

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 March 96 19:48
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Abdulmalik, April B.
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Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
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Bakke, Kyle D.
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Bass, Peter E.
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Bellamy, Ralph C.
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Black, Todd F.
Blieberger, Marion H.
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Boynton, Peter J.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadway, Jamuna
Brown, Dallas
Brown, Nancy E.
Bruton, Robert G.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
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Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya
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Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Dimel, Marsha L.
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Fairfax, Kenneth J.
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Fetig, James L.
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Flessas, Daniel
Florio, Elaine
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Glinski, David L.
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Joshi, M. Kay
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerr, Andrew S.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kreczko, Alan J.
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Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Monday, March 25. Thank you.

[[MAR22GUI.DOC : 4961 in MAR22GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

22 March 96 19:47

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

MAR22GUI.DOC
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 22, 1996

Haiti

B-2

UNSCOM/Iraq

Bosnia/Croatia

Pakistan

Russia

China

Taiwanese Elections

Lebanon

Israel

Iraq

Northern Ireland

Loose Nukes

Liberia

Republican National Missile Defense Bill

Greece

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

Terrorism

HAITI: MEETING WITH HAITIAN PRESIDENT RENE PREVAL

The Haitian Economy

Q: We understand that the focus of your meetings this morning was on economic issues.

What is your assessment of the state of the Haitian economy?

A: President Preval and the President had an open discussion this morning on the critical requirement for reform and revitalization of the Haitian economy. He has already made clear his intent to push forward on privatization of the government-owned industries in Port-au-Prince; development of a realistic budget for the Government of Haiti; and agreements with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Inter-American Development Bank to free up international economic assistance.

They also discussed a bilateral U.S.-Haitian economic "summit," wherein senior U.S. economic experts would travel to Port-au-Prince for discussions with their Haitian counterparts. This would be modeled loosely on the Economic Summit convened in Little Rock shortly after the 1992 election.

Congressional Holds

Q: The recent letters from Senator Dole and Senator Helms, and restrictions on U.S. assistance to Haiti by the House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seem to be direct attacks on your overall Haiti policy. What is your response to these attacks?

A: The chief focus of Congressional critics of our Haiti policy has been charges that:

a) individuals implicated in politically-related murders in Haiti over the past eighteen months continue to hold appointments in the Haitian

National Police, and

b) that the Government of Haiti has been slow to fully investigate such murders.

President Preval has now fired the last of the eight individuals at issue from the police force, has appointed a new Director-General for the HNP, and has pledged to pursue fully the investigations of politically-related murders.

What our Congressional critics fail to acknowledge is that we have in fact restored democracy to Haiti, that we have provided a return to normalcy for the Haitian people, and that we have provided them a chance to rebuild their country and a hope for a more prosperous future.

The Security Situation

Q: There have been a number of incidents within recent weeks of altercations initiated by urban street gangs in Port-au-Prince. In one such incident, in Cite Soleil, eight people were killed. How do you assess the overall security situation?

A: One of the prime tenets of our overall Haiti policy has been recruitment, training and fielding of the new Haitian National Police. That organization is young and inexperienced, and mistakes have been made in a number of instances.

The HNP has been accepted and is respected in cities, towns and villages throughout Haiti however, and we are confident that as the UN presence ramps down, the HNP will continue to mature into a fully professional police force that will reinforce democratic traditions and uphold the rule of law.

Q: Are you comfortable with the fact that the UN Security Council authorized only a four-month extension to the UNMIH mandate?

A: We are comfortable with it, and want to acknowledge the fact that the government of

Canada stepped forward to take charge of the UNMIH military mission. Four months longer was an appropriate compromise for the presence of an international military force. We are working with the UN and the Friends of Haiti in New York to explore options for an extended civilian police advisory presence past the end of UNMIH II.

Redeployment of U.S. Forces

Q: How are the redeployment of U.S. troops and turnover of the UNMIH military mission to Canadian command-and-control proceeding?

A: Our troops have done an absolutely superb job in Haiti, demonstrating once again that they are the best-trained and best-motivated military force in the world today.

The redeployment and transition to Canadian command-and-control is proceeding smoothly and on schedule. Fewer than 500 U.S. troops who were part of UNMIH remain in Haiti. These will finish packing to redeploy completely to their home stations in the United States by April 15.

PRESIDENT'S "21ST B-2" DECISION

Background: In our February 8 announcement of the President's decisions on the future of the B-2 program, we said that while we would not request money for additional B-2s in our FY 1997 budget, we would direct Defense to study "deep strike" tradeoffs involving options with more than 20 B-2s. We also announced that we would spend the \$493 million that Congress had added to the program in FY 1996 "on procurement of B-2 components, upgrades and modifications that would be of value for the existing fleet" of 20 bombers. Since then, various options have been under review for these funds.

On March 20, the President decided that the \$493 million would be used for one specific, high-payoff "upgrade" -- to convert the first B-2 test prototype

("Air Vehicle One" or "AV-1")
into the "21st" deployed B-2. The B-2 program included five test prototypes (AV-1 through AV-5) and the other four AVs have already been upgraded into operational B-2s. Before now, the Air Force had planned to donate AV-1 to a museum.

Northrop has written Secretary Widnall a letter confirming that there is no "fundamental impediment to changing AV-1 to operational configuration" and stating that it is "prepared to propose and negotiate a modification to the existing low rate initial production contract target price of not more than \$493 million." The President has directed the Air Force to negotiate with Northrop Grumman a firm fixed price contractual arrangement to accomplish this upgrade. Obviously, the upgrade of AV-1 will be contingent on this contract being worked out.

Q: What effect will this decision have on the B-2 industrial base?

A: The Air Force has determined that the AV-1 option would result in a substantial rejuvenation of the B-2 vendor base, with most of the \$493 million going to Northrop-Grumman in California. Subcontracts for structural assembly work will also be required with Boeing and Vought and with Hughes for a B-2 radar.

Q: Does this mean that the Administration is now more likely to decide to restart the B-2 production line and build more bombers?

A: No. The situation remains as we described it last month: while we do not rule out more B-2s, we do not believe the case has been made that buying more can be justified, given the high cost and the other modernization and recapitalization priorities facing our Services. Whether that case can be made will be determined by the tradeoff study, which is due the beginning of next year.

Q: Will this decision be supported on the Hill?

A: We certainly believe so. Hill B-2 proponents, including Senator Nunn and Representatives Dicks, Skelton and Harman, have indicated their

strong support for this option. This use of the money is certainly consistent with the intent of Congress when it added the \$493 million to our B-2 request last year.

Q: Is there any daylight between the White House and the Pentagon on this? Did the White House force this "21st B-2" on the Defense Department?

A: No and no. Both Secretary Perry and the Air Force recommended this option, as did the NSC.

Q: Why go this route? Why not spend the money on war readiness spares or munitions and communications upgrades?

A: The Administration concluded that this use of the \$493 million clearly produces the "biggest bang for the buck", since it will in one step increase the B-2 force's capability by five percent. A "21st" B-2 would also provide a better margin for unexpected attrition of B-2s in training accidents or contingencies.

Q: Isn't this inconsistent with your announcement last month that you were not going to build additional B-2s?

A: No. There is no inconsistency between the President's February 8 decision and this option, since this is not a case of building a new B-2 but rather upgrading an existing, sunk-cost asset (the AV-1 test plane) using money we have already committed to expend on the program in one form or the other. In that sense, we will not be "going beyond" the existing program, since the "20 B-2 program" always included 21 "AVs."

Q: What happens next?

A: The next step will be for the Air Force and its acquisition officials to sit down with Northrop-Grumman and negotiate a mutually agreeable firm fixed price contractual arrangement to upgrade Air Vehicle One -- as directed by the President. Unless something unexpected comes up, that contract negotiation should be completed in several

weeks.

UNSCOM: EKEUS TESTIMONY ON IRAQ

Background: Rolf Ekeus, the head of the UN Special Commission charged with dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, testified yesterday that Iraq may still be hiding as many as 16 ballistic missiles, capable of carrying chemical or biological warfare agents.

Q: Do you have any comment on Ambassador Ekeus's testimony on Iraq?

A: Ambassador Ekeus, head of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), articulated UNSCOM's concerns about Iraq's possible continued possession of Scud missiles; his assessment can stand on its own merits, without our commentary.

UNSCOM is responsible for dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

I think it is worthwhile, however, to reemphasize one point made by Ambassador Ekeus on Wednesday. Clearly, the people of Iraq have suffered considerable economic hardship as a direct result of Saddam's continued refusal to cooperate fully with the UN in accounting for and destroying Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. This is a situation that Saddam has the power to remedy.

BOSNIA/CROATIA

IFOR Pullout

☐ It remains our position that IFOR can accomplish the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Accords in about one year.

☐ IFOR's mission has not changed. It is to establish a secure environment and create the conditions within which the parties and the international community can establish a stable and long-lasting peace. That mission is being successfully implemented.

☐ We do not see any need for IFOR to remain in Bosnia after it has accomplished its mission.

☐ The United States and our allies are committed to making Dayton work. Speculation about other eventualities is just that: speculation. Not only is it premature, but we believe counter-productive.

☐ Many of the military tasks of the initial phase of Dayton have been successfully completed. We are at the beginning of a second phase in which the focus of international effort will be the critical challenge of civilian implementation.

On the Question of Withdrawal

It is our expectation that IFOR will remain at its current strength through the elections.

If asked about the NYT's Article on the future of the Peace Accords

☐ There is no question that, in order to establish lasting peace in Bosnia, full implementation of the Dayton Accords, both the military and civilian aspects, is essential.

☐ That is why the parties committed themselves in Geneva to build upon the accomplishments of the first three months of implementation and expressed their determination ensure the complete fulfillment of the spirit and letter of the Agreement.

☐ Now that satisfactory compliance with the military aspects of the Agreement has established a framework of security and predictability within which to build civilian structures, the international community is increasing its efforts to provide the people of Bosnia the necessary means to rebuild their lives.

☐ Economic Reconstruction is moving forward. The President's

quick-impact package has been implemented (see today's press handout), the World Bank held a successful mini-donors conference in December and a major donors' conference will be held in mid-April. The World Bank is working with the Bosnian Government to clear its arrears for future reconstruction funding, and election planning and implementation is ongoing.

☐ We must remember that only the parties can guarantee the success of the Peace Accords. We are there to provide them the opportunity. No question that there is a lot of work still to be done.

Funding for Bosnia

☐ The Administration sent to Congress a \$991 million reprogramming request to fund a major portion of Bosnia operations. The Administration also sent an additional supplemental/rescission request to the Congress, and will send an additional reprogramming request at a later date, to fund the remainder of these operations through September 30, 1996.

Where will funds come from? How much?

☐ This reprogramming action is financed by inflation savings resulting from revised economic assumptions. The supplemental/rescission action will be financed from classified intelligence programs, while the source of the second reprogramming request is not yet identified. The total amount required for U.S. Bosnia military operations in FY 1996 is just under \$2 billion

☐ The EU and the World Bank are responsible for coordinating donors' support for Bosnia.

☐ The \$200 million rescission/supplemental package, presently before Congress, is essential to the overall international reconstruction effort.

☐ Although the Europeans are expected to donate the bulk of the needed funds, the U.S. contribution will be important for creating momentum for the International Donors'

Conference in April and demonstrating our credible commitment to the people of Bosnia. If

Congress does not approve our contribution, then the international donors' conference in April will probably fail.

Reconstruction.

☐ The World Bank approved a plan for Bosnia to become a member of the Bank and expected to lend the country \$450 million over the next four years.

☐ We welcome the decision. This is another important step toward recovery, stability and peace. Helps pave the way for the upcoming Donors' Conference in April.

IFOR Support for Civilian Implementation

☐ NATO, SACEUR, High Rep Bildt, and civilian implementation officials are discussing how IFOR can help support civilian aspects of implementation within the limitations of IFOR's primary mission and available resources.

☐ IFOR Commanders have the authority for supporting tasks, including provision of assistance to War Crimes Tribunal and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions.

Removal of Head of Bosnian Security Agency

☐ We have made clear to Bosnian officials that Bosnian relations with Iran beyond normal diplomatic relations do not contribute to regional stability. These ties also impede the development of our relations with Bosnia.

☐ The presence of any terrorist training elements is unacceptable.

☐ The Bosnian government has assured us that all such activities will come to an immediate halt.

☐ Removal of Alispahic, the Head of Bosnian Agency for Investigation and Documentation's

(BAID), is encouraging given evidence of BAID's continued links with Iranian forces and intelligence personnel.

□ The Dayton Agreement is very clear. It requires that all foreign forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States be withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

□ The discovery of the suspected terrorist training site at Fojnica was clear evidence that foreign forces were still operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina despite assurances by BAID to the contrary.

PAKISTAN

Q: Has the Administration decided to ship conventional arms to Pakistan under the Brown Amendment?

A: No final decision has been made. We are consulting with members of the House and Senate on how best to proceed.

The Brown Amendment opens up a range of cooperation possibilities that had been precluded by previous legislation.

We believe that proceeding with some of this assistance could be helpful in strengthening USG influence with Pakistan on other issues of interest, such as counter-narcotics and non-proliferation.

There is a subset of programs that Brown opens up that would be precluded should we make a decision that our non-proliferation laws have been violated, such as IMET, OPIC and TDA.

While we have made no decision on the non-proliferation issue, we are not considering allowing these programs to go forward in our discussions with the Congress.

Q: Have you decided not to punish either country for China's transfer of ring magnets to the Pakistani nuclear program?

A: No final decision has been made. We now have a nonproliferation team in China, which is raising this issue, and have also approached Pakistan. Once these discussions conclude, we will make decisions based on the law and facts as we understand them.

Q: Did the Administration withhold embarrassing evidence about the ring magnets to help passage of Brown?

A: No.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Russian Poultry Sanctions

- ☐ Negotiations ongoing with Russian officials; seek quick and comprehensive resolution of trade dispute.
- ☐ Continue to rely heavily on Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's assurances that cessation of trade will not take effect. Remain concerned about conflicting Russian news reports over past week. Negotiations critical to ensure that trade stays on track.
- ☐ Have recourse to Section 301 trade measures if needed; Administration currently examining modalities for their potential application.
- ☐ Believe that U.S. poultry, and its inspection system, are as safe and rigorous as that of any poultry-producing nation in the world.

Duma Vote on Belovezhskoye Accords

- ☐ On March 15 Duma passed nonbinding resolutions to repeal Supreme Soviet's ratification of December 1991 Belovezhskoye Accord, which led to dissolution of

USSR and to recognize March 17, 1991 referendum that called for preservation of Soviet Union.

☐ Neither resolution has legal effect. Yeltsin denounced them as unconstitutional, irresponsible and inflammatory. Yeltsin stated integration among NIS should be voluntary, with respect for individual states and without pressure from any side.

☐ U.S. recognizes NIS as sovereign, independent nations and deals with them as such. Reject any attempt to call into question their sovereignty. Support good, cooperative relations among NIS. As for integration, should be based on equality, voluntary and outward-looking.

Alleged "Zavtra" Transcript of January 26 POTUS-Yeltsin Telcon

☐ The President and Yeltsin spoke by phone on January 26. White House Spokesman McCurry summarized the main points of the call at that day's press briefing.

☐ We do not comment in detail on private diplomatic exchanges between the President and other leaders and do not intend to comment on the veracity of the alleged transcript.

General Items

\$10.2 Billion IMF Program for Russia, Impact of Protectionist Measures

☐ IMF-Russia agreement sets clear course for next stage of Russian reform. Encourage Russia to follow through with key policy steps they agreed to take prior to IMF board's final approval of program in late March. Have noted with concern recent statements on protectionist measures that could violate IMF conditions.

☐ If Russia follows through with its commitments, expect that, by time IMF board meets to approve program, Russia will have had three months of solid economic performance in 1996, building on exceptional performance in 1995 when Russia met or

exceeded all IMF targets.

☐ Commend IMF focus on good economic policy. Program sets forth economic guidelines we would back for any government.

Russian Presidential Election

☐ June election for Russian people to decide, exercising democratic habits that are increasingly taking hold in their country. Not for us to intrude on choice of future Russian leader. As elsewhere, we will work with any democratically-elected leadership on the basis of its policies.

☐ We remain steady in our policy of active engagement with Russia to support democracy, economic reform and Russia's integration, and to promote cooperation to advance common foreign and security policy goals.

☐ Working to advance common interests: nuclear disarmament; detargeting; new trade, investment opportunities. Engagement remains in strong interests of both nations.

Chechnya

☐ Strongly believe cycle of violence must be broken. Our consistent position has been that only reliable path to peace is negotiated settlement that takes interests of all parties into account. Hope that Russian government, as it has previously indicated, will soon put forward plan for peaceful resolution to Chechen conflict.

Russia and NATO

☐ U.S. and Russia have different views on logic of NATO enlargement. Have ongoing dialogue with Russians on this issue.

☐ For our part, we intend to manage enlargement process in deliberate, transparent manner that strengthens security, stability of Europe as a whole. Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to develop strong, cooperative NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members.

CHINA

TAIWAN ELECTIONS

-- U.S. stands for democracy and free and fair elections as a matter of principle. And encourage the democratic process wherever it occurs in the world.

-- We will have a reaction on the elections tomorrow.

THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Background: There continue to be stories of escalating tension in the Strait despite the fact that the missile tests have been concluded. Hong Kong press sources misinterpreted statements by China's Premier Li Peng made at the close of the PRC legislative session, "If someone makes a show of force in the Taiwan Strait, that will not only be a futile act, but it also will make the situation all the more complicated." These comments were standard warnings against foreign interference in the Taiwan issue and did not represent a new policy.

Q: Can you comment on Chinese "threats" against U.S. forces operating near Taiwan?

A: I will not comment on specific movements of U.S. naval assets. However, our naval presence is a prudent effort to show our interest in sustaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

(If pressed): The U.S. reserves the right to move its naval forces in international waters at any time.

TAIWAN ARMS SALES

Background: The annual arms sales talks with Taiwan take place this week in Washington. There likely will be reporting that Taiwan is requesting expedited sales and deliveries of new weapons systems. Taiwan's wish list includes a number of weapons systems which we believe they do not need to sustain an adequate defense. The situation

in the Taiwan Strait has not led us to conclude that we should accelerate sales of new systems or deliveries of past purchases. Taiwan is having difficulty absorbing military technology it already has received.

Q: Can you comment on the U.S.-Taiwan discussions on arms sales?

A: The U.S. conducts annual arms sales discussions with Taiwan in the context of our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan in maintaining an adequate self-defense.

This year's talks were scheduled well in advance of the current activities in the Strait.

The talks involved experts from both sides.

Both sides agree not to discuss the details of the talks. Proper notifications will be made to Congress concerning any sales.

Q: Will the U.S. be providing new weapons systems to Taiwan as a result of the arms sales talks taking place this week?

A: In accordance with U.S. law (the Taiwan Relations Act) the administration and the Congress determine which defense articles and services Taiwan needs in order to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

We have an annual process through which we discuss these issues with Taiwan.

This year's talks are scheduled for 19 March. This date was set some time ago through normal and routine scheduling consultations.

Both the U.S. and Taiwan authorities agree not to discuss the specific details of the talks. Announcements of any sales approved by the U.S. and agreed to by Taiwan will be notified to Congress and announced in normal fashion.

CHINESE THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST LOS ANGELES

Points

☐ We will continue to monitor the situation in the Taiwan Straits very closely.

☐ We have had a series of high level meetings during the past several weeks with the Chinese.
We have made clear our position on rising tensions in the Taiwan Straits.

☐ During all of these meetings we have urged the Chinese government to exercise maximum restraint.

☐ At no time have the Chinese threatened military action against the United States.

If asked where the reports of these threats came from:

☐ There never has been any official communication with the United States government or any of its representatives.

CHINA/TAIWAN

☐ There is no ambiguity about our policy on Taiwan's security; grave consequences would flow from a use of force against Taiwan, and we have made clear our determination to see that the future of Taiwan is worked out in a peaceful manner.

☐ A resort to force with respect to Taiwan would directly involve American national interests and would carry grave risks. There should be no ambiguity about our posture in Beijing, Taipei or anywhere else.

☐ We have not concluded that there is any imminent threat to Taiwan, and that we understand the Taiwan authorities have reached the same conclusion.

☐ We are urging restraint by Beijing, while also making clear to Taiwan's leaders that restraint is in their interest. We oppose provocation by either side. We strongly urge both sides to resume their high-level dialogue.

☐ PRC authorities have stated publicly, as well as to us in diplomatic exchanges, that there is no change in their intention to seek a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. They have not, however, ruled out the use of force in certain circumstances.

However, we have no reason to believe the PRC plans to use force against any part of Taiwan.

☐ We continue to monitor the military situation around Taiwan. The USS INDEPENDENCE battle group remains positioned in international waters near Taiwan. The USS NIMITZ and elements of her battle group are due to arrive in the Western Pacific late next week.

TAIWANESE ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to Lee Teng-hui winning the Taiwanese presidential election today?

A: We congratulate the people of Taiwan for successfully carrying out their first direct elections of president and vice president. The democratic transformation of Taiwan over the past 10 years is truly impressive.

We congratulate President Lee and all candidates who prevailed in electoral contests and have earned the trust of the voters to serve in important offices.

We hope that we will see tensions in the Strait subside and that Taiwan and the PRC each will take steps to restore constructive dialogue and stability.

LEBANON

RELEASE OF SUSPECTS IN DEATH OF AMBASSADOR MELOY

Q: What is your reaction to reports that the Lebanese government has released the two convicted suspects in the assassination of Ambassador Meloy in Beirut in 1976?

A: We are disappointed that accomplices to the murder of U.S. diplomats have been

acquitted of murder charges and given amnesty for their role in the kidnappings.

The timing of their acquittal and amnesty is particularly unfortunate at a time of special international focus on the need for greater cooperation against terrorism.

ISRAEL

ON FREEDOM OF ACTION

- ☐ The Israelis are engaged in a struggle against violence and terror, a struggle which has claimed the lives of innocent citizens. They have the right to take steps necessary to defend themselves against these outrages.
- ☐ The President has made very clear that the United States will stand with Prime Minister Peres and the people of Israel as, along with other the peacemakers, they confront this critical challenge.
- ☐ Chairman Arafat is taking important steps to combat terror; in coordination and cooperation with Israel, there must be a sustained, decisive effort to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure.

(If pressed on "legality" of Israeli actions)

- ☐ Israel and the Palestinians are both facing a critical threat from the enemies of peace to the peace process and to their hopes for a better future. It is imperative that everything possible be done to confront terror. I am not going to elaborate further.

IRAQ: ANNOUNCEMENT OF ROUND 3 OF 986 TALKS

Q: Do you have any reaction to reports that Iraqi and UN officials will meet again April 8 for another round of talks on UNSCR 986?

A: As we have said in the past, we want to see 986 implemented. We helped draft it, and its implementation would help relieve the hardships being

suffered by many Iraqis.

Q: What about reports that the only remaining obstacle in the talks is the purchase and distribution of humanitarian assistance to northern Iraq?

A: Resolution 986 is explicit that the humanitarian situation in northern Iraq is to be handled by the UN humanitarian program currently operating there. This program has been very effective in providing humanitarian relief to the North for the past five years; it can certainly continue the job under 986.

NORTHERN IRELAND

British Election Announcement

- ☐ Another step toward the goal of talks on a lasting settlement that will begin June 10.
- ☐ Not our role to endorse any particular electoral system or type of elected forum. We welcome the electoral process because it leads to talks.
- ☐ Hope all parties will participate in the process leading to talks.

Paisley Meeting

- ☐ Paisley met with NSA Lake March 21: President dropped by. Discussed status of process.
- ☐ Know Paisley's views on a role for the U.S. in Northern Ireland peace process (he is against it), but think it important to have exchange of views with all NI leaders. Pleased he came to White House.

If asked about a meeting with Adams

- ☐ We remain in contact with Adams, as with all the party leaders. Beyond that, I am not going to go into details.

Loyalist Statement Warning of Retaliation for IRA Attacks

☐ Praise loyalists restraint to date.

☐ Hope that loyalists will continue to stand firmly against violence as they have done so far. Do not believe that responding to violence with violence is right or effectual; will only increase the toll of death, destruction and hatred.

IRA Claims Responsibility for Bomb in Dumpster March 9

☐ We condemn the latest act of terrorism. Fortunately no one was hurt.

☐ No excuse or reason for campaign of violence. Will lead nowhere but to destruction and hatred.

☐ Only way forward is thorough political process. Talks begin June 10 -- cease-fire must be restored.

☐ We support the efforts of the two governments to move to talks so a lasting and just settlement can be achieved.

U.S. Response to Bombings

☐ Strongly condemn attacks. Hope those responsible brought to justice swiftly.

☐ Sympathy and prayers go out to victims and their families.

☐ Deeply concerned that IRA has resumed violence. People of Northern Ireland clearly want peace. No one has right to deny them that.

☐ Cannot allow terrorists to derail a peace process so overwhelmingly supported by the people of Northern Ireland.

☐ Will do everything we can to assist the two governments in continuing their search for peace.

☐ Note that loyalists paramilitaries have shown restraint in not responding to the breach of the cease-fire and the bombs in London.

☐ Welcome the firmness they are showing, which accords with the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland for peace.

Response to IRA Statements

- ☐ Call on those who have resorted to violence to restore the cease-fire immediately.
- ☐ Another "25 years of war" would be senseless and incomprehensible. Only negotiation and dialogue can achieve a just and lasting settlement in Northern Ireland.
- ☐ Setting of date for all-party talks of June 10 is a milestone for the peace process. Call on all parties to take full advantage of this opportunity to achieve a just and lasting settlement.

IRA Reiteration of No Cease-Fire

- ☐ If raised: The peace process is continuing; we hope the IRA will recognize that that is the way forward and restore the cease-fire.

LOOSE NUKES: SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN THE FSU

- ☐ Administration aware of and working to address concerns over security of nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union.
- ☐ Our concern reflected in \$70 million FY-96 budget for improving nuclear materials security in FSU and plans (detailed in recent GAO report) for \$400 million program over 7 year period.
- ☐ Cooperative programs currently underway with all appropriate governments. Cooperation by host nations -- including Russia -- is excellent.
- ☐ Nuclear material security frequent topic of discussion by Presidents Clinton/Yeltsin and Vice President Gore/Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. VP and PM recently submitted joint report to Presidents on our cooperative efforts -- see Hyde Park statement.
- ☐ Last year, President Clinton consolidated overall management of

programs to improve nuclear material security in NSC.

☐ Rate of progress is extremely rapid -- information correct just months ago is seriously dated today.

☐ Over the past year, agreements put in place and work started at more than 35 locations in Russia and FSU, or about 75% of all known locations where weapons-useable material believed to be stored.

☐ Over past year, U.S. and Russia completed projects protecting more than 8 tons of material -- enough for hundreds of nuclear bombs. In past six months, U.S. and Russia agreed to improve nuclear material security at 17 additional locations, including some large defense-related facilities.

☐ Administration agrees with need for funding; current FY-97 budget request is \$95 million; call on Congress to support Administration's efforts.

☐ U.S. experts never denied access at any facility where we have agreement on improving in nuclear material security.

☐ While valuable, Harvard/Graham Allison study cited by Washington Times based on data collected a year ago and fails to reflect many developments. Even new GAO report based on data collected several months ago.

☐ For up-to-date information on on-the-ground efforts, direct you to Department of Energy.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 22, 1996

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Ambassador Dane Smith, the President's Special Envoy to Liberia, will travel tomorrow to the region for consultations aimed at restoring momentum to the peace process. The United States is deeply concerned by the continued violence in Liberia and lack of progress in implementing the Abuja Peace Accord. Recent fighting in various parts of the country and increased weapons flows into Monrovia and the countryside threaten the peace process. Thousands of innocent men, women and children continue to fall victim to random factional violence.

Despite initial promising signs, the Council of State (COS) in recent months has failed to uphold its commitment to the principles and guidelines agreed at Abuja in August on disarmament, demobilization and the timely holding of national elections. In particular, the factions have not disengaged and prepared for disarmament, nor are they presently cooperating with each other or with the West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG). The United States calls upon all Liberians to recommit themselves immediately to peace.

The United States has strongly and consistently supported efforts to end the war and return Liberia to peaceful, democratic civilian rule. The United States, along with other donors, is providing important logistic support to the ECOMOG peacekeepers as well as substantial humanitarian assistance. We continue to support the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to achieve full and timely implementation of the Abuja Peace Accord. However, continued U.S. support and engagement depends on respect for the cease-fire and substantial progress by all concerned parties in upholding the Abuja Accord.

#

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE BILL

Background: Republican leaders in the House and Senate are scheduled to introduce a free-standing bill today that would mandate the deployment by 2003 of a highly effective National Missile Defense (NMD) that would likely be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty as now constituted.

☐ Objective of the Administration's own NMD program -- as outlined by Secretary Perry a few weeks ago -- is to position U.S. to respond quickly should new strategic threats to U.S. territory emerge.

☐ Under our program, we will have an NMD deployment option ready by 2000 and should we decide then that deployment was required by a long-range threat to our homeland that was materializing sooner than our intelligence community now expects, it could be fielded by 2003.

☐ Regarding the threat, the Intelligence Community (IC) has concluded that a threat to the contiguous United States from proliferant ballistic missiles is unlikely in the next 15 years. Moreover, the threat of attack from Russia is decreasing as we move to a more cooperative relationship involving, among other things, deep reductions in nuclear forces and threat reduction efforts underway as part of the Nunn-Lugar program. In any case, Russia and China face a significant U.S. deterrent. The IC considers the threat from accidental or unauthorized launch from Russia or China as "remote." The Russian "accidental launch" threat is further mitigated by our detargeting agreement, since any accidentally launched missiles would no longer be aimed at American cities.

☐ The new NMD "deployment readiness" program will allow the U.S. to continue the advancement of technology, add new elements to the system, and possibly reduce deployment timeliness.

☐ We oppose making any deployment decision now; deployment decision if/when intelligence indicates emerging threat. Will enable deployment of the best possible system when the threat emerges.

- ☐ Premature deployment would waste needed investment funds; result in lower technology, poorer-performing defensive system if/when threat does emerge; place at risk START I and possibly START II reductions thereby increasing nuclear missile threat to U.S.
- ☐ We hope the Congress will not approve this bill.

GREECE: FAA SECURITY NOTICE ABOUT ATHENS AIRPORT

Q: Is it true that Department of Transportation Secretary Pena has determined that security at Athens airport is inadequate? What is the White House reaction?

A: We understand that Secretary Pena has determined that Hellenikon International Airport in Athens needs to implement more effective security measures in order to be fully consistent with standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

His determination was based on an inspection procedure mandated by a law enacted by Congress in 1985. Our understanding is that under the terms of the legislation, which is designed to ensure the safety and security of the traveling public, Secretary Pena had no recourse but to take the action he did.

The Department of Transportation has told us that U.S. and foreign air carriers that operate between the United States and Greece are providing additional security measures that counter the deficiencies identified at Athens airport. The Department believes that these additional measures provide adequate security for the traveling public under ICAO standards.

The Department of Transportation can provide you with additional details.

We wish to stress that the decision by the Department of

Transportation was based on purely technical criteria. It is in no way a reflection on the excellent relations that exist between the United States and Greece.

We have already made clear our strong willingness and desire to work closely with Greek authorities to help ensure that Athens airport is quickly brought fully up to ICAO standards.

Secretary Pena has advised us that the Greek authorities have already made significant progress in improving security at the airport.

Q: Will the Department of Transportation decision have any effect on the First Lady's trip to Bosnia, Turkey and Greece?

A: There is no connection between this decision and announcement and the First Lady's trip.

The First Lady will make a good will visit to Greece during her trip to the region next week, during which she will attend the Olympic torch lighting ceremony.

Mrs. Clinton is looking forward to a productive visit aimed at strengthening the close ties between the U.S. and Greece, and between the American and Greek peoples.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 22, 1996

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

United States, France and the United Kingdom to Sign Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

The governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States will sign the three Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in Suva, Fiji on March 25. This Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga, creates a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific by prohibiting the testing, manufacture, acquisition and stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of parties to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea.

The Treaty has three Protocols. Under Protocol 1, the United States pledges not to manufacture, station, or test nuclear explosive devices in American territories within the Zone created by the Treaty, i.e., American Samoa and Jarvis Island. Under Protocol 2, the United States pledges not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against any party to the Treaty of Rarotonga or against any territory of a Protocol party within the Zone. Under Protocol 3, the United States pledges not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the Zone.

The signing of these Protocols reflects a number of positive developments that have occurred over the past 10 years. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, sharp reductions in the number of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, indefinite extension of and near universal adherence to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and progress on a comprehensive test ban treaty have all led to a more stable strategic environment in which further progress can be made on arms control and nonproliferation measures.

Signing the Protocols for the United States will be the Honorable Don Gevirtz, Ambassador of the United States of America to Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu. In his remarks, Ambassador Gevirtz will stress the important role that the nations of the South Pacific and the South Pacific Forum play in the international arena on arms control and nonproliferation measures and will cite specifically their strong support for indefinite extension of the NPT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 22, 1996

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRENCH
REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND,
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON THE SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOLS
TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

The governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America will sign on Monday, March 25, 1996 the three additional protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga.

Last year's NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed that internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, based on arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned, enhance international peace and security. The Conference also agreed that the cooperation of all the nuclear weapon states and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such zones and the relevant protocols.

Our decision to sign the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga demonstrates our clear support for a nuclear weapon free zone in the South Pacific.

It is also an important further milestone in demonstrating our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.

It underlines our wish to see a permanent end to nuclear testing throughout the world. It will give a further boost to the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty, which we believe should be completed in the first half of 1996.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 22, 1996

FACT SHEET

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga, establishes a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific. The Treaty prohibits the testing, manufacture, acquisition and stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of parties to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea.

The Treaty also requires all parties to apply full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. A comprehensive control system has been established to verify compliance with the Treaty and there are mechanisms, including provision for mandatory on-site inspection, to assure compliance.

The Treaty affirms the right of each party to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields. It also explicitly upholds the freedom of navigation on the high seas and passage through territorial waters guaranteed by international law.

The Treaty has three Protocols. Under Protocol 1, the United States, France and the United Kingdom are required to apply the basic provisions of the Treaty to their respective territories in the zone established by the Treaty. The Treaty will therefore apply to American Samoa and Jarvis Island. Under Protocol 2, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and China agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty or to each others territories located within

the zone. Under Protocol 3, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and China agree not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone established by the Treaty.

The Treaty was opened for signature on August 6, 1985 in Rarotonga, the largest island in the Cook Islands. All members of the South Pacific Forum are eligible to accede to the Treaty. The Treaty entered into force December 11, 1986. The Protocols were opened for signature on August 8, 1986 in Suva, Fiji.

The following states and freely associated governments have acceded to the Treaty: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. China and Russia are party to Protocols 2 and 3 of the Treaty but did not accede to Protocol 1 since neither has territories within the zone.

TERRORISM: CAPTURE OF ACHILLE LAURO TERRORIST IN SPAIN

☐ We welcome the capture in Spain of Majed Al Molqi, Leon Klinghoffer's killer aboard the Achille Lauro.

☐ We thank the Spanish Government for its swift action in apprehending Molqi.

☐ We are determined that this notorious killer of an American citizen not escape again and that he serve his entire sentence.

If asked why we did not prosecute him:

☐ The U.S. had statutory basis to prosecute the Achille Lauro terrorists in 1985, but dropped charges in light of the Italian prosecution.

☐ Italian authority to prosecute derived from the fact that the Achille Lauro was an Italian flag ship, not because the ship was in Italian waters at the time of the incident.

☐ Majed Al Molqi was sentenced in 1986 by an Italian court to 30 years in prison, not/not a life

sentence.

☐ The GOI Justice Minister passed his recommendation to the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court OK appeals) March 12 for disciplinary action against Parole Judge Laura Longo.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 March 96 19:51

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT March 22 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Beardsley, Tyler S.
Bujold, Noelle D.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, JoAnne M.
Jordan, Donald L.
Moore, Lori A.
Norris, John J.
Reed, George
Saunders, Richard M.
Schmidt, Sandra E.
Wilhelm, Richard J.
Wise, William M.
Woolston, Ann E.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[MAR22GUI.DOC : 4951 in MAR22GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 22 March 96 19:47

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** MAR22GUI.DOC
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

March 22, 1996

Haiti

B-2

UNSCOM/Iraq

Bosnia/Croatia

Pakistan

Russia

China

Taiwanese Elections

Lebanon

Israel

Iraq

Northern Ireland

Loose Nukes

Liberia

Republican National Missile Defense Bill

Greece

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

Terrorism

HAITI: MEETING WITH HAITIAN PRESIDENT RENE PREVAL

The Haitian Economy

Q: We understand that the focus of your meetings this morning was on economic issues.

What is your assessment of the state of the Haitian economy?

A: President Preval and the President had an open discussion this morning on the critical requirement for reform and revitalization of the Haitian economy. He has already made clear his intent to push forward on privatization of the government-owned industries in Port-au-Prince; development of a realistic budget for the Government of Haiti; and agreements with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Inter-American Development Bank to free up international economic assistance.

They also discussed a bilateral U.S.-Haitian economic "summit," wherein senior U.S. economic experts would travel to Port-au-Prince for discussions with their Haitian

counterparts. This would be modeled loosely on the Economic Summit convened in Little Rock shortly after the 1992 election.

Congressional Holds

Q: The recent letters from Senator Dole and Senator Helms, and restrictions on U.S. assistance to Haiti by the House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seem to be direct attacks on your overall Haiti policy. What is your response to these attacks?

A: The chief focus of Congressional critics of our Haiti policy has been charges that:

- a) individuals implicated in politically-related murders in Haiti over the past eighteen months continue to hold appointments in the Haitian National Police, and
- b) that the Government of Haiti has been slow to fully investigate such murders.

President Preval has now fired the last of the eight individuals at issue from the police force, has appointed a new Director-General for the HNP, and has pledged to pursue fully the investigations of politically-related murders.

What our Congressional critics fail to acknowledge is that we have in fact restored democracy to Haiti, that we have provided a return to normalcy for the Haitian people, and that we have provided them a chance to rebuild their country and a hope for a more prosperous future.

The Security Situation

Q: There have been a number of incidents within recent weeks of altercations initiated by urban street gangs in Port-au-Prince. In one such incident, in Cite Soleil, eight people were killed. How do you assess the overall security situation?

A: One of the prime tenets of our overall Haiti policy has been

recruitment, training and fielding of the new Haitian National Police. That organization is young and inexperienced, and mistakes have been made in a number of instances.

The HNP has been accepted and is respected in cities, towns and villages throughout Haiti however, and we are confident that as the UN presence ramps down, the HNP will continue to mature into a fully professional police force that will reinforce democratic traditions and uphold the rule of law.

Q: Are you comfortable with the fact that the UN Security Council authorized only a four-month extension to the UNMIH mandate?

A: We are comfortable with it, and want to acknowledge the fact that the government of Canada stepped forward to take charge of the UNMIH military mission. Four months longer was an appropriate compromise for the presence of an international military force. We are working with the UN and the Friends of Haiti in New York to explore options for an extended civilian police advisory presence past the end of UNMIH II.

Redeployment of U.S. Forces

Q: How are the redeployment of U.S. troops and turnover of the UNMIH military mission to Canadian command-and-control proceeding?

A: Our troops have done an absolutely superb job in Haiti, demonstrating once again that they are the best-trained and best-motivated military force in the world today.

The redeployment and transition to Canadian command-and-control is proceeding smoothly and on schedule. Fewer than 500 U.S. troops who were part of UNMIH remain in Haiti. These will finish packing to redeploy completely to their home stations in the United States by April 15.

PRESIDENT'S "21ST B-2" DECISION

Background: In our February 8 announcement of the President's decisions on the future of the B-2 program, we said that while we would not request money for additional B-2s in our FY 1997 budget, we would direct Defense to study "deep strike" tradeoffs involving options with more than 20 B-2s. We also announced that we would spend the \$493 million that Congress had added to the program in FY 1996 "on procurement of B-2 components, upgrades and modifications that would be of value for the existing fleet" of 20 bombers. Since then, various options have been under review for these funds.

On March 20, the President decided that the \$493 million would be used for one specific, high-payoff "upgrade" -- to convert the first B-2 test prototype ("Air Vehicle One" or "AV-1") into the "21st" deployed B-2. The B-2 program included five test prototypes (AV-1 through AV-5) and the other four AVs have already been upgraded into operational B-2s. Before now, the Air Force had planned to donate AV-1 to a museum.

Northrop has written Secretary Widnall a letter confirming that there is no "fundamental impediment to changing AV-1 to operational configuration" and stating that it is "prepared to propose and negotiate a modification to the existing low rate initial production contract target price of not more than \$493 million." The President has directed the Air Force to negotiate with Northrop Grumman a firm fixed price contractual arrangement to accomplish this upgrade. Obviously, the upgrade of AV-1 will be contingent on this contract being worked out.

Q: What effect will this decision have on the B-2 industrial base?

A: The Air Force has determined that the AV-1 option would result in a substantial rejuvenation of the B-2 vendor base, with most of the \$493 million going to Northrop-Grumman in California. Subcontracts for structural assembly work will also be required with Boeing and Vought and with Hughes for a B-2 radar.

Q: Does this mean that the Administration is now more likely to decide to restart the B-2 production line and build more bombers?

A: No. The situation remains as we described it last month: while we do not rule out more B-2s, we do not believe the case has been made that buying more can be justified, given the high cost and the other modernization and recapitalization priorities facing our Services. Whether that case can be made will be determined by the tradeoff study, which is due the beginning of next year.

Q: Will this decision be supported on the Hill?

A: We certainly believe so. Hill B-2 proponents, including Senator Nunn and Representatives Dicks, Skelton and Harman, have indicated their strong support for this option. This use of the money is certainly consistent with the intent of Congress when it added the \$493 million to our B-2 request last year.

Q: Is there any daylight between the White House and the Pentagon on this? Did the White House force this "21st B-2" on the Defense Department?

A: No and no. Both Secretary Perry and the Air Force recommended this option, as did the NSC.

Q: Why go this route? Why not spend the money on war readiness spares or munitions and communications upgrades?

A: The Administration concluded that this use of the \$493 million clearly produces the "biggest bang for the buck", since it will in one step increase the B-2 force's capability by five percent. A "21st" B-2 would also provide a better margin for unexpected attrition of B-2s in training accidents or contingencies.

Q: Isn't this inconsistent with your announcement last month that you were not going to build additional B-2s?

A: No. There is no inconsistency between the President's February

8 decision and this option, since this is not a case of building a new B-2 but rather upgrading an existing, sunk-cost asset (the AV-1 test plane) using money we have already committed to expend on the program in one form or the other. In that sense, we will not be "going beyond" the existing program, since the "20 B-2 program" always included 21 "AVs."

Q: What happens next?

A: The next step will be for the Air Force and its acquisition officials to sit down with Northrop-Grumman and negotiate a mutually agreeable firm fixed price contractual arrangement to upgrade Air Vehicle One -- as directed by the President. Unless something unexpected comes up, that contract negotiation should be completed in several weeks.

UNSCOM: EKEUS TESTIMONY ON IRAQ

Background: Rolf Ekeus, the head of the UN Special Commission charged with dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, testified yesterday that Iraq may still be hiding as many as 16 ballistic missiles, capable of carrying chemical or biological warfare agents.

Q: Do you have any comment on Ambassador Ekeus's testimony on Iraq?

A: Ambassador Ekeus, head of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), articulated UNSCOM's concerns about Iraq's possible continued possession of Scud missiles; his assessment can stand on its own merits, without our commentary.

UNSCOM is responsible for dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

I think it is worthwhile, however, to reemphasize one point made by Ambassador Ekeus on Wednesday. Clearly, the people of Iraq have suffered

considerable economic hardship
as a direct result of Saddam's continued refusal to cooperate
fully with the UN in
accounting for and destroying Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass
destruction. This is a
situation that Saddam has the power to remedy.

BOSNIA/CROATIA

IFOR Pullout

- ☐ It remains our position that IFOR can accomplish the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Accords in about one year.
- ☐ IFOR's mission has not changed. It is to establish a secure environment and create the conditions within which the parties and the international community can establish a stable and long-lasting peace. That mission is being successfully implemented.
- ☐ We do not see any need for IFOR to remain in Bosnia after it has accomplished its mission.
- ☐ The United States and our allies are committed to making Dayton work. Speculation about other eventualities is just that: speculation. Not only is it premature, but we believe counter-productive.
- ☐ Many of the military tasks of the initial phase of Dayton have been successfully completed. We are at the beginning of a second phase in which the focus of international effort will be the critical challenge of civilian implementation.

On the Question of Withdrawal

It is our expectation that IFOR will remain at its current strength through the elections.

If asked about the NYT's Article on the future of the Peace Accords

- ☐ There is no question that, in order to establish lasting peace in Bosnia, full implementation of the Dayton Accords, both the military and civilian aspects, is essential.
- ☐ That is why the parties committed themselves in Geneva to build upon the accomplishments of the first three months of implementation and expressed their determination ensure the complete fulfillment of the spirit and letter of the Agreement.
- ☐ Now that satisfactory compliance with the military aspects of the Agreement has established a framework of security and predictability within which to build civilian structures, the international community is increasing its efforts to provide the people of Bosnia the necessary means to rebuild their lives.
- ☐ Economic Reconstruction is moving forward. The President's quick-impact package has been implemented (see today's press handout), the World Bank held a successful mini-donors conference in December and a major donors' conference will be held in mid-April. The World Bank is working with the Bosnian Government to clear its arrears for future reconstruction funding, and election planning and implementation is ongoing.
- ☐ We must remember that only the parties can guarantee the success of the Peace Accords. We are there to provide them the opportunity. No question that there is a lot of work still to be done.

Funding for Bosnia

- ☐ The Administration sent to Congress a \$991 million reprogramming request to fund a major portion of Bosnia operations. The Administration also sent an additional supplemental/rescission request to the Congress, and will send an additional reprogramming request at a later date, to fund the remainder of these operations through September 30, 1996.

Where will funds come from? How much?

☐ This reprogramming action is financed by inflation savings resulting from revised economic assumptions. The supplemental/rescission action will be financed from classified intelligence programs, while the source of the second reprogramming request is not yet identified. The total amount required for U.S. Bosnia military operations in FY 1996 is just under \$2 billion

☐ The EU and the World Bank are responsible for coordinating donors' support for Bosnia.

☐ The \$200 million rescission/supplemental package, presently before Congress, is essential to the overall international reconstruction effort.

☐ Although the Europeans are expected to donate the bulk of the needed funds, the U.S. contribution will be important for creating momentum for the International Donors' Conference in April and demonstrating our credible commitment to the people of Bosnia. If Congress does not approve our contribution, then the international donors' conference in April will probably fail.

Reconstruction.

☐ The World Bank approved a plan for Bosnia to become a member of the Bank and expected to lend the country \$450 million over the next four years.

☐ We welcome the decision. This is another important step toward recovery, stability and peace. Helps pave the way for the upcoming Donors' Conference in April.

IFOR Support for Civilian Implementation

☐ NATO, SACEUR, High Rep Bildt, and civilian implementation officials are discussing how IFOR can help support civilian aspects of implementation within the limitations of IFOR's primary mission and available resources.

☐ IFOR Commanders have the authority for supporting tasks, including provision of assistance to War Crimes Tribunal and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions.

Removal of Head of Bosnian Security Agency

- ☐ We have made clear to Bosnian officials that Bosnian relations with Iran beyond normal diplomatic relations do not contribute to regional stability. These ties also impede the development of our relations with Bosnia.
- ☐ The presence of any terrorist training elements is unacceptable.
- ☐ The Bosnian government has assured us that all such activities will come to an immediate halt.
- ☐ Removal of Alispahic, the Head of Bosnian Agency for Investigation and Documentation's (BAID), is encouraging given evidence of BAID's continued links with Iranian forces and intelligence personnel.
- ☐ The Dayton Agreement is very clear. It requires that all foreign forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States be withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- ☐ The discovery of the suspected terrorist training site at Fojnica was clear evidence that foreign forces were still operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina despite assurances by BAID to the contrary.

PAKISTAN

Q: Has the Administration decided to ship conventional arms to Pakistan under the Brown Amendment?

A: No final decision has been made. We are consulting with members of the House and Senate on how best to proceed.

The Brown Amendment opens up a range of cooperation possibilities that had been precluded by previous legislation.

We believe that proceeding with some of this assistance could be helpful in strengthening USG influence with Pakistan on other issues of interest, such as counter-narcotics and non-proliferation.

There is a subset of programs that Brown opens up that would be precluded should we make a decision that our non-proliferation laws have been violated, such as IMET, OPIC and TDA.

While we have made no decision on the non-proliferation issue, we are not considering allowing these programs to go forward in our discussions with the Congress.

Q: Have you decided not to punish either country for China's transfer of ring magnets to the Pakistani nuclear program?

A: No final decision has been made. We now have a nonproliferation team in China, which is raising this issue, and have also approached Pakistan. Once these discussions conclude, we will make decisions based on the law and facts as we understand them.

Q: Did the Administration withhold embarrassing evidence about the ring magnets to help passage of Brown?

A: No.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Russian Poultry Sanctions

☐ Negotiations ongoing with Russian officials; seek quick and comprehensive resolution of trade dispute.

☐ Continue to rely heavily on Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's assurances that cessation of trade will not take effect. Remain concerned about conflicting Russian news reports over past week. Negotiations critical to ensure that trade stays on track.

☐ Have recourse to Section 301 trade measures if needed; Administration currently examining modalities for their potential application.

☐ Believe that U.S. poultry, and its inspection system, are as safe and rigorous as that of any poultry-producing nation in the world.

Duma Vote on Belovezhskoye Accords

☐ On March 15 Duma passed nonbinding resolutions to repeal Supreme Soviet's ratification of December 1991 Belovezhskoye Accord, which led to dissolution of USSR and to recognize March 17, 1991 referendum that called for preservation of Soviet Union.

☐ Neither resolution has legal effect. Yeltsin denounced them as unconstitutional, irresponsible and inflammatory. Yeltsin stated integration among NIS should be voluntary, with respect for individual states and without pressure from any side.

☐ U.S. recognizes NIS as sovereign, independent nations and deals with them as such. Reject any attempt to call into question their sovereignty. Support good, cooperative relations among NIS. As for integration, should be based on equality, voluntary and outward-looking.

Alleged "Zavtra" Transcript of January 26 POTUS-Yeltsin Telcon

☐ The President and Yeltsin spoke by phone on January 26. White House Spokesman McCurry summarized the main points of the call at that day's press briefing.

☐ We do not comment in detail on private diplomatic exchanges between the President and other leaders and do not intend to comment on the veracity of the alleged transcript.

General Items

\$10.2 Billion IMF Program for Russia, Impact of Protectionist Measures

- ☐ IMF-Russia agreement sets clear course for next stage of Russian reform. Encourage Russia to follow through with key policy steps they agreed to take prior to IMF board's final approval of program in late March. Have noted with concern recent statements on protectionist measures that could violate IMF conditions.
- ☐ If Russia follows through with its commitments, expect that, by time IMF board meets to approve program, Russia will have had three months of solid economic performance in 1996, building on exceptional performance in 1995 when Russia met or exceeded all IMF targets.
- ☐ Commend IMF focus on good economic policy. Program sets forth economic guidelines we would back for any government.

Russian Presidential Election

- ☐ June election for Russian people to decide, exercising democratic habits that are increasingly taking hold in their country. Not for us to intrude on choice of future Russian leader. As elsewhere, we will work with any democratically-elected leadership on the basis of its policies.
- ☐ We remain steady in our policy of active engagement with Russia to support democracy, economic reform and Russia's integration, and to promote cooperation to advance common foreign and security policy goals.
- ☐ Working to advance common interests: nuclear disarmament; detargeting; new trade, investment opportunities. Engagement remains in strong interests of both nations.

Chechnya

- ☐ Strongly believe cycle of violence must be broken. Our

consistent position has been that only reliable path to peace is negotiated settlement that takes interests of all parties into account. Hope that Russian government, as it has previously indicated, will soon put forward plan for peaceful resolution to Chechen conflict.

Russia and NATO

□ U.S. and Russia have different views on logic of NATO enlargement. Have ongoing dialogue with Russians on this issue.

□ For our part, we intend to manage enlargement process in deliberate, transparent manner that strengthens security, stability of Europe as a whole. Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to develop strong, cooperative NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members.

CHINA

TAIWAN ELECTIONS

-- U.S. stands for democracy and free and fair elections as a matter of principle. And encourage the democratic process wherever it occurs in the world.

-- We will have a reaction on the elections tomorrow.

THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Background: There continue to be stories of escalating tension in the Strait despite the fact that the missile tests have been concluded. Hong Kong press sources misinterpreted statements by China's Premier Li Peng made at the close of the PRC legislative session, "If someone makes a show of force in the Taiwan Strait, that will not only be a futile act, but it also will make the situation all the more complicated." These comments were standard warnings against foreign interference in the Taiwan issue and did not represent a new policy.

Q: Can you comment on Chinese "threats" against U.S. forces operating near Taiwan?

A: I will not comment on specific movements of U.S. naval assets. However, our naval presence is a prudent effort to show our interest in sustaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

(If pressed): The U.S. reserves the right to move its naval forces in international waters at any time.

TAIWAN ARMS SALES

Background: The annual arms sales talks with Taiwan take place this week in Washington. There likely will be reporting that Taiwan is requesting expedited sales and deliveries of new weapons systems. Taiwan's wish list includes a number of weapons systems which we believe they do not need to sustain an adequate defense. The situation in the Taiwan Strait has not led us to conclude that we should accelerate sales of new systems or deliveries of past purchases. Taiwan is having difficulty absorbing military technology it already has received.

Q: Can you comment on the U.S.-Taiwan discussions on arms sales?

A: The U.S. conducts annual arms sales discussions with Taiwan in the context of our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan in maintaining an adequate self-defense.

This year's talks were scheduled well in advance of the current activities in the Strait. The talks involved experts from both sides.

Both sides agree not to discuss the details of the talks. Proper notifications will be made to Congress concerning any sales.

Q: Will the U.S. be providing new weapons systems to Taiwan as a result of the arms sales talks taking place this week?

A: In accordance with U.S. law (the Taiwan Relations Act) the administration and the Congress determine which defense articles and services Taiwan needs in order to maintain

a sufficient self-defense capability.

We have an annual process through which we discuss these issues with Taiwan.

This year's talks are scheduled for 19 March. This date was set some time ago through normal and routine scheduling consultations.

Both the U.S. and Taiwan authorities agree not to discuss the specific details of the talks. Announcements of any sales approved by the U.S. and agreed to by Taiwan will be notified to Congress and announced in normal fashion.

CHINESE THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST LOS ANGELES

Points

- ☐ We will continue to monitor the situation in the Taiwan Straits very closely.
- ☐ We have had a series of high level meetings during the past several weeks with the Chinese. We have made clear our position on rising tensions in the Taiwan Straits.
- ☐ During all of these meetings we have urged the Chinese government to exercise maximum restraint.
- ☐ At no time have the Chinese threatened military action against the United States.

If asked where the reports of these threats came from:

- ☐ There never has been any official communication with the United States government or any of its representatives.

CHINA/TAIWAN

- ☐ There is no ambiguity about our policy on Taiwan's security; grave consequences would flow from a use of force against Taiwan, and we have made clear our determination to see that the future of Taiwan is worked out in a peaceful manner.
- ☐ A resort to force with respect to Taiwan would directly involve

American national interests and would carry grave risks. There should be no ambiguity about our posture in Beijing, Taipei or anywhere else.

☐ We have not concluded that there is any imminent threat to Taiwan, and that we understand the Taiwan authorities have reached the same conclusion.

☐ We are urging restraint by Beijing, while also making clear to Taiwan's leaders that restraint is in their interest. We oppose provocation by either side. We strongly urge both sides to resume their high-level dialogue.

☐ PRC authorities have stated publicly, as well as to us in diplomatic exchanges, that there is no change in their intention to seek a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. They have not, however, ruled out the use of force in certain circumstances. However, we have no reason to believe the PRC plans to use force against any part of Taiwan.

☐ We continue to monitor the military situation around Taiwan. The USS INDEPENDENCE battle group remains positioned in international waters near Taiwan. The USS NIMITZ and elements of her battle group are due to arrive in the Western Pacific late next week.

TAIWANESE ELECTIONS

Q: What is your reaction to Lee Teng-hui winning the Taiwanese presidential election today?

A: We congratulate the people of Taiwan for successfully carrying out their first direct elections of president and vice president. The democratic transformation of Taiwan over the past 10 years is truly impressive.

We congratulate President Lee and all candidates who prevailed in electoral contests and have earned the trust of the voters to serve in important offices.

We hope that we will see tensions in the Strait subside and that

Taiwan and the PRC
each will take steps to restore constructive dialogue and
stability.

LEBANON

RELEASE OF SUSPECTS IN DEATH OF AMBASSADOR MELOY

Q: What is your reaction to reports that the Lebanese government
has released the two
convicted suspects in the assassination of Ambassador Meloy in
Beirut in 1976?

A: We are disappointed that accomplices to the murder of U.S.
diplomats have been
acquitted of murder charges and given amnesty for their role in
the kidnappings.

The timing of their acquittal and amnesty is particularly
unfortunate at a time of special
international focus on the need for greater cooperation against
terrorism.

ISRAEL

ON FREEDOM OF ACTION

- ☐ The Israelis are engaged in a struggle against violence and
terror, a struggle which has
claimed the lives of innocent citizens. They have the right to
take steps necessary to defend
themselves against these outrages.
- ☐ The President has made very clear that the United States will
stand with Prime Minister Peres
and the people of Israel as, along with other the peacemakers,
they confront this critical
challenge.
- ☐ Chairman Arafat is taking important steps to combat terror; in
coordination and cooperation
with Israel, there must be a sustained, decisive effort to

dismantle the terrorist infrastructure.

(If pressed on "legality" of Israeli actions)

☐ Israel and the Palestinians are both facing a critical threat from the enemies of peace to the peace process and to their hopes for a better future. It is imperative that everything possible be done to confront terror. I am not going to elaborate further.

IRAQ: ANNOUNCEMENT OF ROUND 3 OF 986 TALKS

Q: Do you have any reaction to reports that Iraqi and UN officials will meet again April 8 for another round of talks on UNSCR 986?

A: As we have said in the past, we want to see 986 implemented. We helped draft it, and its implementation would help relieve the hardships being suffered by many Iraqis.

Q: What about reports that the only remaining obstacle in the talks is the purchase and distribution of humanitarian assistance to northern Iraq?

A: Resolution 986 is explicit that the humanitarian situation in northern Iraq is to be handled by the UN humanitarian program currently operating there. This program has been very effective in providing humanitarian relief to the North for the past five years; it can certainly continue the job under 986.

NORTHERN IRELAND

British Election Announcement

☐ Another step toward the goal of talks on a lasting settlement that will begin June 10.

☐ Not our role to endorse any particular electoral system or type of elected forum. We welcome the electoral process because it leads to talks.

☐ Hope all parties will participate in the process leading to talks.

Paisley Meeting

- ☐ Paisley met with NSA Lake March 21: President dropped by. Discussed status of process.
- ☐ Know Paisley's views on a role for the U.S. in Northern Ireland peace process (he is against it), but think it important to have exchange of views with all NI leaders. Pleased he came to White House.

If asked about a meeting with Adams

- ☐ We remain in contact with Adams, as with all the party leaders. Beyond that, I am not going to go into details.

Loyalist Statement Warning of Retaliation for IRA Attacks

- ☐ Praise loyalists restraint to date.
- ☐ Hope that loyalists will continue to stand firmly against violence as they have done so far. Do not believe that responding to violence with violence is right or effectual; will only increase the toll of death, destruction and hatred.

IRA Claims Responsibility for Bomb in Dumpster March 9

- ☐ We condemn the latest act of terrorism. Fortunately no one was hurt.
- ☐ No excuse or reason for campaign of violence. Will lead nowhere but to destruction and hatred.
- ☐ Only way forward is thorough political process. Talks begin June 10 -- cease-fire must be restored.
- ☐ We support the efforts of the two governments to move to talks so a lasting and just settlement can be achieved.

U.S. Response to Bombings

- ☐ Strongly condemn attacks. Hope those responsible brought to justice swiftly.

- ☐ Sympathy and prayers go out to victims and their families.
- ☐ Deeply concerned that IRA has resumed violence. People of Northern Ireland clearly want peace. No one has right to deny them that.
- ☐ Cannot allow terrorists to derail a peace process so overwhelmingly supported by the people of Northern Ireland.
- ☐ Will do everything we can to assist the two governments in continuing their search for peace.
- ☐ Note that loyalists paramilitaries have shown restraint in not responding to the breach of the cease-fire and the bombs in London.
- ☐ Welcome the firmness they are showing, which accords with the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland for peace.

Response to IRA Statements

- ☐ Call on those who have resorted to violence to restore the cease-fire immediately.
- ☐ Another "25 years of war" would be senseless and incomprehensible. Only negotiation and dialogue can achieve a just and lasting settlement in Northern Ireland.
- ☐ Setting of date for all-party talks of June 10 is a milestone for the peace process. Call on all parties to take full advantage of this opportunity to achieve a just and lasting settlement.

IRA Reiteration of No Cease-Fire

- ☐ If raised: The peace process is continuing; we hope the IRA will recognize that that is the way forward and restore the cease-fire.

LOOSE NUKES: SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN THE FSU

- ☐ Administration aware of and working to address concerns over security of nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union.
- ☐ Our concern reflected in \$70 million FY-96 budget for improving nuclear materials security in FSU and plans (detailed in recent GAO report) for \$400 million program over 7 year period.
- ☐ Cooperative programs currently underway with all appropriate governments. Cooperation by host nations -- including Russia -- is excellent.
- ☐ Nuclear material security frequent topic of discussion by Presidents Clinton/Yeltsin and Vice President Gore/Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. VP and PM recently submitted joint report to Presidents on our cooperative efforts -- see Hyde Park statement.
- ☐ Last year, President Clinton consolidated overall management of programs to improve nuclear material security in NSC.
- ☐ Rate of progress is extremely rapid -- information correct just months ago is seriously dated today.
- ☐ Over the past year, agreements put in place and work started at more than 35 locations in Russia and FSU, or about 75% of all known locations where weapons-useable material believed to be stored.
- ☐ Over past year, U.S. and Russia completed projects protecting more than 8 tons of material -- enough for hundreds of nuclear bombs. In past six months, U.S. and Russia agreed to improve nuclear material security at 17 additional locations, including some large defense-related facilities.
- ☐ Administration agrees with need for funding; current FY-97 budget request is \$95 million; call on Congress to support Administration's efforts.
- ☐ U.S. experts never denied access at any facility where we have agreement on improving in nuclear material security.
- ☐ While valuable, Harvard/Graham Allison study cited by Washington

Times based on data
collected a year ago and fails to reflect many developments.
Even new GAO report based
on data collected several months ago.

☐ For up-to-date information on on-the-ground efforts, direct you
to Department of Energy.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 22, 1996

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Ambassador Dane Smith, the President's Special Envoy to Liberia, will travel tomorrow to the region for consultations aimed at restoring momentum to the peace process. The United States is deeply concerned by the continued violence in Liberia and lack of progress in implementing the Abuja Peace Accord. Recent fighting in various parts of the country and increased weapons flows into Monrovia and the countryside threaten the peace process. Thousands of innocent men, women and children continue to fall victim to random factional violence.

Despite initial promising signs, the Council of State (COS) in recent months has failed to uphold its commitment to the principles and guidelines agreed at Abuja in August on disarmament, demobilization and the timely holding of national elections. In particular, the factions have not disengaged and prepared for disarmament, nor are they presently cooperating with each other or with the West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG). The United States calls upon all Liberians to recommit themselves immediately to peace.

The United States has strongly and consistently supported efforts to end the war and return

Liberia to peaceful, democratic civilian rule. The United States, along with other donors, is providing important logistic support to the ECOMOG peacekeepers as well as substantial humanitarian assistance. We continue to support the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to achieve full and timely implementation of the Abuja Peace Accord. However, continued U.S. support and engagement depends on respect for the cease-fire and substantial progress by all concerned parties in upholding the Abuja Accord.

#

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE BILL

Background: Republican leaders in the House and Senate are scheduled to introduce a free-standing bill today that would mandate the deployment by 2003 of a highly effective National Missile Defense (NMD) that would likely be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty as now constituted.

□ Objective of the Administration's own NMD program -- as outlined by Secretary Perry a few weeks ago -- is to position U.S. to respond quickly should new strategic threats to U.S. territory emerge.

□ Under our program, we will have an NMD deployment option ready by 2000 and should we decide then that deployment was required by a long-range threat to our homeland that was materializing sooner than our intelligence community now expects, it could be fielded by 2003.

□ Regarding the threat, the Intelligence Community (IC) has concluded that a threat to the contiguous United States from proliferant ballistic missiles is unlikely in the next 15 years. Moreover, the threat of attack from Russia is decreasing as we move to a more cooperative relationship involving, among other things, deep reductions in nuclear forces and threat reduction efforts underway as part of the Nunn-Lugar program. In

any case, Russia and China face a significant U.S. deterrent. The IC considers the threat from accidental or unauthorized launch from Russia or China as "remote." The Russian "accidental launch" threat is further mitigated by our detargeting agreement, since any accidentally launched missiles would no longer be aimed at American cities.

☐ The new NMD "deployment readiness" program will allow the U.S. to continue the advancement of technology, add new elements to the system, and possibly reduce deployment timeliness.

☐ We oppose making any deployment decision now; deployment decision if/when intelligence indicates emerging threat. Will enable deployment of the best possible system when the threat emerges.

☐ Premature deployment would waste needed investment funds; result in lower technology, poorer-performing defensive system if/when threat does emerge; place at risk START I and possibly START II reductions thereby increasing nuclear missile threat to U.S.

☐ We hope the Congress will not approve this bill.

GREECE: FAA SECURITY NOTICE ABOUT ATHENS AIRPORT

Q: Is it true that Department of Transportation Secretary Pena has determined that security at Athens airport is inadequate? What is the White House reaction?

A: We understand that Secretary Pena has determined that Hellenikon International Airport in Athens needs to implement more effective security measures in order to be fully consistent with standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

His determination was based on an inspection procedure mandated by a law enacted by

Congress in 1985. Our understanding is that under the terms of the legislation, which is designed to ensure the safety and security of the traveling public, Secretary Pena had no recourse but to take the action he did.

The Department of Transportation has told us that U.S. and foreign air carriers that operate between the United States and Greece are providing additional security measures that counter the deficiencies identified at Athens airport. The Department believes that these additional measures provide adequate security for the traveling public under ICAO standards.

The Department of Transportation can provide you with additional details.

We wish to stress that the decision by the Department of Transportation was based on purely technical criteria. It is in no way a reflection on the excellent relations that exist between the United States and Greece.

We have already made clear our strong willingness and desire to work closely with Greek authorities to help ensure that Athens airport is quickly brought fully up to ICAO standards.

Secretary Pena has advised us that the Greek authorities have already made significant progress in improving security at the airport.

Q: Will the Department of Transportation decision have any effect on the First Lady's trip to Bosnia, Turkey and Greece?

A: There is no connection between this decision and announcement and the First Lady's trip.

The First Lady will make a good will visit to Greece during her trip to the region next week, during which she will attend the Olympic torch lighting ceremony.

Mrs. Clinton is looking forward to a productive visit aimed at strengthening the close

ties between the U.S. and Greece, and between the American and Greek peoples.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 22, 1996

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

United States, France and the United Kingdom to Sign Protocols
of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

The governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States will sign the three Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in Suva, Fiji on March 25. This Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga, creates a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific by prohibiting the testing, manufacture, acquisition and stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of parties to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea.

The Treaty has three Protocols. Under Protocol 1, the United States pledges not to manufacture, station, or test nuclear explosive devices in American territories within the Zone created by the Treaty, i.e., American Samoa and Jarvis Island. Under Protocol 2, the United States pledges not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against any party to the Treaty of Rarotonga or against any territory of a Protocol party within the Zone. Under Protocol 3, the United States pledges not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the Zone.

The signing of these Protocols reflects a number of positive developments that have occurred over the past 10 years. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, sharp reductions in the number of nuclear weapons and their delivery

systems, indefinite extension of and near universal adherence to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and progress on a comprehensive test ban treaty have all led to a more stable strategic environment in which further progress can be made on arms control and nonproliferation measures.

Signing the Protocols for the United States will be the Honorable Don Gevirtz, Ambassador of the United States of America to Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu. In his remarks, Ambassador Gevirtz will stress the important role that the nations of the South Pacific and the South Pacific Forum play in the international arena on arms control and nonproliferation measures and will cite specifically their strong support for indefinite extension of the NPT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 22, 1996

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOLS TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

The governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America will sign on Monday, March 25, 1996 the three additional protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga.

Last year's NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed that internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, based on arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the

region concerned, enhance international peace and security. The Conference also agreed that the cooperation of all the nuclear weapon states and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such zones and the relevant protocols.

Our decision to sign the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga demonstrates our clear support for a nuclear weapon free zone in the South Pacific.

It is also an important further milestone in demonstrating our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.

It underlines our wish to see a permanent end to nuclear testing throughout the world. It will give a further boost to the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty, which we believe should be completed in the first half of 1996.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 22, 1996

FACT SHEET

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which is also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga, establishes a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific. The Treaty prohibits the testing, manufacture, acquisition and stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of parties to the Treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea.

The Treaty also requires all parties to apply full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. A comprehensive control system has been established to verify compliance with the Treaty and there are mechanisms, including provision

for mandatory on-site inspection, to assure compliance.

The Treaty affirms the right of each party to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields. It also explicitly upholds the freedom of navigation on the high seas and passage through territorial waters guaranteed by international law.

The Treaty has three Protocols. Under Protocol 1, the United States, France and the United Kingdom are required to apply the basic provisions of the Treaty to their respective territories in the zone established by the Treaty. The Treaty will therefore apply to American Samoa and Jarvis Island. Under Protocol 2, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and China agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty or to each others territories located within the zone. Under Protocol 3, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and China agree not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone established by the Treaty.

The Treaty was opened for signature on August 6, 1985 in Rarotonga, the largest island in the Cook Islands. All members of the South Pacific Forum are eligible to accede to the Treaty. The Treaty entered into force December 11, 1986. The Protocols were opened for signature on August 8, 1986 in Suva, Fiji.

The following states and freely associated governments have acceded to the Treaty: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. China and Russia are party to Protocols 2 and 3 of the Treaty but did not accede to Protocol 1 since neither has territories within the zone.

TERRORISM: CAPTURE OF ACHILLE LAURO TERRORIST IN SPAIN

□ We welcome the capture in Spain of Majed Al Molqi, Leon Klinghoffer's killer aboard the Achille Lauro.

☐ We thank the Spanish Government for its swift action in apprehending Molqi.

☐ We are determined that this notorious killer of an American citizen not escape again and that he serve his entire sentence.

If asked why we did not prosecute him:

☐ The U.S. had statutory basis to prosecute the Achille Lauro terrorists in 1985, but dropped charges in light of the Italian prosecution.

☐ Italian authority to prosecute derived from the fact that the Achille Lauro was an Italian flag ship, not because the ship was in Italian waters at the time of the incident.

☐ Majed Al Molqi was sentenced in 1986 by an Italian court to 30 years in prison, not/not a life sentence.

☐ The GOI Justice Minister passed his recommendation to the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court OK appeals) March 12 for disciplinary action against Parole Judge Laura Longo.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 28 March 96 08:44
FROM Fetig, James L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Lee Visit to U.S.? [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wiley, Mary C.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY Would like Sandy Berger to clear Bob's recommended guidance as soon as he can. Thanks.

From: Suettinger, Robert L.
To: Fetig, James L.; @PRESS - Public Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; Kristoff, Sandra J.
Subject: Lee Visit to U.S.? [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, March 28, 1996 08:33 AM

[[LEEINV.DOC : 2069 in LEEINV.DOC]]

Heard reports this morning that Lee has begun to be coy about another U.S. visit -- saying he would not respond positively to Helms' invitation unless both Congress and President agreed. Real cute. Attached is press guidance to be used if needed. Obviously will need to be cleared at a high level.
Bob

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 28 March 96 8:28
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** LEEINV.DOC

China-Taiwan

Q: Do you have any comment on Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's statement that he will not accept an invitation to the U.S. unless it is agreed by both the Congress and the President?

A: Lee said prior to the election and reiterated afterward that domestic priorities in Taiwan -- including efforts to restore amicable relations with the PRC -- were his first priority, and that he did not intend to undertake any international travel.

In view of the still-tense relationship between Taiwan and the mainland, we consider that a prudent decision, and we take him at his word.

Q: Does that mean you do not support Senator Helm's invitation to President Lee to visit the U.S.?

A: Senator Helms has not consulted with the Administration about issuing such an invitation.

We consider it to be of primary importance for Taiwan and the PRC to establish a productive dialogue based on mutual trust and a reduction of tension. We have urged both sides to work seriously toward that goal.

A visit to the U.S. at this time would not promote progress toward reducing tension between Taiwan and the PRC.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 28 March 96 09:35

FROM Fetig, James L.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: Lee Visit to U.S.? [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wiley, Mary C.

CARBON_COPY Cullin, Brian P.
Fetig, James L.
Johnson, David T.
Naplan, Steven J.
Schuker, Jill A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY

Replaces earlier version sent to SRB for clearance. Kristoff has modified this version.

From: Suettinger, Robert L.
To: Fetig, James L.; @PRESS - Public Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; Kristoff, Sandra J.
Subject: Lee Visit to U.S.? [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, March 28, 1996 08:33 AM

[[LEEINV.DOC : 2362 in LEEINV.DOC]]

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Bob

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 28 March 96 9:34

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** LEEINV.DOC

China-Taiwan

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Q: Does that mean you do not support Senator Helm's invitation to President Lee to visit the U.S.?

A: Senator Helms has not consulted with the Administration about issuing such an invitation.

We consider it to be of primary importance for Taiwan and the PRC to establish a productive dialogue based on mutual trust and a reduction of tension. We have urged both sides to work seriously toward that goal.

We hope that the energies of both sides will be devoted to reasonable dialogue.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 29 March 96 17:11
FROM Kristoff, Sandra J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT pr stuff on china and japan [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Suettinger, Robert L.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
bobby---i ran out of think power on the japan q and a. please review and edit whatever you want. after that, i'll e-mail to kyle, poneman and david j. simultaneously. thanks sjk

[[QANDA.DOC : 4417 in QANDA.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 29 March 96 17:6

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** QANDA.DOC

CHINA

ISSUE:

Tensions in the Taiwan Strait, President Lee's election, the ring magnet nonproliferation case, enforcement of intellectual property rights, human rights concerns and the approaching annual Congressional MFN debate keep the U.S.-China relationship in the forefront of the news.

OVERALL RELATIONSHIP

Q: Do you believe the policy of comprehensive engagement remains valid in light of the tensions over Taiwan?

A: We are committed to having as positive a relationship with China as we can. It is an important country and a productive relationship with a strong, stable, open and prosperous China will contribute not only to our long term interests, but also to regional and global stability and prosperity. We want to encourage China to play a constructive international role.

There are a number of problem areas in our relations, but we believe they are manageable. We want to work with China, at all

levels, to assert our interests. It is important we keep at these problem issues steadily, with long term goals in mind.

Comprehensive engagement remains in our interest. China is still in the process of reform and opening to the outside world. Engagement does not mean compromising our interests; it means pressing our interests, and enforcing our laws and agreements.

RING MAGNETS

Q: Are you going to sanction China for sale of ring magnets to Pakistan?

A: We are reviewing reports that China provided sensitive nuclear assistance to Pakistan and we have had several consultations with China on this issue.

If Secretary Christopher determines China has willfully aided or abetted Pakistan's acquisition of unsafeguarded nuclear material or nuclear weapons, we will examine our responsibilities under the nonproliferation statutes and take action appropriate to the facts of the case and our long term goals with China, including our desire to gain Chinese restraint in exports to unsafeguarded facilities.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Q: U.S. industry says piracy has doubled since last year's precedent setting IPR agreement. Are you going to force China to live up to its trade commitments?

A: Protection of U.S. intellectual property is a top priority. Our talks with China are continuing and Ambassador Barshefsky will visit Beijing next week to try and hammer out specific steps China will take to close down pirate operations.

We have made it clear that implementation of the agreement is essential in order for China to avoid imposition of sanctions.

TAIWAN

Q: With President Lee's election, do you expect a reduction of tensions in the Strait? Are you going to invite President Lee to visit the U.S. again this year?

A: The PRC military exercise is over, our naval assets have resumed normal deployment and both President Lee and the Beijing leadership have expressed an interest in resuming the cross-Strait dialogue. These are good signs tensions are lessening.

There are no easy answers to the question of the future of Taiwan. We have no interest in being drawn into the middle of the debate between Beijing and Taipei.

The one China policy has been followed by five administrations. It works and we intend to continue to see it work by reminding the PRC of our interests in peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question and by reminding Taipei of the need to engage constructively with China.

President Lee has said domestic priorities in Taiwan, including restoring amicable relations with Beijing, would be the focus of his efforts and that he had no intention to undertake any international travel. We have not received a request from him to visit the U.S.

Q: Does this mean you support Helms' invitation to Lee to visit the U.S.?

A: I'm not going to comment on Senator Helms' invitation.

MFN

Q: Are you going to seek to renew China's MFN status?

A: In order to encourage the types of reforms we seek in the Chinese system, we need to be engaged with Beijing economically. Revocation of MFN would sever the U.S.-China relationship and isolate us from China. It would not isolate China from the rest of the world; rather, loss of MFN removes our ability to encourage China to undertake economic reform, introduce the rule of law in its commercial and civil systems and improve the human rights environment.

JAPAN

Q: What are your goals for the April meeting with Prime Minister Hashimoto?

A: Japan and the U.S. have a strong security relationship and a strong and healthy economic relationship. Prime Minister Hashimoto and I are committed to ensuring the relationship remains strong and that it serves as a central component of sustained regional peace, stability and prosperity.

We expect to discuss regional issues such as China's emergence as a key actor economically and politically, the need to proceed with North Korean implementation of KEDO and progress in developing multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN Regional

Forum within which regional security issues can be discussed.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 29 March 96 18:43
FROM Kristoff, Sandra J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT potus press q and a [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Johnson, David T.
Kyle, Robert D.
Poneman, Daniel B.
CARBON_COPY Suettinger, Robert L.

TEXT_BODY

dan and bob--please review the attached and send your edits to david johnson. dan--in partiucalar you should look at my rather terse ring magnet point. bob--on china mfn i drew from my notes of berger's brief on the hill. david--let me know if you need something else. sandy k

[[QANDA.DOC : 4679 in QANDA.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 29 March 96 18:41

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** QANDA.DOC

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plans to replace North Korea's dangerous nuclear reactor program, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and progress in developing multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum within which regional security issues can be discussed.

Q: Will the Okinawa problem be solved by the time you get there?

A: The issue of U.S. forces and their deployment in different areas of Japan is a difficult one. It is most complex in Okinawa, where a terrible rape incident last fall focused attention on larger issues involving the U.S. military presence in Japan.

We continue to work with the Japanese government through a Special Action Committee to resolve some of these issues, and we expect to have reached a good agreement by the time of my visit. The problems are complicated and long-standing, however, and we will still need to work hard the rest of the year. But I am encouraged about the progress already made.

Q: What about economic problems?

A: We will of course be discussing economic issues, most of which consists of good news, including improvement of the trade balance, implementation of many trade agreements that have benefited both sides, and continuing efforts to deregulate the Japanese economy and open it more to foreign competition. We are working to resolve some specific ongoing trade differences, but they should not be seen as the focus of the summit.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 29 March 96 19:40
FROM Kristoff, Sandra J.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT FW: China points [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Johnson, David T.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 3/12/2019
2006-1363-F(3)

david--go with poneman edits. sjk

From: Poneman, Daniel B.

To: @ASIA - Asian Affairs; @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @PRESS - Public

Affairs; @NONPRO - Export Controls

CC: /R, Record at A1

Subject: China points [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

Date: Friday, March 29, 1996 07:27 PM

[[QANDA.DOC : 4958 in QANDA.DOC]]

Sandy: I'd be even terser. See attached (if it is not blue-lined, I messed up). dp

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 29 March 96 19:26

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME QANDA.DOC

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