

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Robert Malley to Richard Nuccio. Subject: Cuba. [See jm1876_004, sb2104_001, vz5057_002] (8 pages)	07/27/1995	P1/b(1)
002. email	Robert Malley to Richard Nuccio. Subject: RE: Cuba. [See vz5058_003] (6 pages)	07/28/1995	P1/b(1)
003. email	Robert Malley to Kathleen Cooper and Mort Halperin. Subject: Cuba. [Duplicate vz5057_003] (9 pages)	07/28/1995	P1/b(1)
004. email	Richard Nuccio to Robert Malley. Subject: [Cuba]. (9 pages)	07/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
 OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/27/1995-07/28/1995]

2006-1363-F

vz5603

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 27 July 95 17:43
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT July 27 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Beardsley, Tyler S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[JUL27GUI.DOC : 4399 in JUL27GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 27 July 95 17:25

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** JUL27GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 27, 1995

Contingency Press Guidance
-- Alleged Serb Use of Gas
-- Missile Transfers to Pakistan

Bosnia: Reaction to Dole Resolution

Bosnia: London Meeting and NATO Decisions on Bosnia

Bosnia

Bosnia: Talking Points on Dole Amendment

Korea: President Kim Visit

IOB Guatemala Review

China

Sale of Pakistan's F-16 Aircraft

Northern Ireland

U.S.-Cuba Migration Talks

Cuba and News Bureaus

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1868)

Haiti

Russia

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE

BOSNIA: ALLEGED SERB USE OF GAS

Q: Today's New York Times reports that the Serbs have used an incapacitating chemical warfare agent, BZ, against Bosnian troops around Zepa. Could you comment on this?

A: We are aware of these reports, and have been looking into them.

We are unable to confirm that chemical weapons have been used.

I would note, however, that we would deplore in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in this tragic conflict.

CHINA: MISSILE TRANSFERS TO PAKISTAN

Q: Jim Hoagland writes in today's Washington Post that the White House and State Department have been slow to deal with reports that M-11 missiles were transferred from China to Pakistan. What is your response to this?

A: I'm not going to comment on alleged intelligence information, but I would emphasize that we take all reports on proliferation matters seriously, and we are monitoring China and Pakistan's activities.

closely.

We have not determined that China or Pakistan have engaged in activities that trigger missile sanctions under U.S. law.

The piece is off base on a number of counts.

-- First of all, our policy on South Asia has been developed through a thorough interagency review of our key interests in the region and the best way to advance them. The South Asia Bureau has been one of the most important players in this process, but many other views and perspectives have been taken into account.

-- Second, the decision to sell Pakistan's F-16s to a third country and return the proceeds to Pakistan, and to seek authority to return other military equipment purchased before 1990 was the President's. The President wanted to address the basic fairness question that he and Prime Minister Bhutto discussed when they met in April. He also wanted to do it in such a way that our long term interests in the region -- including considerations of the military balance between Pakistan and India -- were taken into careful consideration. That is why he chose to sell the F-16s to a third country, even though Pakistan had requested the return of the planes.

-- Third, we do believe that a stronger relationship between Washington and Islamabad will contribute to the stability and security of Pakistan and its neighbors. Only in a more stable political environment can we engage the parties in the region on the vital issue of nonproliferation. We do agree with the Post that building a nuclear firebreak in South Asia is a critical challenge and a high priority for US foreign policy.

REACTION BY THE PRESS SECRETARY TO THE PASSAGE
OF THE DOLE RESOLUTION ON BOSNIA (S. 21)

-- The President is very disappointed by the Senate's vote to pass S.21, which would provide for the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

-- The President will continue to make his opposition clear when the issue moves to the House; He is prepared to veto any legislation requiring unilateral lift that reaches his desk.

-- A vote for the Dole Resolution is a vote to send American ground troops to Bosnia

-- Our Allies in UNPROFOR have said that a unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo will result in their withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. In that case the U.S., as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation to assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia for a very difficult mission.

-- Moreover, requiring the U.S. to unilaterally violate a binding UN Security Council resolution would undermine other UN sanctions regimes, such as against Iraq, that serve vital U.S. interests.

-- It just doesn't make sense to take an action like this when we are working to strengthen the international response to Serb aggression. This encourages our Allies to do less, not more -- and to give us sole responsibility for the future of Bosnia. A unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility.

LONDON MEETING AND NATO DECISIONS ON BOSNIA

-- Early Wednesday morning in Brussels, NATO acted swiftly and resolutely to implement significant decisions taken at last week's international meeting on Bosnia in London

-- After intensive action by NATO military authorities, the North Atlantic Council approved planning for use of substantial NATO air power to deter or respond to Bosnian Serb attacks on the UN safe area of Gorazde.

-- Just as importantly, NATO military authorities were instructed to formulate command and control arrangements for protecting other safe areas, particularly around Bihac.

-- Authority for the decisions taken at NATO already exists under current UNSC resolutions.

-- The measures agreed to in Brussels reflect unanimous Allied endorsement for the London decision to modify substantially the "dual key" previously in effect, by delegating authority for air strikes to the UN and NATO commanders in the theater.

-- We are pleased that UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has agreed to delegate his "key" to General Janvier, who may in turn delegate it to subordinate commanders. This arrangement reflects standard military practice.

-- The new arrangements will ensure that the use of air power is substantial and decisive. Such operations, once initiated, will not be lightly discontinued. In short, there will be no more pinpricks.

-- The Alliance recognizes that there are risks involved in use of substantial air power, but will not

be deterred.

-- They are consistent with the requirements of the U.S. military and have its endorsement.

-- Working with our NATO Allies, the United States has embarked on a more decisive approach to preserving the UN mission in Bosnia.

-- New command and control arrangements agreed to in Brussels last night, combined with British and French resolve in using their Rapid Reaction Forces to secure routes into Sarajevo, are vivid examples of our heightened resolve.

BOSNIA

Key Points:

-- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:

-- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state;

-- to prevent the spread of the conflict;

-- to help limit the loss of life;

-- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

-- That is why the United States

-- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;

-- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history:

-- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;

- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;
- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.
- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.
- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo -- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;
- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.
- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.
- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.
- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions, support the decisions on decisive use of NATO air power taken last week in London, and work for a peaceful settlement.

London Conference and Follow-up Decisions by NATO

- We went to London convinced that the status quo in Bosnia was untenable and that only strong and decisive

action would be sufficient to halt Serb aggression, restore UNPROFOR's effectiveness

, and reestablish

conditions that could lead to a political settlement.

- We were particularly determined that clear decisions be taken to prevent the Bosni

an Serbs from attacking the

last remaining safe area in eastern Bosnia, Gorazde, and that measures be adopted fo

r relieving the Serbs'

siege of Sarajevo.

- The London meeting achieved these objectives. Early Wednesday morning, NATO appro

ved the military plans

needed to implement the London decisions on air power to defend Gorazde.

- We are fully satisfied with results at NATO: they reflect full reaffirmation of London decisions:

- NATO reaffirmed that any Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde would be met with a substa

ntial and decisive

response by NATO air power, going beyond the limited strikes conducted previously, i

f the Serbs defy our

ultimatum.

- Allies agreed on concept of operations that provides for broad-gauged strikes agai

nst military

forces attacking Gorazde or concentrating for an attack in a wide geographic area ar

ound Gorazde.

They also agreed that, if these strikes did not halt Serb offensive, NATO would be p

repared to move to

strike Serb military targets elsewhere in Bosnia.

- Allies endorsed the substantial changes to the "dual key" system approved in Londo

n. They

agreed that authority to initiate air strikes should be in the hands of the NATO ai r commander and the

UN ground commander, consistent with normal military practice.

- Allies also agreed that NATO Military Authorities should immediately develop plans

for applying

this new approach to Bihac and other safe areas, if that proves necessary.

- Allies agreed it is vital, for strategy to work, that UN political authorities be taken out of the chain of command.

- Welcome decision by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to delegate his "key" to the UN force commander, General Janvier, who may in turn delegate authority to the appropriate subordinate commander on the ground. This is significant breakthrough.

- Allies took this decision fully aware of risks that the Bosnian Serbs would seek to respond as they have in the past by taking hostages, but agreed that our policy would not be held hostage to hostage-taking.

- The second important decision in London was to take decisive action to ensure access to Sarajevo for delivery of humanitarian aid and resupply of UN forces, through early use of the Rapid Reaction Force. The British announced their decision to send a battalion to Sarajevo to further strengthen the effectiveness of UN capabilities there.

- In light of Bosnian Serb attacks on UN peacekeepers along the Mt. Igman road, our allies have now deployed elements of the Rapid Reaction Force as reinforcements.

- The London meeting also reaffirmed the international community's commitment to achieving a political settlement, stressing the urgency of renewed negotiations among the Bosnian parties based on the Contact Group plan.

- The participants voiced their support for the efforts of EU mediator Carl Bildt to secure recognition of Bosnia by Serbia-Montenegro and a sealing of Serbia's border with Bosnia.

- Bildt briefed Contact Group Ministers on the package he has worked out with Milosevic, but that package was not approved; in fact, we see a number of issues that still need to be satisfactorily resolved, and we also need to consult with the Bosnian Government on whether the terms for mutual recognition are acceptable.
- The Contact Group met with Bildt in London on Wednesday to discuss the way forward in his negotiations.
- The participants in the meeting also agreed to increase support for efforts to address Bosnia's humanitarian crisis, which was exacerbated by the Serb attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa and the new wave of brutal ethnic cleansing. The participants demanded the international community be given immediate access to all detainees still being held by the Bosnian Serbs.
- Underlying all these decisions is a reaffirmation that a strengthened and more effective UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia.
- We continue to believe that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to a larger human tragedy in Bosnia and an increased danger of wider conflict in the Balkans.
- Our allies made clear in London that action by the U.S. to lift the arms embargo unilaterally will force the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. It would also undermine the London meeting's renewed display of resolve, reaffirmed in Brussels yesterday, for UNPROFOR to deal firmly with the Bosnian Serbs' outrageous behavior.
- We should not be taking actions that drive UNPROFOR out at the very moment actions are

being taken to protect the Bosnian people in Gorazde and other safe areas.

Srebrenica and Zepa

-- What has happened in Srebrenica and Zepa is tragic and inhumane. No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- The actions by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and Zepa are a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.

-- The Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas were established primarily as a haven for refugees expelled from other parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The attack against these undefended enclaves and the peacekeepers stationed there, and the reports of brutal ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of this travesty, provide further dramatic proof of the intent of Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group to ensure that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to all the civilian refugees in the enclave, and to cease their illegal and inhumane detention of groups of refugees on the basis of unsubstantiated or trumped-up "war criminal" charges.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to

an even greater tragedy.

-- Events of the past weeks emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.

-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their influence to stop this aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers. Serbia must make clear in word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts. In particular, it should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission. (See separate points on London meeting proposals)

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and draw the United States in.

Q & A: Hot Issues

Russia and Bosnia:

Q: What is your reaction to the Russian approach on Bosnia?

-- Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have exchanged letters on Bosnia.

-- While Moscow disagrees with us on NATO's threat of air strikes, we and Russians

ee
eye-to-eye on need to get Bosnian Serbs to desist from further attacks on safe areas

-- This was one reason for Foreign Minister Kozyrev's July 24 visit to Belgrade. We hope the Russians will be successful in persuading Bosnian Serbs to halt their attacks and comply with NATO's ultimatum.

Q: What about the Kozyrev and Duma comments on Senate vote?

-- Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Duma members have criticized Senate's vote to lift arms embargo unilaterally. Duma members have in past said Russia should respond by lifting arms embargo on Serbs.

-- There is no comparison between Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb actions; clear the Bosnian Serbs are the aggressors. Nevertheless, Duma comments show one of the risks of Senate vote to lift arms embargo unilaterally.

Q: Why aren't you doing anything about Bihac?

-- Very concerned about Serb offensive in Bihac region, with involvement of rebel Muslim forces and Croatian Serb forces. Not only threat to civilian population, but increased risk that war could spread into Croatia.

-- NATO Military Authorities were tasked to develop plans for possible application of "Gorazde rules" to Bihac and other safe areas. That work is proceeding in Brussels.

-- Our people are also looking urgently at what NATO could do to stabilize situation in Bihac.

Q: What next after Senate passage of the Dole resolution?

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift as action shifts to House.

-- Senior advisors met with House Democratic leadership yesterday.

-- We believe our current efforts to strengthen UN and NATO response to Serb aggressive behavior should be given chance to work.

-- If House nevertheless passes equivalent resolution to Dole, President prepared to veto it.

Q: Isn't the dual key unchanged under the NATO decision on Gorazde?

-- NATO allies have unanimously endorsed significant change to dual key in new decision on Gorazde. This would involve delegation to the UN and NATO military commanders of the authority to call in close air support and to initiate air strikes to defend Gorazde.

-- Pleased that Boutros-Ghali has now agreed to do this. This is significant breakthrough.

Q: Why should we believe this is different from previous NATO decisions that led to nothing more than "pinprick" strikes?

-- NATO decision breaks important new ground in authorizing large-scale air strikes against wide range of targets -- not only forces attacking the safe area of Gorazde, but concentrations of weapons and forces directly threatening the safe area.

-- Authorizes effective actions to suppress air defenses at time strikes initiated.

-- Substantially modifies dual key, consistent with normal military practice.

Q: What is your reaction to Russian plans to send peacekeepers to Gorazde?

-- London meeting left open the question of whether to reinforce British and Ukrainian forces.

peacekeepers in Gorazde, in view of difficulties in deploying and resupplying forces there.

-- If this provides an added incentive for Bosnian Serbs to comply with NATO's ultimatum, it could be helpful.

Q: Why did we not support the French desire to deploy the RRF to help defend Gorazde?

-- Our military experts did not believe that deploying 1000 members of a rapid reaction force to conduct a static defense of Gorazde was the most efficient use of the abilities of the RRF. Moreover, their view was that the threat of massive use of air power would have a greater deterrent impact.

-- We fully support French and British efforts to use RRF to ensure access to Sarajevo.

Q: Is Contact Group going to endorse lifting additional sanctions on Belgrade? How can you even consider this after recent Serb offensives and ethnic cleansing?

-- Contact Group met Wednesday with EU negotiator Carl Bildt in London to discuss status of negotiations with Milosevic on recognition of Bosnia.

-- We and Bosnian Government continue to believe that mutual recognition, if accompanied by serious measures to seal Serbia's border with Bosnia and cut-off of all support for the Bosnian Serbs, could be basis for suspension of some economic sanctions on Belgrade.

-- Still many issues to be resolved, including mechanism for reimposing sanctions if Milosevic does not fulfill his commitments.

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few weeks emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica or Zepa?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- Disappointed by Senate vote on Dole.

-- Remain strongly opposed to unilateral lift and will make that clear as action shifts to House. So long as resolution would require unilateral lift, President prepared to veto. Unilateral lift makes Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- The U.S. would be obligated to send thousands of U.S. troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war
-- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

Q: Bosnian Government continues to call for lifting the arms embargo. If that's what the Bosnians say they want, why not support them?

-- We will support a multilateral lift of the arms embargo if, despite our efforts, UNPROFOR mission is terminated.

-- We do not support unilateral lift, which would have the effect of causing UNPROFOR to withdraw prematurely, and place U.S. in violation of binding UNSC resolutions.

-- We remain concerned that, in the time between lifting the embargo and the integration of new weapons into the Bosnian armed forces, the Bosnian Serbs would take military action that the Bosnians would be hard pressed to resist on their own.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws.

Isn't that the Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of UNPROFOR

and

cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame for the

deteriorating

situation would be placed on us.

President's Comments on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President has said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR may leave.

Do you expect

UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No. We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with Serbian actions to

interfere with its mission.

No more business as usual.

-- This view was fully supported by the London conference and by subsequent decisions at

NATO.

Q: In reiterating his support for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the President signaling his expectation that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia but we

do not

expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to achieve

ever that goal.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential

Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$18-27 million of goods and services -- under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged approach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and tightening his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia,

promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospect
s for an
overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of
all-out
war that
would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the
conflic
t, and effectively end
the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providin
g our
own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate,
most notably
through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on
th
e
ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable,
an adequa
te plan
and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support
missions
to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as
NAT
O to deter a
repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we
abandon
our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate th
e military
standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other pa
rties to the conflict
in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR efforts that have proven ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel. It will be used to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move it into theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- We are committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does not seem to be any Congressional support?

-- We are working with the United Nations and other member states to use a voluntary fund to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services to support our allies.)

-- Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services is being provided.

-- The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser target designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to aircraft and helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence support.

-- We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. This support would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings

Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ceilings previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will represent no more than \$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3 million.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for

the p
rovision of
up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a
authoriti
es and primarily for
transpiration services and equipment.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has
repeatedly demons
trated that it is totally
ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid , protecting the citizens in the
Safe Areas from attack, or ending
the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian
suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief
organizatio
ns are
feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons,
and
others affected by
the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been
saved a
nd
violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat
Federation,
which
has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic
cooperation
is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the
alter
natives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that
would
surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Ame

ricanizes war
and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration
and
American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely
i
f the international
presence remains.

Results to Date:

Q: Isn't our policy of support for UNPROFOR bankrupt?

-- No. While the tragedy of recent events is enormous, you should not overlook
what
has been

accomplished to date:

-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement
between Bo

snia's

Muslims and Croats, which has brought peace to the vast majority of territory
under

Bosnian government
control;

-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in
1994)

-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the
longest airborne

relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;

-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);

-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping
the war

out of the

air over Bosnia for two and a half years; and

-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the
ground in
Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the
conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better altern
atives that don't

depend on wishful thinking.
U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the conflict or to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or if units need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties, to use U.S. troops as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying out in good faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of military plans, we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnians' requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire arms and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

Points on the Dole Amendment

-- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would hinder our efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.

-- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. military support to the Bosnian government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and Serbia.

-- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the international community's other efforts have yielded significant benefits.

-- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing the killing and suffering in Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.

- UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million people.
Its

presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of Central Bosnia.

- UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and is fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.

-- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

-- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partners to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them limited support and time to prove themselves.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue to oppose unilateral lift.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government

would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively with its new arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

-- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo within 12 weeks of the date the Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually ensures Allied entanglement in the war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the

mission could take up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war -- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like Serbia, would likely provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes, such as those against Iraq and Libya, that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to distinguish between Bosnia and other situations.

-- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with respect to decisions that could involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and other Americans to imminent

risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential responsibilities.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and risks of an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and protecting the Bosnians that will follow?

-- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

REPUBLIC OF KOREA -- PRESIDENT KIM VISIT

Q: What is the purpose of South Korean President Kim's State Visit this week?

A: The U.S. and the Republic of Korea share a history of close ties that spans more than 40 years. President Kim and President Clinton will reaffirm our countries' friendship and the importance of our relationship as they jointly dedicate the Korean War Veterans Memorial on Thursday.

-- The President will reaffirm U.S. commitment to the US-ROK alliance and American support for the South Korea's efforts to bring peace and security to the Korean Peninsula. They will talk about the next steps in the implementation of the Agreed Framework that the U.S. signed with North Korea to commit its nuclear program to be frozen and eventually dismantled.

-- The two Presidents will also discuss economic issues, including the upcoming

APEC
meeting
and the bilateral trade relationship.

Q: Why is he here now?

A: The timing was determined by the dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial, which is opening on the anniversary of the signing of the armistice.

Q: What is the overall state of U.S.-ROK relations? Weren't there some tensions over the discussions between the U.S. and North Korea?

A: Overall relations are very solid. From the strategic and security perspective, we believe our joint efforts, along with the close cooperation of Japan, have been effective.

The threat of the North Korean nuclear program has been frozen under international inspection, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula have eased.

In its talks with North Korea in May and June, the United States was fully supportive of South Korean interests and objectives. South Korea fully supports the Agreed Framework and the steps taken to date to implement it.

There are economic and trade issues that need some attention, but they are being handled appropriately.

KOREA: AGREED FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION

Q: Does North Korea really accept that it will receive South Korean light water reactors?

A: There is no other way to read the outcome of the Kuala Lumpur talks last month.

In Kuala Lumpur, North Korea agreed that KEDO (KEY-doe) -- the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization -- will select both the reactor model and prime contractor for the North Korean reactor project.

The same day, KEDO confirmed that both the reactor model and prime contractor will be South Korean.

NORTH KOREA: ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA

Q: Why are we providing assistance to North Korea under the Agreed Framework?

A: The Agreed Framework is deeply in our national interest. It commits North Korea to go beyond its international obligations by freezing and then dismantling its dangerous nuclear program.

In exchange, and in consultation with our South Korean and Japanese allies, we agreed to provide North Korea with light-water reactors to replace the existing North Korean program.

The lion's share of these costs will be borne by South Korea and Japan. We are also seeking broad international support, which requires a modest US contribution as well.

NORTH KOREA: SPENT FUEL

Q: What is the state of play on US efforts to store safely the DPRK's spent fuel?

A: We reached agreement with the North Koreans in June on procedures to store safely the spent fuel rods from the North Korean 5 megawatt reactor.

U.S. experts also installed equipment to cool the water holding the rods, which will reduce the rate of corrosion of the cladding, and agreed on a schedule to install equipment to clarify

fy the water.

The rods will later be placed in special canisters for safe storage, and eventually will be shipped out of North Korea.

KOREA: DPRK RICE

Q: What is your view of the emergency rice deliveries from the ROK and Japan? Does the U.S. plan to provide any humanitarian food aid? Why?/Why not?

A: The U.S. welcomes these agreements. In particular we fully support and encourage further direct contacts between North and South Korea.

North and South Korea have been meeting to continue discussions on humanitarian food aid to the North.

The ROK is providing the North with 150,000 tons of rice on a grant basis. Japan will provide a total of 300,000 tons of rice.

There has been no decision reached about possible U.S. food aid to North Korea.

NORTH KOREA: DIVERSION OF HEAVY FUEL OIL

Q: In January, North Korea diverted fuel oil supplied to it to non-agreed uses. What is being done to prevent repetition?

A: Based on reports that some heavy fuel oil was diverted by North Korea after the first delivery, we insisted on monitoring measures to ensure it does not happen again.

North Korea agreed in June that sealed instruments will be installed to measure fuel flows at the facilities where the heavy fuel oil is supposed to be used.

-- These instruments will be installed before the next shipment of oil is delivered

NORTH KOREA: NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

Q: What is the US doing about North Korea's refusal to engage the South?

A: We applaud South Korea's recent success in negotiating an agreement to provide North Korea with humanitarian shipments of rice.

We are encouraged that the North has begun to engage with the South, and that an additional round of negotiations is scheduled for August.

We have told North Korea that it cannot hope to have good relations with the United States if it is not also prepared to deal constructively with South Korea.

Nevertheless, North Korea has not yet fulfilled its commitment under the Agreed Framework to pursue dialogue and to implement the 1992 "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

We strongly urge the North to do so. Constructive North-South dialogue is the key to permanent peace on the peninsula and essential to the smooth implementation of the Agreed Framework.

NORTH KOREA: EFFECT OF DPRK TALKS ON US-ROK TIES

Q: How have the nuclear negotiations affected the US-ROK alliance?

A: If anything, they have strengthened an already strong alliance that has endured for more than four decades.

Our alliance with South Korea is a pillar of our security posture in Northeast Asia.

We naturally worked very hard to maintain the closest possible cooperation -- both

with South
Korea and Japan -- throughout this lengthy effort to resolve the North Korean
nuclea
r issue.

The US and ROK share the goal of a peaceful, non-nuclear Korean peninsula and
a str
ong
non-proliferation regime, and agree that the Agreed Framework moves us toward
that g
oal. As allies, we
will work together to assure its full implementation.

-- In Kuala Lumpur, we achieved North Korea's clear acceptance of South
Korea's

central role in the LWR project. Just after the Kuala Lumpur negotiations,
Preside
nt Kim wrote me
that he and his government consider the outcome in Kuala Lumpur to have been a
meani
ngful step
forward.

U.S. - ROK SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

Q: On the occasion of the dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial,
what is th
e status of the
U.S.-Korea security relationship?

A: The security relationship is dynamic and strong. North Korea is still a threat,
and the Republic of
Korea and the U.S. remain determined to maintain a cooperative ability to
counter th
at threat.

As you know, we maintain 37,000 troops there, and they will stay as long as the
peo
ple of South
Korea want them there.

We continue to consult closely at the highest levels of our security and defense es
tablishments.

Secretary Perry, for example, will be going to Seoul in November as part of an
annu
al Defense
Ministerial meeting which alternates between the U.S. and South Korea.

We maintain a vigorous cycle of joint military exercises, both to enhance deterrence and to ensure readiness of our forces if deterrence fails.

U.S. - ROK SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

Q: Why did you recently issue a joint statement saying the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would be reviewed?

A: We did so at the request of the South Korean Government, which has the legal right under our Status of Forces Agreement to request such a review.

As you know, there have been several deplorable incidents involving U.S. forces in Korea this year.

We believe it is useful to sit down together to see if there is any way to improve how we mutually handle such incidents.

We have not committed ourselves to any particular outcome, nor has our South Korean ally asked us to do so.

SOUTH KOREA-U.S. TRADE DISPUTES

Q: What is the status of the overall trade relationship with the ROK? Did you discuss trade disputes with President Kim?

A: Like the rest of our relationship with the Republic of Korea, our trade relationship is intense, cooperative, and mutually beneficial.

It is also very large. South Korea is one of our largest trade partners, and we absorb nearly a fifth of its exports.

And unlike our trading relationships with other major economic powers in Asia, we don't run a large trade deficit with Korea.

Nevertheless, no one should be surprised that in such a large relationship that has grown yearly, there are some trade disputes.

We have some market access concerns in areas such as autos, financial services and

telecommunications.

President Kim and I discussed these issues. I am confident that under his leadership -- particularly with his vision of the "globalization" of Korea -- we will be able to resolve these difficulties, as we have resolved trade disagreements in the past.

KOREA: SAMPOONG DEPARTMENT STORE COLLAPSE

Q: First a bridge, then a subway, and most recently a department store. Do you have a comment on South Korean construction standards? Have South Korean firms constructed U.S. facilities? Have these facilities been inspected? What does this record imply about South Korea's role in building the LWRs in North Korea?

A: Let me first express my sincere condolences to the families of the deceased, the injured, and the missing.

I have full confidence in the safety of South Korean reactors.

Korean contractors have built a number of facilities used by US forces in Korea.

A
s with any US facility, these are subject to regular inspections and maintenance.

I am confident that KEDO, an international consortium led by Korea, the U.S., and Japan, will devote the utmost attention to safety in assigning contracts.

KOREA: LOCAL ELECTIONS

Q: Do you have any comment on the recent local elections in Korea? Does President Kim's party's poor showing affect his ability to follow through with South Korea playing a central role in KEDO or engaging in inter-Korean dialogue?

A: In our meeting, I congratulated President Kim for having presided over the first local elections in South Korea since 1961. These elections were further proof that democracy is firmly in place in the Republic of Korea.

I have no reason to believe that these elections will alter President Kim's government's determination or ability to play a central role in KEDO or to engage the North in meaningful dialogue.

KOREA: NON-IMMIGRANT VISAS

Q: Do you have any comment on Korean complaints of bottlenecks in the U.S. embassy in Seoul's processing of non-immigrant visas?

A: I know that this is a concern to many Korean travelers. The phenomenal growth in demand for visas has caused a real problem for our embassy in Seoul. The State Department is allocating additional resources to address this problem.

IOB GUATEMALA REVIEW

The Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) delivered on Friday a report updating the President on its Guatemala Review. The update responds to the President's interest in keeping informed on the review.

The update report notes that the IOB has received and reviewed CIA's initial Inspector General Report on

Guatemala.

ù The report from CIA's IG covers, among other things, CIA performance and activities in connection with the cases of Michael DeVine and Efraim Bamaca Valasquez.

ù CIA's IG review of other Guatemala-related cases continues and will be completed in the coming months, as will be the IG reviews being conducted by the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice.

ù The IOB's full report will draw on these studies as well as its own independent investigation.

Q. What did the CIA/IG report conclude?

A. The CIA/IG found

No evidence implicating CIA officers in the interrogation or deaths of DeVine or Bamaca.

There have been widely reported allegations that Guatemalan Colonel Alpirez was present at DeVine's death and that he killed Bamaca. A thorough examination of all available evidence raises serious doubts about the factual basis of the reports which led to those allegations.

CIA performance was not as professional or sound in its judgments as the CIA and the U.S. Government have a right to expect.

While the CIA in February 1995 properly and expeditiously notified Congress on matters clearly of Congressional interest, it failed to do so in earlier instances. The CIA could be criticized for unintentionally misleading Congress.

Q. Did CIA hide or destroy relevant documents?

A. The CIA/IG found no evidence for either charge.

Q. Does the IOB agree with the CIA/IG report?

A. The key findings of fact presented in the CIA/IG report are substantially consist ent with what the IOB so far has independently found, but the IOB effort is not yet complete and t he IOB has not yet formulated its conclusions.

Most importantly IOB is presently aware of no information indicating CIA officials participated in or had prior knowledge of the abduction and murder of Michael DeVine or the repor ted torture and execution of Efrain Bamaca Valasquez.

Q. Was Col Alpirez a U.S. asset at the time of the DeVine murder?

A. As a matter of policy, we would not comment on such a matter. (If pressed: Comm enting on such issues adversely affects the nation's intelligence capacity and puts assets at risk.)

Q. When will the IOB be finished?

A. We would expect the IOB effort to be completed by the fall.

Q. Was Congressman Torricelli wrong in his accusations?

A. On the central issue of CIA wrongdoing, the IG report found no evidence implicati ng CIA officers in the deaths of DeVine or Bamaca. While the IOB has not completed its inv estigation and cannot draw a final conclusion, it has found to date nothing inconsistent with the C IA report in this regard. Likewise, the IOB has found no evidence of destruction of documents in asso ciation with this investigation.

Q. Would you comment on the House Ethics Committee exoneration of

Congressman Torricelli?

A. These findings of the House Ethics Committee are a matter for the House of Representatives to comment on.

Q. Was it right for CIA to hire assets who had been accused of Human Rights violations?

A. DCI John Deutch has begun a review to make sure all CIA operations are consistent with this Administration's standards and policies on human rights, and the IOB is also expected to address this subject. We will not further comment at this point.

Q. What disciplinary action has been or will be taken against CIA officials?

A. DCI Deutch will be considering what disciplinary measures to take. It would be inappropriate to comment further on disciplinary action at this time.

CHINA

Q: What is your response to the reports of Harry Wu's "confession?"

A: We have gotten some information about this, but it is not very complete, and we have no comment at this point. The picture and audio quality of the video shown in Hong Kong are very poor.

Q: Was the confession coerced?

A: We cannot determine that on the basis of what we have seen. We will continue to seek more frequent consular access to Wu so that we can be reassured that he remains in good health.

Q: Is Wu cooperating with the Chinese Government to gain an early release?

A: It is not useful to speculate about this at any length. Our information is still incomplete.

Q: Why did the Chinese release the confession, and why now?

A: Those are questions to raise with the Chinese Government.

Q: What are you doing to secure Wu's release?

A: We remain very concerned about the Harry Wu case and continue to work to persuade the Chinese government to release him immediately.

We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese

government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself. Our charge, raised the case again this week with a senior Foreign Ministry official.

We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case is of great importance for U.S.-China relations.

We continue to request more frequent consular access.

Q: Is the Chinese missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait a threat to Taiwan?

A: The Chinese government has announced that the missile exercises have been completed. Taiwan's security was not in jeopardy at any point.

We are concerned that tensions are rising in the Taiwan Straits. We understand other military exercises will continue at various locations in the vicinity of the Taiwan Straits. We hope that both sides will seek to avoid taking steps that could exacerbate the situation.

The United States has for many years supported the process of peaceful dialogue and

negotiation of differences between China and Taiwan. Both sides, in our view, have an interest in maintaining the atmosphere of peace and cooperation that has enabled both sides to develop their economies.

We believe that China and Taiwan over the past few years have developed good cooperative processes for discussing problems and resolving differences. We hope they will continue to develop.

Q: How many missiles have actually been fired?

A: Six missiles were fired.

Q: Does this represent a new threat to Taiwan's overall defense?

A: China has had for many years missiles capable of reaching Taiwan. The mobile missiles involved in the test are a relatively recent addition to China's inventory.

Q: How has Taiwan reacted to the missile firings?

A: We understand the Taiwan legislature has condemned the tests, and various public figures have also criticized China's actions. Taiwan heightened its military alert status somewhat, and tried to ensure that commercial airlines and fishing vessels avoided the declared target zone.

Q: Was this exercise related to the Lee Teng-hui visit to the U.S.?

A: That is a question for the Chinese government.

Q: Will the United States protest to China about the exercise?

A: There are no plans to do so. The PRC has undertaken training exercises in this region in the past. It has notified the international shipping and air transport communities of the closure areas in an appropriate fashion.

Q: Will the United States support Taiwan if China attacks?

A: That is a completely speculative question unwarranted by the circumstances.

Q: What impact is all this having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

A: Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range of our bilateral interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engaged on issues of mutual interest.

The Secretary of State will be meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on August 1, when both will be attending an ASEAN meeting in Brunei.

Q: What is your view of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement that the meeting between Qian and Christopher is critical to the future of the relationship?

A: We acknowledge that this is an important meeting to discuss serious issues. We would caution

against over-dramatization, however. The communication process between two major powers requires frequent contacts at many levels.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that apologize for inviting Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. and promise not to let it happen again?

A: The President stands by his decision and has no intention of apologizing.

The decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and fully consistent with American values and opinion.

We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it constitute a change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will Lee be allowed to visit again?

A: We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case basis, based on our judgment of what is in the U.S. interest. The Secretary of State noted a few days ago that we expect visits to be completely private and rare. There is no request pending at the moment.

SALE OF PAKISTAN'S F-16 AIRCRAFT

Q: Is the Administration seeking to sell the Pakistani F-16s now embargoed by the Pressler Amendment to Indonesia?

A: The President decided that we would seek to sell the F-16s to a third country and return the proceeds to Pakistan. We are also seeking legislative authority to resume economic and non-lethal military assistance to Pakistan and to return to Pakistan other military equipment now being held in the U.S. in accordance with the Pressler Amendment.

By resolving the question of the aircraft and military equipment purchased by Pakistan, we seek a more positive basis for our dialogue on nonproliferation and other issues with the Pakistanis.

(If asked whether there are nonproliferation conditions attached to this sale)

-- Stemming nuclear and missile proliferation remains a key U.S. objective for South Asia. The President believes that we need to resolve the Pressler Amendment issue to make possible a more productive dialogue on nonproliferation.

-- We did not receive nonproliferation assurances from Pakistan as part of the initiative we are proposing to resolve the F-16 problem. However, we have told the Pakistanis that this initiative is predicated on there being no significant change in the status quo with respect to the nonproliferation issues of concern to the United States.

(if asked whether the planes will be sold to Indonesia)

-- Neither we nor the Pakistanis have decided on a buyer for these aircraft. Indonesia is one possible purchaser, but the Indonesian government has not indicated it wants to buy them.

(If asked whether the Pakistanis will get back all of their money)

-- We expect that there will be a shortfall between what Pakistan paid for these aircraft and what will be realized in a sale to a third party. This is an issue that will have to be addressed in future consultations with the Government of Pakistan and the Congress.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Q: Do you have any comment on the report that the UK's Northern Ireland Secretary, Sir Patrick Mayhew, and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams held a secret meeting last week in Northern Ireland?

A: We welcome the news of a meeting between the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Sinn Féin representatives, as an important step in advancing the peace process. The President has encouraged dialogue as the best way to move the peace process forward. Obviously dialogue at such senior levels of the British government and Sinn Féin is a positive development.

If asked

-- Sinn Féin representatives had meetings with the UK at the ministerial level in May, conducted by the NIO's junior minister, Mr. Ancram. While Sir Patrick Mayhew and Mr. Adams met here in Washington during the investment conference in May, as far as we know the meeting last Tuesday would have been their first in Northern Ireland.

Q: What is your view of the idea of a "decommissioning commission" that was reportedly discussed by NIO Secretary Sir Patrick Mayhew and Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring in their meeting on Monday?

-- We support the Irish and British governments' efforts to find a way to move the peace process forward. One of the ideas that has been under discussion is the formation of an international commission to help resolve the issue of decommissioning of weapons. If the two governments decide to form such a commission, we would welcome their decision. The membership and mandate of a decommissioning commission are matters for the two governments to decide.

If asked

-- We have not been approached to serve on such a commission.

U.S. - CUBA MIGRATION TALKS

Background: U.S. -Cuba migration review talks were held in Havana July 17-18. These were part of a series of regular talks to discuss exclusively migration issues between the two countries. The U.S. delegation was led by Anne Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and the Cuban delegation was led by Ricardo Alarcon, president of Cuba's National Assembly. No agreement was reached, and differences remain on a number of issues.

Key Points

- The talks held in Havana were part of regular discussions on migration issues between the U.S. and Cuba.
- Both sides agreed that the September 9 and May 2 accords were working: They are directing migration into legal channels, while discouraging unsafe migration.
- The U.S. raised several suggestions to assure that the two sides do everything to facilitate safe, orderly and legal migration.
- No new agreements were reached.

Qs & As

Q: Which issues remain unresolved?

A: A broad range of migration issues was discussed. Many of them were operational. These talks were not aimed simply at reaching discrete agreements but are part of an ongoing process to promote

safe, orderly and legal migration.

[If pressed]

The fees charged by the Cuban government to migrants who have already been issued travel documents was one of the issues discussed.

Q: Did the Cubans raise other issues such as lifting the sanctions imposed by President Clinton last August?

A: Yes, the Cuban government raised those issues but they were outside the scope of these talks. These discussions dealt solely with questions involving safe, orderly and legal migration.

CUBA AND NEWS BUREAUS

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times story of July 17? Are we on the verge of a deal with the Cuban Government on news bureaus?

A: The Administration continually reviews all aspects of our policy toward Cuba, exploring ways to make the embargo more effective and to provide support to the Cuban people. In that context, the Administration is still reviewing the possibility of licensing U.S. news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba and of permitting Cuban official news organs to operate in the United States.

Licensing decisions are exclusively the decision of the U.S. Government and no negotiations with Cuba about this issue have occurred nor are any planned.

Q: Is Senator Helms' insistence on letting Radio Marti/TV Marti into Cuba the sticking point?

A: Radio and TV Marti are not commercial news stations. They comprise the Office of Cuba Broadcasting in the Bureau of Broadcasting of USIA which is represented at our Interests Section in Havana. Under consideration is the licensing of commercial news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba.

Although Radio and TV Marti would certainly benefit from a greater flow of accurate, uncensored news from Cuba, they are not directly related to the issue of reciprocal news bureaus.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1868)

Background: The House completed action on HR1868, the FY 96 foreign operations appropriations bill July 11, passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your advisors have not yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropriating considerably less than we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would reinforce the Mexico City family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia and Mexico. It also contains other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations appropriations bill, HR 1868, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, giving the Administration flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is particularly important because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are to meet our intent

ernational
commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems.

T

hese include

the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning
process and

other

amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign
policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many
prog
rams. These

reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy.

We will work with the

committees to obtain additional funding for these programs , (e.g. funding for the
W

orld Bank and for

Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a
decision

about what to

do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign
affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State
Department Aut

horization

bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the
Pres

ident's ability to

conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs
agencies;

and deep funding

cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill
and

the Foreign

Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he
veto

the State

Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar

recommendat
ion for the Foreign
Assistance Act.)

HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and
announc
ed where reruns would be
taking place. The results point to a significant Lavalas victory, but it is importan
t to note that, overall,
non-Lavalas parties gathered roughly 60-65% of the vote and that a second round
will
be required in about 70%
of the parliamentary or senate races. The Lavalas share of 35-40% of the vote
shou
ld be viewed in light of
President Aristide's 70% share when he was elected in 1991. Reruns will take
place
in about 20% of localities.
This is more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns
ar
e now scheduled for August 6
and the second round for August 27 , though both dates remain subject to change.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral
Cou
ncil's announcement. A number
of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the
ele
ctions. Amb. Swing is
attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral
council acted in ways that
justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the
el
ections was not
significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud. Bob Past
or, a member of the
Carter Center, offered a different and far more critical assessment of the elections
. While he acknowledges that
the security situation was adequate, and that there was no centralized effort to sub
vert the process, he calls these
the "most disastrous" of 13 elections he observed.

Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time, were able to vote peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of their choice. In light of Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine months ago it was ruled by a repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, will require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or of an attempt to subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy, especially in one of the poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral process and might not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a mistake. The parties, the electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards strengthening Haiti's democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and preparing for upcoming elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Pastor's Assessment of the Elections

-- We do not share Bob Pastor's overall negative assessment. Our assessment is closer to that of most international observers -- the European Union, the United Nations, and the OAS, which had the

benefit of the largest observation mission of all.

-- However, as we have always said, these were far from perfect elections. Indeed, many of the irregularities noted in Bob Pastors' report were mentioned by the Presidential Delegation that observed the elections and by Administration officials.

-- At the same time, we should not make unfair comparisons or have unrealistic expectations. Haiti is the poorest, and least educated country in the hemisphere. There is little infrastructure, telecommunications capability, or practicable roads. Only nine months ago, Haitians were ruled by a repressive military regime. They had never experienced an election free of violence and wide-scale intimidation.

-- Taken all that into account, these elections were a remarkable achievement.

-- These were the first elections in Haiti's history free of violence. For the first time ever,

Haitians were able to exercise their democratic right to vote without intimidation. This was noted by every observer mission and is the most basic requirement for a true democracy.

-- Observer missions, including Bob Pastor's, agreed that there was no systematic fraud or a centralized attempt to subvert the electoral process. Indeed, Pastor's report emphasizes that even the party closest to President Aristide, the OPL, suffered from the irregularities. As one observer put it, the process was "free, fair, and fouled up."

-- There were 11,000 candidates from over 20 parties. They were free to express themselves and to campaign.

-- These elections represent an important step forward. The most important task

now
 is to build
 on what has been achieved, correct the errors that were made, and resolve the
 differences between the
 political parties and the electoral council so that the electoral process can continue with the support of all
 Haitians. We know that President Aristide is committed to strengthening Haiti's
 democracy and is trying
 hard to move the process forward. That is also what the Administration and
 Ambassador
 or Swing have
 been working for from day one.

Qs & As.

Q: Will you oppose reruns and runoffs until differences between Aristide and the
 parties are
 resolved, as urged by Bob Pastor?

A: It is not up to us to agree to or to oppose reruns and runoffs. It is up to the
 Haitians. Our
 embassy has and will continue to do what it can to help the parties overcome their
 differences and
 strengthen Haiti's young democracy.

Q: What are the Administration's views of Pastor's specific recommendations?

A: Bob Pastor has many interesting ideas on how to get the process back on
 track, so
 some of which
 we have been suggesting -- such as a national dialogue, improved training and
 support for local electoral
 officials and poll-watchers, and improved procedures for ballot counting. Once
 again,
 in, we have been
 encouraging Haitians to take these steps and are ready to assist in any way
 possible
 . At the same time, it
 is important that these elections reflect the will of the Haitian people, and not the
 outcome of backroom
 dealings.

Q: Will the Administration be sending a mediator?

A: There is no such plan. But as I said, we are available to assist in the ways Haiti

tians believe most appropriate.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicly and privately, that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitution, limiting the President to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on track, which calls for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President in February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in U.S. policy.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protracted.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Understand that Yeltsin has left the hospital and has entered rehabilitation center for period of convalescence.

-- With proper care and medical attention, Yeltsin should be able to return to normal schedule.

Announcement of Duma Election Date

-- Yeltsin has issued decree that Russian Duma elections will be held December 17. Welcome this as positive, normal step for democratizing Russia.

Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices. Addressing political as well as military issues. Understand remaining point of difference at this time is the future status of Chechnya (i.e. Chechnya's relationship to the Russian Federation)

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence," achieve negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively with Russia toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Robert Malley to Richard Nuccio. Subject: RE: Cuba. [See vz5058_003] (6 pages)	07/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/27/1995-07/28/1995]

2006-1363-F

vz5603

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Robert Malley to Kathleen Cooper and Mort Halperin. Subject: Cuba. [Duplicate vz5057_003] (9 pages)	07/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/27/1995-07/28/1995]

2006-1363-F

vz5603

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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004. email	Richard Nuccio to Robert Malley. Subject: [Cuba]. (9 pages)	07/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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