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TEXT_BODY

PLEASE PASS TO NANCY FOR URGENT CLEARANCE. Mike is briefing around 1:00 today. Bosnia, China, Japan and Russia have been updated. Nigeria and Mexico are new. Thanks.

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**ATTACHMENT
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Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 20, 1995

Bosnia
-- Points for Presidential Use with Congressional Leaders
-- Talking Points on Dole Amendment

Nigeria: McHenry Missions

Mexico

U.S.-Cuba Migration Talks

Cuba and News Bureaus

China

U.S.-Japan Civil Aviation Dispute

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

Haiti

Russia

BOSNIA

Key Points:

- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:
- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state;
- to prevent the spread of the conflict;
- to help limit the loss of life;
- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.
- That is why the United States
- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;
- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;
- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;
- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;
- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.

ct.

-- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.

-- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo

-- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.

-- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.

-- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

Srebrenica and Zepa

-- What has happened in Srebrenica and Zepa is tragic and inhumane. No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- Continued actions by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and against the enclave of Zepa is a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.

-- The Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas were established primarily as a haven for refugees expelled from other parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The attack against these undefended enclaves and the peacekeepers stationed there, and the reports of brutal ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of this travesty, provide further dramatic proof of the intent of Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group to ensure that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to all the civilian refugees in the enclave, and to cease their illegal and inhumane detention of groups of refugees on the basis of unsubstantiated or trumped-up "war criminal" charges.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.

-- Events of the past weeks emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.

-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their influence to stop this aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers. Serbia must make clear in

word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts.

In particular, it should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission. (See separate points on London meeting proposals)

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and draw the United States in.

U.S. Proposals for the London meeting:

-- We are consulting actively with our Allies in preparation for Friday's meeting in London of Contact Group members and major troop-contributing nations. Secretaries Christopher and Perry, as well as General Shalikashvili, are in London today preparing for Friday's meeting and seeking to forge a common approach.

-- We and our key allies agree that the situation as it stands is intolerable, and that UNPROFOR's current posture is not sustainable.

-- Decisive action is needed to halt the pattern of Serb aggressiveness, restore UNPROFOR's effectiveness, and reestablish conditions that can lead to a political settlement.

-- We and our Allies agree we need to draw line at Gorazde, the largest of the three eastern enclaves, and not allow any further Serb violations of the safe areas. We also back strong action to end th

e Serbs' strangulation of
Sarajevo by opening up secure routes into the city using the Rapid Reaction
Force.

-- Discussions continuing on best approach to take to increase protection of
Gorazde
and deter Serb attack.

-- We have proposed that Allies deliver a clear and unambiguous warning to the
Bosni
an Serbs that, if they attack
Gorazde, NATO will respond with an extensive air campaign.

-- This would entail going beyond the limited, tit-for-tat use of air power in the p
ast. We would respond against a
wide range of military targets, and reserve the right to go even further to attack S
erb strategic targets in other parts
of Bosnia.

-- This air campaign would take place without the existing dual-key arrangement.
Wh
ile NATO would still
coordinate with the local UN commanders on the ground, there would be no
political v
eto.

-- This is not meant to be a declaration of war against Bosnian Serbs. If they hee
d the warning and do not attack,
there will be no air campaign (as was the case in the immediate aftermath of
NATO's
February 1994 ultimatum in
Sarajevo). But if they continue to flout UN resolutions and violate the safe areas,
it will be they who have crossed
the line.

-- We continue to discuss the French proposal to deploy up to 1000 French
peacekeepe
rs in Gorazde to reinforce
the British and Ukrainian forces there. We are skeptical of the military value of t
he proposal, however.

-- The key threat to Gorazde comes from Serb artillery and tanks, which can be
count
ered by NATO air power.
Additional peacekeepers would not make a real difference in terms of defending
the e
nclave, yet would create
enormous new resupply and reinforcement problems. At best, they could have
symbolic
value as a deterrent.

-- Know the course we propose entails risks. But President sees no alternative to decisive action if we want to avoid collapse of UNPROFOR, with all the hard choices and risks that would bring.

Q & A: Hot Issues

U.S. Military Assistance for defense of Gorazde

Q: U.S. commitment of ground troops/Chirac request for assistance in saving enclave
s.

-- As we have said consistently, we will not commit ground troops to the conflict.

-- We are reviewing other options under discussion.

-- General Shali met over the weekend with his British and French counterparts to assess various military options for strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to protect the remaining Safe Areas, and the President and key advisors have been examining those options over the past 48 hours.

-- Short of providing ground forces, we are looking for ways to support our allies in their commitment to make UNPROFOR stronger. These include those that have already been made public, such as using helicopters to assist UNPROFOR reinforcement of Gorazde and restoring the legitimacy of the threat of air power.

(If pressed)

Q: Wouldn't the use of helicopters cross the line into the use of American ground forces?

-- No. What is being looked at is a one time provision of airlift to assist the French in moving troops to Gorazde, if this option is chosen -- and that decision has NOT been taken by us or our allies yet.

Q: Are the Eastern enclaves viable?

-- We deplore the tragic and inhumane events taking place in Srebrenica and Zepa.

-- We are consulting with the Contact Group and UNHCR to address the urgent humanitarian needs of civilians.

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.
-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift. Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR for
ces are still in place would
make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.
The 1
2 week delay Dole is
proposing flies in the face of all U.S. and Allied military advice, which sees
withd
rawal taking up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S.
would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to mak
e major gains in the months
before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame
for UNPROFOR's failure on
the U.S.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to
intervene to stem the
deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war
-- thus making the war a
unilateral U.S. responsibility.

Q: Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey is meeting with administration and congressional
leaders to call for lifting the
arms embargo. If that's what the Bosnians say they want, why not support them?

-- We support the concept of a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, should the UNP
ROFOR mission be
terminated.

-- We do not support unilateral lift, which would have the effect of causing UNPROFOR to withdraw prematurely.

-- We remain concerned that, in the time between lifting the embargo and the integration of new weapons into the Bosnian armed forces, the Bosnian Serbs would take military action that the Bosnians would be hard pressed to resist on their own.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws.
Isn't that the Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of UNPROFOR and cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame for the deteriorating situation would be placed on us.

President's Comments on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR may leave.
Do you expect UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with Serb actions to interfere with its mission.

Q: In reiterating his support for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the President signaling his expectation that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia but we do not expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to achieve that goal.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$27 million of goods and services -- under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged approach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and tightening his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospects for an overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of all-out war that would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the conflict, and effectively end the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on the ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequate plan and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NATO to deter a repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we abandon

our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other parties to the conflict in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR efforts that have proven ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel. It will be used to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move it into theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does not seem to be any Congressional support?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our Allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We plan to work with the United Nations and other member states to establish

a voluntary fund
as a means to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services to support our allies.)

-- (If pressed) Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- (If pressed) As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services will be provided.

-- (If pressed) The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser target designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to aircraft and helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence support.

-- (If pressed) We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. This support would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings (Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ceilings previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will represent

ent no more than
\$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.)

-- We have informally consulted with the Congress on our intent to use Section 506(a)(1) emergency drawdown authorities of the FAA to provide up to \$15 million of DOD goods and services (primarily transportation and equipment) to our allies participating in the RRF.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3 million.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for the provision of up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a authorities and primarily for transportation services and equipment.

NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusion zones been rendered null and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the UN commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and political situation.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demons

trated that it is totally ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid , protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alternatives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Results to Date:

Q: Isn't our policy of support for UNPROFOR bankrupt?

-- No. While the tragedy of recent events is enormous, you should not overlook what

has been

accomplished to date:

-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bo

snia's

Muslims and Croats, which has brought peace to the vast majority of territory under

Bosnian government

control;

-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)

;

-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne

relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;

-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);

-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war

out of the

air over Bosnia for two and a half years; and

-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.

U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the

conflict or

to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or if units

need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties, to use U.S. troops as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying out in good faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of military plans,

we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire arms and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is

be
 tter to work to
 strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

BOSNIA POINTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP:

ù There are three key points I want to make to you about Bosnia.

-- First, we should keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia, where, despite "common knowledge" to the contrary, it has had a major positive impact -- but we must make it work better.

-- Second, we will be making critical decisions with our Allies over the next few days on how to use the RRF and effective air power to halt Serb aggressiveness.

-- Third, we should not be undermining these efforts by seeking a unilateral lift of the arms embargo when our Allies are putting their troops on the line in a last ditch effort to make UNPROFOR work.

ù Bosnia remains extremely difficult, as it was when I arrived here. But as we press for a resolution, let's not lose sight of the results that have been achieved -- in part by UNPROFOR, in part by NATO and in part with U.S. persistence.

-- The war continues, but at greatly reduced levels. There were 130,000 Bosnian civilians killed in 1992; 2,500 in 1994;

-- Over 3 million Bosnians now depend on the UN for food and medicine. 50,000 tons of supplies have been delivered in the longest humanitarian relief effort in history;

-- A three-way conflict has been transformed into a two-way conflict, with the

Bosnian-Croat Federation we helped broker continuing to hold. This has great strategic significance; nearly all of central Bosnia is now at peace.

-- Through the no-fly zone, we have kept the war out of the air over Bosnia and with our deployments in Macedonia and other warnings, we've kept the war from spreading beyond Bosnia.

ù Nevertheless, given the events of the past few weeks, it is clear that staying with the status quo is totally unacceptable.

-- UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies are prepared to take to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

ù At the upcoming meeting in London, we will work with our Allies to put some teeth into UNPROFOR. We intend to make the case that the most important thing is to be able to bring air power to bear decisively, not in the timid manner done to date.

-- We will seek a clear warning to the Bosnian Serbs: any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a massive air campaign that cripples Serb military capability.

-- Cannot be just another empty threat. If Bosnian Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering even if we suffer losses or additional hostages are taken.

-- In addition to supporting Bosnian defense of Gorazde, important to open secure routes to Sarajevo. This is the most pressing mission for the RRF.

ù Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partners to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them support and time to prove themselves.

-- Understand frustration that bill's supporters feel.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but unilateral lift would undermine efforts to reach negotiated settlement, lead to escalation of conflict, and possibly Americanize the war.

-- No simple or risk free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious consequences.

-- Allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that unilateral lift, which would place the troops in greater danger, will result in their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse.

-- I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation under those circumstances to assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission.

-- Consequently, at the least, unilateral lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out of Bosnia and pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined mission.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility.

-- It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more. It will provide the pretext

for absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a stronger role at this critical moment.

-- It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. action that forces UNPROFOR departure.

-- First, as I have noted, we immediately would be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw UNPROFOR.

-- Second, after that operation is complete, there will be an intensification of the fighting in Bosnia.

-- The Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air support and if that fails, more active military support.

-- At that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as a result of unilateral lift. The U.S. will be asked to fill the void -- in military support, humanitarian aid and in response to refugee crises.

-- Third, intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace.

-- Finally, UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future.

-- In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. We are in this with our allies now. We would be in it by ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and

risks
 of an UNPROFOR
 withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and
 p
 rotecting the Bosnians
 that will follow?

-- I want to state clearly that I will veto any resolution or bill that may require
 the United States to
 lift unilaterally the arms embargo. It will make a bad situation much worse. I ask
 that you not support
 the pending legislation, S.21.

Points on the Dole Amendment

-- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the
 arms e
 mbargo would hinder our
 efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.

-- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. mili
 tary support to the Bosnian
 government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and
 Ser
 bia.

-- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the
 international commun
 ity's other efforts have
 yielded significant benefits.

-- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing
 the
 killing and suffering in
 Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.

- UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million
 people.
 Its
 presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of
 Central B
 osnia.

- UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and is fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.

-- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

-- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partner to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them limited support and time to prove themselves.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue to oppose unilateral lift.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government

would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively with its new arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

-- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo within 12 weeks of the date the Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually ensures Allied entanglement in the war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the mission could take up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war

-- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like Serbia, would likely provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes, such as those against Iraq and Libya, that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to distinguish between Bosnia and other situations.

-- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with respect to decisions that could involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and other Americans to imminent risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential responsibilities.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and risks of an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and protecting the Bosnians that will follow?

-- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

NIGERIA: McHenry Missions

Q: What details can you provide on Amb. McHenry's secret missions to Nigeria? With whom did he meet?

A: In December 1994, the President asked Ambassador Donald McHenry, a private citizen, to approach leading Nigerians -- in the government, in opposition groups, and private citizens -- to ascertain how the USG could assist Nigeria in a rapid return to democratic civilian government.

Ambassador McHenry has traveled to Nigeria several times under this mandate. His efforts have been closely coordinated with the Administration.

His discussions with Nigerians have been useful. He has expressed growing U.S. concern about the lack of progress toward restoration of civilian rule.

(If pressed):

Ambassador McHenry has made a total of 6 visits to Nigeria in the past seven months. The

most recent visit was within the past month.

(If pressed):

He has met with representatives of a broad range of the political spectrum, both public and private, in Nigeria, including General Abacha.

Q: What have been the results of the McHenry missions?

A: Ambassador McHenry's mission has contributed to our efforts to communicate to Nigeria our concern about the lack of progress toward democracy. We believe that frank exchange of views can only increase understanding and may advance positive change.

This mission was undertaken on a confidential basis because we believe a private dialogue can at times yield better result. We believe it would be counterproductive to further discuss or characterize its status at this time.

Q: Are we considering further sanctions if death sentence are carried out against Obasanjo or other alleged coup plotters?

A: We are reviewing, in conjunction with our allies, all policy options. We do not rule out any sanctions.

MEXICO -- HOUSE VOTE 7/19

Background: The House passed by a 245-183 vote a measure that would prohibit the Treasury Department from advancing any more money to Mexico in the next fiscal year from the U.S. Exchange Stabilization fund. Mexico has thus far received \$12.5 billion from the ESF as part of an international aid package.

kage developed to help stabilize the Mexican economy.

Points

-- The President made the decision to use ESF assets to support the Mexican peso only after securing the support of Congressional leadership from both sides of the aisle, and only after it became clear that an exhaustive effort to develop a congressionally-authorized assistance package could not be completed in time to be effective.

-- The President's decision was the right one: as a consequence of his action the Government of Mexico has been able to take the necessary steps to stabilize its economy, preventing a situation that could have had serious consequences for Mexico, for the United States her largest trading partner, and for emerging markets around the world.

-- House action on this legislation is but one step in a long and continuing legislative process. We will continue to press our very strong concerns on this issue in the weeks and months ahead.

U.S. - CUBA MIGRATION TALKS

Background: U.S. -Cuba migration review talks were held in Havana July 17-18. These were part of a series of regular talks to discuss exclusively migration issues between the two countries. The U.S. delegation was led by Anne Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and the Cuban delegation was led by Ricardo Alarcon, president of Cuba's National Assembly. No agreement was

reached
, and differences remain
on a number of issues.

Key Points

-- The talks held in Havana were part of regular discussions on migration issues
bet
ween the U.S.
and Cuba.

-- Both sides agreed that the September 9 and May 2 accords were working: They
are d
irecting
migration into legal channels, while discouraging unsafe migration.

-- The U.S. raised several suggestions to assure that the two sides do everything
to
facilitate safe,
orderly and legal migration.

-- No new agreements were reached.

Qs & As

Q: Which issues remain unresolved?

A: A broad range of migration issues was discussed. Many of them were
operational.
These talks
were not aimed simply at reaching discrete agreements but are part of an ongoing
pro
cess to promote
safe, orderly and legal migration.

[If pressed]

The fees charged by the Cuban government to migrants who have already been
issued tr
avel documents
was one of the issues discussed.

Q: Did the Cubans raise other issues such as lifting the sanctions imposed by
Presid
ent Clinton last
August?

A: Yes, the Cuban government raised those issues but they were outside the
scope of
these talks.

These discussions dealt solely with questions involving safe, orderly and legal migration.

CUBA AND NEWS BUREAUS

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times story of July 17? Are we on the verge of a deal with the Cuban Government on news bureaus?

A: The Administration continually reviews all aspects of our policy toward Cuba, exploring ways to make the embargo more effective and to provide support to the Cuban people. In that context, the Administration is still reviewing the possibility of licensing U.S. news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba and of permitting Cuban official news organs to operate in the United States.

Licensing decisions are exclusively the decision of the U.S. Government and no "negotiations" with Cuba about this issue have occurred nor are any planned.

Q: Is Senator Helms' insistence on letting Radio Marti/TV Marti into Cuba the sticking point?

A: Radio and TV Marti are not commercial news stations. They comprise the Office of Cuba Broadcasting in the Bureau of Broadcasting of USIA which is represented at our Interests Section in Havana. Under consideration is the licensing of commercial news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba.

Although Radio and TV Marti would certainly benefit from a greater flow of

accurate
 , uncensored news
 from Cuba, they are not directly related to the issue of reciprocal news bureaus.

CHINA

Q: What is the Administration's position on the upcoming China MFN legislation?

There are two pieces of legislation the House is likely to consider. One is a resolution of disapproval which would overturn the President's decision to continue Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status for China. The Administration strongly opposes this resolution. I am pleased to say that we believe this resolution will be tabled later today.

The second is a bill developed by the House leadership that addresses many of the outstanding issues in the U.S.-China relationship (e.g., Harry Wu, nonproliferation). We have problems with some specific provisions of this bill, although we support its goals. We will not oppose this bill because the disapproval resolution is so much worse.

Q: How can you grant MFN when Harry Wu is still in jail?

A: We remain very concerned about the Harry Wu case and continue to work to persuade the Chinese government to release him. But we do not believe denying MFN to China would help. It would, in fact, more likely result in harsher treatment for Wu.

It is important that the issues be treated separately. The President determined in 1994 and reiterated this year that the best way for bringing about long-term improvements in China's human rights record was to maintain a comprehensive engagement with China, including in the area of economic and commercial relations.

Q: What are you doing to get Harry Wu out?

A: We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself.

We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case is of great importance for U.S.-China relations.

Q: What about Chinese hints that he will be freed after the investigation is completed?

A: We cannot base our approach on hints and rumors. Our position is unchanged. He should be released immediately.

Background: (NOT FOR USE WITH PRESS)

China announced yesterday that it is closing an area off the coast of Fujian Province

(in the Taiwan Straits) to all

foreign air traffic and shipping from July 21-28 for the purpose of launching a surface

air-to-surface missile. It did

not say what kind of missile, but the size of the closed area -- small and circular -- suggests it could be an MRBM.

Taiwan is somewhat alarmed and has sharply criticized Beijing's heavy-handed tactic

..

Q: Is the recently-announced Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait a threat to Taiwan?

A: We have no information to suggest that this is anything other than an exercise.

Taiwan's security is not in jeopardy.

We would be concerned if tensions were to rise significantly in the Taiwan Straits.

We hope that both sides will seek to avoid taking steps that would bring about such a situation.

The United States has for many years supported the process of peaceful dialogue and

negotiation of differences between China and Taiwan. Both sides, in our view, have an interest in maintaining the atmosphere of peace and cooperation that has enabled both sides to develop their economies.

We believe that China and Taiwan over the past few years have developed good, cooperative processes for discussing problems and resolving differences. We hope they will continue to develop.

Q: Is this exercise related to the Lee Teng-hui visit to the U.S.?

A: That is a question for the Chinese government.

Q: Will the United States protest to China about the exercise?

A: There are no plans to do so. The PRC has undertaken training exercises in this region in the past. It has notified the international shipping and air transport communities of the closure areas in an appropriate fashion.

Q: Will the United States support Taiwan if China attacks?

A: That is a completely speculative question unwarranted by the circumstances.

Q: What impact is all this having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

A: Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range of our bilateral interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engaged on issues of mutual interest.

The Secretary of State will be meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on August 1, when both will be attending an ASEAN meeting in Brunei.

Q: What is your view of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement that the meeting between Qian and Christopher is critical to the future of the relationship?

A: We acknowledge that this is an important meeting to discuss serious issues. We would caution against over-dramatization, however. The communication process between two major powers requires frequent contacts at many levels.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that apologize for inviting Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. and promise not to let it happen again?

The President stands by his decision and has no intention of apologizing.

The decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and fully consistent with American values and opinion.

We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it constitute a change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will Lee be allowed to visit again?

We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case basis.

asis, based
on our judgment of what is in the U.S. interest. The Secretary of State noted a few
days ago that we
expect visits to be completely private and rare. There is no request pending at the moment.

U.S.-JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION DISPUTE

Background: There was no agreement between the U.S. and Japan during the July 13-15
civil aviation talks in
Tokyo. However, Japan has proposed another Vice Ministerial-level meeting, followed
by a meeting between
Secretary Pena and Ministry of Transport Minister Kamei. We have accepted this prop
osal and meetings are
taking place today in Los Angeles. .

Q: Can you tell us what is going on in the civil aviation talks with Japan?

A: Japan proposed another round of Vice Ministerial-level talks, to be followed
by a
meeting
between Secretary Pena and Minister Kamei.

We accepted that idea and meetings are currently taking place in Los Angeles.

While the talks have not yet reached an agreement, we believe that they have
been p
roductive,
and they are continuing.

We continue to work towards a negotiated solution to this dispute which
recognizes
the rights
of U.S. carriers such as Federal Express under the existing agreement.

Q: Will the Japanese upper house elections on July 23 have any effect on the negotia
tions?

A: It is not appropriate to speculate either on the outcome of the elections or on t
he effect they
may have on important negotiations.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign operations appropriations bill last evening passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your advisors have not yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropriating considerably less than we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would reinforce the Mexico City family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia and Mexico. It also contains other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations appropriations bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, giving the Administration flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is particularly important because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are to meet our international commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems. These include the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning process and other amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many programs. These reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy. We will work with the committees to obtain additional funding for these programs, (e.g. funding for the

World Bank and for Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a decision about what to do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies; and deep funding cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and the Foreign Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto the State Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendation for the Foreign Assistance Act.)

HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announced where reruns would be taking place. The results point to a significant Lavalas victory, but it is important to note that, overall, non-Lavalas parties gathered roughly 60-65% of the vote and that a second round will be required in about 70% of the parliamentary or senate races. The Lavalas share of 35-40% of the vote should

ld be viewed in light of
 President Aristide's 70% share when he was elected in 1991. Reruns will take
 place
 in about 20% of localities.
 This is more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns
 ar
 e now scheduled for August 6
 and the second round for August 27 , though both dates remain subject to change.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral
 Cou
 ncil's announcement. A number
 of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the
 ele
 ctions. Amb. Swing is
 attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral
 council acted in ways that
 justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the
 el
 ections was not
 significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud.

Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time
 , were able to vote
 peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of
 the
 ir choice. In light of
 Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine month
 s ago it was ruled by a
 repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These
 will have to be
 remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances,
 wi
 ll require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or
 of
 an attempt to
 subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy,
 espec
 ally in one of the
 poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral

proc
 ess and might
 not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a
 mista
 ke. The parties, the
 electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards
 stren
 gthening Haiti's
 democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and
 preparing fo
 r upcoming
 elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicl
 y and privately,
 that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitutio
 n, limiting the President
 to one term
- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on tr
 ack, which calls
 for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President i
 n February of 1996.
- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in US policy.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic
 reform
 there. It
 matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, central
 ly planned or
 market-oriented economies.
- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex,
 protract

ed.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over

50% of

Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Yeltsin acknowledged in his July 18 television interview he had suffered heart attack.

-- Understand there will be period of convalescence.

-- With proper care and medical attention, Yeltsin should be able to return to normal schedule.

-- Prior to his interview on Tuesday, Yeltsin spent hour talking with Chernomyrdin and

Nationalities Minister Mikhaylov about various issues, including Chechnya .

Announcement of Duma Election Date

-- Yeltsin has issued decree that Russian Duma elections will be held December 17. Welcome this as positive, normal step for democratizing Russia.

Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices. Addressing

political as well as military issues. Understand remaining point of difference at this time is the future

status of Chechnya (i.e. Chechnya's relationship to the Russian Federation)

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence," achieve negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

Rejection of U.S. ABM Treaty Proposal

-- Since May summit in Moscow, U.S. has been engaged in dialogue with Russia on how best to follow up on Joint Statement of Principles we agreed upon there to guide future negotiations on demarcation between theater missile defenses (which are not restricted by ABM Treaty) and strategic missile defenses (which are).

-- Deputy Secretary Talbott recently reviewed Russian paper on this subject that we found disappointing.

-- We do not, however, view this as Russia's last word on this subject.

-- We will continue to press Russia to adopt negotiating position that reflects demarcation principles we agreed upon in May.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building

democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S.
Not
in our interest to
cut this assistance.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work
actively
with Russia
toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working
with u
s to
develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to
manage enlar
gement
process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 July 95 16:36
FROM Nuccio, Richard A.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO Malley, Robert
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 12/18/2014
2006-1363-1

TEXT_BODY
[[CUBCNSL.DOC : 4119 in CUBCNSL.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 20 July 95 16:35
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME CUBCNSL.DOC

Rob, edits on the memo.

Cover:

2nd sentence -- We are requesting that the President authorize wide consultations before his approval of any specific measures. In prelim conver, Sen. Graham ...

Memo:

p. 1 Backgrnd para -- We believe it is time to begin consultations with the Congress, the Cuban American community, and other interested constituencies on a series of initiatives aimed at expanding contacts with the Cuban people, supporting non-governmental activities outside Cuban government control, and encouraging forces that could contribute to a more peaceful and democratic transition on the island.

Licensing Western Union -- Add at end of para, Both Sen. Graham and Rep. Torricelli have indicated their support for this.

Licensing NGO para -- e.g., human and labor rights organizations, environmental groups, and centers for market economics.

Mil/Mil -- counterparts in certain third countries. Additional last sentence to read, Such mil/mil contacts have been recommended by the Rand Corp and would help to add to our scarce body of

information about the thinking of this important actor in Cuba which will likely play a key role in any future transition and in a new democratic Cuba.

Helms/Burton -- Rewrite as follows, House and Senate versions differ from each other in significant respects, but both bills still contain provisions that would seriously undermine Executive privilege, complicate our relations with third countries, and hamper our goal of a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. The House bill will come to the floor soon and Sen. Helms might bring his bill directly to the floor with a committee markup. We would need a statement of administration policy in both cases. Our request is that you authorize us to say that your senior foreign policy advisers recommend the bills in their current form.

New tick:

Cuban Broadcasting Board -- For reasons of professional journalism as well as political consideration, we believe it is imperative to reform the President's Advisory Board on Cuba Broadcasting. The current thinking on options ranges from replacing the entire board but not its chair, Jorge Mas, to replacing Jorge as chair but inviting him to remain on the board as a member, to waiting for Cuba Broadcasting to be folded into a broader VOA board. We would like to consult with a few of your closest supporters in the Congress and the Cuban American community before making a specific recommendation to you on action.

MS Mail

DATE-TIME 20 July 95 17:03
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andricos, George M.
 Burrell, Christina L.
 Danvers, William C.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[VETO.DOC : 4394 in VETO.DOC]]
**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 20 July 95 17:1
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** VETO.DOC
 5645
 cc: Stephanie Streett

Schedule Proposal date ____/____/____

____ACCEPT ____REGRET ____PENDING

TO: Billy Webster
 Director of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Anthony Lake
 Pat Griffin

REQUEST: Public Presidential
 statement on vetoing S. 908, State
 Department Authorization bill.

PURPOSE: To reaffirm
 Administration opposition to S. 908 and
 Congressional efforts to infringe on

Presidential prerogatives such as how the Federal Government should be organized.

BACKGROUND: The President made a public statement on May 23 indicating that he would veto H.R. 1561, the House companion bill. The Senate version, sponsored by Sen. Helms, is as equally troublesome bill. Secretary Christopher has recommended a veto as have other key foreign policy advisers, particularly since the bill contains a provision that would force the consolidation of the four key foreign policy agencies-- the State Department, AID, ACDA and USIA.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President made a similar statement on HR 1561 in the Rose Garden on May 23.

DATE AND TIME: Shortly before the bill comes to the floor, which could be as early as next week.

BRIEFING TIME: 15 minutes.

DURATION: 10 minutes.

LOCATION: Rose Garden, press briefing room.

PARTICIPANTS: President, Vice President, Secretary Christopher, Tony Lake

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Make a brief statement on the bill and of his intention to veto it, if it comes to him in its present form.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Pool.

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: N/A

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: Yes

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

CONTACT: Tony Lake

ORIGIN OF THIS PROPOSAL: NSC

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: N/A

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 20 July 95 18:51

FROM Danvers, William C.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Subject: Legislative Update [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Baker, Jane E.
Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Darby, Melanie B.
Dohse, Fred J.
Emery, Mary C.
Gray, Wendy
Hall, Wilma G.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Joshi, M. Kay
Millison, Cathy L.
Sens, Andrew D.
Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY Andricos, George M.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Wise, William M.

TEXT_BODY

Note for Tony, Sandy and Nancy:

Bob Bell has indicated that we are on track for START II ratification. There should be a July 31 or Aug. 1 SFRC mark up and negotiations with Helms staff on the text of the resolution have begun. We are organizing an interagency meeting with Bob on ABM/TMD to see how best to counter language in the Senate DoD auth bill and if not in conference.

Bosnia UC accepted in the Senate today. Nine possible amends but there will be no filibuster. We will meet with friendly Senate staff at the WH on Monday to discuss next steps, particularly after the weekend's activities. We will also work a briefing schedule with State and DoD on what occurs this weekend.

The President made a public statement on May 23 indicating that he would veto H.R. 1561, the House companion bill. The Senate version, sponsored by Sen. Helms, is as equally troublesome bill. Secretary Christopher has

recommended a veto as have other key foreign policy advisers, particularly since the bill contains a provision that would force the consolidation of the four key foreign policy agencies-- the State Department, AID, ACDA and USIA.

SFRC Nigeria hearing today. Both Kassebaum and Feingold want to talk with McHenry on Nigeria. I will work with Susan on this.

The DoD approps bill goes to full ct. tomorrow. Murtha may still offer and amend to bill on requiring a prior authorization for carrying out op plan. Asked WH LA to see if chief of staff can call Murtha. DoD is trying to get Shali or Owens to call him. There is also a problem with drawdown language. DoD is trying to work this.

State Authorization bill could come up next week after Bosnia. Still uncertain.

Lynn Davis briefed HIRC staff on GCC related issues. Lugar will be briefed tomorrow.

On Pakistan, important for POTUS to Glenn and Pressler calls go through. Brown will offer an amend to State auth bill-- to be laid down as a legislative marker. Robin Rafael will meet with a number Senators next week. There will have to be a lot of work to get language accepted.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 July 95 17:21
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Daily Guidance Update [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreassen, Steven P.
Andricos, George M.
Aoki, Steven N.
Appel, Edward J.
Argarin, Jocelyn D.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atkin, Timothy J.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Bakke, Kyle D.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bassett, Leslie A.
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Benjamin, Daniel
Bieda, James M.
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blacker, Coit D.
Blieberger, Marion H.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Boorstin, Robert O.
Boright, John
Bradley, Amelia J.
Breeland, Jocelyn G.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadway, Jamuna
Brown, Dallas
Bruton, Robert G.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Kevin J. Cadieux
Canty, Mary T.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.

Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Claussen, Eileen B.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Crispell, Thomas G.
Daniel, Patty A.
Danvers, William C.
Darby, Melanie B.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Debortoli, Michelle A.
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dragone, Karen D.
Drew, Samuel N.
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Dymersky, Debra L.
Eddy, Randolph P.
Edwards, Joan
Emery, Mary C.
Evans, Paul A.
Feinberg, Richard E.
Fetig, James L.
Ficklin, John W.
Flessas, Daniel
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Froman, Michael B.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
Gardner, Anthony
Gates, Brian K.
Genton, Regina A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Glinski, David
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Guekel, Kathi A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, Wilma G.
Halperin, Morton H.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Hammond, Cathy J.
Hammonds, Lisa W.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Herrington, David E.

Heslin, Sheila N.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephen D.
Houck, Baerbel K.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Jones, Steven R.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kammerer, Kelly C.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerr, Andrew S.
Ketterer, James P.
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Laipson, Ellen B.
Leary, William H.
Lindsey, Wanda
Litwak, Robert C.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
Mack, Kathryn S.
Malley, Robert
Marmol, Madelyn P.
Marshall, Betty A.
Martinez, Alejandro
Stefan T. Mauzy
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Mazzuchi, Anthony D.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Miller, Matthew E.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Moody, Angelyn D.
Neil, M. Elise
Noetzel, Jon C.
Norman, Marcia G.
Nuccio, Richard A.
O'Loughlin, Katherine
Parco, Jim E.
Gwyn M. Parker
Parramore, Carl W.
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Pease, Bruce E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.

Pifer, Steven K.
Poneman, Daniel B.
Poppiti, Victoria L.
Porter, Gidell
Quinn, Mary E.
Ramsay, Martha S.
Reade, Evan G.
Realuyo, Celina B.
Rice, Susan E.
Roth, Stanley O.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Satterfield, David M.
Saunders, John W.
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Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
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Seaton, James B.
Seeley, Charlotte P.
Sens, Andrew D.
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Sheehan, Michael A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simon, Steven N.
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Stauffer, Helen L.
Stern, Jessica E.
Sterns, Crayton L.
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Tyler, John T.
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Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
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Wales, Jane
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Ward, JoAnn X.
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**ATTACHMENT
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Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 21, 1995

Bosnia: Chirac/Izetbegovic Calls

Bosnia

Bosnia: Talking Points on Dole Amendment

Nigeria: McHenry Missions

U.S.-Cuba Migration Talks

Cuba and News Bureaus

China

U.S.-Japan Aviation Negotiations

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

Haiti

Russia

BOSNIA: CHIRAC/IZETBEGOVIC CALLS

Chirac Call

-- President spoke for about 15 minutes with President Chirac, who is in Rabat on a State visit.
(Call took place around 4:00)

-- President stressed importance of coming together on a common approach in advance of tomorrow's London meeting.

-- Both agreed it was important to take decisive action to protect Gorazde against Serb attack as well as to relieve siege of Sarajevo.

-- President reiterated our view that best approach to Gorazde would be to give Serbs clear ultimatum that any attack would be met with an extensive air campaign.

-- This would entail going beyond the limited, tit-for-tat use of air power in the past, without the existing dual-key arrangement.

-- Chirac reiterated his view that reinforcing peacekeepers in Gorazde was key to deterring Serbs at Gorazde, but suggested French were also prepared to accept our proposal as well.

-- Discussions are continuing in London in preparation for tomorrow's meeting. Based on Chirac's call and reports from London, we are hopeful meeting will provide a clear signal of international community's resolve to halt Serb aggressiveness, restore UNPROFOR's effectiveness, and reestablish conditions that can lead to a political settlement.

Q: Have French dropped their proposal for airlifting in peacekeepers?

-- French still favor deploying additional peacekeepers.

-- We still have questions about the military value and the feasibility, but discussions are continuing among Defense Ministers and CHODS in London.

Izetbegovic Call

-- President and Bosnian President Izetbegovic spoke for about 15 minutes early this afternoon.

-- Izetbegovic expressed concern about fate of civilian population of Zepa and President assured him we would do all we could to avert another human tragedy.

-- President told Izetbegovic of U.S. proposals to bring NATO air power to bear in protecting Gorazde and Sarajevo.

-- Izetbegovic welcomed proposals, stressed that only peace Sarajevo has enjoyed occurred last year when NATO's February ultimatum was taken seriously by Serbs.

-- Izetbegovic reaffirmed Bosnians' commitment to peaceful settlement and Contact Group plan. President said that Bosnians had made right choice and that strong decision in London should help give new impetus to search for a settlement.

BOSNIA

Key Points:

-- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:

-- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic

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Bosnian state;

-- to prevent the spread of the conflict;

-- to help limit the loss of life;

-- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

-- That is why the United States

-- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;

-- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;

-- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;

-- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;

-- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.

-- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which he

helped

reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.

4.

-- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of

American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo

-- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in

the conflict.

-- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict,

something

neither the President nor our people want to see.

-- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

Srebrenica and Zepa

-- What has happened in Srebrenica and Zepa is tragic and inhumane. No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- Continued actions by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and against the enclave of Zepa is a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.

-- The Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas were established primarily as a haven for refugees expelled from other parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The attack against these undefended enclaves and the peacekeepers stationed there, and the reports of brutal ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of this travesty, provide further dramatic proof of the intent of Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group to ensure that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to all the civilian refugees in the enclave, and to cease their illegal and inhumane detention of groups of refugees on the basis of unsubstantiated or trumped-up "war criminal" charges.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.

-- Events of the past weeks emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.

-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their influence to stop this aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers. Serbia must make clear in word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts. In particular, it should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission. (See separate points on London meeting proposals)

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and draw the United States in.

U.S. Proposals for the London meeting:

-- We are consulting actively with our Allies in preparation for Friday's meeting in London of Contact Group members and major troop-contributing nations. Secretaries

Christopher
and Perry, as
well as General Shalikashvili, are in London today preparing for Friday's meeting
and seeking to forge a
common approach.

-- We and our key allies agree that the situation as it stands is intolerable, and that UNPROFOR's
current posture is not sustainable.

-- Decisive action is needed to halt the pattern of Serb aggressiveness, restore UNPROFOR's
effectiveness, and reestablish conditions that can lead to a political settlement.

-- We and our Allies agree we need to draw line at Gorazde, the largest of the three
eastern enclaves, and not allow
any further Serb violations of the safe areas. We also back strong action to end the Serbs' strangulation of
Sarajevo by opening up secure routes into the city using the Rapid Reaction
Force.

-- Discussions continuing on best approach to take to increase protection of
Gorazde
and deter Serb attack.

-- We have proposed that Allies deliver a clear and unambiguous warning to the
Bosnians that, if they attack
Gorazde, NATO will respond with an extensive air campaign.

-- This would entail going beyond the limited, tit-for-tat use of air power in the past. We would respond against a
wide range of military targets, and reserve the right to go even further to attack Serbian strategic targets in other parts
of Bosnia.

-- This air campaign would take place without the existing dual-key arrangement. While NATO would still
coordinate with the local UN commanders on the ground, there would be no
political veto.

-- This is not meant to be a declaration of war against Bosnian Serbs. If they heed the warning and do not attack,
there will be no air campaign (as was the case in the immediate aftermath of NATO's

February 1994 ultimatum in Sarajevo). But if they continue to flout UN resolutions and violate the safe areas, it will be they who have crossed the line.

-- We continue to discuss the French proposal to deploy up to 1000 French peacekeepers in Gorazde to reinforce the British and Ukrainian forces there. We are skeptical of the military value of the proposal, however.

-- The key threat to Gorazde comes from Serb artillery and tanks, which can be countered by NATO air power. Additional peacekeepers would not make a real difference in terms of defending the enclave, yet would create enormous new resupply and reinforcement problems. At best, they could have symbolic value as a deterrent.

-- Know the course we propose entails risks. But President sees no alternative to decisive action if we want to avoid collapse of UNPROFOR, with all the hard choices and risks that would bring.

Q & A: Hot Issues

U.S. Military Assistance for defense of Gorazde

Q: U.S. commitment of ground troops/Chirac request for assistance in saving enclaves.

-- As we have said consistently, we will not commit ground troops to the conflict.

-- We are reviewing other options under discussion.

-- General Shali met over the weekend with his British and French counterparts to assess various military options for strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to protect the remaining Safe Areas, and the

President and key advisors have been examining those options over the past 48 hours.

-- Short of providing ground forces, we are looking for ways to support our allies in their commitment to make UNPROFOR stronger. These include those that have already been made public, such as using helicopters to assist UNPROFOR reinforcement of Gorazde and restoring the legitimacy of the threat of air power.

(If pressed)

Q: Wouldn't the use of helicopters cross the line into the use of American ground forces?

-- No. What is being looked at is a one time provision of airlift to assist the French in moving troops to Gorazde, if this option is chosen -- and that decision has NOT been taken by us or our allies yet.

Q: Are the Eastern enclaves viable?

-- We deplore the tragic and inhumane events taking place in Srebrenica and Zepa.

-- We are consulting with the Contact Group and UNHCR to address the urgent humanitarian needs of civilians.

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift. Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces. The 12 week delay Dole is proposing flies in the face of all U.S. and Allied military advice, which sees withdrawal taking up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war
-- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

Q: Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey is meeting with administration and congressional leaders to call for lifting the arms embargo. If that's what the Bosnians say they want, why not support them?

-- We support the concept of a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, should the UNPROFOR mission be terminated.

-- We do not support unilateral lift, which would have the effect of causing UNPROFOR to withdraw prematurely.

-- We remain concerned that, in the time between lifting the embargo and the integration of new weapons into the Bosnian armed forces, the Bosnian Serbs would take military action that the Bosnians would be hard pressed to resist on their own.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws. Isn't that the Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of UNPROFOR and cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame

for th
e
deteriorating situation would be placed on us.

President's Comments on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR may leave.

Do you expect
UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with
Serb acti
ons to
interfere with its mission.

Q: In reiterating his support for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the President signaling his expectation that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia but we
do not
expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to
achi
eve that goal.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15
mill
ion of
transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a
P
residential
Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to
the allies. The
Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of
equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$27 million of goods and services -- under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged approach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and tightening his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospects for an overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of all-out war that would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the conflict, and effectively end the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably

through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on the ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequate plan and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NATO to deter a repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we abandon our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other parties to the conflict in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR efforts that have proven ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel. It will be used to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.
- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:
 - emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;
 - help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;
 - facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.
- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for UNPROFOR.
- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move it into theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.
- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:
 - provide close air support through NATO;
 - assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;
 - provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);
- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain

UNPROFOR

, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does not seem to be any Congressional support?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our Allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We plan to work with the United Nations and other member states to establish a voluntary fund as a means to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services to support our allies.)

-- (If pressed) Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- (If pressed) As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services will be provided.

-- (If pressed) The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser targets, designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to

a
ircraft and
helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence
support.

-- (If pressed) We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air
Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence
capabilities. T
his support
would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings (Of the RRF's
14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved
manpower cei
lings
previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will
repres
ent no more than
\$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.)

-- We have informally consulted with the Congress on our intent to use Section
506(a
(1)
emergency drawdown authorities of the FAA to provide up to \$15 million of
DOD goods
and services
(primarily transportation and equipment) to our allies participating in the RRF.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15
mill
ion of
transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a
P
residential
Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transpiration support to
the allies. The
Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3
milli
on.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for
the p
rovision of
up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a
authoriti
es and primarily for

transpiration services and equipment.

NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusion zones been rendered null and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the UN commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and political situation.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demonstrated that it is totally ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid, protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alter natives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Results to Date:

Q: Isn't our policy of support for UNPROFOR bankrupt?

-- No. While the tragedy of recent events is enormous, you should not overlook what has been accomplished to date:

-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bosnia's

Muslims and Croats, which has brought peace to the vast majority of territory under Bosnian government control;

-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)

-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne

relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;

-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);

-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war out of the

air over Bosnia for two and a half years; and

-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.
U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the conflict or to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or if units need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties, to use U.S. troops as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying out in good faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of military plans,

we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire arms and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

Points on the Dole Amendment

-- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would hinder our efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.

-- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. military support to the Bosnian government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and Serbia.

-- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the international community's other efforts have yielded significant benefits.

-- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing the killing and suffering in Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.

- UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million people. Its presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of Central Bosnia.

- UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and is fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.

-- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

-- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partners to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them limited support and time to prove themselves.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue to oppose unilateral lift.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government

would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively with its new arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo within 12 weeks of the date the Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually ensures Allied entanglement in the war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the mission could take up to 22 weeks.
- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.
- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.
- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.
- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.
- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.
- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.
- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war.
- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.
- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like Serbia, would likely provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.
- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes, such

as those against Iraq and Libya, that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to distinguish between Bosnia and other situations.

-- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with respect to decisions that could involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and other Americans to imminent risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential responsibilities.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and risks of an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and protecting the Bosnians that will follow?

-- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

NIGERIA: McHenry Missions

Q: What details can you provide on Amb. McHenry's secret missions to Nigeria? With whom did he meet?

A: In December 1994, the President asked Ambassador Donald McHenry, a private citizen, to approach leading Nigerians -- in the government, in opposition groups, and private citizens -- to ascertain how the USG could assist Nigeria in a rapid return to democratic civilian government.

Ambassador McHenry has traveled to Nigeria several times under this mandate. His e

fforts have been
closely coordinated with the Administration.

His discussions with Nigerians have been useful. He has expressed growing U.S.
con
cern about the
lack of progress toward restoration of civilian rule.

(If pressed):

Ambassador McHenry has made a total of 6 visits to Nigeria in the past seven
months
. The
most recent visit was within the past month.

(If pressed):

He has met with representatives of a broad range of the political spectrum, both
pu
blic and
private, in Nigeria, including General Abacha.

Q: What have been the results of the McHenry missions?

A: Ambassador McHenry's mission has contributed to our efforts to communicate
to Nig
eria our
concern about the lack of progress toward democracy. We believe that frank
exchange
of views can
only increase understanding and may advance positive change.

This mission was undertaken on a confidential basis because we believe a private
di
alogue can
at times yield better result. We believe it would be counterproductive to further d
iscuss or characterize
its status at this time.

Q: Are we considering further sanctions if death sentence are carried out against
Ob
asanjo or other
alleged coup plotters?

A: We are reviewing, in conjunction with our allies, all policy options. We do not
rule out any
sanctions.

U.S. - CUBA MIGRATION TALKS

Background: U.S. -Cuba migration review talks were held in Havana July 17-18. These were part of a series of regular talks to discuss exclusively migration issues between the two countries. The U.S. delegation was led by Anne Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and the Cuban delegation was led by Ricardo Alarcon, president of Cuba's National Assembly. No agreement was reached, and differences remain on a number of issues.

Key Points

- The talks held in Havana were part of regular discussions on migration issues between the U.S. and Cuba.
- Both sides agreed that the September 9 and May 2 accords were working. They are directing migration into legal channels, while discouraging unsafe migration.
- The U.S. raised several suggestions to assure that the two sides do everything to facilitate safe, orderly and legal migration.
- No new agreements were reached.

Qs & As

Q: Which issues remain unresolved?

A: A broad range of migration issues was discussed. Many of them were operational. These talks were not aimed simply at reaching discrete agreements but are part of an ongoing process to promote safe, orderly and legal migration.

[If pressed]

The fees charged by the Cuban government to migrants who have already been issued travel documents was one of the issues discussed.

Q: Did the Cubans raise other issues such as lifting the sanctions imposed by President Clinton last August?

A: Yes, the Cuban government raised those issues but they were outside the scope of these talks. These discussions dealt solely with questions involving safe, orderly and legal migration.

CUBA AND NEWS BUREAUS

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times story of July 17? Are we on the verge of a deal with the Cuban Government on news bureaus?

A: The Administration continually reviews all aspects of our policy toward Cuba, exploring ways to make the embargo more effective and to provide support to the Cuban people. In that context, the Administration is still reviewing the possibility of licensing U.S. news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba and of permitting Cuban official news organs to operate in the United States.

Licensing decisions are exclusively the decision of the U.S. Government and no "negotiations" with Cuba about this issue have occurred nor are any planned.

Q: Is Senator Helms' insistence on letting Radio Marti/TV Marti into Cuba the

sticki
ng point?

A: Radio and TV Marti are not commercial news stations. They comprise the Office of Cuba Broadcasting in the Bureau of Broadcasting of USIA which is represented at our Interests Section in Havana. Under consideration is the licensing of commercial news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba.

Although Radio and TV Marti would certainly benefit from a greater flow of accurate, uncensored news from Cuba, they are not directly related to the issue of reciprocal news bureaus.

CHINA

Q: What is the Administration's position on the China legislation passed by the House of Representatives yesterday?

We are pleased that the House tabled the resolution of disapproval of the President's decision to continue Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status for China. The Administration strongly opposed this resolution and is pleased the vote margin was substantial.

The China Policy Act of 1995 is a bill developed by the House leadership that addresses many of the outstanding issues in the U.S.-China relationship (e.g., Harry Wu, nonproliferation). We have problems with some specific provisions of this bill, although we support its goals.

We did not oppose this bill because the disapproval resolution was so much worse in terms of its overall impact. We do not know at this point if a similar bill is being considered by the Senate.

Q: What is the status of the Harry Wu case?

A: We remain very concerned about the Harry Wu case and continue to work to persuade the Chinese government to release him.

Q: What are you doing to get Harry Wu out?

A: We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself.

We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case is of great importance for U.S.-China relations.

We continue to request more frequent consular access.

In addition to the visit with Mr. Wu by our consul general on July 10, we have made one additional effort to meet with him, but were turned down by local authorities.

Although the U.S. embassy officer, who was traveling in Wuhan on other business, was not permitted to see Wu, we were able to deliver some written material to him.

Background: (NOT FOR USE WITH PRESS)

China announced that it is closing an area off the coast of Fujian Province (in the Taiwan Straits) to all foreign air traffic and shipping from July 21-28 for the purpose of launching a surface-to-surface missile. It did not say what kind of missile, but the size of the closed area -- small and circular -- suggests it could be an MRBM. Taiwan is somewhat alarmed and has sharply criticized Beijing's heavy-handed tactic.

Q: Is the Chinese missile exercise in the Taiwan Strait a threat to Taiwan?

A: We have no information to suggest that this is anything other than an exercise.

Taiwan's security is not in jeopardy. That said, we consider the activity unnecessary and provocative.

We are concerned that tensions are in the Taiwan Straits. We hope that both sides will seek to avoid taking steps that could exacerbate the situation.

The United States has for many years supported the process of peaceful dialogue and

negotiation of differences between China and Taiwan. Both sides, in our view, have an interest in maintaining the atmosphere of peace and cooperation that has enabled both sides to develop their economies.

We believe that China and Taiwan over the past few years have developed good, cooperative processes for discussing problems and resolving differences. We hope they will continue to develop.

Q: Have any missiles actually been fired?

A: I'll take your question.

Q: Is this exercise related to the Lee Teng-hui visit to the U.S.?

A: That is a question for the Chinese government.

Q: Will the United States protest to China about the exercise?

A: There are no plans to do so. The PRC has undertaken training exercises in this region in the past. It has notified the international shipping and air transport communities of the closure areas in an appropriate fashion.

Q: Will the United States support Taiwan if China attacks?

A: That is a completely speculative question unwarranted by the circumstances.

Q: What impact is all this having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

A: Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range of our bilateral interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engaged on issues of mutual interest.

The Secretary of State will be meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on August 1, when both will be attending an ASEAN meeting in Brunei.

Q: What is your view of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement that the meeting between Qian and Christopher is critical to the future of the relationship?

A: We acknowledge that this is an important meeting to discuss serious issues. We would caution against over-dramatization, however. The communication process between two major powers requires frequent contacts at many levels.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that apologize for inviting Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. and promise not to let it happen again?

The President stands by his decision and has no intention of apologizing.

The decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and

ully
consistent with American values and opinion.

We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it
const
itute a
change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will Lee be allowed to visit again?

We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case
b
asis, based
on our judgment of what is in the U.S. interest. The Secretary of State noted a
few
days ago that we
expect visits to be completely private and rare. There is no request pending at the
moment.

U.S.-JAPAN AVIATION NEGOTIATIONS

-- Following talks between U.S. Secretary of Transportation Frederico Pena, and
Japa
nese
Minister for Transport Shizuka Kamei, the Government of Japan recognized the
rights
of U.S. carriers
under the U.S.-Japan aviation agreement. The Japanese aeronautical authorities
have
approved the
application of Federal Express to operate without encumbrance on seven routes
that h
ave been under
discussion for some time.

-- This approval will allow Federal Express to open its new facility at Subic Bay,
P
hilippines -- a
vital hub designed to serve the rapidly growing Asian cargo market through
Subic and
Japan.

-- Following approval of the Federal Express routes and recognition of the rights
of
U.S. carriers,
Secretary Pena and Minister Kamei held additional talks this morning in Los

Angeles
to begin a process of
expanding air cargo opportunities for the benefit of both our nations. They have
in
structed their
representatives to reach an agreement today that would provide a concrete plan
for d
iscussions to
move toward a more liberal all-cargo relationship, and that would provide an
additio
nal route for Japanese
cargo service to Chicago.

-- Consultations between Japan and the U.S. will begin in September aiming at
removi
ng
restrictions so as to achieve equality of opportunity between Japanese carriers and
U.S. carriers, and
at achieving a more liberal framework in the field of all cargo services. These neg
otiations should be
concluded in a six month period.

IF ASKED:

Q: By agreeing to a new route for Japanese air cargo service to Chicago, without
gai
ning
immediately a comparable route for the U.S., didn't the U.S. in effect pay for
right
s it already enjoyed
under the existing treaty?

A: No. Our position has been constant for months -- once the Federal Exress
routes
were
approved and our rights under the existing treaty acknowledged, the U.S. would
move
directly to
consider an agenda of other air cargo issues. The talks underway today are
designed
to begin a process
that will lead to an expansion of air cargo opportunities for the carriers of both n
ations.

Q: Does the Administration agree with claims by Japan that the aviation treaty is
im
balanced and
needs to be renegotiated?

A: The U.S. recognizes that the Government of Japan is concerned about a perceived imbalance in opportunities made available to Japanese and U.S. carriers. The talks that begin today are designed to consider those concerns in the context of discussions that liberalize air cargo services and expand the opportunities for both nations.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign operations appropriations bill last evening passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your advisors have not yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropriating considerably less than we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would reinforce the Mexico City family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia and Mexico. It also contains other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations appropriations bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, giving the Administration flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is particularly important because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are to meet our international commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems. These include the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning process and other amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many

programs. These reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy. We will work with the committees to obtain additional funding for these programs, (e.g. funding for the World Bank and for Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a decision about what to do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies; and deep funding cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and the Foreign Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto the State Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendation for the Foreign Assistance Act.)

HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announced where reruns would be taking place. The results point to a significant Lavalas victory, but it is important to note that, overall,

non-Lavalas parties gathered roughly 60-65% of the vote and that a second round will be required in about 70% of the parliamentary or senate races. The Lavalas share of 35-40% of the vote should be viewed in light of President Aristide's 70% share when he was elected in 1991. Reruns will take place in about 20% of localities. This is more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns are now scheduled for August 6 and the second round for August 27, though both dates remain subject to change.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral Council's announcement. A number of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the elections. Amb. Swing is attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral council acted in ways that justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the elections was not significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud. Bob Pastor, a member of the Carter Center, offered a different and far more critical assessment of the elections. While he acknowledges that the security situation was adequate, and that there was no centralized effort to subvert the process, he calls these the "most disastrous" of 13 elections he observed.

Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time, were able to vote peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of their choice. In light of Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine months ago it was ruled by a repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, will

It require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or of an attempt to subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy, especially in one of the poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral process and might not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a mistake. The parties, the electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards strengthening Haiti's democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and preparing for upcoming elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Pastor's Assessment of the Elections

-- We do not share Bob Pastor's overall negative assessment. Our assessment is closer to that of most international observers -- the European Union, the United Nations, and the OAS, which had the benefit of the largest observation mission of all.

-- However, as we have always said, these were far from perfect elections. Indeed, many of the irregularities noted in Bob Pastors' report were mentioned by the Presidential Delegation that observed the elections and by Administration officials.

-- At the same time, we should not make unfair comparisons or have unrealistic expectations.

Haiti is the poorest, and least educated country in the hemisphere. There is little infrastructure, telecommunications capability, or practicable roads. Only nine months ago, Haitians were ruled by a repressive military regime. They had never experienced an election free of violence and wide-scale intimidation.

-- Taken all that into account, these elections were a remarkable achievement.

-- These were the first elections in Haiti's history free of violence. For the first time ever,

Haitians were able to exercise their democratic right to vote without intimidation. This was noted by every observer mission and is the most basic requirement for a true democracy.

-- Observer missions, including Bob Pastor's, agreed that there was no systematic fraud or a centralized attempt to subvert the electoral process. Indeed, Pastor's report emphasizes that even the party closest to President Aristide, the OPL, suffered from the irregularities. As one observer put it, the process was "free, fair, and fouled up."

-- There were 11,000 candidates from over 20 parties. They were free to express themselves and to campaign.

-- These elections represent an important step forward. The most important task now is to build on what has been achieved, correct the errors that were made, and resolve the differences between the political parties and the electoral council so that the electoral process can continue with the support of all Haitians. We know that President Aristide is committed to strengthening Haiti's democracy and is trying hard to move the process forward. That is also what the Administration and Ambassador Swing have

been working for from day one.

Qs & As.

Q: Will you oppose reruns and runoffs until differences between Aristide and the parties are resolved, as urged by Bob Pastor?

A: It is not up to us to agree to or to oppose reruns and runoffs. It is up to the Haitians. Our embassy has and will continue to do what it can to help the parties overcome their differences and strengthen Haiti's young democracy.

Q: What are the Administration's views of Pastor's specific recommendations?

A: Bob Pastor has many interesting ideas on how to get the process back on track, some of which we have been suggesting -- such as a national dialogue, improved training and support for local electoral officials and poll-watchers, and improved procedures for ballot counting. Once again, we have been encouraging Haitians to take these steps and are ready to assist in any way possible. At the same time, it is important that these elections reflect the will of the Haitian people, and not the outcome of backroom dealings.

Q: Will the Administration be sending a mediator?

A: There is no such plan. But as I said, we are available to assist in the ways Haitians believe most appropriate.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicly and privately, that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitution, limiting the President to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on track, which calls for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President in February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in U.S. policy.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protracted.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change. Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Yeltsin acknowledged in his July 18 television interview he had suffered heart attack.

-- Understand there will be period of convalescence.

-- With proper care and medical attention, Yeltsin should be able to return to normal schedule.

-- Prior to his interview on Tuesday, Yeltsin spent hour talking with Chernomyrdin and

Nationalities Minister Mikhaylov about various issues, including Chechnya .

Announcement of Duma Election Date

-- Yeltsin has issued decree that Russian Duma elections will be held December 17. Welcome this as positive, normal step for democratizing Russia.

Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices. Addressing political as well as military issues. Understand remaining point of difference at this time is the future status of Chechnya (i.e. Chechnya's relationship to the Russian Federation)

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence," achieve negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

Rejection of U.S. ABM Treaty Proposal

-- Since May summit in Moscow, U.S. has been engaged in dialogue with Russia on how best to follow up on Joint Statement of Principles we agreed upon there to guide future negotiations on demarcation between theater missile defenses (which are not restricted by ABM Treaty) and strategic missile defenses (which are).

-- Deputy Secretary Talbott recently reviewed Russian paper on this subject that we found disappointing.

-- We do not, however, view this as Russia's last word on this subject.

-- We will continue to press Russia to adopt negotiating position that reflects demarcation principles we agreed upon in May.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime

Mini
ster

Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively with Russia toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.