

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	William Danvers to Peter Bass, Kristen Cicio, Mary Emery et al. Subject: NPR and resources. (5 pages)	05/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/03/1995-07/18/1995]

2006-1363-F
vz5600

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 03 May 95 16:36
FROM Halperin, Morton H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: RE: [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Cooper, Kathleen H.
Halperin, Morton H.
Lennon, John E
Longoria, Michael A.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Malley, Robert
Ross, Thomas B.

CARBON_COPY Fetig, James L.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Spalter, Jonathan H.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY

I will call.

From: Ross, Thomas B.
To: Halperin, Morton H.; @DEMOCRACY - Democracy Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, May 03, 1995 03:11 PM

Mort:

Carla Robbins, Wall Street Journal, is asking what our position is regarding Sen. Helms bill on Cuba. She thinks we are waffling.

Would like you to talk to her @ 862-9264. Be advised that Sandy Berger talked to her yesterday on migrants.

If you would rather not speak to her, please E-mail me what you would like me to say.

Thanks.

Jim Fetig (Am not on E-mail yet, please sent to Tom Ross.)

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 11 May 95 16:15
FROM Kerrick, Donald L.
CLASSIFICATION **** NO CLASSIFICATION ****
SUBJECT Subject: RE: Helms' staff looking at disposition of US frcs in Croatia
TO Danvers, William C.
Saunders, Richard M.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

More good news is always welcome!!

From: Saunders, Richard M.
To: Danvers, William C.; Kerrick, Donald L.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Helms' staff looking at disposition of US frcs in Croatia
[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, May 11, 1995 03:21 PM

One of our domestic policy staff people heard from a friend on the Hill that Senator Helms' staff is asking questions about the defensive posture of U.S. units in Croatia. They apparently aren't planning hearings, but may be gathering evidence to use if at some point in the future someone gets hurt by a Krajina Serb attack.

Just thought you'd like to know.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 19 June 95 19:22
FROM Malley, Robert
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Rights of the Child [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andricos, George M.
Danvers, William C.
Fetig, James L.
Funches, Christina L.
CARBON_COPY Halperin, Morton H.
TEXT_BODY

Attached are talking points.

[[CROC.DOC : 4937 in CROC.DOC]]

From: Fetig, James L.
To: Malley, Robert
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: RE: Rights of the Child [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, June 19, 1995 04:15 PM

We will definitely need some press guidance.

From: Malley, Robert
To: Halperin, Morton H.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1; Cooper, Kathleen H.
Subject: Rights of the Child [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, June 19, 1995 03:46 PM

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be taking up Helms' sense of the Congress resolution on the Convention on the Rights of the Child tomorrow. The resolution has about 19 co-sponsors, all republican, criticizes the POTUS for signing the Convention, and asks that he not submit it for ratification.

H is preparing talking points, and I will use them to prepare some here.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

19 June 95 19:21

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

CROC.DOC

UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Talking Points

Background

The Convention was signed by Ambassador Albright on February 16, 1995, on behalf of the President. On June 20, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be taking up a resolution sponsored by Senator Helms and co-sponsored by 18 other Republican Senators which states that the Convention is incompatible with parental rights and states that the President should not send it to the Senate for ratification.

Talking Points

- We believe that signing the Convention represents an important step to provide basic, worldwide protection for children.
- The focus of the Convention is on protecting children from universally condemned forms of abuse - exploitation, physical abuse - and providing them with basic necessities of life.
- It has been signed or ratified by 176 countries in the world, including every Western industrialized nation and the Vatican.
- The vast majority of its provisions are fully consistent with the U.S. Constitution and domestic laws.
- The Convention will not serve as a legal basis for lawsuits, and in particular will not enable children to sue their parents.
- The Convention is not anti-family. It supports the traditional role of parents in the upbringing of children. Significantly, the Vatican is a party to the Convention, and the Pope explicitly supported its position on the role of the family and parents.
- Responsibility for educational matters will remain with parents, and if they choose to send them to a given school, with that particular school. The President intends to make this clear by means of a reservation or understanding when he submits the Convention to the Senate.
- As for areas where conflicts exist with state laws, careful consideration will be given to the question of implementation. The Department of State currently is preparing a package of reservations, understandings, and declarations to accompany submission of the Convention to the Senate for ratification.
- In particular, we will reserve the right to use existing tools of our criminal justice system in appropriate cases.

-- With regard to submission of the Convention for ratification, the Administration believes that there are other important treaties the Senate needs to address first -- in particular the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 21 June 95 16:39
FROM Danvers, William C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Kerry [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andricos, George M.
Danvers, William C.
Funches, Christina L.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
Chris--

Kerry

[[KERRY2.DOC : 4182 in KERRY2.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 21 June 95 16:4
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** KERRY2.DOC

4784

June 21, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

FROM: BILL DANVERS

SUBJECT: Meeting with Sen. Kerry

You are scheduled to meet with Sen. Kerry tomorrow. He will most certainly want to talk to you about Viet Nam, Bosnia and you should raise with him the issues of reorganizing the foreign affairs

agencies.

On Viet Nam, in January, 1994, the Senator introduced a Sense of the Senate resolution calling for the lifting of the Viet Nam arms embargo. The resolution passed by a vote of 62-38.

As you know, the Senator, along with Sen. McCain, has called for the normalization of relations with Viet Nam. He would like to see the Administration preempt efforts by other Senators, most notably Dole and Smith, to place restrictions on the process of normalization. He feels very strongly that we should normalize and equally strongly that if he is to take the lead again on getting support for normalization that the Administration publicly support his position from the start. Kerry may complain that a White House report on POW/MIAs was unnecessarily harsh.

On Bosnia, the Senator has been a defender of our policy, but has recently moved away from that position. At yesterday's briefing of Democratic Senators, Sen. Kerry was highly critical of our policy. Specifically, he had questions about precisely what our policy is; what's at stake for us; what's the level of interest here in doing something in Bosnia; and what we are willing to do in Bosnia and when. He also had questions about the purpose of the RRF.

On the issues of reorganizing the foreign affairs agencies, the Senator is in favor of some sort of reorganization. Earlier this year, he indicated a willingness to work with Sen. Helms on a compromise proposal for consolidation. He introduced an amendment at SFRC mark up on the State Department Authorization bill that would have required the Administration to submit a plan to the Hill on reorganization that would have included at least some consolidation. It is my understanding now that he has backed off from that position and wants to fight Helms outright, supporting a veto threat. The points you may want to raise with the Senator is that while we remain against consolidation, the NPR process continues and we will continue get the agencies to streamline. You should also use this as an opportunity to get the Senator's opinion of how the State bill will play out on the floor of the Senate-- i.e., could we win the vote, can we at least hold our Democrats.

Attached are points on Bosnia (Tab I) and Viet Nam (Tab II).

Concurrences by: Roth; Vershbow; Halperin.

Attachment
Tab I Bosnia
Tab II Viet Nam

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 July 95 10:44
FROM Suettinger, Robert L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: RE: Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Fetig, James L.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

US-China Relations

Background:

US relations with China are in a downturn phase at the moment, mainly because of China's sharp reaction to the President's decision to grant Taiwan's President (but don't call him that) Lee Teng-hui a visa to make a private visit to Cornell University, where he is a respected alumnus. In response to the visit, China suspended consultations on a variety of strategic issues, including non-proliferation, postponed the visit of its Defense Minister, recalled its ambassador, withheld agreement for the appointment of James Sasser as US Ambassador to China, and has engaged in very sharp criticism of the Administration's China policy in general, and the Lee visa decision in particular. Repercussions continue to spread to nearly all aspects of the bilateral relationship.

Some Qs & As:

Q: What is the state of U.S.-China relations?

A: Bilateral relations are in a difficult phase at the moment, due to steps China has taken in reaction to the private visit last month of Lee Teng-hui to Cornell University.

Q: Does the USG believe it made a mistake by granting the visa?

A: Certainly not. The decision was consistent with US values and opinion. It was not "aimed" at China, was not intended to pressure China, and did not portend or represent any change in U.S. policy in the region. The United States has assured China at the highest level, including a meeting between President Clinton and the Chinese ambassador, that US adherence to a "one China" policy remains firm.

Q: Has China overreacted to the issue?

A: I don't believe it is helpful to characterize China's reaction. China has taken certain steps that we regret, such as cancelling consultations and recalling its ambassador. For our part, we have made every effort to indicate US support for continuing a positive relationship with China, despite the existence of numerous problems in the relationship, including continuing human rights abuses, worrisome nonproliferation practices, and continuing trade frictions.

Q: Is the detention of Harry Wu related to China's irritation over the Lee visit?

A: We are treating the issue entirely separately. This is a basic issue of abiding by international agreements. Our position is that China must provide information about and access to Mr. Wu immediately, as called for by our bilateral consular agreement.

Q: What actions have you taken to force China to release Wu?

A: We are not trying to force China to do anything. We are simply asking that it abide by a recognized agreement. We have been making daily representations to the Chinese Government, and we are confident that our message has been received at the highest levels. Our primary interest is the welfare of an American citizen.

Q: Do you believe Wu was "set up" by China?

A: We do not know the reasons or circumstances of Mr. Wu's detention. Little purpose is served by speculating.

Q: Has the Wu case created splits within the Chinese Government?

A: Again, the question calls for speculation.

Q: What will you do if Congress imposes punishment on China in response to the Wu case?

A: There is significant Congressional interest in Wu -- a strong critic of China's prison labor and reform through labor practices. Senator Helms and others have threatened serious repercussions to the entire relationship if Wu is not promptly released. While we don't know what actions are being considered by Congress, we have reminded the Chinese Government that larger issues are at stake in this case. That said, we do not believe that the entire US-China relationship should be focused on, or judged by, this particular problem.

From: Fetig, James L.
To: @ASIA - Asian Affairs
CC: /R, Record at A1; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, July 06, 1995 08:53 AM

Will need guidance on the state of our relationship with China -- note the Al Hunt piece in today's WSJ; and on Harry Wu.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 14 July 95 18:38

FROM Halperin, Morton H.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT LETTER FROM SENATOR Feinstein ON CONSOLIDATION
[UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Fuerth, Leon S.

CARBON_COPY Wise, William M.

TEXT_BODY

[[5267E.DOC : 4646 in 5267E.DOC]][[5267D.DOC : 4645 in 5267D.DOC]][[5267B.DOC : 4644 in 5267B.DOC]][[5267A.DOC : 4643 in 5267A.DOC]][[5267.DOC : 4642 in 5267.DOC]]

This is what I wanted to talk to you about and still do. If you are around on Saturday and have a few minutes I would like to come in and talk to you about it. In any case I need your views or concurrence before sending this on to Tony. Obviously, this is something that concerns the VP and you should let me know if you think it should be going to the President by some other route.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 14 July 95 18:23

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 5267.DOC

5267

July 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MORTON H. HALPERIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Feinstein Re:
Credible Alternative to Helms Bill on Foreign Affairs

Agencies

Senator Feinstein has written to the President expressing her concern about the failure of the Administration to present a credible alternative to Senator Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

In her letter, Senator Feinstein indicates that she shares many of the Administration's reservations about the Helms' plan but notes that as things now stand it will pass easily. She urges that we develop an alternative "consolidation" plan which would give the President significant flexibility and expresses the view that negotiations between the Administration and Senator Helms would produce a bill acceptable to the Administration.

As you know, our current posture is to decline to negotiate with Helms on the grounds that he is not really interested in any deal and because we believe that both the agencies and the Democratic Senators would strongly object. My impression is that we are also not trying to work Republican Senators for fear that this would draw us into a negotiation and that we are likely to lose this by a wide margin (gaining few if any Republicans and losing a significant number of Democrats).

The assumption of the inter-agency is that the bill will pass both houses and the President will then veto it. The veto will be sustained and no effort will be made to attach the reorganization to the appropriations bill. NPR is now pressing the agencies for a more robust reorganization scheme that might be announced in August.

If we hold firm to this position you should send the President the letter at Tab A.

Recognizing that others have the primary responsibility for dealing with the Congress, I feel obliged to express my agreement with Senator Feinstein and to suggest that the issue might be one for discussion in the new SRG committee or some other inter-agency forum. Here are my concerns about the current approach:

- ù We are strongly in favor of a bi-partisan foreign policy. Yet, we seem content to have a confrontation on the main foreign policy authorization bill without seriously trying to reach agreement either with Helms and Dole or with a group of moderate Republican Senators. This serves only to reinforce the view that we are not serious about wanting a bipartisan foreign policy but rather are seeking to attack the Republicans.

- ù The Helms bill as reported is certainly unacceptable to us, but

it is not as clearly isolationist as we allege and it could be made acceptable with relatively few changes. As we know, many serious internationalists believe that the time has come for consolidation. The numbers in the bill are too low but it is likely that the President will end up signing appropriations bills with numbers in that range. The restrictions are not qualitatively different from those that other Congresses has imposed. Thus, some agreement to put off a final decision on reorganization by a commission or some other means as suggested by Feinstein, some increase in the numbers, and a clear Presidential waiver of the restrictions, would make the bill acceptable. I believe this is how it is seen by many foreign policy observers in the press and at think tanks. Feinstein's letter indicates that at least some Democratic Senators share this view.

ù Even if the President's veto is sustained, I think there is a fair chance that the consolidation will be put on the appropriations bill or some other bill that the President ends up deciding that he must sign. Thus, we could end up having this consolidation forced on us.

For these reasons, I think that we should consider a more active stance on the bill. I would begin, after talking to the Democrats on SFRC, by talking to some moderate Democrats and Republicans who care about foreign policy, about possible compromises. These conversations should be one on one with Senators. Based on what they say I would try to beat Helms or negotiate with him. If we were to go this route we would send the memo at Tab II to the President recommending that he sign the letter at Tab B.

Bill Danvers [to come]

Leon Fuerth [to come]

Concurrence by: [Enter names of concurring NSC staff, initialed off]

RECOMMENDATION

That [Enter recommendation text here]

Approve _____ Disapprove _____[Optional]

Attachment

Tab [I or A] [Enter brief description of attachment]

FILE DATE 14 July 95 18:31

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 5267A.DOC

5267

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Response to Letter for Senator Feinstein
on Foreign Affairs Agency Consolidation

Purpose

To recommend a response to a letter to you from Senator Feinstein on the Helms bill mandating consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies into the State Department.

Background

Senator Feinstein has written to the President expressing her concern about the failure of the Administration to present a credible alternative to Senator Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

In her letter, Senator Feinstein indicates that she shares many of the Administration's reservations about the Helms' plan but notes that as things now stand it will pass easily. She urges that we develop an alternative "consolidation" plan which would give the President significant flexibility and expresses the view that negotiations between the Administration and Senator Helms would produce a bill acceptable to the Administration.

We do not share Senator Feinstein's view that it would be possible to negotiate a satisfactory text with Senator Helms. Everything we have seen suggests that he is determined to force the consolidation on us. Moreover, the bill has a number of unacceptable restrictions on your prerogatives and does not authorize enough money.

The proposed letter to Senator Feinstein explains why we do not think that an effort to negotiate with Senator Helms will be successful and asks for her support in opposing the bill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Feinstein at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Senator Feinstein

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:30

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267B.DOC

5267

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Response to Letter for Senator Feinstein
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We have been skeptical of Senator Helms' willingness to compromise on the bill and still have real doubts about whether it will be possible to reach agreement. Nonetheless, in light of her warning, we think it would be sensible to consult with her and with other key moderates to see if we can build support for an acceptable bill which might prevail even if we cannot reach closure with Senator Helms.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Feinstein at Tab B.

Attachment
Tab B Letter to Senator Feinstein

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:32

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267D.DOC

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter dealing with Senator's Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

I wish I could share your optimism that it would be possible to reach agreement with Senator Helms on this question. Moreover, his bill has unacceptable restrictions on presidential prerogatives and unacceptably low authorization numbers which would force me to veto it even if the consolidation issue were resolved.

Thus, we see no choice but to oppose the bill and hope to have your continuing support.

Sincerely,

[Name/Title in Initial Caps]
[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:34

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267E.DOC

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter regarding Senator Helms' plan for consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

Our judgment has been that Senator Helms had no interest in reaching an accommodation and that we had no choice but to fight the bill. In light of your letter, I have asked my staff to meet with you and other key Senators to see if you can develop a proposal that would command broad support in the Senate.

Thank you for writing.

Sincerely,

[Name/Title in Initial Caps]
[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 14 July 95 18:39
FROM Halperin, Morton H.
CLASSIFICATION ***** CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND *****
SUBJECT LETTER FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN TO POTUS ON CONSOLIDATION
TO Danvers, William C.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

I have been given a letter from Senator Feinstein on consolidation for action. I have prepared a package for Tony which keeps him to options for the memo to the President and the letter to the Senator. My cover memo suggests a change in approach on this issue. I recognize that you will feel that the issues I raise are within your jurisdiction, but there was no way I could forward a recommendation to Tony about the letter without raising them. Attached is my draft. As you will see I have left space for your views.

[[5267.DOC : 4661 in 5267.DOC]][[5267A.DOC : 4662 in 5267A.DOC]][[5267B.DOC : 4663 in 5267B.DOC]][[5267D.DOC : 4664 in 5267D.DOC]][[5267E.DOC : 4665 in 5267E.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:23

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267.DOC

5267

July 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MORTON H. HALPERIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Feinstein Re:

Credible Alternative to Helms Bill on Foreign Affairs Agencies

Senator Feinstein has written to the President expressing her concern about the failure of the Administration to present a credible alternative to Senator Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

In her letter, Senator Feinstein indicates that she shares many of the Administration's reservations about the Helms' plan but notes that as things now stand it will pass easily. She urges that we develop an alternative "consolidation" plan which would give the President significant flexibility and expresses the view that negotiations between the Administration and Senator Helms would produce a bill acceptable to the Administration.

As you know, our current posture is to decline to negotiate with Helms on the grounds that he is not really interested in any deal and because we believe that both the agencies and the Democratic Senators would strongly object. My impression is that we are also not trying to work Republican Senators for fear that this would draw us into a negotiation and that we are likely to lose this by a wide margin (gaining few if any Republicans and losing a significant number of Democrats).

The assumption of the inter-agency is that the bill will pass both houses and the President will then veto it. The veto will be sustained and no effort will be made to attach the reorganization to the appropriations bill. NPR is now pressing the agencies for a more robust reorganization scheme that might be announced in August.

If we hold firm to this position you should send the President the letter at Tab A.

Recognizing that others have the primary responsibility for dealing with the Congress, I feel obliged to express my agreement with Senator Feinstein and to suggest that the issue might be one for discussion in the new SRG committee or some other inter-agency forum. Here are my concerns about the current approach:

ù We are strongly in favor of a bi-partisan foreign policy. Yet, we seem content to have a confrontation on the main foreign policy authorization bill without seriously trying to reach agreement either with Helms and Dole or with a group of moderate Republican Senators. This serves only to reinforce the view that we are not serious about wanting a bipartisan foreign policy but rather are seeking to attack the Republicans.

ù The Helms bill as reported is certainly unacceptable to us, but it is not as clearly isolationist as we allege and it could be made acceptable with relatively few changes. As we know, many serious internationalists believe that the time has come for consolidation. The numbers in the bill are too low but it is likely that the President will end up signing appropriations bills with numbers in that range. The restrictions are not qualitatively different from those that other Congresses has imposed. Thus, some agreement to put off a final decision on reorganization by a commission or some other means as suggested by Feinstein, some increase in the numbers, and a clear Presidential waiver of the restrictions, would make the bill acceptable. I believe this is how it is seen by many foreign policy observers in the press and at think tanks. Feinstein's letter indicates that at least some Democratic Senators share this view.

ù Even if the President's veto is sustained, I think there is a fair chance that the consolidation will be put on the appropriations bill or some other bill that the President ends up deciding that he must sign. Thus, we could end up having this consolidation forced on us.

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Bill Danvers [to come]

Leon Fuerth [to come]

Concurrence by: [Enter names of
concurring NSC staff, initialed off]

RECOMMENDATION

That [Enter recommendation text here]

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ [Optional]

Attachment

Tab [I or A] [Enter brief description of attachment]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:31

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267A.DOC

5267

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff

ACTION**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT****FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN****SUBJECT: Response to Letter for Senator Feinstein
on Foreign Affairs Agency Consolidation****Purpose**

To recommend a response to a letter to you from Senator Feinstein on the Helms bill mandating consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies into the State Department.

Background

Senator Feinstein has written to the President expressing her concern about the failure of the Administration to present a credible alternative to Senator Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

In her letter, Senator Feinstein indicates that she shares many of the Administration's reservations about the Helms' plan but notes that as things now stand it will pass easily. She urges that we develop an alternative "consolidation" plan which would give the President significant flexibility and expresses the view that negotiations between the Administration and Senator Helms would produce a bill acceptable to the Administration.

We do not share Senator Feinstein's view that it would be possible to negotiate a satisfactory text with Senator Helms. Everything we have seen suggests that he is determined to force the consolidation on us. Moreover, the bill has a number of unacceptable restrictions

on your prerogatives and does not authorize enough money.

The proposed letter to Senator Feinstein explains why we do not think that an effort to negotiate with Senator Helms will be successful and asks for her support in opposing the bill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Feinstein at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Senator Feinstein

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:30

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267B.DOC

5267

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Response to Letter for Senator Feinstein
on Foreign Affairs Agency Consolidation

Purpose

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We have been skeptical of Senator Helms' willingness to compromise on the bill and still have real doubts about whether it will be possible to reach agreement. Nonetheless, in light of her warning, we think it would be sensible to consult with her and with other key moderates to see if we can build support for an acceptable bill which might prevail even if we cannot reach closure with Senator Helms.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Feinstein at Tab B.

Attachment
Tab B Letter to Senator Feinstein

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:32

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267D.DOC

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter dealing
with Senator's Helms' proposal to consolidate the

foreign affairs agencies.

I wish I could share your optimism that it would be possible to reach agreement with Senator Helms on this question. Moreover, his bill has unacceptable restrictions on presidential prerogatives and unacceptably low authorization numbers which would force me to veto it even if the consolidation issue were resolved.

Thus, we see no choice but to oppose the bill and hope to have your continuing support.

Sincerely,

[Name/Title in Initial Caps]
[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:34

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267E.DOC

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter regarding Senator Helms' plan for consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

Our judgment has been that Senator Helms had no interest in reaching an accommodation and that we had no choice but to fight the bill. In light of your letter, I have asked my staff to meet with you and other key Senators to see if you can develop a proposal that would command

broad support in the Senate.

Thank you for writing.

Sincerely,

[Name/Title in Initial Caps]
[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 14 July 95 18:39
FROM Cooper, Kathleen H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Action from Mort [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Tyler, John T.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
Tim -- Mort sent the attached action around for comments on Friday night and would like you to take a look at it as well.

[[5267.DOC : 4639 in 5267.DOC]][[5267A.DOC : 4640 in 5267A.DOC]][[5267B.DOC : 4641 in 5267B.DOC]][[5267D.DOC : 4642 in 5267D.DOC]][[5267E.DOC : 4643 in 5267E.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 14 July 95 18:23
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME 5267.DOC

5267

July 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MORTON H. HALPERIN

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Feinstein Re:
Credible Alternative to Helms Bill on Foreign Affairs
Agencies

Senator Feinstein has written to the President expressing her concern about the failure of the Administration to present a

credible alternative to Senator Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

In her letter, Senator Feinstein indicates that she shares many of the Administration's reservations about the Helms' plan but notes that as things now stand it will pass easily. She urges that we develop an alternative "consolidation" plan which would give the President significant flexibility and expresses the view that negotiations between the Administration and Senator Helms would produce a bill acceptable to the Administration.

As you know, our current posture is to decline to negotiate with Helms on the grounds that he is not really interested in any deal and because we believe that both the agencies and the Democratic Senators would strongly object. My impression is that we are also not trying to work Republican Senators for fear that this would draw us into a negotiation and that we are likely to lose this by a wide margin (gaining few if any Republicans and losing a significant number of Democrats).

The assumption of the inter-agency is that the bill will pass both houses and the President will then veto it. The veto will be sustained and no effort will be made to attach the reorganization to the appropriations bill. NPR is now pressing the agencies for a more robust reorganization scheme that might be announced in August.

If we hold firm to this position you should send the President the letter at Tab A.

Recognizing that others have the primary responsibility for dealing with the Congress, I feel obliged to express my agreement with Senator Feinstein and to suggest that the issue might be one for discussion in the new SRG committee or some other inter-agency forum. Here are my concerns about the current approach:

ù We are strongly in favor of a bi-partisan foreign policy. Yet, we seem content to have a confrontation on the main foreign policy authorization bill without seriously trying to reach agreement either with Helms and Dole or with a group of moderate Republican Senators. This serves only to reinforce the view that we are not serious about wanting a bipartisan foreign policy but

rather are seeking to attack the Republicans.

ù The Helms bill as reported is certainly unacceptable to us, but it is not as clearly isolationist as we allege and it could be made acceptable with relatively few changes. As we know, many serious internationalists believe that the time has come for consolidation. The numbers in the bill are too low but it is likely that the President will end up signing appropriations bills

with numbers in that range. The restrictions are not qualitatively different from those that other Congresses has imposed. Thus, some agreement to put off a final decision on reorganization by a commission or some other means as suggested by Feinstein, some increase in the numbers, and a clear Presidential waiver of the restrictions, would make the bill acceptable. I believe this is how it is seen by many foreign policy observers in the press and at think tanks. Feinstein's letter indicates that at least some Democratic Senators share this view.

ù Even if the President's veto is sustained, I think there is a fair chance that the consolidation will be put on the appropriations bill or some other bill that the President ends up deciding that he must sign. Thus, we could end up having this consolidation forced on us.

For these reasons, I think that we should consider a more active stance on the bill. I would begin, after talking to the Democrats on SFRC, by talking to some moderate Democrats and Republicans who care about foreign policy, about possible compromises. These conversations should be one on one with Senators. Based on what they say I would try to beat Helms or negotiate with him. If we were to go this route we would send the memo at Tab II to the President recommending that he sign the letter at Tab B.

Bill Danvers [to come]

Leon Fuerth [to come]

Concurrence by: [Enter names of concurring NSC staff, initialed off]

RECOMMENDATION

That [Enter recommendation text here]

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ [Optional]

Attachment

Tab [I or A] [Enter brief description of attachment]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:31

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267A.DOC

5267

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Response to Letter for Senator Feinstein
on Foreign Affairs Agency Consolidation

Purpose

To recommend a response to a letter to you from Senator Feinstein on the Helms bill mandating consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies into the State Department.

Background

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In her letter, Senator Feinstein indicates that she shares many of the Administration's reservations about the Helms' plan but notes that as things now stand it will pass easily. She urges that we develop an alternative "consolidation" plan which would give the President significant flexibility and expresses the view that negotiations between the Administration and Senator Helms would produce a bill acceptable to the Administration.

We do not share Senator Feinstein's view that it would be possible to negotiate a satisfactory text with Senator Helms. Everything we have seen suggests that he is determined to force the consolidation on us. Moreover, the bill has a number of unacceptable restrictions on your prerogatives and does not authorize enough money.

The proposed letter to Senator Feinstein explains why we do not think that an effort to negotiate with Senator Helms will be successful and asks for her support in opposing the bill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Feinstein at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Senator Feinstein

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:30

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267B.DOC

5267

cc: Vice President

Chief of Staff

ACTION**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Response to Letter for Senator Feinstein
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Purpose

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Feinstein at Tab B.

Attachment
Tab B Letter to Senator Feinstein

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:32

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267D.DOC

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter dealing with Senator's Helms' proposal to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies.

I wish I could share your optimism that it would be possible to reach agreement with Senator Helms on this question. Moreover, his bill has

unacceptable restrictions on presidential prerogatives and unacceptably low authorization numbers which would force me to veto it even if the consolidation issue were resolved.

Thus, we see no choice but to oppose the bill and hope to have your continuing support.

Sincerely,

[Name/Title in Initial Caps]
[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

14 July 95 18:34

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

5267E.DOC

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter regarding Senator Helms' plan for consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

Our judgment has been that Senator Helms had no interest in reaching an accommodation and that we had no choice but to fight the bill. In light of your letter, I have asked my staff to meet with you and other key Senators to see if you can develop a proposal that would command broad support in the Senate.

Thank you for writing.

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[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 17 July 95 16:37
FROM Halperin, Morton H.
CLASSIFICATION ***** CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND *****
SUBJECT FW: LETTER FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN TO POTUS ON
CONSOLIDATION
TO Cooper, Kathleen H.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Insert into memo. Ask Bill Wise for a clearance. I asked Danvers by e-mail to provide text of a letter he would recommend.

From: Danvers, William C.
To: Halperin, Morton H.
CC: /R, Record at A1; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE: LETTER FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN TO POTUS ON
CONSOLIDATION
[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Monday, July 17, 1995 04:26 PM

[[MORTFEN2.DOC : 4186 in MORTFEN2.DOC]]

Mort-- here are my comments:

Bill

From: Halperin, Morton H.
To: Danvers, William C.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: LETTER FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN TO POTUS ON
CONSOLIDATION
[UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, July 14, 1995 06:39 PM

<<Attached File: 5267.DOC>>
<<Attached File: 5267A.DOC>>
<<Attached File: 5267B.DOC>>
<<Attached File: 5267D.DOC>>
<<Attached File: 5267E.DOC>>

I have been given a letter from Senator Feinstein on consolidation for

action. I have prepared a package for Tony which keeps him to options for the memo to the President and the letter to the Senator. My cover memo suggests a change in approach on this issue. I recognize that you will feel that the issues I raise are within your jurisdiction, but there was no way I could forward a recommendation to Tony about the letter without raising them. Attached is my draft. As you will see I have left space for your views.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

17 July 95 16:24

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

MORTFEN2.DOC

5267

July 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

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SUBJECT: Response to Senator Feinstein Re:
Credible Alternative to Helms Bill on Foreign Affairs
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Comments from Bill Danvers

Mort has given me an opportunity to respond to his suggestions on how to handle the Hill on the Helms' bill. Since I think he has gotten some of his facts wrong, as well as the premise of why we ought to change the course, I will take him up on his offer.

First, the facts. From the beginning, there has been a concerted effort among agencies to talk to both Republicans and Democrats on the SFRC, seeking common ground. A few examples include initial efforts to work with Sen. Snowe, who subsequently supported Helms publicly at his press conference; with Sen. Kassebaum on the U.N. provisions in the bill; and even with Sen. Brown in the context of the Helms' foreign assistance bill on Pakistan. We have attempted to find common ground where we could, and in some cases-- most notably with Sen. Kassebaum-- we have succeeded. Those discussions have since broadened now that the bill is out of committee.

With regard to the veto threat and the possibility of putting consolidation on an appropriations bill, Mort makes a valid point. But again I think he only sees part of the situation. The President has already stated publicly that he will veto the Gilman bill if it reaches his desk without changes, and the assumption is that he will do the same with Helms' bill. In fact, I believe Tony Blinken has already drafted a veto statement. For the President to now back off the threat of a veto of the Helms' bill after there was such a

public and private outcry against the Gilman bill, would be inconsistent and confusing to our supporters.

The second part of his argument that reorganization will be attached to an appropriations bill, fortunately, has not happened. So far, neither the House Foreign Ops bill or the subcommittee passed CJS bill has contained any reorganization language. From conversations with Republicans and Democrats on both subcommittees, there seems to be no appetite for it, which means we are in a better position in conference even if the Senate decides to put reorganization on their bills. You should know, however, that it does not look as if McConnell will do so, although this could change. Gramm, new chair of CJS, is a wildcard. (As you know, CJS funds USIA and ACDA.) My hunch is there will be an effort to force the issue through cuts to operating expenses. As I understand it, this is motivating at least some of the agencies to rethink reinvention.

On the issue of whether there has been an effort to seek accommodation with Sen. Helms, Mort is right, there has not been. The reasons vary from distrust to a belief that he has a bottom line-- consolidation of the agencies-- that he will not change. Mort's premise, that we will not negotiate with Sen. Helms, is, as I understand it, based on the belief that we are willing to give a little on that point. If we are, then this is a brand new policy, and we can, therefore, begin serious discussions with the Hill on how to reach some accommodation. I don't, however, believe we have changed the position that we are against consolidation. Until we do, or until we have a radical reorganization plan of our own that we can share with our allies, then we can't go up to the Hill and negotiate.

As you may recall, at the beginning of the year when I made a simple call to a Helms' staffer about having further discussions, you were called by Strobe and Brian, as was Pat Griffin, accusing me of negotiating with the enemy. So much for trying to reach some understanding with Helms.

The bottom line is that until we have something with which to negotiate, we aren't going to be able to strike a blow for a bipartisan foreign policy on the issue of reorganization. That does not mean that we won't be able to work with Republicans. We can and do; China MFN is a current example of that. Russia is another-- Lugar and Gingrich have been very helpful in getting funds for the NIS.

The Helms' bill does have problems beyond consolidation. He does cut foreign aid, and he does micromanage. As to whether or not this is a reason to threaten a veto is a decision that was made when the President made a strong public statement against the Gilman bill. The real problem is that our Democratic friends are concerned that we will sell them out after they have gone to bat for us in trying to derail the Helms' bill. Remember the bill was reported out of

committee on a straight party line vote-- not bad for us in a very tough year on the Hill.

As for Mort's replies to Sen. Feinstein, I think that neither work. We need to let her know that we hear her concerns, that much work has already been done at AID and the other agencies on reorganization and that more will be done. The other points to make are that we are reinventing these agencies in a responsible way and that the organization of the executive branch has always been and should always be the prerogative of the President.

Leon Fuerth [to come]

Concurrence by: [Enter names of
concurring NSC staff, initialed off]

RECOMMENDATION

That [Enter recommendation text here]

Approve _____ Disapprove _____[Optional]

Attachment

Tab [I or A] [Enter brief description of attachment]

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 18 July 95 13:35
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT July 18 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Fetig, James L.
Mitchell, Calvin A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY Includes changes made by Nancy Soderberg --
[[JUL18GUI.DOC : 3365 in JUL18GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 18 July 95 13:34

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** JUL18GUI.DOC

Foreign Policy Talking Points

July 18, 1995

Bosnia (includes talking points on Dole Amendment)

Iraq: Richardson/Daliberti Meeting with POTUS

Guatemala

Cuba and News Bureaus

Cuban-American Flotilla

House Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill (HR1816)

China (to be updated China MFN and House Resolution)

U.S.-Japan Civil Aviation Dispute

Haiti

Russia

BOSNIA

Key Points:

-- The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia:

-- to find a peaceful solution to the conflict that preserves a viable, multi-ethnic
Bosnian state;

-- to prevent the spread of the conflict;

-- to help limit the loss of life;

-- and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there.

-- That is why the United States

-- led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year;

-- has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history;

-- has participated in enforcing the no-fly zone;

-- has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia;

-- and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict.

-- And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR,
which helped
reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in
1994.

-- For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or
especially because of
American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo

-- the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict.

-- Such a venture, to succeed, would require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.

-- So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF, support UNPROFOR's efforts to deal more firmly with Serb actions and work for a peaceful settlement.

Srebrenica and Zepa

-- What has happened in Srebrenica and Zepa is tragic and inhumane. No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- Continued actions by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica and against the enclave of Zepa is a flagrant and brutal contradiction of the United Nation's peace efforts. The United States reiterates its condemnation of these attacks in the strongest terms.

-- The Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas were established primarily as a haven for refugees expelled from other parts of Bosnia as a result of Serbian ethnic cleansing. The attack against these undefended enclaves and the peacekeepers stationed there, and the reports of brutal ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of this travesty, provide further dramatic proof of the intent of Bosnian Serb forces.

-- The United States continues to work with the UN, our Allies and the Contact Group

to ensure
that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are

ensured. We call upon the Bosnian Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to all the civilian refugees in the enclave, and to cease their illegal and inhumane detention of groups of refugees on the basis of unsubstantiated or trumped-up "war criminal" charges.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.

-- Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.

-- We have also called on the Serbian authorities in Belgrade to use their influence to stop this aggression and ensure the safety of civilian populations and UN peacekeepers. Serbia must make clear in word and deed that it joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts. In particular, it should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale regime.

-- We are consulting urgently with our allies and other troop contributors on next steps aimed at strengthening UNPROFOR's effectiveness so that it can continue to perform its mission.

-- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is grim, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and

draw the United States in.

Q & A: Hot Issues

U.S. Military Assistance for defense of Gorazde

Q: U.S. commitment of ground troops/Chirac request for assistance in saving enclave
s.

-- As we have said consistently, we will not commit ground troops to the conflict.

-- We are reviewing other options under discussion.

-- General Shali met over the weekend with his British and French counterparts to
as
sess various

military options for strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to protect the remaining
Safe
Areas, and the
National Security Council and key advisors have been examining those options
over th
e past 48 hours.

-- Short of providing ground forces, we are looking for ways to support our allies
i
n their
commitment to make UNPROFOR stronger. These include those that have
already been ma
de public,
such as using helicopters to assist UNPROFOR reinforcement of Gorazde and
restoring
the legitimacy of
the threat of air power. Since the details involve sensitive military plans being d
eveloped in conjunction
with the troop contributing nations, and it would not be appropriate to comment
on t
hem further.

(If pressed) Q: Wouldn't the use of helicopters cross the line into the use of Ameri
can ground
forces?

-- No. What is being looked at is a one time provision of airlift to assist the French in moving troops to Gorazde, if this option is chosen -- and that decision has NOT been taken by us or our allies yet.

Q: Are the Eastern enclaves viable?

-- We deplore the tragic and inhumane events taking place in Srebrenica and Zepa.

-- We are consulting with the Contact Group and UNHCR to address the urgent humanitarian needs of civilians.

Q: Is UNPROFOR withdrawing from the Eastern enclaves? In general?

-- No. Events of the past few days emphasize the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively.

-- If UNPROFOR withdraws, the humanitarian crisis would worsen;

-- we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch;

-- and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict.

-- This is an outcome neither the President nor the American people want to see.

Q: Would the Rapid Reaction Force, if in place, have helped save Srebrenica?

-- Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which are not currently available.

The Dole Resolution:

Q: Will the President veto the Dole Resolution?

-- We have not seen the final text.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift. Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR for
ces are still in place would
make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.
The 1
2 week delay Dole is
proposing flies in the face of all U.S. and Allied military advice, which sees
withd
rawal taking up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S.
would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to mak
e major gains in the months
before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame
for UNPROFOR's failure on
the U.S.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.
n.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to
intervene to stem the
deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war

-- thus making the war a
unilateral U.S. responsibility.

Q: Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey is meeting with administration and congressional
leaders to call for lifting the
arms embargo. If that's what the Bosnians say they want, why not support them?

-- We support the concept of a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, should the UNP
ROFOR mission be

terminated.

-- We do not support unilateral lift, which would have the effect of causing UNPROFOR to withdraw prematurely.

-- We remain concerned that, in the time between lifting the embargo and the integration of new weapons into the Bosnian armed forces, the Bosnian Serbs would take military action that the Bosnians would be hard pressed to resist on their own.

Q: The Dole Resolution mandates lifting the arms embargo after UNPROFOR withdraws. Isn't that the Administration's policy?

-- The resolution would unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

-- Such an effort would violate the UN resolutions, trigger a withdrawal of UNPROFOR and cause a deterioration of an already difficult humanitarian situation.

-- American forces would thus be sucked into the crisis and much of the blame for the deteriorating situation would be placed on us.

President's Comments on UNPROFOR Withdrawal:

Q: The President said that if things did not improve in Bosnia, UNPROFOR may leave. Do you expect UNPROFOR to leave?

-- No.

-- We expect UNPROFOR to stay and urge it to do so.

-- The key is for UNPROFOR, backed up by the RRF, to deal more firmly with Serbian actions to interfere with its mission.

Q: In reiterating his support for multilateral lift of the arms embargo, was the Pr

esident signaling his expectation
that UNPROFOR will withdraw?

-- No. We expect and urge UNPROFOR to remain and urge it to do so.

-- We have long supported multilateral lift if UNPROFOR were to leave Bosnia
but we
do not
expect that to occur.

-- We strongly oppose unilateral lift and oppose current efforts in Congress to
achi
eve that goal.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: Where do your efforts to get Congressional approval for RRF funding stand?

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15
mil
lion of
transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a
P
residential
Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transpiration support to
the allies. The
Administration is also preparing for a drawdown of about \$3 million of
equipment.

-- The Administration is preparing for the provision of about an additional \$27 mi
llion of goods
and services -- under 506a authorities and primarily for equipment.

Q&A: Recurring Questions

Our Policy for the Way Ahead: Current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged
appr
oach to our objectives:

-- Achieve a negotiated end to the conflict that would preserve Bosnia's political i
ndependence and
territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its et
hnic groups;

-- Pressure the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already
accepted by the other parties;

-- Negotiate with Milosevic to obtain recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and
tighteni

ng his

cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;

-- Support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospects for an overall settlement.

-- Sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR in order to help prevent a resumption of all-out war that would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering, risk the spread of the conflict, and effectively end the prospect for a negotiated settlement. Toward that end, we are:

-- supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);

-- working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on the ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequate plan and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and

-- continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions

to protect those on the ground.

-- Strengthen and adapt the abilities of existing, proven, organizations such as NATO to deter a repetition of the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. We cannot do this if we abandon our Allies.

-- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

-- As a first step, we reiterate our call for the Bosnian Serbs to join the other parties to the conflict in accepting the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

Rapid Reaction Force:

Q: What is the mission of the RRF? How will it be different from other UNPROFOR efforts that have proven ineffective?

-- The rapid reaction force is intended to provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel. It will be used to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate.

-- We expect it to be in place and fully operational by mid-August.

-- Based on discussions at the UN, its missions would include:

-- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;

-- help redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;

-- facilitate freedom of movement where necessary.

-- This force will be used to perform tasks that have previously been impossible for UNPROFOR.

-- By providing the UN with the means to defend itself if attacked while fulfilling its mandate, the

RRF force should enhance UNPROFOR's overall credibility and effectiveness.

Q: What have we given the RRF?

-- We have authorized \$12 of lift support to the RRF, and we have begun to help move it into theater.

Q: What support are we prepared to give the RRF?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We have indicated to our allies that if asked, and in consultation with Congress, we would be prepared to:

-- provide close air support through NATO;

-- assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data;

-- provide equipment such as, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel);

-- These commitments are intended to strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR, whose presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid and preserve conditions for political settlement.

Q: How will you make good on your pledge to help finance the RRF when there does not seem to be any Congressional support?

-- I am committed to providing U.S. support to our Allies who are contributing troops to the RRF.

-- We plan to work with the United Nations and other member states to establish a voluntary fund as a means to defray the costs of the RRF.

-- The U.S. contribution will come in three forms:

-- 1) DOD drawdowns of equipment and transportation services (We are consulting with Congress on the use of existing authorities to use DOD equipment and services

to support our allies.)

-- (If pressed) Our initial support has been in the area of air and sea lift to support movement of the RRF forces into the theater.

-- (If pressed) As you are aware, the British have begun to move their initial forces, and we have provided the necessary lift capabilities. Approximately \$12 million in lift services will be provided.

-- (If pressed) The remainder of the drawdown authority would support other lift requirements from the Dutch, French and Germans, if requested, and provide force enhancement through equipment such as night vision goggles, communications terminals, laser targets, precision navigation and refueling capabilities, and modifications to aircraft and helicopters to enhance their air defense capabilities.

-- 2) direct contributions of national assets, such as close air and intelligence support.

-- (If pressed) We also intend to use national assets to continue our Close Air Support for forces assigned to UNPROFOR and to provide intelligence capabilities. This support would not require the exercise of drawdown authority.

-- 3) UN assessments of previously approved manpower ceilings (Of the RRF's 14,500 troops, 5,300 will be deployed under existing UNPROFOR approved manpower ceilings previously authorized by the Security Council. This portion of the RRF will represent no more than \$35 million of our UNPROFOR assessment.)

-- We have informally consulted with the Congress on our intent to use Section 506(a)(1) emergency drawdown authorities of the FAA to provide up to \$15 million of DOD goods and services (primarily transportation and equipment) to our allies participating in the RRF.

-- We have consulted with the Congress on the President's intent to provide \$15 million of transportation and equipment support. Of this amount, the President has signed a Presidential Determination authorizing the provision of \$12 million of transportation support to the allies. The Administration is also preparing an initial provision of equipment of about \$3 million.

-- The Administration is conducting formal consultations with the Congress for the provision of up to an additional \$30 million of goods and services -- again under 506a authorities and primarily for transportation services and equipment.

NATO Airstrikes:

Q: Has the NATO ultimatum pledging to use airstrikes to enforce the weapons exclusion zones been rendered null and void?

-- NATO continues to stand ready to implement its decisions in cooperation with the UN commanders, should they determine that such action is warranted by the military and political situation.

Support for UNPROFOR:

Q: Why do you continue to support the UNPROFOR effort when it has repeatedly demonstrated that it is totally

ineffective in either ensuring the delivery of aid , protecting the citizens in the Safe Areas from attack, or ending the fighting?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

-- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.

-- Shouldn't forget UNPROFOR's success in implementing the Bosnian-Croat Federation, which has restored peace to central Bosnia and demonstrated that multi-ethnic cooperation is still possible.

-- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alternatives:

-- quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed);

-- continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or

-- sending Americans to fight in a Balkan ground war, which the administration and American people reject.

-- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Results to Date:

Q: Isn't our policy of support for UNPROFOR bankrupt?

-- No. While the tragedy of recent events is enormous, you should not overlook what

has been

accomplished to date:

-- negotiating efforts have been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bo

snia's

Muslims and Croats, which has brought peace to the vast majority of territory under

Bosnian government

control;

-- civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994)

;

-- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne

relief operation ever -- thousands have received food and medical supplies;

-- shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days);

-- NATO's Operation Deny Flight has flown more than 60,000 sorties, keeping the war

out of the

air over Bosnia for two and a half years; and

-- war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.

-- All accomplished without introduction of American combat forces on the ground in

Bosnia.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.

U.S. Ground Forces:

Q: What is our policy regarding provision of U.S. ground forces?

-- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the

conflict or

to join UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

-- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or

if units
need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through
NATO.

-- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete,
temp
orary
operations:

1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the
parties,
to use U.S. troops
as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were
carryin
g out in good
faith.

2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and
review of m
ilitary plans,
we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.

3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNP
ROFOR have
formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an
eme
rgency
extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in
Bos
nia.

Lifting the Arms Embargo:

Q: Why not go along with the Bosnian's requests to lift the arms embargo?

-- Lifting arms embargo would lead to immediate decision by UNPROFOR to
withdraw.
UNPROFOR withdrawal would lead to increased humanitarian suffering and
wider war, re
duce chances
for political settlement.

-- Even if arms embargo were lifted, would take time for Bosnian Government to
acqui
re arms
and training needed to use them. Great vulnerability in interim, particularly if Be
lgrade resumes all-out
support for Bosnian Serbs.

- If UNPROFOR has to leave, we will support multilateral lift, but believe it is better to work to strengthen UNPROFOR and redouble efforts to achieve negotiated settlement.
- Will continue to oppose unilateral lift.

Points on the Dole Amendment

- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would hinder our efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.
- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. military support to the Bosnian government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and Serbia.
- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.
- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the international community's other efforts have yielded significant benefits.
- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing the killing and suffering in Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.
- UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million people. Its presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of Central Bosnia.
- UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and is fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.

-- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.

-- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partner to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them limited support and time to prove themselves.

-- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue to oppose unilateral lift.

-- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.

- Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government

would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively with its new arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

-- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo within 12 weeks of the date the Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually ensures Allied entanglement in the war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the mission could take up to 22 weeks.

-- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make

e major gains in the months
before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.

-- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.

-- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the
blame
for UNPROFOR's failure on
the U.S.

-- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.

-- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian
situatio
n.

-- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great
pressure to
intervene to stem the
deteriorating situation.

-- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the
war
-- thus making the war a
unilateral U.S. responsibility.

-- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like
Serbia, would likely provide military
assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.

-- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes,
such
as those against Iraq and
Libya. that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to disting
uish between Bosnia and other
situations.

-- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with
respect to decisions that could
involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and
other Americans to imminent
risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential
respo
nsibilities.

-- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are
prepared to put
some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the
effort

works, or do we
take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and
risks
of an UNPROFOR
withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and
p
rotecting the Bosnians
that will follow?

-- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

IRAQ: RICHARDSON/DALIBERTI MEETING WITH POTUS

-- The President will welcome the Richardson Mission home early this evening in
the
Oval Office.
He will receive Congressman and Mrs. Bill Richardson, David Daliberti and his
wife K
athy, and members
of the Florida delegation, where the Dalibertis live.

-- The Barloon family is having their reunion in Kuwait. The President told Bill
Ba
rloon that he
hoped to meet him. Once the family comes to the States, we'll arrange a meeting.

GUATEMALA HUMAN RIGHTS

Background: The Washington Post Style Section ran an article featuring
allegations
by Sister Diana Ortiz of being
abducted, raped and tortured while in Guatemala in 1989. At that time the U.S.
Emba
ssy provided assistance to
Ortiz, and has pressed the Guatemalan Government to investigate her case. Sister
Or
tiz' case is also subject to
IOB review. While Ortiz at one time implied that the "North American" who
allegedly

rescued her from her torture
was affiliated with the U.S. Embassy, her lawyer has since retracted that claim.
Th
e Post article also mentions the
Harbury case; Jennifer Harbury continues to work with the Guatemalan Special
Prosecu
tor to secure legal
permission to excavate a site where it is rumored her husband's remains are
buried.

Points

(on Sister Diana Ortiz)

-- Since 1989, the U.S. Embassy and the State Department have provided
assistance to
Sister
Ortiz and have pressed the Guatemalan Government to conduct a thorough
investigation
of the incident.

-- While Sister Ortiz' lawyers have reiterated that they do not believe the U.S.
Emb
assy had any
role in the abduction or torture of Sister Ortiz, her case is nonetheless subject to
review by the
Intelligence Oversight Board, which is reviewing all aspects of allegations
relating
to the abduction,
torture or killing of American citizens in Guatemala since 1984.

(on Jennifer Harbury)

-- We understand Ms. Harbury continues to seek to begin excavation at a site in
Guat
emala where
it is rumored the remains of her husband might be found. The U.S. Embassy in
Guatem
ala continues to
provide her with every appropriate assistance in that endeavor.

CUBA AND NEWS BUREAUS

Q: What comment do you have on The New York Times story today? Are we on

the verge
of a
deal with the Cuban Government on news bureaus?

A: The Administration continually reviews all aspects of our policy toward Cuba, exploring ways to make the embargo more effective and to provide support to the Cuban people. In that context, the Administration is still reviewing the possibility of allowing reciprocal establishment of news bureaus in the U.S. and Cuba.

Q: Is Senator Helms' insistence on letting Radio Marti/TV Marti into Cuba the sticking point?

A: Radio and TV Marti are not commercial news stations. They comprise the Office of Cuba Broadcasting in the Bureau of Broadcasting of USIA which is represented at our Interests Section in Havana. Under consideration is the licensing of commercial news organizations to establish news bureaus in Cuba.

Although Radio and TV Marti would certainly benefit from a greater flow of accurate, uncensored news from Cuba, they are not directly related to the issue of reciprocal news bureaus.

CUBAN-AMERICAN FLOTILLA

Background: The organizers of yesterday's Cuban-American "flotilla" say that a Cuban coast guard vessel rammed their flagship, the Democracia, injuring three people (including a Dade County Commissioner). The collision occurred about two miles inside Cuban territorial waters. US Coast Guard picked up the injured

persons after the flotilla returned to international waters, and they are receiving medical treatment in Key West.

The US Interests Section yesterday asked the Cuban government for its version of events. The GOC this morning publicly released a statement reporting on the flotilla's entrance into Cuban waters and flotilla-associated aircrafts' violation of Cuban airspace, dropping leaflets along the seaside drive in Havana. The GOC says that its border guards "maintained great composure throughout the provocations" and did not ram, bow first, the Democracia. It border guard boats "simply came alongside and prevented the advance" of the flotilla boat. Flotilla organizers videotaped the incident and have provided the tape to US TV stations. (FYI: The videotape is subject to different interpretations.)

(If asked)

Q: What comment do you have on yesterday's collision involving a boat in the Cuban-American flotilla and Cuban coast guard vessels?

A: We regret that a collision occurred and that several persons were injured. We have urged all parties to exercise utmost restraint.

We would refer you to the State Department for any additional details on the incident.

HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL (HR1816)

Background: The House completed action on HR1816, the FY 96 foreign operations appropriations bill last evening, passing it by a vote of 333-89. The bill contains many troubling provisions. Your advisors have not yet recommended a veto and are working to improve the bill. In addition to

appropriating considerably less than we need, among the more troubling provisions are the Smith Amendment, which would reinforce the Mexico City family planning process, and caps on funds to Turkey, restrictions on aid to Russia and Mexico. It also contains other infringements on your authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We have concerns over certain provisions in the House passed foreign operations appropriations bill, HR 1816, but we are pleased that the bill does not have many restrictions, giving the Administration flexibility to use scarce foreign aid funds to meet complex challenges. This is particularly important because far fewer funds were appropriated than are needed if we are to meet our international commitments and fulfill our leadership role.

-- There are some provisions in the bill with which we have particular problems. These include the Smith amendment that would reimpose the Mexico City family planning process and other amendments that would restrict the President's authority to conduct foreign policy.

-- We are seriously concerned about large reductions in appropriations for many programs. These reductions will severely limit our ability to carry out an effective foreign policy. We will work with the committees to obtain additional funding for these programs, (e.g. funding for the World Bank and for Developmental Assistance) as the appropriations process continues.

-- We believe we will be able to improve the bill along the way and make a decision about what to do about the bill later on in the process.

-- We are also pleased that the bill does not legislate consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies.

(IF ASKED:

-- The President threatened a veto of HR 1561, the House passed State Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act, for three primary reasons: restrictions on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy; mandating the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies; and deep funding cuts to foreign aid programs.

-- While the Senate has not yet taken up the State Department Authorization bill and the Foreign Assistance Act, key advisers to the President have already recommended that he veto the State Department Authorization bill, and we anticipate there will be a similar recommendation for the Foreign Assistance Act.)

CHINA

Q: What is the status of the vote on MFN for China?

A: Congressional action is anticipated in the near future. We hope the Congress will confirm the President's decision to extend MFN for China.

Q: Is the Administration working with the Congress on a second resolution critical of China?

A: The House leadership is considering how best to address the MFN issue. Obviously, we will want to monitor any additional Congressional initiatives that might be developing.

Q: How can you grant MFN when Harry Wu is still in jail?

A: We remain very concerned about the Harry Wu case and continue to work to persuade the Chinese government to release him. But we do not believe denying MFN to

China would help. It would, in fact, more likely result in harsher treatment for Wu.

It is important that the issues be treated separately. The President determined in 1994 and reiterated this year that the best way for bringing about long-term improvements in China's human rights record was to maintain a comprehensive engagement with China, including in the area of economic and commercial relations.

Q: What are you doing to get Harry Wu out?

A: We have made clear in repeated demarches and other communications with the Chinese government that this is a high-priority issue in U.S.-China relations. Its repercussions go beyond the legal case itself.

We are also working with other countries to reinforce the point that the Wu case is of great importance for U.S.-China relations.

Q: What about Chinese hints that he will be freed after the investigation is completed?

A: We cannot base our approach on hints and rumors. Our position is unchanged. He should be released immediately.

Q: What impact is this case having on overall U.S.-China relations? What is the state of the relationship?

A: The Harry Wu case is receiving our full attention and is a high-priority issue. We have made clear that it will be high on the agenda as long as he remains imprisoned.

Overall, the relationship has clearly been strained by the various events of the last month. We continue, however, to believe that the U.S.-China relationship is of fundamental importance.

ortance, and the
Administration's overall outlook on the long-term importance remains intact.

We will persist in our efforts to engage the Chinese government on the full range
o
f our bilateral
interests and clarify those policy issues on which there is misunderstanding.

We hope the Chinese government will similarly recognize the need to remain
engaged
on issues
of mutual interest.

The Secretary of State will be meeting with China's Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen on
August 1,
when both will be attending an ASEAN meeting in Brunei.

Q: What is the Administration's response to Chinese demands that apologize for
invit
ing Lee
Teng-hui to the U.S. and promise not to let it happen again?

The President stands by his decision and has no intention of apologizing.

The decision to permit Lee to make a private visit to Cornell was appropriate and
f
ully
consistent with American values and opinion.

We have said repeatedly that the decision was not aimed at China, nor does it
const
itute a

change in our approach to either China or Taiwan.

Q: Will Lee be allowed to visit again?

We will deal with requests for private visits by Taiwan leaders on a case-by-case
b
asis, based
on our judgment of what is in the U.S. interest. There is no request pending at the
moment.

U.S.-JAPAN CIVIL AVIATION DISPUTE

Background: There was no agreement between the U.S. and Japan during the July 13-15 civil aviation talks in Tokyo. However, Japan has proposed another Vice Ministerial-level meeting, followed by a meeting between Secretary Pena and Ministry of Transport Minister Kamei. We have accepted this proposal in principle and are now in the process of discussing with the Japanese the modalities (e.g., time, place) of that meeting.

Talking Points:

-- We continue to work towards a negotiated solution to this dispute which recognizes the rights of U.S. carriers such as Federal Express under the existing agreement.

-- While the talks last week did not reach an agreement, we believe that they were productive.

-- Japan has proposed another round of Vice Ministerial-level talks, followed by a meeting between Secretary Pena and Minister Kamei.

-- We have accepted that idea in principle and are now discussing the venue and timing for such talks in the next several days.

HAITI

Background: The Electoral Council has released partial election results and announced where reruns would be taking place. The results point to a significant Lavalas victory, but it is important to note that, overall, non-Lavalas parties gathered roughly 60-65% of the vote and that a second round will be required in about 70%

of the parliamentary or senate races. The Lavalas share of 35-40% of the vote should be viewed in light of President Aristide's 70% share when he was elected in 1991. Reruns will take place in about 20% of localities. This is more limited than had been demanded by the political parties. The reruns are still scheduled for July 22, though it is unlikely this will be sufficient time.

The political parties (other than Lavalas) have reacted angrily to the Electoral Council's announcement. A number of them have said they would boycott both the reruns and the second round of the elections. Amb. Swing is attempting to persuade them to stay in.

Our view is that, while there were irregularities and flaws, and while the electoral council acted in ways that justifiably undermined the parties' confidence in the process, the outcome of the elections was not significantly affected, and that there is no evidence of widespread fraud.

Points

-- The most significant aspect of the elections is that Haitians, for the first time, were able to vote peacefully, without intimidation, and were able to choose the representatives of their choice. In light of Haiti's history of extreme political violence and of the fact that barely nine months ago it was ruled by a repressive military regime, this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

-- Of course, we regret the irregularities that have marked these elections. These will have to be remedied before the second round of balloting takes place and, in some instances, will require reruns.

-- However, international observers have seen no evidence of systematic fraud or of an attempt to subvert the electoral process. These are natural growing pains of democracy, especially in one of the poorest, least educated countries in the world.

-- We are aware that some of the political parties have denounced the electoral process and might not participate in the reruns or the second round. We believe that would be a mistake. The parties, the electoral council and the government should instead turn their efforts towards strengthening Haiti's democracy by remaining engaged, correcting whatever errors occurred and preparing for upcoming elections, in particular the presidential elections.

Question: Will President Aristide extend his term?

Points

-- President Aristide has assured the USG repeatedly, at the highest levels, publicly and privately, that he does not intend to run again for President, as stipulated in the Constitution, limiting the President to one term

-- He has also said that he plans to keep the Presidential elections timetable on track, which calls for an election at the end of this year and the inauguration of the next President in February of 1996.

-- We expect to keep to this timetable -- there is no change in US policy.

RUSSIA

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting political, economic reform there. It matters greatly to us if Russia, other NIS are dictatorships or democracies, centrally planned or market-oriented economies.

-- Long-term strategy. Understand transformation underway will be complex,

protract
ed.

-- Struggle going on between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.
Will be setbacks, like Chechnya. Have to work to make progress on these.

-- But engagement also producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50% of Russian GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

Yeltsin's Medical Status

-- Russians report that Yeltsin's doctors have recommended that he remain in the hospital this week, further report that Yeltsin continues to work from the hospital.

-- Have seen reports that Chernomyrdin visited Yeltsin in the hospital today for about an hour.

Announcement of Duma Election Date

-- Yeltsin has issued decree that Russian Duma elections will be held December 17. Welcome this as positive, normal step for democratizing Russia.

July 12 Impeachment Vote

-- Russian Duma voted July 12 on motion to set up commission to consider impeachment

proceedings against Yeltsin. Motion failed to gather 226 votes needed to pass.

Chechnya

-- Negotiations continue between Russians and Chechens under OSCE auspices. Addressing political as well as military issues. Understand remaining point of difference at this time is the future status of Chechnya (i.e. Chechnya's relationship to the Russian Federation)

-- Talks have our full support -- offer opportunity "to break the cycle of violence

, " achieve
negotiated political solution, and launch process of reconciliation.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin discussed in late June. Have begun serious dialogue that will continue

-- We are making clear that we remain opposed to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests, by helping reformers succeed in building democracy and market economy, and by helping to reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in our interest to cut this assistance.

Russia, European Security and NATO

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Want to work actively with Russia toward this end.

-- Welcome Russia's agreement to join Partnership for Peace and begin working with us to

develop NATO-Russia relationship.

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. We intend to manage enlargement process in manner that undercuts no country's security.

-- Process will be deliberate, gradual, transparent. No surprises.