

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. email	Elisa Harris to Judith Miscik. Subject: [Helms on Chemical Weapons] (2 pages)	11/10/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/09/1995-11/11/1995]

2006-1363-F

vz5610

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 09 November 95 09:12
FROM Halperin, Morton H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Halperin Package [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Danvers, William C.
CARBON_COPY Burrell, Christina L.
TEXT_BODY

This is what I found in Mort's e-mail. We have now gotten a dunning notice from exec sec looking for this letter. What should we do? Kathy

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Bell, Robert G.; Clarke, Richard A.; Halperin, Morton H.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Cooper, Kathleen H.; Kelly, Sandra L.; Lindsey, Wanda D.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: FW: Halperin Package [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, September 27, 1995 01:49 PM

[[6787-1A.DOC : 2393 in 6787-1A.DOC]][[6787-2A.DOC : 2394 in 6787-2A.DOC
]]][6787-3A.DOC : 2395 in 6787-3A.DOC]]

Some changes.

From: Burrell, Christina L.
To: Danvers, William C.
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: Halperin Package [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, September 27, 1995 01:36 PM

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 27 September 95 13:20

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 6787-1A.DOC

6787

LIMITED ACCESS

D R A F T

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MORTON H. HALPERIN

FROM: TIM TYLER

SUBJECT: Helms Letter to POTUS on Consolidation

Following their meeting, Senator Helms sent a letter to the President on September 8th offering to work with us and with the State Department on the authorization bill. We need to respond to the letter -- after we decide what to do.

There has been one subsequent meeting between Helms' staff and the interagency (State, USAID, ACDA, USIA and NSC) legislative affairs offices. That meeting was limited to discussion about procedures, i.e. deal with restrictions on presidential prerogatives first, then the numbers and then with the consolidation issue. Since then the context has changed.

ù Jesse Helms won a 57-43 vote on tabling his amendment to force consolidation -- he then withdrew his amendment.

ù Bob Dole is now involved.

ù John Kerry commented on the Senate floor that he was willing to see one of the agencies consolidated.

ù Issue has been raised by Leon Panetta at his staff meeting: his feeling is that we have to solve the problem.

ù "Hanging tough is an increasingly difficult strategy." Helms will keep coming at us and he has some Democratic support.

ù The heads of the Agencies remain opposed to consolidation.

ù We have had a solid hang tough--all for one and one for all--

position for months, which is identified with the Vice President. A shift from that position could move Helms to claim victory.

We need to decide how to proceed once we have an agreed upon position. We suggest that there be a VP-led meeting of concerned agency heads, bringing them on board. We should then get back to our Democrats in the Senate and House to let them know what we want to do. Finally, contact should be made with Helms and Gilman, presenting our proposal. The issue remains as to what our "proposal" will be. The most workable solution is to tell Helms and Gilman that we will get back to them with a specific

reorganization plan by a date certain.

Our end game is simple:

- ù Respond to Helms;

- ù Avoid forced, mandated consolidation; and

- ù Use the budget context to force a hard look at the reinvention of the foreign affairs agencies and move toward acceptance of the position developed through the NPR review of the four agencies.

We have attached a memo to the President (Tab I) and a letters from the President to Senator Helms (Tab A) reflecting this position.

Concurrence by: Richard Clarke; Bill
Danvers; Bob Bell

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Senator Helms
Tab B Letter from Senator Helms

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

27 September 95 13:33

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

6787-2A.DOC

6787

LIMITED ACCESS

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PAT GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Response to Sen. Helms Letter of
September 8, 1995

Purpose

To respond to Senator Jesse Helms' offer to work with us on the issue of "reorganizing the State Department" and the other foreign affairs agencies.

Background

Following your meeting with him, Senator Helms wrote you on September 8th, offering to work with us and the State Department on the State Department Bill (i.e. on the issue of consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies). There has also been a follow-up meeting with Helms' staff and interagency legislative affairs representatives on procedural matters. Since then the situation has changed:

ù Jesse Helms won a 57-43 vote on tabling an amendment he sponsored with Senator Dole to force consolidation last week during Senate consideration of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. He subsequently withdrew his amendment.

ù Senator Helms has stated publicly on several occasions that he is waiting for a response from you to your meeting with him and that he will hold up nominations and consideration of treaties, particularly START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; nominations; and other Committee business until he has an up or down vote on his proposal.

ù There is some Democratic support for consolidation. Three Democrats voted against the motion to table the Helms amendment last week. Senator Kerry stated on the Senate floor that he is willing to see one of the agencies consolidated, a position he took during Senate Foreign Relations Committee deliberations on this issue.

On the other side of this issue, Agencies targeted by the Helms legislation continue to oppose any consolidation. There are also key Democrats who are willing to back us in our resistance to the Helms plan. We believe that in order to try to get the Foreign Relations Committee business moving again, we should respond to Senator Helms by telling him that we will present to Congress by a date certain a reorganization plan. This will allow us and our

supporters to be able to say that we have responded to the Senator and that he should now allow the SFRC to meet to conduct its business.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to Senator Helms.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Jesse Helms

Tab B Letter from Senator Helms

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

27 September 95 13:16

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

6787-3A.DOC

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I wanted to get back to you following our meeting to discuss your proposal to reorganize the foreign affairs agencies. Since then, I am pleased that representatives from the Administration have met with your staff as a follow on to that discussion.

I am asking the Vice President to submit to you and Representative Gilman a proposal that we will get back to you by a date certain our detailed plan for reorganizing the foreign affairs agencies.

As you know, I strongly believe that the organization of the federal government is the prerogative of the Executive branch, although I think it is important to take into consideration Congressional concerns and ideas as we complete this process.

I ask that in the interim the Committee resume its work with us on treaties such as START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention, Ambassadorial confirmations and other committee business.

I continue to believe that it is critical for this nation to pursue a strongly bipartisan foreign policy and that the Congress provide the resources necessary to keep America's world leadership strong.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 09 November 95 20:43
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Alijanil, Leyla
Andreasen, Steven P.
Andricos, George M.
Appel, Edward J.
Argarin, Jocelyn D.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Bakke, Kyle D.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bassett, Leslie A.
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blacker, Coit D.
Blieberger, Marion H.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Bradley, Amelia J.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadway, Jamuna
Brown, Dallas
Brown, Nancy E.
Bruton, Robert G.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Kevin J. Cadieux
Canty, Mary T.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Claussen, Eileen B.

Cooper, Kathleen H.
Crispell, Thomas G.
Cullin, Brian P.
Daadler, Ivo H.
Daniel, Patty A.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dragone, Karen D.
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Dymersky, Debra L.
Eddy, Randolph P.
Edwards, Joan
Eisenhower, James J.
Emery, Mary C.
Fairfax, Kenneth J.
Feeley, John F.
Feinberg, Richard E.
Fetig, James L.
Ficklin, John W.
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Flessas, Daniel
Frias, Angela M.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Froman, Michael B.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
Gardner, Anthony
Gates, Brian K.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gladbach, Damon J.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gragg, Mark A.
Gray, Wendy
Grimes, Richard J.
Grummon, Stephen R.
Guekel, Kathi A.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, Wilma G.
Halperin, Morton H.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hawes, David J.

Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Heslin, Sheila N.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Houck, Baerbel K.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kammerer, Kelly C.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerr, Andrew S.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Leary, William H.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsey, Wanda
Litwak, Robert C.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
Malley, Robert
Marmol, Madelyn P.
Marshall, Betty A.
Martinez, Alejandro
Mauzy, Stefan T.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Mazzuchi, Anthony D.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Miller, Matthew E.
Millison, Cathy L.
Miscik, Judith A.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Moody, Angelyn D.
Naplan, Steven J.
Neil, M. Elise
Noetzel, Jon C.
Norman, Marcia G.
Nuccio, Richard A.
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Parco, Jim E.
Gwyn M. Parker
Parramore, Carl W.
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Pease, Bruce E.
Peggins, John W.

Peters, Mary A.
Pifer, Steven K.
Kenneth M. Pollack
Poneman, Daniel B.
Porter, Gidell
Quinn, Mary E.
Ramsay, Martha S.
Reade, Evan G.
Realuyo, Celina
Reznik, Victoria (NMI)
Rice, Susan E.
Roth, Stanley O.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Satterfield, David M.
Saunders, John W.
Schifter, Richard
Schmidt, John R.
Schuker, Jill A.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Seeley, Charlotte P.
Sens, Andrew D.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Sevigny, Theodore T.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Showalter, Victoria A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Stauffer, Helen L.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tarullo, Daniel K.
Turner, Joe T.
Tyler, John T.
Unrue, Michael M.
Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Wales, Jane
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Whitworth, Frank D.

Willis, Robin M.
Wilson, Marilyn E.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wooton, Kevin B.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Yorkdale, Glenn H.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Monday,
November 13. Thanks.

[[NOV9GUI.DOC : 5210 in NOV9GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

9 November 95 13:31

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

NOV9GUI.DOC
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

November 9, 1995

EUROPE
Bosnia/Croatia
Ireland
NATO Secretary General
Russia
CFE
Turkey

MIDDLE EAST
Jerusalem
Iraq Sanctions

CENTRAL AMERICA
Haiti

FAR EAST
Okinawa

AFRICA

Angola

Nigeria

MISCELLANEOUS

START Space Launch Vehicles

Experiments at Nevada Test Site

CWC

BOSNIA/CROATIA

Release of David Rohde

ù David Rohde of the Christian Science Monitor was released yesterday by the
Bosnian
Serbs to our
Embassy in Belgrade.

ù We are happy for his release and glad that he is safe and can return to his
family

ù Freedom of the press is very important to the U.S.

ù We condemn the actions of the Bosnian Serb authorities. Their behavior
throughout
this incident,
including their failure to admit for several days they were holding Mr. Rohde, has
b
een utterly
irresponsible, especially in light of the ongoing peace negotiations in Dayton.

Intelligence Sharing with the Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal

ù The U.S. intelligence community is not "sitting on" information that may be of
use
to the Tribunal prosecutor.

ù A coordinated Intelligence Community process has been in place since last
spring t

o manage the handling of
specific requests for information and classified responses to those requests.

Moreo

ver, we provide available
information that could aid the Tribunal's investigations even in the absence of a
sp
ecific request.

ù U.S. has not withheld any intelligence with the intent to prevent the prosecution

of any war criminals including
Mladic and Karadzic.

ù The talks in Dayton have had no bearing whatsoever on our commitment to
support an
d assist the War Crimes
Tribunal in every way its efforts to bring war criminals to justice.

Proximity Talks

ù Proximity talks are continuing. We're keeping the public informed on the talks
th
rough a single spokesman at
the State Department. For details on yesterday's activities, refer to State daily r
eport.

ù Last Wednesday the U.S. negotiating team led by Ambassador Holbrooke
began proximi
ty talks in Dayton,
Ohio.

ù As the President said when he sent the team off on last Tuesday, this is a
definin
g moment for Bosnia.

ù Only the parties to this terrible conflict can end it.

ù In Dayton, our diplomats face a tremendous challenge. There is no guarantee
they
will succeed. American
leadership key to success.

ù Talks co-chaired by Holbrooke/Bildt. Goal to secure final peace agreement that
par
ties will initial in Dayton.

ù Balkan parties: Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic plus Contact
Group
partners.

- ù Intensive U.S. /CG diplomacy - parties agreed Geneva (9/8/95)/New York (9/26/95)

- to settlement basic

- principles: Bosnia as single state; 51/49 basis for territorial solution; constitutional structure; democratic elections; and subsequently to cease-fire

- ù Difficult issues still to be resolved: (i) internal boundary for Bosnian-Croat Federation/Serb Republic; (ii) Sarajevo status; (iii) practical steps to separate forces /ceasing hostilities; (iv) election procedures.

- ù After Dayton, next steps: Paris international peace conference and implementation

- conference in London. May

- be meetings after Paris before final settlement signed.

- ù U.S./CG continue to do everything to press for peace.

- ù No set duration.

Peace Plan Implementation

- ù NAC approved concept of ops for IFOR.

- ù Detailed planning by NATO Military Authorities will proceed.

- ù Joulwan briefed President and national security team last week on state of NATO'S plans.

- ù Number of forces for operation not determined - will depend on peace agreement modalities.

- ù NATO briefed UN, UN Peace Force contributors, and interested PFP countries this la

- st week, contributions

- by non-NATO countries would be welcome.

- ù Churkin attended "16-plus-one" with NAC last week to discuss NATO's planning.

- ù Concept of ops 5 phases:

- Phase I: Preparation Phase. Presently in this phase now.

- Phase II: Entry. Begin after signing of peace agreement. Military forces would

deploy to area
by sea/land.

- Phase III: Implementation. Deployment of forces in country to secure critical areas and maintain outposts.

- Phase IV: Transition to Peace. Initial robust forces slowly drawdown over years as peace agreement takes effect.

- Phase V: Exit. Orderly hand over of commitments to appropriate civilian organizations and withdrawal of IFOR and equipment.

War Criminals

ù IFOR mission is to implement the peace agreement.

ù Pursuing war criminals not in mission, but will take into custody if come into contact.

Military Stabilization

ù Our goal to establish stability on ground by time IFOR completes mission. One of the keys to ensuring

settlement does not break down after IFOR leaves.

ù Preference for balance of forces between Federation/Bosnian Serbs through arms control measures that provide for a "build-down."

ù Arms control by itself unlikely to achieve stable balance, prepared to equip/train Federation forces to ensure effective self-defense capability.

ù Effort separate from NATO-led implementation force. First step: lifting of arms embargo.

New Ethnic Cleansing/Reports of Mass Graves

ù U.S. has/will continue to investigate and provide information to UN/War

Crimes Tri

bunal regarding violations

of international human rights and humanitarian law in a timely manner.

ù Shattuck has documented evidence of Bosnian Serb atrocities. Last August, he went

to Central/Northeastern

Bosnia, collected eyewitness accounts of mass executions, beatings, rape and other

violations of human rights

and international humanitarian law. Shattuck just returned to region to interview r efugees in Zenia.

ù Albright presented to UN Security Council compelling evidence gathered by US. Ev

idence based on US

intelligence and photographic intelligence, strongly suggested mass grave sites in Srebrenica.

ù Actively support international organizations like UNHCR and Red Cross to document

fate and whereabouts of

missing persons.

House Resolution

ù The Resolution of the House on October 30 was unfortunate.

ù At a time when all efforts should be spent to support the upcoming negotiations, t

his resolution was not

helpful.

Sanctions

ù We and our European Allies are unified on our views on lifting sanctions.

ù Our policy has not changed -- UN-imposed economic sanctions will be suspended on

ce a peace agreement is

signed. Lifting of sanctions would occur when the settlement is implemented.

Atrocities

If asked about the request from the war crimes tribunal to include in the peace acc ord the provision for

handing over indicted suspects or if asked if we were slow in providing

information
to the War Crimes
Tribunal.

ù The United States is carefully considering the request. As the President (October 15) said we fully support war crimes International Tribunal. The United States is its largest contributor and most ardent supporter.

ù The United States supports the tribunal in its investigations, consistent with national security guidelines that relate to the provision of this type of information.

ù Reporting such information is time-consuming, but we make a strenuous effort to respond as rapidly as possible.

ù We will find a way to get the Tribunal the information it needs.

ù We will continue to work with the Tribunal and appropriate agencies to see that the responsible people are brought to justice.

ù We will continue to provide the War Crimes Tribunal necessary information in a timely manner.

ù Continue to condemn these gross violations of human rights.

ù Led vigorous effort to uncover/publicize evidence of war crimes in Balkans.

ù Shattuck three times raised issue with Serbs.

ù War crimes indictments not negotiable.

ù Actively support investigating international organizations (UNHCR, Red Cross).

ù Stopping atrocities one main reason for active U.S. role in the peace negotiations

Srebrenica

ù Did not know anymore than UN about the Bosnian Serb's intent to attack Srebrenica.

ù Did not have prior information on BSA intent to commit atrocities.

12-Month IFOR Time Limit

ù U.S. position: IFOR military aspects should have finite duration (NATO/NAC accepted)

ù Believe military aspects accomplished in about one year.

ù Will not make final decision on duration until final peace agreement/completed OPLAN.

ù 12 months NATO planning figure not been formally adopted by Alliance.

ù One year sufficient to establish stable ground situation.

ù Desire to create stable balance through arms reductions, but this will also require some military support for Federation forces to ensure they have an effective self-defense capability.

Russian IFOR Participation

ù Russia will participate in the multilateral effort to implement a peace agreement in Bosnia. This is consistent with the important role Russia played in diplomatic process.

ù Prefer NATO/Russian forces not separated between Federation and Serb areas.

ù Major Hyde Park topic of discussion.

ù Last week Perry/Grachev met to discuss Russian roles/functions in IFOR. Talks productive, progress made.

Will meet again November 8 in Belgium to continue their discussion.

ù Russia and U.S. will participate in a special force that will deploy 30 days after IFOR. That force will work on transport, logistics.

IRELAND

U.S. Role

ù We are committed to working with the two governments and the parties to help in the search for peace.

ù Thankful there has been a year in which the guns and bombs are silent.

ù First time in a generation there is real hope for a lasting peace and a more prosperous future. People of Belfast are finally living a normal life.

ù One can literally say that there are individuals walking the streets in Belfast alive today who would not be had we not gotten involved. American engagement has been an essential ingredient in the search for peace.

U.S. Meetings

ù UUP leader Trimble met with the Vice President November 1. The President joined them for part of the meeting. The focus of the discussion was the peace process in Northern Ireland. Part of our continuing efforts to maintain contacts with all of the parties.

ù We have had a number of contacts over the last several weeks about how to move the peace process forward.

ù Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams recently met with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. The Vice President joined them for part of the meeting.

ù The Vice President and Mr. Lake met with UK Minister of State for Northern Ireland Michael Ancram.

ù On September 29, the President saw Irish Deputy Prime Minister, Dick Spring, who was at the White House for a meeting with the Vice President.

ù The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Nancy Soderberg, recently conducted a round of consultations with all parties in Ireland and the UK.

ù The National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, held consultations in London with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland and other issues October 16-19. While there, he also met Northern Ireland political leaders, David Trimble of the UUP and John Hume of the SDLP..

ù We are hopeful a way can be found to move things forward. Contacts with all the parties are continuing. We are not prepared to go into any detail. NSA Lake's Trip to London

ù NSA Lake was in London week October 16-19. He was there for consultations with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland, the President's trip, and other issues. While there, he also met with Northern Ireland political leaders.

ù If asked: Mr. Lake was accompanied by Deputy NSA Nancy Soderberg and Director for European Affairs Mary Ann Peters.

Twin Track

ù We see a basis for progress in the "twin-track" proposal to begin inclusive talks between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties and to establish an international body to address the issue of decommissioning the paramilitaries' weapons.

ù We will continue to encourage all sides to be flexible and find a way to move the process forward.

British Stalling on Talks?

ù As we have said, we hope that momentum will have been restored to the process by t

he time the President
visits Northern Ireland at the end of November.

ù We believe Prime Minister Major is committed to achieving a lasting peace in
North
ern Ireland.

Position on Decommissioning:

ù On decommissioning of weapons, we have said that parties observing the
cease-fire
"must take the next
step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have made clear to Sinn
Fei
n and loyalists that
we expect movement on this issue.

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

ù The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet
made a
decision.

ù It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there
is a formal decision.

Comments of new UUP leader Trimble on twin track?

ù Trimble's speech of October 21 represented no change in the unionist position
of o
pposition to the twin
track approach.
ù Our view is that twin track strategy of the British and Irish Governments offers
t
he best prospect for
moving the peace process forward.

ù Looking forward to working with Mr. Trimble as we have with the Unionists
over the
past year.

Paisley Visit

ù Paisley met with NSA Lake and VP Gore October 27.

Deportations

[Irish groups mounting a campaign against deportation of former IRA members,
some wh

o are married to U.S. citizens and/or have U.S. children. U.S. law provides no flexibility in prohibiting permanent residency to those linked to terrorism. We are looking into possible legislative waivers.]

ù Issue recently brought to our attention.

ù Law provides no flexibility on many cases.

ù Staff reviewing issue.

SUCCESSOR TO NATO SYG CLAES

Q: How is the U.S. reacting to the public announcements by a number of allies (including France, Germany, Italy and the UK) that they support former Dutch PM Ruud Lubbers to be the new Secretary General of NATO? Is Lubbers' candidacy a done deal? Is Lubbers the U.S. choice? Have the European allies managed a fait accompli?

A: We have been having extensive consultations with allies on a possible successor to Willy Claes as NATO Secretary General. Secretary Christopher, in particular, has had numerous conversations with his Alliance counterparts.

As a key element in this process, the Secretary invited former Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (ELL-eh-man YEN-sehn) and former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (LUH-bers) to visit Washington last week.

Lubbers met with Secretary Christopher on Thursday, Ellemann-Jensen on Friday. National Security Advisor Lake also had meetings with both candidates, who also had meetings at the Pentagon.

Although several allies have publicly stated their preferences, we have yet to decide on a particular candidate. We are continuing consultations with our allies, working to get this process back on track.

As with all NATO decisions, the final selection will be made by consensus.

(If pressed on European support for Lubbers)

-- As far as we are concerned, the final outcome is not preordained; that is why Secretary Christopher invited both Ellemann-Jensen and Lubbers to Washington, and Administration officials may be meeting with others.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Heart Problem

-- President Yeltsin remains hospitalized, where he continues to see senior government officials. Expect he will be under medical supervision through November. Embassy Moscow in regular touch with Russian officials; what Embassy has heard about Yeltsin tracks with what Russian officials saying publicly.

-- In brief conversation November 6 in Israel, President asked Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to convey his wishes for full recovery to Yeltsin. No other messages since October 26 get-well message -- our inclination to defer Presidential-level communications at this time, given Yeltsin's illness.

(Seeking Medical Treatment Outside Russia?)

-- Yeltsin spokesman has denied that Russians might seek treatment for Yeltsin
outsi
de of Russia.
Russians have said nothing to us about wanting medical treatment in U.S.

(Chernomyrdin to Coordinate "Power" Ministers)

-- Chernomyrdin said November 3 he would more actively coordinate "power"
ministers,
but
Yeltsin's spokesman, Chernomyrdin later said there was no transfer of
presidential p
ower.

Yabloko, Derzhava Blocs and December 17 Duma Elections

-- Russian Supreme Court reversed Central Electoral Commission's decision to
bar Yab
loko and
Derzhava blocs from party-list election and has ordered both registered for
election

-- Strongly support free and fair elections in which voters have choice among
partie
s representing
all view-points.

Perry-Grachev Talks on Russia and Bosnia IFOR

-- Perry and Grachev agreed on November 8 on military framework under which
Russian
combat
forces will participate in a Bosnia peace implementation operation.

-- Warmly welcome this understanding, as we consider Russian participation in
Bosnia
peace
implementation important and desirable.

(If pressed for details of arrangement, best to defer to Defense)

New Russian Central Bank Head

-- Ms. Paramonova played key role in reducing Russian inflation from 18 percent
per
month in

January to less than five percent per month today, but Duma's failure to confirm her forced her departure.

-- Expect acting bank head Khandruyev will work closely with Chernomyrdin and Deputy Prime Minister Chubays to sustain strong reform program.

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting reform there. Matters greatly to us if Russia dictatorship or democracy, centrally planned or market-oriented economy.
-- Long-term strategy. Transformation underway will be complex, protracted. Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

-- Engagement producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

-- President and Yeltsin had productive meeting at Hyde Park on October 23. Meeting

underscored stability, inner strength of U.S.-Russia partnership.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests. It helps reformers succeed in building a democracy and a market economy, and it helps reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Intend to manage enlargement

ent
 process in deliberate, transparent manner that threatens no country and
 strengthens
 security and stability
 of Europe as a whole.

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to
 develop
 NATO-Russia
 relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members. Robust
 NATO-
 Russia
 relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and
 Pr
 ime Minister
 Chernomyrdin continuing serious dialogue on issue.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear
 cooperation
 with Iran,
 given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Chechnya

-- While formal Russian-Chechen talks have not resumed, sides conducting
 informal wo
 rking
 meetings. Welcome Chernomyrdin's reaffirmation of commitment to pursue
 negotiated s
 ettlement.

-- Dispute in Chechnya can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides
 to
 work
 together to implement military agreement and to find political solution.

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

ù Over the past weeks, the U.S., together with its Allies, has been actively
 seeking
 a solution to the CFE flank
 issue, in Vienna, in Brussels, and in our bilateral discussions.

ù In this context, during the Grachev visit the two sides held extensive discussions on this crucial issue.

ù Grachev sought an informal U.S. reaction to various ideas Russia was considering, in terms of its response in Vienna to the proposal NATO had tabled on September 22.

ù In the course of these discussions, Grachev and Perry reached an understanding that Russia would not propose to exclude from the flank zone -- and thus from the flank limits -- the Leningrad oblast, which contains over 1900 tanks, artillery pieces and armored combat vehicles. For its part, the U.S. agreed to be flexible with regard to other oblasts in the south Russia will propose be exempted from the flank zone.

ù Secretary Perry emphasized that any change to the flank zone can only be implemented if it is approved by all 30 states party to the CFE Treaty.

ù In coordination with NATO Allies, the U.S. now looks forward to a discussion of the Russian proposal with the other CFE states, with the objective of concluding flank negotiations by November 17 -- the date when the flank limits take effect under the treaty.

TURKEY

Reactions to Ciller Vote of Confidence

ù We look forward to continuing our cordial relations with Prime Minister Ciller's government.

ù Turkey remains a good friend and ally of the United States.

ù We strong support Mrs. Ciller's efforts to secure the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU and we strongly urge ratification by the European parliament later this fall.

Reactions to Acquittal of Amcit Reuters Reporter Aliza Marcus

ù We welcome the decision of the Turkish court to acquit Ms. Marcus on the grounds that her article on Turkish military activities in southeastern Turkey did not violate Turkish law.

JERUSALEM BILL

Background: The Congressional Bill requiring the relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem becomes law today (7 November 1995) without the President's signature.

Q: Any comment on the Jerusalem legislation becoming law today?

A: The President has repeatedly pledged that he will take no action that could undermine the peace process.

He remains convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which the parties themselves have agreed to discuss only in the context of permanent status negotiations.

Consequently, as he indicated when the legislation was passed, the President did not sign this legislation.

(If asked)

The President has said he will exercise the waiver provisions of the bill as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that could be interpreted as preempting the negotiating process.

IRAQ SANCTIONS

Background: On October 17, President Zayid of the UAE called for the lifting of UN sanctions on Iraq. His remarks were quickly echoed by the Secretary General of the Arab League and the Qatari government.

Q: What is your reaction to recent demands from certain Arab leaders for the lifting of sanctions on Iraq?

A: We remain strongly opposed to any modification of the current sanctions against Iraq until it is in full compliance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions, and are pleased that the sanctions were extended by the UNSC on November 8.

With regard to the humanitarian problems in Iraq, we are convinced that these are problems created by the Iraqi regime, and not by the sanctions.

The United Nations has made provisions by which Iraq could sell oil to buy food and medicine for its population, but the regime has refused to exercise this option.

The Iraqi regime has purposely refrained from providing its population with the food and medicine they need to try to score propaganda points.

HAITI

Q: What is your comment on this morning's Post report of a "first overt U.S. display

of
disapproval of Aristide's management..." by the White House with respect to
Haiti?

A: It is true that approximately \$4.6 million of \$45 million total in Balance of
Pay
ments support
money has not been released by USAID to the Government of Haiti.

Not the result of any recent decision, or guidance from the White House.

The Balance of Payments support treaty that was signed with Haiti last April set
ce
rtain
conditions for each tranche of the money to be released.

Because of the recent change in government (resignation of PM Michel), Haiti
has no
t been able
to achieve all of the conditions specified for the last tranche. By law therefore,
the money could not be
released.

Haiti's new government confirmed yesterday. Expect forward progress when it
gets i
ts feed
on the ground.

USG has been working closely with President Aristide and his government to
encourag
e and
assist their economic transition. Agencies: USAID, Commerce, Treasury,
Agriculture

OKINAWA

ù It's important to distinguish between the justified emotional outpouring
resulting
from the tragic incident
on Okinawa and the more fundamental issue of continued Japanese support for
the US-J
apan security
alliance.

ù In view of the fact that the trial of the servicemen began yesterday, I would have expected emotional sentiment to be at a peak.

ù While I don't believe it's appropriate for me to comment any further about the incident itself while the trial is ongoing, I should point out that every senior American official, from President Clinton, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale on down, has publicly expressed regret over this incident.

ù In terms of underlying support for the security relationship, that certainly remains strong, both within the Japanese Government and the Japanese people as a whole.

ù Just last week, Secretary Perry visited Japan, during which he and his Japanese counterpart, Minister Eto, held a press conference in which they both publicly expressed their support for the continued presence of 47,000 US troops in Japan.

ù At a subsequent meeting, Prime Minister Murayama indicated to Secretary Perry that he agreed with this.

ù The bottom line is that the Japanese Government is not asking us to reduce our troop presence, because it recognizes that this presence is crucial to Japan's own interest in the preservation of peace and stability in Asia.

ANGOLA

Background: The President will meet Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos at the White House on Friday, December 8, for an official working visit.

Q: Why is the President inviting President dos Santos to the White House at this time

e?

A: The President supports strongly the peace process in Angola. We see this meeting as an important means of advancing the peace process by enabling constructive dialogue between the two leaders about future steps required by the Angolan parties and ways the international community can continue to support implementation of the Lusaka Accords.

Q: What will the President discuss with President dos Santos?

A: The President will discuss ways to advance the peace process, sustain the restoration of peace and stability and promote democracy and national reconciliation in Angola. The meeting will also focus on efforts to increase bilateral trade and investment and revitalize the Angolan economy.

Q: Will the President invite UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to the White House?

A: We would welcome a visit by Dr. Savimbi to the United States at an appropriate time as the peace process progresses and UNITA assumes its role in a government of national reconciliation.

NIGERIA: KEN SARO-WIWA SENTENCE CONFIRMED

Background: We have received reports from Nigeria that the Provisional Ruling Council has confirmed the death sentences made by the Special Tribunal which convicted Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his colleagues of incitement to murder of four Ogoni leaders in 1994. The State Department previously issued a statement condemning the

verdicts and sentences which resulted from a gravely flawed judicial process
conduct
ed outside the traditional
judicial system and without regard for due process.

Q: What is your reaction to the confirmation by the PRC of the death sentence
given
to Ken
Saro-Wiwa?

A: We have reports that the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) confirmed the
death sen
tences for
Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others -- which were handed down on October 31 by a
special
tribunal. We
have received voluminous expressions of concern from Members of Congress
and the pub
lic.

The United States strongly condemns the decision of the PRC to confirm the
death se
ntences
which were imposed as a consequence of a gravely flawed judicial process
conducted o
utside the
traditional judicial system and without regard for due process.

We urge the Government of Nigeria not to carry out executions and commute the
death

sentences. We further call on the Nigerian government to ensure that the accused
ar
e afforded open
and fair trials with the right of appeal in an independent judicial process consiste
nt with international
standards of due process.

Q: What else has the Administration done in response to the PRC's decision?

A: The United States is protesting these death sentences through sentences
through d
iplomatic
channels both in Nigeria and in Washington.

The United States reiterates its call on the Nigerian leadership to effect a transi
tion to a stable,
civilian democracy that respects human rights

Q: What can you tell us about Shell Oil's involvement in the Saro-Wiwa situation?

A: Shell Oil, a British and Dutch firm, has been the target of Saro-Wiwa's Movement to Save the Ogoni People (MOSOP) because of its pollution of the region from oil and gas exploration.

We understand that, as a result of the death sentences handed to Ken Saro-Wiwa and his co-defendants, Shell has made a unilateral decision not to return to the region.

START SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

Q: Has the United States agreed to "relax" START Treaty constraints to allow the export of ICBMs and SLBMs from Russia and Ukraine as space launch vehicles, as reported on November 10 by the Washington Times?

A:

ù No, the story is not correct and in fact has it backwards.

ù Rather than making a "concession" on START or "relaxing" the Treaty, the U.S. secured an important success by persuading Russia to reaffirm and uphold the manner in which the Treaty as originally negotiated applies to space launch vehicles.

ù Specifically, the United States, along with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, recently reaffirmed that space launch vehicles that use the first stage of a START Treaty-limited ICBM or SLBM are subject to all relevant Treaty provisions -- including the ban on transferring such missiles to other

er countries.

ù The START Treaty does not prohibit a Treaty party from establishing a space launch facility outside its national territory. However, the Treaty party must maintain ownership and control of both the Treaty-limited missiles and launchers at all times, and cannot sell them to another party.

[If asked about the "U.S. Government White Paper" that is extensively quoted in the article]

ù We are not aware of the "white paper" that is referred to in the article.

EXPERIMENTS AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE

Q: Secretary O'Leary announced on October 27 that she was directing the conduct of "subcritical" high-explosive experiments with nuclear materials at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Doesn't this undermine the President's commitment to a "zero yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

A:

ù The Secretary's decision to approve the conduct of subcritical experiments at the NTS is completely consistent with the President's "zero yield" decision announced in August.

ù The purpose of these experiments is to help ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the absence of nuclear testing. They have been specifically designed NOT to reach nuclear criticality, that is, there will be no nuclear chain reaction and therefore no nuclear explosion.

[If asked: Why are you conducting these experiments underground at the NTS?]

ù Nevada has unique facilities and capabilities for supporting subcritical experiments.

ù Conducting these experiments at the NTS will also help maintain the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities, which is one of the CTBT safeguards announced by the President on August 11.

RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION INVESTIGATION

Background: There have been press reports in recent days that Russian authorities are investigating the possibility that a former Russian General, Anatoli Kuntsevich, illegally provided chemical weapons materials to buyers in the Middle East. In a letter to the President this week, Senator Helms seized on the issue as a (new) justification for continuing to hold the Chemical Weapons Convention hostage.

Q: Do you have any further information on press reports that Russia is investigating the possible smuggling of chemical weapons materials by former General Kuntsevich?

A: We too have seen press reports about the investigation.

They indicate that Russian authorities are conducting a criminal investigation of the matter. Accordingly, it might be more appropriate to direct inquiries to the Russian Government on this.

Q: Is the U.S. assisting the investigation?

A: The smuggling of materials for weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological, is of vital concern to the U.S.

Press reports indicate that Russian law enforcement authorities are investigating the matter. If there is anything we can do to be of assistance, we obviously would be prepared

to c
onsider it.

Q: Is it true that the chemical materials were smuggled to the Middle East?

A: The Russian Government has this matter under investigation.

We do not know what the outcome of that investigation will be.

Q: Is it true that Senator Helms is holding the Chemical Weapons Convention
hostage
over this
issue?

A: Senator Helms has expressed concern over this issue.

We share those concerns.

That said, rather than being an argument against the CWC, this underscores why
it i
s so
important for the U.S. to ratify it quickly.

Q: How does the CWC help deal with problems such as this?

A: The CWC imposes a legally-binding prohibition on assisting others to acquire
chem
ical
weapons.

In addition, it requires Parties to monitor and report on transfers of the chemical
s that can be
used to make chemical weapons.

It also prohibits Parties from transferring to non-Parties key chemical weapons
pre
cursors.

The treaty also requires that Parties enact domestic legislation imposing real pena
lties on those
who violate these or any other treaty obligations.

Perhaps most importantly, the treaty's routine and challenge inspection provisions
will provide
access to information that could reveal or even confirm a potential transfer
problem

In sum, if the CWC were in force today in Russia and other countries, it would be
b
oth more
difficult and more costly for proliferators to carry out the activities for which Ku
ntsevich reportedly is
being investigated.

As the President has done on repeated occasions, we urge the Senate to move
forward
with
ratification of this vital treaty.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 09 November 95 21:04

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT November 9 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Beardsley, Tyler S.
Reed, George
Woolston, Ann E.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[NOV9GUI.DOC : 5400 in NOV9GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 9 November 95 20:44

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** NOV9GUI.DOC
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

November 9, 1995

EUROPE
Bosnia/Croatia
Ireland
NATO Secretary General
Russia
CFE
Turkey

MIDDLE EAST
Jerusalem
Iraq Sanctions

CENTRAL AMERICA
Haiti

FAR EAST
Okinawa

AFRICA

Angola

Nigeria

MISCELLANEOUS

START Space Launch Vehicles

Experiments at Nevada Test Site

CWC

BOSNIA/CROATIA

Release of David Rohde

ù David Rohde of the Christian Science Monitor was released yesterday by the Bosnian

Serbs to our
Embassy in Belgrade.

ù We are happy for his release and glad that he is safe and can return to his family

ù Freedom of the press is very important to the U.S.

ù We condemn the actions of the Bosnian Serb authorities. Their behavior throughout this incident, including their failure to admit for several days they were holding Mr. Rohde, has been utterly irresponsible, especially in light of the ongoing peace negotiations in Dayton.

Intelligence Sharing with the Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal

ù The U.S. intelligence community is not "sitting on" information that may be of use to the Tribunal prosecutor.

ù A coordinated Intelligence Community process has been in place since last spring t

o manage the handling of
specific requests for information and classified responses to those requests.

Moreo

ver, we provide available

information that could aid the Tribunal's investigations even in the absence of a
sp

ecific request.

ù U.S. has not withheld any intelligence with the intent to prevent the prosecution

of any war criminals including

Mladic and Karadzic.

ù The talks in Dayton have had no bearing whatsoever on our commitment to
support an

d assist the War Crimes

Tribunal in every way its efforts to bring war criminals to justice.

Proximity Talks

ù Proximity talks are continuing. We're keeping the public informed on the talks
th

rough a single spokesman at

the State Department. For details on yesterday's activities, refer to State daily r
eport.

ù Last Wednesday the U.S. negotiating team led by Ambassador Holbrooke
began proximi

ty talks in Dayton,

Ohio.

ù As the President said when he sent the team off on last Tuesday, this is a
definin

g moment for Bosnia.

ù Only the parties to this terrible conflict can end it.

ù In Dayton, our diplomats face a tremendous challenge. There is no guarantee
they

will succeed. American

leadership key to success.

ù Talks co-chaired by Holbrooke/Bildt. Goal to secure final peace agreement that
par

ties will initial in Dayton.

ù Balkan parties: Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic plus Contact
Group

partners.

ù Intensive U.S. /CG diplomacy - parties agreed Geneva (9/8/95)/New York (9/26/95)

to settlement basic

principles: Bosnia as single state; 51/49 basis for territorial solution; constitutional structure; democratic elections; and subsequently to cease-fire

ù Difficult issues still to be resolved: (i) internal boundary for Bosnian-Croat Federation/Serb Republic; (ii) Sarajevo status; (iii) practical steps to separate forces /ceasing hostilities; (iv) election procedures.

ù After Dayton, next steps: Paris international peace conference and implementation

conference in London. May

be meetings after Paris before final settlement signed.

ù U.S./CG continue to do everything to press for peace.

ù No set duration.

Peace Plan Implementation

ù NAC approved concept of ops for IFOR.

ù Detailed planning by NATO Military Authorities will proceed.

ù Joulwan briefed President and national security team last week on state of NATO'S plans.

ù Number of forces for operation not determined - will depend on peace agreement modalities.

ù NATO briefed UN, UN Peace Force contributors, and interested PFP countries this last

week, contributions

by non-NATO countries would be welcome.

ù Churkin attended "16-plus-one" with NAC last week to discuss NATO's planning.

ù Concept of ops 5 phases:

- Phase I: Preparation Phase. Presently in this phase now.

- Phase II: Entry. Begin after signing of peace agreement. Military forces would

deploy to area
by sea/land.

- Phase III: Implementation. Deployment of forces in country to secure critical areas and man outposts.

- Phase IV: Transition to Peace. Initial robust forces slowly drawdown over years as peace agreement took effect.

- Phase V: Exit. Orderly hand over of commitments to appropriate civilian organizations and withdrawal of IFOR and equipment.

War Criminals

ù IFOR mission is to implement the peace agreement.

ù Pursuing war criminals not in mission, but will take into custody if come into contact.

Military Stabilization

ù Our goal to establish stability on ground by time IFOR completes mission. One of the keys to ensuring

settlement does not break down after IFOR leaves.

ù Preference for balance of forces between Federation/Bosnian Serbs through arms control measures that provide for a "build-down."

ù Arms control by itself unlikely to achieve stable balance, prepared to equip/train Federation forces to ensure effective self-defense capability.

ù Effort separate from NATO-led implementation force. First step: lifting of arms embargo.

New Ethnic Cleansing/Reports of Mass Graves

ù U.S. has/will continue to investigate and provide information to UN/War

Crimes Tri
bunal regarding violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law in a timely manner.

ù Shattuck has documented evidence of Bosnian Serb atrocities. Last August, he
went
to Central/Northeastern
Bosnia, collected eyewitness accounts of mass executions, beatings, rape and
other
violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law. Shattuck just returned to region to interview r
efugees in Zenia.

ù Albright presented to UN Security Council compelling evidence gathered by
US. Ev
idence based on US
intelligence and photographic intelligence, strongly suggested mass grave sites in
Srebrenica.

ù Actively support international organizations like UNHCR and Red Cross to
document
fate and whereabouts of
missing persons.

House Resolution

ù The Resolution of the House on October 30 was unfortunate.

ù At a time when all efforts should be spent to support the upcoming
negotiations, t
his resolution was not
helpful.

Sanctions

ù We and our European Allies are unified on our views on lifting sanctions.

ù Our policy has not changed -- UN-imposed economic sanctions will be
suspended on
ce a peace agreement is
signed. Lifting of sanctions would occur when the settlement is implemented.

Atrocities

If asked about the request from the war crimes tribunal to include in the peace acc
ord the provision for
handing over indicted suspects or if asked if we were slow in providing

information
to the War Crimes
Tribunal.

ù The United States is carefully considering the request. As the President (October 15) said we fully support war crimes International Tribunal. The United States is its largest contributor and most ardent supporter.

ù The United States supports the tribunal in its investigations, consistent with national security guidelines that relate to the provision of this type of information.

ù Reporting such information is time-consuming, but we make a strenuous effort to respond as rapidly as possible.

ù We will find a way to get the Tribunal the information it needs.

ù We will continue to work with the Tribunal and appropriate agencies to see that the responsible people are brought to justice.

ù We will continue to provide the War Crimes Tribunal necessary information in a timely manner.

ù Continue to condemn these gross violations of human rights.

ù Led vigorous effort to uncover/publicize evidence of war crimes in Balkans.

ù Shattuck three times raised issue with Serbs.

ù War crimes indictments not negotiable.

ù Actively support investigating international organizations (UNHCR, Red Cross).

ù Stopping atrocities one main reason for active U.S. role in the peace negotiations

Srebrenica

ù Did not know anymore than UN about the Bosnian Serb's intent to attack Srebrenica.

ù Did not have prior information on BSA intent to commit atrocities.

12-Month IFOR Time Limit

ù U.S. position: IFOR military aspects should have finite duration (NATO/NAC accept ed)

ù Believe military aspects accomplished in about one year.

ù Will not make final decision on duration until final peace agreement/completed OPL AN.

ù 12 months NATO planning figure not been formally adopted by Alliance.

ù One year sufficient to establish stable ground situation.

ù Desire to create stable balance through arms reductions, but this will also require some military support for Federation forces to ensure they have an effective self-defense capability.

Russian IFOR Participation

ù Russia will participate in the multilateral effort to implement a peace agreement in Bosnia. This is consistent with the important role Russia played in diplomatic process.

ù Prefer NATO/Russian forces not separated between Federation and Serb areas.

ù Major Hyde Park topic of discussion.

ù Last week Perry/Grachev met to discuss Russian roles/functions in IFOR. Talks productive, progress made.
Will meet again November 8 in Belgium to continue their discussion.

ù Russia and U.S. will participate in a special force that will deploy 30 days after IFOR. That force will work on transport, logistics.

IRELAND

U.S. Role

ù We are committed to working with the two governments and the parties to help in the search for peace.

ù Thankful there has been a year in which the guns and bombs are silent.

ù First time in a generation there is real hope for a lasting peace and a more prosperous future. People of Belfast are finally living a normal life.

ù One can literally say that there are individuals walking the streets in Belfast alive today who would not be had we not gotten involved. American engagement has been an essential ingredient in the search for peace.

U.S. Meetings

ù UUP leader Trimble met with the Vice President November 1. The President joined them for part of the meeting. The focus of the discussion was the peace process in Northern Ireland. Part of our continuing efforts to maintain contacts with all of the parties.

ù We have had a number of contacts over the last several weeks about how to move the peace process forward.

ù Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams recently met with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake. The Vice President joined them for part of the meeting.

ù The Vice President and Mr. Lake met with UK Minister of State for Northern Ireland Michael Ancram.

ù On September 29, the President saw Irish Deputy Prime Minister, Dick Spring, who was at the White House for a meeting with the Vice President.

ù The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Nancy Soderberg, recently conducted a round of consultations with all parties in Ireland and the UK.

ù The National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, held consultations in London with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland and other issues October 16-19. While there, he also met Northern Ireland political leaders, David Trimble of the UUP and John Hume of the SDLP..

ù We are hopeful a way can be found to move things forward. Contacts with all the parties are continuing. We are not prepared to go into any detail. NSA Lake's Trip to London

ù NSA Lake was in London week October 16-19. He was there for consultations with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland, the President's trip, and other issues. While there, he also met with Northern Ireland political leaders.

ù If asked: Mr. Lake was accompanied by Deputy NSA Nancy Soderberg and Director for European Affairs Mary Ann Peters.

Twin Track

ù We see a basis for progress in the "twin-track" proposal to begin inclusive talks between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties and to establish an international body to address the issue of decommissioning the paramilitaries' weapons.

ù We will continue to encourage all sides to be flexible and find a way to move the process forward.

British Stalling on Talks?

ù As we have said, we hope that momentum will have been restored to the process by t

he time the President
visits Northern Ireland at the end of November.

ù We believe Prime Minister Major is committed to achieving a lasting peace in
North
ern Ireland.

Position on Decommissioning:

ù On decommissioning of weapons, we have said that parties observing the
cease-fire
"must take the next
step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have made clear to Sinn
Fei
n and loyalists that
we expect movement on this issue.

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

ù The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet
made a
decision.

ù It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there
is a formal decision.

Comments of new UUP leader Trimble on twin track?

ù Trimble's speech of October 21 represented no change in the unionist position
of o
pposition to the twin
track approach.
ù Our view is that twin track strategy of the British and Irish Governments offers
t
he best prospect for
moving the peace process forward.

ù Looking forward to working with Mr. Trimble as we have with the Unionists
over the
past year.

Paisley Visit

ù Paisley met with NSA Lake and VP Gore October 27.

Deportations

[Irish groups mounting a campaign against deportation of former IRA members,
some wh

o are married to U.S. citizens and/or have U.S. children. U.S. law provides no flexibility in prohibiting permanent residency to those linked to terrorism. We are looking into possible legislative waivers.]

ù Issue recently brought to our attention.

ù Law provides no flexibility on many cases.

ù Staff reviewing issue.

SUCCESSOR TO NATO SYG CLAES

Q: How is the U.S. reacting to the public announcements by a number of allies (including France, Germany, Italy and the UK) that they support former Dutch PM Rudd Lubbers to be the new Secretary General of NATO? Is Lubbers' candidacy a done deal? Is Lubbers the U.S. choice? Have the European allies managed a fait accompli?

A: We have been having extensive consultations with allies on a possible successor to Willy Claes as NATO Secretary General. Secretary Christopher, in particular, has had numerous conversations with his Alliance counterparts.

As a key element in this process, the Secretary invited former Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (ELL-eh-man YEN-sehn) and former Dutch Prime Minister Rudd Lubbers (LUH-bers) to visit Washington last week.

Lubbers met with Secretary Christopher on Thursday, Ellemann-Jensen on Friday. National Security Advisor Lake also had meetings with both candidates, who also had meetings at the Pentagon.

Although several allies have publicly stated their preferences, we have yet to decide on a particular candidate. We are continuing consultations with our allies, working to get this process back on track.

As with all NATO decisions, the final selection will be made by consensus.

(If pressed on European support for Lubbers)

-- As far as we are concerned, the final outcome is not preordained; that is why Secretary Christopher invited both Ellemann-Jensen and Lubbers to Washington, and Administration officials may be meeting with others.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Heart Problem

-- President Yeltsin remains hospitalized, where he continues to see senior government officials. Expect he will be under medical supervision through November. Embassy Moscow in regular touch with Russian officials; what Embassy has heard about Yeltsin tracks with what Russian officials saying publicly.

-- In brief conversation November 6 in Israel, President asked Prime Minister Cherno Myrdin to convey his wishes for full recovery to Yeltsin. No other messages since October 26 get-well message -- our inclination to defer Presidential-level communications at this time, given Yeltsin's illness.

(Seeking Medical Treatment Outside Russia?)

-- Yeltsin spokesman has denied that Russians might seek treatment for Yeltsin outside of Russia.
Russians have said nothing to us about wanting medical treatment in U.S.

(Chernomyrdin to Coordinate "Power" Ministers)

-- Chernomyrdin said November 3 he would more actively coordinate "power" ministers, but Yeltsin's spokesman, Chernomyrdin later said there was no transfer of presidential power.

Yabloko, Derzhava Blocs and December 17 Duma Elections

-- Russian Supreme Court reversed Central Electoral Commission's decision to bar Yabloko and Derzhava blocs from party-list election and has ordered both registered for election

-- Strongly support free and fair elections in which voters have choice among parties representing all view-points.

Perry-Grachev Talks on Russia and Bosnia IFOR

-- Perry and Grachev agreed on November 8 on military framework under which Russian combat forces will participate in a Bosnia peace implementation operation.

-- Warmly welcome this understanding, as we consider Russian participation in Bosnia peace implementation important and desirable.

(If pressed for details of arrangement, best to defer to Defense)

New Russian Central Bank Head

-- Ms. Paramonova played key role in reducing Russian inflation from 18 percent per month in

January to less than five percent per month today, but Duma's failure to confirm her forced her departure.

-- Expect acting bank head Khandrujev will work closely with Chernomyrdin and Deputy Prime Minister Chubays to sustain strong reform program.

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting reform there. Matters greatly to us if Russia dictatorship or democracy, centrally planned or market-oriented economy.
 -- Long-term strategy. Transformation underway will be complex, protracted. Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

-- Engagement producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

-- President and Yeltsin had productive meeting at Hyde Park on October 23. Meeting

underscored stability, inner strength of U.S.-Russia partnership.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests. It helps reformers succeed in building a democracy and a market economy, and it helps reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Intend to manage enlargement

ent
 process in deliberate, transparent manner that threatens no country and
 strengthens
 security and stability
 of Europe as a whole.

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to
 develop
 NATO-Russia
 relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members. Robust
 NATO-
 Russia
 relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and
 Pr
 ime Minister
 Chernomyrdin continuing serious dialogue on issue.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear
 cooperation
 with Iran,
 given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Chechnya

-- While formal Russian-Chechen talks have not resumed, sides conducting
 informal wo
 rking
 meetings. Welcome Chernomyrdin's reaffirmation of commitment to pursue
 negotiated s
 ettlement.

-- Dispute in Chechnya can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides
 to
 work
 together to implement military agreement and to find political solution.

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

ù Over the past weeks, the U.S., together with its Allies, has been actively
 seeking
 a solution to the CFE flank
 issue, in Vienna, in Brussels, and in our bilateral discussions.

ù In this context, during the Grachev visit the two sides held extensive discussions on this crucial issue.

ù Grachev sought an informal U.S. reaction to various ideas Russia was considering, in terms of its response in Vienna to the proposal NATO had tabled on September 22.

ù In the course of these discussions, Grachev and Perry reached an understanding that Russia would not propose to exclude from the flank zone -- and thus from the flank limits -- the Leningrad oblast, which contains over 1900 tanks, artillery pieces and armored combat vehicles. For its part, the U.S. agreed to be flexible with regard to other oblasts in the south Russia will propose be exempted from the flank zone.

ù Secretary Perry emphasized that any change to the flank zone can only be implemented if it is approved by all 30 states party to the CFE Treaty.

ù In coordination with NATO Allies, the U.S. now looks forward to a discussion of the Russian proposal with the other CFE states, with the objective of concluding flank negotiations by November 17 -- the date when the flank limits take effect under the treaty.

TURKEY

Reactions to Ciller Vote of Confidence

ù We look forward to continuing our cordial relations with Prime Minister Ciller's government.

ù Turkey remains a good friend and ally of the United States.

ù We strong support Mrs. Ciller's efforts to secure the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU and we strongly urge ratification by the European parliament later this fall.

Reactions to Acquittal of Amcit Reuters Reporter Aliza Marcus

ù We welcome the decision of the Turkish court to acquit Ms. Marcus on the grounds that her article on Turkish military activities in southeastern Turkey did not violate Turkish law.

JERUSALEM BILL

Background: The Congressional Bill requiring the relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem becomes law today (7 November 1995) without the President's signature.

Q: Any comment on the Jerusalem legislation becoming law today?

A: The President has repeatedly pledged that he will take no action that could undermine the peace process.

He remains convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which the parties themselves have agreed to discuss only in the context of permanent status negotiations.

Consequently, as he indicated when the legislation was passed, the President did not sign this legislation.

(If asked)

The President has said he will exercise the waiver provisions of the bill as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that could be interpreted as preempting the negotiating process.

IRAQ SANCTIONS

Background: On October 17, President Zayid of the UAE called for the lifting of UN sanctions on Iraq. His remarks were quickly echoed by the Secretary General of the Arab League and the Qatari government.

Q: What is your reaction to recent demands from certain Arab leaders for the lifting of sanctions on Iraq?

A: We remain strongly opposed to any modification of the current sanctions against Iraq until it is in full compliance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions, and are pleased that the sanctions were extended by the UNSC on November 8.

With regard to the humanitarian problems in Iraq, we are convinced that these are problems created by the Iraqi regime, and not by the sanctions.

The United Nations has made provisions by which Iraq could sell oil to buy food and medicine for its population, but the regime has refused to exercise this option.

The Iraqi regime has purposely refrained from providing its population with the food and medicine they need to try to score propaganda points.

HAITI

Q: What is your comment on this morning's Post report of a "first overt U.S. display

of
disapproval of Aristide's management..." by the White House with respect to
Haiti?

A: It is true that approximately \$4.6 million of \$45 million total in Balance of
Pay
ments support
money has not been released by USAID to the Government of Haiti.

Not the result of any recent decision, or guidance from the White House.

The Balance of Payments support treaty that was signed with Haiti last April set
ce
rtain
conditions for each tranche of the money to be released.

Because of the recent change in government (resignation of PM Michel), Haiti
has no
t been able
to achieve all of the conditions specified for the last tranche. By law therefore,
the money could not be
released.

Haiti's new government confirmed yesterday. Expect forward progress when it
gets i
ts feed
on the ground.

USG has been working closely with President Aristide and his government to
encourag
e and
assist their economic transition. Agencies: USAID, Commerce, Treasury,
Agriculture

OKINAWA

ù It's important to distinguish between the justified emotional outpouring
resulting
from the tragic incident
on Okinawa and the more fundamental issue of continued Japanese support for
the US-J
apan security
alliance.

ù In view of the fact that the trial of the servicemen began yesterday, I would have expected emotional sentiment to be at a peak.

ù While I don't believe it's appropriate for me to comment any further about the incident itself while the trial is ongoing, I should point out that every senior American official, from President Clinton, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale on down, has publicly expressed regret over this incident.

ù In terms of underlying support for the security relationship, that certainly remains strong, both within the Japanese Government and the Japanese people as a whole.

ù Just last week, Secretary Perry visited Japan, during which he and his Japanese counterpart, Minister Eto, held a press conference in which they both publicly expressed their support for the continued presence of 47,000 US troops in Japan.

ù At a subsequent meeting, Prime Minister Murayama indicated to Secretary Perry that he agreed with this.

ù The bottom line is that the Japanese Government is not asking us to reduce our troop presence, because it recognizes that this presence is crucial to Japan's own interest in the preservation of peace and stability in Asia.

ANGOLA

Background: The President will meet Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos at the White House on Friday, December 8, for an official working visit.

Q: Why is the President inviting President dos Santos to the White House at this time?

e?

A: The President supports strongly the peace process in Angola. We see this meeting as an important means of advancing the peace process by enabling constructive dialogue between the two leaders about future steps required by the Angolan parties and ways the international community can continue to support implementation of the Lusaka Accords.

Q: What will the President discuss with President dos Santos?

A: The President will discuss ways to advance the peace process, sustain the restoration of peace and stability and promote democracy and national reconciliation in Angola. The meeting will also focus on efforts to increase bilateral trade and investment and revitalize the Angolan economy.

Q: Will the President invite UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to the White House?

A: We would welcome a visit by Dr. Savimbi to the United States at an appropriate time as the peace process progresses and UNITA assumes its role in a government of national reconciliation.

NIGERIA: KEN SARO-WIWA SENTENCE CONFIRMED

Background: We have received reports from Nigeria that the Provisional Ruling Council has confirmed the death sentences made by the Special Tribunal which convicted Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his colleagues of incitement to murder of four Ogoni leaders in 1994. The State Department previously issued a statement condemning the

verdicts and sentences which resulted from a gravely flawed judicial process
conduct
ed outside the traditional
judicial system and without regard for due process.

Q: What is your reaction to the confirmation by the PRC of the death sentence
given
to Ken
Saro-Wiwa?

A: We have reports that the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) confirmed the
death sen
tences for
Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others -- which were handed down on October 31 by a
special
tribunal. We
have received voluminous expressions of concern from Members of Congress
and the pub
lic.

The United States strongly condemns the decision of the PRC to confirm the
death se
ntences
which were imposed as a consequence of a gravely flawed judicial process
conducted o
utside the
traditional judicial system and without regard for due process.

We urge the Government of Nigeria not to carry out executions and commute the
death

sentences. We further call on the Nigerian government to ensure that the accused
ar
e afforded open
and fair trials with the right of appeal in an independent judicial process consiste
nt with international
standards of due process.

Q: What else has the Administration done in response to the PRC's decision?

A: The United States is protesting these death sentences through sentences
through d
iplomatic
channels both in Nigeria and in Washington.

The United States reiterates its call on the Nigerian leadership to effect a transi
tion to a stable,
civilian democracy that respects human rights

Q: What can you tell us about Shell Oil's involvement in the Saro-Wiwa situation?

A: Shell Oil, a British and Dutch firm, has been the target of Saro-Wiwa's Movement to Save the Ogoni People (MOSOP) because of its pollution of the region from oil and gas exploration.

We understand that, as a result of the death sentences handed to Ken Saro-Wiwa and his co-defendants, Shell has made a unilateral decision not to return to the region.

START SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

Q: Has the United States agreed to "relax" START Treaty constraints to allow the export of ICBMs and SLBMs from Russia and Ukraine as space launch vehicles, as reported on November 10 by the Washington Times?

A:

ù No, the story is not correct and in fact has it backwards.

ù Rather than making a "concession" on START or "relaxing" the Treaty, the U.S. secured an important success by persuading Russia to reaffirm and uphold the manner in which the Treaty as originally negotiated applies to space launch vehicles.

ù Specifically, the United States, along with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, recently reaffirmed that space launch vehicles that use the first stage of a START Treaty-limited ICBM or SLBM are subject to all relevant Treaty provisions -- including the ban on transferring such missiles to other

er countries.

ù The START Treaty does not prohibit a Treaty party from establishing a space launch facility outside its national territory. However, the Treaty party must maintain ownership and control of both the Treaty-limited missiles and launchers at all times, and cannot sell them to another party.

[If asked about the "U.S. Government White Paper" that is extensively quoted in the article]

ù We are not aware of the "white paper" that is referred to in the article.

EXPERIMENTS AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE

Q: Secretary O'Leary announced on October 27 that she was directing the conduct of "subcritical" high-explosive experiments with nuclear materials at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Doesn't this undermine the President's commitment to a "zero yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

A:

ù The Secretary's decision to approve the conduct of subcritical experiments at the NTS is completely consistent with the President's "zero yield" decision announced in August.

ù The purpose of these experiments is to help ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the absence of nuclear testing. They have been specifically designed NOT to reach nuclear criticality, that is, there will be no nuclear chain reaction and therefore no nuclear explosion.

[If asked: Why are you conducting these experiments underground at the NTS?]

ù Nevada has unique facilities and capabilities for supporting subcritical experiments.

ù Conducting these experiments at the NTS will also help maintain the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities, which is one of the CTBT safeguards announced by the President on August 11.

RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION INVESTIGATION

Background: There have been press reports in recent days that Russian authorities are investigating the possibility that a former Russian General, Anatoli Kuntsevich, illegally provided chemical weapons materials to buyers in the Middle East. In a letter to the President this week, Senator Helms seized on the issue as a (new) justification for continuing to hold the Chemical Weapons Convention hostage.

Q: Do you have any further information on press reports that Russia is investigating the possible smuggling of chemical weapons materials by former General Kuntsevich?

A: We too have seen press reports about the investigation.

They indicate that Russian authorities are conducting a criminal investigation of the matter. Accordingly, it might be more appropriate to direct inquiries to the Russian Government on this.

Q: Is the U.S. assisting the investigation?

A: The smuggling of materials for weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological, is of vital concern to the U.S.

Press reports indicate that Russian law enforcement authorities are investigating the matter. If there is anything we can do to be of assistance, we obviously would be prepared

to c
onsider it.

Q: Is it true that the chemical materials were smuggled to the Middle East?

A: The Russian Government has this matter under investigation.

We do not know what the outcome of that investigation will be.

Q: Is it true that Senator Helms is holding the Chemical Weapons Convention
hostage
over this
issue?

A: Senator Helms has expressed concern over this issue.

We share those concerns.

That said, rather than being an argument against the CWC, this underscores why
it i
s so
important for the U.S. to ratify it quickly.

Q: How does the CWC help deal with problems such as this?

A: The CWC imposes a legally-binding prohibition on assisting others to acquire
chem
ical
weapons.

In addition, it requires Parties to monitor and report on transfers of the chemical
s that can be
used to make chemical weapons.

It also prohibits Parties from transferring to non-Parties key chemical weapons
pre
cursors.

The treaty also requires that Parties enact domestic legislation imposing real pena
lties on those
who violate these or any other treaty obligations.

Perhaps most importantly, the treaty's routine and challenge inspection provisions
will provide
access to information that could reveal or even confirm a potential transfer
problem

In sum, if the CWC were in force today in Russia and other countries, it would be both more difficult and more costly for proliferators to carry out the activities for which Kuntsevich reportedly is being investigated.

As the President has done on repeated occasions, we urge the Senate to move forward with ratification of this vital treaty.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Elisa Harris to Judith Miscik. Subject: [Helms on Chemical Weapons] (2 pages)	11/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/09/1995-11/11/1995]

2006-1363-F

vz5610

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 11 November 95 15:50
FROM Sestak, Joseph A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Daily Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Cullin, Brian P.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY Fetig, James L.
Johnson, David T.
Naplan, Steven J.
Schuker, Jill A.

TEXT_BODY

Attached is new press guidance for the article in Saturday's Washington Post on increase in modernization funding for Defense. r, Joe

[[MODERN1.DOC : 3927 in MODERN1.DOC]]

From: Cullin, Brian P.
To: @NSC - NSC Staff
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Daily Guidance[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, November 10, 1995 04:15 PM

[[10NOVGUI.DOC : 3926 in 10NOVGUI.DOC]]

Please update in bold. Disregard Nigeria, will update this afternoon.
There is new guidance on Bosnia, Iran, Iraq, Cuba, NATO Secretary General, and NIGERIA.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

10 November 95 16:4

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

10NOVGUI.DOC
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

November 10, 1995

EUROPE
Bosnia/Croatia
Ireland
NATO Secretary General
Russia

CFE
Turkey

MIDDLE EAST
Jerusalem
Israel-China Tech Transfer
Iraq Sanctions
Iran

CENTRAL AMERICA
Haiti
Cuba

FAR EAST
Okinawa

AFRICA
Nigeria

MISCELLANEOUS
START Space Launch Vehicles
Experiments at Nevada Test Site
CWC

BOSNIA/CROATIA

Federation in Dayton
ù Secretary Christopher flew to Dayton today to announce decisions that bring the Bosnian/Croat Federation to life.

ù President Tudjman witnessed the signing. Izetbegovic and Zubak signed it. The two mayors of Mostar and Mostar's EU administrator signed it.

ù The U.S. representative to the Federation, Daniel Serwer, played a key role in negotiating this agreement.

ù This is the first concrete result to flow from Dayton, but we hope and expect it will not be the last.

ù Secretary Christopher will remain in Dayton today for further discussions with the parties; he returns to Washington tonight.

(If asked whether there will be an agreement today on Eastern Slavonia.)

ù That is a very difficult issue; I wouldn't want to make any prediction. You might want to check with your colleagues with the Secretary in Dayton.

Sanctions Relief

ù Izetbegovic and Milosevic requested immediate resumption of natural gas deliveries to both Bosnia and Serbia on humanitarian grounds and as a confidence building measure.

ù U.S. working with Contact group members for action at the UNSC under existing humanitarian exemption.

ù This is a humanitarian gesture to provide heating fuel in response to severe winter conditions.

ù Delivery is for two months.

ù Action is similar to one last year where relief was provided for humanitarian reasons.

ù (If asked about sanctions suspension) This will take a full UNSCR and our position

has not changed-we

will support suspension when there is a peace agreement.

Federation

ù Initialed last night and will be signed today with Secstate present.

ù Important step/delineates responsibilities of the Federation and Republic, unites

Mostar/will enhance future stability.

ù Efer questions on specifics to State.

Release of David Rohde

ù David Rohde of the Christian Science Monitor was released Wednesday by the Bosnian

Serbs to our

Embassy in Belgrade.

ù We are happy for his release and glad that he is safe and can return to his family

ù Freedom of the press is very important to the U.S.

ù We condemn the actions of the Bosnian Serb authorities. Their behavior throughout this incident, including their failure to admit for several days they were holding Mr. Rohde, has been utterly irresponsible, especially in light of the ongoing peace negotiations in Dayton.

Intelligence Sharing with the Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal

ù The U.S. intelligence community is not "sitting on" information that may be of use to the Tribunal prosecutor.

ù A coordinated Intelligence Community process in place since spring to manage handling of requests for information/classified responses to requests. We provide available information even in the absence of a specific request.

ù U.S. has not withheld any intelligence with the intent to prevent the prosecution of any war criminals including Mladic and Karadzic.

ù Talks in Dayton have had no bearing whatsoever on our commitment to support and assist the War Crimes Tribunal in every way its efforts to bring war criminals to justice.

ù Reporting such information is time-consuming, but we make a strenuous effort to respond as rapidly as possible.

ù We will find a way to get the Tribunal the information it needs. Atrocities

ù Continue to condemn these gross violations of human rights.

ù Led vigorous effort to uncover/publicize evidence of war crimes in Balkans.

ù Shattuck three times raised issue with Serbs.

ù War crimes indictments not negotiable.

ù Actively support investigating international organizations (UNHCR , Red Cross).

ù Stopping atrocities one main reason for active U.S. role in the peace negotiations

Srebrenica

ù Did not know anymore than UN about the Bosnian Serb's intent to attack Srebrenica.

ù Did not have prior information on BSA intent to commit atrocities.

Proximity Talks

ù Proximity talks are continuing. We're keeping the public informed on the talks through a single spokesman at the State Department. For details on yesterday's activities, refer to State daily report.

ù President said to team last Tuesday, this is a defining moment for Bosnia.

ù Only the parties to this terrible conflict can end it.

ù In Dayton, our diplomats face a tremendous challenge. There is no guarantee they will succeed. American leadership key to success.

ù Talks co-chaired by Holbrooke/Bildt. Goal to secure final peace agreement that parties will initial in Dayton.

ù Balkan parties: Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic plus Contact Group partners.

ù Intensive U.S. /CG diplomacy - parties agreed Geneva (9/8/95)/New York (9/26/95) to settlement basic principles: Bosnia as single state; 51/49 basis for territorial solution; constitutional structure; democratic elections; and subsequently to cease-fire

ù Difficult issues still to be resolved: (i) internal boundary for Bosnian-Croat Federation/Serb Republic; (ii) Sarajevo status; (iii) practical steps to separate forces /ceasing hostilities; (iv) election procedures.

ù After Dayton, next steps: Paris international peace conference and implementation conference in London. May be meetings after Paris before final settlement signed.

ù No set duration.

Peace Plan Implementation

ù NAC approved concept of ops for IFOR.

ù Detailed planning by NATO Military Authorities proceeding; Joulwan briefed President and national security team on state of NATO'S plans.

ù Number of forces for operation not determined - will depend on peace agreement modalities.

ù NATO briefed UN, UN Peace Force contributors, and interested PFP countries contributions by non-NATO countries would be welcome.

ù Churkin attended "16-plus-one" with NAC to discuss NATO's planning.

ù Concept of ops 5 phases:

- Phase I: Preparation Phase. Presently in this phase now.

- Phase II: Entry. Begin after signing of peace agreement. Military forces would deploy to area by sea/land.

- Phase III: Implementation. Deployment of forces in country to secure critical areas and man outposts.

- Phase IV: Transition to Peace. Initial robust forces slowly drawdown over year as peace agreement took affect.

- Phase V: Exit. Orderly hand over of commitments to appropriate civilian organizations and withdrawal of IFOR and equipment.

War Criminals

ù IFOR mission is to implement the peace agreement.

ù Pursuing war criminals not in mission, but will take into custody if come into contact.

Military Stabilization

ù Our goal to establish stability on ground by time IFOR completes mission. One key is to ensure settlement does not break down after IFOR leaves.

ù Preference for balance of forces between Federation/Bosnian Serbs through arms control measures that provide for a "build-down."

ù Arms control by itself unlikely to achieve stable balance, prepared to equip/train Federation forces to ensure effective self-defense capability (DoD has details on contracting).

ù Effort separate from NATO-led implementation force. First step: lifting of arms embargo.

New Ethnic Cleansing/Reports of Mass Graves

ù U.S. has/will continue to investigate and provide information to UN/War Crimes Tribunal regarding violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in a timely manner.

ù Shattuck documented evidence of Bosnian Serb atrocities. Last August, went to Central/Northeastern Bosnia, collected eyewitness accounts of mass executions, beatings, rape and other violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Shattuck just returned to region to interview refugees in Zenica.

ù Albright presented to UN Security Council compelling evidence gathered by US. Evidence based on US intelligence and photographic intelligence, strongly suggested mass grave sites in Srebrenica.

ù Actively support international organizations like UNHCR and Red Cross to document fate and whereabouts of missing persons.

12-Month IFOR Time Limit

ù U.S. position: IFOR military aspects should have finite duration (NATO/NAC accepted)

ù Believe military aspects accomplished in about one year.

ù Will not make final decision on duration until final peace agreement/completed OPLAN.

ù 12 months NATO planning figure not been formally adopted by Alliance.

ù One year sufficient to establish stable ground situation.

ù Desire to create stable balance through arms reductions, but this will also require some military support for Federation forces to ensure they have an effective self-defense capability.

Russian IFOR Participation

ù Perry/Grachev reached agreement on Russian participation of IFOR. Russian forces will come under the

operational command of a Russian general officer who will report to General Joulwan

as overall commander

of IFOR. The Russian Brigade will be folded into an American division which will exercise tactical control.

The Russians will retain national command over their forces as other nations that

participate in IFOR.

ù Russia and U.S. may also participate in a special force that will deploy 30 days a

fter IFOR. That force will
work on transport, logistics.

ù Prefer NATO/Russian forces not separated between Federation and Serb areas.

IRELAND

U.S. Role

ù We are committed to working with the two governments and the parties to help
in th
e search for peace.

ù Thankful there has been a year in which the guns and bombs are silent.

ù First time in a generation there is real hope for a lasting peace and a more prosp
erous future. People of
Belfast are finally living a normal life.

ù One can literally say that there are individuals walking the streets in Belfast al
ive today who would not be
had we not gotten involved. American engagement has been an essential
ingredient in
the search for
peace.

U.S. Meetings

ù UUP leader Trimble met with the Vice President November 1. The President
joined t
hem for part of the
meeting. The focus of the discussion was the peace process in Northern Ireland.
Pa
rt of our continuing
efforts to maintain contacts with all of the parties.

ù We have had a number of contacts over the last several weeks about how to
move the
peace process
forward.

ù Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams recently met with National Security Advisor
Anthon
y Lake. The Vice
President joined them for part of the meeting.

ù The Vice President and Mr. Lake met with UK Minister of State for Northern

Ireland
Michael Ancram.

ù On September 29, the President saw Irish Deputy Prime Minister, Dick Spring, who was at the White House for a meeting with the Vice President.

ù The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Nancy Soderberg, recently conducted a round of consultations with all parties in Ireland and the UK.

ù The National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, held consultations in London with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland and other issues October 16-19. While there, he also met with Northern Ireland political leaders, David Trimble of the UUP and John Hume of the SDLP..

ù We are hopeful a way can be found to move things forward. Contacts with all the parties are continuing. We are not prepared to go into any detail. NSA Lake's Trip to London

ù NSA Lake was in London week October 16-19. He was there for consultations with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland, the President's trip, and other issues. While there, he also met with Northern Ireland political leaders.

ù If asked: Mr. Lake was accompanied by Deputy NSA Nancy Soderberg and Director for European Affairs Mary Ann Peters.

Twin Track

ù We see a basis for progress in the "twin-track" proposal to begin inclusive talks between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties and to establish an international body to address the issue of decommissioning the paramilitaries' weapons.

ù We will continue to encourage all sides to be flexible and find a way to move

the
process forward.

British Stalling on Talks?

ù As we have said, we hope that momentum will have been restored to the process by the time the President visits Northern Ireland at the end of November.

ù We believe Prime Minister Major is committed to achieving a lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Position on Decommissioning:

ù On decommissioning of weapons, we have said that parties observing the cease-fire "must take the next step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have made clear to Sinn Féin and loyalists that we expect movement on this issue.

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

ù The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet made a decision.

ù It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there is a formal decision.

Comments of new UUP leader Trimble on twin track?

ù Trimble's speech of October 21 represented no change in the unionist position of opposition to the twin track approach.

ù Our view is that twin track strategy of the British and Irish Governments offers the best prospect for moving the peace process forward.

ù Looking forward to working with Mr. Trimble as we have with the Unionists over the past year.

Paisley Visit

ù Paisley met with NSA Lake and VP Gore October 27.

Deportations

[Irish groups mounting a campaign against deportation of former IRA members, some who are married to U.S. citizens and/or have U.S. children. U.S. law provides no flexibility in prohibiting permanent residency to those linked to terrorism. We are looking into possible legislative waivers.]

ù Issue recently brought to our attention.

ù Law provides no flexibility on many cases.

ù Staff reviewing issue.

SUCCESSOR TO NATO SYG CLAES

ù The decision to withdraw former Prime Minister Lubbers' candidacy for the position of NATO Secretary General was for the Dutch Government to make.

ù We have the highest regard for Mr. Lubbers. He has been a good friend and reliable ally of the United States who served his country with distinction as Prime Minister for more than a decade.

ù His leadership contributed to the strength of the NATO Alliance and the transatlantic relationship, including the decisions taken at the January 1994 NATO Summit.

ù We have not made any decision on who would make the best candidate for the position of NATO Secretary General and are continuing to consult with our Allies.

ù The final decision will, of course, require a consensus among all 16 members of the Alliance.

(If pressed on whether U.S. rejected Lubbers' candidacy):

It would be inappropriate to comment on the confidential discussions that are taking place within the Alliance on this matter.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Heart Problem

-- President Yeltsin remains hospitalized, where he continues to see senior government officials.

Expect he will be under medical supervision through November. Embassy in Moscow in regular touch with Russian officials; what Embassy has heard about Yeltsin tracks with what Russian officials saying publicly.

-- In brief conversation November 6 in Israel, President asked Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to convey his wishes for full recovery to Yeltsin. No other messages since October 26 get-well message -- our inclination to defer Presidential-level communications at this time, given Yeltsin's illness.

(Seeking Medical Treatment Outside Russia?)

-- Yeltsin spokesman has denied that Russians might seek treatment for Yeltsin outside of Russia. Russians have said nothing to us about wanting medical treatment in U.S.

(Chernomyrdin to Coordinate "Power" Ministers)

-- Chernomyrdin said November 3 he would more actively coordinate "power" ministers, but Yeltsin's spokesman, Chernomyrdin later said there was no transfer of

presidential p
ower.

Yabloko, Derzhava Blocs and December 17 Duma Elections

-- Russian Supreme Court reversed Central Electoral Commission's decision to
bar Yab
loko and
Derzhava blocs from party-list election and has ordered both registered for
election

-- Strongly support free and fair elections in which voters have choice among
partie
s representing
all view-points.

Perry-Grachev Talks on Russia and Bosnia IFOR

-- Perry and Grachev agreed on November 8 on military framework under which
Russian
combat
forces will participate in a Bosnia peace implementation operation.

-- Warmly welcome this understanding, as we consider Russian participation in
Bosnia
peace
implementation important and desirable.

(If pressed for details of arrangement, best to defer to Defense)

New Russian Central Bank Head

-- Ms. Paramonova played key role in reducing Russian inflation from 18 percent
per
month in
January to less than five percent per month today, but Duma's failure to confirm
her
forced her
departure.

-- Expect acting bank head Khandruyev will work closely with Chernomyrdin
and Deputy
Prime
Minister Chubays to sustain strong reform program.

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting reform there. Matters greatly to us if Russia dictatorship or democracy, centrally planned or market-oriented economy.
 -- Long-term strategy. Transformation underway will be complex, protracted. Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

-- Engagement producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

-- President and Yeltsin had productive meeting at Hyde Park on October 23. Meeting

underscored stability, inner strength of U.S.-Russia partnership.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests. It helps reformers succeed in building a democracy and a market economy, and it helps reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Intend to manage enlargement process in deliberate, transparent manner that threatens no country and strengthens security and stability of Europe as a whole.

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to develop NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members. Robust NATO-Russia relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin continuing serious dialogue on issue.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Chechnya

-- While formal Russian-Chechen talks have not resumed, sides conducting informal working meetings. Welcome Chernomyrdin's reaffirmation of commitment to pursue negotiated settlement.

-- Dispute in Chechnya can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides to work together to implement military agreement and to find political solution.

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

ù Over the past weeks, the U.S., together with its Allies, has been actively seeking a solution to the CFE flank issue, in Vienna, in Brussels, and in our bilateral discussions.

ù In this context, during the Grachev visit the two sides held extensive discussions on this crucial issue.

ù Grachev sought an informal U.S. reaction to various ideas Russia was considering, in terms of its response in Vienna to the proposal NATO had tabled on September 22.

ù In the course of these discussions, Grachev and Perry reached an understanding that Russia would not propose to exclude from the flank zone -- and thus from the flank limits -- the Leni

ograd oblast, which contains over 1900 tanks, artillery pieces and armored combat vehicles. For its part, the U.S. agreed to be flexible with regard to other oblasts in the south Russia will propose be exempted from the flank zone.

Secretary Perry emphasized that any change to the flank zone can only be implemented if it is approved by all 30 states party to the CFE Treaty.

In coordination with NATO Allies, the U.S. now looks forward to a discussion of the Russian proposal with the other CFE states, with the objective of concluding flank negotiations by November 17 -- the date when the flank limits take effect under the treaty.

TURKEY

Reactions to Ciller Vote of Confidence

We look forward to continuing our cordial relations with Prime Minister Ciller's government.

Turkey remains a good friend and ally of the United States.

We strongly support Mrs. Ciller's efforts to secure the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU and we strongly urge ratification by the European parliament later this fall.

Reactions to Acquittal of Amcit Reuters Reporter Aliza Marcus

We welcome the decision of the Turkish court to acquit Ms. Marcus on the grounds that her article on Turkish military activities in southeastern Turkey did not violate Turkish law.

JERUSALEM BILL

Background: The Congressional Bill requiring the relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem becomes law today (7 November 1995) without the President's signature.

Q: Any comment on the Jerusalem legislation becoming law today?

A: The President has repeatedly pledged that he will take no action that could undermine the peace process.

He remains convinced that it is unwise for the United States to take actions that could be interpreted as prejudicing sensitive matters, such as Jerusalem, which the parties themselves have agreed to discuss only in the context of permanent status negotiations.

Consequently, as he indicated when the legislation was passed, the President did not sign this legislation.

(If asked)

The President has said he will exercise the waiver provisions of the bill as necessary or appropriate to ensure that no steps are taken that could be interpreted as preempting the negotiating process.

ISRAEL-CHINA TECH TRANSFER

Subject: Illegal transfer of high-tech defense technology to the PRC by Israel to develop F-10 aircraft.

ù I am not going to confirm the NBC story.
ù I can tell you that we have an ongoing dialogue with the Israelis on technology transfer. I will not go into the substance of that dialogue.

ù Secretary Perry did raise this issue with the late Prime Minister Rabin in January 1995.

ù Rabin responded he was committed to not letting it become an irritant to U.S.-Israel relations, and to resolving these issues.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMENTS ON HUMANITARIAN AID FOR IRAQ

Q.: Did the President tell Arab-Americans Thursday that he would seek new ways to get humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people?

A.: The administration remains alert and sensitive to the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein. But it is Saddam Hussein who is ultimately responsible for that suffering, due to his refusal to avail himself of the mechanisms for securing humanitarian aid under the UNSC sanctions regime.

We remain alert to ways that we might channel aid to the people of Iraq, but we do not do that in the context of ensuring that the aid is received by the groups for which it is intended.

(Note: the President introduced nothing new during his meeting with Arab-Americans. He simply reiterated established USG policy in response to some specific questions from his guests.)

IRAN -- COMMENT ON JEFF SMITH ARTICLE

Q.: Are we leaning toward tighter sanctions on Iran? What about the Administration's work with the Congress on a new covert action plan?

A.: With respect to any question concerning intelligence issues, we will have no comment.

ment.

With respect to our work with Congress on increasing the pressure on Iran, our policy is well known:

We view Iran as a potential threat to its neighbors and an enemy of the peace process. For that reason we have already taken a number of steps to increase pressure on Iran and to limit the resources available to Iran to foster terrorism and to attempt to derail the Middle East Peace Process.

As Under Secretary Tarnoff said yesterday in his testimony, we remain interested in working with the Congress to find new, effective ways to increase the pressure on Iran, to limit its resources, and ultimately to affect its behavior.

We are working closely with the Congress on this issue, seeking ways to increase that pressure consistent with our obligations to our partners and allies.

HAITI

Q: What is your comment on this morning's Post report of a "first overt U.S. display of disapproval of Aristide's management..." by the White House with respect to Haiti?

A: It is true that approximately \$4.6 million of \$45 million total in Balance of Payments support money has not been released by USAID to the Government of Haiti.

Not the result of any recent decision, or guidance from the White House.

The Balance of Payments support treaty that was signed with Haiti last April set certain conditions for each tranche of the money to be released.

Because of the recent change in government (resignation of PM Michel), Haiti has no

t been able
to achieve all of the conditions specified for the last tranche. By law therefore,
the money could not be
released.

Haiti's new government confirmed yesterday. Expect forward progress when it
gets i
ts feed
on the ground.

USG has been working closely with President Aristide and his government to
encourag
e and
assist their economic transition. Agencies: USAID, Commerce, Treasury,
Agriculture

CUBA
WASHINGTON TIMES STORY ON
EXCHANGING HELMS-BURTON VETO FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS

Q.: Is there any truth to the Washington Times story that the USG offered to veto
th
e Helms-Burton bill if Castro
would release some of his political prisoners?

A.: Absolutely none. No administration official and no one authorized to speak
on b
ehalf of the administration has
offered Castro or any representative of the Cuban government any "deal" to veto
the
Helms-Burton bill.

Whether that bill is signed or not will be decided on the merits of the legislation.

The Secretary of State has said that he would recommend that the President veto
an e
arlier version of the bill. But
at present, there are differing versions of the bill passed by the House and the Sen
ate, and nothing has emerged
from conference.

At this point, therefore, there's nothing before the President to consider.

Original Helms-Burton

- Encroached on the President's authority to conduct foreign policy by recklessly disregarding broader U.S. interests and relationships in ways that would be difficult to defend under international law.
- Would withhold World Bank and IDB contributions.
- Included extraterritorial extension of U.S. law, complicating the USG's ability to settle property and making it impossible for U.S. companies anywhere in the world to have confidence in their property agreements.

OKINAWA

- ù It's important to distinguish between the justified emotional outpouring resulting from the tragic incident on Okinawa and the more fundamental issue of continued Japanese support for the US-Japan security alliance.
- ù In view of the fact that the trial of the servicemen began yesterday, I would have expected emotional sentiment to be at a peak.
- ù While I don't believe it's appropriate for me to comment any further about the incident itself while the trial is ongoing, I should point out that every senior American official, from President Clinton, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale on down, has publicly expressed regret over this incident.
- ù In terms of underlying support for the security relationship, that certainly remains strong, both within the Japanese Government and the Japanese people as a whole.
- ù Just last week, Secretary Perry visited Japan, during which he and his Japanese counterpart, Minister Eto, held a press conference in which they both publicly expressed their support

fo
r the continued
presence of 47,000 US troops in Japan.

ù At a subsequent meeting, Prime Minister Murayama indicated to Secretary Perry that he agreed with this.

ù The bottom line is that the Japanese Government is not asking us to reduce our tro
op presence, because it
recognizes that this presence is crucial to Japan's own interest in the preservation
of peace and stability in
Asia.

EXECUTIONS CONFIRMED

Background: We have confirmed reports from Nigeria that the Provisional Ruling Coun
cil has executed Ken
Saro-Wiwa and eight of his colleagues for the alleged murder of four Ogoni
leaders i
n 1994. Both the President
and the State Department previously issued statements condemning the verdicts
and s
entences which resulted
from a gravely flawed judicial process conducted outside the traditional judicial
sy
stem and without regard for due
process.

This morning the United States is recalling its ambassador for consultations, has
is
sued a direct protest to the
Nigerian government, will ban all military sales and maintance work, and will
contin
ue its strict visa restrictions
against military members of the Nigerian government.

Statement by the Press Secretary

The United States strongly condemns the execution today of environmental and
human r
ights activist Ken

Saro-Wiwa and eight others accused of murder in May 1994. These executions underscore the Abacha regime's refusal to abide by the most basic international norms and universal standard of human rights.

The United States extends its sincere condolences to the families of those executed.

Their deaths will be mourned by friends and supporters around the world.

The United States has consistently deplored the inherent denial of due process afforded by trials conducted before special tribunals outside of the traditional judicial system. This latest action follows the Government of Nigeria's unacceptable transition to democratic governance announced on October 1. We continue to be deeply troubled by the lack of respect for human rights, prompt and credible steps taken by the Government of Nigeria to return to democracy.

In response to these executions, President Clinton has recalled Ambassador Carrington from Lagos for consultations. The White House has been in contact with the Nigerian Ambassador to the U.S. Zubair Mahmud Kazaure, to protest the executions. In addition, the President has banned the sale and repair of military goods and services to Nigeria and ordered the extension of visa restrictions to make all Nigerian military officers and their families subject to exclusion from the United States. Henceforth, Nigerian Government officials visiting the United Nations, the international financial institutions and IMF will be required to remain within 25 miles of the institution.

The United States reiterates its call on the Nigerian leadership to effect a swift and credible transition to a stable, civilian democracy that respects human rights.

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START SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

Q: Has the United States agreed to "relax" START Treaty constraints to allow the export of ICBMs and SLBMs from Russia and Ukraine as space launch vehicles, as reported on November 10 by the Washington Times?

A:

ù No, the story is not correct and in fact has it backwards.

ù Rather than making a "concession" on START or "relaxing" the Treaty, the U.S. secured an important success by persuading Russia to reaffirm and uphold the manner in which the Treaty applies to space launch vehicles.

ù Specifically, the United States, along with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, recently reaffirmed that space launch vehicles that use the first stage of a START Treaty-limited ICBM or SLBM are subject to all relevant Treaty provisions -- including the ban on transferring such missiles to other countries.

ù The START Treaty does not prohibit a Treaty party from establishing a space launch facility outside its national territory. However, the Treaty party must maintain ownership and control of both the Treaty-limited missiles and launchers at all times, and cannot sell them to another party.

[If asked about the "U.S. Government White Paper" that is extensively quoted in the article]

ù We are not aware of the "white paper" that is referred to in the article.

EXPERIMENTS AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE

Q: Secretary O'Leary announced on October 27 that she was directing the conduct of "subcritical" high-explosive experiments with nuclear materials at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Doesn't this undermine the President's commitment to a "zero yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

A:

ù The Secretary's decision to approve the conduct of subcritical experiments at the NTS is completely consistent with the President's "zero yield" decision announced in August.

ù The purpose of these experiments is to help ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the absence of nuclear testing. They have been specifically designed NOT to reach nuclear criticality, that is, there will be no nuclear chain reaction and therefore no nuclear explosion.

[If asked: Why are you conducting these experiments underground at the NTS?]

ù Nevada has unique facilities and capabilities for supporting subcritical experiments.

ù Conducting these experiments at the NTS will also help maintain the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities, which is one of the CTBT safeguards announced by the President on August 11.

RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION INVESTIGATION

Background: There have been press reports in recent days that Russian authorities are investigating the possibility that a former Russian General, Anatoli Kuntsevich, illegally provided chemical weapons materials to buyers in the Middle East. In a letter to the President this week, Senator Helms seized on the issue as a (new) justification for continuing to hold the Chemical Weapons Convention hostage.

Q: Do you have any further information on press reports that Russia is investigating the possible smuggling of chemical weapons materials by former General Kuntsevich?

A: We too have seen press reports about the investigation.

They indicate that Russian authorities are conducting a criminal investigation of the matter. Accordingly, it might be more appropriate to direct inquiries to the Russian Government on this.

Q: Is the U.S. assisting the investigation?

A: The smuggling of materials for weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological, is of vital concern to the U.S.

Press reports indicate that Russian law enforcement authorities are investigating the matter. If there is anything we can do to be of assistance, we obviously would be prepared to consider it.

Q: Is it true that the chemical materials were smuggled to the Middle East?

A: The Russian Government has this matter under investigation.

We do not know what the outcome of that investigation will be.

Q: Is it true that Senator Helms is holding the Chemical Weapons Convention hostage over this issue?

A: Senator Helms has expressed concern over this issue.

We share those concerns.

That said, rather than being an argument against the CWC, this underscores why it is so important for the U.S. to ratify it quickly.

Q: How does the CWC help deal with problems such as this?

A: The CWC imposes a legally-binding prohibition on assisting others to acquire chemical weapons.

In addition, it requires Parties to monitor and report on transfers of the chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.

It also prohibits Parties from transferring to non-Parties key chemical weapons precursors.

The treaty also requires that Parties enact domestic legislation imposing real penalties on those who violate these or any other treaty obligations.

Perhaps most importantly, the treaty's routine and challenge inspection provisions will provide access to information that could reveal or even confirm a potential transfer problem.

In sum, if the CWC were in force today in Russia and other countries, it would be both more difficult and more costly for proliferators to carry out the activities for which Kuntsevich reportedly is being investigated.

As the President has done on repeated occasions, we urge the Senate to move forward with ratification of this vital treaty.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

MODERN1.DOC

**MILITARY LEADERS URGE ACCELERATED 50% INCREASE IN
MODERNIZATION****BACKGROUND**

The Washington Post reported on November 11 that the uniformed leaders of the armed forces, worried about aging weapons and equipment, have recommended a 50 percent increase in procurement spending, from \$40 billion at present to \$60 billion by Fiscal Year 1998. Administration plans for the same rise by 2001. The recommendation was included in General Shalikashvili's Chairman Program Assessment, recently submitted to Secretary Perry. The recommendation makes clear the military chiefs do not expect the added funds for modernization to come from higher overall defense spending but rather through cuts in some programs under development and other savings. Nor are the Chiefs suggesting reversing the priority given last year to readiness over procurement. The biggest adjustments proposed by the Chairman would involve cutting back on competing service programs.

POINTS

- ù The President has pledged to maintain the best-equipped, best-trained, and best-prepared fighting force in the world.
- ù Post Cold War drawdown permitted us to retain the newest equipment from the large recapitalization and procurement period of the 1980s while retiring older, less useful systems.
- ù With drawdown nearly complete, modernization programs now receiving special attention in FY97-01 program review. In future years, recapitalization is a priority as many weapon systems approach block obsolescence. That's why last December, President increased defense spending plan by \$25 billion.
- ù Agree with Defense Department's goal for an accelerated increase in planned procurement spending by achieving efficiencies and funding reductions in programs of lower priority from a warfighting perspective.
- ù (IF ASKED: "Is the military asking for an increase in the Defense Department's topline?":
 - ù No, General Shalikashvili's recommendation makes clear the military chiefs do not expect added funds for modernization to come from higher overall defense spending but rather through cuts in some programs under development and other savings.)

ù