

M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 18 July 95 17:53  
**FROM** Danvers, William C.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** FW: Daily Guidance Update [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Fetig, James L.  
Mitchell, Calvin A.  
Wozniak, Natalie S.  
**CARBON\_COPY** Andricos, George M.  
Burrell, Christina L.  
Danvers, William C.  
**TEXT\_BODY**  
Jim-- a few changes.  
  
From: Fetig, James L.  
To: @NSC - NSC Staff  
CC: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: Daily Guidance Update [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Tuesday, July 18, 1995 05:41 PM  
  
[[ JUL18GUI.DOC : 4369 in JUL18GUI.DOC ]]

Please review and forward your updates to @Press by 10:00 a.m. tomorrow.  
Thanks. This system for updating the guidance seems to be working very well.

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 18 July 95 13:34  
**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** JUL18GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 18, 1995

Bosnia (includes talking points on Dole Amendment)

Iraq: Richardson/Daliberti Meeting with POTUS

Guatemala

Cuba and News Bureaus

Cuban-American Flotilla

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

China (to be updated China MFN and House Resolution)

U.S.-Japan Civil Aviation Dispute

Haiti

Russia

## BOSNIA

### Key Points:

- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:
- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state;
- to prevent the spread of the conflict;
- to help limit the loss of life;
- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.
- That is why the United States
- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;
- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;
- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;
- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;
- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.

-- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.

-- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo

-- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.

-- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.

-- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

Srebrenica and Zepa

-- What has happened in Srebrenica and Zepa is tragic and inhumane. No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- Continued actions by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and against the enclave of Zepa is a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.

-- The Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas were established primarily as a haven for refugees expelled from other parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The attack against these undefended enclaves and the peacekeepers stationed there, and the reports of brutal ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of this travesty, provide further dramatic proof of the intent of Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group to ensure that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are

ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to all the civilian refugees in the enclave, and to cease their illegal and inhumane detention of groups of refugees on the basis of unsubstantiated or trumped-up "war criminal" charges.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.

-- Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.

-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their influence to stop this aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers. Serbia must make clear in word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts. In particular, it should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission.

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and draw the United States in.

#### Q & A: Hot Issues

##### U.S. Military Assistance for defense of Gorazde

Q: U.S. commitment of ground troops/Chirac request for assistance in saving enclave.  
S.

-- As we have said consistently, we will not commit ground troops to the conflict.

-- We are reviewing other options under discussion.

-- General Shali met over the weekend with his British and French counterparts to discuss various

military options for strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to protect the remaining Safe Areas, and the National Security Council and key advisors have been examining those options over the past 48 hours.

-- Short of providing ground forces, we are looking for ways to support our allies in their commitment to make UNPROFOR stronger. These include those that have already been made public,

such as using helicopters to assist UNPROFOR reinforcement of Gorazde and restoring the legitimacy of the threat of air power. Since the details involve sensitive military plans being developed in conjunction with the troop contributing nations, and it would not be appropriate to comment on them further.

(If pressed) Q: Wouldn't the use of helicopters cross the line into the use of American ground forces?

-- No. What is being looked at is a one time provision of airlift to assist the French in moving troops to Gorazde, if this option is chosen -- and that decision has NOT been taken by us or our allies yet.

Q: Are the Eastern enclaves viable?

-- We deplore the tragic and inhumane events taking place in Srebrenica and Zepa.

-- We are consulting with the Contact Group and UNHCR to address the urgent humanitarian needs of civilians.

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;  
-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.  
-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- We have not seen the final text.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift. Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces. The 12 week delay Dole is proposing flies in the face of all U.S. and Allied military advice, which sees withdrawal taking up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war

-- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

Q: Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey is meeting with administration and congressional leaders to call for lifting the arms embargo. If that's what the Bosnians say they want, why not support them?

-- We support the concept of a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, should the UNPROFOR mission be terminated.

-- We do not support unilateral lift, which would have the effect of causing UNPROFOR to withdraw prematurely.

-- We remain concerned that, in the time between lifting the embargo and the integration of new weapons into the Bosnian armed forces, the Bosnian Serbs would take military action that the Bosnians would be hard pressed to resist on their own.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws. Isn't that the Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of UNPROFOR and cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame for the deteriorating situation would be placed on us.

President's Comments on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR may leave.



Do you expect  
UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with  
Serb acti  
ons to  
interfere with its mission.

Q: In reiterating his support for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the Pr  
esident signaling his expectation  
that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia  
but we  
do not  
expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to  
achi  
eve that goal.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15  
mil  
lion of  
transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a  
P  
residential  
Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transpiration support to  
the allies. The  
Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of  
equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$27 mi  
llion of goods  
and services -- under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged

appr  
oach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and tightening his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospects for an overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of all-out war that would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the conflict, and effectively end the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on the ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequate plan and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NAT  
O to deter a  
repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we  
abandon  
our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate th  
e military  
standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other pa  
rties to the conflict  
in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other  
UNPROFOR ef  
forts that have proven  
ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander  
with well-  
armed  
and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations  
person  
nel. It will be used  
to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity  
to car  
ry out its existing  
mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible  
for  
UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the

RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move it into theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does not seem to be any Congressional support?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our Allies who are contributing troops

s to the RRF.

-- We plan to work with the United Nations and other member states to establish a voluntary fund as a means to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services to support our allies.)

-- (If pressed) Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- (If pressed) As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services will be provided.

-- (If pressed) The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser target designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to aircraft and helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence support.

-- (If pressed) We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. T

his support  
would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings (Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ceilings previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will represent no more than \$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.)

-- We have informally consulted with the Congress on our intent to use Section 506(a)(1) emergency drawdown authorities of the FAA to provide up to \$15 million of DOD goods and services (primarily transportation and equipment) to our allies participating in the RRF.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3 million.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for the provision of up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a authorities and primarily for transportation services and equipment.

NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusion zones been rendered null and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with

the  
UN  
commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military  
and  
political situation.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has  
repeatedly demons  
trated that it is totally

ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid , protecting the citizens in the  
Safe Areas from attack, or ending  
the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian  
suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief  
organizatio  
ns are  
feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons,  
and  
others affected by  
the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been  
saved a  
nd  
violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat  
Federation,  
which  
has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic  
cooperation  
is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the  
alter  
natives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that  
would  
surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Ame  
ricanizes war

and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Results to Date:

Q: Isn't our policy of support for UNPROFOR bankrupt?

-- No. While the tragedy of recent events is enormous, you should not overlook what has been accomplished to date:

-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bosnia's

Muslims and Croats, which has brought peace to the vast majority of territory under Bosnian government control;

-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)

-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne

relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;

-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);

-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war out of the

air over Bosnia for two and a half years; and

-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.



#### U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the conflict or to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or if units need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties, to use U.S. troops as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying out in good faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of military plans, we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

#### Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to

withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire arms and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

#### Points on the Dole Amendment

-- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would hinder our efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.

-- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. military support to the Bosnian government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and Serbia.

-- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the international community's other efforts have yielded significant benefits.

-- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing the killing and suffering in

Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.

- UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million people.

Its

presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of Central Bosnia.

- UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and is fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.

- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partner to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them limited support and time to prove themselves.

- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue to oppose unilateral lift.

- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government

would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively with its new arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo within 1

2 weeks of the date the  
Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually  
ensures A  
llied entanglement in the  
war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the  
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-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertai  
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pressure to  
intervene to stem the  
deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the  
war

-- thus making the war a  
unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like  
Serbia, would likely provide military  
assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes,  
such  
as those against Iraq and  
Libya. that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to disting  
uish between Bosnia and other  
situations.

-- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with respect to decisions that could involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and other Americans to imminent risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential responsibilities.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and risks of an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and protecting the Bosnians that will follow?

-- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

#### IRAQ: RICHARDSON/DALIBERTI MEETING WITH POTUS

-- The President will welcome the Richardson Mission home early this evening in the Oval Office. He will receive Congressman and Mrs. Bill Richardson, David Daliberti and his wife Kathy, and members of the Florida delegation, where the Dalibertis live.

-- The Barloon family is having their reunion in Kuwait. The President told Bill Barloon that he hoped to meet him. Once the family comes to the States, we'll arrange a meeting.

#### GUATEMALA HUMAN RIGHTS

Background: The Washington Post Style Section ran an article featuring allegations by Sister Diana Ortiz of being abducted, raped and tortured while in Guatemala in 1989. At that time the U.S. Embassy provided assistance to Ortiz, and has pressed the Guatemalan Government to investigate her case. Sister Ortiz' case is also subject to IOB review. While Ortiz at one time implied that the "North American" who allegedly rescued her from her torture was affiliated with the U.S. Embassy, her lawyer has since retracted that claim. The Post article also mentions the Harbury case; Jennifer Harbury continues to work with the Guatemalan Special Prosecutor to secure legal permission to excavate a site where it is rumored her husband's remains are buried.

#### Points

(on Sister Diana Ortiz)

-- Since 1989, the U.S. Embassy and the State Department have provided assistance to Sister Ortiz and have pressed the Guatemalan Government to conduct a thorough investigation of the incident.

-- While Sister Ortiz' lawyers have reiterated that they do not believe the U.S. Embassy had any role in the abduction or torture of Sister Ortiz, her case is nonetheless subject to review by the Intelligence Oversight Board, which is reviewing all aspects of allegations relating to the abduction, torture or killing of American citizens in Guatemala since 1984.

(on Jennifer Harbury)

-- We understand Ms. Harbury continues to seek to begin excavation at a site in Guatemala where it is rumored the remains of her husband might be found. The U.S. Embassy in

Guatem  
 ala continues to  
 provide her with every appropriate assistance in that endeavor.

## CUBA AND NEWS BUREAUS

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times story today? Are we on the verge of a deal with the Cuban Government on news bureaus?

A: The Administration continually reviews all aspects of our policy toward Cuba, exploring ways to make the embargo more effective and to provide support to the Cuban people. In that context, the Administration is still reviewing the possibility of allowing reciprocal establishment of news bureaus in the U.S. and Cuba.

Q: Is Senator Helms' insistence on letting Radio Marti/TV Marti into Cuba the sticking point?

A: Radio and TV Marti are not commercial news stations. They comprise the Office of Cuban Broadcasting in the Bureau of Broadcasting of USIA which is represented at our Interests Section in Havana. Under consideration is the licensing of commercial news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba.

Although Radio and TV Marti would certainly benefit from a greater flow of accurate, uncensored news from Cuba, they are not directly related to the issue of reciprocal news bureaus.

## CUBAN-AMERICAN FLOTILLA

Background: The organizers of yesterday's Cuban-American "flotilla" say that a Cuban coast guard vessel rammed their flagship, the Democracia, injuring three people (including a Dade County Commissioner). The collision occurred about two miles inside Cuban territorial waters. US Coast Guard picked up the injured persons after the flotilla returned to international waters, and they are receiving medical treatment in Key West.

The US Interests Section yesterday asked the Cuban government for its version of events. The GOC this morning publicly released a statement reporting on the flotilla's entrance into Cuban waters and flotilla-associated aircrafts' violation of Cuban airspace, dropping leaflets along the seaside drive in Havana. The GOC says that its border guards "maintained great composure throughout the provocations" and did not ram, bow first, the Democracia. It border guard boats "simply came alongside and prevented the advance" of the flotilla boat. Flotilla organizers videotaped the incident and have provided the tape to US TV stations. (FYI: The videotape is subject to different interpretations.)

(If asked)

Q: What comment do you have on yesterday's collision involving a boat in the Cuban-American flotilla and Cuban coast guard vessels?

A: We regret that a collision occurred and that several persons were injured. We have urged all parties to exercise utmost restraint.

We would refer you to the State Department for any additional details on the incident.



nt.

## HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign operations appropriations bill last evening passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your advisors have not yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropriations, the bill contains provisions that are considerably less than we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would reimpose the Mexico City family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia and Mexico. It also contains other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations appropriations bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, giving the Administration flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is particularly important because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are to meet our international commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems. These include the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning process and other amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many programs. These reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy. We will work with the committees to obtain additional funding for these programs, (e.g. funding for the

W  
orld Bank and for  
Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a decision about what to do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies; and deep funding cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and the Foreign Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto the State Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendation for the Foreign Assistance Act.)

CHINA

Q: What is the status of the vote on MFN for China?

A: Congressional action is anticipated in the near future. We hope the Congress will confirm the President's decision to extend MFN for China.

Q: Is the Administration working with the Congress on a second resolution critical of China?

A: The House leadership is considering how best to address the MFN issue. Obviously, we will want to monitor any additional Congressional initiatives that might be developing.

Q: How can you grant MFN when Harry Wu is still in jail?

A: We remain very concerned about the Harry Wu case and continue to work to persuade the Chinese government to release him. But we do not believe denying MFN to China would help. It would, in fact, more likely result in harsher treatment for Wu.

It is important that the issues be treated separately. The President determined in 1994 and reiterated this year that the best way for bringing about long-term improvements in China's human rights record was to maintain a comprehensive engagement with China, including in the area of economic and commercial relations.

Q: What are you doing to get Harry Wu out?

A: We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself.

We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case is of great importance for U.S.-China relations.

Q: What about Chinese hints that he will be freed after the investigation is completed?

A: We cannot base our approach on hints and rumors. Our position is unchanged. He should be released immediately.

Q: What impact is this case having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

A: The Harry Wu case is receiving our full attention and is a high-priority issue. We have made clear that it will be high on the agenda as long as he remains imprisoned.

Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range of our bilateral interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engaged on issues of mutual interest.

The Secretary of State will be meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on August 1, when both will be attending an ASEAN meeting in Brunei.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that apologize for inviting Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. and promise not to let it happen again?

The President stands by his decision and has no intention of apologizing.

The decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and fully consistent with American values and opinion.

We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it constitute a change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will Lee be allowed to visit again?

We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case basis, based on our judgment of what is in the U.S. interest. There is no request pending at the moment.

#### U.S.-JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION DISPUTE

Background: There was no agreement between the U.S. and Japan during the July 13-15 civil aviation talks in Tokyo. However, Japan has proposed another Vice Ministerial-level meeting, followed by a meeting between Secretary Pena and Ministry of Transport Minister Kamei. We have accepted this proposal in principle and are now in the process of discussing with the Japanese the modalities (e.g., time, place) of that meeting.

#### Talking Points:

- We continue to work towards a negotiated solution to this dispute which recognizes the rights of U.S. carriers such as Federal Express under the existing agreement.
- While the talks last week did not reach an agreement, we believe that they were productive.
- Japan has proposed another round of Vice Ministerial-level talks, followed by a meeting between Secretary Pena and Minister Kamei.
- We have accepted that idea in principle and are now discussing the venue and timing for such talks in the next several days.

## HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announced where reruns would be taking place. The results point to a significant Lavalas victory, but it is important to note that, overall, non-Lavalas parties gathered roughly 60-65% of the vote and that a second round will be required in about 70% of the parliamentary or senate races. The Lavalas share of 35-40% of the vote should be viewed in light of President Aristide's 70% share when he was elected in 1991. Reruns will take place in about 20% of localities. This is more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns are still scheduled for July 22, though it is unlikely this will be sufficient time.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral Council's announcement. A number of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the elections. Amb. Swing is attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral council acted in ways that justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the elections was not significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud.

## Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time, were able to vote peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of their choice. In light of Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine months ago it was ruled by a repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, will require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or of an attempt to subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy, especially in one of the poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral process and might not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a mistake. The parties, the electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards strengthening Haiti's democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and preparing for upcoming elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicly and privately, that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitution, limiting the President to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on track, which calls for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President in February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in US policy.

## RUSSIA

### U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protracted.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change. Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

### Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Russians report that Yeltsin's doctors have recommended that he remain in the hospital this week, further report that Yeltsin continues to work from the hospital.

-- Have seen reports that Chernomyrdin visited Yeltsin in the hospital today for about an hour.

### Announcement of Duma Election Date

-- Yeltsin has issued decree that Russian Duma elections will be held December 17. Welcome this as positive, normal step for democratizing Russia.

### July 12 Impeachment Vote

-- Russian Duma voted July 12 on motion to set up commission to consider impeachment



proceedings against Yeltsin. Motion failed to gather 226 votes needed to pass.

#### Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices.

Address

ing

political as well as military issues. Understand remaining point of difference at this time is the future

status of Chechnya (i.e. Chechnya's relationship to the Russian Federation

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence," achieve

negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

#### Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime

Mini

ster

Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with

Iran,

given

Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

#### Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers

succeed

in building

democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S.

Not i

n our interest to

cut this assistance.

#### Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work

actively

with Russia

toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to

develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 18 July 95 17:54  
**FROM** Wozniak, Natalie S.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** July 18 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Beardsley, Tyler S.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY** [[ JUL18GUI.DOC : 4383 in JUL18GUI.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 18 July 95 17:52

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** JUL18GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 18, 1995

Bosnia (includes talking points on Dole Amendment)

Iraq: Richardson/Daliberti Meeting with POTUS

Guatemala

Cuba and News Bureaus

Cuban-American Flotilla

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

China (to be updated China MFN and House Resolution)

U.S.-Japan Civil Aviation Dispute

Haiti

Russia

## BOSNIA

### Key Points:

- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:
- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state;
- to prevent the spread of the conflict;
- to help limit the loss of life;
- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.
- That is why the United States
- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;
- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;
- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;
- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;
- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.
- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.
- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo
- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;
- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get

out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.

-- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.

-- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

#### Srebrenica and Zepa

-- What has happened in Srebrenica and Zepa is tragic and inhumane. No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- Continued actions by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and against the enclave of Zepa is a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.

-- The Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas were established primarily as a haven for refugees expelled from other parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The attack against these undefended enclaves and the peacekeepers stationed there, and the reports of brutal ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of this travesty, provide further dramatic proof of the intent of Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group to ensure that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dut

ch peacekeepers are

ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to all the civilian refugees in the enclave, and to cease their illegal and inhumane detention of groups of refugees on the basis of unsubstantiated or trumped-up "war criminal" charges.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.

-- Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.

-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their influence to stop this aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers. Serbi a must make clear in word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts. In particular, it should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission.

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and draw the United States in.

Q & A: Hot Issues

U.S. Military Assistance for defense of Gorazde

Q: U.S. commitment of ground troops/Chirac request for assistance in saving enclave

s.

-- As we have said consistently, we will not commit ground troops to the conflict.

-- We are reviewing other options under discussion.

-- General Shali met over the weekend with his British and French counterparts to as  
sess various

military options for strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to protect the remaining Safe  
Areas, and the  
National Security Council and key advisors have been examining those options  
over th  
e past 48 hours.

-- Short of providing ground forces, we are looking for ways to support our allies  
i  
n their  
commitment to make UNPROFOR stronger. These include those that have  
already been ma  
de public,  
such as using helicopters to assist UNPROFOR reinforcement of Gorazde and  
restoring  
the legitimacy of  
the threat of air power. Since the details involve sensitive military plans being d  
eveloped in conjunction  
with the troop contributing nations, and it would not be appropriate to comment  
on t  
hem further.

(If pressed) Q: Wouldn't the use of helicopters cross the line into the use of Ameri  
can ground  
forces?

-- No. What is being looked at is a one time provision of airlift to assist the Fre  
nch in moving

troops to Gorazde, if this option is chosen -- and that decision has NOT been taken by us or our allies yet.

Q: Are the Eastern enclaves viable?

-- We deplore the tragic and inhumane events taking place in Srebrenica and Zepa.

-- We are consulting with the Contact Group and UNHCR to address the urgent humanitarian needs of civilians.

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;  
-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.  
-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- We have not seen the final text.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift. Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while



UNPROFOR for  
ces are still in place would  
make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.  
The 1  
2 week delay Dole is  
proposing flies in the face of all U.S. and Allied military advice, which sees  
withd  
rawal taking up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S.  
would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to mak  
e major gains in the months  
before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame  
for UNPROFOR's failure on  
the U.S.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to  
intervene to stem the  
deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war

-- thus making the war a  
unilateral U.S. responsibility.

Q: Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey is meeting with administration and congressional leaders to call for lifting the arms embargo. If that's what the Bosnians say they want, why not support them?

-- We support the concept of a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, should the UNPROFOR mission be terminated.

-- We do not support unilateral lift, which would have the effect of causing UNPROFOR to withdraw prematurely.

-- We remain concerned that, in the time between lifting the embargo and the integration of new weapons into the Bosnian armed forces, the Bosnian Serbs would take military action that the Bosnians would be hard pressed to resist on their own.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws. Isn't that the Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of UNPROFOR and cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame for the deteriorating situation would be placed on us.

#### President's Comments on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR may leave. Do you expect UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with Serbian actions to interfere with its mission.

Q: In reiterating his support for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the President signaling his expectation that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia but we do not expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to achieve that goal.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$27 million of goods and services -- under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged approach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and tightening his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for

Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospects for an overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of all-out war that would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the conflict, and effectively end the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on the ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequate plan and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NATO to deter a repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we abandon our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other pa

rties to the conflict  
in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other  
UNPROFOR ef  
forts that have proven  
ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander  
with well-  
armed  
and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations  
person  
nel. It will be used  
to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity  
to car  
ry out its existing  
mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible  
for  
UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling  
its mandate, the

RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help  
move  
it into  
theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troop  
s to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress,  
we would be  
prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely i  
ntelligence  
data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment  
(but no  
t  
with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR  
, whose  
presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve cond  
itions for political  
settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there  
does no  
t seem to be any  
Congressional support?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our Allies who are contributing troop  
s to the RRF.

-- We plan to work with the United Nations and other member states to establish a vo  
luntary fund  
as a means to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services to support our allies.)

-- (If pressed) Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- (If pressed) As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services will be provided.

-- (If pressed) The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser target designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to aircraft and helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence support.

-- (If pressed) We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. This support would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings (Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ceilings previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will represent no more than \$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.)

-- We have informally consulted with the Congress on our intent to use Section 506(a

(1)  
 emergency drawdown authorities of the FAA to provide up to \$15 million of  
 DOD goods  
 and services  
 (primarily transportation and equipment) to our allies participating in the RRF.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15  
 million of  
 transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a  
 Presidential  
 Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to  
 the allies. The  
 Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3  
 million.  
 on.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for  
 the provision of  
 up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a  
 authorities  
 and primarily for  
 transportation services and equipment.

NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons  
 exclusion  
 zones been rendered null  
 and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with  
 the  
 UN  
 commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military  
 and  
 political situation.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has  
 repeatedly demonstrated  
 that it is totally

ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid , protecting the citizens in the



Safe Areas from attack, or ending the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alternative:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Results to Date:

Q: Isn't our policy of support for UNPROFOR bankrupt?

- No. While the tragedy of recent events is enormous, you should not overlook what has been accomplished to date:
  - negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, which has brought peace to the vast majority of territory under Bosnian government control;
  - civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994);
  - U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;
  - shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);
  - NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war out of the air over Bosnia for two and a half years; and
  - war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.
- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in Bosnia.
- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.
- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.

U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the conflict or to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.
- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or if units need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through

NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties, to use U.S. troops as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying out in good faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of military plans, we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire arms and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better

ter to work to  
strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

#### Points on the Dole Amendment

-- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the arms e  
mbargo would hinder our  
efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.

-- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. mili  
tary support to the Bosnian  
government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and Ser  
bia.

-- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the  
international commun  
ity's other efforts have  
yielded significant benefits.

-- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing  
the  
killing and suffering in  
Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.

- UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million  
people.  
Its  
presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of  
Central B  
osnia.

- UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central  
Bosnia and is  
fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.

-- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in  
greater

security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

-- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partner to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them limited support and time to prove themselves.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue to oppose unilateral lift.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government

would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively with its new arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

-- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo within 12 weeks of the date the Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually ensures Allied entanglement in the war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the mission could take up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.
- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.
- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.
- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.
- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.
- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war
  - thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.
- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like Serbia, would likely provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.
- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes, such as those against Iraq and Libya, that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to distinguish between Bosnia and other situations.
- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with respect to decisions that could involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and other Americans to imminent risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential responsibilities.
- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and

risks  
of an UNPROFOR  
withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and  
p  
rotecting the Bosnians  
that will follow?

-- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

#### IRAQ: RICHARDSON/DALIBERTI MEETING WITH POTUS

-- The President will welcome the Richardson Mission home early this evening in the Oval Office. He will receive Congressman and Mrs. Bill Richardson, David Daliberti and his wife Kathy, and members of the Florida delegation, where the Dalibertis live.

-- The Barloon family is having their reunion in Kuwait. The President told Bill Barloon that he hoped to meet him. Once the family comes to the States, we'll arrange a meeting.

#### GUATEMALA HUMAN RIGHTS

Background: The Washington Post Style Section ran an article featuring allegations by Sister Diana Ortiz of being abducted, raped and tortured while in Guatemala in 1989. At that time the U.S. Embassy provided assistance to Ortiz, and has pressed the Guatemalan Government to investigate her case. Sister Ortiz' case is also subject to IOB review. While Ortiz at one time implied that the "North American" who allegedly rescued her from her torture was affiliated with the U.S. Embassy, her lawyer has since retracted that claim.

Th  
e Post article also mentions the  
Harbury case; Jennifer Harbury continues to work with the Guatemalan Special  
Prosecu  
tor to secure legal  
permission to excavate a site where it is rumored her husband's remains are  
buried.

Points

(on Sister Diana Ortiz)

-- Since 1989, the U.S. Embassy and the State Department have provided  
assistance to  
Sister  
Ortiz and have pressed the Guatemalan Government to conduct a thorough  
investigation  
of the incident.

-- While Sister Ortiz' lawyers have reiterated that they do not believe the U.S.  
Emb  
assy had any  
role in the abduction or torture of Sister Ortiz, her case is nonetheless subject to  
review by the  
Intelligence Oversight Board, which is reviewing all aspects of allegations  
relating  
to the abduction,  
torture or killing of American citizens in Guatemala since 1984.

(on Jennifer Harbury)

-- We understand Ms. Harbury continues to seek to begin excavation at a site in  
Guat  
emala where  
it is rumored the remains of her husband might be found. The U.S. Embassy in  
Guatem  
ala continues to  
provide her with every appropriate assistance in that endeavor.

## CUBA AND NEWS BUREAUS

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times story today? Are we on  
the verge  
of a



deal with the Cuban Government on news bureaus?

A: The Administration continually reviews all aspects of our policy toward Cuba, exploring ways to make the embargo more effective and to provide support to the Cuban people. In that context, the Administration is still reviewing the possibility of allowing reciprocal establishment of news bureaus in the U.S. and Cuba.

Q: Is Senator Helms' insistence on letting Radio Marti/TV Marti into Cuba the sticking point?

A: Radio and TV Marti are not commercial news stations. They comprise the Office of Cuban Broadcasting in the Bureau of Broadcasting of USIA which is represented at our Interests Section in Havana. Under consideration is the licensing of commercial news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba.

Although Radio and TV Marti would certainly benefit from a greater flow of accurate, uncensored news from Cuba, they are not directly related to the issue of reciprocal news bureaus.

## CUBAN-AMERICAN FLOTILLA

Background: The organizers of yesterday's Cuban-American "flotilla" say that a Cuban coast guard vessel rammed their flagship, the Democracia, injuring three people (including a Dade County Commissioner). The collision occurred about two miles inside Cuban territorial waters. US Coast Guard picked up the injured persons after the flotilla returned to international waters, and they are receiving medical treatment in Key West.

The US Interests Section yesterday asked the Cuban government for its version of events. The GOC this morning publicly released a statement reporting on the flotilla's entrance into Cuban waters and flotilla-associated aircrafts' violation of Cuban airspace, dropping leaflets along the seaside drive in Havana. The GOC says that its border guards "maintained great composure throughout the provocations" and did not ram, bow first, the Democracia. It border guard boats "simply came alongside and prevented the advance" of the flotilla boat. Flotilla organizers videotaped the incident and have provided the tape to US TV stations. (FYI: The videotape is subject to different interpretations.)

(If asked)

Q: What comment do you have on yesterday's collision involving a boat in the Cuban-American flotilla and Cuban coast guard vessels?

A: We regret that a collision occurred and that several persons were injured. We have urged all parties to exercise utmost restraint.

We would refer you to the State Department for any additional details on the incident.

#### HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign operations appropriations bill last evening, passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your advisors have not yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropriations, we are considering considerably less than we

need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would reinf  
orce the Mexico City  
family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to  
Russia  
and Mexico. It also contains  
other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign  
operations a  
ppropriations  
bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, g  
iving the Administration  
flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is pa  
rticularly important  
because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are too meet our  
int  
ernational  
commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems.  
T  
hese include  
the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning  
process and  
other  
amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign  
policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many  
prog  
rams. These  
reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy.  
We will work with the  
committees to obtain additional funding for these programs , (e.g. funding for the  
W  
orld Bank and for  
Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a  
decision  
about what to  
do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign  
affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State

Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies; and deep funding cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and the Foreign Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto the State Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendation for the Foreign Assistance Act.)

## CHINA

Q: What is the status of the vote on MFN for China?

A: Congressional action is anticipated in the near future. We hope the Congress will confirm the President's decision to extend MFN for China.

Q: Is the Administration working with the Congress on a second resolution critical of China?

A: The House leadership is considering how best to address the MFN issue. Obviously, we will want to monitor any additional Congressional initiatives that might be developing.

Q: How can you grant MFN when Harry Wu is still in jail?

A: We remain very concerned about the Harry Wu case and continue to work to persuade the Chinese government to release him. But we do not believe denying MFN to China would help. It would,

in fact, more likely result in harsher treatment for Wu.

It is important that the issues be treated separately. The President determined in 1994 and reiterated this year that the best way for bringing about long-term improvements in China's human rights record was to maintain a comprehensive engagement with China, including in the area of economic and commercial relations.

Q: What are you doing to get Harry Wu out?

A: We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself.

We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case is of great importance for U.S.-China relations.

Q: What about Chinese hints that he will be freed after the investigation is completed?

A: We cannot base our approach on hints and rumors. Our position is unchanged. He should be released immediately.

Q: What impact is this case having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

A: The Harry Wu case is receiving our full attention and is a high-priority issue. We have made clear that it will be high on the agenda as long as he remains imprisoned.

Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range of our bilateral interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engaged on issues of mutual interest.

The Secretary of State will be meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on August 1, when both will be attending an ASEAN meeting in Brunei.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that apologize for inviting Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. and promise not to let it happen again?

The President stands by his decision and has no intention of apologizing.

The decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and fully consistent with American values and opinion.

We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it constitute a

change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will Lee be allowed to visit again?

We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case basis, based on our judgment of what is in the U.S. interest. There is no request pending at the moment.

#### U.S.-JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION DISPUTE

Background: There was no agreement between the U.S. and Japan during the July 13-15

civil aviation talks in Tokyo. However, Japan has proposed another Vice Ministerial-level meeting, followed by a meeting between Secretary Pena and Ministry of Transport Minister Kamei. We have accepted this proposal in principle and are now in the process of discussing with the Japanese the modalities (e.g., time, place) of that meeting.

#### Talking Points:

-- We continue to work towards a negotiated solution to this dispute which recognizes the rights of U.S. carriers such as Federal Express under the existing agreement.

-- While the talks last week did not reach an agreement, we believe that they were productive.

-- Japan has proposed another round of Vice Ministerial-level talks, followed by a meeting between Secretary Pena and Minister Kamei.

-- We have accepted that idea in principle and are now discussing the venue and timing for such talks in the next several days.

#### HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announced where reruns would be taking place. The results point to a significant Lavalas victory, but it is important to note that, overall, non-Lavalas parties gathered roughly 60-65% of the vote and that a second round will be required in about 70% of the parliamentary or senate races. The Lavalas share of 35-40% of the vote should

ld be viewed in light of  
President Aristide's 70% share when he was elected in 1991. Reruns will take  
place  
in about 20% of localities.  
This is more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns  
ar  
e still scheduled for July 22,  
though it is unlikely this will be sufficient time.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral  
Cou  
ncil's announcement. A number  
of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the  
ele  
ctions. Amb. Swing is  
attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral  
council acted in ways that  
justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the  
el  
ections was not  
significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud.

#### Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time  
, were able to vote  
peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of  
the  
ir choice. In light of  
Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine month  
s ago it was ruled by a  
repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These  
will have to be  
remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances,  
wi  
ll require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or  
of  
an attempt to  
subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy,  
especi  
ally in one of the  
poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral



proc  
 ess and might  
 not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a  
 mista  
 ke. The parties, the  
 electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards  
 stren  
 gthening Haiti's  
 democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and  
 preparing fo  
 r upcoming  
 elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicl  
 y and privately,  
 that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitutio  
 n, limiting the President  
 to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on tr  
 ack, which calls  
 for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President i  
 n February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in US policy.

## RUSSIA

### U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic  
 reform  
 there. It  
 matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, central  
 ly planned or  
 market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex,  
 protract  
 ed.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over

50% of

Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

#### Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Russians report that Yeltsin's doctors have recommended that he remain in the hospital this

week, further report that Yeltsin continues to work from the hospital.

-- Have seen reports that Chernomyrdin visited Yeltsin in the hospital today for about an hour.

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#### Announcement of Duma Election Date

-- Yeltsin has issued decree that Russian Duma elections will be held December 17. Welcome this

as positive, normal step for democratizing Russia.

#### July 12 Impeachment Vote

-- Russian Duma voted July 12 on motion to set up commission to consider impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin. Motion failed to gather 226 votes needed to pass.

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#### Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices. Addressing

political as well as military issues. Understand remaining point of difference at this time is the future

status of Chechnya (i.e. Chechnya's relationship to the Russian Federation)

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence," achieve

negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence," achieve negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

### Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

### Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

### Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively with Russia toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to

develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.



## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 19 July 95 19:22  
**FROM** Fetig, James L.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** Daily Guidance Update [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Andreassen, Steven P.  
Andricos, George M.  
Aoki, Steven N.  
Appel, Edward J.  
Argarin, Jocelyn D.  
Armstrong, Fulton T.  
Atkin, Timothy J.  
Atlas, Edwin L.  
Baker, Jane E.  
Baker, James E.  
Bakke, Kyle D.  
Baldwin, Kenneth  
Bassett, Leslie A.  
Bass, Peter E.  
Battenfield, Pat  
Beers, Rand R.  
Behring, Deanna M.  
Bellamy, Ralph C.  
Bell, Robert G.  
Benjamin, Daniel  
Bieda, James M.  
Birkland, Andrea L.  
Blacker, Coit D.  
Blieberger, Marion H.  
Blinken, Antony J.  
Bolinski, Charlene C.  
Boorstin, Robert O.  
Boright, John  
Bradley, Amelia J.  
Breeland, Jocelyn G  
Bresnahan, Gary E.  
Broadway, Jamuna  
Brown, Dallas  
Bruton, Robert G.  
Bryan, Lloyd D.  
Burrell, Christina L.  
Kevin J. Cadieux  
Canty, Mary T.  
Carter, Michael E.  
Chyba, Christopher F.

Cicio, Kristen K.  
Clark, Bronya  
Clarke, Richard A.  
Claussen, Eileen B.  
Cooper, Kathleen H.  
Crispell, Thomas G.  
Daniel, Patty A.  
Danvers, William C.  
Darby, Melanie B.  
Darnes, Victoria J.  
Debortoli, Michelle A.  
Deshazer, Macarthur X.  
Dimel, Marsha L.  
Dohse, Fred J.  
Dragone, Karen D.  
Drew, Samuel N.  
Dupuy, Shawn L.  
Dymersky, Debra L.  
Eddy, Randolph P.  
Edwards, Joan  
Emery, Mary C.  
Evans, Paul A.  
Feinberg, Richard E.  
Fetig, James L.  
Ficklin, John W.  
Flessas, Daniel  
Fried, Daniel  
Friedrich, M. K.  
Froman, Michael B.  
Fuhrman, Thomas A.  
Gardner, Anthony  
Gates, Brian K.  
Genton, Regina A.  
George, Christopher  
Gerstner, Christina L.  
Glinski, David  
Gorsuch, Robert P.  
Gray, Wendy  
Guekel, Kathi A.  
Hale, John E.  
Hall, Wilma G.  
Halperin, Morton H.  
Hamilton, Roy A.  
Hammond, Cathy J.  
Hammonds, Lisa W.  
Harmon, Joyce A.  
Harris, Elisa D.  
Harrison, Lyle M.  
Hawes, David J.  
Hawkins, Ardenia R.

Herrington, David E.  
Heslin, Sheila N.  
Hilliard, Brenda I.  
Hill, Roseanne M.  
Hofmann, Stephen D.  
Houck, Baerbel K.  
Hunerwadel, Joan S.  
Jones, Steven R.  
Joshi, M. Kay  
Kammerer, Kelly C.  
Kelly, Sandra L.  
Kerr, Andrew S.  
Ketterer, James P.  
Kreczko, Alan J.  
Kyle, Robert D.  
Laipson, Ellen B.  
Leary, William H.  
Lindsey, Wanda  
Litwak, Robert C.  
Longoria, Michael A.  
Lorin, Matthew E.  
Lowry, Jay E.  
Mack, Kathryn S.  
Malley, Robert  
Marmol, Madelyn P.  
Marshall, Betty A.  
Martinez, Alejandro  
Stefan T. Mauzy  
Maxfield, Nancy H.  
Mazzuchi, Anthony D.  
McCormick, Shawn H.  
McIntyre, Stuart H.  
Merchant, Brian  
Miller, Matthew E.  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Mitchell, Calvin A.  
Mitsler, Elaine M.  
Miyaoka, Lester H.  
Moody, Angelyn D.  
Neil, M. Elise  
Norman, Marcia G.  
Nuccio, Richard A.  
O'Loughlin, Katherine  
Parco, Jim E.  
Gwyn M. Parker  
Parramore, Carl W.  
Parris, Mark R.  
Pascual, Carlos E.  
Pease, Bruce E.  
Peggins, John W.

Peters, Mary A.  
Pifer, Steven K.  
Poneman, Daniel B.  
Poppiti, Victoria L.  
Porter, Gidell  
Quinn, Mary E.  
Ramsay, Martha S.  
Reade, Evan G.  
Realuyo, Celina B.  
Rice, Susan E.  
Roth, Stanley O.  
Roundtree, Beverly J.  
Salvetti, Lisa M.  
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.  
Satterfield, David M.  
Saunders, John W.  
Schifter, Richard  
Schmidt, John R.  
Schwartz, Eric P.  
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.  
Seaton, James B.  
Seeley, Charlotte P.  
Sens, Andrew D.  
Sestak, Joseph A.  
Sevigny, Theodore T.  
Sheehan, Michael A.  
Sigler, Ralph  
Simon, Steven N.  
Simons, James R.  
Stauffer, Helen L.  
Stern, Jessica E.  
Sterns, Crayton L.  
Suettinger, Robert L.  
Sulser, Jack A.  
Tarullo, Daniel K.  
Turner, Joe T.  
Tyler, John T.  
Unrue, Michael M.  
Van Tassel, David S.  
Veit, Katherine M.  
Vershbow, Alexander R.  
Verville, Elizabeth G.  
Wadsworth, Valon J.  
Wales, Jane  
Walsh, Helen C.  
Ward, JoAnn X.  
Weber, Paul A.  
Wilson, Marilyn E.  
Witkowsky, Anne A.  
Wooton, Kevin B.



Wozniak, Natalie S.  
Wright, Allison M.  
Yorkdale, Glenn H.

**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

**TEXT\_BODY** [[ JUL19GUI.DOC : 4924 in JUL19GUI.DOC ]]

Please send updates to @Press by 10 a.m. Thanks.

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 19 July 95 13:41

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** JUL19GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 19, 1995

Bosnia  
-- Points for Presidential Use with Press on Margins of Meeting with  
Congressional Leaders  
-- Talking Points on Dole Amendment

U.S.-Cuba Migration Talks

Cuba and News Bureaus

China

U.S.-Japan Civil Aviation Dispute

Jordan: Najim Extradition (to be provided)

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

Haiti

Russia

BOSNIA

Key Points:

- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:
- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic Bosnian state;
- to prevent the spread of the conflict;
- to help limit the loss of life;
- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.
- That is why the United States
- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;
- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;
- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;
- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;
- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.
- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.
- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo
- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;
- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;
- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.
- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military

into  
intervention in  
the conflict.

-- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.

-- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

Srebrenica and Zepa

-- What has happened in Srebrenica and Zepa is tragic and inhumane. No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- Continued actions by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and against the enclave of Zepa is a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.

-- The Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas were established primarily as a haven for refugees expelled from other parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The attack against these undefended enclaves and the peacekeepers stationed there, and the reports of brutal ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of this travesty, provide further dramatic proof of the intent of Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group to ensure that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are

ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to all the civilian

refugees in the enclave, and to cease their illegal and inhumane detention of groups of refugees on the basis of unsubstantiated or trumped-up "war criminal" charges.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.

-- Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.

-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their influence to stop this aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers. Serbia must make clear in word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts. In particular, it should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission.

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and draw the United States in.

#### Q & A: Hot Issues

U.S. Military Assistance for defense of Gorazde

Q: U.S. commitment of ground troops/Chirac request for assistance in saving

enclave  
s.

-- As we have said consistently, we will not commit ground troops to the conflict.

-- We are reviewing other options under discussion.

-- General Shali met over the weekend with his British and French counterparts to  
as  
sess various

military options for strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to protect the remaining  
Safe  
Areas, and the  
National Security Council and key advisors have been examining those options  
over th  
e past 48 hours.

-- Short of providing ground forces, we are looking for ways to support our allies  
i  
n their  
commitment to make UNPROFOR stronger. These include those that have  
already been ma  
de public,  
such as using helicopters to assist UNPROFOR reinforcement of Gorazde and  
restoring  
the legitimacy of  
the threat of air power. Since the details involve sensitive military plans being d  
eveloped in conjunction  
with the troop contributing nations, and it would not be appropriate to comment  
on t  
hem further.

(If pressed) Q: Wouldn't the use of helicopters cross the line into the use of Ameri  
can ground  
forces?

-- No. What is being looked at is a one time provision of airlift to assist the Fre  
nch in moving  
troops to Gorazde, if this option is chosen -- and that decision has NOT been  
taken  
by us or our allies  
yet.

Q: Are the Eastern enclaves viable?

-- We deplore the tragic and inhumane events taking place in Srebrenica and Zepa.

-- We are consulting with the Contact Group and UNHCR to address the urgent humanitarian needs of civilians.

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- We have not seen the final text.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift. Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces. The 1 2 week delay Dole is

proposing flies in the face of all U.S. and Allied military advice, which sees withdrawal taking up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war  
-- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

Q: Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey is meeting with administration and congressional leaders to call for lifting the arms embargo. If that's what the Bosnians say they want, why not support them?

-- We support the concept of a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, should the UNPROFOR mission be terminated.

-- We do not support unilateral lift, which would have the effect of causing UNPROFOR to withdraw prematurely.

-- We remain concerned that, in the time between lifting the embargo and the integration of new weapons into the Bosnian armed forces, the Bosnian Serbs would take military action that the Bosnians would be hard pressed to resist on their own.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws.  
Isn't that the Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of UNPROFOR and cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame for the deteriorating situation would be placed on us.

President's Comments on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR may leave.  
Do you expect UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with Serb actions to interfere with its mission.

Q: In reiterating his support for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the President signaling his expectation that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia but we



do not  
expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to  
achi  
eve that goal.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15  
mil  
lion of  
transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a  
P  
residential  
Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transpiration support to  
  
the allies. The  
Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of  
equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$27 mi  
llion of goods  
and services -- under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

#### Q&A: Recurring Questions

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged  
appr  
oach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political i  
ndependence and  
territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its et  
hnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already  
accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and  
tighteni  
ng his  
cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for  
Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central  
Bosn  
ia,

promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospect  
s for an  
overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of  
all-out  
war that  
would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the  
conflic  
t, and effectively end  
the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providin  
g our  
own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate,  
most notably  
through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on  
th  
e  
ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable,  
an adequa  
te plan  
and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support  
missions  
  
to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as  
NAT  
O to deter a  
repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we  
abandon  
our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate th  
e military  
standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other pa  
rties to the conflict  
in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR efforts that have proven ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel. It will be used to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the

RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move it into theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with

Congress,  
we would be  
prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does not seem to be any Congressional support?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our Allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We plan to work with the United Nations and other member states to establish a voluntary fund as a means to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services to support our allies.)

-- (If pressed) Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- (If pressed) As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and

we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services will be provided.

-- (If pressed) The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser target designators, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to aircraft and helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence support.

-- (If pressed) We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. This support would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings (Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ceilings previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will represent no more than \$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.)

-- We have informally consulted with the Congress on our intent to use Section 506(a)(1) emergency drawdown authorities of the FAA to provide up to \$15 million of DOD goods and services (primarily transportation and equipment) to our allies participating in the RRF.

•

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3 million.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for the provision of up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a authorities and primarily for transportation services and equipment.

#### NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusion zones been rendered null and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the UN commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and political situation.

#### Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demonstrated that it is totally

ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid, protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alternatives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Results to Date:

Q: Isn't our policy of support for UNPROFOR bankrupt?

-- No. While the tragedy of recent events is enormous, you should not overlook what has been accomplished to date:

-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement

between Bo  
snia's  
Muslims and Croats, which has brought peace to the vast majority of territory  
under  
Bosnian government  
control;  
-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in  
1994)  
;  
-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the  
longest airborne  
relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;  
-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);  
-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping  
the war  
out of the  
air over Bosnia for two and a half years; and  
-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the  
ground in  
Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the  
conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better altern  
atives that don't  
depend on wishful thinking.

U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to  
the  
conflict or  
to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to  
withdraw or  
if units  
need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through  
NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete,  
temp  
orary



operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties, to use U.S. troops as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying out in good faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of military plans, we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to withdraw.

UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and wider war, reduce chances for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to acquire arms and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Belgrade resumes all-out support for Bosnian Serbs.

-- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.

-- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

BOSNIA POINTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL MEETING  
WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP:

ù There are three key points I want to make to you about Bosnia.

-- First, we should keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia, where, despite "common knowledge" to the contrary, it has had a major positive impact -- but we must make it work better.

-- Second, we will be making critical decisions with our Allies over the next few days on how to use the RRF and effective air power to halt Serb aggressiveness.

-- Third, we should not be undermining these efforts by seeking a unilateral lift of the arms embargo when our Allies are putting their troops on the line in a last ditch effort to make UNPROFOR work.

ù Bosnia remains extremely difficult, as it was when I arrived here. But as we press for a resolution, let's not lose sight of the results that have been achieved -- in part by UNPROFOR, in part by NATO and in part with U.S. persistence.

-- The war continues, but at greatly reduced levels. There were 130,000 Bosnian civilians killed in 1992; 2,500 in 1994;

-- Over 3 million Bosnians now depend on the UN for food and medicine. 50,000 tons of supplies have been delivered in the longest humanitarian relief effort in history;

-- A three-way conflict has been transformed into a two-way conflict, with the Bosnian-Croat Federation we helped broker continuing to hold. This has great strategic significance; nearly all of central Bosnia is now at peace.

-- Through the no-fly zone, we have kept the war out of the air over Bosnia and with our deployments in Macedonia and other warnings, we've kept the war from spreading beyond Bosnia.

ù Nevertheless, given the events of the past few weeks, it is clear that staying with the status quo is totally unacceptable.

-- UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies are prepared to take to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

ù

ù At the upcoming meeting in London, we will work with our Allies to put some teeth into UNPROFOR. We intend to make the case that the most important thing is to be able to bring air power to bear decisively, not in the timid manner done to date.

-- We will seek a clear warning to the Bosnian Serbs: any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a massive air campaign that cripples Serb military capability.

-- Cannot be just another empty threat. If Bosnian Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering even if we suffer losses or additional hostages are taken.

-- In addition to supporting Bosnian defense of Gorazde, important to open secure routes to Sarajevo. This is the most pressing mission for the RRF.

ù Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European

partners  
to strengthen  
UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to  
give  
them support and time  
to prove themselves.

-- Understand frustration that bill's supporters feel.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but  
unilateral  
lift  
would undermine efforts to reach negotiated settlement, lead to escalation of  
confl  
ict, and  
possibly Americanize the war.

-- No simple or risk free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo  
h  
as  
serious consequences.

-- Allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that unilateral lift, which would place  
the  
ir  
troops in greater danger, will result in their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR,  
leadi  
ng to its  
collapse.

-- I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation  
unde  
r  
those circumstances to assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S.  
troops  
in a  
difficult mission.

-- Consequently, at the least, unilateral lift by the U.S. drives our European allie  
s out of  
Bosnia and pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined mission.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertai  
n  
outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility.

-- It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more. It will provide  
the pretext  
for absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a  
stronge

r role at this  
critical moment.

-- It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. action that forces  
UN  
PROFOR  
departure.

-- First, as I have noted, we immediately would be part of a costly NATO  
operation t  
o withdraw  
UNPROFOR.

-- Second, after that operation is complete, there will be an intensification of the  
fighting in Bosnia.

-- The Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air support and  
if  
that fails,  
more active military support.

-- At that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as a result of  
unil  
ateral lift. The  
U.S. will be asked to fill the void -- in military support, humanitarian aid and in  
response to refugee  
crises.

-- Third, intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-re  
aching implications  
for regional peace.

-- Finally, UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful,  
negotiated  
solution  
for the foreseeable future.

-- In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. We are in this with o  
ur allies now. We  
would be in it by ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are  
prepared to put  
some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the  
effort  
works, or do we  
take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and  
risks

of an UNPROFOR  
 withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and  
 p  
 rotecting the Bosnians  
 that will follow?

-- I want to state clearly that I will veto any resolution or bill that may require  
 the United States to  
 lift unilaterally the arms embargo. It will make a bad situation much worse. I ask  
 that you not support  
 the pending legislation, S.21.

#### Points on the Dole Amendment

-- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the  
 arms e  
 mbargo would hinder our  
 efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.

-- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. mili  
 tary support to the Bosnian  
 government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and  
 Ser  
 bia.

-- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the  
 international commun  
 ity's other efforts have  
 yielded significant benefits.

-- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing  
 the  
 killing and suffering in  
 Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.

- UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million  
 people.

Its  
 presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of  
 Central B  
 osnia.

- UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central

Bosnia and is  
fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.

-- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

-- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partner to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them limited support and time to prove themselves.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue to oppose unilateral lift.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government

would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively with its new arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

-- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo within 12 weeks of the date the Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually ensures Allied entanglement in the war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the mission could take up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain

n outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war  
-- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like Serbia, would likely provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes, such as those against Iraq and Libya, that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to distinguish between Bosnia and other situations.

-- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with respect to decisions that could involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and other Americans to imminent risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential responsibilities.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are



prepared to put  
 some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the  
 effort  
 works, or do we  
 take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and  
 risks  
 of an UNPROFOR  
 withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and  
 p  
 rotecting the Bosnians  
 that will follow?

-- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

## U.S. - CUBA MIGRATION TALKS

Background: U.S. -Cuba migration review talks were held in Havana July 17-18.  
 Thes  
 e were part of a series of  
 regular talks to discuss exclusively migration issues between the two countries.  
 Th  
 e U.S. delegation was led by  
 Anne Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs  
 and t  
 he Cuban delegation was led  
 by Ricardo Alarcon, president of Cuba's National Assembly. No agreement was  
 reached  
 , and differences remain  
 on a number of issues.

### Key Points

-- The talks held in Havana were part of regular discussions on migration issues  
 bet  
 ween the U.S.  
 and Cuba.

-- Both sides agreed that the September 9 and May 2 accords were working: They  
 are d  
 irecting  
 migration into legal channels, while discouraging unsafe migration.

-- The U.S. raised several suggestions to assure that the two sides do everything  
 to

facilitate safe,  
orderly and legal migration.

-- No new agreements were reached.

Qs & As

Q: Which issues remain unresolved?

A: A broad range of migration issues was discussed. Many of them were operational. These talks were not aimed simply at reaching discrete agreements but are part of an ongoing process to promote safe, orderly and legal migration.

[If pressed]

The fees charged by the Cuban government to migrants who have already been issued travel documents was one of the issues discussed.

Q: Did the Cubans raise other issues such as lifting the sanctions imposed by President Clinton last August?

A: Yes, the Cuban government raised those issues but they were outside the scope of these talks. These discussions dealt solely with questions involving safe, orderly and legal migration.

## CUBA AND NEWS BUREAUS

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times story of July 17? Are we on the verge of a deal with the Cuban Government on news bureaus?

A: The Administration continually reviews all aspects of our policy toward Cuba, exp

loring ways  
 to make the embargo more effective and to provide support to the Cuban people.  
 In t  
 hat context, the  
 Administration is still reviewing the possibility of licensing U.S. news  
 organizatio  
 ns to establish news  
 bureaus in Cuba and of permitting Cuban official news organs to operate in the  
 Unite  
 d States.

Licensing decisions are exclusively the decision of the U.S. Government and no  
 "neg  
 otiations"  
 with Cuba about this issue have occurred nor are any planned.

Q: Is Senator Helms' insistence on letting Radio Marti/TV Marti into Cuba the  
 sticki  
 ng point?

A: Radio and TV Marti are not commercial news stations. They comprise the  
 Office of  
 Cuba  
 Broadcasting in the Bureau of Broadcasting of USIA which is represented at our  
 Inter  
 ests Section in  
 Havana. Under consideration is the licensing of commercial news organizations  
 to es  
 tablish news bureaus  
 in Cuba.

Although Radio and TV Marti would certainly benefit from a greater flow of  
 accurate  
 , uncensored news  
 from Cuba, they are not directly related to the issue of reciprocal news bureaus.

## CHINA

Q: What is the Administration's position on the upcoming China MFN  
 legislation?

There are two pieces of legislation the House is likely to consider. One is a reso  
 lution of  
 disapproval which would overturn the President's decision to continue Most  
 Favored N  
 ation (MFN)  
 trading status for China. The Administration opposes this resolution.

The second is a bill developed by the House leadership that addresses many of the outstanding issues in the U.S.-China relationship (e.g., Harry Wu, nonproliferation). We have problems with some specific provisions of this bill, although we support its goals. To the extent the language in the bill is consistent with the version we saw yesterday, we will not oppose this bill because the disapproval resolution is so much worse.

Q: How can you grant MFN when Harry Wu is still in jail?

A: We remain very concerned about the Harry Wu case and continue to work to persuade the Chinese government to release him. But we do not believe denying MFN to China would help. It would, in fact, more likely result in harsher treatment for Wu.

It is important that the issues be treated separately. The President determined in 1994 and reiterated this year that the best way for bringing about long-term improvements in China's human rights record was to maintain a comprehensive engagement with China, including in the area of economic and commercial relations.

Q: What are you doing to get Harry Wu out?

A: We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself.

We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case is of great importance for U.S.-China relations.

Q: What about Chinese hints that he will be freed after the investigation is completed?

ed?

A: We cannot base our approach on hints and rumors. Our position is unchanged. He should be released immediately.

Background: (NOT FOR USE WITH PRESS)

China announced today that it is closing an area off the coast of Fujian Province (in the Taiwan Straits) to all foreign air traffic and shipping from July 21-28 for the purpose of launching a surface-to-surface missile. It did not say what kind of missile, but the size of the closed area -- small and circular -- suggests it could be an MRBM. Taiwan is somewhat alarmed and has put its own military on relatively low-level alert in response.

Q: What about the Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait?

A: We have no information to suggest that this is anything other than an exercise.

Taiwan's security is not in jeopardy.

We would be concerned if tensions were to rise significantly in the Taiwan Straits.

We hope that both sides will seek to avoid taking steps that would bring about such a situation.

The United States has for many years supported the process of peaceful dialogue and

negotiation of differences between China and Taiwan. Both sides, in our view, have an interest in maintaining the atmosphere of peace and cooperation that has enabled both sides to develop their economies.

We believe that China and Taiwan over the past few years have developed good,

cooperative

processes for discussing problems and resolving differences. We hope they will continue to develop.

Q: Is this saber-rattling related to the Lee Teng-hui visit to the U.S.?

A: That is a question for the Chinese government.

Q: Will the United States protest to China about the exercise?

A: There are no plans to do so. The PRC has undertaken training exercises in this region in the past. It has notified the international shipping and air transport communities of the closure areas in an appropriate fashion.

Q: Will the United States support Taiwan if China attacks?

A: That is a completely speculative question unwarranted by the circumstances.

Q: What impact is all this having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

A: Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance, and the Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range of our bilateral interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain engaged on issues of mutual interest.

The Secretary of State will be meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on August 1, when both will be attending an ASEAN meeting in Brunei.

Q: What is your view of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement that the meeting between Qian and Christopher is critical to the future of the relationship?

A: We acknowledge that this is an important meeting to discuss serious issues. We would caution against over-dramatization, however. The communication process between two major powers is a continuing process at many levels.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that apologize for inviting Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. and promise not to let it happen again?

The President stands by his decision and has no intention of apologizing.

The decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and fully consistent with American values and opinion.

We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it constitute a change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will Lee be allowed to visit again?

We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case basis, based on our judgment of what is in the U.S. interest. The Secretary of State noted a few days ago that we expect visits to be completely private and rare. There is no request pending at the moment.

#### U.S.-JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION DISPUTE

Background: There was no agreement between the U.S. and Japan during the July 13-15

civil aviation talks in Tokyo. However, Japan has proposed another Vice Ministerial-level meeting, followed by a meeting between Secretary Pena and Ministry of Transport Minister Kamei. We have accepted this proposal in principle and are now in the process of discussing with the Japanese the modalities (e.g., time, place) of that meeting.

Talking Points:

-- We continue to work towards a negotiated solution to this dispute which recognizes the rights of U.S. carriers such as Federal Express under the existing agreement.

-- While the talks last week did not reach an agreement, we believe that they were productive.

-- Japan has proposed another round of Vice Ministerial-level talks, followed by a meeting between Secretary Pena and Minister Kamei.

-- We have accepted that idea in principle and are now discussing the venue and timing for such talks in the next several days.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign operations appropriations bill last evening, passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your advisors have not yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to appropriations



ng considerably less than we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would reinf  
orce the Mexico City family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia and Mexico. It also contains other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations a  
ppropriations bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, g  
iving the Administration flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is pa  
rticularly important because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are too meet our  
int  
ernational commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems.  
T  
hese include the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning process and  
other amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many prog  
rams. These reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy. We will work with the  
committees to obtain additional funding for these programs , (e.g. funding for the W  
orld Bank and for Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a decision  
about what to do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies; and deep funding cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and the Foreign Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto the State Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendation for the Foreign Assistance Act.)

## HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announced where reruns would be taking place. The results point to a significant Lavalas victory, but it is important to note that, overall, non-Lavalas parties gathered roughly 60-65% of the vote and that a second round will be required in about 70% of the parliamentary or senate races. The Lavalas share of 35-40% of the vote should be viewed in light of President Aristide's 70% share when he was elected in 1991. Reruns will take place in about 20% of localities. This is more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns are now scheduled for August 6 and the second round for August 27, though both dates remain subject to change.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral Council's announcement. A number of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the election.

ctions. Amb. Swing is attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral council acted in ways that justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the elections was not significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud.

#### Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time, were able to vote peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of their choice. In light of Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine months ago it was ruled by a repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, will require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or of an attempt to subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy, especially in one of the poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral process and might not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a mistake. The parties, the electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards strengthening Haiti's democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and preparing for upcoming elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicly and privately, that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitution, limiting the President to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on track, which calls for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President in February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in US policy.

## RUSSIA

### U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex, protracted.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change. Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

### Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Yeltsin acknowledged in his July 18 television interview he had suffered heart attack.

-- Understand there will be period of convalescence.

-- With proper care and medical attention, Yeltsin should be able to return to normal schedule.

-- Prior to his interview on Tuesday, Yeltsin spent hour talking with Chernomyrdin and Nationalities Minister Mikhaylov about various issues, including Chechnya .

### Announcement of Duma Election Date

-- Yeltsin has issued decree that Russian Duma elections will be held December 17. Welcome this as positive, normal step for democratizing Russia.

### Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices. Addressing political as well as military issues. Understand remaining point of difference at this time is the future status of Chechnya (i.e. Chechnya's relationship to the Russian Federation)

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence," achieve negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

### Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran,

given  
Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

#### Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

#### Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively with Russia toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to

develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.