

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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001. email	Robert Malley to Kathleen Cooper. Subject: Cuba. (6 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

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[07/24/1995-07/25/1995]

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RESTRICTION CODES

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 July 95 11:06

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT July 24 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY Fetig, James L.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY

PLEASE PASS TO TONY AND/OR SANDY FOR URGENT CLEARANCE.
Mike McCurry is
briefing at 2:00 p.m. Thanks.

[[JUL24GUI.DOC : 2839 in JUL24GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 24 July 95 11:3

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** JUL24GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 24, 1995

Bosnia: London Meeting

Bosnia

Bosnia: Talking Points on Dole Amendment

U.S.-Cuba Migration Talks

Cuba and News Bureaus

China

Japanese Elections

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

Haiti

Russia

LONDON MEETING ON BOSNIA

ù We went to London convinced that the status quo in Bosnia was untenable and that only strong and decisive action would be sufficient to halt Serb aggression, restore UNPROFOR's effectiveness, and reestablish conditions that could lead to a political settlement.

ù We were particularly determined that clear decisions be taken to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from attacking the last remaining safe area in eastern Bosnia, Gorazde, and that measures be adopted for relieving the Serbs' siege of Sarajevo.

ù The London meeting achieved these objectives. The key now is to move quickly to translate these decisions into reality. Let me review the decisions and their significance:

ù First, there was agreement that any Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde would be met with a "substantial and decisive response." This means a strong and decisive response by NATO air power, going beyond the limited strikes conducted previously, if the Serbs defy our warning.

- The U.S., UK and France agreed on a concept of operations that provides for broad-gauged strikes against military forces attacking Gorazde or concentrating for an attack, against supporting forces and command-and-control and, if necessary,

against

military targets elsewhere in Bosnia.

- It would also modify the "dual key" in a significant way, taking UN political authorities out of the chain of command and placing authority to initiate the air campaign in the hands of the NATO air commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, and the UNPROFOR force commander on the

ground, General Rupert Smith. This is consistent with normal military practice.

- Moreover, once the air campaign is initiated, the NATO commander would have sole authority to continue the air strikes until the Serbs halt their attacks on Gorazde.

ù The NAC will meet today to task work by NATO's military authorities. The plan will then be discussed by the NATO Military Committee, with a view to a decision by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on Monday to put the new approach into effect.

- I should point out that existing authority for air strikes and close air support is still in effect should the Serbs move on Gorazde (or other safe areas) before the NAC has acted.

ù We have agreed with the British and French that the new approach could be applied to the other safe areas if necessary. This would require only a decision by the NAC to do so.

ù The second important decision in London was to take decisive action to ensure access to Sarajevo for delivery of humanitarian aid and resupply of UN forces, through early use of the Rapid Reaction Force. The British announced their decision to send a battalion to Sarajevo to further strengthen the effectiveness of UN capabilities there.

ù The London meeting also reaffirmed the international community's

commitment to achieving a political settlement, stressing the urgency of renewed negotiations among the Bosnian parties based on the Contact Group plan.

- The participants voiced their support for the efforts of EU mediator Carl Bildt to secure recognition of Bosnia by Serbia-Montenegro and a sealing of Serbia's border with Bosnia.

- Bildt briefed Contact Group Ministers on the package he has worked out with Milosevic, but that package was not approved; in fact, we see a number of issues that still need to be satisfactorily resolved, and we also need to consult with the Bosnian Government on whether the terms for mutual recognition are acceptable.

ù The participants in the meeting also agreed to increase support for efforts to address Bosnia's humanitarian crisis, which was exacerbated by the Serb attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa and the new wave of brutal ethnic cleansing. The participants demanded the international community be given immediate access to all detainees still being held by the Bosnian Serbs.

ù Underlying all these decisions is a reaffirmation that a strengthened and more effective UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia.

- We continue to believe that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to a larger human

tragedy in Bosnia and an increased danger of wider conflict in the Balkans.

- Our allies made clear in London that action by the U.S. to lift the arms embargo unilaterally will force the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. It would also undermine the London meeting's renewed display of resolve for UNPROFOR to deal firmly with the Bosnian

Serbs' outrageous behavior.

- We should not be taking actions that drive UNPROFOR out at the very moment it has

committed to take action to protect the Bosnian people in Gorazde and other safe areas.

BOSNIA

Key Points:

-- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:

-- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state;

-- to prevent the spread of the conflict;

-- to help limit the loss of life;

-- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

-- That is why the United States

-- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;

-- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history:

-- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;

-- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;

-- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.

-- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which he helped

reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.

-- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo

-- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.

-- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.

-- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

London Conference Results and Next Steps at NATO

- We went to London convinced that the status quo in Bosnia was untenable and that only strong and decisive action would be sufficient to halt Serb aggression, restore UNPROFOR's effectiveness, and reestablish conditions that could lead to a political settlement.

- We were particularly determined that clear decisions be taken to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from attacking the last remaining safe area in eastern Bosnia, Gorazde, and that measures be adopted for relieving the Serbs'

siege of Sarajevo.

- The London meeting achieved these objectives. The key now is to move quickly to translate these decisions into reality. Let me review the decisions and their significance:

- First, there was agreement that any Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde would be met with a "substantial and decisive response." This means a strong and decisive response by NATO air power, going beyond the limited strikes conducted previously, if the Serbs defy our warning.

- The U.S., UK and France agreed on a concept of operations that provides for broad-gauged strikes against military forces attacking Gorazde or concentrating for an attack, against supporting forces and command-and-control and, if necessary, against military targets elsewhere in Bosnia. Such attacks would include suppression of enemy air defense capabilities at the outset.

- UN political authorities will be out of the chain of command for the air campaign. Authority to initiate the air campaign will be in the hands of the NATO air commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, and the UNPROFOR force commander on the ground, General Rupert Smith. This is consistent with normal military practice.

- Moreover, once the air campaign is initiated, the NATO commander would have sole authority to continue the air strikes until the Serbs halt their attacks on Gorazde.

- Conference participants recognized the risk that the Bosnian Serbs would seek to respond as they have in the past by taking hostages, but agreed that our policy would not be held hostage to hostage-taking.

- The North Atlantic Council (NAC) met on Saturday and tasked NATO's military authorities urgently to determine how to make more effective and timely use of air power to deter Serbian aggression. The plan is being discussed by the NATO Military Committee over the weekend, with a view to a decision by the NAC on Monday to put the new approach into effect.
- I should point out that existing authority for air strikes and close air support is still in effect should the Serbs move on Gorazde (or other safe areas) before the new approach involving wider use of air power is fully operational.
- We have agreed with the British and French that the new approach could be applied to the other safe areas if necessary. This would require only a decision by the NAC to do so.
- The second important decision in London was to take decisive action to ensure access to Sarajevo for delivery of humanitarian aid and resupply of UN forces, through early use of the Rapid Reaction Force. The British announced their decision to send a battalion to Sarajevo to further strengthen the effectiveness of UN capabilities there.
- The London meeting also reaffirmed the international community's commitment to achieving a political settlement, stressing the urgency of renewed negotiations among the Bosnian parties based on the Contact Group plan.
- The participants voiced their support for the efforts of EU mediator Carl Bildt to secure recognition of Bosnia by Serbia-Montenegro and a sealing of Serbia's border with Bosnia.
- Bildt briefed Contact Group Ministers on the package he has worked out with Milos

evic, but
 that package was not approved: in fact, we see a number of issues that still need to
 be satisfactorily
 resolved, and we also need to consult with the Bosnian Government on whether
 the terms
 for mutual
 recognition are acceptable.

- The participants in the meeting also agreed to increase support for efforts to address Bosnia's humanitarian crisis, which was exacerbated by the Serb attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa and the new wave of brutal ethnic cleansing. The participants demanded the international community be given immediate access to all

detainees still being held by the Bosnian Serbs.

- Underlying all these decisions is a reaffirmation that a strengthened and more effective UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia.

- We continue to believe that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to a larger human tragedy in Bosnia and an increased danger of wider conflict in the Balkans.

- Our allies made clear in London that action by the U.S. to lift the arms embargo unilaterally will force the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. It would also undermine the London meeting's renewed display of resolve for UNPROFOR to deal firmly with the Bosnian Serbs' outrageous behavior.

- We should not be taking actions that drive UNPROFOR out at the very moment it has

committed to take action to protect the Bosnian people in Gorazde and other safe areas.

Srebrenica and Zepa

-- What has happened in Srebrenica and Zepa is tragic and inhumane. No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- The actions by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and Zepa are a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.

-- The Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas were established primarily as a haven for refugees expelled from other parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The attack against these undefended enclaves and the peacekeepers stationed there, and the reports of brutal ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of this travesty, provide further dramatic proof of the intent of Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group to ensure that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to all the civilian refugees in the enclave, and to cease their illegal and inhumane detention of groups of refugees on the basis of unsubstantiated or trumped-up "war criminal" charges.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.

-- Events of the past weeks emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported

ted been in country,
it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.

-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their influence to stop this aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers. Serbi
a must make clear in word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts.
In particular, it should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission. (See separate points on London meeting proposals)

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and draw the United States in.

Q & A: Hot Issues

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica or

Zepa
?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

Q: Why did we not support the French desire to deploy the RRF to help defend Gorazde?

-- Our military experts did not believe that deploying 1000 members of a rapid reaction force to conduct a static defense of Gorazde was the most efficient use of the abilities of the RRF. Moreover, their view was that the threat of massive use of air power would have a greater deterrent impact.

-- We fully support French and British efforts to use the RRF to ensure access to and from Sarajevo.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift. So long as the Dole resolution would require unilateral lift, the President has said he will veto it. Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces. The 12 week delay Dole is proposing flies in the face of all U.S. and Allied military advice, which sees withdrawal taking up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months

before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war
-- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

Q: Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey continues to call for lifting the arms embargo

. If that's what the Bosnian's say they want, why not support them?

-- We support the concept of a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, should the UNPROFOR mission be terminated.

-- We do not support unilateral lift, which would have the effect of causing UNPROFOR to withdraw prematurely.

-- We remain concerned that, in the time between lifting the embargo and the integration of new weapons into the Bosnian armed forces, the Bosnian Serbs would take military action that the Bosnians would be hard pressed to resist on their own.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR

withdraws.
Isn't that the
Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of
UNPROFOR
and
cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame
for th
e
deteriorating situation would be placed on us.

President's Comments on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President has said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR
may le
ave. Do you expect
UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with
Serb acti
ons to
interfere with its mission.

-- This view was fully supported by the London conference.

Q: In reiterating his support for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the Pr
esident signaling his expectation
that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia
but we
do not

expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to
achi
eve that goal.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$27 million of goods and services -- under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged approach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and tightening his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospects for an overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of all-out war that would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the conflict, and effectively end the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on the ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequate plan and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NATO to deter a repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we abandon our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other parties to the conflict in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR efforts that have proven ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander

with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel. It will be used to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move it into theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- We are committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence

data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does not seem to be any Congressional support?

-- We are working with the United Nations and other member states to use a voluntary fund to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services to support our allies.)

-- Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services is being provided.

-- The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide

force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser target designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to aircraft and helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence support.

-- We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. This support would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings

Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ceilings previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will represent no more than \$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3 million.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for the provision of up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a authorities and primarily for transportation services and equipment.

NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusion zones been rendered null and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the UN commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and political situation.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demonstrated that it is totally ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid, protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alternative.

natives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Results to Date:

Q: Isn't our policy of support for UNPROFOR bankrupt?

-- No. While the tragedy of recent events is enormous, you should not overlook what has been accomplished to date:

-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bosnia's

Muslims and Croats, which has brought peace to the vast majority of territory under Bosnian government control;

-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)

-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne

relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;

-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);

-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war out of the

air over Bosnia for two and a half years; and

-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the

conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.
U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the conflict or to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or if units need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties, to use U.S. troops as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying out in good faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of military plans, we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire arms and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

Points on the Dole Amendment

-- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would hinder our efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.

-- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. military support to the Bosnian government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and Serbia.

-- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the international community's other efforts have yielded significant benefits.

-- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing the killing and suffering in Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.

- UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million people.

Its

presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of Central Bosnia.

- UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and is fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.

-- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

-- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partner to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them limited support and time to prove themselves.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue to oppose unilateral lift.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government

would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively with its new arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

-- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo within 12 weeks of the date the

Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually ensures Allied entanglement in the war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the mission could take up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war
-- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like Serbia, would likely provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes, such as those against Iraq and Libya, that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to distinguish between Bosnia and other situations.

-- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with

respect to decisions that could involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and other Americans to imminent risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential responsibilities.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and risks of an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and protecting the Bosnians that will follow?

-- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

U.S. - CUBA MIGRATION TALKS

Background: U.S. -Cuba migration review talks were held in Havana July 17-18. These were part of a series of regular talks to discuss exclusively migration issues between the two countries. The U.S. delegation was led by Anne Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and the Cuban delegation was led by Ricardo Alarcon, president of Cuba's National Assembly. No agreement was reached, and differences remain on a number of issues.

Key Points

-- The talks held in Havana were part of regular discussions on migration issues between the U.S. and Cuba.

-- Both sides agreed that the September 9 and May 2 accords were working: They are directing migration into legal channels, while discouraging unsafe migration.

-- The U.S. raised several suggestions to assure that the two sides do everything to facilitate safe, orderly and legal migration.

-- No new agreements were reached.

Qs & As

Q: Which issues remain unresolved?

A: A broad range of migration issues was discussed. Many of them were operational. These talks were not aimed simply at reaching discrete agreements but are part of an ongoing process to promote safe, orderly and legal migration.

[If pressed]

The fees charged by the Cuban government to migrants who have already been issued travel documents was one of the issues discussed.

Q: Did the Cubans raise other issues such as lifting the sanctions imposed by President Clinton last August?

A: Yes, the Cuban government raised those issues but they were outside the scope of these talks. These discussions dealt solely with questions involving safe, orderly and legal migration.

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times story of July 17? Are we on the verge of a deal with the Cuban Government on news bureaus?

A: The Administration continually reviews all aspects of our policy toward Cuba, exploring ways to make the embargo more effective and to provide support to the Cuban people. In that context, the Administration is still reviewing the possibility of licensing U.S. news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba and of permitting Cuban official news organs to operate in the United States.

Licensing decisions are exclusively the decision of the U.S. Government and no "negotiations" with Cuba about this issue have occurred nor are any planned.

Q: Is Senator Helms' insistence on letting Radio Marti/TV Marti into Cuba the sticking point?

A: Radio and TV Marti are not commercial news stations. They comprise the Office of Cuban Broadcasting in the Bureau of Broadcasting of USIA which is represented at our Interests Section in Havana. Under consideration is the licensing of commercial news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba.

Although Radio and TV Marti would certainly benefit from a greater flow of accurate, uncensored news from Cuba, they are not directly related to the issue of reciprocal news bureaus.

CHINA

Q: What is the status of the Harry Wu case?

A: We remain very concerned about the Harry Wu case and continue to work to persuade the Chinese government to release him.

Q: What are you doing to get Harry Wu out?

A: We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself.

We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case is of great importance for U.S.-China relations.

We continue to request more frequent consular access.

In addition to the visit with Mr. Wu by our consul general on July 10, we have made one additional effort to meet with him, but were turned down by local authorities.

Although the U.S. embassy officer, who was traveling in Wuhan on other business, was not permitted to see Wu, we were able to deliver some written material to him, and we have some materials from his wife that we are trying to get passed to him.

Q: Is the Chinese missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait a threat to Taiwan?

A: We have no information to suggest that this is anything other than an exercise. Taiwan's security is not in jeopardy. That said, we consider the activity unnecessary and provocative.

We are concerned that tensions are in the Taiwan Straits. We hope that both sides will seek to avoid taking steps that could exacerbate the situation.

The United States has for many years supported the process of peaceful dialogue and

negotiation of differences between China and Taiwan. Both sides, in our view, have an interest in maintaining the atmosphere of peace and cooperation that has enabled both sides to develop their economies.

We believe that China and Taiwan over the past few years have developed good, cooperative processes for discussing problems and resolving differences. We hope they will continue to develop.

Q: How many missiles have actually been fired?

A: I don't wish to disclose information provided by our intelligence community. Press sources in Asia have said four, and possibly six.

Q: Does this represent a new threat to Taiwan's overall defense?

A: China has had for many years missiles capable of reaching Taiwan. The mobile missiles involved in the test are a relatively recent addition to China's inventory.

Q: Is this exercise related to the Lee Teng-hui visit to the U.S.?

A: That is a question for the Chinese government.

Q: Will the United States protest to China about the exercise?

A: There are no plans to do so. The PRC has undertaken training exercises in this region in the past. It has notified the international shipping and air transport communities of the closure areas in an appropriate fashion.

Q: Will the United States support Taiwan if China attacks?

A: That is a completely speculative question unwarranted by the circumstances.

Q: What impact is all this having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

A: Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range of our bilateral interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engaged on issues of mutual interest.

The Secretary of State will be meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on August 1, when both will be attending an ASEAN meeting in Brunei.

Q: What is your view of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement that the meeting between Qian and Christopher is critical to the future of the relationship?

A: We acknowledge that this is an important meeting to discuss serious issues. We would caution against over-dramatization, however. The communication process between two major powers requires frequent contacts at many levels.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that apologize for inviting Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. and promise not to let it happen again?

The President stands by his decision and has no intention of apologizing.

The decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and

ully
consistent with American values and opinion.

We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it
const
itute a
change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will Lee be allowed to visit again?

We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case
b
asis, based
on our judgment of what is in the U.S. interest. The Secretary of State noted a
few
days ago that we
expect visits to be completely private and rare. There is no request pending at the
moment.

JAPANESE ELECTIONS

Q: Any comment on the outcome of upper house elections in Japan?

A: The upper house elections in Japan are a normal process in a healthy
democracy.
The Japanese
people have given their assessment of the performance of their elected leaders, as
p
eople in democracies
have the right and privilege to do.

We do not believe the voting portends any change in Japan's approach toward
relatio
ns with the
United States, nor do we intend any change in our bilateral relationship with
Japan.

Our alliance and firm relationship with Japan are the products of long-term
nationa
l interests
and has lasted through numerous changes of administration and political shifts in
bo
th countries.

We look forward to continuing our close cooperation with Prime Minister
Murayama an

d his
government.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign operations appropriations bill last evening passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your advisors have not yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropriations, the bill contains provisions that are considerably less than we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would reinforce the Mexico City family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia and Mexico. It also contains other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations appropriations bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, giving the Administration flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is particularly important because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are to meet our international commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems. These include the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning process and other amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many programs. These reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy.

We will work with the committees to obtain additional funding for these programs , (e.g. funding for the World Bank and for Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a decision about what to do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies; and deep funding cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and the Foreign Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto the State Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendation for the Foreign Assistance Act.)

HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announced where reruns would be taking place. The results point to a significant Lavalas victory, but it is important to note that, overall, non-Lavalas parties gathered roughly 60-65% of the vote and that a second round will be required in about 70%

of the parliamentary or senate races. The Lavalas share of 35-40% of the vote should be viewed in light of President Aristide's 70% share when he was elected in 1991. Reruns will take place in about 20% of localities. This is more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns are now scheduled for August 6 and the second round for August 27, though both dates remain subject to change.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral Council's announcement. A number of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the elections. Amb. Swing is attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral council acted in ways that justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the elections was not significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud. Bob Pastor, a member of the Carter Center, offered a different and far more critical assessment of the elections. While he acknowledges that the security situation was adequate, and that there was no centralized effort to subvert the process, he calls these the "most disastrous" of 13 elections he observed.

Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time, were able to vote peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of their choice. In light of Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine months ago it was ruled by a repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, will require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or

of
 an attempt to
 subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy,
 especi
 ally in one of the
 poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral
 proc
 ess and might
 not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a
 mista
 ke. The parties, the
 electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards
 stren
 gthening Haiti's
 democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and
 preparing fo
 r upcoming
 elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Pastor's Assessment of the Elections

-- We do not share Bob Pastor's overall negative assessment. Our assessment is
 clos
 er to that of
 most international observers -- the European Union, the United Nations, and the
 OAS,
 which had the
 benefit of the largest observation mission of all.

-- However, as we have always said, these were far from perfect elections.
 Indeed,
 many of the
 irregularities noted in Bob Pastors' report were mentioned by the Presidential
 Deleg
 ation that observed
 the elections and by Administration officials.

-- At the same time, we should not make unfair comparisons or have unrealistic
 expec
 tations.
 Haiti is the poorest, and least educated country in the hemisphere. There is littl
 e infrastructure,
 telecommunications capability, or practicable roads. Only nine months ago,

Haitians were ruled by a repressive military regime. They had never experienced an election free of violence and wide-scale intimidation.

-- Taken all that into account, these elections were a remarkable achievement.

-- These were the first elections in Haiti's history free of violence. For the first time ever,

Haitians were able to exercise their democratic right to vote without intimidation. This was noted by every observer mission and is the most basic requirement for a true democracy.

-- Observer missions, including Bob Pastor's, agreed that there was no systematic fraud or a centralized attempt to subvert the electoral process. Indeed, Pastor's report emphasizes that even the party closest to President Aristide, the OPL, suffered from the irregularities. As one observer put it, the process was "free, fair, and fouled up."

-- There were 11,000 candidates from over 20 parties. They were free to express themselves and to campaign.

-- These elections represent an important step forward. The most important task now is to build on what has been achieved, correct the errors that were made, and resolve the differences between the political parties and the electoral council so that the electoral process can continue with the support of all Haitians. We know that President Aristide is committed to strengthening Haiti's democracy and is trying hard to move the process forward. That is also what the Administration and Ambassador Swing have been working for from day one.

Qs & As.

Q: Will you oppose reruns and runoffs until differences between Aristide and the parties are resolved, as urged by Bob Pastor?

A: It is not up to us to agree to or to oppose reruns and runoffs. It is up to the Haitians. Our embassy has and will continue to do what it can to help the parties overcome their differences and strengthen Haiti's young democracy.

Q: What are the Administration's views of Pastor's specific recommendations?

A: Bob Pastor has many interesting ideas on how to get the process back on track, some of which we have been suggesting -- such as a national dialogue, improved training and support for local electoral officials and poll-watchers, and improved procedures for ballot counting. Once again, we have been encouraging Haitians to take these steps and are ready to assist in any way possible. At the same time, it is important that these elections reflect the will of the Haitian people, and not the outcome of backroom dealings.

Q: Will the Administration be sending a mediator?

A: There is no such plan. But as I said, we are available to assist in the ways Haitians believe most appropriate.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicly and privately, that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitution, limiting the President to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on track, which calls for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President in

n February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in U.S. policy.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protracted.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change. Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Understand that Yeltsin has left the hospital and has entered rehabilitation center for period of convalescence.

-- With proper care and medical attention, Yeltsin should be able to return to normal schedule.

Announcement of Duma Election Date

-- Yeltsin has issued decree that Russian Duma elections will be held December 17. Welcome this as positive, normal step for democratizing Russia.

Chechnya

- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices. Addressing political as well as military issues. Understand remaining point of difference at this time is the future status of Chechnya (i.e. Chechnya's relationship to the Russian Federation)
- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence," achieve negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

Rejection of U.S. ABM Treaty Proposal

- Since May summit in Moscow, U.S. has been engaged in dialogue with Russia on how best to follow up on Joint Statement of Principles we agreed upon there to guide future negotiations on demarcation between theater missile defenses (which are not restricted by ABM Treaty) and strategic missile defenses (which are).
- Deputy Secretary Talbott recently reviewed Russian paper on this subject that we found disappointing.
- We do not, however, view this as Russia's last word on this subject.
- We will continue to press Russia to adopt negotiating position that reflects demarcation principles we agreed upon in May.

Iran Reactor Sale

- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively with Russia toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 July 95 14:24
FROM Cooper, Kathleen H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Urgent Actions [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Fuerth, Leon S.
Wise, William M.
CARBON_COPY Woolston, Ann E.

TEXT_BODY

We sent last week by e-mail and hard copy an action which is a response to Sen. Feinstein on the consolidation of foreign affairs agencies. This is now way overdue but we don't want to send this forward without concurrence from your office. I am attaching the relevant documents again but would appreciate your comments/concurrence by tomorrow. Mort has raised a new approach (which I think he has spoken to Leon about) and Bill Danvers has added his own response. Thank you for your assistance. Bill Wise has the latest hard copy as delivered by Tim Tyler last week.

[[5267.DOC : 3587 in 5267.DOC]][[5267A.DOC : 3588 in 5267A.DOC]][[5267B.DOC : 3589 in 5267B.DOC]][[5267D.DOC : 3590 in 5267D.DOC]][[5267E.DOC : 3591 in 5267E.DOC]][[5267F.DOC : 3592 in 5267F.DOC]] -- also

we have been waiting for a concurrence on a schedule proposal for the President to receive a briefing on the CIA State Failure Task Force. This is action 5287. Since this was originally done for the VP we again didn't want to move it forward without your okay. I will attach the relevant documents again.

[[5287.DOC : 3593 in 5287.DOC]][[5287A.DOC : 3594 in 5287A.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

24 July 95 13:54

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267.DOC

5267

July 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MORTON H. HALPERIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Feinstein Re:
Credible Alternative to Helms Bill on Foreign Affairs
Agencies

Senator Feinstein has written to the President expressing her concern about the failure of the Administration to present a credible alternative to Senator Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

In her letter, Senator Feinstein indicates that she shares many of the Administration's reservations about the Helms' plan but notes that as things now stand it will pass easily. She urges that we develop an alternative "consolidation" plan which would give the President significant flexibility and expresses the view that negotiations between the Administration and Senator Helms would produce a bill acceptable to the Administration.

As you know, our current posture is to decline to negotiate with Helms on the grounds that he is not really interested in any deal and because we believe that both the agencies and the Democratic Senators would strongly object. My impression is that we are also not trying to work Republican Senators for fear that this would draw us into a negotiation and that we are likely to lose this by a wide margin (gaining few if any Republicans and losing a significant number of Democrats).

The assumption of the inter-agency is that the bill will pass both houses and the President will then veto it. The veto will be sustained and no effort will be made to attach the reorganization to the appropriations bill. NPR is now pressing the agencies for a more robust reorganization scheme that might be announced in August.

If we hold firm to this position you should send the President the letter at Tab A.

Recognizing that others have the primary responsibility for dealing with the Congress, I feel obliged to express my agreement with Senator Feinstein and to suggest that the issue might be one for discussion in the new SRG committee or some other inter-agency forum. Here are my concerns about the current approach:

ù We are strongly in favor of a bi-partisan foreign policy. Yet, we seem content to have a confrontation on the main foreign policy authorization bill without seriously trying to reach agreement either with Helms and Dole or with a group of moderate Republican Senators. This serves only to reinforce the view that we are not serious about wanting a bipartisan foreign policy but rather are seeking to attack the Republicans.

ù The Helms bill as reported is certainly unacceptable to us, but it is not as clearly isolationist as we allege and it could be made acceptable with relatively few changes. As we know, many serious internationalists believe that the time has come for consolidation. The numbers in the bill are too low but it is likely that the President will end up signing appropriations bills with numbers in that range. The restrictions are not qualitatively different from those that other Congresses has imposed. Thus, some agreement to put off a final decision on reorganization by a commission or some other means as suggested by Feinstein, some increase in the numbers, and a clear Presidential waiver of the restrictions, would make the bill acceptable. I believe this is how it is seen by many foreign policy observers in the press and at think tanks. Feinstein's letter indicates that at least some Democratic Senators share this view.

ù Even if the President's veto is sustained, I think there is a fair chance that the consolidation will be put on the appropriations bill or some other bill that the President ends up deciding that he must sign. Thus, we could end up having this consolidation forced on us.

For these reasons, I think that we should consider a more active stance on the bill. I would begin, after talking to the Democrats on SFRC, by talking to some moderate Democrats and Republicans who care about foreign policy, about possible compromises. These conversations should be one on one with Senators. Based on what they say I would try to beat Helms or negotiate with him. If we were to go this route we would send the memo at Tab II to the President recommending that he sign the letter at Tab B.

Bill Danvers [to come]

Leon Fuerth [to come]

Concurrence by: [Enter names of
concurring NSC staff, initialed off]

RECOMMENDATION

That [Enter recommendation text here]

Approve _____ Disapprove _____[Optional]

Attachment

Tab [I or A] [Enter brief description of attachment]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

20 July 95 9:2

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267A.DOC

5267

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Response to Letter for Senator Feinstein
on Foreign Affairs Agency Consolidation

Purpose

To recommend a response to a letter to you from Senator Feinstein on the Helms bill mandating consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies into the State Department.

Background

Senator Feinstein has written to the President expressing her concern about the failure of the Administration to present a credible alternative to Senator Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

In her letter, Senator Feinstein indicates that she shares many of the Administration's reservations about the Helms' plan but notes

that as things now stand it will pass easily. She urges that we develop an alternative "consolidation" plan which would give the President significant flexibility and expresses the view that negotiations between the Administration and Senator Helms would produce a bill acceptable to the Administration.

We do not share Senator Feinstein's view that it would be possible to negotiate a satisfactory text with Senator Helms. Everything we have seen suggests that he is determined to force the consolidation on us. Moreover, the bill has a number of unacceptable restrictions on your prerogatives and does not authorize enough money.

The proposed letter to Senator Feinstein explains why we do not think that an effort to negotiate with Senator Helms will be successful and asks for her support in opposing the bill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Feinstein at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Senator Feinstein

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

20 July 95 9:3

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267B.DOC

5267

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Response to Letter for Senator Feinstein
on Foreign Affairs Agency Consolidation

Purpose

To recommend a response to a letter to you from Senator Feinstein on the Helms bill mandating consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies into the State Department.

Background

Senator Feinstein has written to the President expressing her concern about the failure of the Administration to present a credible alternative to Senator Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

In her letter, Senator Feinstein indicates that she shares many of the Administration's reservations about the Helms' plan but notes that as things now stand it will pass easily. She urges that we develop an alternative "consolidation" plan which would give the President significant flexibility and expresses the view that negotiations between the Administration and Senator Helms would produce a bill acceptable to the Administration.

We have been skeptical of Senator Helms' willingness to compromise on the bill and still have real doubts about whether it will be possible to reach agreement. Nonetheless, in light of her warning, we think it would be sensible to consult with her and with other key moderates to see if we can build support for an acceptable bill which might prevail even if we cannot reach closure with Senator Helms.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Feinstein at Tab B.

Attachment
Tab B Letter to Senator Feinstein

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

20 July 95 9:8

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

5267D.DOC

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter dealing with Senator's Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

I wish I could share your optimism that it would be possible to reach agreement with Senator Helms on this question. Moreover, his bill has unacceptable restrictions on presidential prerogatives and unacceptably low authorization numbers which would force me to veto it even if the consolidation issue were resolved.

Thus, we see no choice but to oppose the bill and hope to have your continuing support.

Sincerely,

[Name/Title in Initial Caps]
[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

20 July 95 9:3

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267E.DOC

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter regarding Senator Helms' plan for consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

Our judgment has been that Senator Helms had no interest in reaching an accommodation and that we had no choice but to fight the bill. In light of your letter, I have asked my staff to meet with you and other key Senators to see if you can develop a proposal that would command broad support in the Senate.

Thank you for writing.

Sincerely,

[Name/Title in Initial Caps]
[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

20 July 95 9:0

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267F.DOC

Dear Diane:

Thank you for your letter on S. 908, the State Department Authorization bill, which contains language that would consolidate and reorganize the foreign affairs agencies-- the State Department, the Agency for International Development (AID), the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

I share your reservations about S. 908. I too believe it infringes on Presidential prerogatives. The most obvious infringement is in the area of how to organize the government to perform its functions. That is and always has been the prerogative of the Executive branch.

I disagree with the assessment of the need for consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies. We are vigorously pursuing our alternative to the one put forward in S. 908, which is to take a more responsible and thorough look at the role of all of these agencies

and to make changes that make sense. Creating a megabureaucracy at the State Department is not the way to reinvent our foreign policy apparatus.

The National Performance Review has in close coordination with these agencies has already realized substantial efficiencies in its reinvention efforts. For example, a consolidation of international broadcasting activities, which we have already implemented will result in over \$400 million in savings. AID has closed 17 overseas posts and 22 missions. The State Department has abolished 30% of its senior positions; AID has eliminated 25% of its senior management positions; and USIA has cut 439 positions. There is also an ongoing effort to identify and streamline or eliminate areas of administrative overlap between the foreign affairs agencies.

This process is continuing to produce impressive results. Today's foreign policy concerns are varied and fast-moving, requiring special skills and abilities. Consolidation moves in the opposite direction by creating a foreign policy monolith which would inhibit the special talents and independent initiative necessary to address U.S. national interests abroad. I am happy to discuss our reinvention efforts, but I remain convinced that consolidation is not now a viable option.

Thank you again for sharing your thoughts with me on this most important issue.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

20 July 95 9:10

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5287.DOC

5287

July 11, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MORTON H. HALPERIN

FROM: MATTHEW LORIN

SUBJECT: POTUS Schedule Proposal re: CIA State
Failure Task Force Briefing

Attached at Tab I is a POTUS Schedule Proposal for a briefing by the CIA State Failure Task Force concerning the findings of a new model for predicting state failure.

The Vice President asked the Task Force to look at cases of substantial domestic crisis, analyze data patterns, and anticipate future crises in order to support policymaking on "preventative diplomacy." POTUS saw a reference to this study in the PDB and requested a briefing.

The briefing will take approxiamtely 15 - 20 minutes with an additional 10 minutes for questions.

John Deutch has also expressed interest in attending.

Concurrence by: Bill Wise

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached schedule proposal.

Attachment
Tab I Schedule Proposal

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

20 July 95 9:8

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

5287A.DOC

5287

cc: Stephanie Streett

Schedule Proposal date ____/____/____

____ACCEPT ____REGRET ____PENDING

TO: Billy Webster

Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Anthony Lake

REQUEST: Briefing

PURPOSE: A briefing for the President by the CIA State Failure Task Force concerning the findings of a new model for predicting state failure.

BACKGROUND: The Vice President asked the Task Force to look at cases of substantial domestic crisis, analyze data patterns, and anticipate future crises in order to support policymaking on "preventative diplomacy." POTUS saw a brief reference to the study in his PDB and requested a briefing.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE AND TIME: OPEN with 24 hours notice for briefers

BRIEFING TIME: 20 Minutes

DURATION: 30 Minutes

LOCATION: OPEN

PARTICIPANTS: Ellen Tidd - CIA
Ted Gurr - University of Maryland
Pam Surko - Science Applications
International Corporation
John Deutch - CIA
Morton Halperin - NSC
Bill Wise - Vice President's Office

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Briefing and Q&A.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: No

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: No

RECOMMENDED BY: Vice President,
Morton Halperin

CONTACT: Matthew Lorin
NSC/Democracy 69247

ORIGIN OF THIS PROPOSAL: Requested
by POTUS. Recommended by NSC following
NSC briefing by Task Force.

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: No

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Robert Malley to Kathleen Cooper. Subject: Cuba. (6 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/24/1995-07/25/1995]

2006-1363-F
vz5602

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 25 July 95 14:14
FROM Cooper, Kathleen H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Urgent Action [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Fetig, James L.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY Lorin, Matthew E.
TEXT_BODY

For Jim Fetig --

Your comments/concurrence on the attached Presidential scheduling request would be greatly appreciated. Please call or e-mail Cooper or Lorin.
Thanks.

[[5559A.DOC : 3672 in 5559A.DOC]][[5559.DOC : 3673 in 5559.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 25 July 95 14:13

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 5559A.DOC

5559

July 24, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MORTON H. HALPERIN

FROM: MATTHEW LORIN

SUBJECT: USIA Invitation to the President for
Remarks at the Fulbright Teachers' Exchange.

Attached at Tab I is a Presidential Scheduling Proposal in response to a letter from Joe Duffey, Director of USIA, requesting that the President address a group of 400 U.S. and foreign Fulbright exchange teachers and their families representing 24 countries.

The event, which is scheduled from August 1-3, would provide a platform for the President to counter Senator Helms' pending foreign policy legislation; to reiterate his commitment to citizen diplomacy and the USIA; to mark the reinvention of the Radios, i.e., move of RFE/RL and the new Broadcast Board of Governors; and, the Administration's emphasis on bipartisan foreign policy and continued international engagement.

While the White House has gone to lengths to indicate its commitment to citizen diplomacy domestically, it has not received significant international attention. This forum provides a unique audience and opportunity for VOA/USIA to broadcast this critical message.

Concurrence: Jim Fetig

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached Memorandum at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Presidential Scheduling Proposal
Tab A Letter of Invitation from USIA

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

25 July 95 14:7

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5559.DOC

5559

cc: Stephanie Streett

Schedule Proposal date ____/____/____

____ACCEPT ____REGRET ____PENDING

TO: Billy Webster
Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Anthony Lake

REQUEST: Joe Duffey, Director of USIA, has requested that the President address a group of 400 U.S. and foreign Fulbright exchange teachers and their families representing 24 countries.

PURPOSE: To provide a forum for the President to counter Senator Helms' pending foreign policy legislation; to reiterate his commitment to citizen diplomacy and the USIA; to mark the reinvention of the Radios, i.e., move of RFE/RL and the new Broadcast Board of Governors; and, the Administration's emphasis on bipartisan foreign policy and continued international engagement.

BACKGROUND: Since 1946, the Fulbright Teachers' Exchange Program has exchanged more than 20,000 teachers. It is one of USIA's premiere citizen diplomacy initiatives created by an act of Congress and the support of Sen. William Fulbright.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE AND TIME: Open: August 1-3,
8:30am - 7:00pm
Recommended: August 1, 7:00pm

BRIEFING TIME: 5 minutes

DURATION: 30 minutes including
transport

LOCATION: American University

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Dr.
Joseph Duffey, John Loiello

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Introduction by
Dr. Joseph Duffey, brief remarks.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Keynote

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open Photo

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: No

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: No

RECOMMENDED BY: Joseph Duffey

CONTACT: Matthew Lorin 6-9247

ORIGIN OF THIS PROPOSAL: Joseph
Duffey

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Open

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 25 July 95 18:43
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT July 25 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Beardsley, Tyler S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[JUL25GUI.DOC : 4634 in JUL25GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 25 July 95 18:38
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** JUL25GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 25, 1995

Bosnia: London Agreement

Bosnia: London Meeting

Bosnia

Bosnia: Talking Points on Dole Amendment

Korea: President Kim Visit

China

Japanese Elections

Sale of Pakistan's F-16 Aircraft

Northern Ireland

U.S.-Cuba Migration Talks

Cuba and News Bureaus

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1868)

Haiti

Russia

LONDON AGREEMENT

The London Agreement calls for an extended air campaign against Bosnian Serb targets if they attack the safe area at Gorazde. This policy, and the ultimatum delivered to the Bosnian Serbs by the U.S., French and British on Sunday, is designed to deter such an attack. The London Conference participants also agreed that this policy could be applied to the other safe areas if required. Extension of the ultimatum to one or more of the remaining safe areas would require only a decision in the North Atlantic Council at NATO.

LONDON MEETING ON BOSNIA

We went to London convinced that the status quo in Bosnia was untenable and that only strong and decisive action would be sufficient to halt Serb aggression, restore UNPROFOR's effectiveness, and reestablish conditions that could lead to a political settlement.

We were particularly determined that clear decisions be taken to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from attacking the last remaining safe area in eastern Bosnia, Gorazde, and that measures be adopted for relieving the Serbs' siege of Sarajevo.

ù The London meeting achieved these objectives. The key now is to move quickly to translate these decisions into reality. Let me review the decisions and their significance:

ù First, there was agreement that any Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde would be met with a "substantial and decisive response." This means a strong and decisive response by NATO air power, going beyond the limited strikes conducted previously, if the Serbs defy our warning.

- The U.S., UK and France agreed on a concept of operations that provides for broad-gauged strikes against military forces attacking Gorazde or concentrating for an attack, against supporting forces and command-and-control and, if necessary, against military targets elsewhere in Bosnia. Such attacks would include suppression of enemy air defense capabilities at the outset.

- UN political authorities would be taken out of the chain of command, with authority to initiate the use of air power in the hands of the NATO air commander and UN ground commander. This is consistent with normal military practice.

- Conference participants recognized the risk that the Bosnian Serbs would seek to respond as they have in the past by taking hostages, but agreed that our policy would not be held hostage to hostage-taking.

ù NATO's Military Committee met Sunday and Monday to prepare the military plan needed to implement the London decision on Gorazde.

ù The North Atlantic Council has been meeting all day today (Tuesday) to finalize that decision. There are numerous details to be worked out in terms of targeting and command and control, and

our Ambassador,
Robert Hunter, has been instructed to meet into the night to ensure that we get it right.

- Existing authority for air strikes and close air support is still in effect should the Serbs move on Gorazde (or other safe areas) before the NAC has acted.

ù We have agreed with the British and French that the new approach could be applied to the other safe areas if necessary. This would require only a decision by the NAC to do so.

ù The second important decision in London was to take decisive action to ensure access to Sarajevo for delivery of humanitarian aid and resupply of UN forces, through early use of the Rapid Reaction Force. The British announced their decision to send a battalion to Sarajevo to further strengthen the effectiveness of UN capabilities there.

ù In light of Bosnian Serb attacks on UN peacekeepers along the Mt. Igman road, our allies have now deployed elements of the Rapid Reaction Force as reinforcements.

ù The London meeting also reaffirmed the international community's commitment to achieving a political settlement, stressing the urgency of renewed negotiations among the Bosnian parties based on the Contact Group plan.

- The participants voiced their support for the efforts of EU mediator Carl Bildt to secure recognition of Bosnia by Serbia-Montenegro and a sealing of Serbia's border with Bosnia.

- Bildt briefed Contact Group Ministers on the package he has worked out with Milosevic, but that package was not approved; in fact, we see a number of issues that still need to be satisfactorily resolved, and we also need to consult with the Bosnian Government on whether

the terms for mutual recognition are acceptable.

- The Contact Group will be meeting again with Bildt in London on Wednesday.

ù The participants in the meeting also agreed to increase support for efforts to address Bosnia's humanitarian

crisis, which was exacerbated by the Serb attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa and the new wave of brutal ethnic cleansing. The participants demanded the international community be given immediate access to all detainees still being held by the Bosnian Serbs.

ù Underlying all these decisions is a reaffirmation that a strengthened and more effective UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia.

- We continue to believe that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to a larger human tragedy in Bosnia and an increased danger of wider conflict in the Balkans.

- Our allies made clear in London that action by the U.S. to lift the arms embargo unilaterally will force the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. It would also undermine the London meeting's renewed display of resolve for UNPROFOR to deal firmly with the Bosnian Serbs' outrageous behavior.

- We should not be taking actions that drive UNPROFOR out at the very moment it has

committed to take action to protect the Bosnian people in Gorazde and other safe areas.

BOSNIA

Key Points:

-- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:

-- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic
Bosnian state;

-- to prevent the spread of the conflict;

-- to help limit the loss of life;

-- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

-- That is why the United States

-- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;

-- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;

-- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;

-- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;

-- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.

-- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.

-- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo

-- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.

-- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.

-- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

London Conference Results and Next Steps at NATO

- We went to London convinced that the status quo in Bosnia was untenable and that only strong and decisive action would be sufficient to halt Serb aggression, restore UNPROFOR's effectiveness, and reestablish conditions that could lead to a political settlement.

- We were particularly determined that clear decisions be taken to prevent the Bosnians from attacking the last remaining safe area in eastern Bosnia, Gorazde, and that measures be adopted for relieving the Serbs' siege of Sarajevo.

- The London meeting achieved these objectives. The key now is to move quickly to translate these decisions into reality. Let me review the decisions and their significance:

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- We should not be taking actions that drive UNPROFOR out at the very moment
it has

committed to take action to protect the Bosnian people in Gorazde and other safe
are
as.

Srebrenica and Zepa

-- What has happened in Srebrenica and Zepa is tragic and inhumane. No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- The actions by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and Zepa are a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.

-- The Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas were established primarily as a haven for refugees expelled from other parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The attack against these undefended enclaves and the peacekeepers stationed there, and the reports of brutal ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of this travesty, provide further dramatic proof of the intent of Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group to ensure that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to all the civilian refugees in the enclave, and to cease their illegal and inhumane detention of groups of refugees on the basis of unsubstantiated or trumped-up "war criminal" charges.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.

-- Events of the past weeks emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.

-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their influence to stop this aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers. Serbia must make clear in word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts. In particular, it should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission. (See separate points on London meeting proposals)

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and draw the United States in.

Q & A: Hot Issues

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.
- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica or Zepa?

- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

Q: Why did we not support the French desire to deploy the RRF to help defend Gorazde?

- Our military experts did not believe that deploying 1000 members of a rapid reaction force to conduct a static defense of Gorazde was the most efficient use of the abilities of the RRF. Moreover, their view was that the threat of massive use of air power would have a greater deterrent impact.

- We fully support French and British efforts to use the RRF to ensure access to and from Sarajevo.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

- We strongly oppose unilateral lift. So long as the Dole resolution would require unilateral lift, the President has said he will veto it. Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make

e major gains in the months
before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the
blame
for UNPROFOR's failure on
the U.S.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- The U.S. would be obligated to send U.S. troops to help UNPROFOR
withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian
situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great
pressure to
intervene to stem the
deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the
war

-- thus making the war a
unilateral U.S. responsibility.

Q: Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey continues to call for lifting the arms
embargo

. If that's what the Bosnian's
say they want, why not support them?

-- We support the concept of a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, should the
UNP
ROFOR mission be
terminated.

-- We do not support unilateral lift, which would have the effect of causing
UNPROFO
R to withdraw
prematurely.

-- We remain concerned that, in the time between lifting the embargo and the
integra
tion of new weapons
into the Bosnian armed forces, the Bosnian Serbs would take military action that
the
Bosnians would be hard
pressed to resist on their own.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws.

Isn't that the
Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of UNPROFOR and cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame for the deteriorating situation would be placed on us.

President's Comments on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President has said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR may leave. Do you expect UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with Serbian actions to interfere with its mission.

-- This view was fully supported by the London conference.

Q: In reiterating his support for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the President signaling his expectation that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia but we do not expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to achieve that goal.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of

transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to

the allies. The Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$27 million of goods and services -- under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged approach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and tightening his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospects for an

overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of all-out war that would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the conflict, and effectively end the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on the ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequate plan and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NATO to deter a repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we abandon our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other parties to the conflict in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR efforts that have proven ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel. It will be used to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move it into theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- We are committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does not seem to be any

Congressional support?

-- We are working with the United Nations and other member states to use a voluntary fund to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services to support our allies.)

-- Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services is being provided.

-- The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser target designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to aircraft and helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence support.

-- We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. This support would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings

Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ceilings previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will represent no more than \$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3 million.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for the provision of up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a authorities and primarily for transportation services and equipment.

NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusion zones been rendered null and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the UN commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and political situation.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demonstrated that it is totally ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid, protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alter natives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Results to Date:

Q: Isn't our policy of support for UNPROFOR bankrupt?

-- No. While the tragedy of recent events is enormous, you should not overlook what has been accomplished to date:

-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bosnia's

Muslims and Croats, which has brought peace to the vast majority of territory under Bosnian government control;

-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)

;

-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne

relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;

-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);

-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war out of the

air over Bosnia for two and a half years; and

-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.
U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the conflict or to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or if units need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties, to use U.S. troops as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying out in good faith.
2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of military plans, we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.
3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire arms and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

Points on the Dole Amendment

-- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would hinder our efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.

-- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. military support to the Bosnian government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and Serbia.

-- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the international community's other efforts have yielded significant benefits.

-- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing the killing and suffering in

Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.

- UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million people.

Its

presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of Central Bosnia.

- UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and is

fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.

- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater

security. The Rapid

Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best

prospect of enabling

it to continue its missions.

- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partner

to strengthen

UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give

them limited support and

time to prove themselves.

- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue

to oppose unilateral lift.

- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR for

ces are still in place would

make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government

would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively

with its new

arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo

within 1
2 weeks of the date the
Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually
ensures A
llied entanglement in the
war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the
mission cou
ld take up to 22
weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S.
would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to mak
e major gains in the months
before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame
for UNPROFOR's failure on
the U.S.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to
intervene to stem the
deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war

-- thus making the war a
unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like Serbia, would likely provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes, such
as those against Iraq and
Libya. that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to distinguish between Bosnia and other situations.

-- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with respect to decisions that could involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and other Americans to imminent risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential responsibilities.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and risks of an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and protecting the Bosnians that will follow?

-- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

REPUBLIC OF KOREA -- PRESIDENT KIM VISIT

Q: What is the purpose of South Korean President Kim's State Visit this week?

A: The U.S. and the Republic of Korea share a history of close ties that spans more than 40 years.

President Kim and President Clinton will reaffirm our countries' friendship and the importance of our relationship as they jointly dedicate the Korean War Veterans Memorial.

-- The President will reaffirm U.S. commitment to the US-ROK alliance and American support for the South Korea's efforts to bring peace and security to the Korean Peninsula. They will talk about the

next steps in the implementation of the Agreed Framework that the U.S. signed with North Korea to bring its nuclear program under control.

-- The two Presidents will also discuss economic issues, including the upcoming APEC meeting and the bilateral trade relationship.

Q: Why is he here now?

A: The timing was determined by the dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial, which is opening on the anniversary of the signing of the armistice.

Q: What is the overall state of U.S.-ROK relations? Weren't there some tensions over the discussions between the U.S. and North Korea?

A: Overall relations are very solid. From the strategic and security perspective, we believe our joint efforts, along with the close cooperation of Japan, have been correct and fruitful.

The North Korean nuclear program is being brought under control, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula have eased.

In its talks with North Korea in May and June, the United States was fully supportive of South Korean interests and objectives. South Korea fully supports the Agreed Framework and the steps taken to date to implement it.

There are economic and trade issues that need some attention, but they are being handled appropriately.

CHINA

Q: What is the status of the Harry Wu case?

A: We remain very concerned about the Harry Wu case and continue to work to persuade the Chinese government to release him.

Q: What are you doing to get Harry Wu out?

A: We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself.

We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case is of great importance for U.S.-China relations.

We continue to request more frequent consular access.

In addition to the visit with Mr. Wu by our consul general on July 10, we have made one additional effort to meet with him, but were turned down by local authorities.

Although the U.S. embassy officer, who was traveling in Wuhan on other business, was not permitted to see Wu, we were able to deliver some written material to him, and we have some materials from his wife that we are trying to get passed to him.

Q: Is the Chinese missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait a threat to Taiwan?

A: We have no information to suggest that this is anything other than an exercise. Taiwan's security is not in jeopardy. That said, we consider the activity unnecessary and provocative.

We are concerned that tensions are rising in the Taiwan Straits. We hope that both sides will seek to avoid taking steps that could exacerbate the situation.

The United States has for many years supported the process of peaceful dialogue and

negotiation of differences between China and Taiwan. Both sides, in our view, have an interest in maintaining the atmosphere of peace and cooperation that has enabled both sides to develop their economies.

We believe that China and Taiwan over the past few years have developed good, cooperative processes for discussing problems and resolving differences. We hope they will continue to develop.

Q: How many missiles have actually been fired?

A: I don't wish to disclose information provided by our intelligence community. Press sources in Asia have said four, and possibly six.

Q: Does this represent a new threat to Taiwan's overall defense?

A: China has had for many years missiles capable of reaching Taiwan. The mobile missiles involved in the test are a relatively recent addition to China's inventory.

Q: Is this exercise related to the Lee Teng-hui visit to the U.S.?

A: That is a question for the Chinese government.

Q: Will the United States protest to China about the exercise?

A: There are no plans to do so. The PRC has undertaken training exercises in this region in the past. It has notified the international shipping and air transport communities of the closure areas in an appropriate fashion.

Q: Will the United States support Taiwan if China attacks?

A: That is a completely speculative question unwarranted by the circumstances.

Q: What impact is all this having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

A: Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range of our bilateral interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engaged on issues of mutual interest.

The Secretary of State will be meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on August 1, when both will be attending an ASEAN meeting in Brunei.

Q: What is your view of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement that the meeting between Qian and Christopher is critical to the future of the relationship?

A: We acknowledge that this is an important meeting to discuss serious issues. We would caution against over-dramatization, however. The communication process between two major powers requires frequent contacts at many levels.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that apologize for inviting Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. and promise not to let it happen again?

The President stands by his decision and has no intention of apologizing.

The decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and fully consistent with American values and opinion.

We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it constitute a change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will Lee be allowed to visit again?

We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case basis, based on our judgment of what is in the U.S. interest. The Secretary of State noted a few days ago that we expect visits to be completely private and rare. There is no request pending at the moment.

JAPANESE ELECTIONS

Q: Any comment on the outcome of upper house elections in Japan?

A: The upper house elections in Japan are a normal process in a healthy democracy. The Japanese people have given their assessment of the performance of their elected leaders, as people in democracies have the right and privilege to do.

We do not believe the voting portends any change in Japan's approach toward relations with the United States, nor do we intend any change in our bilateral relationship with Japan.

Our alliance and firm relationship with Japan are the products of long-term national interests and has lasted through numerous changes of administration and political shifts in both countries.

We look forward to continuing our close cooperation with Prime Minister Murayama and his government.

SALE OF PAKISTAN'S F-16 AIRCRAFT

Q. Is the Administration seeking to sell the Pakistani F-16s now embargoed by the Pressler Amendment to Indonesia?

A. The President decided that we would seek to sell the F-16s to a third country and return the proceeds to Pakistan. We are also seeking legislative authority to resume economic and non-lethal military assistance to Pakistan and to return to Pakistan other military equipment now being held in the U.S. in accordance with the Pressler Amendment.

By resolving the question of the aircraft and military equipment purchased by Pakistan, we seek a more positive basis for our dialogue on nonproliferation and other issues with the Pakistanis.

(If asked whether there are nonproliferation conditions attached to this sale)

-- Stemming nuclear and missile proliferation remains a key U.S. objective for South Asia. The President believes that we need to resolve the Pressler Amendment issue to make possible a more productive dialogue on nonproliferation.

-- We did not receive nonproliferation assurances from Pakistan as part of the initiative.

ative we are
proposing to resolve the F-16 problem. However, we have told the Pakistanis that
th
is initiative is
predicated on there being no significant change in the status quo with respect to t
he nonproliferation
issues of concern to the United States.

(if asked whether the planes will be sold to Indonesia)

-- Neither we nor the Pakistanis have decided on a buyer for these aircraft. Indone
sia is one
possible purchaser, but the Indonesian government has not indicated it wants to
buy
them.

(If asked whether the Pakistanis will get back all of there money)

-- We expect that there will be a shortfall between what Pakistan paid for these
air
craft and what
will be realized in a sale to a third party. This is an issue that will have to be
addressed in future
consultations with the Government of Pakistan and the Congress.

NORTHERN IRELAND

Q: Do you have any comment on the report that the UK's Northern Ireland
Secretary, S
ir Patrick
Mayhew, and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams held a secret meeting last week
in North
ern Ireland?

A: We welcome the news of a meeting between the Secretary of State for
Northern Irel
and and
Sinn Fein representatives, as an important step in advancing the peace process.
The
President has
encouraged dialogue as the best way to move the peace process forward.
Obviously di
alogue at such
senior levels of the British government and Sinn Fein is a positive development.

If asked

-- Sinn Fein representatives had meetings with the UK at the ministerial level in May, conducted by the NIO's junior minister, Mr. Ancram. While Sir Patrick Mayhew and Mr. Adams met here in Washington during the investment conference in May, as far as we know the meeting last Tuesday would have been their first in Northern Ireland.

Q: What is your view of the idea of a "decommissioning commission" that was reported by discussed by NIO Secretary Sir Patrick Mayhew and Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring in their meeting on Monday?

-- We support the Irish and British governments' efforts to find a way to move the peace process forward. One of the ideas that has been under discussion is the formation of an international commission to help resolve the issue of decommissioning of weapons. If the two governments decide to form such a commission, we would welcome their decision. The membership and mandate of a decommissioning commission are matters for the two governments to decide.

If asked

-- We have not been approached to serve on such a commission.

U.S. - CUBA MIGRATION TALKS

Background: U.S. -Cuba migration review talks were held in Havana July 17-18. These were part of a series of regular talks to discuss exclusively migration issues between the two countries.

The U.S. delegation was led by Anne Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and the Cuban delegation was led by Ricardo Alarcon, president of Cuba's National Assembly. No agreement was reached, and differences remain on a number of issues.

Key Points

-- The talks held in Havana were part of regular discussions on migration issues between the U.S. and Cuba.

-- Both sides agreed that the September 9 and May 2 accords were working: They are directing migration into legal channels, while discouraging unsafe migration.

-- The U.S. raised several suggestions to assure that the two sides do everything to facilitate safe, orderly and legal migration.

-- No new agreements were reached.

Qs & As

Q: Which issues remain unresolved?

A: A broad range of migration issues was discussed. Many of them were operational. These talks were not aimed simply at reaching discrete agreements but are part of an ongoing process to promote safe, orderly and legal migration.

[If pressed]

The fees charged by the Cuban government to migrants who have already been issued travel documents was one of the issues discussed.

Q: Did the Cubans raise other issues such as lifting the sanctions imposed by President

ent Clinton last
August?

A: Yes, the Cuban government raised those issues but they were outside the scope of these talks. These discussions dealt solely with questions involving safe, orderly and legal migration.

CUBA AND NEWS BUREAUS

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times story of July 17? Are we on the verge of a deal with the Cuban Government on news bureaus?

A: The Administration continually reviews all aspects of our policy toward Cuba, exploring ways to make the embargo more effective and to provide support to the Cuban people. In that context, the Administration is still reviewing the possibility of licensing U.S. news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba and of permitting Cuban official news organs to operate in the United States.

Licensing decisions are exclusively the decision of the U.S. Government and no "negotiations" with Cuba about this issue have occurred nor are any planned.

Q: Is Senator Helms' insistence on letting Radio Marti/TV Marti into Cuba the sticking point?

A: Radio and TV Marti are not commercial news stations. They comprise the Office of Cuban Broadcasting in the Bureau of Broadcasting of USIA which is represented at our Interests Section in

Havana. Under consideration is the licensing of commercial news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba.

Although Radio and TV Marti would certainly benefit from a greater flow of accurate, uncensored news from Cuba, they are not directly related to the issue of reciprocal news bureaus.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1868)

Background: The House completed action on HR1868, the FY 96 foreign operations appropriations bill July 11, passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your advisors have not yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropriating considerably less than we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would reinforce the Mexico City family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia and Mexico. It also contains other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations appropriations bill, HR 1868, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, giving the Administration flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is particularly important because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are to meet our international commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems. These include the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning

process and
other
amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign
policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many
prog
rams. These
reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy.
We will work with the
committees to obtain additional funding for these programs , (e.g. funding for the
W
orld Bank and for
Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a
decision
about what to
do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign
affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State
Department Aut
horization
bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the
Pres
ident's ability to
conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs
agencies;
and deep funding
cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill
and
the Foreign
Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he
veto
the State
Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar
recommenda
tion for the Foreign
Assistance Act.)

HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announced where reruns would be taking place. The results point to a significant Lavalas victory, but it is important to note that, overall, non-Lavalas parties gathered roughly 60-65% of the vote and that a second round will be required in about 70% of the parliamentary or senate races. The Lavalas share of 35-40% of the vote should be viewed in light of President Aristide's 70% share when he was elected in 1991. Reruns will take place in about 20% of localities. This is more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns are now scheduled for August 6 and the second round for August 27, though both dates remain subject to change.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral Council's announcement. A number of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the elections. Amb. Swing is attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral council acted in ways that justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the elections was not significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud. Bob Pastor, a member of the Carter Center, offered a different and far more critical assessment of the elections. While he acknowledges that the security situation was adequate, and that there was no centralized effort to subvert the process, he calls these the "most disastrous" of 13 elections he observed.

Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time, were able to vote peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of their choice. In light of Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine months ago it was ruled by a

repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, will require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or of an attempt to subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy, especially in one of the poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral process and might not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a mistake. The parties, the electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards strengthening Haiti's democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and preparing for upcoming elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Pastor's Assessment of the Elections

-- We do not share Bob Pastor's overall negative assessment. Our assessment is closer to that of most international observers -- the European Union, the United Nations, and the OAS, which had the benefit of the largest observation mission of all.

-- However, as we have always said, these were far from perfect elections. Indeed, many of the irregularities noted in Bob Pastors' report were mentioned by the Presidential Deleg

ation that observed
the elections and by Administration officials.

-- At the same time, we should not make unfair comparisons or have unrealistic expectations.

Haiti is the poorest, and least educated country in the hemisphere. There is little infrastructure, telecommunications capability, or practicable roads. Only nine months ago, Haitians were ruled by a repressive military regime. They had never experienced an election free of violence and wide-scale intimidation.

-- Taken all that into account, these elections were a remarkable achievement.

-- These were the first elections in Haiti's history free of violence. For the first time ever,

Haitians were able to exercise their democratic right to vote without intimidation. This was noted by every observer mission and is the most basic requirement for a true democracy.

-- Observer missions, including Bob Pastor's, agreed that there was no systematic fraud or a centralized attempt to subvert the electoral process. Indeed, Pastor's report emphasizes that even the party closest to President Aristide, the OPL, suffered from the irregularities. As one observer put it, the process was "free, fair, and fouled up."

-- There were 11,000 candidates from over 20 parties. They were free to express themselves and to campaign.

-- These elections represent an important step forward. The most important task now is to build on what has been achieved, correct the errors that were made, and resolve the differences between the political parties and the electoral council so that the electoral process can continue with the support of all

Haitians. We know that President Aristide is committed to strengthening Haiti's democracy and is trying hard to move the process forward. That is also what the Administration and Ambassador Swing have been working for from day one.

Qs & As.

Q: Will you oppose reruns and runoffs until differences between Aristide and the parties are resolved, as urged by Bob Pastor?

A: It is not up to us to agree to or to oppose reruns and runoffs. It is up to the Haitians. Our embassy has and will continue to do what it can to help the parties overcome their differences and strengthen Haiti's young democracy.

Q: What are the Administration's views of Pastor's specific recommendations?

A: Bob Pastor has many interesting ideas on how to get the process back on track, some of which we have been suggesting -- such as a national dialogue, improved training and support for local electoral officials and poll-watchers, and improved procedures for ballot counting. Once again, we have been encouraging Haitians to take these steps and are ready to assist in any way possible. At the same time, it is important that these elections reflect the will of the Haitian people, and not the outcome of backroom dealings.

Q: Will the Administration be sending a mediator?

A: There is no such plan. But as I said, we are available to assist in the ways Haitians believe most appropriate.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicly and privately, that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitution, limiting the President to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on track, which calls for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President in February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in U.S. policy.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protracted.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change. Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Understand that Yeltsin has left the hospital and has entered rehabilitation center for period of convalescence.

-- With proper care and medical attention, Yeltsin should be able to return to

norma
I schedule.

Announcement of Duma Election Date

-- Yeltsin has issued decree that Russian Duma elections will be held December 17. Welcome this as positive, normal step for democratizing Russia.

Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices. Addressing political as well as military issues. Understand remaining point of difference at this time is the future status of Chechnya (i.e. Chechnya's relationship to the Russian Federation)

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence," achieve negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not i

n our interest to
cut this assistance.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work
actively
with Russia
toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working
with u
s to
develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to
manage enlar
gement
process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.