

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 15 November 95 18:28

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO

Alijanil, Leyla
Andreasen, Steven P.
Andricos, George M.
Appel, Edward J.
Argarin, Jocelyn D.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Bakke, Kyle D.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bassett, Leslie A.
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blacker, Coit D.
Blieberger, Marion H.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Bradley, Amelia J.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadway, Jamuna
Brown, Dallas
Brown, Nancy E.
Bruton, Robert G.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Kevin J. Cadieux
Canty, Mary T.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Claussen, Eileen B.

Cooper, Kathleen H.
Crispell, Thomas G.
Cullin, Brian P.
Daadler, Ivo H.
Daniel, Patty A.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Deshazer, Macarthur X.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dragone, Karen D.
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Dymersky, Debra L.
Eddy, Randolph P.
Edwards, Joan
Eisenhower, James J.
Emery, Mary
Fairfax, Kenneth J.
Feeley, John F.
Feinberg, Richard E.
Fetig, James L.
Ficklin, John W.
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Flessas, Daniel
Frias, Angela M.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Froman, Michael B.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
Gardner, Anthony
Gates, Brian K.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gladbach, Damon J.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gragg, Mark A.
Gray, Wendy
Grimes, Richard J.
Grummon, Stephen R.
Guekel, Kathi A.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, Wilma G.
Halperin, Morton H.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hawes, David J.

Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Heslin, Sheila N.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Houck, Baerbel K.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kammerer, Kelly C.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerr, Andrew S.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kyle, Robert D.
Leary, William H.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsey, Wanda
Litwak, Robert C.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
Malley, Robert
Marmol, Madelyn P.
Marshall, Betty A.
Martinez, Alejandro
Mauzy, Stefan T.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Mazzuchi, Anthony D.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Miller, Matthew E.
Millison, Cathy L.
Miscik, Judith A.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Moody, Angelyn D.
Naplan, Steven J.
Neil, M. Elise
Noetzel, Jon C.
Norman, Marcia G.
Nuccio, Richard A.
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Parco, Jim E.
Gwyn M. Parker
Parramore, Carl W.
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Pease, Bruce E.
Peggins, John W.

Peters, Mary A.
Pifer, Steven K.
Kenneth M. Pollack
Poneman, Daniel B.
Porter, Gidell
Quinn, Mary E.
Ramsay, Martha S.
Reade, Evan G.
Realuyo, Celina
Reznik, Victoria (NMI)
Rice, Susan E.
Roth, Stanley O.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Satterfield, David M.
Saunders, John W.
Schifter, Richard
Schmidt, John R.
Schuker, Jill A.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Seeley, Charlotte P.
Sens, Andrew D.
Sestak, Joseph A.
Sevigny, Theodore T.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Showalter, Victoria A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Stauffer, Helen L.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tarullo, Daniel K.
Turner, Joe T.
Tyler, John T.
Unrue, Michael M.
Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Wales, Jane
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Whitworth, Frank D.

Willis, Robin M.
Wilson, Marilyn E.
Witkowski, Anne A.
Wooton, Kevin B.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Yorkdale, Glenn H.

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TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Thursday, November 16. Thanks.

[[NOV15GUI.DOC : 4654 in NOV15GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

15 November 95 12:25

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

NOV15GUI.DOC
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

November 15, 1995

EUROPE
Bosnia/Croatia
Ireland
NATO Secretary General
Russia
CFE

FAR EAST
Osaka/Japan Trip
Okinawa

MIDDLE EAST
Saudi Arabia
MEPFA Extension
Iran

CENTRAL AMERICA
Haiti

AFRICA

Nigeria

MISCELLANEOUS
POW/MIA
Military Modernization
START Space Launch Vehicles
CWC

BOSNIA/CROATIA

House Bill on IFOR

ù We understand the legitimate concerns that have been raised concerning the U.S. role in implementing a peace settlement in Bosnia

ù If an agreement is reached, there will be an opportunity for further consultation between the administration and congress, and the President has said that he will request an expression of support from congress.

ù By attempting to limit the President's authority as this bill does, Congress risks derailing the negotiations and endangers any military forces that might participate in the operation to implement a peace agreement.

ù This Bill would restrict the President's ability to carry out his constitutional responsibilities as Commander-in-chief and to conduct foreign policy.

Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia

ù Transitional period of 12 months which may be extended for 12 months.

ù UN Security Council requested to establish a Transitional Administration.

ù UN Security Council requested to authorize an international force to deploy during the transitional period to maintain peace and security and assist in implementation of this agreement.

ù Transitional Administration shall help establish and train temporary police forces

ù All persons have the right to return freely to their place of residence in the Region and to live in conditions of security.

ù Not later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period, elections for all local government bodies shall be organized by the Transitional Administration.

ù The Government of Croatia shall cooperate fully with the Transitional Administration and the international force.

If asked whether IFOR is to be the international force

ù The international force and its composition has not been determined. The UN Security Council must first authorize an international force. IFOR does not have a mission to implement an agreement in Eastern Slavonia.

Federation in Dayton

ù Secretary Christopher flew to Dayton November 9 to announce decisions that bring the Bosnian/Croat Federation to life.

ù President Tudjman witnessed the signing. Izetbegovic and Zubak signed it. The two mayors of Mostar and Mostar's EU administrator signed it.

ù The U.S. representative to the Federation, Daniel Serwer, played a key role in negotiating this agreement.

ù Secretary Christopher remained in Dayton Friday for further discussions with the parties. He returned to Washington Friday night.

ù Secretary Christopher returned to Dayton yesterday for discussions with the parties before leaving on his trip to the Pacific.

ù Through his work, and that of Dick Holbrooke, Ambassador Galbraith and Special Negotiator Stoltenberg, the parties were able to reach agreement Sunday on a peaceful arrangement in the return of Eastern Slavonia to Croatian control, following up to two years of international UN supervision.

Sanctions Relief

ù Izetbegovic and Milosevic requested immediate resumption of natural gas deliveries to both Bosnia and Serbia on humanitarian grounds and as a confidence building measure.

ù U.S. working with Contact group members for action at the UNSC under existing humanitarian exemption.

ù This is a humanitarian gesture to provide heating fuel in response to severe winter conditions.

ù Delivery is for two months.

ù Action is similar to one last year where relief was provided for humanitarian reasons.

ù (If asked about sanctions suspension) This will take a full UNSCR and our position has not changed-we will support suspension when there is a peace agreement.

Intelligence Sharing with the Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal

ù The U.S. intelligence community is not "sitting on" information that may be of use to the Tribunal prosecutor.

ù A coordinated Intelligence Community process in place since spring to manage handling of requests for information/classified responses to requests. We provide available information even in the absence of a specific request.

ù U.S. has not withheld any intelligence with the intent to prevent the prosecution of any war criminals including Mladic and Karadzic.

ù Talks in Dayton have had no bearing whatsoever on our commitment to support and assist the War Crimes Tribunal in every way its efforts to bring war criminals to justice.

ù Reporting such information is time-consuming, but we make a strenuous effort to respond as rapidly as possible.

ù We will find a way to get the Tribunal the information it needs.

Atrocities

ù Continue to condemn these gross violations of human rights.

ù Led vigorous effort to uncover/publicize evidence of war crimes in Balkans.

ù Shattuck three times raised issue with Serbs.

ù War crimes indictments not negotiable. In fact, the Tribunal recently announced additional indictments.

ù Actively support investigating international organizations (UNHCR , Red Cross).

ù Stopping atrocities one main reason for active U.S. role in the peace negotiations

Proximity Talks

ù Proximity talks are continuing. We're keeping the public informed on the talks through a single spokesman at the State Department. For details on yesterday's activities, refer to State daily report.

ù President said to team on October 31, before the talks began, this is a defining moment for Bosnia.

ù Only the parties to this terrible conflict can end it.

ù In Dayton, our diplomats face a tremendous challenge. There is no guarantee they will succeed. American leadership key to success.

ù Talks co-chaired by Holbrooke/Bildt. Goal to secure final peace agreement that parties will initial in Dayton.

ù Balkan parties: Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic plus Contact Group partners.

ù Intensive U.S. /CG diplomacy - parties agreed Geneva (9/8/95)/New York (9/26/95) to settlement basic principles: Bosnia as single state; 51/49 basis for territorial solution; constitutional structure; democratic elections; and subsequently to cease-fire

ù Difficult issues still to be resolved: (i) internal boundary for Bosnian-Croat Federation/Serb Republic; (ii) Sarajevo status; (iii) practical steps to separate forces /ceasing hostilities; (iv) election procedures.

ù After Dayton, next steps: Paris international peace conference and implementation conference in London. May be meetings after Paris before final settlement signed.

ù No set duration.

Peace Plan Implementation

ù NAC approved concept of ops for IFOR.

ù Detailed planning by NATO Military Authorities proceeding; Joulwan briefed President and national security team on state of NATO'S plans.

ù Number of forces for operation not determined - will depend on peace agreement modalities.

ù NATO briefed UN, UN Peace Force contributors, and interested PFP countries contrib

utions by non-NATO countries would be welcome.

ù Churkin attended "16-plus-one" with NAC to discuss NATO's planning.

ù Concept of ops 5 phases:

- Phase I: Preparation Phase. Presently in this phase now.

- Phase II: Entry. Begin after signing of peace agreement. Military forces would deploy to area by sea/land.

- Phase III: Implementation. Deployment of forces in country to secure critical areas and man outposts.

- Phase IV: Transition to Peace. Initial robust forces slowly drawdown over years as peace agreement took effect.

- Phase V: Exit. Orderly hand over of commitments to appropriate civilian organizations and withdrawal of IFOR and equipment.

War Criminals

ù IFOR mission is to implement the peace agreement.

ù Pursuing war criminals not in mission, but will take into custody if come into contact.

Military Stabilization

ù Our goal to establish stability on ground by time IFOR completes mission. One key is to ensure settlement does not break down after IFOR leaves.

ù Preference for balance of forces between Federation/Bosnian Serbs through arms control measures that provide for a "build-down."

ù Arms control by itself unlikely to achieve stable balance, prepared to help equip/

train Federation forces to
ensure effective self-defense capability (DoD has details on contracting).

ù Effort separate from NATO-led implementation force. First step: lifting of arms
e
mbargo.

New Ethnic Cleansing/Reports of Mass Graves

ù U.S. has/will continue to investigate and provide information to UN/War
Crimes Tri
bunal regarding violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law in a timely manner.

ù Shattuck documented evidence of Bosnian Serb atrocities. Last August, went to
Cen
tral/Northeastern Bosnia,
collected eyewitness accounts of mass executions, beatings, rape and other
violation
s of human rights and
international humanitarian law. Shattuck just returned to region to interview refug
ees in Zenia.

ù Albright presented to UN Security Council compelling evidence gathered by
US. Evi
dence based on US
intelligence and photographic intelligence, strongly suggested mass grave sites in
Srebrenica.

ù Actively support international organizations like UNHCR and Red Cross to
document
fate and whereabouts of
missing persons.

12-Month IFOR Time Limit

ù U.S. position: IFOR military aspects should have finite duration (NATO/NAC
accept
ed)

ù Believe military aspects accomplished in about one year.

ù Will not make final decision on duration until final peace agreement/completed
OPL
AN.

ù 12 months NATO planning figure not been formally adopted by Alliance.

ù One year sufficient to establish stable ground situation.

ù Desire to create stable balance through arms reductions, but this will also require some military support for Federation forces to ensure they have an effective self-defense capability.

Russian IFOR Participation

ù Perry/Grachev reached agreement on Russian participation of IFOR. Russian forces will come under the operational command of a Russian general officer who will report to General Joulwan as overall commander of IFOR. The Russian Brigade will be folded into an American division which will exercise tactical control. The Russians will retain national command over their forces as other nations that participate in IFOR.

ù Russia and U.S. may also participate in a special force that will deploy 30 days after IFOR. That force will work on transport, logistics.

ù Prefer NATO/Russian forces not separated between Federation and Serb areas.

Dole and Gingrich Bosnia Letter

ù Administration wants to work with public and Congress so that we can have bipartisan consensus if and when a peace agreement is reached.

ù We are now engaged in intensive consultations with Congress, given prospect of U.S. participation in NATO-led force to implement a peace settlement.

ù President will request expression of Congressional support for U.S. participation in implementation of a settlement.

ù At sensitive point in our efforts to negotiate a political settlement to conflict in Bosnia.

ù We all share an interest in ensuring that settlement is one American people can support.

ù This is issue of huge consequence -- for Bosnia, for NATO, and for U.S. leadership

ù Whole world watching not only what parties do at Dayton, but how we, the U.S., will deal with biggest security challenge in Europe since WWII. Without American leadership, a peace agreement is sure to fail.

ù Critically important that members of Congress and public keep an open mind over next few weeks as peace is negotiated. We won't have a clear picture of the requirements and risks until agreement is reached. When we do, we will present details of our plan, and President will seek public and Congressional support.

Points We Have Made

ù It is in our interest to have broadest possible based of public support -- in both parties

ù -- for U.S. role in implementation of settlement if we achieve one. Want to hear your views.

ù Despite many hurdles to overcome, believe we have best chance in four years to reach settlement. U.S. leadership, so critical to achieving peace, will be critical to implementation as well.

ù Remain firmly convinced that only NATO can effectively enforce military aspects of settlement. NATO presence is essential to creating secure environment in which political and economic rebuilding can begin.

ù As leader of NATO, U.S. has to be involved. Our interests are very much at stake:

Our engagement essential
to prevent spread of conflict, achieve lasting peace.

ù First, and most important, there won't be a peace agreement unless NATO enforces it.

ù We believe the parties can reach a mutually acceptable peace settlement. But even if they do, they all recognize the need for an international implementation force to stabilize the situation and build confidence so that peace can take hold.

ù NATO is the only organization capable of playing this role.

ù Second, if NATO takes on the implementation mission but we do not participate, it will be the end of NATO and of U.S. leadership on transatlantic security issues.

ù Some argue that Bosnia is a European problem so the Europeans should take care of it. This may sound attractive, but the reality is that we have a deep interest in European security.

ù The United States was drawn into two world wars and a 50-year Cold War because of threats to security and stability in Europe. The lessons of history are clear -- U.S. leadership is essential for Europe to solve its problems.

ù And third, the risks of participating in the implementation force must be weighed against the risk of an expanded war if the peace process fails.

ù The dangers of spillover are real.

ù The only way to prevent the spread of conflict and future massacres of innocents is to seize this opportunity when all parties may be willing to accept an agreement -- and to recognize that the only way to make the agreement stick is for NATO, with the U.S. in the lead, to provide the stability necessary in the first months after the settlement.

ù We will make sure terms of agreement are enforceable and that parties themselves accept the mission and robust ROE that NATO implementation force (IFOR) must have.

ù Let me emphasize a few key points:

ù IFOR will have carefully defined mission, clear chain of command with no "dual key," and authority to use force against any violation.

ù Forces will not be predominantly American: Europeans and other non-Americans will provide 2/3 of troops.

ù Hope Russians and other Partnership for Peace countries will also participate. Any combat forces, however, must be under NATO operational or tactical control.

ù We will have a clear exit strategy and will be careful to guard against mission creep.

ù Part of exit strategy to establish stability on ground by time IFOR completes mission. This will be one of the keys to ensuring settlement does not break down after IFOR leaves.

- Preference is to establish balance of forces between Federation and Bosnian Serbs through arms control measures that provide for a "build-down."

- Arms control by itself unlikely to achieve stable balance, so we are prepared to equip/train Federation forces to ensure they have effective self-defense capability.

- Effort will be separate from NATO-led implementation force and will need to be carefully managed to avoid any risks to the IFOR and to avoid stimulating a regional arms race. First step: lifting of arms embargo.

ù Expect NATO mission can be completed in about a year, but need to see agreement on

d NATO plan before
making such commitment.

ù International community can create opportunity for parties to make durable
peace,
but ultimate responsibility is
theirs.

IRELAND

U.S. Role

ù We are committed to working with the two governments and the parties to help
in th
e search for peace.

ù Thankful there has been a year in which the guns and bombs are silent.

ù First time in a generation there is real hope for a lasting peace and a more prosp
erous future. People of
Belfast are finally living a normal life.

ù One can literally say that there are individuals walking the streets in Belfast al
ive today who would not be
had we not gotten involved. American engagement has been an essential
ingredient in
the search for
peace.

U.S. Meetings

ù UUP leader Trimble met with the Vice President November 1. The President
joined t
hem for part of the
meeting. The focus of the discussion was the peace process in Northern Ireland.
Pa
rt of our continuing
efforts to maintain contacts with all of the parties.

ù We have had a number of contacts over the last several weeks about how to
move the
peace process
forward.

ù Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams is meeting today with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake.

ù The Vice President and Mr. Lake have met with UK Minister of State for Northern Ireland Michael Ancram.

ù On September 29, the President saw Irish Deputy Prime Minister, Dick Spring, who was at the White House for a meeting with the Vice President.

ù The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Nancy Soderberg, recently conducted a round of consultations with all parties in Ireland and the UK.

ù The National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, held consultations in London with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland and other issues October 16-19. While there, he also met with Northern Ireland political leaders, David Trimble of the UUP and John Hume of the SDLP..

ù We are hopeful a way can be found to move things forward. Contacts with all the parties are continuing. We are not prepared to go into any detail. NSA Lake's Trip to London

ù NSA Lake was in London week October 16-19. He was there for consultations with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland, the President's trip, and other issues. While there, he also met with Northern Ireland political leaders.

ù If asked: Mr. Lake was accompanied by Deputy NSA Nancy Soderberg and Director for European Affairs Mary Ann Peters.

Twin Track

ù We see a basis for progress in the "twin-track" proposal to begin inclusive talks between the British and

Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties and to establish an international body to address the issue of decommissioning the paramilitaries' weapons.

ù We will continue to encourage all sides to be flexible and find a way to move the process forward.

British Stalling on Talks?

ù As we have said, we hope that momentum will have been restored to the process by the time the President visits Northern Ireland at the end of November.

ù We believe Prime Minister Major is committed to achieving a lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Position on Decommissioning:

ù On decommissioning of weapons, we have said that parties observing the cease-fire "must take the next step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have made clear to Sinn Féin and loyalists that we expect movement on this issue.

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

ù The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet made a decision.

ù It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there is a formal decision.

Comments of new UUP leader Trimble on twin track?

ù Trimble's speech of October 21 represented no change in the unionist position of opposition to the twin track approach.

ù Our view is that twin track strategy of the British and Irish Governments offers the best prospect for moving the peace process forward.

ù Looking forward to working with Mr. Trimble as we have with the Unionists over the past year.

Paisley Visit

ù Paisley met with NSA Lake and VP Gore October 27.

Deportations

[Irish groups mounting a campaign against deportation of former IRA members, some who are married to U.S. citizens and/or have U.S. children. U.S. law provides no flexibility in prohibiting permanent residency to those linked to terrorism. We are looking into possible legislative waivers.]

ù Issue recently brought to our attention.

ù Law provides no flexibility on many cases.

ù Staff reviewing issue.

SUCCESSOR TO NATO SYG CLAES

ù The decision to withdraw former Prime Minister Lubbers' candidacy for the position of NATO Secretary General was for the Dutch Government to make.

ù We have the highest regard for Mr. Lubbers. He has been a good friend and reliable ally of the United States who served his country with distinction as Prime Minister for more than a decade.

ù His leadership contributed to the strength of the NATO Alliance and the transatlantic relationship, including the decisions taken at the January 1994 NATO Summit.

ù We have not made any decision on who would make the best candidate for the position of NATO Secretary General and are continuing to consult with our Allies.

ù The final decision will, of course, require a consensus among all 16 members of the Alliance.

(If pressed on whether U.S. rejected Lubbers' candidacy):

ù It would be inappropriate to comment on the confidential discussions that are taking place within the Alliance on this matter.

Q: Is there a rift in the Alliance regarding the choice of a new Secretary General?

A: Every member of NATO recognizes that the choice of a new Secretary General will have a significant impact on the future of the Alliance at this critical juncture in its history.

This is why it is essential that the right person be selected for the job.

It is also essential that any candidate for the position be acceptable to all 16 members of the Alliance. This is why the rule of consensus applies in such decisions.

We are continuing active consultations with our allies on possible candidates, but we have not yet reached a decision on whom the best candidate would be.

It would be inappropriate to comment on the content of these consultations. While no candidate has yet emerged who is acceptable to all Allies, neither has a rift developed over the selection process.

We and our Allies are committed to moving forward as rapidly as possible to find the right person for the job.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Heart Problem

-- President Yeltsin remains in hospital but taking on increasingly active schedule.

Met November

14 with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev.

Embassy M

oscow in touch

with Russian officials; what Embassy has heard from them about Yeltsin tracks with w

hat Russian

officials saying publicly.

(Seeking Medical Treatment Outside Russia?)

-- Yeltsin spokesman has denied that Russians might seek treatment for Yeltsin outsi

de of Russia,

and Yeltsin has denied that he needs heart surgery. Russians have said nothing to u

s about wanting

medical treatment in U.S.

Perry-Grachev Talks on Russia and Bosnia IFOR

-- Perry and Grachev agreed on November 8 on military framework under which Russian

combat

forces will participate in a Bosnia peace implementation operation. Warmly welcome

this understanding,

as we consider Russian participation in Bosnia peace implementation important and de

sirable.

(If pressed for details of arrangement, best to defer to Defense)

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting reform there. Matters gr eatly to us if

Russia dictatorship or democracy, centrally planned or market-oriented economy.

-- Long-term strategy. Transformation underway will be complex, protracted.

Strugg

le going on

between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

-- Engagement producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50%

of R
ussian
GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

-- President's productive meeting with Yeltsin at Hyde Park on October 23
underscore
d stability,
inner strength of U.S.-Russia partnership.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests. It helps reformers succeed in building a democracy and a market economy, and it helps reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not in o
ur interest to cut this assistance.

Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Intend to manage enlargem
ent
process in deliberate, transparent manner that threatens no country and strengthens security and stability of Europe as a whole.

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to develop NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members. Robust NATO-Russia relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Pr
ime Minister Chernomyrdin continuing serious dialogue on issue.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear

cooperation
with Iran,
given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Chechnya

-- While formal Russian-Chechen talks have not resumed, sides conducting informal working meetings. Welcome Chernomyrdin's reaffirmation of commitment to pursue negotiated settlement.

-- Dispute in Chechnya can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides to work together to implement military agreement and to find political solution.

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

ù Over the past weeks, the U.S., together with its Allies, has been actively seeking a solution to the CFE flank issue, in Vienna, in Brussels, and in our bilateral discussions.

ù In this context, during the Grachev visit the two sides held extensive discussions on this crucial issue.

ù Grachev sought an informal U.S. reaction to various ideas Russia was considering, in terms of its response in Vienna to the proposal NATO had tabled on September 22.

ù In the course of these discussions, Grachev and Perry reached an understanding that Russia would not propose to exclude from the flank zone -- and thus from the flank limits -- the Leningrad oblast, which contains over 1900 tanks, artillery pieces and armored combat vehicles. For its part, the U.S. agreed to be flexible with regard to other oblasts in the south Russia will propose be exempted from the flank zone.

ù Secretary Perry emphasized that any change to the flank zone can only be implemented if it is approved by all 30 states party to the CFE Treaty.

ù In coordination with NATO Allies, the U.S. now looks forward to a discussion of the Russian proposal with the other CFE states, with the objective of concluding flank negotiations by November 17 -- the date when the flank limits take effect under the treaty.

OSAKA/JAPAN TRIP

Q: If you consider Asia (and Japan in particular) as important as you say, why did you cancel your important bilateral meetings in Osaka and cut short your State Visit to Japan?

A: It is precisely because the President considers the Asia-Pacific region in general and the Japan relationship in particular to be so important that he is still going both to APEC and the state visit to Japan.

Just as he won't walk away from his principles and programs in the budget confrontation with the Congress, he won't walk away from his commitment to a strong priority in U.S. foreign policy for the Asia Pacific region.

Therefore, POTUS felt it best to shorten his trip in order to deal with the budget situation here but not to cancel it entirely, which might have been wrongly interpreted by some as a signal of lesser U.S. interest in the Asia-Pacific region.

OKINAWA

ù It's important to distinguish between the justified emotional outpouring resulting from the tragic incident on Okinawa and the more fundamental issue of continued Japanese support for the US-Japan security alliance.

ù While I don't believe it's appropriate for me to comment any further about the incident itself while the trial is ongoing, I should point out that every senior American official, from President Clinton, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale on down, has publicly expressed regret over this incident.

ù In terms of underlying support for the security relationship, that certainly remains strong, both within the Japanese Government and the Japanese people as a whole.

ù Just last week, Secretary Perry visited Japan, during which he and his Japanese counterpart, Minister Eto, held a press conference in which they both publicly expressed their support for the continued presence of 47,000 US troops in Japan.

ù At a subsequent meeting, Prime Minister Murayama indicated to Secretary Perry that he agreed with this.

The bottom line is that the Japanese Government is not asking us to reduce our troop presence, because it recognizes that this presence is crucial to Japan's own interest in the preservation of peace and stability in Asia.

SAUDI ARABIA BOMBING AFTERMATH

Q: Have you identified the perpetrators of the bombing yet?

A: The full resources of the US government are being brought to bear on this

investi
gation and we
are determined to do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators are identif
ied and brought to justice.

However, the investigation is at a very early stage and we are not going to
specula
te on who may be
responsible.

Q: What do you know about the Islamic Movement for Change, which claimed
responsibil
ity for
the attack?

A: A number of groups have claimed responsibility for the attack. We are
investigat
ing all of these
claims.

We are aware of the IMC and its stated opposition to the US presence in the
Persian
Gulf.

Q: What security measures are being taken to guard US personnel and facilities in
Sa
udi Arabia?

A: The Saudi government and US agencies have responded quickly and
effectively to im
prove
security for US personnel and facilities, both government and private, throughout
th
e Kingdom.

(If pressed:) I don't want to get into the details of the new security arrangement
s. That would be
counterproductive.

Q: What contact has there been between the USG and the Saudi government?

A: Ambassador Mabus and his staff have been in constant contact with Saudi
officials
at all levels,
including King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah.

At his meeting with the King, Ambassador Mabus passed on the President's
appreciati
on for the
tremendous effort the Saudis have made in the wake of the bombing.

Although Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar was not in the US at the time of the bombing, we have been in contact with him and he has been helping expedite the movement of US equipment and personnel both to and from the Kingdom.

Q: Do you believe that the security of U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia was lax before the bombing?

A: I think we should wait to hear what the experts say before making a judgment on that.

MEPFA EXTENSION

ù President signed fourth short-term extension of Middle East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) on November 13; POTUS subsequently signed a Presidential Determination exercising his authority under the Act to find that it is in the national interest to suspend certain legislative restrictions on the PLO through December 31, expiration date of this extension.

ù This is the fourth short-term MEPFA extension. The last extension expired October 31; Congress did not pass the new authority until November 10. The only practical effect of the lapse in suspension of restrictions on the PLO was the closing of the PLO office in DC; that office will now be able to reopen.

ù Aid to the Palestinians was not affected; no disbursements were planned during the period of the lapse. Our diplomatic exchanges with the PLO are unaffected by the MEPFA.

ù Administration supports long-term extension of MEPFA; such an extension is current
ly part of the Foreign
Ops Appropriations Bill, awaiting further Hill action.

IRAN -- COMMENT ON JEFF SMITH ARTICLE

Q: Are we leaning toward tighter sanctions on Iran? What about the Administration's
work with
the Congress on a new covert action plan?

A.: With respect to any question concerning intelligence issues, we will have no com
ment.

With respect to our work with Congress on increasing the pressure on Iran, our polic
y is well known:

We view Iran as a potential threat to its neighbors and an enemy of the peace proces
s. For that reason we
have already taken a number of steps to increase pressure on Iran and to limit the
r
esources available to
Iran to foster terrorism and to attempt to derail the Middle East Peace Process.

As Under Secretary Tarnoff said yesterday in his testimony, we remain interested in
working with the
Congress to find new, effective ways to increase the pressure on Iran, to limit its
resources, and
ultimately to affect its behavior.

We are working closely with the Congress on this issue, seeking ways to increase tha
t pressure consistent
with our obligations to our partners and allies.

HAITI

Q: What is your comment on the unsettling events of the past week in Haiti?

[Parliam

entarian

Feuille's murder last Tuesday, a Haitian police raid on former President Avril's hom

e that evening,

President Aristide's emotional remarks at Feuille's funeral (Feuille was a second c

ousin), and resultant

crowd violence in Les Cayes, Gonaives and Port-au-Prince through the weekend.]

A: The events of the past week show that we cannot let down our vigilance with resp

ect to Haiti.

We believe that the violence over the weekend was the result of a unique and unfortu

nate combination of

events, and not part of any larger pattern or long-term trend. The situation is now quiet throughout the

country. Senior U.S. and UN officials are working closely with President Aristide

and his government to

calm popular emotion and continue planning toward economic reform, a

Presidential e

lection in

December/January, and inauguration of a new President in February.

Q: What is your comment on last week's Post report of a "first overt U.S. display of

disapproval

of Aristide's management..." by the White House with respect to Haiti?

A: It is true that approximately \$4.6 million of \$45 million total in Balance of Pay

ments support

money has not been released by USAID to the Government of Haiti.

This was not the result of any recent decision, or guidance from the White House.

The Balance of Payments support treaty that was signed with Haiti last April set ce

rtain

conditions for each tranche of the money to be released.

Because of the recent change in government (resignation of PM Michel), Haiti has no

t been able

to achieve all of the conditions specified for the last tranche. By law therefore, the money could not be released.

Haiti's new government was sworn-in last week. Expect forward progress when it gets its feet on the ground.

USG has been working closely with President Aristide and his government to encourage and assist their economic transition. Agencies: USAID, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture

NIGERIA: EXECUTIONS CONFIRMED

Background: Nigeria's Provisional Ruling Council executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his colleagues last Friday for the alleged murder of four Ogoni leaders in 1994. Both the President and the State Department previously issued statements condemning the verdicts and sentences which resulted from a gravely flawed judicial process conducted outside the traditional judicial system and without regard for due process.

The United States has recalled its ambassador for consultations, has issued a direct protest to the Nigerian government, has banned all military sales and maintenance work, and will continue its strict visa restrictions against military members of the Nigerian government. Other measures remain under review.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The United States strongly condemns the execution today of environmental and human rights

rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others accused of murder in May 1994. These executions underscore the Abacha regime's refusal to abide by the most basic international norms and universal standard of human rights.

The United States extends its sincere condolences to the families of those executed.

Their deaths will be mourned by friends and supporters around the world.

The United States has consistently deplored the inherent denial of due process afforded by trials conducted before special tribunals outside of the traditional judicial system. This latest action follows the Government of Nigeria's unacceptable transition to democratic governance announced on October 1. We continue to be deeply troubled by the lack of respect for human rights, prompt and credible steps taken by the Government of Nigeria to return to democracy.

In response to these executions, President Clinton has recalled Ambassador Carrington from Lagos for consultations. The White House has been in contact with the Nigerian Ambassador to the U.S. Zubair Mahmud Kazaure, to protest the executions. In addition, the President has banned the sale and repair of military goods and services to Nigeria and ordered the extension of visa restrictions to make all Nigerian military officers and their families subject to exclusion from the United States. Henceforth, Nigerian Government officials visiting the United Nations, the international financial institutions and IMF will be required to remain within 25 miles of the institution. Other measures remain under review including oil sanctions.

The United States reiterates its call on the Nigerian leadership to effect a swift and credible transition to a stable, civilian democracy that respects human rights.

#

POW/MIA

Background: Defense DPMO (Defense POW/MIA Office) has a new work plan that sets new priorities for resolving cases. 567 have been declared "unrecoverable." The Hill is being briefed today. CNN and Washington Times have reported this.

ù This is in no way a legal finding nor is it a final declaration. Most cases remain open.

ù Is an evaluation based on review of and nature of the evidence. Most lost at sea or in way that suggests little or no chance of ever recovering remains.

ù A special panel must review this finding and make a final decision. That panel not yet formed. Refer to DPMO.

ù All USG efforts continue to repatriate remains and resolve discrepancies with the Vietnamese. This includes a trilateral commission with Laos to resolve cases there.

MILITARY LEADERS URGE ACCELERATED 50% INCREASE IN MODERNIZATION

Background: The Washington Post reported on November 11 that the uniformed leaders of the armed forces, worried about aging weapons and equipment, have recommended a 50 percent increase in procurement spending, from \$40 billion at present to \$60 billion by Fiscal Year 1998. Administration plans for the same rise by 2001. The recommendation was included in General Shalikashvili's Chairman Program Assessment, recently submitted

to Secretary Perry. The recommendation makes clear the military chiefs do not expect the added funds for modernization to come from higher overall defense spending but rather through cuts in some programs under development and other savings. Nor are the Chiefs suggesting reversing the priority given last year to readiness over procurement. The biggest adjustments proposed by the Chairman would involve cutting back on competing service programs.

Points

- ù The President has pledged to maintain the best-equipped, best-trained, and best-prepared fighting force in the world.

- ù Post Cold War drawdown permitted us to retain the newest equipment from the large recapitalization and procurement period of the 1980s while retiring older, less useful systems.

- ù With drawdown nearly complete, modernization programs now receiving special attention in FY97-01 program review. In future years, recapitalization is a priority as many weapon systems approach block obsolescence. That's why last December, President increased defense spending plan by \$25 billion.

- ù Agree with Defense Department's goal for an accelerated increase in planned procurement spending by achieving efficiencies and funding reductions in programs of lower priority from a warfighting perspective.

- ù (IF ASKED: "Is the military asking for an increase in the Defense Department's timeline?":

- ù No, General Shalikashvili's recommendation makes clear the military chiefs do not expect added funds for modernization to come from higher overall defense spending but rather

through cuts in some programs under development and other savings.)

START SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

Q: Has the United States agreed to "relax" START Treaty constraints to allow the export of ICBMs and SLBMs from Russia and Ukraine as space launch vehicles, as reported on November 10 by the Washington Times?

A: No, the story is not correct and in fact has it backwards.

Rather than making a "concession" on START or "relaxing" the Treaty, the U.S. secured an important success by persuading Russia to reaffirm and uphold the manner in which the Treaty as originally negotiated applies to space launch vehicles.

Specifically, the United States, along with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, recently reaffirmed that space launch vehicles that use the first stage of a START Treaty-limited ICBM or SLBM are subject to all relevant Treaty provisions -- including the ban on transferring such missiles to other countries.

The START Treaty does not prohibit a Treaty party from establishing a space launch facility outside its national territory. However, the Treaty party must maintain ownership and control of both the Treaty-limited missiles and launchers at all times, and cannot sell them to another party.

[If asked about the "U.S. Government White Paper" that is extensively quoted in the article]

We are not aware of the "white paper" that is referred to in the article.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Background: Monday's Washington Post reports that SFRC Chairman Jesse Helms has concerns about the Chemical Weapons Convention and is prepared to block its ratification "indefinitely."

The story notes that enthusiasm for the treaty is waning in other countries because of the U.S. failure to ratify and states that if the treaty falls by the wayside, it would represent a triumph of one determined legislator over a decade-long bipartisan consensus in support of the treaty.

Q: Do you have any comments on the story in today's Washington Post about ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention?

A: Chemical weapons proliferation poses a serious danger to U.S. national security and that of our friends and allies. The Chemical Weapons Convention will make it harder and more costly for proliferators and terrorists alike to acquire chemical weapons by outlawing the development, production, stockpiling and use.

Q: Aides to Senator Helms say that Senator is prepared to block ratification "indefinitely". What is your view of this?

A: The CWC has enjoyed and continues to enjoy strong bipartisan support in the U.S. It was negotiated under President Reagan, concluded and signed under President Bush, and submitted to the Senate by President Clinton.

In recent weeks, Senators Lugar, Nunn, Kassebaum, Glenn, Biden, Levin and others have pressed the case for CWC ratification. They have been joined by an impressive group of former Administration officials, including Brent Scowcroft, Larry Eagleburger and Ron Lehman.

The strong support for the CWC on the part of these and other top officials underscores a simple fact: the CWC is in our national security interests, and we need it now.

Q: What will happen to the CWC if the U.S. does not ratify?

A: To date, 159 countries have signed the CWC and 42 have ratified it. However, many other countries are waiting and watching to see if the U.S. will ratify before completing their own ratification efforts. U.S. leadership is critical to reaching the threshold of 65 ratifications necessary to bring the CWC into force.

Q: Why hasn't the Senate ratified yet?

A: Since November 1993, when the CWC was submitted to the Senate, nine hearings have been held on the treaty, the last of which was in August 1994.

In September 1995, the Senate adopted a "Sense of the Senate" amendment calling for prompt ratification of CWC (and START II).

As far as obstacles to Senate action are concerned, we would simply note that the full Senate ought to be given the opportunity to carry out its Constitutional responsibility to provide its advice and consent to ratification.

The CWC should be debated on its merits, fully and openly by the entire Senate. We should not allow this vital agreement to slip away simply by default -- because the full

Senate
was denied the
opportunity to debate the Convention fully and openly.

We are confident that, if given the chance, the Senate will come to the same
conclu
sion as the
Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations -- that the CWC is in our national
security
interests and should
be ratified promptly.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 16 November 95 18:37

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT November 16 Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Beardsley, Tyler S.
Reed, George
Woolston, Ann E.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[NOV16GUI.DOC : 4678 in NOV16GUI.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 16 November 95 18:36

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** NOV16GUI.DOC
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

November 16, 1995

EUROPE
Bosnia/Croatia
Ireland
NATO Secretary General
Russia
CFE

FAR EAST
Osaka/Japan Trip
Okinawa

MIDDLE EAST
Algeria
Saudi Arabia
MEPFA Extension

CENTRAL AMERICA
Haiti

AFRICA
Nigeria

MISCELLANEOUS
CIA
POW/MIA
START Space Launch Vehicles
CWC

BOSNIA/CROATIA

Russian IFOR Participation

ù Perry/Grachev reached agreement on Russian participation of IFOR. Russian forces will come under the operational command of a Russian general officer who will report to General Joulwan as overall commander of IFOR. The Russian Brigade will be folded into an American division which will exercise tactical control. The Russians will retain national command over their forces as other nations that participate in IFOR.

ù Russia and U.S. may also participate in a special force that will deploy 30 days after IFOR. That force will work on transport, logistics.

ù Prefer NATO/Russian forces not separated between Federation and Serb areas.

If asked about Grachev assertion of Russian political veto over NATO IFOR decisions:

ù Russia does not have a veto over IFOR operations.

ù In any case, the agreements reached between Perry-Grachev have not been approved by NATO, yet.

ù There have been no decisions made regarding the political relations with NATO.

ù Talks are continuing and Perry will meet Grachev at the end of the month.

House Bill on IFOR

ù Understand that Congress may take up a resolution as soon as tomorrow that would require an appropriation before the United States could deploy troops.

ù President has asked Congress to hold off passing a resolution until we have an agreement -- if we do. There has been some progress in Dayton, and this resolution could undermine that progress.

ù Want to make something very clear: this type of action does not simply threaten the talks, it threatens peace.

ù Those on Capitol Hill who support this resolution need to understand that they will share the responsibility for a failure to put together a peace agreement in Dayton in passing such a resolution.

Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia

ù Transitional period of 12 months which may be extended for 12 months.

ù UN Security Council requested to establish a Transitional Administration.

ù UN Security Council requested to authorize an international force to deploy during the transitional period to maintain peace and security and assist in implementation of this agreement.

ù Transitional Administration shall help establish and train temporary police forces

ù All persons have the right to return freely to their place of residence in the Region and to live in conditions of security.

ù Not later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period, elections for all local government bodies shall be organized by the Transitional Administration.

ù The Government of Croatia shall cooperate fully with the Transitional Administration and the international force.

If asked whether IFOR is to be the international force

ù The international force and its composition has not been determined. The UN Security Council must first authorize an international force. IFOR does not have a mission to implement an agreement in Eastern Slavonia.

Federation in Dayton

ù Secretary Christopher flew to Dayton November 9 to announce decisions that bring to life the Bosnian/Croat Federation.

ù President Tudjman witnessed the signing. Izetbegovic and Zubak signed it. The two mayors of Mostar and Mostar's EU administrator signed it.

ù The U.S. representative to the Federation, Daniel Serwer, played a key role in negotiating this agreement.

ù Secretary Christopher remained in Dayton Friday for further discussions with the parties. He returned to Washington Friday night.

ù Secretary Christopher returned to Dayton Tuesday for discussions with the parties before leaving on his trip to the Pacific.

ù Through his work, and that of Dick Holbrooke, Ambassador Galbraith and Special Negotiator Stoltenberg, the parties were able to reach agreement Sunday on a peaceful arrangement in the return of Eastern Slavonia to Croatian control, following up to two years of international UN supervision.

Sanctions Relief

ù Izetbegovic and Milosevic requested immediate resumption of natural gas deliveries to both Bosnia and Serbia on humanitarian grounds and as a confidence building measure.

ù U.S. working with Contact group members for action at the UNSC under existing humanitarian exemption.

ù This is a humanitarian gesture to provide heating fuel in response to severe winter conditions.

ù Delivery is for two months.

ù Action is similar to one last year where relief was provided for humanitarian reasons.

ù (If asked about sanctions suspension) This will take a full UNSCR and our position has not changed-we will support suspension when there is a peace agreement.

Intelligence Sharing with the Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal

ù The U.S. intelligence community is not "sitting on" information that may be of use to the Tribunal prosecutor.

ù A coordinated Intelligence Community process in place since spring to manage handling of requests for information/classified responses to requests. We provide available information even in the absence of a specific request.

ù U.S. has not withheld any intelligence with the intent to prevent the prosecution of any war criminals including Mladic and Karadzic.

ù Talks in Dayton have had no bearing whatsoever on our commitment to support and as

sist the War Crimes

Tribunal in every way its efforts to bring war criminals to justice.

ù Reporting such information is time-consuming, but we make a strenuous effort to respond as rapidly as possible.

ù We will find a way to get the Tribunal the information it needs.

Atrocities

ù Continue to condemn these gross violations of human rights.

ù Led vigorous effort to uncover/publicize evidence of war crimes in Balkans.

ù Shattuck three times raised issue with Serbs.

ù War crimes indictments not negotiable. In fact, the Tribunal recently announced additional indictments.

ù Actively support investigating international organizations (UNHCR , Red Cross).

ù Stopping atrocities one main reason for active U.S. role in the peace negotiations

Proximity Talks

ù Proximity talks are continuing. We're keeping the public informed on the talks through a single spokesman at the State Department. For details on yesterday's activities, refer to State daily report.

ù President said to team on October 31, before the talks began, this is a defining moment for Bosnia.

ù Only the parties to this terrible conflict can end it.

ù In Dayton, our diplomats face a tremendous challenge. There is no guarantee they will succeed. American leadership key to success.

ù Talks co-chaired by Holbrooke/Bildt. Goal to secure final peace agreement that par

ties will initial in Dayton.

ù Balkan parties: Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic plus Contact Group partners.

ù Intensive U.S. /CG diplomacy - parties agreed Geneva (9/8/95)/New York (9/26/95) to settlement basic principles: Bosnia as single state; 51/49 basis for territorial solution; constitutional structure; democratic elections; and subsequently to cease-fire

ù Difficult issues still to be resolved: (i) internal boundary for Bosnian-Croat Federation/Serb Republic; (ii) Sarajevo status; (iii) practical steps to separate forces /ceasing hostilities; (iv) election procedures.

ù After Dayton, next steps: Paris international peace conference and implementation conference in London. May be meetings after Paris before final settlement signed.

ù No set duration.

Peace Plan Implementation

ù NAC approved concept of ops for IFOR.

ù Detailed planning by NATO Military Authorities proceeding; Joulwan briefed President and national security team on state of NATO'S plans.

ù Number of forces for operation not determined - will depend on peace agreement modalities.

ù NATO briefed UN, UN Peace Force contributors, and interested PFP countries. Contributions by non-NATO countries would be welcome.

ù Churkin attended "16-plus-one" with NAC to discuss NATO's planning.

ù Concept of ops 5 phases:

- Phase I: Preparation Phase. Presently in this phase now.

- Phase II: Entry. Begin after signing of peace agreement. Military forces would deploy to area by sea/land.
- Phase III: Implementation. Deployment of forces in country to secure critical areas and main outposts.
- Phase IV: Transition to Peace. Initial robust forces slowly drawdown over years as peace agreement took effect.
- Phase V: Exit. Orderly hand over of commitments to appropriate civilian organizations and withdrawal of IFOR and equipment.

War Criminals

ù IFOR mission is to implement the peace agreement.

ù Pursuing war criminals not in mission, but will take into custody if come into contact.

Military Stabilization

ù Our goal to establish stability on ground by time IFOR completes mission. One key is to ensure settlement does not break down after IFOR leaves.

ù Preference for balance of forces between Federation/Bosnian Serbs through arms control measures that provide for a "build-down."

ù Arms control by itself unlikely to achieve stable balance, prepared to help equip/train Federation forces to ensure effective self-defense capability (DoD has details on contracting).

ù Effort separate from NATO-led implementation force. First step: lifting of arms embargo.

New Ethnic Cleansing/Reports of Mass Graves

ù U.S. has/will continue to investigate and provide information to UN/War Crimes Tribunal regarding violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in a timely manner.

ù Shattuck documented evidence of Bosnian Serb atrocities. Last August, went to Central/Northeastern Bosnia, collected eyewitness accounts of mass executions, beatings, rape and other violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Shattuck just returned to region to interview refugees in Zenica.

ù Albright presented to UN Security Council compelling evidence gathered by US. Evidence based on US intelligence and photographic intelligence, strongly suggested mass grave sites in Srebrenica.

ù Actively support international organizations like UNHCR and Red Cross to document fate and whereabouts of missing persons.

12-Month IFOR Time Limit

ù U.S. position: IFOR military aspects should have finite duration (NATO/NAC accepted)

ù Believe military aspects accomplished in about one year.

ù Will not make final decision on duration until final peace agreement/completed OPLAN.

ù 12 months NATO planning figure not been formally adopted by Alliance.

ù One year sufficient to establish stable ground situation.

ù Desire to create stable balance through arms reductions, but this will also require some military support for Federation forces to ensure they have an effective self-defense capability.

Dole and Gingrich Bosnia Letter

ù Administration wants to work with public and Congress so that we can have bipartis
an consensus if and when
a peace agreement is reached.

ù We are now engaged in intensive consultations with Congress, given prospect of U.S
. participation in
NATO-led force to implement a peace settlement.

ù President will request expression of Congressional support for U.S.
participation
in implementation of a
settlement.

ù At sensitive point in our efforts to negotiate a political settlement to conflict in Bosnia.

ù We all share an interest in ensuring that settlement is one American people can su
pport.

ù This is issue of huge consequence -- for Bosnia, for NATO, and for U.S.
leadership

ù Whole world watching not only what parties do at Dayton, but how we, the U.S., wil
l deal with biggest
security challenge in Europe since WWII. Without American leadership, a peace agree
ment is sure to fail.

ù Critically important that members of Congress and public keep an open mind over ne
xt few weeks as peace is
negotiated. We won't have a clear picture of the requirements and risks until agree
ment is reached. When we
do, we will present details of our plan, and President will seek public and Congress
ional support.

Points We Have Made

ù It is in our interest to have broadest possible based of public support -- in both parties

ù -- for U.S. role in implementation of settlement if we achieve one. Want to hear your views.

ù Despite many hurdles to overcome, believe we have best chance in four years to reach settlement. U.S. leadership, so critical to achieving peace, will be critical to implementation as well.

ù Remain firmly convinced that only NATO can effectively enforce military aspects of settlement. NATO presence is essential to creating secure environment in which political and economic rebuilding can begin.

ù As leader of NATO, U.S. has to be involved. Our interests are very much at stake: Our engagement essential to prevent spread of conflict, achieve lasting peace.

ù First, and most important, there won't be a peace agreement unless NATO enforces it.

ù We believe the parties can reach a mutually acceptable peace settlement. But even if they do, they all recognize the need for an international implementation force to stabilize the situation and build confidence so that peace can take hold.

ù NATO is the only organization capable of playing this role.

ù Second, if NATO takes on the implementation mission but we do not participate, it will be the end of NATO and of U.S. leadership on transatlantic security issues.

ù Some argue that Bosnia is a European problem so the Europeans should take care of it. This may sound attractive, but the reality is that we have a deep interest in European security.

ù The United States was drawn into two world wars and a 50-year Cold War because of threats to security and stability in Europe. The lessons of history are clear -- U.S. leadership is essential.

al for Europe to solve its problems.

ù And third, the risks of participating in the implementation force must be weighed against the risk of an expanded war if the peace process fails.

ù The dangers of spillover are real.

ù The only way to prevent the spread of conflict and future massacres of innocents is to seize this opportunity when all parties may be willing to accept an agreement -- and to recognize that the only way to make the agreement stick is for NATO, with the U.S. in the lead, to provide the stability necessary in the first months after the settlement.

ù We will make sure terms of agreement are enforceable and that parties themselves accept the mission and robust ROE that NATO implementation force (IFOR) must have.

ù Let me emphasize a few key points:

ù IFOR will have carefully defined mission, clear chain of command with no "dual key," and authority to use force against any violation.

ù Forces will not be predominantly American: Europeans and other non-Americans will provide 2/3 of troops.

ù Hope Russians and other Partnership for Peace countries will also participate. Any combat forces, however, must be under NATO operational or tactical control.

ù We will have a clear exit strategy and will be careful to guard against mission creep.

ù Part of exit strategy to establish stability on ground by time IFOR completes mission. This will be one of the keys to ensuring settlement does not break down after IFOR leaves.

- Preference is to establish balance of forces between Federation and Bosnian Serbs through arms control measures that provide for a "build-down."
- Arms control by itself unlikely to achieve stable balance, so we are prepared to help equip/train Federation forces to ensure they have effective self-defense capability.
- Effort will be separate from NATO-led implementation force and will need to be carefully managed to avoid any risks to the IFOR and to avoid stimulating a regional arms race. First step: lifting of arms embargo.
- ù Expect NATO mission can be completed in about a year, but need to see agreement and NATO plan before making such commitment.
- ù International community can create opportunity for parties to make durable peace, but ultimate responsibility is theirs.

IRELAND

U.S. Role

- ù We are committed to working with the two governments and the parties to help in the search for peace.
- ù Thankful there has been a year in which the guns and bombs are silent.
- ù First time in a generation there is real hope for a lasting peace and a more prosperous future. People of Belfast are finally living a normal life.
- ù One can literally say that there are individuals walking the streets in Belfast alive today who would not be had we not gotten involved. American engagement has been an essential ingredient in

the search for
peace.

U.S. Meetings

ù UUP leader Trimble met with the Vice President November 1. The President joined them for part of the meeting. The focus of the discussion was the peace process in Northern Ireland. Part of our continuing efforts to maintain contacts with all of the parties.

ù We have had a number of contacts over the last several weeks about how to move the peace process forward.

ù Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams met yesterday with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake.

ù Lake met today with leaders of loyalist parties.

ù The Vice President and Mr. Lake have met with UK Minister of State for Northern Ireland Michael Ancram.

ù On September 29, the President saw Irish Deputy Prime Minister, Dick Spring, who was at the White House for a meeting with the Vice President.

ù The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Nancy Soderberg, recently conducted a round of consultations with all parties in Ireland and the UK.

ù The National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, held consultations in London with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland and other issues October 16-19. While there, he also met Northern Ireland political leaders, David Trimble of the UUP and John Hume of the SDLP..

ù We are hopeful a way can be found to move things forward. Contacts with all the parties are continuing.

We are not prepared to go into any detail.

NSA Lake's Trip to London

ù NSA Lake was in London week October 16-19. He was there for consultations with the British Government on Bosnia, Northern Ireland, the President's trip, and other issues. While there, he also met with Northern Ireland political leaders.

ù If asked: Mr. Lake was accompanied by Deputy NSA Nancy Soderberg and Director for European Affairs Mary Ann Peters.

Twin Track

ù We see a basis for progress in the "twin-track" proposal to begin inclusive talks between the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties and to establish an international body to address the issue of decommissioning the paramilitaries' weapons.

ù We will continue to encourage all sides to be flexible and find a way to move the process forward.

British Stalling on Talks?

ù As we have said, we hope that momentum will have been restored to the process by the time the President

visits Northern Ireland at the end of November.

ù We believe Prime Minister Major is committed to achieving a lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

Position on Decommissioning:

ù On decommissioning of weapons, we have said that parties observing the cease-fire "must take the next step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning." We have made clear to Sinn Féin and loyalists that

we expect movement on this issue.

Senator Mitchell to Chair Commission on Decommissioning?:

ù The two governments and parties are discussing the proposal. Have not yet made a decision.

ù It's premature to discuss any U.S. Government or private citizen role until there is a formal decision.

Comments of new UUP leader Trimble on twin track?

ù Trimble's speech of October 21 represented no change in the unionist position of opposition to the twin track approach.

ù Our view is that twin track strategy of the British and Irish Governments offers the best prospect for moving the peace process forward.

ù Looking forward to working with Mr. Trimble as we have with the Unionists over the past year.

Paisley Visit

ù Paisley met with NSA Lake and VP Gore October 27.

Deportations

[Irish groups mounting a campaign against deportation of former IRA members, some who are married to U.S. citizens and/or have U.S. children. U.S. law provides no flexibility in prohibiting permanent residency to those linked to terrorism. We are looking into possible legislative waivers.]

ù Issue recently brought to our attention.

ù Law provides no flexibility on many cases.

ù Staff reviewing issue.

SUCCESSOR TO NATO SYG CLAES

ù The decision to withdraw former Prime Minister Lubbers' candidacy for the position of NATO Secretary General was for the Dutch Government to make.

ù We have the highest regard for Mr. Lubbers. He has been a good friend and reliable ally of the United States who served his country with distinction as Prime Minister for more than a decade.

ù His leadership contributed to the strength of the NATO Alliance and the transatlantic relationship, including the decisions taken at the January 1994 NATO Summit.

ù We have not made any decision on who would make the best candidate for the position of NATO Secretary General and are continuing to consult with our Allies.

ù The final decision will, of course, require a consensus among all 16 members of the Alliance.

(If pressed on whether U.S. rejected Lubbers' candidacy):

ù It would be inappropriate to comment on the confidential discussions that are taking place within the Alliance on this matter.

Q: Is there a rift in the Alliance regarding the choice of a new Secretary General?

A: Every member of NATO recognizes that the choice of a new Secretary General will have a significant impact on the future of the Alliance at this critical juncture in its history.

This is why it is essential that the right person be selected for the job.

It is also essential that any candidate for the position be acceptable to all 16 members of the Alliance. This is why the rule of consensus applies in such decisions.

We are continuing active consultations with our allies on possible candidates, but we have not yet reached a decision on whom the best candidate would be.

It would be inappropriate to comment on the content of these consultations.

While

no

candidate has yet emerged who is acceptable to all Allies, neither has a rift developed over the selection process.

We and our Allies are committed to moving forward as rapidly as possible to find the right

person for the job.

RUSSIA/NIS

Current Items

Yeltsin Heart Problem

-- President Yeltsin remains in hospital but taking on increasingly active schedule.

Met November

14 with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev.

Embassy Moscow

in touch

with Russian officials; what Embassy has heard from them about Yeltsin tracks with what Russian

officials saying publicly.

(Seeking Medical Treatment Outside Russia?)

-- Yeltsin spokesman has denied that Russians might seek treatment for Yeltsin outside of Russia,

and Yeltsin has denied that he needs heart surgery. Russians have said nothing to us about wanting

medical treatment in U.S.

Perry-Grachev Talks on Russia and Bosnia IFOR

-- Perry and Grachev agreed on November 8 on military framework under which Russian combat

forces will participate in a Bosnia peace implementation operation. Warmly welcome

this understanding,
as we consider Russian participation in Bosnia peace implementation important
and de
sirable.

(If pressed for details of arrangement, best to defer to Defense)

General Items

U.S. Stake in Relationship

-- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia and supporting reform there. Matters gr
eatly to us if
Russia dictatorship or democracy, centrally planned or market-oriented economy.

-- Long-term strategy. Transformation underway will be complex, protracted.
Strugg
le going on
between those who support reform and those who oppose or fear change.

-- Engagement producing important successes: reducing nuclear threat, over 50%
of R
ussian
GDP now from private sector, no Russian troops in Central Europe or Baltics.

-- President's productive meeting with Yeltsin at Hyde Park on October 23
underscore
d stability,
inner strength of U.S.-Russia partnership.

Cuts in/Conditions on Bilateral Aid

-- Have differences with Russians on important areas. Working hard to resolve
these

-- But our assistance advances critical U.S. interests. It helps reformers succeed
in building a
democracy and a market economy, and it helps reduce nuclear threat to U.S. Not
in o
ur interest to cut
this assistance.

Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement

-- Understand Russia has concerns about NATO enlargement. Intend to manage
enlargem
ent

process in deliberate, transparent manner that threatens no country and strengthens security and stability of Europe as a whole.

-- Russia a key player in building stable, undivided Europe. Our goal is to develop NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with NATO's process of taking in new members. Robust NATO-Russia relationship in interests of U.S., Europe and Russia.

Iran Reactor Sale

-- President has discussed Bushehr reactor sale with Yeltsin. Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin continuing serious dialogue on issue.

-- Have made clear and continue to stress our opposition to any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Tehran's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

Chechnya

-- While formal Russian-Chechen talks have not resumed, sides conducting informal working meetings. Welcome Chernomyrdin's reaffirmation of commitment to pursue negotiated settlement.

-- Dispute in Chechnya can only be resolved by negotiated settlement. Urge sides to work together to implement military agreement and to find political solution.

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

-- Over the past weeks, the U.S., together with its Allies, has been actively seeking a solution to the CFE flank issue, in Vienna, in Brussels, and in our bilateral discussions.

ù In this context, during the Grachev visit the two sides held extensive discussions on this crucial issue.

ù Grachev sought an informal U.S. reaction to various ideas Russia was considering, in terms of its response in Vienna to the proposal NATO had tabled on September 22.

ù In the course of these discussions, Grachev and Perry reached an understanding that Russia would not propose to exclude from the flank zone -- and thus from the flank limits -- the Leningrad oblast, which contains over 1900 tanks, artillery pieces and armored combat vehicles. For its part, the U.S. agreed to be flexible with regard to other oblasts in the south Russia will propose be exempted from the flank zone.

ù Secretary Perry emphasized that any change to the flank zone can only be implemented if it is approved by all 30 states party to the CFE Treaty.

ù In coordination with NATO Allies, the U.S. now looks forward to a discussion of the Russian proposal with the other CFE states, with the objective of concluding flank negotiations by November 17 -- the date when the flank limits take effect under the treaty.

OSAKA/JAPAN TRIP

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

With deep regret, the President decided this evening to postpone his trip to Japan so that he can deal with the budget crisis in Washington. A few moments ago, the President informed Japanese Prime Minister Murayama of his decision and proposed that the Vice President travel to Japan in his place. The

Prime Minister expressed understanding and welcomed the Vice President's visit.

As the President has said, the budget debate is a critical and defining moment for the future of our country. This weekend will be a crucial period in that debate -- requiring the President's immediate attention. The Republican leadership has indicated its intent to pass and send to the President another unacceptable budget resolution on Friday. The President feels strongly that he must be in the United States to respond to -- and if necessary veto -- this legislation.

The President is determined to keep the process moving forward, to do everything in his power to get a budget from Congress that protects the American people, and to make sure the government opens for business again as soon as possible.

It is unfortunate that this unprecedented political crisis has compelled the President to cancel his trip. The President considers our relationship with Japan and the other nations of the Asia Pacific region to be of great importance to the American people -- and that is why he has asked the Vice President to represent him at the APEC Summit, subject to concurrence by the other APEC member economies.

At the APEC Summit, the President expects the Vice President to continue the U.S. drive for open trade and markets in Asia that the President began in Seattle two years ago. More than half of America's trade is with the nations of this region. It sustains more than 3 million jobs here at home. The President's vision of open trade throughout Asia by 2020 is taking shape -- and the Vice President is expected to discuss with the APEC leaders the next steps to be taken to make that vision a reality.

In Japan, the Vice President will praise the remarkable partnership for progress that the United States and Japan have built over the past fifty years and look ahead to the next half century of cooperation. He will reaffirm our

commitment to keep our alliance strong and adapt it to meet new challenges -- like the spread of nuclear weapons, terrorism, and international crime and drug trafficking.

He will also review the progress we have made with Japan on trade over the past two and a half years and urge further efforts to open Japan's economy to our products. The twenty trade agreements this Administration has already signed with Japan are making a real difference to people on both sides of the Pacific. For the American people, they have meant more exports and more jobs. For the Japanese people, they have meant greater choice and lower prices.

It is regrettable that Congress' failure to pass a budget that protects the American people, keeps our government open, and keeps our country out of default has compelled the President to cancel his trip. The Vice President will carry on our work to make the American people more secure and open markets for American workers and businesses.

OKINAWA

It's important to distinguish between the justified emotional outpouring resulting from the tragic incident on Okinawa and the more fundamental issue of continued Japanese support for the US-Japan security alliance.

While I don't believe it's appropriate for me to comment any further about the incident itself while the trial is ongoing, I should point out that every senior American official, from President Clinton, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale on down, has publicly expressed regret over this

incident.

ù In terms of underlying support for the security relationship, that certainly remains strong, both within the Japanese Government and the Japanese people as a whole.

ù Just last week, Secretary Perry visited Japan, during which he and his Japanese counterpart, Minister Eto, held a press conference in which they both publicly expressed their support for the continued presence of 47,000 US troops in Japan.

ù At a subsequent meeting, Prime Minister Murayama indicated to Secretary Perry that he agreed with this.

The bottom line is that the Japanese Government is not asking us to reduce our troop presence, because it recognizes that this presence is crucial to Japan's own interest in the preservation of peace and stability in Asia.

ALGERIAN ELECTIONS

ù The U.S. will withhold comment on the elections until the results are known and a more complete judgment can be made on how they were conducted.

SAUDI ARABIA BOMBING AFTERMATH

Q: Have you identified the perpetrators of the bombing yet?

A: The full resources of the US government are being brought to bear on this investigation and we are determined to do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators are identified and brought to justice.

However, the investigation is at a very early stage and we are not going to

specula
te on who may be
responsible.

Q: What do you know about the Islamic Movement for Change, which claimed
responsibil
ity for
the attack?

A: A number of groups have claimed responsibility for the attack. We are
investigat
ing all of these
claims.

We are aware of the IMC and its stated opposition to the US presence in the
Persian
Gulf.

Q: What security measures are being taken to guard US personnel and facilities in
Sa
udi Arabia?

A: The Saudi government and US agencies have responded quickly and
effectively to im
prove
security for US personnel and facilities, both government and private, throughout
th
e Kingdom.

(If pressed:) I don't want to get into the details of the new security arrangement
s. That would be
counterproductive.

Q: What contact has there been between the USG and the Saudi government?

A: Ambassador Mabus and his staff have been in constant contact with Saudi
officials
at all levels,
including King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah.

At his meeting with the King, Ambassador Mabus passed on the President's
appreciati
on for the
tremendous effort the Saudis have made in the wake of the bombing.

Although Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar was not in the US at the time of the
bombin
g, we have been
in contact with him and he has been helping expedite the movement of US
equipment an

d personnel both to
and from the Kingdom.

Q: Do you believe that the security of U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia was lax
befor
e the bombing?

A: I think we should wait to hear what the experts say before making a judgment
on t
hat.

MEPFA EXTENSION

ù President signed fourth short-term extension of Middle East Peace Facilitation
Act
(MEPFA) on November 13;
POTUS subsequently signed a Presidential Determination exercising his
authority unde
r the Act to find that it is
in the national interest to suspend certain legislative restrictions on the PLO thro
ugh December 31, expiration
date of this extension.

ù This is the fourth short-term MEPFA extension. The last extension expired
October
31; Congress did not pass
the new authority until November 10. The only practical effect of the lapse in
susp
ension of restrictions on
the PLO was the closing of the PLO office in DC; that office will now be able to
reo
pen.

ù Aid to the Palestinians was not affected; no disbursements were planned during
the
period of the lapse. Our
diplomatic exchanges with the PLO are unaffected by the MEPFA .

ù Administration supports long-term extension of MEPFA; such an extension is
current
ly part of the Foreign
Ops Appropriations Bill, awaiting further Hill action.

HAITI

Q: What is your comment on the unsettling events of the past week in Haiti?

[Parliamentarian

Feuille's murder last Tuesday, a Haitian police raid on former President Avril's home

that evening,

President Aristide's emotional remarks at Feuille's funeral (Feuille was a second cousin), and resultant

crowd violence in Les Cayes, Gonaives and Port-au-Prince through the weekend.]

A: The events of the past week show that we cannot let down our vigilance with respect to Haiti.

We believe that the violence over the weekend was the result of a unique and unfortunate

combination of

events, and not part of any larger pattern or long-term trend. The situation is now quiet throughout the

country. Senior U.S. and UN officials are working closely with President Aristide

and his government to

calm popular emotion and continue planning toward economic reform, a

Presidential election in

December/January, and inauguration of a new President in February.

Q: What is your comment on last week's Post report of a "first overt U.S. display of

disapproval

of Aristide's management..." by the White House with respect to Haiti?

A: It is true that approximately \$4.6 million of \$45 million total in Balance of Payments support

money has not been released by USAID to the Government of Haiti.

This was not the result of any recent decision, or guidance from the White House.

The Balance of Payments support treaty that was signed with Haiti last April set the

rtain
conditions for each tranche of the money to be released.

Because of the recent change in government (resignation of PM Michel), Haiti has not been able to achieve all of the conditions specified for the last tranche. By law therefore, the money could not be released.

Haiti's new government was sworn-in last week. Expect forward progress when it gets its feet on the ground.

USG has been working closely with President Aristide and his government to encourage and assist their economic transition. Agencies: USAID, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture

NIGERIA

Dutch Shell Decision

Background: On November 10, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) announced that it would not support the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project in Nigeria. However, Dutch Shell, the technical leader of the project, which involves the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, AGIP of Italy, and Elf of France, has decided to move ahead with the \$3.5 billion project.

Q: What is the United States reaction to the Dutch Shell decision to move forward with the LNG project in Nigeria?

A: We understand that the Dutch Shell Group announced that it intends to invest in a \$3.5 billion

natural gas operation in Nigeria that will likely begin producing gas early in the year 2000.

We believe that the timing of this decision is unfortunate and that now is not the time for this investment to go forward.

The United States, along with other nations of the world, is outraged over the gravely flawed judicial process which led to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others accused of murder last May. These executions demonstrate to the world the Abacha regime's contempt for even the most basic international norms and universal standards of human rights.

We have repeatedly urged the Government of Nigeria to establish a democratic government which respects the human rights of all of its citizens. In the longer term, it is in the interest of all private sector firms to see a politically stable Nigeria.

Q: Comment on the EU's decision NOT to impose an oil embargo on Nigerian oil. What about a unilateral U.S. oil embargo?

A: We do not rule out the possibility of oil sanctions.

The U.S. continues to believe that multilateral oil sanctions would be more effective than unilateral sanctions because there is a ready market for its high-quality crude.

Executions Confirmed

Background: Nigeria's Provisional Ruling Council executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his colleagues last Friday for the alleged murder of four Ogoni leaders in 1994. Both the President and the State Department previously issued statements condemning the verdicts and sentences which resulted from a gravely flawed judicial process conducted outside the traditional judicial system and without regard for due process.

The United States has recalled its ambassador for consultations, has issued a direct protest to the Nigerian government, has banned all military sales and maintenance work, and will continue its strict visa restrictions against military members of the Nigerian government. Other measures remain under review.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The United States strongly condemns the execution today of environmental and human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others accused of murder in May 1994. These executions underscore the Abacha regime's refusal to abide by the most basic international norms and universal standard of human rights.

The United States extends its sincere condolences to the families of those executed. Their deaths will be mourned by friends and supporters around the world.

The United States has consistently deplored the inherent denial of due process afforded by trials conducted before special tribunals outside of the traditional judicial system. This latest action follows the Government of Nigeria's unacceptable transition to democratic governance announced on October 1. We continue to be deeply troubled by the lack of respect for human rights, prompt and credible steps taken by the Government of Nigeria to return to democracy.

In response to these executions, President Clinton has recalled Ambassador Carrington from Lagos for consultations. The White House has been in contact with the Nigerian Ambassador to the U.S. Zubair Mahmud Kazaure, to protest the executions. In addition, the President has banned the sale and repair of military

goods and services to Nigeria and ordered the extension of visa restrictions to make all Nigerian military officers and their families subject to exclusion from the United States. Henceforth, Nigeria n Government officials visiting the United Nations, the international financial institutions and IMF will be require d to remain within 25 miles of the institution. Other measures remain under review including oil sanctions.

The United States reiterates its call on the Nigerian leadership to effect a swift and credible transition to a stable, civilian democracy that respects human rights.

###

CIA

Q: Is Deutch trying to restructure CIA to benefit Defense?

A: No. A number of studies are currently underway examining the roles, missions, and organization of the Intelligence Community. These studies, albeit not yet complete, and actions that John Deutch is taking independently, are all designed to improve the efficiency and enhance the capabilities of the Intelligence Community as a whole. Allegations that CIA is some how losing influence because of recent events are simply untrue.

POW/MIA

Background: Defense DPMO (Defense POW/MIA Office) has a new work plan that sets new priorities for resolving cases. 567 have been declared "unrecoverable." The Hill is being

briefed
today. CNN and
Washington Times have reported this.

ù This is in no way a legal finding nor is it a final declaration. Most cases remain open.

ù Is an evaluation based on review of and nature of the evidence. Most lost at sea or in way that suggests little or no chance of ever recovering remains.

ù A special panel must review this finding and make a final decision. That panel not yet formed. Refer to DPMO.

ù All USG efforts continue to repatriate remains and resolve discrepancies with the Vietnamese. This includes a trilateral commission with Laos to resolve cases there.

START SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

Q: Has the United States agreed to "relax" START Treaty constraints to allow the export of ICBMs and SLBMs from Russia and Ukraine as space launch vehicles, as reported on November 10 by the Washington Times?

A: No, the story is not correct and in fact has it backwards.

Rather than making a "concession" on START or "relaxing" the Treaty, the U.S. secured an important success by persuading Russia to reaffirm and uphold the manner in which the Treaty as originally negotiated applies to space launch vehicles.

Specifically, the United States, along with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, recently reaffirmed that space launch vehicles that use the first stage of a START Treaty-limited ICBM or

r SLBM are subject to all relevant Treaty provisions -- including the ban on transferring such missiles to other countries.

The START Treaty does not prohibit a Treaty party from establishing a space launch facility outside its national territory. However, the Treaty party must maintain ownership and control of both the Treaty-limited missiles and launchers at all times, and cannot sell them to another party.

[If asked about the "U.S. Government White Paper" that is extensively quoted in the article]

We are not aware of the "white paper" that is referred to in the article.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Background: Monday's Washington Post reports that SFRC Chairman Jesse Helms has concerns about the Chemical Weapons Convention and is prepared to block its ratification "indefinitely."

The story notes that enthusiasm for the treaty is waning in other countries because of the U.S. failure to ratify and states that if the treaty falls by the wayside, it would represent a triumph of one determined legislator over a decade-long bipartisan consensus in support of the treaty.

Q: Do you have any comments on the story in today's Washington Post about ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention?

A: Chemical weapons proliferation poses a serious danger to U.S. national security and that of our friends and allies. The Chemical Weapons Convention will make it harder and more costly for

proliferators and terrorists alike to acquire chemical weapons by outlawing the development, production, stockpiling and use.

Q: Aides to Senator Helms say that Senator is prepared to block ratification "indefinitely". What is your view of this?

A: The CWC has enjoyed and continues to enjoy strong bipartisan support in the U.S. It was negotiated under President Reagan, concluded and signed under President Bush, and submitted to the Senate by President Clinton.

In recent weeks, Senators Lugar, Nunn, Kassebaum, Glenn, Biden, Levin and others have pressed the case for CWC ratification. They have been joined by an impressive group of former Administration officials, including Brent Scowcroft, Larry Eagleburger and Ron Lehman.

The strong support for the CWC on the part of these and other top officials underscores a simple fact: the CWC is in our national security interests, and we need it now.

Q: What will happen to the CWC if the U.S. does not ratify?

A: To date, 159 countries have signed the CWC and 42 have ratified it. However, many other countries are waiting and watching to see if the U.S. will ratify before completing

their own ratification efforts. U.S. leadership is critical to reaching the threshold of 65 ratifications necessary to bring the CWC into force.

Q: Why hasn't the Senate ratified yet?

A: Since November 1993, when the CWC was submitted to the Senate, nine hearings have been

held on the treaty, the last of which was in August 1994.

In September 1995, the Senate adopted a "Sense of the Senate" amendment calling for prompt ratification of CWC (and START II).

As far as obstacles to Senate action are concerned, we would simply note that the full Senate ought to be given the opportunity to carry out its Constitutional responsibility to provide its advice and consent to ratification.

The CWC should be debated on its merits, fully and openly by the entire Senate. We should not allow this vital agreement to slip away simply by default -- because the full Senate was denied the opportunity to debate the Convention fully and openly.

We are confident that, if given the chance, the Senate will come to the same conclusion as the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations -- that the CWC is in our national security interests and should be ratified promptly.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 29 November 95 14:33

FROM Litwak, Robert C.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Euratom -- memo of transmittal to Congress[UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Andricos, George M.
Baker, James E.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Kreczko, Alan J.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

Alan or Jamie, Bill or Gordie -- Could I get comment/concurrence on the attached memos that transmit the EURATOM Agreement's confidential attachment to the SFRC and the HIRC. This piece (because it is classified) must go directly to the committees from Exec Sec, while the Agreement itself is transmitted by the Executive Clerk.

[[8348ADD1.DOC : 3618 in 8348ADD1.DOC]][[8348ADDA.DOC : 3619 in 8348ADDA.DOC]][[8438ADD.DOC : 3620 in 8438ADD.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

29 November 95 14:15

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

8348ADD1.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
8348ADD-ON1
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: European Union
Reason: 1.5b
Declassify On: 1/6, X5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 29, 1995

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2018
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 2/18/2018
2006-1363-F

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN

FROM: ROBERT LITWAK

SUBJECT: EURATOM Agreement: Transmittal of
Confidential Attachment to Congress

Attached at Tab I are memoranda transmitting the Agreement's
confidential attachment (listing EURATOM facilities covered under the
Agreement) to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House
International Relations Committee.

Concurrence by: Alan Kreczko, William
Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed memoranda at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memoranda to SFRC and HIRC
Tab A Confidential Attachment to EURATOM Agreement

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

29 November 95 14:15

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

8348ADDA.DOC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: European Union

Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 1.6, X5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
CHAIRMAN
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Confidential Attachment to the EURATOM
Agreement

Pursuant to Presidential Determination 96-4, I hereby transmit the confidential attachment to the proposed Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The attachment lists EURATOM facilities covered under the Agreement and was classified at the request of the European Union.

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Confidential Attachment to EURATOM Agreement

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

29 November 95 14:15

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

8438ADD.DOC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: European Union

Reason: 1.5b

Declassify On: 1.6, X5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JESSE HELMS
CHAIRMAN
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Confidential Attachment to the EURATOM
Agreement

Pursuant to Presidential Determination 96-4, I hereby transmit the confidential attachment to the proposed Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The attachment lists EURATOM facilities covered under the Agreement and was classified at the request of the European Union.

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Confidential Attachment to EURATOM Agreement

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 December 95 12:21

FROM Maxfield, Nancy H.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]Letters on 9062

TO Baker, Jane E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Gray, Wendy
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY [[9062NG.DOC : 3074 in 9062NG.DOC]][[9062JH.DOC : 3075 in 9062JH.DOC]]
Sorry about that.

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 20 December 95 15:6

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 9062NG.DOC

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2373(c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question. The previous submission covered progress through September 30, 1995. The current submission covers the period October 1, 1995, through November 30, 1995.

The focus of my Administration's activity during this reporting period was preparations for the December trip to Cyprus of my

special emissary, Richard Beattie. Mr. Beattie's travel reflects my interest in intensifying USG efforts to achieve progress towards an intercommunal settlement. His ongoing work supports the UN-led effort to attain lasting peace on the island. Consultations with the parties confirmed that security has not diminished as a key concern for both sides.

With respect to Cyprus' EU accession process, in discussions with European officials and others, my representatives continued to urge that the EU engage both communities regularly to explain what EU membership would mean for a federal Cyprus state. Such dialogue would encourage the parties to use the period before accession negotiations to establish a bizonal, bicomunal federation that could ultimately enter the EU.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speak of the House of
Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

20 December 95 15:5

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

9062JH.DOC

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2373(c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question. The previous submission covered progress through September 30, 1995. The current submission covers the period

October 1, 1995, through November 30, 1995.

The focus of my Administration's activity during this reporting period was preparations for the December trip to Cyprus of my special emissary, Richard Beattie. Mr. Beattie's travel reflects my interest in intensifying USG efforts to achieve progress towards an intercommunal settlement. His ongoing work supports the UN-led effort to attain lasting peace on the island. Consultations with the parties confirmed that security has not diminished as a key concern for both sides.

With respect to Cyprus' EU accession process, in discussions with European officials and others, my representatives continued to urge that the EU engage both communities regularly to explain what EU membership would mean for a federal Cyprus state. Such dialogue would encourage the parties to use the period before accession negotiations to establish a bizonal, bicomunal federation that could ultimately enter the EU.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 24 January 96 11:51
FROM Bass, Peter E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT revised solana letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Schmidt, John R.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
[[8827LTR.DOC : 2865 in 8827LTR.DOC]]

Above should contain in blue the revisions suggested by TL to the letter.
After you put them in, please shoot it over and we'll get the letters out
as soon as possible. Thanks

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 24 January 96 11:48
**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** 8827LTR.DOC

Dear Senator Coverdell:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about the selection of Javier Solana as the new Secretary General of NATO.

Secretary General Javier is a staunch supporter of NATO who brings impressive skills to his new job. His strong commitment to the transatlantic relationship and to an enduring U.S. role in Europe was amply on display during his tenure as Spanish Foreign Minister. Both as Foreign Minister, and now as NATO Secretary General, he has championed a strong Alliance role in Bosnia, earning high marks for leadership in overseeing the IFOR deployment there. He is also a strong supporter of NATO enlargement, fully sharing our view that enlargement is the most important contribution the Alliance can make to creating a united and integrated Europe.

Although he and other members of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), and many ordinary Spanish citizens as well, initially harbored doubts about NATO membership in the early 1980's, these doubts evolved into strong support during the period after PSOE came to power in 1982. For well over a decade now, NATO membership has been now warmly embraced by all segments of Spanish political opinion. Secretary General Solana's own support for the Alliance is beyond question. In addition, he has strong U.S. connections, having studied and taught here. He is a real friend of the United States and I believe we are lucky to have him as Secretary General at NATO.

I have invited Secretary General Solana to meet with me on February 20 during his upcoming visit to Washington. We will be discussing the full range of NATO issues. He will also be available for meetings with members of Congress and I would strongly encourage you to arrange to see him if at all possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Paul Coverdell
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1004

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about the selection of Javier Solana as the new Secretary General of NATO.

Let me assure that you that, in deciding to support Solana for the post of Secretary General, we carefully considered his previous opposition to NATO membership for Spain as well as his current strong support for the organization. As you know, NATO membership was a controversial issue in Spain during the early 1980s. The subsequent Spanish experience with NATO membership has been wholly

positive and it is now warmly embraced by all segments of Spanish political opinion.

Whatever his previous views may have been, we are convinced that Secretary General Solana is strongly committed to the NATO Alliance and to maintenance of a strong U.S. role in the organization. We also believe he has the political skills and personal qualities necessary to be a highly effective Secretary General. He has already earned high marks for leadership in overseeing the NATO IFOR deployment to Bosnia. We look forward to a continuing close relationship with him as NATO continues its progress toward enlargement and further adapts itself to the changes of the post-Cold War world.

I have invited Secretary General Solana to meet with me on February 20 during his upcoming visit to Washington. We will be discussing the full range of NATO issues. He will also be available for meetings with members of Congress and I would encourage you to arrange to see him if at all possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1601

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about the selection of Javier Solana as the new Secretary General of NATO.

Let me assure that you that, in deciding to support Solana for the post of Secretary General, we carefully considered his previous opposition to NATO membership for Spain as well as his current strong support for the organization. As you know, NATO membership was a controversial issue in Spain during the early 1980s. The

subsequent Spanish experience with NATO membership has been wholly positive and it is now warmly embraced by all segments of Spanish political opinion.

Whatever his previous views may have been, we are convinced that Secretary General Solana is strongly committed to the NATO Alliance and to maintenance of a strong U.S. role in the organization. We also believe he has the political skills and personal qualities necessary to be a highly effective Secretary General. He has already earned high marks for leadership in overseeing the NATO IFOR deployment to Bosnia. We look forward to a continuing close relationship with him as NATO continues its progress toward enlargement and further adapts itself to the changes of the post-Cold War world.

I have invited Secretary General Solana to meet with me on February 20 during his upcoming visit to Washington. We will be discussing the full range of NATO issues. He will also be available for meetings with members of Congress and I would encourage you to arrange to see him if at all possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Senator McCain:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about the selection of Javier Solana as the new Secretary General of NATO.

Let me assure that you that, in deciding to support Solana for the post of Secretary General, we carefully considered his previous opposition to NATO membership for Spain as well as his current strong support for the organization. As you know, NATO membership

was a controversial issue in Spain during the early 1980s. The subsequent Spanish experience with NATO membership has been wholly positive and it is now warmly embraced by all segments of Spanish political opinion.

Whatever his previous views may have been, we are convinced that Secretary General Solana is strongly committed to the NATO Alliance and to maintenance of a strong U.S. role in the organization. We also believe he has the political skills and personal qualities necessary to be a highly effective Secretary General. He has already earned high marks for leadership in overseeing the NATO IFOR deployment to Bosnia. We look forward to a continuing close relationship with him as NATO continues its progress toward enlargement and further adapts itself to the changes of the post-Cold War world.

I have invited Secretary General Solana to meet with me on February 20 during his upcoming visit to Washington. We will be discussing the full range of NATO issues. He will also be available for meetings with members of Congress and I would encourage you to arrange to see him if at all possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Snowe:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about the selection of Javier Solana as the new Secretary General of NATO.

Let me assure that you that, in deciding to support Solana for the post of Secretary General, we carefully considered his previous opposition to NATO membership for Spain as well as his current

strong support for the organization. As you know, NATO membership was a controversial issue in Spain during the early 1980s. The subsequent Spanish experience with NATO membership has been wholly positive and it is now warmly embraced by all segments of Spanish political opinion.

Whatever his previous views may have been, we are convinced that Secretary General Solana is strongly committed to the NATO Alliance and to maintenance of a strong U.S. role in the organization. We also believe he has the political skills and personal qualities necessary to be a highly effective Secretary General. He has already earned high marks for leadership in overseeing the NATO IFOR deployment to Bosnia. We look forward to a continuing close relationship with him as NATO continues its progress toward enlargement and further adapts itself to the changes of the post-Cold War world.

I have invited Secretary General Solana to meet with me on February 20 during his upcoming visit to Washington. We will be discussing the full range of NATO issues. He will also be available for meetings with members of Congress and I would encourage you to arrange to see him if at all possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1903

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter expressing concern about the selection of Javier Solana as the new Secretary General of NATO.

Let me assure that you that, in deciding to support Solana for the post of Secretary General, we carefully considered his previous

opposition to NATO membership for Spain as well as his current strong support for the organization. As you know, NATO membership was a controversial issue in Spain during the early 1980s. The subsequent Spanish experience with NATO membership has been wholly positive and it is now warmly embraced by all segments of Spanish political opinion.

Whatever his previous views may have been, we are convinced that Secretary General Solana is strongly committed to the NATO Alliance and to maintenance of a strong U.S. role in the organization. We also believe he has the political skills and personal qualities necessary to be a highly effective Secretary General. He has already earned high marks for leadership in overseeing the NATO IFOR deployment to Bosnia. We look forward to a continuing close relationship with him as NATO continues its progress toward enlargement and further adapts itself to the changes of the post-Cold War world.

I have invited Secretary General Solana to meet with me on February 20 during his upcoming visit to Washington. We will be discussing the full range of NATO issues. He will also be available for meetings with members of Congress and I would encourage you to arrange to see him if at all possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-4001

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 06 February 96 09:51
FROM Dohse, Fred J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: POTUS Visit with Troops Returning from Haiti [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Seaton, James B.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

Thanks.

From: Seaton, James B.
 To: Dohse, Fred J.
 CC: /R, Record at A1
 Subject: FW: POTUS Visit with Troops Returning from Haiti [UNCLASSIFIED]
 Date: Tuesday, February 06, 1996 09:16 AM

Fred,

Ft. Polk, Louisiana is probably the only other base where it wouldn't be a real stretch to conduct a Haiti event. The cavalry troops who were among the last units in Haiti are based there. Still, though, Ft. Bragg is the ideal choice as it represents the continuum of Special Forces involvement, home of the 82nd, etc. (I am sending the memo up this morning that gives some background info on North Carolina.)

Semper Fidelis, Jim

From: Cicio, Kristen K.
 To: Dohse, Fred J.
 CC: /R, Record at A1; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
 Subject: FW: POTUS Visit with Troops Returning from Haiti [UNCLASSIFIED]
 Date: Monday, February 05, 1996 10:45 AM

Fred,

Sandy asks... "Is there another base besides Bragg that would be appropriate? Much stronger than WH event."

Kris

From: Dohse, Fred J.
 To: Cicio, Kristen K.

CC: /R, Record at A1; Sens, Andrew D.
Subject: FW: POTUS Visit with Troops Returning from Haiti [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, February 02, 1996 12:36 PM

PLEASE PASS TO SANDY BERGER

Sandy, want to make you aware that Scheduling has asked us to explore the option of bringing a representative group of troops, who participated in the operations in Haiti, to the White House vice going to Fort Bragg to see them on their own turf. Political Affairs (Sosnik & Hancox) are opposed to going to North Carolina because it is Jesse Helms' territory and is not one of our targeted states. I've asked Jim Seaton to quietly ask DoD their view on the feasibility of bringing a group to the White House.

From: Dohse, Fred J.
To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
CC: /R, Record at A1; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: POTUS Visit with Troops Returning from Haiti [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Friday, February 02, 1996 10:20 AM

Jim, the President's schedule may not allow him to make a trip to North Carolina to see the troops coming back from Haiti. With the political season coming on strong and North Carolina not being a state that is already targeted for a POTUS visit, adding a Fort Bragg stop to the schedule will be hard, not impossible, but hard. No final decision has been made, but Scheduling has asked if the option of bringing a group to the White House is a possibility in place of the President going to them. Would you please quietly ask DoD if this is feasible in their opinion and how many people do they feel should come to the White House to make the event meaningful.