

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                              | DATE       | RESTRICTION   |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------------|
| 001. email               | Alexander Vershbow to James Baker and William Danvers. Subject: Rewrite of Helms Reply. (4 pages)                          | 05/08/1996 | P1/b(1)       |
| 002. email               | Alexander Vershbow to Jane Baker, M.K. Friedrich, Brenda Hillard et al. Subject: FW: Revised Final Helms Letter. (4 pages) | 05/13/1996 | P1/b(1)       |
| 003. email               | Anne Witkowsky to William Danvers, Elisa Harris, and Gary Samore. Subject: ACDA Annual Report. (10 pages)                  | 06/26/1996 | P1/b(1)       |
| 004. email               | Michael Sheehan to Richard Clarke. Subject: Haiti Update. [partial] (1 page)                                               | 07/25/1996 | b(7)(C), b(6) |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Emails  
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Jesse Helms])  
OA/Box Number: 590000

### FOLDER TITLE:

[03/12/1996-04/17/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5597

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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## M S M a i l

**DATE-TIME** 12 March 96 08:10  
**FROM** Millison, Cathy L.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** Helms-Burton [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Frias, Angela M.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY**

Angie:

Attached are copies of the documents which have gone to the President for this morning's signing ceremony.

[[ 1633.DOC : 2094 in 1633.DOC ]][[ 1633COV.DOC : 2095 in  
1633COV.DOC ]][[  
1633PART.DOC : 2096 in 1633PART.DOC ]][[ 1633SCEN.DOC : 2097 in  
1633SCEN.DOC  
]]  
And here's remarks for the ceremony  
[[ 1633ING.DOC : 2098 in 1633ING.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 11 March 96 19:43

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** 1633.DOC  
1633

CUBA BILL SIGNING EVENT  
DATE: March 12, 1996  
LOCATION: Room 450 OEOB  
TIME: 10:30 a.m.- 11:00 a.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE  
JOHN HILLEY

I. PURPOSE

To acknowledge key members of Congress and the public for their help in bringing about prompt legislative action regarding Cuba.

## II. BACKGROUND

You are scheduled to participate in a brief signing ceremony for the Helms/Burton Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. Despite initial Administration opposition to some aspects of the legislation, House and Senate conferees, led by Rep. Menendez, agreed upon compromise language that we can now support. Congressional attendance at the ceremony will be bipartisan and comprised largely of members from the Florida and New Jersey delegations. We have also invited the bill's cosponsors and chairs and rankings of key committees.

## III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab A.

## IV. PRESS PLAN

Pool press.

## V. SEQUENCE

See Tab B.

## VI. REMARKS

To be provided by speechwriting.

Attachments  
Tab A List of Participants  
Tab B Sequence of Events

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

11 March 96 13:51

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

1633COV.DOC  
1633

March 11, 1996

## ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: WILLIAM C. DANVERS

FROM: WILL DAVIS

SUBJECT: Cuba Bill Signing Event

The President is scheduled to participate in a signing ceremony for the Helms/Burton Cuba Liberty and Solidarity Act. We have invited a relatively small group of members to attend the event. Since we were able to achieve a compromise on the bill in conference that we can accept, we have invited a bi-partisan group including the bill's co-sponsors, members of the Florida and New Jersey delegations, and key committee chairmen and ranking members.

A memo for the President is attached at Tab I and remarks are being prepared by White House speechwriting in conjunction with NSC staff.

Concurrence by: Rick Nuccio

## RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo to the President at Tab I.

## Attachments

Tab I Memo for the President  
Tab A List of Participants  
Tab B Sequence of Events

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

11 March 96 17:40

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

1633PART.DOC

## PARTICIPANTS

## ADMINISTRATION

## MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL)  
Sen. Connie Mack (R-FL)  
Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC)  
Sen. Paul Coverdell (R-GA)  
Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ)

Rep. Robert Menendez (D-NJ)  
Rep. Bob Torricelli (D-NJ)  
Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL)  
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)  
Rep. Peter Deutsch (D-FL)  
Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN)  
Rep. Patrick Kennedy (D-RI)

## INVITED BUT UNABLE TO ATTEND

Sen. Chuck Robb (D-VA)  
Rep. Carrie Meek (D-FL)  
Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-FL)  
Rep. Ben Gilman (R-NY)  
Sen. Bill Bradley (D-NJ)

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

11 March 96 20:3

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

1633SCEN.DOC

Draft 4  
3/11/96

PLEASE NOTE THAT ALL TIMES ARE TENTATIVE

SCENARIO FOR THE HELMS-BURTON BILL SIGNING CEREMONY  
ROOM 450, OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING  
March 12, 1996

10:15 a.m. Alexis Herman, Al Maldon and Rick Nuccio join the President in the Oval Office to prebrief.

10:25 a.m. President's prebrief ends. The President, along with Mr. Lake, Ms. Herman and Mr. Maldon, proceeds to Room 450, Old Executive Office Building.

10:32 a.m. Upon being announced, the President enters Room 450, proceeds on stage to the Toast Lectern at the far end of the stage, and begins remarks. (Press Pool)

10:38 a.m. The President ends his formal remarks.

10:39 a.m. From the podium, the President invites the four family members of the victims to join him at the Signing Table.

10:40 a.m. The President proceeds to the Signing Table (shaking hands with the family members as they arrive at the Table). Following immediately behind the family members will be the Congressional members, who will stand on either side of the family members.

10:43 a.m. The President takes his seat at the table and signs the document.

10:45 a.m. The President stands up and shakes hands with everyone on stage (handing each one a pen).

10:56 a.m. The President departs Room 450 and returns to the Oval Office.

11:00 a.m. The President arrives at the Oval Office.

G:\execsec\scenario\helms312.doc

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

11 March 96 20:46

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

1633ING.DOC  
3/9/96 7:00 p.m.

PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON  
CLINTON

REMARKS UPON SIGNING  
THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ACT  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
MARCH 12, 1996

We come together today around a common commitment to bring democracy to Cuba. Two and a half weeks ago, the world received a harsh reminder of why a democratic Cuba is so important -- to us and to the Cuban people. In broad daylight and without justification, Cuban military jets shot down two unarmed U.S. civilian planes -- causing the deaths of three American citizens and one U.S. resident. The planes were unarmed, the pilots unwarned. They posed no threat to Cuba's security. This was the cruel and brutal act.

It demanded a firm, immediate response. On my instructions, Ambassador Albright convened the United Nations Security Council, which unanimously deplored Cuba's actions. Dozens of countries around the world expressed their revulsion. Cuba's blatant disregard for international law is not just an issue between Havana and Washington -- but between Havana and the entire world.

I also ordered a number of unilateral actions. One of those steps was to have my representatives work closely with Congress to reach prompt agreement on the Helms-Burton bill. Within two days -- and with the help of my good friend, Congressman Bob Menendez -- Democrats and Republicans came together and produced a better bill. It will strengthen the embargo in a way that advances the cause of freedom in Cuba. Today, I sign it with the certainty that it will send a powerful, unified message to Havana....that the yearning of the Cuban people for democracy must not be denied.

This bill continues our bipartisan effort to pursue an activist Cuba policy, an effort that began some four years ago with the Cuban Democracy Act. Under the provisions of that legislation, our Administration has encouraged Cuba's peaceful transition to democracy. We have promoted the free flow of ideas into Cuba -- through greater support for Cuba's brave human rights activists...a dramatic increase in non-governmental humanitarian

aid to the Cuban people...as well as long-distance phone service. This policy is working. And the more the Cuban people learn about the freedoms and rights their neighbors enjoy, the more they will insist on change.

We have also kept the pressure on Cuba to reform by maintaining a tough economic embargo. The legislation I am signing today further tightens that embargo. It sends a strong message to the Cuban government: we will not tolerate attacks on U.S. citizens and we stand with those, both inside and outside of Cuba, who are working for a peaceful transition to democracy.

Finally, let me say that as I sign this bill into law, I do so in the name of the four men who were killed when their planes were shot down on February 24: Armando Alejandro [ah-lay-HAHN-dray], Jr.; Carlos Costa; Mario de la Pena and Pablo Morales. In their memory, I will continue to do everything in my power to help the tide of democracy that has swept our hemisphere finally reach the shores of Cuba. The Cuban people must receive the blessings of freedom they have so long been denied.

[BUDGET INSERT]

I would now like to invite the families of the victims to join me at the table.

###

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 27 March 96 19:03

**FROM** Edwards, Joan

**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT** Package 827 [UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO** Danvers, William C.  
Kristoff, Sandra J.  
Parris, Mark R.

**CARBON\_COPY** Burrell, Christina L.  
Cooper, Kathleen H.  
Hill, Roseanne M.  
Quinn, Mary E.

**TEXT\_BODY**

Please comment or concur on attached ASAP!

[[ 0827.DOC : 4872 in 0827.DOC ]][[ 0827B.DOC : 4873 in 0827B.DOC ]][[ 0827D.DOC : 4874 in 0827D.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 27 March 96 15:54

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** 0827.DOC  
0827

March 25, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN

FROM: ELISA D. HARRIS

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Helms on Reports of Chinese Missile  
Cooperation with Iran

Senator Helms has written the President to express concern about recent press reports of Chinese missile-related sales to Iran. A memorandum for the President and proposed response are at Tab I.

Concurrences by: Mark Parris, Sandra Kristoff, Bill Danvers

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

#### Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Response to Senator Helms

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

27 March 96 15:16

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

0827B.DOC

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning press reports of Chinese missile-related sales to Iran.

We take any reports of proliferation-related activities very seriously, and investigate them promptly and thoroughly.

In the case of China and Iran, we have made clear to the Chinese our concerns about Iran's missile programs and the need to control missile-related exports in accordance with the international

Missile  
Technology Control Regime. We will continue to  
monitor closely information concerning potential  
Chinese missile-related sales to Iran and to  
implement the missile sanctions law fully and  
faithfully.

Thank you again for sharing your views on this  
important issue.

Sincerely,

[Name/Title in Initial Caps]  
[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]  
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]  
[Address - Initial Caps]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

27 March 96 16:17

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

0827D.DOC

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning  
press  
reports of Chinese missile-related sales to  
Iran.

We take any reports of proliferation-related  
activities very seriously, and investigate them  
promptly and thoroughly.

In the case of China and Iran, we have made  
clear  
to the Chinese our concerns about Iran's missile  
programs and the need to control missile-related

exports in accordance with the international  
Missile

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monitor closely information concerning potential  
Chinese missile-related sales to Iran and to  
implement the missile sanctions law fully and  
faithfully.

Thank you again for sharing your views on this  
important issue.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Sincerely,

[

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. email               | Alexander Vershbow to James Baker and William Danvers. Subject:<br>Rewrite of Helms Reply. (4 pages) | 05/08/1996 | P1/b(1)     |

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Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Emails  
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Jesse Helms])  
OA/Box Number: 590000

### FOLDER TITLE:

[03/12/1996-04/17/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5597

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|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002. email               | Alexander Vershbow to Jane Baker, M.K. Friedrich, Brenda Hillard et al. Subject: FW: Revised Final Helms Letter. (4 pages) | 05/13/1996 | P1/b(1)     |

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MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Jesse Helms])  
OA/Box Number: 590000

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2006-1363-F

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|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------------|
| 004. email               | Michael Sheehan to Richard Clarke. Subject: Haiti Update. [partial]<br>(1 page) | 07/25/1996 | b(7)(C), b(6) |

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NSC Emails  
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Jesse Helms])  
OA/Box Number: 590000

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## M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 25 July 96 16:22  
FROM Sheehan, Michael A.  
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SUBJECT Haiti Update [CONFIDENTIAL]  
TO Clarke, Richard A  
CARBON\_COPY Brown, Dallas  
Roundtree, Beverly J.  
TEXT\_BODY

Patrick Elie update (former Aristide minister in jail in Arlington for assault):

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

[004]

Elie now threatens to go to Helms and the press with his story

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

(b)(6), (b)(7)c

He shouted  
to Bev that he would take his story to Helms and the press.

Mike

Patrick Elie is threatening to go to Jesse helms and the press because the Administration is not taking his catastrophic warnings to heart.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By 12 NARA, Date 12/18/2018  
2006-1363-F

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 13 September 96 18:12  
**FROM** Lindsay, James M.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Sheehan, Michael A.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY**

Mike,

Here is a revised copy of the Helms rebuttal. The peacekeeping figures are what we spent, not what we owed.

Jim

[[ HELMS-RE.DOC : 4648 in HELMS-RE.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 13 September 96 18:10

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** HELMS-RE.DOC

Jesse Helms on the United Nations

(JK won't go as far as Helms but may use his more moderate claims)

Helms's Claims in Foreign Affairs

☐ BBG's empowerment campaign is turning the UN into a quasi-sovereign entity. The UN bureaucracy is growing, its costs are spiraling, and its mission is exceeding its mandate and ability.

☐ Two goals: (1) stop UN encroachment on national sovereignty; and (2) scale back the UN in size and in activities.

☐ Five reforms: (1) fire Boutros-Ghali; (2) cut UN staff by 50%; (3) end unneeded committees and conferences (e.g., Beijing Women's Summit;

Habitat II); (4) limit the UN regular budget to \$250m and fund all other UN activities on a voluntary basis; and (5) limit peacekeeping operations and enable the UN to pursue peacekeeping missions without US funding or participation. The UN must adopt these reforms or the US should leave the UN.

#### Responses

- ☐ Most Americans say that US membership in the UN is important.
- ☐ The Clinton Administration has aggressively pushed reform. The UN has a no-growth budget for 1996-7 -- UN spending is declining in real terms. The UN has cut 900 staff jobs.
- ☐ Peacekeeping costs jumped in 1990-93 because the Bush Administration supported new missions in Bosnia and elsewhere. Under Clinton's leadership U.S. peacekeeping costs have dropped, falling from a peak of \$1.1b in 1994 to an estimated \$282m in 1997.
- ☐ MNF operations allow the US to support a peacekeeping mission without paying for it or contributing troops.
- ☐ UN membership advances our national interest. Our \$304 million share of the UN regular budget--about \$1.13 per American--buys us: world-wide compliance with sanctions; international standards and laws in areas ranging from the environment to drug trafficking; an ability to fashion coalitions to keep the peace.
- ☐ UN membership benefits the US economy. The UN is one of the 20 largest employers in New York City, generating more than \$3b in spending each year. The UN buys roughly \$800m worth of goods from American companies each year.

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 05 December 96 17:17

**FROM** Wozniak, Natalie S.

**CLASSIFICATION** \*\*\*\*\* CLASSIFICATION NOT FOUND \*\*\*\*\*

**SUBJECT** Dec 5 Panetta/Bowles Press Briefing re New Foreign Policy Team

**TO**

Abdulmalik, April B.  
Albert, Ronda A.  
Alijanil, Leyla  
Andreasen, Steven P.  
Appel, Edward J.  
Armstrong, Fulton T.  
Atlas, Edwin L.  
Babcock, Douglas W.  
Baker, Jane E.  
Baker, James E.  
Bakke, Kyle D.  
Baldwin, Kenneth  
Bass, Peter E.  
Battenfield, Pat  
Bedell, Blair B.  
Beers, Rand R.  
Behring, Deanna M.  
Bellamy, Ralph C.  
Bell, Robert G.  
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.  
Bendick, Gordon L.  
Benjamin, Daniel  
Biernacki, Eileen V.  
Birkland, Andrea L.  
Black, Todd F.  
Blieberger, Marion H.  
Blinken, Antony J.  
Bolinski, Charlene C.  
Boulton, Darrien D.  
Boynton, Peter J.  
Brennan, Steven A.  
Bresnahan, Gary E.  
Brooks, Jennifer  
Brown, Dallas  
Brown, Nancy E.  
Bruton, Robert G.  
Bryan, Lloyd D.  
Bujold, Noelle D.  
Burrell, Christina L.

Busick, Paul E.  
Caravelli, John M.  
Carter, Michael E.  
Chen, Philip D.  
Cicio, Kristen K.  
Clark, Bronya  
Clarke, Richard A.  
Cooper, Kathleen H.  
Daadler, Ivo H.  
Danvers, William C.  
Darnes, Victoria J.  
Davis, William K.  
Dimel, Marsha L.  
Dobbins, James F.  
Dohse, Fred J.  
Dowling, J. Nicholas  
Dupuy, Shawn L.  
Durham, Robert J.  
Edwards, Joan  
Eggert, Tamara E.  
Elkind, Jonathan H.  
Epstein, Gerald L.  
Feeley, John F.  
Fetig, James L.  
Ficklin, John W.  
Flessas, Dan  
Florio, Elaine  
Fort, Jane B.  
Fried, Daniel  
Friedrich, M. K.  
Fuerth, Leon S.  
Fuhrman, Thomas A.  
George, Christopher  
Gerstner, Christina L.  
Gibney, James S.  
Gladbach, Damon J.  
Glinski, David L.  
Gorsuch, Robert P.  
Gray, Wendy  
Grummon, Stephen R.  
Haines, Mary A.  
Hale, John E.  
Hall, James A.  
Hall, Wilma G.  
Hamel, Michael A.  
Hamilton, Roy A.  
Harding, Bruce D.  
Harmon, Joyce A.  
Harris, Elisa D.  
Harrison, Lyle M.

Hasman, Thomas M.  
Hawes, David J.  
Hawkins, Ardenia R.  
Heslin, Sheila N.  
Higgins, David B.  
Hilliard, Brenda I.  
Hill, Roseanne M.  
Hilty, JoAnne M.  
Hofmann, Stephan D.  
Houck, Baerbel K.  
Huggins, Peter  
Hunerwadel, Joan S.  
Johnson, David T.  
Johnson, Natalie A.  
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.  
Jordan, Donald L.  
Joshi, M. Kay  
Kale, Dora A.  
Kelly, Sandra L.  
Kessinger, Jodi  
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.  
Koehler, Marc  
Kreczko, Alan J.  
Kristoff, Sandra J.  
Kyle, Robert D.  
Lawrence, Cynthia  
Leary, William H.  
LeBaron, Richard B.  
Lee, Malcolm R.  
Letts, Kelly J.  
Lindsay, James M.  
Lindsey, Christine J.  
Lorin, Matthew E.  
Lowry, Jay E.  
MacDonald, Bruce W.  
Malley, Robert  
Marshall, Betty A.  
Marsh, Thomas S.  
Martinez, Alejandro  
Martinez, Valentino E.  
Maxfield, Nancy H.  
McCarthy, Mary O.  
McCormick, Shawn H.  
McIntyre, Stuart H.  
Merchant, Brian  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Mitsler, Elaine M.  
Miyaoka, Lester H.  
Moffett, Julia  
Moody, Angelyn D.

Moore, Lori A.  
Moran, Betsy Q.  
Motherway, Daniel J.  
Mueller, William (Doug) D.  
Naplan, Steven J.  
Natoli, Kim M.  
Neil, M. Elise  
Norris, John J.  
O'loughlin, Kathrine  
Orfini, Michael H.  
Orr, Robert C.  
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick  
Panerali, Kristen E.  
Gwyn M. Parker  
Parramore, Carl W.  
Parris, Mark R.  
Pascual, Carlos E.  
Peggins, John W.  
Peters, Mary A.  
Piccone, Theodore J.  
Pifer, Steven K.  
Porter, Gidell  
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.  
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.  
Quinn, Mary E.  
Ragan, Richard F.  
Ramsay, Martha S.  
Rice, Susan E.  
Rice, Sean P.  
Roach, Darren S.  
Robinson, Wylma  
Rosa, Frederick M.  
Roundtree, Beverly J.  
Rumer, Eugene B.  
Salvetti, Lisa M.  
Samore, Gary S.  
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.  
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Santarcangelo, Jason M.  
Saunders, John W.  
Schifter, Richard  
Schmelz, Angela  
Schmidt, John R.  
Schwartz, Eric P.  
Scott, John F.  
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.  
Seaton, James B.  
Sens, Andrew D.  
Sestak, Joseph A.  
Sheehan, Michael A.

Showalter, Victoria A.  
Sigler, Ralph  
Simonalle, Eugene A.  
Simon, Steven N.  
Simons, James R.  
Smith, Michael P.  
Snyder, Julie A.  
Sparks, John E.  
Suettinger, Robert L.  
Sulser, Jack A.  
Szasz, Nicholas J.  
Uriu, Robert M.  
Van Tassel, David S.  
Veit, Katherine M.  
Vershbow, Alexander R.  
Verville, Elizabeth G.  
Wadsworth, Valon J.  
Waller, Robert P.  
Walsh, Helen C.  
Ward, JoAnn X.  
Weber, Paul A.  
Wechsler, William F.  
Wetzel, M. Jeanne  
Whitworth, Frank D.  
Willis, Robin M.  
Wise, William M.  
Witkowski, Anne A.  
Woolston, Ann E.  
Wozniak, Natalie S.  
Wright, Allison M.  
Wright, Jay  
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release December 5, 1996

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY CHIEF OF STAFF LEON PANETTA AND  
CHIEF OF STAFF-DESIGNATE ERSKINE BOWLES

The Briefing Room

2:55 P.M. EST

MR. MCCURRY: Good afternoon, everyone. I had a number of requests for a little bit of behind-the-scenes tick-tock on the decision that the President has made. You'll all recall that I told you during the last several days that there really were four people who did these deliberations and worked together and thought through so many of the issues -- three of them, obviously, except for the President: the Vice President; the Chief of Staff, Mr. Panetta; and the Chief of Staff-designate, Mr. Bowles.

It's a pleasure to have two of those four here. And I will turn the podium over first to Mr. Panetta and then to Mr. Bowles. And we will proceed accordingly.

Leon.

MR. PANETTA: What I wanted to do is give you a little bit of background as we approach these decisions and what took place, and then have Erskine -- I'll take it up to roughly the election day and what happened last night, and have Erskine describe the process from the election day to the decision that was finally made.

We began to first meet on the transition actually about three to four weeks before the election itself to begin to talk about putting a process in place and ensuring that we had developed after the election the process that was in place so that we could

present  
the President with the best background and the best information  
possible on the names that he would have to consider for those  
that  
were to be replaced.

At the time, basically it was myself, Erskine and Vernon  
Jordan and Mickey Kantor were the ones that began this  
discussion.

At the time, we thought it was well that I would interview all of  
the  
Cabinet members to determine what their plans were and at the  
same  
time have Evelyn Lieberman talk to White House staff as well.

As a result of those discussions that I had, it was  
clear that Secretary Christopher wanted to move on, as did  
Secretary  
Perry, and that obviously then began to lead us to a discussion  
of  
possible candidates to replace them.

I have to tell you, we had one discussion prior to the  
election with the President in which we began to talk about  
possible  
replacements for Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, and  
at  
that time in one of the very early meetings we had with the  
President, we discussed the possibility of Madeleine Albright as  
Secretary of State and Bill Cohen as Defense Secretary at that  
time.

That isn't to say that we didn't begin the process of  
looking at a number of other names, as all of you can imagine.  
But I  
do want to make clear that we had thought very early on of the  
combination of Madeleine Albright and Bill Cohen as one  
possibility  
at that point.

We then, during that time, began the process of  
continuing to have discussions among that group as we moved  
towards  
the election. On election day, as you may recall, Secretary  
Christopher actually came down to Little Rock and met with the  
President to formally indicate his plans for the President, and  
at  
that time indicated his comments about possible replacements, of  
which Madeleine Albright was clearly one of those that he said  
would

be an excellent replacement for him as Secretary of State.

We then, after the election, began the transition process, and I'll let Erskine get into that. I should point out, though, that the final decision was not made until last night, and it came during the Congressional Ball -- at which time I was having a dance with my wife, finally, and --

Q Having danced with everybody else? (Laughter.)

MR. PANETTA: Having at least talked with everybody else. And I was asked to go upstairs and meet with the President, and went upstairs, the President having concluded shaking hands with, as you know, all the members that were there. And at that time, we sat down in the kitchen upstairs and he basically said, I think I've come to a conclusion here that I'd like to have Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State and Bill Cohen as Secretary of Defense. And I'd like to try to move towards an announcement on that.

We then talked about, obviously, moving ahead. We had talked about other members of the team at that point, and where Tony Lake would go -- knowing that John Deutch was also intending to leave -- and moving Sandy Berger up. And so we decided, obviously, that we ought to announce all of those members of the team last night, and moved with it this morning. The President made calls to Senator Mitchell, to Senator Nunn, to Holbrooke and, obviously, first and foremost, to Madeleine Albright and to Bill Cohen. And then we moved ahead with calls to the Hill, and the ceremony that took place.

In the end, let me just say this. I think the President said it right -- the final determination was because -- or the final -- the decision here by the President was because of the combination of qualities that Madeleine Albright brought to the position of Secretary of State. He had developed a close, working relationship

with her over the last four years; she was part of the national security team. There were meetings on a weekly basis with that national security team. He was familiar with her, respected her, respected her decisions. Because of her background, because of her expertise, because of the work she did as Ambassador of the United Nations, but I think foremost, her determination as an individual, determination on some very critical issues, particularly when we dealt with Haiti and when we dealt with Bosnia -- those were issues that I think played a key role in the final decision.

Let me just turn it over.

Q But she had all those qualities the first time you talked about her. Why didn't you just settle on her the first time you had this discussion?

MR. PANETTA: Because this President really wanted to have a full range of discussion on other possible candidates. All of these candidates would have made outstanding Secretaries of State. But he did not, and his nature is one of not just suddenly coming down -- he wanted to talk about other possibilities, consider them, get the backgrounds, have the opportunity to talk with them, and then make his decision on that basis.

Q Did he call Pickering, too?

MR. PANETTA: No.

MR. BOWLES: Let me just talk a little bit about the process we've had so that some of the speculation that's gone on can maybe be a little bit more accurate or better informed. We have had a process that has been, I think, fairly well-organized from the beginning. We have moved forward against some very firm time lines. We are ahead of those time lines today and ahead of where we had wanted to be.

We have put together a transition team that has reached out to a broad cross-section of people from different

backgrounds,  
different level of expertise. And we have used those people who  
in  
turn reach to even a broader group of people to get  
recommendations  
for each one of the Cabinet posts that we have been reviewing.

We have had daily meetings generally, sometimes every  
other day, with this group of people, refining this information.  
We  
have been going through extensive background checks on all of the  
people, reviewing their writings, talking to people who know  
them,  
talking to experts -- in the case of the ones we made today, all  
in  
foreign policy -- to prepare some detailed memorandum that we  
submitted to the President upon his return from his Far Eastern  
trip.

He took that information with him on Thanksgiving  
vacation. He reviewed that information. We had a number of  
discussions while he was gone. He made a number of telephone  
calls.  
He came back. He's been meeting with the Vice President, with  
Leon  
and myself since that time. He has been doing a lot of homework  
in  
his own right. And today, or last night, he reached the final  
decision as to who he wanted to name for the foreign policy team.

We had been looking at each one of these announcements  
as team; the chemistry as to how each one of the people will work  
with other members of the team and work with the President and  
the  
Vice President has been very important in the calculations we  
have  
made as to who to finally pick in the final analysis.

Q Why is the President leaving Janet Reno twisting in  
the wind?

MR. BOWLES: I don't think that's an appropriate  
assessment. The President plans to meet with all of the members  
of  
the Cabinet over an organized period of time. I would expect  
that he  
would meet with General Reno as well as other members of the  
Cabinet  
next week or the week after.

Q How many memorandum did you eventually prepare for the President to take away to review? Were there like a half a dozen or four?

MR. BOWLES: It was a different number for each one of the Cabinet positions.

Q Well, say for State?

MR. BOWLES: For Secretary of State we probably prepared as many as six memoranda.

Q And each of the other five people got a call today?

MR. BOWLES: All of the other people who have been considered for the post have been contacted. We are not going to speculate as to who those people have been or who other people might be for other positions that we haven't announced.

Q But Leon already said that he called some individuals in particular, and was that because the President had actually personally interviewed those people and said, I'm considering you for this job and you should know that?

MR. PANETTA: Yes, I wanted to make clear that in my description that those were individuals that the President talked with. But that doesn't -- do not assume that there weren't other names that were also considered and discussed.

Q But those were the personal ones. And what time was your dance interrupted, Leon? (Laughter.)

MR. PANETTA: I think it was about 9:00 p.m., a little after 9:00 p.m.

Q Mr. Panetta, you said earlier that John Deutch had let it be known that he wasn't going to stay.

MR. PANETTA: Yes.

Q Was that a development that happened earlier than we had assumed? People had said --

MR. PANETTA: Yes.

Q -- he was a candidate for other jobs. Was that not the case?

MR. PANETTA: Yes. He had -- he was one of the ones -- obviously, as I went through the different Cabinet Secretaries before the election, I sat down with him and he indicated that he wanted to depart the CIA. But do not assume from that that he was also not in consideration for some other positions as well.

Q Are those who have said they want to stay, does that assume that they will stay? I mean, did you go to each one now in the Cabinet and get an idea of whether they want to leave or stay?

MR. PANETTA: Yes.

Q And did you give them any idea whether they could stay?

MR. PANETTA: Not necessarily, no. The purpose of that was to really talk with them and determine what their plans were, because the President wanted to know which -- I mean, obviously those Cabinet members that of their own volition wanted to move on, the President needed to know that. That did not assume that he might not want others to move on, but that's a discussion that we're having with Cabinet members.

Q Will the rest of the Cabinet be named at one time, or will it come out piecemeal?

MR. BOWLES: It will come out piecemeal. We will probably name the economic team at one time, because again that's one of the chemistry-related efforts that we want to make sure that we focus on.

Q Which positions are on the economic team?

MR. BOWLES: The CEA, the Treasury Secretary, the SBA, which I always like to think of, Commerce, Labor, the NEC.

Q Is there any doubt whatsoever that Secretary Rubin would not remain as Treasury Secretary?

MR. BOWLES: Not in my mind.

Q What about the White House staff?

Q Is there a chemistry team then for every -- for let's say, Transportation?

MR. BOWLES: Well, we want to make sure that the whole Cabinet works together as a team. As you look at each one of the positions it does have an effect on the other position. But again, I think you have to look at those that are involved the most frequently with each other, and the economic team and the foreign policy team work as a group, generally.

Q What about the White House staff? When do you expect that you will have announcements about who your deputies will be and Domestic Council and what's going on inside here?

MR. BOWLES: I would expect that you'll hear all of these before Christmas, is what we're working for.

Q Is Mr. McCurry staying on?

MR. BOWLES: I certainly hope so.

Q When you said before Christmas, you mean everything you just talked about, every area, or just White House staff?

MR. BOWLES: I hope -- our plan has always been to submit all of the names to the President for consideration by the time he got back from his trip. We accomplished that goal. Then our plan was to make decisions over an orderly period of time so that we could submit to the Congress in the first week of January the names of the people for confirmation. And then our hope was that the committees would meet during the early part of January so that they could be confirmed by the time the President is sworn in on January 20th. We don't know if the committees are actually going to meet, but we are well ahead of that schedule.

Q So you gave him memos for the entire Cabinet, not just for the National Security team?

MR. BOWLES: He has memorandums now on each and every one of the positions that we're looking at.

Q Mr. Bowles, do you think the NEC's management could be improved if you have two chairman -- co-chairmen -- as opposed to the structure you have now with one chairman?

MR. BOWLES: I have seen it work well in my business career with co-chairmen; I've seen it work well with single chairman.

I think it depends on who the individuals are and how it's structured and how the overall team's organized.

Q The President has now decided on who will be the foreign policy team, but we don't know what he's decided. Has he decided on an overall strategy that is represented by this team? Any change in direction or any one overarching theory or strategy of foreign policy?

MR. BOWLES: I think you can see that three of the members of the new team were members of the old team. And so I don't think you'll see a different strategy going forward than the one we've had before. We hope to build on the current strategy.

MR. MCCURRY: I think it's important to look back at some of the things the President said during the course of the campaign, in his speech on the future of Europe --

Q Uncle. (Laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: I want -- it's a good question. (Laughter.) And also the speech at the United Nations, in which he really has talked in a very specific way about the architecture of the post-Cold War era and how you define it. He had a first-term foreign policy team that really performed ably as the President set out an agenda and began to deal with these challenges.

But the President increasingly, as he said today, sees the next four years as an opportunity to really put together in a more coherent way a definition of America's place in the new world we're going to live in as we reach for the 21st century.

And those threats, as he's defined them -- the geopolitical threats of terrorism, drug trafficking and proliferation;

secondly, the promotion of America's global economic security through trade arrangements; and third, dealing with those major alliances that define America's place in Europe and in Asia are going to be major parts of the equation.

We have important decisions coming up on the future of Europe and Russia's role in Europe, the future of Asia and whither China. On all these things, the President's thinking is well-developed. And today, he's produced a team that I think will really reflect his foreign policy as it has been and as it will be in the next four years.

Q Do you expect there to be other Republicans in the Cabinet?

MR. BOWLES: As I said earlier, we're not going to speculate on any of the other positions that could be -- we're certainly looking at some others.

Q On the foreign policy team, which you said is almost -- is going to have to have a new U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. to replace Madeleine Albright -- how long before that person's chosen?

MR. BOWLES: We'll do it in an orderly fashion. We just have an opening today created, so we'll be hoping to fill it.

Q Mr. Panetta, Mrs. Clinton has been an advocate in the past of appointing women and considering women for positions they haven't held before. Did she weigh in on the Secretary of State appointment this time?

MR. PANETTA: The conversations that we had with the President included the Vice President, Erskine Bowles and myself. That was the fundamental focus of the discussion. What discussions took place in the residence I don't know.

Q The final conversation was just you and the President last night, correct?

Q Mr. Bowles, does the President have any role in mind for George Mitchell now that he's not going to be Secretary of State?

MR. BOWLES: I think George Mitchell, again, was one of those that we think would have been an outstanding Secretary of State had he been chosen. The President's got a very close relationship with George Mitchell. He is going to continue to seek his advice on both foreign policy and domestic policy issues.

Q Since you guys made the point that you are actually the only ones who have any --

MR. BOWLES: Mike points out that he obviously is going to continue to do the work that he is doing with regards to Northern Ireland. He's on his way back, as a matter of fact, from there now.

Q Since you all pointed out that you're the only ones who really have any earthly idea of how these discussions have proceeded, and since Mr. Bowles gently but somewhat firmly rebuked us for all the rampant speculation we've indulged in -- (laughter) -- can you lift the table cloth a tiny bit here? Can you say a little bit more about how this proceeded -- I mean, when things crystallized in the President's mind? What did he do on the golf course yesterday afternoon? Was it one last moment to be alone with himself and his thoughts on this thing and kind of let it gel? Was there a moment a week ago when he called one of you and said, you know, really my gut tells me Madeleine and I just got to let it sort of titrate out here over the next week. (Laughter.) I mean, is there anything you can say about that? This is a desperate journalistic exercise. (Laughter.)

MR. BOWLES: This is pretty desperate. (Laughter.) The way -- the best way I can describe it is that we obviously had centered on a group of names for his consideration. But then beyond that, we obviously wanted to look at the foreign policy team and what a foreign policy team would look like and that obviously included the Secretary of Defense. And so there were a number of ways to approach this, in which you look at candidates and then look at

possible combinations that we presented to the President and talked about. And I think he went through a consideration of those kinds of combinations in his own mind and what worked and how it would work.

And so that, I think, was a part of this. Part of this was just, as he spoke to each one of them he -- you know, he was greatly impressed with the discussions that he had with the key individuals involved here and saw their strengths. And I think he wanted to be able to consider that, as well. But in the end, I think it did -- I think the day he had on the golf course helped and I think the discussions he had late with Erskine and with the Vice President helped. And then last night it kind of all came together.

Q Has the President already had personal conversations --

MR. MCCURRY: Todd, on that one, he told me yesterday, he said, you know, I always do my best thinking on the golf course. And it was clear that he was ready to do his best thinking on this subject yesterday afternoon.

Q Do you have any comment on that picture in the Australian newspaper -- speaking about golf courses? (Laughter.)

MR. PANETTA: There were no candidates in the bushes. (Laughter.)

Q The conversations you're talking about, that he's had one-on-one with people, has he begun to have those conversations with people who would be part of the economic team?

MR. PANETTA: Beyond --

Q Has he begun to have these personal kind of interview conversations with people for the next round of appointments?

MR. PANETTA: His fundamental focus up to this point, although -- I mean, we discussed other areas, but the fundamental focus has really been on the national security slots.

Q Can you say that he's now turning to the economic team, Leon, and this will be his next big priority?

MR. BOWLES: We'll be looking at all the other Cabinet positions now.

MR. PANETTA: We'll be looking at the others.

Q Is the USTR included in the econ team?

MR. PANETTA: Yes.

Q Can you all say, talking about partnerships, what it is about Cohen and Albright that you think make them a good team, how they complement each other, what you see about them that will make them work together well?

MR. PANETTA: Well, I think the great strengths are these: number one, that, obviously, for Madeleine, because of her performance as Ambassador at the UN, one of the considerations that the President wanted to look at for Secretary of State is obviously someone that he could trust when that individual had to sit down across the table from an adversary in a tough negotiation. And he felt very comfortable with her ability to be able to sit there, represent the United States, and be tough in that negotiation.

Secondly, resources for the Department of State. It is extremely important that we try to provide additional resources for the Department of State. Congress has been tough, as you know, with regards to providing those additional funds. She has a very good relationship with the Hill and with the committees that have overseen her operation. So we felt very comfortable with her ability to do that.

Combined with Bill Cohen, who obviously, because Congress is Republican and because of his relationship to the leadership, would also be able to address resources as well and be part of that team. Bill Cohen also, obviously, because of his background, his abilities, and his performance in the committee on defense, I think represents someone who can build a relationship

with  
the Hill that hopefully can establish what the President has been  
after for a long time, which is a bipartisan approach to foreign  
policy and to national security policy. Those are the reasons  
these  
people were selected.

Q Speaking of the Hill, Jesse Helms was very  
complimentary about the choices already today. (Laughter.) Was  
he  
contacted in advance? Did you all check things out with him and  
say,  
would this sound right to you?

MR. BOWLES: We called Senator Helms right before we  
made the announcements and informed him of our choices.

Q Who made that call?

MR. BOWLES: I don't know who made it.

MR. PANETTA: John Hilley -- I think the John Hilley  
shop basically called all of the committees and key chairmen and  
ranking members that had to be informed, but those calls began at  
11:30 a.m. today.

Q But there were no informal exchanges?

MR. PANETTA: There were some discussions with key  
senators during the course of this and there were a number of  
candidates that were being discussed.

Q Including Helms?

MR. PANETTA: Not that I'm aware of, in terms of Helms.  
I did not get a call from Helms on that.

MR. BOWLES: I talked to Senator Helms several times in  
the last couple of days, but not about these appointments. We  
did  
reach out to various members of the Senate and were able to -- we  
did  
reach out to various members of the Senate. We did ask them  
their  
opinions, and we took those into account and made sure that the  
President was aware of them.

Q What was the Vice President's role in all of this?

MR. BOWLES: The Vice President had a very significant

role. He reviewed the information. He offered his opinion. He reached out to others to find their opinion and made sure that the President was well aware of what he felt the pluses and minuses of each one of the candidates were.

Q Why wouldn't the U.N. ambassador, the new ambassador be considered part of this team?

Q Mr. Bowles, could you be clear on the timetable? Are we looking for all these appointments by Christmas or January?

MR. MCCURRY: Hold on. Susan and then Helen.

Q Could you be clear on the timetable? Are we looking for all the Cabinet and the White House appointments by Christmas or by the first of the year?

MR. BOWLES: Our due date, what we're working off, the calendar that we're working off, the time line that we have established is by the first of the year. I hope to beat that. I can't tell you I will, but that's what our goal is.

Q Mr. Bowles, you were scheduled to meet with a group of House Republicans today. Did you have lunch with House Republicans today, and if so what was your message to them?

MR. BOWLES: I didn't have lunch with them. I met with a group of moderate Republicans today. I had a good meeting. We discussed bipartisan ways to work together to accomplish the goals that I think the American people outlined in the last election.

Q Did you focus on the budget or --

MR. BOWLES: We talked about the budget a great deal. We talked about campaign finance reform. We talked about education.

We talked about literacy. We talked about the environment.

Q Mr. Bowles, there are reports that Mayor Rice of Seattle was in the White House today talking about a possible job in the administration. As a question of fact, not speculation, was he, indeed, here and did he talk to White House officials?

MR. BOWLES: I think Mayor Rice was here today and I believe he did have conversations with members of our group. Clearly, he would be -- he has the kind of credentials and the kind of experience and background that we would look for to fill any number of positions in the administration.

MR. MCCURRY: Okay. We're going to do one, two, three and we're done.

Q Just the FDA, the Federal Drug Administration nomination -- is that included in your fast-track due date?

MR. BOWLES: It's not. We have a different process set up for FDA. Secretary Shalala has been conducting an outreach for people to consider and Leon and I expect to receive her list of first-round, broad-brush, I think, large group of people to look at in the not-to-distant future.

Q Now that you mentioned and confirmed about Mayor Rice, could you tell me if Bill Daley also talked to Rubin? When was he here?

MR. BOWLES: Again, that's -- no, I can't.

MR. PANETTA: You're learning, Erskine. (Laughter.)

MR. BOWLES: Yeah, yeah. Thank you. (Laughter.)

MR. MCCURRY: Thank you. Okay, we'll do two more.

Q Is the United Nations ambassadorship not part of the national security team?

MR. BOWLES: Yes, but the vacancy only became available last night.

Q Yes, but so did the National Security Advisor vacancy only become --

MR. BOWLES: Yes, but we had known for a long period of time that Director Deutch did not -- was not planning to stay in that position. So we had been focused on it for a long period of time. We'll move on to that position very quickly.

MR. MCCURRY: Yes, last question.

Q Gentlemen, the Secretary of State Warren Christopher invested many hours in flying to Damascus. How do you see the new Secretary of State doing the same job? Will the Middle East be as high on their agenda as it was in the previous administration?

MR. MCCURRY: Ambassador Albright, herself, has followed very closely the deliberations of the Middle East peace process. As you all know, we're at a very important moment in that process. The United States would, obviously, continue to play the facilitating role that it attempts to play with the parties and encourage them to bridge differences, particularly at a moment when there is a fruitful dialogue -- in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli discussions. And I am certain that Ambassador Albright will continue to play the kind of active role that Secretary Christopher offered to all of the tracks of the Middle East peace process.

Thank you.

END

3:20 P.M. EST

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 12 December 96 16:56  
**FROM** Harris, Elisa D.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** RE: bowles.... [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Bell, Robert G.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY**

panetta apparently will be there rather than bowles.

---

From: Bell, Robert G.  
To: Harris, Elisa D.  
CC: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: RE: bowles.... [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Thursday, December 12, 1996 12:28 PM

The list of participants for the PC from Kay yesterday includes "Chief of Staff." You might ask Vallenga whether it will be Leon or Erskine coming.

---

From: Harris, Elisa D.  
To: Bell, Robert G.  
CC: /R, Record at A1; Blinken, Antony J.; Samore, Gary S.  
Subject: bowles.... [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Thursday, December 12, 1996 12:06 PM

bob:

i understand from various sources that our new chief of staff, erskine bowles, is close to jesse helms. seems to me it would be a good idea for us to see if we can brief bowles or his staff on cwc so that he is fully aware of the admin effort. pls advise. thanks!!

elisa

# M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 14 January 97 17:47  
**FROM** Bell, Robert G.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** RE: CWC training [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Harris, Elisa D.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY**

I had a long talk last night with Ted McNamara about this. Let's discuss at our 1:00 tomorrow.

From: Harris, Elisa D.  
To: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor  
CC: /R, Record at A1; Bell, Robert G.  
Subject: CWC training [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Tuesday, January 07, 1997 11:02 AM

counselors:

i have an important cwc issue that i need your help on. several years ago, the US offered to provide training to cwc inspectors, on the grounds that we were the experts in this field and a well-trained inspectorate was critical to effective implementation of the treaty.

unfortunately, we have not been able to reach agreement with the cwc organization on steps for protecting the ITAR-controlled information in the training program, so we are now in a situation where we have to forego participating in the basic training course (module 1), which begins january 13. in a sub-iwg which i chaired this morning, i tasked the agency lawyers and policy experts who have been working this issue to go back to the drawing board and try to figure out some way of providing the next 2 training courses, which involve specialist training (module 2) and trial inspections (module 3). state and dod lawyers have already made up their minds that US laws and regs will preclude us from providing training under terms acceptable to teh cwc organization. acda and i feel, however, that these agencies may be being too theological in their interpretation of the regs, and that some flexibility to work out agreeable arrangements with the cwc organization may exist.

it is essential that every effort be made to find a way, within the law, for the u.s. to provide module 2 and module 3 training. jesse helms' staff has already been poking around in teh hague on teh inspector training issue, and can be expected to use this against us in the ratification debate. (the

argument being that the cwc will be even less effective than we thought because inspectors have not been properly trained.) i would be most grateful if you could talk to marylib hoinkes about this and help me explore whether there is a way for us to come to a more forthcoming position. many thanks!!

elisa

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 17 January 97 19:12  
**FROM** Kreczko, Alan J.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** RE: Cuba--CNN Package [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Armstrong, Fulton T.  
**CARBON\_COPY** Baker, James E.  
Hunerwadel, Joan S.  
Kreczko, Alan J.  
Sparks, John E.

**TEXT\_BODY**

OK> I'd shorten the legal sentence in the memo to POTUS, as indicated below.

[[ 0281BX.DOC : 4878 in 0281BX.DOC ]]

From: Armstrong, Fulton T.  
To: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs  
CC: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: Cuba--CNN Package [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Friday, January 17, 1997 04:37 PM

<<Attached File: 0281A.DOC>>

<<Attached File: 0281B.DOC>>

Alan, Bill and Dave: Attached for your clearance/comments is the package to the President on the CNN license request. Note that we propose holding off on notifying CNN or making decision public until week of February 3.  
--Fulton

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 17 January 97 19:9

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** 0281BX.DOC  
0281  
cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

## ACTION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: CNN Request for License to Open Havana Bureau

## Purpose

To decide whether to approve a request by the Cable News Network (CNN) for a license to open a news bureau in Cuba.

## Background

As you will recall, CNN renewed its application for a Treasury Department license to open a bureau in Havana in November upon receipt of Cuban government permission to open an office. A half dozen U.S. news media -- including the Miami Herald, AP, and two other major TV networks -- have license requests pending, but only CNN has received Cuban approval.

The Helms-Burton Act contains provisions authorizing the "exchange of news bureaus" with Cuba under certain conditions, including that the GOC must allow Radio Marti to open offices in Cuba. However, we retain authority under other laws to approve requests like CNN's whether or not the GOC permits a Marti bureau. The Cuban Democracy Act and U.S. policy before Helms-Burton (notably in your statement on October 6, 1995) clearly set the free flow of information between our countries, including through the establishment of U.S. news bureaus in Cuba, as a priority.

Since CNN renewed its application, we have sought ways to promote the establishment of other news bureaus in Havana, thereby reducing the GOC's ability to "pick and choose" which media can open bureaus. Many in the Cuban-American community see CNN and Ted Turner as too friendly with Fidel Castro and believe, like publisher David

Lawrence, that the Miami Herald should be in the first group approved.

### Options

There are four basic options:

- 1) To approve CNN's request alone.
- 2) To approve all pending applications -- a largely symbolic gesture because the GOC so far has only agreed to CNN.
- 3) To hold off on approval until the GOC authorizes bureaus from a more representative sampling of U.S. media.
- 4) To delay the application until the GOC gives approval for Radio and TV Marti to open offices -- unlikely to happen as long as the current regime remains in power.

Option 1 has no supporters (not even CNN) because the USG would essentially be "holding back" other applicants and confirming the GOC's right to pick and choose. Option 4 (linkage to Radio Marti) would likely preclude any American news service from setting up in Cuba, and goes beyond what even most of the Cuban-American community believes we should require. Option 3 sets a more attainable objective, the entry of several American news organizations, but in the short to medium term the effect is also likely to preclude the opening of any. We therefore favor Option 2, with certain conditionality. The State and Treasury Departments concur.

Under this scenario, we would grant all pending license applications for Cuba bureaus with two conditions: 1) that the bureaus be permitted to conduct their newsgathering activities free from GOC restrictions and harassment; and 2) that the licenses be subject to review in one year. We would make clear that Cuba's willingness to allow further bureaus to open would be a factor in considering the renewal of CNN's license a year hence.

### Political Dynamic

This approach appears likely to gain the widest support. Most

interested U.S. media, including the Miami Herald (which has withdrawn its reservations), the American Society of Newspaper Editors, and the Committee to Protect Journalists advocate approval for all pending requests. (Many would likely back a First Amendment court challenge to a possible USG denial, which CNN quietly threatened at one point.) Representative Lee Hamilton and eight other Democrats wrote to Secretary Christopher urging approval. Members of your Cuba "Core Group" will support it with the license conditionality we propose.

Other Cuban-American and Republican leaders -- including Senator Jesse Helms -- will not openly support the decision but have indicated they do not intend to oppose it either. Representative Bob Menendez is reluctantly prepared to go along; he does not share the position of Representatives Diaz-Balart and Ros-Lehtinen that CNN or any other news organization should not be allowed in Cuba until Radio and TV Marti can establish bureaus there. Jorge Mas Canosa's Cuban-American National Foundation has indicated that it will not oppose the decision.

We propose informing CNN and making the decision public during the week of February 3 so as not to conflict with other Cuba-related activities during the previous week.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the Treasury Department to grant pending license applications for U.S. news organizations to establish bureaus in Cuba for one year on the condition that they be allowed to operate free from restrictions by the Cuban government, and on the understanding that Cuba's willingness to allow further bureaus to open will be a factor in our considering the renewal of CNN's license one year hence. (State and Treasury support.)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 27 January 97 13:25  
**FROM** Harris, Elisa D.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** RE: CWC training [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Bell, Robert G.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY**

bob:

you and i never had a chance to discuss this. as you know, i am chairing an interagency meeting tuesday to try to come to conclusions. would appreciate any feedback from your conversation with ted. thanks!

elisa

---

From: Bell, Robert G.  
To: Harris, Elisa D.  
CC: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: RE: CWC training [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Tuesday, January 14, 1997 05:47 PM

I had a long talk last night with Ted McNamara about this. Let's discuss at our 1:00 tomorrow.

---

From: Harris, Elisa D.  
To: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor  
CC: /R, Record at A1; Bell, Robert G.  
Subject: CWC training [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Tuesday, January 07, 1997 11:02 AM

counselors:

i have an important cwc issue that i need your help on. several years ago, the US offered to provide training to cwc inspectors, on the grounds that we were the experts in this field and a well-trained inspectorate was critical to effective implementation of the treaty.

unfortunately, we have not been able to reach agreement with the cwc organization on steps for protecting the ITAR-controlled information in the training program, so we are now in a situation where we have to forego participating in the basic training course (module 1), which begins january 13. in a sub-iwg which i chaired this morning, i tasked the agency lawyers

and policy experts who have been working this issue to go back to the drawing board and try to figure out some way of providing the next 2 training courses, which involve specialist training (module 2) and trial inspections (module 3). state and dod lawyers have already made up their minds that US laws and regs will preclude us from providing training under terms acceptable to teh cwc organization. acda and i feel, however, that these agencies may be being too theological in their interpretation of the regs, and that some flexibility to work out agreeable arrangements with the cwc organization may exist.

it is essential that every effort be made to find a way, within the law, for the u.s. to provide module 2 and module 3 training. jesse helms' staff has already been poking around in teh hague on teh inspector training issue, and can be expected to use this against us in the ratification debate. (the argument being that the cwc will be even less effective than we thought because inspectors have not been properly trained.) i would be most grateful if you could talk to marylib hoinkes about this and help me explore whether there is a way for us to come to a more forthcoming position. many thanks!!

elisa

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 28 January 97 17:43  
**FROM** Harris, Elisa D.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** RE: CWC training [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Bell, Robert G.  
**CARBON\_COPY** Baker, James E.  
Hunerwadel, Joan S.  
Kelly, Sandra L.  
Kreczko, Alan J.  
Sparks, John E.

**TEXT\_BODY**

bob:

after our meeting with sandy, i chaired a sub-iwg on the cwc inspector training issue. discussion at the meeting made clear that we have 2 basic options.

option 1 would be to stick with the position we took in december requiring the PTS to set up an info control system based on nationality, which they have already rejected as politically untenable. because this is not negotiable, option 1 would effectively preclude us from providing Module 2 or Module 3 training. (OSD and JCS are leaning toward this option at the working level)

pro: this would avoid possible criticism from gaffney et al that we are providing training that might indirectly fall into the hands of nationals from proscribed countries.

cons: because no other country can provide Module 3 training, in particular, this would leave the PTS with an inspectorate which has never seen a chemical weapon or CW facility, and thus very ill-equipped to do inspections after EIF.

option 2 would put the confidentiality obligation directly on individual inspectors, requiring those inspectors to sign nondisclosure agreements under which they would be subject to criminal penalties if they disclose information from the course to someone not authorized to receive it. no nationals from proscribed countries would receive training. (acda and state are leaning toward this option at the working level)

pro: this would enable us to go forward with training for at least some inspectors, and thus ensure that the PTS can effectively carry out its

inspection obligations;

con: this risks criticism from gaffney et al that we are providing training that might indirectly fall into the hands of nationals from proscribed countries.

i am convinced that unless we do the training, we will be open to severe criticism that the treaty's inspection regime is a paper tiger. this would be very damaging in the ratification debate. moreover, under option 2, we would not train the bad guys and would make it clear to those we do train that they will be subject to criminal penalties if they violate their nondisclosure agreement.

we need to advise the PTS of our decision by friday. accordingly, i have asked acda to draft and circulate a cable by tomorrow afternoon for agency clearance. i know that you have already talked to ted (which i assume accounts for state's more forthcoming posture), but it would be very helpful if you touched base again not only with him but especially frank miller. given the importance of this issue to cwc ratification, i have asked the cable to be cleared by agencies at your level.

pls give me a call if you have any questions. thanks!

---

From: Harris, Elisa D.  
To: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor  
CC: /R, Record at A1; Bell, Robert G.  
Subject: CWC training [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Tuesday, January 07, 1997 11:02 AM

counselors:

i have an important cwc issue that i need your help on. several years ago, the US offered to provide training to cwc inspectors, on the grounds that we were the experts in this field and a well-trained inspectorate was critical to effective implementation of the treaty.

unfortunately, we have not been able to reach agreement with the cwc organization on steps for protecting the ITAR-controlled information in the training program, so we are now in a situation where we have to forego participating in the basic training course (module 1), which begins january 13. in a sub-iwg which i chaired this morning, i tasked the agency lawyers and policy experts who have been working this issue to go back to the drawing board and try to figure out some way of providing the next 2 training courses, which involve specialist training (module 2) and trial inspections (module 3). state and dod lawyers have already made up their minds that US laws and regs will preclude us from providing training under terms acceptable to the cwc organization. acda and i feel, however, that these agencies may be being too theological in their interpretation of the

regs, and that some flexibility to work out agreeable arrangements with the cwc organization may exist.

it is essential that every effort be made to find a way, within the law, for the u.s. to provide module 2 and module 3 training. jesse helms' staff has already been poking around in teh hague on teh inspector training issue, and can be expected to use this against us in the ratification debate. (the argument being that the cwc will be even less effective than we thought because inspectors have not been properly trained.) i would be most grateful if you could talk to marylib hoinkes about this and help me explore whether there is a way for us to come to a more forthcoming position. many thanks!!

elisa

## M S M a i l

---

**DATE-TIME** 18 February 97 12:22  
**FROM** Baker, James E.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** Draft Flynn Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO** Johnson, David T.  
Peters, Mary A.

**CARBON\_COPY** Baker, James E.  
Hunerwadel, Joan S.  
Kreczko, Alan J.  
Sparks, John E.

**TEXT\_BODY**

David:

Don't want to leave you hanging.

(1) I think the first bullets are rather (too) strong for someone who has been reprimanded twice by State. Not a usual event for ambassadors. President may not want to go too far out on a limb, particularly if the Globe has copies of letters and juxtaposes the President's remarks against excerpts from letters.

(2) Because the Globe likely has copies of the disciplinary letters, we have added an additional (if pressed) bullet. However, we are still trying to obtain copies of the letters so that we can offer the POTUS as one sentence summary of the issues. Roughly, we are told one had to do with inappropriate criticism of Congress, and the other with the use of campaign funds and use of official staff for personal matters, but I will not be comfortable with a summary until I see the letters.

[[ FLYNN218.DOC : 3104 in FLYNN218.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 18 February 97 11:41

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** FLYNN218.DOC

1030 18 FEB 97  
RAY FLYNN

Are you going to follow Jesse Helms's advice and relieve Ray Flynn?

Hasn't he embarrassed you with his antics and the trouble he's gotten himself into? Don't you need a more effective Ambassador at the Vatican?

☐ Ray's an extraordinary individual and extraordinary Ambassador. Vatican is a unique post, needs someone like Ray who can bring some real imagination to the job.

☐ Found him helpful in keeping me abreast of Vatican's thinking. Humanitarian vision, moral authority of Vatican sometimes underestimated power in changing world for the better. Ray's helped me stay in touch with that, work with Vatican, Holy Father.

☐ Ray's been in Rome since shortly after first term began. Understand he's planning to return to U.S. this summer. Looking to find someone with the drive, imagination of Ray to replace him; will be a hard task.

☐ If Raised: Know there have been some accusations against Ray. They've been dealt with appropriately by the State Department.

☐ If Pressed (we believe the Globe has obtained copies of the Department's two disciplinary letters.): There have been two letters of reprimand from Secretary Christopher and Acting Secretary Tarnoff. Beyond that I am not going to discuss internal State Department disciplinary processes.

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 18 February 97 12:34  
**FROM** Johnson, David T.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** Flynn 1230 Guidance for packet [UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO** Baker, James E.  
Dowling, J. Nicholas  
Feeley, John F.  
Hunerwadel, Joan S.  
Kreczko, Alan J.  
Lindsey, Christine J.  
Marshall, Betty A.  
Maxfield, Nancy H.  
Peters, Mary A.  
Schmidt, John R.  
Sparks, John E.  
Vershbow, Alexander R.

**CARBON\_COPY** Bass, Peter E.  
Cicio, Kristen K.  
Hall, Wilma G.  
Johnson, David T.  
Kale, Dora A.  
Kerrick, Donald L.  
Rubin, Eric S.  
Veit, Katherine M.  
Wozniak, Natalie S.

**TEXT\_BODY** [[ FLYNN218.DOC : 3106 in FLYNN218.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 18 February 97 12:33

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** FLYNN218.DOC

1030 18 FEB 97  
RAY FLYNN

Are you going to follow Jesse Helms's advice and relieve Ray  
Flynn?  
Hasn't he embarrassed you with his antics and the trouble he's  
gotten himself into? Don't you need a more effective Ambassador

at  
the Vatican?

- ☐ Ray's an extraordinary individual. Vatican is a unique post, needs someone who can bring some real imagination to the job.
- ☐ Found him helpful in keeping me abreast of Vatican's thinking. Humanitarian vision, moral authority of Vatican sometimes underestimated power in changing world for the better. Ray's helped me stay in touch with that, work with Vatican, Holy Father.
- ☐ Ray's been in Rome since shortly after first term began. Understand he's planning to return to U.S. this summer.
- ☐ If Raised: Know there have been some accusations against Ray. They've been dealt with appropriately by the State Department.
- ☐ If Pressed (we believe the Globe has obtained copies of the Department's two disciplinary letters.): There have been two letters of reprimand from Secretary Christopher and Acting Secretary Tarnoff. Beyond that I am not going to discuss internal State Department disciplinary processes.

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 05 March 97 08:42  
**FROM** LeBaron, Richard B.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** Helms Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Barks-Ruggles, Erica  
**CARBON\_COPY** LeBaron, Richard B.  
Parris, Mark R.  
**TEXT\_BODY**  
[[ LETHELMS.DOC : 2080 in LETHELMS.DOC ]]  
Erica: We propose a small fix. Thanks, RL  
  
**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 5 March 97 8:41  
**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** LETHELMS.DOC

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We remain firmly committed to helping South Africa through its difficult transition to majority, democratic rule. There is much still to do to achieve economic equality, justice and reconciliation, and we, like you, want to help South Africa reach those goals. I am pleased that the U.S.-South Africa partnership is strong and that the quality of our bilateral relations allows us to tackle difficult issues constructively.

In this context, we have communicated to the South African Government in frank terms our deep concerns about the serious

implications for our bilateral relations of the possible sale of a tank fire control system to Syria. Most recently, Vice President Gore had constructive discussions on this issue with the highest levels of the South African government during the recent Bi-National Commission meetings. The South African Government well understands our position on the tank fire control system sale, as evidenced by its decision on January 22 to delay addressing this issue and to seek further consultations with other countries, including the United States. All weapons sales and exports, including the possible sale to Syria, must be reviewed and approved by the South Africa Cabinet at several points. We are working to ensure that all factors, including our concerns, are taken into account during those deliberations. We will continue to pursue this issue as appropriate with South Africa through diplomatic channels.

As to the ARMSCOR case, a plea agreement was entered and accepted by the courts settling this long-standing dispute. The ARMSCOR case is separate from the issue of current weapons sales as it occurred during the previous apartheid government, while South Africa was under international embargoes and before the recent export control regime was put into place.

I appreciate your concern on this issue. Rest assured that we will continue to work diligently to protect American interests in this case.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms  
Chairman  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510-6225

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 07 March 97 13:52

**FROM** Sparks, John E.

**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT** FW: Concurrence on Helms/South Africa reply [UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO** Barks-Ruggles, Erica  
Battenfield, Pat  
McCormick, Shawn H.  
Orr, Robert C.  
Prendergast, John P.  
Rice, Susan E.

**CARBON\_COPY** Baker, James E.  
Hunerwadel, Joan S.  
Kreczko, Alan J.  
Sparks, John E.

**TEXT\_BODY**

cleared for legal./JES

From: Hunerwadel, Joan S.  
To: Sparks, John E.  
CC: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: FW: Concurrence on Helms/South Africa reply [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Friday, March 07, 1997 01:18 PM

[[ 0393LTR.DOC : 3336 in 0393LTR.DOC ]][[ 0393PRS.DOC : 3337 in 0393PRS.DOC ]][[ 0393SRB.DOC : 3338 in 0393SRB.DOC ]]

From: Battenfield, Pat A.  
To: Edwards, Joan K.; Hunerwadel, Joan S.; Quinn, Mary E.  
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1  
Subject: FW: Concurrence on Helms/South Africa reply [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Thursday, March 06, 1997 08:52 AM

Please check with Tucker and Kreczko to see if they concur with the attached package and get back to me. Thanks!

From: Battenfield, Pat A.  
To: Quinn, Mary E.; Edwards, Joan K.; Hunerwadel, Joan S.; Burrell,

Christina L.  
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1  
Subject: FW: Concurrence on Helms/South Africa reply [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Wednesday, March 05, 1997 09:31 AM

Looking for concurrences....thanks!

From: Barks-Ruggles, Erica  
To: Davis, William K.; Kreczko, Alan J.; LeBaron, Richard B.; Tucker, Maureen E.; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs  
CC: /R, Record at A1; Battenfield, Pat A.; Sparks, John E.  
Subject: Concurrence on Helms/South Africa reply[UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Tuesday, March 04, 1997 07:10 PM

Attached is package for your concurrence: POTUS reply to Helms letter on possible sale of tank fire control systems by South Africa to Syria (including urging suspension of now concluded negotiations on ARMSCOR). Please email concurrence or changes by COB Wednesday 3/5 so we can get rid of this, the last piece leftover from ARMSCOR business. Thanks - Erica

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

4 March 97 19:0

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

0393LTR.DOC

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We remain firmly committed to helping South Africa through its difficult transition to majority, democratic rule. There is much still to do to achieve economic equality, justice and reconciliation, and we, like you, want to help South Africa reach those goals. I am pleased that the U.S.-South Africa partnership is strong and that the quality of our bilateral relations allows us to tackle

difficult  
issues constructively.

In this context, we have communicated to the South African Government in frank terms our deep concerns about the possible sale of a tank fire control system to Syria. We have left no doubt about the serious implications such a sale could have on our bilateral relations. Most recently, Vice President Gore had constructive discussions on this issue with the highest levels of the South African government during the recent Bi-National Commission meetings.

The South African Government well understands our position on the tank fire control system sale, as evidenced by its decision on January 22 to delay addressing this issue and to seek further consultations with other countries, including the United States.

All weapons sales and exports, including the possible sale to Syria, must be reviewed and approved by the South Africa Cabinet at several points. We are working to ensure that all factors, including our concerns, are taken into account during those deliberations. We will continue to pursue this issue as appropriate with South Africa through diplomatic channels.

As to the ARMSCOR case, a plea agreement was entered and accepted by the courts settling this long-standing dispute. The ARMSCOR case is separate from the issue of current weapons sales as it occurred during the previous apartheid government, while South Africa was under international embargoes and before the recent export control regime was put into place.

I appreciate your concern on this issue. Rest assured that we will continue to work diligently to protect American interests in this case.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms  
Chairman  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510-6225

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

4 March 97 19:4

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

0393PRS.DOC  
UNCLASSIFIED 0393  
UNCLASSIFIED cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VL NARA, Date 12/18/2018  
7006-1303 -F

**ACTION**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**FROM: SAMUEL BERGER  
JOHN HILLEY**

**SUBJECT: Response to Senator Helms' Letter on Possible South  
African Weapons System Sale to Syria**

**Purpose**

To respond to a letter from Senator Helms.

**Background**

On January 17 Senator Helms wrote to express concern over the possible sale of tank fire control systems by South Africa to Syria (Tab B). He urged the Administration to communicate USG concerns to South Africa, opining that a sale of the fire control systems would trigger a mandatory cutoff of aid to South Africa. He urged you to

suspend negotiations with South Africa to settle the ARMSCOR cases until the issue was resolved.

We have communicated to the South Africans our deep concerns about the contemplated sale, including during private meetings at the recent Gore-Mbeki Bi-National Commission meetings. On February 27, the plea agreement -- the product of months of difficult negotiations -- was accepted by the U.S. court, thus settling the ARMSCOR case.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Senator Helms at Tab A.

Attachments  
Tab A Letter to Senator Helms  
Tab B Letter from Senator Helms

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

4 March 97 19:5

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

0393SRB.DOC  
UNCLASSIFIED 0393  
  
UNCLASSIFIED

March 4, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: SUSAN E. RICE

FROM: ERICA J. BARKS-RUGGLES

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Helms for POTUS Signature

Senator Helms wrote the President on January 17 (Tab B) expressing his concern about the possible sale by South Africa of tank fire control systems to Syria. He urged the President to communicate to the Government of South Africa that provision of this system would lead to a mandatory aid suspension. He also urged the Administration to stop negotiations on the ARMSCOR case. A plea was entered in the ARMSCOR case on Thursday, February 27.

At Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a proposed response to Helms (Tab A).

Concurrences by: Will Davis, Alan Kreczko, Maureen Tucker, Richard LeBaron, Leon Fuerth

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President (Tab I).

#### Attachments

Tab I Memo for the President

Tab A Letter to Senator Helms

Tab B Letter from Senator Helms

## M S M a i l

---

**DATE-TIME** 04 April 97 12:34

**FROM** Naplan, Steven J.

**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT** RE: Hey Ho Way to Go [UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO** Andreasen, Steven P.  
Bass, Peter E.  
Bell, Robert G.  
Bendick, Gordon L.  
Benjamin, Daniel  
Blinken, Antony J.  
Bouchard, Joseph F.  
Burrell, Christina L.  
Caravelli, John M.  
Cicio, Kristen K.  
Danvers, William C.  
Davis, William K.  
Edwards, Joan  
Gibney, James S.  
Gray, Wendy  
Hall, Wilma G.  
Harris, Elisa D.  
Helweg, M. Diana  
Johnson, David T.  
Kale, Dora A.  
Kelly, Sandra L.  
Kerrick, Donald L.  
LaFleur, Vinca A.  
Langley, Janice M.  
Luzzatto, Anne R.  
Millison, Cathy L.  
Mulligan, George D.  
Murray, Lori E.  
Naplan, Steven J.  
Quinn, Mary E.  
Rubin, Eric S.  
Samore, Gary S.  
Seaton, James B.  
Tucker, Maureen E.  
Veit, Katherine M.  
Witkowsky, Anne A.  
Wozniak, Natalie S.

**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

**TEXT\_BODY**

AP coverage

[[ AP.DOC : 3078 in AP.DOC ]]

From: Harris, Elisa D.

To: Blinken, Antony J.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @NONPRO - Export Controls; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @PRESS -

Public Affairs; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs

CC: /R, Record at A1

Subject: RE: Hey Ho Way to Go [UNCLASSIFIED]

Date: Friday, April 04, 1997 12:26 PM

tara deserves an academy award. you, tony, deserve one as well, for coordinating great speeches and orchestrating a great public affairs effort around the event. can't wait to see the news tonite!

From: Blinken, Antony J.

To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @NONPRO

- Export Controls; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @PRESS - Public Affairs;

@LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs

CC: /R, Record at A1

Subject: Hey Ho Way to Go

Date: Friday, April 04, 1997 12:16 PM

Kudos to the CWC team, especially Tara, Elisa and Lori for a heck of an event. A good example of a picture being worth a thousand words. Special Admiration Award to Tara for being casting director, stage manager and diplomat all in one. Onward!

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE**

4 April 97 12:34

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME**

AP.DOC

Clinton Urges Global Chemical Ban

By RON FOURNIER Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Flanked by a high-powered cast of Republicans and Democrats, President Clinton today urged the Senate to pass a global ban on chemical weapons and ``banish poisonous gas from the earth."

Lawmakers, diplomats, veterans' group leaders, arms experts, and religious and military leaders gathered on the South Lawn to help promote passage of the 161-nation chemical weapons ban treaty before an April 29 deadline.

Addressing critics of the accord, Clinton said, ``Of course, the treaty is not a panacea ... but no nation acting alone can protect itself from the

threat posed by poisonous weapons."

"We must have an international solution to a global problem," he said.

The guest list included Republican and Democratic lawmakers, former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, former Kansas Sen. Nancy Kassebaum Baker and retired Army Gen. Colin Powell. Powell, a Republican, was not among the speakers.

James Baker, the former GOP secretary of state, warned that rejecting the treaty "will be sending a clear signal of retreat from international leadership. This is a message we should never send."

Brent Scowcroft, who was President Bush's national security adviser, cosigned a letter of support that said without the ban "the United States will forfeit pre-eminent leadership on security issues which range far beyond the area of chemical weapons."

Several key Republican senators, including Dick Lugar of Indiana, favor the treaty. Bush, following a recent visit from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, called for passage of the treaty. A spokesman said Bush was out of the country and could not attend today's event.

Today's ceremony closed with a chorus of patriotic music, after Clinton told the crowd: "We are closing a 20th century which gives us an opportunity now to forge a widening international commitment to banish poisonous gas from the earth in the 21st century."

The Chemical Weapons Convention, signed by 161 countries and ratified by 70 so far, would ban development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of chemical weapons.

The accord takes effect with or without U.S. approval. Supporters say that without ratification, the United States will have no role in its implementation and U.S. chemical companies could face sanctions. It has been pending before the Senate since November 1993.

Opponents assert the pact would be difficult to enforce and might burden companies that produce chemicals for legitimate purposes.

The treaty had been held up by Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. After a full day of diplomatic wooing by Albright, who visited his home state last month, Helms announced in a joint news conference that he would work with the administration so that the treaty might be ratified.

Though still opposed to the pact, Helms will allow hearings on the treaty after the congressional recess that ends next week. Administration officials are growing more confident that they can get it out of committee and approved by the full Senate.

□AP-NY-04-04-97 1122EST

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04/04

## M S M a i l

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**DATE-TIME** 08 April 97 10:14

**FROM** LaFleur, Vinca A.

**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT** CWC Stonewall OpEd [UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO** Bell, Robert G.  
Blinken, Antony J.  
Danvers, William C.  
Harris, Elisa D.

**CARBON\_COPY** Andreasen, Steven P.  
Bendick, Gordon L.  
Benjamin, Daniel  
Bouchard, Joseph F.  
Burrell, Christina L.  
Davis, William K.  
Gibney, James S.  
Gray, Wendy  
Kelly, Sandra L.  
LaFleur, Vinca A.  
Langley, Janice M.  
Mulligan, George D.  
Murray, Lori E.  
Naplan, Steven J.  
Seaton, James B.  
Witkowsky, Anne A.

**TEXT\_BODY** [[ CWCHELM.DOC : 2561 in CWCHELM.DOC ]]

Tony, Elisa, Bob, Bill -  
Attached is a draft op-ed on the Helms stonewall argument, as Sandy Berger requested. Please get any comments to Vinca ASAP. Thanks very much.

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 8 April 97 10:12

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** CWCHELM.DOC

04/08/97 10:15 AM

Bringing the CWC to a Vote:  
A Tale of Stone Walls or Deaf Ears?

The clocking is ticking toward April 29, the day the Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force. This critical treaty, negotiated under Presidents Reagan and Bush and completed under President Clinton, will help us fight two of the most dangerous threats we face: the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. With broad bipartisan support from former public officials, military and business leaders, veterans, religious organizations and scientific experts, President Clinton has spared no effort to secure the treaty's passage.

Yet, with just [x] days to the critical deadline, Senator Jesse Helms suggests the Administration is "stonewalling" on the issues in dispute. With all due respect to Senator Helms, the allegation of Administration delay just doesn't stand up to the facts. The real question is, will the Senate vote on this vital treaty in time for America to enjoy its benefits against rogue states and terrorists; to help govern its implementation; and to serve as inspectors and verifiers of the tough regime we designed? Or will we put our national security at risk; be slapped with the very trade penalties we created; and go from leading the world to joining the company of pariah nations?

This question is urgent -- but far from abrupt. The CWC has been before the Senate since November 1993. In the past three and a half years, there have been 13 hearings and the Administration has conducted dozens of briefings for Senators and staff. We have provided the Senate more than 1,500 pages of information on the CWC, including more than 300 pages of testimony, more than 500 pages of answers to letters and reports, more than 400 pages of answers to questions for the record, and more than 300 pages of other information.

We have taken very seriously Congressional concerns. In early January, the President and Majority Leader Lott agreed to work together to try to address the 30 separate complaints some members of the Republican Caucus had levied against the treaty. They set up a process to review the list and try to find in every case some remedy or reassurance. On those few issues where no

common ground existed, we agreed to propose alternative options, so the Senate could vote on the points in dispute as the Constitution provides.

Since that time, there have been eight different sessions -- four in which [I/National Security Advisor Samuel Berger] led the Administration's discussions with the Majority Leader's task force, followed by four intensive sessions at the expanded senior-staff level. After two months of rigorous, good faith negotiations, we have managed in almost every case to reach a compromise agreement, or identify a reasonable alternative from which the Senate can decide.

For example, some Senators expressed concern that our Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures would be trampled by international inspectors. In fact, at the insistence of the United States, the CWC explicitly allows members to take into account their constitutional obligations when providing access to inspectors. We went even farther, agreeing to a condition that would require the government to obtain a search warrant for any involuntary inspection.

Others worried that joining the treaty might lead us to lessen our efforts to protect our troops against the effects of chemical weapons. The President has no graver responsibility than safeguarding our servicemen and women. We have committed to ensure that our troops are effectively equipped and trained to operate in a chemical or biological weapons environment.

We reassured critics who mistakenly feared the treaty obligates members to facilitate the transfer of militarily-relevant chemical technology to untrustworthy countries that join. And we have done more -- offering to certify to the Senate that national and multilateral export controls on chemical-related materials are fully consistent with the CWC.

In short, we have made a tremendous effort so this vital treaty can move forward. Working with Senator Lott and his team, the gaps have been narrowed significantly. But frankly, there is only so much you can do if you have to meet a deadline. April 29 is not negotiable. Either we're

ready or we're not. We simply can't afford to let the clock run out. It's time for the Senate to vote on the issues that are still in disagreement.

It is hard to imagine what significant information more debate of the CWC could bring to light.

The fact is, the treaty is really about other country's chemical weapons, not our own. Long before the CWC was completed, Congress directed the destruction of our nation's chemical weapons, and that process is well under way. The CWC will help ensure other nations follow our lead, and get out of the business of poison gas -- under strict international supervision. This is no time to go it alone, or abdicate our leadership role. Our security, our authority, and our prosperity are at stake. The Senate should act -- now.

###

## M S M a i l

---

**DATE-TIME** 16 April 97 11:01  
**FROM** Burrell, Christina L.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** FW: CWC Positions [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Danvers, William C.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY**

From: Burrell, Christina L.  
To: Danvers, William C.  
CC: /N, NonRecord at A1  
Subject: CWC Positions [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Monday, April 14, 1997 03:44 PM  
  
[[ CWCSSEN.DOC : 2838 in CWCSSEN.DOC ]]

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 14 April 97 15:43

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** CWCSSEN.DOC

SENATORS POSITIONS ON CWC

SENATORS  
COMMENTS

Spencer Abraham (R-MI)  
Lean Oppose;  
concerned about  
verification and  
Constitutionality; has chemical  
industry in state  
Wayne Allard (R-CO)  
Undecided; concerns are  
chemical destruction,

Constitution, Russia  
John Ashcroft (R-MO)  
Oppose; concerns on  
Constitutional, small business  
grounds  
Robert Bennett (R-UT)  
Lean Support; will vote based  
on GOP leadership  
Christopher Bond (R-MO)  
Lean Oppose  
Sam Brownback  
(R-KS)  
Oppose; concerns re: Russia  
Conrad Burns (R-MT)  
Lean Oppose;  
concerns re small  
business, Russia; impacted by  
Cheney  
Ben Campbell (R-CO)  
Lean Support; concerns with  
chem demil  
John Chafee (R-RI)  
Support  
Dan Coats (R-IN)  
Lean Support  
Thad Cochran (R-MS)  
Oppose  
Susan Collins (R-ME)  
Support  
Paul  
Coverdell (R-GA)  
Lean Oppose  
Larry Craig (R-ID)  
Undecided  
Alfonse  
D'Amato (R-NY)  
Lean Oppose  
Mike DeWine (R-OH)  
Oppose  
Pete Domenici  
(R-NM)  
Support  
Michael Enzi (R-WY)  
Undecided  
Lauch Faircloth (R-NC)  
Oppose  
William Frist (R-TN)  
Lean Support; concerns on  
Constitutional issues  
Slade Gorton (R-WA)

Lean Support; under  
pressure  
from Helms and Kyl to vote 'no'  
Phil Gramm (R-TX)  
Oppose  
Rod Grams  
(R-MN)  
Lean Support  
Charles Grassley (R-IA)  
Lean Support  
Judd Gregg  
(R-NH)  
Undecided  
Chuck Hagel (R-NE)  
Lean Support  
Orrin Hatch (R-UT)  
Undecided  
Jesse Helms (R-NC)  
Oppose  
Tim Hutchinson (R-AR)  
Undecided  
SENATORS  
COMMENTS

Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX)  
Lean Oppose  
James  
Inhofe (R-OK)  
Oppose  
James Jeffords (R-VT)  
Support  
Dirk Kempthorne  
(R-ID)  
Lean Oppose; problems with  
search and seizure  
Jon Kyl (R-AZ)  
Oppose  
Trent Lott (R-MS)  
Undecided  
Richard Lugar (R-IN)  
Support  
Connie Mack (R-FL)  
Lean Support  
John  
McCain (R-AZ)  
Support; pressured by GOP  
leadership  
Mitch McConnell (R-KY)  
Lean Support

Frank Murkowski  
(R-AZ)  
Oppose  
Don Nickles (R-OK)  
Lean Oppose  
Pat Roberts (R-KS)  
Undecided  
William Roth (R-DE)  
Lean Support  
Rick Santorum (R-PA)  
Undecided  
Jeff Sessions (R-AL)  
Undecided  
Richard Shelby (R-AL)  
Oppose  
Gordon Smith (R-OR)  
Lean Support  
Robert Smith (R-NH)  
Oppose  
Olympia  
Snowe (R-ME)  
Support  
Arlen Specter (R-PA)  
Support  
Ted Stevens (R-AK)  
Support  
Craig Thomas (R-WY)  
Lean Oppose  
Fred Thompson (R-TN)  
Undecided  
Strom Thurmond (R-SC)  
Undecided  
John Warner (R-WA)  
Undecided

## M S M a i l

---

**DATE-TIME** 17 April 97 01:24  
**FROM** Murray, Lori E.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** Points for Principals on Conditions [UNCLASSIFIED]  
**TO** Bell, Robert G.  
Bendick, Gordon L.  
Blinken, Antony J.  
Danvers, William C.  
Harris, Elisa D.  
**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE  
**TEXT\_BODY** [[ PRINCON.DOC : 290 in PRINCON.DOC ]]  
Attached are the points for principals on the 23 conditions for their  
calls to Senators. Please clear ASAP.  
**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 17 April 97 1:21  
**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** PRINCON.DOC

## POINTS FOR PRINCIPALS ON CWC AGREED CONDITIONS

- ☐ I was calling to seek your support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- ☐ I wanted to bring to your attention that agreement was reached this week on over 20 conditions to be included in a Senate resolution of ratification on the Convention.
- ☐ We believe that these conditions, which address virtually every concern raised about the CWC, mark a significant achievement.
- ☐ The negotiations that led to this package began in January, following an agreement between the President and the Majority Leader to establish a process to address concerns raised by members of the Republican caucus.
- ☐ Over 60 hours of negotiations have taken place on various issues related to the CWC. The White House team, led by National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and the Majority Leader and his

nine member Task Force, held over 30 hours of discussion. That was followed by 28 hours of discussion coordinated by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms and Ranking Minority Member Joe Biden.

- ☐ Among the 23, are conditions that would:
  - Require the Secretary of Defense to maintain robust chemical and biological defenses for US troops;
  - Ensure that instances of noncompliance will be subject to tough U.S. enforcement action;
  - Require the U.S., under Article X, to limit any assistance to countries of concern, such as Cuba and Iran, to medical antidotes and treatment;
  - Obligate the President to obtain assurances from our Australia Group allies that Article XI is fully consistent with maintaining strict export controls on dangerous chemicals; and
  - Ensure that nothing in the CWC requires any action by the U.S. prohibited by the Constitution.
- ☐ I would urge that you review this package, circulated by Senator Biden, carefully, as you consider the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- ☐ We are continuing to discuss additional issues with Senator Lott of particular importance including search warrants and use of riot control agents in certain wartime situations. In those areas where agreement cannot be reached, we have proposed conditions we believe address the underlying concerns.

## M S M a i l

---

**DATE-TIME** 17 April 97 12:44  
**FROM** Blinken, Antony J.  
**CLASSIFICATION** UNCLASSIFIED  
**SUBJECT** FW: Points for Principals on Conditions [UNCLASSIFIED]

**TO** Bell, Robert G.  
Bendick, Gordon L.  
Benjamin, Daniel  
Blinken, Antony J.  
Danvers, William C.  
Gibney, James S.  
Gray, Wendy  
Harris, Elisa D.  
LaFleur, Vinca A.  
Murray, Lori E.  
Naplan, Steven J.

**CARBON\_COPY** NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

**TEXT\_BODY**

Lori -- my small fix to conditions. also added sections on why ratift CWC, why deadline real so they have in one place the whole thing. Basically tracked your other TPs for that, with some tweaking. With any other changes from Bob, Bill, Elisa, you should get this forward to SRB ASAP for clearance. Then we/Bill can distribute.

From: Murray, Lori E.  
To: Bell, Robert G.; Bendick, Gordon L.; Blinken, Antony J.; Danvers, William C.; Harris, Elisa D.  
CC: /R, Record at A1  
Subject: Points for Principals on Conditions [UNCLASSIFIED]  
Date: Thursday, April 17, 1997 01:24 AM

[[ PRINCON.DOC : 3144 in PRINCON.DOC ]]

Attached are the points for principals on the 23 conditions for their calls to Senators. Please clear ASAP.

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE DATE** 17 April 97 12:41

**ATTACHMENT  
FILE NAME** PRINCON.DOC

POINTS FOR PRINCIPALS ON CWC AGREED CONDITIONS

☐ I was calling to seek your support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.

#### Important Breakthrough on Conditions

☐ I wanted to bring to your attention that agreement was reached this week on over 20 conditions to be included in a Senate resolution of ratification on the Convention.

☐ We believe that these conditions, which address virtually every concern raised about the CWC, mark a significant achievement.

☐ The negotiations that led to this package began in January, following an agreement between the President and the Majority Leader to establish a process to address concerns raised by members of the Republican caucus.

☐ Over 60 hours of negotiations have taken place on various issues related to the CWC. The White House team, led by National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and the Majority Leader and his nine member Task Force, held over 30 hours of discussion. That was followed by 28 hours of discussion coordinated by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms and Ranking Minority Member Joe Biden.

☐ Among the 23, are conditions that would:  
Require the Secretary of Defense to maintain robust chemical and biological defenses for US troops;  
Ensure that instances of noncompliance will be subject to tough U.S. enforcement action;  
Require the U.S., under Article X, to limit any chemical defense assistance to countries of concern, such as Cuba and Iran, to medical antidotes and treatment;  
Obligate the President to obtain assurances from our Australia Group allies that Article XI is fully consistent with maintaining strict export controls on dangerous chemicals; and  
Ensure that nothing in the CWC requires any action by the U.S. prohibited by the Constitution.

☐ I would urge that you review this package, circulated by Senator Biden, carefully, as you consider the CWC

☐ We are continuing to discuss additional important issues with Senator Lott including search warrants and use of riot control agents in certain wartime situations. In

those

areas where agreement cannot be reached, we have proposed conditions we believe address the underlying concerns.

#### Why We Must Ratify the CWC (If Needed)

☐ We already are getting rid of our chemical weapons. A law passed by Congress in 1985 directed the destruction of the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpile. This treaty will help ensure as many other nations as possible follow our lead.

☐ We led the fight to secure this treaty: The Reagan Administration began the effort, Bush Administration completed negotiations and signed the treaty, Clinton Administration submitted to the Senate. Failure to ratify would be a terrible blow to our leadership overall, to our efforts to combat poison gas, and to our work to reduce the danger of weapons of mass destruction.

☐ Our troops will be safer as major countries around the world follow our lead and destroy their CW stockpiles and we formally expand controls over a broad range of chemicals and precursors. That's why every Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff for the past twenty years supports the treaty, as do the overwhelming majority of veterans groups across America.

☐ The treaty will make it harder and more costly for terrorists to acquire chemical weapons by eliminating stockpiles -- the largest potential source of theft or criminal diversion -- and restricting the flow of chemicals used to make CW.

☐ The treaty will help us keep the pressure on rogue states by making it harder and more costly for them to acquire or make chemical weapons. Nations who refuse to join will be subject to trade restrictions and unable to trade in many chemicals that can be used to make chemical weapons.

☐ If we are not a party, our chemical companies will face these same trade restrictions aimed at rogue states -- which could cost them hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in sales. That is why industry -- which helped write the rules of the treaty to make sure the burdens on business would be minimal and trade secrets protected -- strongly support this treaty.

☐ The CWC will not solve the CW problem -- but it is a key element of an effective response to a growing threat.

April 29: A Real Deadline with Real Consequences (If Needed)

- ☐ If Congress fails to ratify before April 29, we will do damage to our national security and our economic security.
- ☐ We will be denied the CWC's tools against rogue states and terrorists who seek to acquire CW. And we will be denied the ability to require other states to do what we already are doing -- get out of the chemical weapons business.
- ☐ We will be unable to enforce the rules of a treaty we took the lead in writing. The U.S. will lose its seat on the governing board of the treaty. Americans will be ineligible to serve as inspectors and to hold other key posts such as head of security, administration and industry inspections.
- ☐ American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to overseas competitors as mandatory trade restrictions aimed at non-parties phase in. Industry estimates this could put at risk as much as \$600 million in sales and many jobs.