Committed to full funding for NADBank.

☐ Carbon I/II emissions of concern, know you are running tests, believe there should be technical discussion regarding emissions issue.

☐ Believe we are close to finalizing a joint environmental mapping project -- important initiative that should receive both governments' support.

☐ Border 2000 an important program, EPA has given 14 related grants to tribal and local governments, NGOs and community organizations.

Ruiz Massieu Extradition (RTQ)

Understand concern. Justice worked to press this case in our courts. However, cannot control judge's ruling. Will continue to examine options.

Tuna/Dolphins (RTQ)

☐ Respect progress Mexico and other members of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission have made reducing dolphin mortality.

☐ Declaration signed in Panama last week was a significant step that we hope will enable us to amend our law.

☐ Will work with Congress on this.

Hemispheric Diplomacy

☐ Zedillo speech at OAS will place these issues discussed in a hemispheric context.

□ Many issues we discussed today addressed at Summit of the Americas. Welcome active participation in Summit follow-up.

Mexico Repayment of Emergency Loans

Q Is it true that Mexico will prepay \$1 billion worth of emergency loans from the United States, when President Zedillo visits Washington later this month?

-- That is a matter best addressed by representatives of the Mexican government.

-- But it is a very healthy sign that nobody's talking anymore about whether Mexico will repay; they're only asking when Mexico is going to repay.

-- This change only serves to underscore the potential and importance of the Mexican market and the ultimate wisdom of NAFTA.

CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS

Q: Where will the summit between President Clinton and President Jiang be held?

A: The meeting will be held in New York on October 24, as announced yesterday. Details are still being worked out.

Q: What is the purpose of the meeting?

A: To promote better mutual understanding and continue the process of developing the overall U.S.-China relationship, which is in the long-term interest of both countries.

Q: What will the two Presidents talk about?

A: There is a broad agenda available to both sides, including, from the U.S. perspective, strategic international and regional issues, non-proliferation, human rights and trade. China also has a number of issues it intends to raise with the United States.

Q: So it will be primarily an opportunity to review disagreements?

A: The purpose of the President's invitation is to provide an opportunity for communication and a review of the overall relationship, which has undergone some ups and downs recently. This is fully a part of our engagement approach with the Chinese.

The purpose is not only to rehash disagreements but more to find common ground and areas where cooperation is achievable.

Q: Will any agreements be signed?

A: Although planning for the meeting is still in progress, we do not anticipate any formal signing of agreements.

Q: Why is the meeting in New York and not Washington? Was there a disagreement?

A: The United States initially invited Jiang for an official working visit to Washington, which we believe is consistent with the current state of the relationship and provides an opportunity to focus on improving mutual understanding and dealing with issues.

The President prefers a more informal setting and has carried out numerous meetings with visiting heads-of-state in this manner. China preferred a full State visit, which generally focuses attention on ceremony over substance.

After a full discussion, it was agreed by both sides that New York was an appropriate venue for a meeting.

Q: Is this then a "second-class" summit? A politically safe summit?

A: Of course not. The President is also meeting with President Yeltsin in New York.

The U.S.-China relationship is of great importance to the United States, and President Clinton holds President Jiang in high regard. The meeting is going to happen -- that's the

important point.

Q: Has the U.S. agreed to limit speeches by Taiwan leaders visiting the United States, as China's Foreign Minister implied?

A: The U.S. position on visits consistently has been that visits by Taiwan leaders would be private, unofficial, rare, and evaluated case-by-case. That would exclude visits for predominantly political purposes. The United States does not limit or restrict free speech by visitors.

Q: We hear the Chinese have told the Iranians that they would sell them nuclear reactors inspite of what they've told the U.S.

A: I would refer you to what the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said on the record in Beijing yesterday: That China is "not providing reactors" to Iran.

EXPORT CONTROLS ON COMPUTERS

- ☐ Announced revision of U.S. export controls on computers to enhance the effectiveness of our export control system, protect our national security, and ease regulatory burdens on both government and industry.
- ☐ Controls last revised 1993. Computer technology would continue to change rapidly -- we would need to review control levels within 18 to 24 months.
- ☐ Administration has conducted review of computer export controls: (1) the rapid advance of computing technology since 1993, (2) security and nonproliferation interests, and (3) need for policy remain effective over 18 to 24 months.
- ☐ Review found enormous advances in power and capabilities of computing systems in widespread commercial use.
- ☐ Commercial computer market being transformed by emergence of workstations containing multiple high-speed microprocessors, ready availability of high-speed communications links,

and rapid progress in software to permit difficult problems to run in parallel and on networks.

□ Computers up to 7000 million theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) widely available in open commerce within the next two years. Significant number of important national security applications have performance requirements above 10,000 MTOPS.

New computer export controls designed around following goals:

Permit the government to calibrate control levels and licensing conditions depending upon the national security or proliferation risk posed at a specific destination;

Enhance U.S. national security and preserve the U.S. computer industrial base by ensuring controls on computer exports are effective and do not unnecessarily impede legitimate computer exports; and

Permit government to track global sales, and show how high-performance computing used to pursue critical military applications.

The Revised Controls

□ Group A (Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand): General license for all computers (i.e. no prior government review, but companies must keep records on higher performance shipments that will be provided to the U.S. government as directed).

□ Group B (South America, South Korea, ASEAN, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa): General license up to 10,000 MTOPS with record-keeping and reporting as directed; individual license (requiring prior government review) above 10,000 MTOPS. Above 20,000 MTOPS, the government may require certain safeguards at the end-user location.

□ Group C (India, Pakistan, all Middle East/Maghreb, the former Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, rest of Eastern Europe): General license up to 2000 MTOPS.

Individual license for military and proliferation-related end-uses and end-users and general license for civil end-users between 2000 MTOPS and 7000 MTOPS, with exporter record keeping and reporting as directed. Individual license for all end-users above 7000 MTOPS. Above 10,000 MTOPS, additional safeguards may be required at the end-user location.

□ Group D (Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea): Current policies continue to apply (i.e. virtual embargo on computer exports).

For all these groups, reexport and retransfer provisions continue to apply. The revised controls will become effective after they are implemented in formal Commerce Department regulations.

Continue to implement Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), provides authority for government to block exports of computers of export cases to end-uses or end-users of proliferation concern or risks of diversion to proliferation activities. Criminal as well as civil penalties apply to violators of the EPCI.

Department of Commerce developing additional measures to inform exporters of obligations and potential proliferation and other security risks. Will publish regulations clarifying exporters' duty to check suspicious circumstances and inquire about end-uses and end-users. Exporters will be advised to contact Department of Commerce if they have any concern with the identity or activities of the end-users. Regular briefings/industry outreach on proliferation and security issues will be available for computer companies producing high-performance computers.

Multilateral Coordination
Administration actively consulting with Japan in context of bilateral arrangement on high performance computers. Also consulting with partners engaged in negotiations to establish successor to COCOM (the New Forum), to ensure they understand the basis for new controls. Committed to working closely to stem flow of computers to destinations that present collective security concerns. Controls consistent with foundations/principles of New Forum negotiations:

deny arms/sensitive dual-use technologies to countries of proliferation concern and develop mechanisms for information sharing among the partners as a way to harmonize our export control practices and policies.

Q&A

Q: What have you decided?

A: We decided to raise the threshold of control on computers to take into account changes in technology and the increasing availability of these machines around the world.

This reform advances our national security by focusing controls where they can be effective, while relieving US industry of unnecessary or ineffective controls.

Q: Won't this help countries like Pakistan and Iran to get nuclear and other advanced weapons and China to improve theirs?

A: The fact is that these countries can get access to the level of computer under the new thresholds, no matter what we do. There is just too much availability to stop it. So broad brush controls just won't work.

That does not mean we give up. We will continue to require licenses for machines intended for military or proliferation-related end users well below the level where they can be effectively controlled.

And we will continue to enforce our regulations that allow us to block the transfer of computers of any level to a military or proliferation end use.

Q: Isn't this just a sellout to industry and a political move aimed at California?

A: No. This decision is based on a thorough review, led by the Department of Defense and involving all agencies, of what levels of computer controls make sense in light of changes in technology and the marketplace.

In 1993, we set computer thresholds that we said we would have to

revise in two years to
account for such changes. That is what we have done.

Q: What about Japan and other countries. Will the US go it alone
if they don't agree to your new
thresholds? Will you break the US-Japan supercomputer agreement?

A: We are consulting with Japan and our partners in building a new
regime to succeed COCOM.
We hope to persuade them to adopt the same control structure we
have.

(if pressed) We are consulting with Japan under the
supercomputer agreement. Won't speculate
on outcome or contingencies.

Q: Wasn't there a lot of dissent inside the USG on this?

A: My senior advisors presented me with a unanimous
recommendation. That recommendation
followed thorough discussion, as it should.

CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE REPORT ON DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL

BACKGROUND

On September 29, the House rejected by a wide margin the
conference report on the FY 1996
Defense Appropriations Bill. As reported by the conferees, the
bill would have provided for a
\$243 billion defense budget for next year -- \$6.7 billion more
than requested by the
Administration. The bill's defeat in the House was attributable
to a strong bloc of "pro-life"
Members concerned by the watering down of the House-passed
provision in the bill on abortion
and other Members opposed to the increase in spending for
programs such as the B-2 and
National Missile Defense.

POINTS

-- Committed to maintaining best trained, best equipped, most
ready armed forces in the
world.

-- My budget protects readiness and ensures we are prepared to defend American interests.

-- Although the conferees did remove objectionable policy provisions and other unacceptable restrictions on my prerogatives as Commander in Chief and they did fund several important programs of priority interest to this Administration (e.g., Nunn-Lugar and TRP), I am very concerned by the inclusion of almost \$7 billion for procurement and R&D spending we did not request.

-- With the defeat of the Conference Report by the House, the bill now goes back to the conference to be reworked. As the conferees consider how to revise the bill to improve its prospects of ever being enacted into law, it is important that they understand that absent a broader agreement with Congress that provides adequate funding for crucial domestic programs that are underfunded in other appropriations bills, I will veto any defense appropriations bill that adds extra billions for defense programs not in my request.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURITY

Q: What is new in the Presidential directive on nuclear material security just released?

A: -- The directive reflects another step in the President's continuing efforts to address the risks of nuclear proliferation.

-- It calls for expanded and accelerated cooperation with Russia and the other FSU states, and pulls together a large number of USG efforts -- including State, Energy, Defense, the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, the national labs, and law enforcement agencies -- into a clearer organization led by the NSC staff.

-- (if pressed) It does not represent a dramatic departure from existing efforts. This has been an area of significant effort. The President believes we need to intensify those efforts.

CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW) REVIEW CONFERENCE (LANDMINES/LASERS)

-- Primary U.S. objective at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Review Conference, which opened yesterday and lasts until October 13, will be to strengthen the CCW's restrictions on the use of landmines. We are gravely concerned with humanitarian tragedy caused by the indiscriminate use of these weapons. As the President said in his speech to the UN General Assembly last September, the United States is committed to the eventual elimination of all anti-personnel landmines.

-- Signed in 1980, the U.S. obtained Senate advice and consent to CCW ratification in March of this year after it had languished in the Senate during the last two administrations.

-- The U.S. has advanced the principal proposals to improve the CCW "landmines" protocol that will be considered at the Review Conference. These include, for example:

- requiring that all remotely delivered mines (those delivered by aircraft, rocket or artillery) used outside of marked and monitored minefields self-destruct after a relatively short period, so that they will not remain a threat to civilians after a conflict ends;

- requiring that all mines be detectable using commonly-available technology, to facilitate their clearing;

- expanding the scope of the "landmines" protocol to apply in internal armed

conflicts, where the greatest civilian casualties have occurred;
and

- requiring that the party laying the mines assume responsibility for clearing them,
including a duty at the "cessation of active hostilities" to clear them or maintain them in controlled fields to protect civilians. Where the party laying the mines no longer controls the territory in which they were laid, it would have a duty to provide assistance for their clearance, to the extent possible.

-- (If asked) The U.S. will also be prepared to support a protocol prohibiting the use of so-called "blinding" lasers, provided it protects certain military requirements for the legitimate use of lasers on the battlefield, such as targeting and range-finding.

-- (If asked about the Leahy moratorium amendment adopted by the Senate) That amendment is currently being considered by the conferees on the FY 1996 defense authorization bill, and we remain hopeful that they will be able to reconcile the goals of this provision with the military-operational concerns General Shalikashvili has expressed so forcefully to the conference.

-- Ambassador Michael J. Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Advisor to the Department of State, will lead our delegation.

Freedom House Foreign Policy Points

- ☐ American leadership -- and bipartisan support for our leadership -- is the source of our strength and our success around the world.
- ☐ We saw benefits of leadership once again in recent weeks in the Middle East, in Bosnia and in the anniversary of Haiti intervention.
- ☐ Not easy or automatic. Demanded time, energy, resources, strong military -- in short, leadership. As we debate foreign policy course for years ahead, we must make it priority to live up to legacy of leadership.
- ☐ Bipartisan support for American leadership born in 1941 when we entered WWII (same year Freedom House founded by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Wilkie). We won war, and we

won peace (NATO - Marshall Plan - Bretton Woods - Cold War) because we led.

□ Main focus of our leadership for 50 years has been to support powerful global trend toward democracy and free markets. Our interests and our ideals converge in these goals. Democracy and free markets good for America and for people around world who fight and die for them.

□ For fifty years, Democrats and Republicans have come together to support these goals, even if they disagreed on tactics. But now, consensus is in danger because of isolationist backlash.

□ Some people say that with end of Cold War, we can turn inward. I came to office determined to put our own house in order -- and I am. But also said we cannot be strong at home if we fail to lead abroad. Communism may be dead, but new democracies must be nurtured and defended. And new problems -- nuclear proliferation, drugs, terror, crime -- just like fascism and communism, demand American leadership to defeat them.

□ Line between foreign and domestic policy blurring. Problems that start abroad -- nukes, drugs, environment -- become problems at home. And need to build prosperity at home through jobs requires opening markets abroad.

□ So isolationists are dead wrong. New challenges and opportunities make enduring values more important than ever. Must be true to them to make future safer and more secure. That's why we're leading fight to reduce nukes, spread democracy and human rights, support peace and open markets.

□ These goals not abstractions. We're making real difference in day to day lives of Americans:

* Americans safer because reducing nuclear threat (Russian missiles; cutting arsenals; NPT extension; Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan; North Korea; securing materials).

* Bringing democracy to Haiti stopped flow of illegal migrants to Florida.

* Mexico support package preserved critical export market, saved American jobs, gave countries around world faith in democracy and free markets.

* Bringing Europe closer together (thru economic reform in FSU, CEE and NATO expansion) means no more wars in bloodiest battleground of century.

* We're creating jobs by opening markets. Already 2 million new jobs because we're making trade more free and fair thru GATT, NAFTA, APEC etc...

□ We're also making difference to people around the world -- turning American ideals into world's reality: The people of Belfast, Jerusalem, Sarajevo, Port au Prince, CEE, Kuwait, all better off for our leadership.

□ Isolationist backlash threatens our leadership and these kinds of achievements. I am determined to resist it.

□ That's why fighting to preserve foreign assistance, State budget, ability to work with U.N. and build coalitions.

□ Foreign assistance not a handout. Every dollar we spend comes back tenfold. Use it to reduce nukes in NIS, N. Korea. To support reform in FSU and CEE which will become big markets for our products. To fight problems in developing world (AIDS, overpopulation, drugs...) that could become our problems tomorrow. To prevent future crises whose cost would be exponentially greater.

□ State Department cutters would shut down our embassies first, worry about consequences later. But embassies helping American companies win billions of dollars in contracts. Our diplomats are responding to crises in Burundi, Rwanda. Working to keep drugs from our shores. To move peace forward in N. Ireland, Bosnia, Middle East. We can't afford part time or half strength diplomacy in world of moving opportunities and 24-hour crises.

□ Some would even zero out ACDA, USIA, AID -- but all make America safer, stronger.

□ Finally, some say America must act alone -- or not at all. Leadership can't be reduced to unilateralism. Need flexibility to work with U.N., lead coalitions (e.g. Desert Storm, Haiti).

□ Last 50 years have taught us U.S. has unique ability and responsibility to be force for peace and progress in world and security and prosperity at home. But we can only succeed if we lead and maintain resources and tools leadership requires.

□ We all want same thing: future without nuclear war... in which sons and daughters won't be called to fight war we could have prevented... in which borders won't be under assault by people fleeing tyranny... in which markets open to our products and provide us with good jobs... in which America remains at peace and prospers as never before. That's what I'm working for every day. We can make it reality if we live up to legacy of American leadership -- and we do it together.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Laura Sepucha to Robert Bell and Gordon Bendick. Subject: Clearance Ltr II to Lugar. (11 pages)	08/29/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/15/1996-09/09/1996]

2006-1363-F
vz5616

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 03 September 96 12:29
FROM Walsh, Helen C.
CLASSIFICATION ***** CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND *****
SUBJECT RE: Urgnt: Transmittal of Indonesia,Austria, Luxembourg Tax
TO Lee, Malcolm R.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Malcolm -- These look great. I would only put some indication in the cover notes (to TL/LT and POTUS) of the time sensitivity -- something like: "Treasury has asked that these treaties be transmitted as expeditiously as possible since Senator Helms has scheduled hearing on all the new tax treaties for September 11."

From: Lee, Malcolm R.
To: Danvers, William C.; Kreczko, Alan J.; Kristoff, Sandra J.; Kyle, Robert D.; Peters, Mary A.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @INTECON - Economic Affairs;
@EUROPE - European Affairs; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Subject: Urgnt: Transmittal of Indonesia,Austria, Luxembourg Tax Treaties[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, September 03, 1996 12:18 PM

<<Attached File: 5878LAKE.DOC>>
<<Attached File: 5878PRES.DOC>>
<<Attached File: 5878AUST.DOC>>
<<Attached File: 5878IND.DOC>>
<<Attached File: 5878LUX.DOC>>

Kreczko/Peters/Kristoff/Kyle/Danvers

We have just received from State three tax treaties that HELMS wants POTUS to transmitt to the Senate TODAY in advance of Sept 11 hearings. Treasury briefs Committee staff TOMORROW on these treaties. They are good for America and our bilateral relations. Your quick clearance on these memos and POTUS transmittal letters is appreciated. Treasury expects no political opposition. It is mindboggling that State sat on them. Thanks.
Malcolm Lee 6-9299

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 03 September 96 18:18
FROM Dohse, Fred J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Indonesia, Austria, Luxembourg Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Davis, William K.
Lee, Malcolm R.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

The package is with Laura Tyson. Malcolm, ball is in your court.

From: Davis, William K.
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: FW: Indonesia, Austria, Luxembourg Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, September 03, 1996 06:08 PM

I add my voice to Malcolm's in pleading to move these treaties rapidly - Sen. Helms' staff has already called me pressing for them and criticizing that they have cleared time on the busy Senate schedule to do these treaties at the Administration's request, but we can't even get them the official documents. I know we weren't the reason for the delay, but anything that can be done to expedite them would be appreciated. thanks

From: Lee, Malcolm R.
To: Davis, William K.; Millison, Cathy L.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: RE: Indonesia, Austria, Luxembourg Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, September 03, 1996 03:52 PM

Indonesia, Austria and Luxembourg tax treaty package (#5878) with Dep Exec Sec now. Need to move forward Lake, Tyson, POTUS. Any assistance you can provide appreciated. ML

From: Davis, William K.
To: @INTECON - Economic Affairs
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: FW: Indonesia Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, August 30, 1996 04:55 PM

Malcolm, FYI

From: Bakke, Kyle D.
To: Millison, Cathy L.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
CC: /R, Record at A1; @RECORDS & ACCESS MGMT; @LEGISLAT-
Legislative Affairs;
@LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @ASIA - Asian Affairs
Subject: RE: Indonesia Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, August 30, 1996 04:42 PM

Cathy, et al -

FYI, the Indonesia Tax Treaty just arrived at WWD. It's on its way to Recs Mgmt for quick staffing.

- Kyle

From: Millison, Cathy L.
To: @RECORDS & ACCESS MGMT
CC: /R, Record at A1; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW: Turkish Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, August 30, 1996 10:06 AM

Please be on the lookout for any of the treaties referred to in the attached note and move them as quickly as possible.

From: Davis, William K.
To: Millison, Cathy L.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @INTECON -
Economic
Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: Turkish Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, August 30, 1996 10:00 AM

many many thanks Cathy - but let me clear up that there is a BRIEFING for staff on Wednesday (there will be a HEARING on Sept. 11th). It is still important that the official treaty get to the Hill soonest on Tuesday though, so I appreciate your help. Also FYI, Treasury has told me there will be tax treaties for Indonesia, Austria and Luxembourg coming through here (I don't know if any have arrived from State yet or not) that will also need to be moved quickly to allow them to be considered by staff prior to the Sept. 11th hearing.

From: Millison, Cathy L.
To: @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: FW: Turkish Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, August 30, 1996 09:37 AM

As requested, I have a call in to the Executive Clerk's office. I'll let them know that this needs to go to the Hill on Tuesday since there is a hearing on Wednesday on this issue.

From: Friedrich, Mary K.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.
CC: /R, Record at A1; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: Turkish Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, August 27, 1996 06:46 PM

Sandy,

Staff Secretary says that it's with the Executive Clerk's Office (it has been signed by the POTUS). They are not allowed to transmit it to Congress until they are back in session. Anyways they said that they will be sure that it is transmitted as soon as Congress is back.

Kate

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: Friedrich, Mary K.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: RE: Turkish Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, August 27, 1996 06:04 PM

Thanks, Kate. Done any good memcons lately?

From: Friedrich, Mary K.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.
CC: /R, Record at A1; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: RE: Turkish Tax Treaty [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, August 27, 1996 05:50 PM

Sandy,

Checking w/ Staff Secretary on the status of package 5308. I will let you know as soon as I know something.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Turkish Tax Treaty[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, August 27, 1996 05:34 PM

See panicky message from State Turkish desk below. This went to President for approval in early August. Is it still there? Need to break it loose.

From: Maxfield, Nancy H.
To: Vershbow, Alexander R.
Subject: PHONE: LAIRD TREIBER

Date: Tuesday, August 27, 1996 04:32 PM

PHONE NUMBER: 7 6114

MESSAGE:

TURKISH DESK AT STATE. WE NEED TO GET THE TURKISH TAX
TREATY TO THE
SENATE BY SEPTEMBER 4.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 September 96 20:09
FROM Bendick, Gordon L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

CWC: Bob Bell briefed Sen DeWine today. Brief went very well. Tomorrow we'll be briefing Sen Lugar on outstanding issues. Kassebaum is getting an update from ACDA. Both Senators have expressed concerns regarding the allegations made by Sen Helms at the R caucus that the Admin is not living up to the Unanimous Consent that requires us to provide Helms with information.

- Working with Senate Judiciary Subc Repub staff to get DOJ witness to appear at Sept 10th hearing. They are not receptive as yet. Dem Senators are being helpful.

- Christopher, Perry and Deutch are working their schedules to be available for Arms Control Observer Group meeting before the Senate on the 9th. JCS looking for appropriate Flag Officer to represent them.

- Schwarzkopf is considering a letter to Lugar. He's out of town, but will communicate with us tomorrow.

DOD APPROPRIATIONS: Perry and Shali meeting with Young, Murtha, Stevens and Inouye tomorrow to discuss their issues. DOD tells us that their Approps Bill is likely to part of the CR. Should know more tomorrow.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 September 96 20:50
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Biernacki, Eileen V.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.
Sens, Andrew D.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wetzel, M. Jeanne
Wiley, Mary C.

CARBON_COPY Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Wise, William M.

TEXT_BODY

Note for Tony, Sandy and Nancy:

INDONESIA F-16S: Briefing for HIRC members tomorrow will be cancelled - Republican and Democratic staff both called today to warn it was being set up to be a disaster for us if we wanted to propose going forward with the sale. Will tell members we will monitor closely Indonesia's behavior and reassess the sale at the beginning of the new Congress. Spoke with H about Strobe's talking with the GOP.

UNC2: House Dems caucused tonight and decided that they will not mount an effort to defeat the Republican sponsored command and control bill tomorrow. Despite SAP stating Sec. Defense and Attorney General would recommend veto, Perry letter recommending veto, and lengthy work with Gephardt's staff on an acceptable alternative, strong majority of Dems (including Hamilton, Skelton, Spratt, Pete Peterson) decided this was too difficult a vote when possibility of regaining control of the House could be in the balance. Will

get talkers to some members who are willing to speak against the bill and will try to slow bill down in the Senate, but will be difficult with vote signalling overwhelming bipartisan support in the House.

HAITI: Rep. Hamilton has call in to Tony to communicate support for Preval security initiative - will urge us to be proactive in selling this to Hill. Word has begun to spread on Hill; according to STATE H, Swing is source of public discussion of trip.

NORTH KOREA: working to set up CIA brief for Rep. Tony Hall on food situation in N. Korea - Hall will testify next week before SFRC subcommittee on dire humanitarian situation he saw there on recent trip. Trying to get Hall a more balanced assessment of situation from CIA intel.

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- Mark Parris briefed John Kerry on the phone today.

- Mark Parris and others will brief the Speaker's foreign policy LA tomorrow morning at 9 AM.

- The Speaker has asked to meet with Shali and Perry on Friday to talk about this.

-- The Senate is negotiating the text of an Iraqi resolution to be taken up soon. We have been working with Daschle's office.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 05 September 96 18:11
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Kristoff, Sandra J.
CARBON_COPY Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.

TEXT_BODY

No, didn't think you were. Just wanted to let you know what went on.

From: Kristoff, Sandra J.
To: Danvers, William C.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: RE: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, September 05, 1996 05:59 PM

bill---thanks, i wasn't complaining about communication between us (or with strobe who i know tried to reach me) but rather that we still will face an uphill battle in january. of course, this is what we get paid for.
regards---sjk

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Kristoff, Sandra J.
CC: /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, September 05, 1996 04:34 PM

Between you and me, I was somewhat surprised that they were was a decision not to gather more information from the Hill on the F-16s. That said, I think that is where we would have ended up, and there was some advantage to not putting ourselves through the wringer with the Hill. Strobe tried to conference you into a call that he and I had on this issue yesterday afternoon. We couldn't get ahold of you or Bob.

From: Kristoff, Sandra J.
To: Danvers, William C.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: RE: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, September 05, 1996 02:52 PM

Bill---

The f-16 decision to defer is most unfortunate; now the Hill and the DRL crowd will argue there has to have been a significant improvement by winter in order for the sale to be justified. Please be sure Sandy Berger clears on the press guidance. On the north korea issue, let me know if you need some help with the agency---i got a good briefing about ten days ago and am in the process of setting up another one soon.

Regards---sjk

From: Danvers, William C.
To: @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs; @ALLNSC - NSC Staff
CC: /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: FW: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, September 04, 1996 08:35 PM

From: Danvers, William C.
To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor;
Soderberg,
Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; Fuerth, Leon S.; Wise,
William M.
Subject: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, September 04, 1996 08:33 PM

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]