

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Japan-U.S. / Okinawa Base Issue (4 pages)	09/27/1996	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: No Subject Found [World Summary] (5 pages)	09/29/1996	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: Digest Executive Edition 187-96 (13 pages)	10/01/1996	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: Diet Election, Okinawa (9 pages)	10/01/1996	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: Support Cable for East Asia Brief 96/231 (3 pages)	10/02/1996	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Re: September 17 Meeting - Special Action Committee on Okinawa (11 pages)	10/02/1996	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: SACO [Special Action Committee on Okinawa], Guidelines (5 pages)	10/03/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1996 - 10/03/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1883

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
LINE1: OAAUZYUW RUEHKO A8999 2710132-UUUU--RHEHAAA.
LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3: O 270132Z SEP 96
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
OSRI: RUEHKO
DTG: 270132Z SEP 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO: RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1235
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7665
INFO: RUEBBEA/USDOT WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUYNJDK/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RHHMAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N5//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUCPDOG/USDOC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
SUBJ: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 27
TEXT:

////////////////// INCOMPLETE MESSAGE //////////////////

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 008999

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR
EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA
WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS;
USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA;
COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 27

TOP HEADLINES:

ASAHI: LOWER HOUSE WILL BE DISSOLVED TODAY; ELECTION TO
BE ANNOUNCED ON OCT. 8 WITH ELECTION DAY SET FOR OCT. 20;
FIRST GENERAL ELECTION UNDER NEW ELECTION SYSTEM

NIHON KEIZAI: LOWER HOUSE TO BE DISSOLVED TODAY WITH
ELECTION ANNOUNCED ON OCT. 8 AND ELECTION DAY SET FOR

OCT. 20; CONSUMPTION TAX, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM TO COME UP AS CAMPAIGN ISSUES; FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT TO BE QUESTIONED

TOKYO SHIMBUN: DISSOLUTION OF LOWER HOUSE TODAY; DECISION LEFT ENTIRELY TO PRIME MINISTER'S JUDGMENT AT RULING-PARTY HEADS TALKS; THIRD DISSOLUTION AT OUTSET OF DIET SESSION SINCE END OF WORLD WAR; ELECTION DAY TO BE SET FOR OCT. 20

MAINICHI: LOWER HOUSE TO BE DISSOLVED AT OUTSET OF EXTRAORDINARY DIET SESSION TODAY; PRIME MINISTER CONVEYS HIS INTENTION IN MEETING OF THREE PARTY HEADS

YOMIURI: LOWER HOUSE TO BE DISSOLVED TODAY; PRIME MINISTER STATES JUDGMENT WILL BE GIVEN TO COALITION GOVERNMENT

SANKEI: SURVEY OF "NEXT LOWER-HOUSE ELECTION": LDP LIKELY TO SECURE 200 SEATS; SHINSHINTO'S 130 OR SO SEATS; SDP, SAKIGAKE PLAYING A LOSING GAME; UNAFFILIATED VOTERS HOLD KEY FOR DEMOCRATIC PARTY (TRANSLATION BELOW)

TROUBLE OVER THE SENKAKUS HAS MADE GOVERNMENT NERVOUS ABOUT HOW TO RESPOND (NIHON KEIZAI - PAGE 8)

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WILL LIKELY BE UNDER EVEN MORE PRESSURE NOW OVER HOW TO RESPOND TO THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS. SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVE TAKEN THE VIEW THAT THE JAPAN-CHINA FOREIGN MINISTERIAL ON THE 24TH HELPED TO "TONE DOWN A SHOWDOWN MOOD" IN JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS. CHINA HAS STIFFENED ITS STANCE, TOUCHED OFF BY THE PROTEST ACTIVITIES IN HONG KONG AND TAIWAN. BUT IF THE CASUALTY THIS TIME (ONE HONG KONG PROTESTOR DROWNED WHEN HE JUMPED INTO THE WATERS OFF THE SENKAKUS) HELPS AGGRAVATES THE ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT IN HONG KONG, THE ISSUE MIGHT WELL UP INTO A DIPLOMATIC PROBLEM, AFFECTING THE JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. THE GOVERNMENT HAS CALLED FOR THE SELF-RESTRAINT OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT AND AUTHORITIES OF TAIWAN THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, BUT IT REMAINS UNABLE TO COME UP WITH A DECISIVE MOVE TO PREVENT THE CURRENT SITUATION FROM WORSENING.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESS OFFICER HASHIMOTO YESTERDAY AFTERNOON RELEASED AN URGENT STATEMENT THAT EMPHASIZED: THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT (1) RESCUED PROTEST ACTIVISTS OF HONG KONG FROM A HUMANITARIAN STANDPOINT; AND (2) URGED THEIR SELF-RESTRAINT TO PREVENT THE RECURRENCE OF A SIMILAR INCIDENT. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CONVEYED THE OUTLINE OF THE INCIDENT ALSO TO HONG KONG, TAIWAN, CHINA, AND BRITAIN, SEEKING THEIR COOPERATION TO PREVENT SUCH AN INCIDENT.

FOREIGN MINISTER YUKIHIKO IKEDA IN THEIR TALKS ON THE 24TH TOLD CHINESE DEPUTY PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN IN NEW YORK, "JAPAN HAS HAD TO TAKE STEPS OF CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY (IN VIEW OF DOMESTIC LAW OVER THE

SENKAKU ISLANDS ISSUE)." THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFIRMED THE NEED FOR "BOTH SIDES TO MAKE EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECT OF THE INCIDENT ON THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP."

ALL THE MORE BECAUSE THE DROWNING OCCURRED JUST AFTER THEIR MEETING, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS BEEN FRUSTRATED. ANOTHER FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL, COMMENTING ON THE UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 07 TOKYO 008999

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 27

CONSTRUCTION OF A LIGHTHOUSE BY A JAPANESE POLITICAL GROUP, WHICH TRIGGERED THE SENKAKU ISLAND ISSUE, STRESSED, "WE HAVE TRANSMITTED TO HONG KONG AND TAIWAN THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT SUPPORT THEIR MOVES," BUT AS FOR THE MINISTRY'S RESPONSE, HE ADDED, "THERE WILL BE NO WAY BUT TO PUT APPROVAL (OF THE LIGHTHOUSE) ON HOLD."

PRIME MINISTER WORRIED THAT SENKAKUS WILL IMPACT ON JAPANQS DIPLOMACY (YOMIURI - PAGE 1)

REACTING TO THE INCIDENT WHERE A MALE HONG KONG ACTIVIST DROWNED IN THE SEAS NEAR THE SENKAKU ISLANDS, THE GOVERNMENT IS MULLING HOW TO EASE THE SITUATION. PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO TOLD REPORTERS AT HIS OFFICE LAST EVENING, "I CANNOT SAY THERE WILL BE NO DIPLOMATIC IMPACT." PRIOR TO THIS, CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY KAJIYAMA IN A PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE SAME DAY CALLED FOR A COOL RESPONSE BY CHINA AND HONG KONG TO STOP THE ROW (OVER THE SENKAKUS ISUE) FROM BECOMING FURTHER INFLAMED, SAYING, "IT IS ONLY NATURAL FOR JAPAN TO HAVE A STANCE AND A VIEW. WE WANT THEM TO MAKE A COOL-HEADED RESPONSE." THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MOFA) ALSO ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON A STATEMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESS OFFICER HASHIMOTO THAT EMPHASIZED THE EFFORT THE JAPANESE SIDE MADE FOR RELIEF OPERATIONS. THE STATEMENT GOES, "JAPAN MADE UTMOST EFFORTS TO RESCUE HIM FROM A HUMANITARIAN STANDPOINT, BUT THE END WAS TRAGIC. I FEEL IT WAS REGRETTABLE." MOFA ALSO EXPLAINED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS THE CONTENTS OF THE INCIDENT AND THE JAPANESE SIDE'S RELIEF EFFORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CHINA, HONG KONG AND BRITAIN SO THAT WRONG INFORMATION WOULD NOT BE TRANSMITTED. SUCH EXPLANATIONS WERE MADE TO TAIWAN, WITH WHICH JAPAN HAS NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BY USING THE EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION -- A CONTACT POINT FOR

PRIVATE-SECTOR EXCHANGES.

YOKOTA AIR BASE AIRCRAFT TRACKED BY JAPANESE GROUP TO
INDIAN OCEAN AND EVEN RUSSIA (ASAHI - PAGE 31)

U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT MADE AN ANNUAL TOTAL OF OVER 3,000
TAKEOFFS LAST YEAR FROM THE U.S. FORCES' YOKOTA AIR FORCE
BASE IN TOKYO, AND THEIR OPERATIONS RANGED FROM THE U.S.
MAINLAND TO THE INDIAN OCEAN, REACHING EVEN LOCAL CITIES
IN RUSSIA. THIS FACT WAS LEARNED FROM THE RESULTS OF A
SURVEY CONDUCTED BY A GROUP OF CITIZENS WATCHING THE
BASE. JAPAN AND THE U.S. ARE NOW PROCEEDING WITH THE
WORK OF REDEFINING THE BILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT TO
EXPAND THE SCOPE OF OPERATIONS COVERED BY THE U.S. FORCES
IN JAPAN FROM THE "FAR EAST" TO THE "ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION." IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, IT WAS FOUND AGAIN
THAT THE USFJ BASES HAVE ALREADY BEEN INCLUDED IN GLOBAL
OPERATIONS AS IF TO ANTICIPATE THAT MOVE.

,HE SURVEILLANCE WORK WAS DONE BY FUSSA SHIMIN RENGO
(FUSSA CITIZENS FEDERATION) (REPRESENTED BY YOICHI ENDO,
A MEMBER OF FUSSA CITY'S MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY). THE GROUP
SURVEYED SEVEN AIRCRAFT TYPES INCLUDING C-5 LARGE-SIZE
TRANSPORTS FROM THE U.S. MAINLAND AND OTHER PLACES, IN
ADDITION TO C-130 TRANSPORTS AND C-9 MEDICAL TRANSPORTS
ASSIGNED TO YOKOTA AFB, AND THE GROUP LOOKED INTO THE
SCOPE OF THEIR OPERATIONS AND ANALYZED IT BY CONDUCTING
SUCH ACTIVITIES AS SECURING DATA THAT SHOW THE
DESTINATIONS OF U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT THAT TOOK OFF
YOKOTA AFB BETWEEN JANUARY AND DECEMBER LAST YEAR.

ACCORDING TO THE GROUP'S FACT-FINDINGS, SINGLE AND TEAMED
AIRCRAFT TAKEOFFS TOTALED 3,427 (AT YOKOTA AFB). THOSE
U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT TAKEOFFS INCLUDE 617 AS THE
LARGEST NUMBER OF FLIGHTS BOUND FOR THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA, WHERE THE U.S. 7TH AIR FORCE KEEPING AN EYE ON THE
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)
LOCATES ITS HEADQUARTERS AT ITS BASE AT OSAN AND HAS
ANOTHER BASE AT KUNSAN.

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 07 TOKYO 008999

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RE, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR
EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA
WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS;
USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA;
COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 27

IN ADDITION, THERE WERE TAKEOFFS PRESUMABLY FOR TRAINING
FLIGHTS TO THE AREAS AROUND YOKOTA AFB, AND THERE WERE
ALSO FLIGHTS TO SOME OTHER DESTINATIONS, INCLUDING

FLIGHTS TO OKINAWA WHERE KADENA AFB IS LOCATED, FLIGHTS TO THE U.S. MAINLAND (INCLUDING HAWAII) WHERE THE U.S. AIR FORCE HAS BASES AT SUCH POINTS AS ELMENDORF AND TRAVIS, AND FLIGHTS TO MISAWA AFB IN AOMORI PREFECTURE. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IN JAPAN AND FLIGHTS TO THE U.S., INCLUDING GUAM, AND TO THE ROK ACCOUNTS FOR NEARLY 90 PERCENT OF THE WHOLE.

AS FOR THE REST OF THOSE TAKEOFFS CORRESPONDING TO A LITTLE OVER 10 PERCENT AND NUMBERING 354 FLIGHTS, THE GREATER PART OF THEM WERE BOUND FOR COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, SUCH AS THAILAND, MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE, BUT ALSO INCLUDED FLIGHTS TO DIEGO GARCIA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND ULAN-UDE IN RUSSIA.

DIEGO GARCIA IS A STRATEGIC POINT THAT EYES THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE B-52 BOMBERS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE RECENT ATTACKS ON IRAQ WERE DEPLOYED THERE AS WELL. LARGE-SIZE TRANSPORTS AND OTHER PLANES USED TO FLY THERE ABOUT TWICE A MONTH, AND THE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS TO THAT POINT DOUBLES IF THOSE ON THE ROUTE VIA KADENA AFB ARE INCLUDED.

ULAN-UDE IS NEAR THE BORDER WITH MONGOLIA, AND TRANSPORTS AND OTHER AIRCRAFT HEADED FOR THAT PLACE FIVE TIMES IN TOTAL IN THAT YEAR'S SPRING AND FALL. THE U.S. ONCE CONCLUDED A TREATY WITH THE FORMER SOVIET UNION FOR THE TOTAL ABOLITION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF), AND IN THOSE DAYS THE U.S. ONCE SENT AN INSPECTION TEAM TO ULAN-UDE AS A POINT OF ENTRY INTO THE SOVIET SIDE. THE GROUP PRESUMES THAT THE U.S. STILL CONTINUES IT.

YOKOTA AFB IS WHERE THE USFJ LOCATES ITS HEADQUARTERS. NO FIGHTER UNITS ARE ASSIGNED THERE, BUT YOKOTA IS A STRATEGIC HUB OF THE U.S. FORCES FOR AIRLIFT ACTIVITIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

THE GROUP'S REPRESENTATIVE, ENDO, WHO ANALYZED THOSE FINDINGS, COMMENTS: "THE RANGE OF THEIR OPERATIONS WAS WIDER THAN EXPECTED. THEY USED TO GO BEYOND THE FAR EAST IN PEACETIME, AND THEY WERE TASKED WITH ROLES OTHER THAN BASE-TO-BASE TRANSPORTATION. SO, WE FOUND SUCH FACTS ENDORSE THEIR HAVING BACKED UP THE USFJ'S WIDE-RANGING OPERATIONS ON THE WHOLE."

AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER CONDITIONED OKINAWA REVERSION TO DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (YOMIURI - PAGE 4)

(WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 25, TAKASHI ITAMOTO) ACCORDING TO UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS THAT RECENTLY WERE DECLASSIFIED AND MADE PUBLIC, AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN EDWIN REISCHAUER IN 1965 SUGGESTED TO HIGH-LEVEL U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THE NOTION OF LETTING JAPAN ALLOW U.S. FORCES TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN AND TO USE BASES THERE FREELY IN RETURN FOR THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA.

FOUR YEARS AFTER THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT IDEA, NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RETURN OF OKINAWA REACHED A SETTLEMENT WITH "NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE DEPLOYED THERE, JUST AS IN MAINLAND JAPAN." BUT THIS EVENT PROVES HOW WEIGHTY OKINAWA WAS FOR THE U.S. AS A FORWARD BASE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR.

THE DOCUMENT RELATED TO THAT EVENT IS A MEMORANDUM ON THE DETAILS OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE OKINAWA PROBLEM CONDUCTED ON JULY 16, 1965, AMONG AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER, U.S. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY STANLEY REIZER (?) (AT THE TIME) AND HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 07 TOKYO 008999

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 27
AND DEFENSE.

IN THE MEETING, AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER GAVE HIS ANALYSIS THAT FACED WITH RISING NATIONALISM IN BOTH MAINLAND JAPAN AND OKINAWA, THE U.S.' CONTROL OVER OKINAWA "CANNOT BE MAINTAINED FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS." HE STATED THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN ACTIVELY MAKING A PROPOSAL FOR THE RETURN OF (OKINAWA).

IN THOSE DAYS, CALLS FOR THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA WERE GROWING STRONGER IN JAPAN. ONE MONTH AFTER THE ABOVE MEETING, PRIME MINISTER SATO (AT THE TIME) VISITED OKINAWA FOR THE FIRST TIME AND ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT LATER BECAME WELL-KNOWN: "AS LONG AS THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO MAINLAND JAPAN IS NOT REALIZED, JAPAN'S POST-WAR SETTLEMENT WILL NOT END."

REGARDING A SPECIFIC PLAN AFTER THE REVERSION, AMBASSADOR REISCHAUER STATED: "IF JAPAN GIVES THE U.S. A PROMISE TO ACCEPT DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE COUNTRY AND TO ALLOW, IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY, THE U.S. FORCES' COMMANDER TO EFFECTIVELY PUT THE OKINAWA ISLANDS UNDER THEIR RULE, THEN THE U.S. CAN MAINTAIN U.S. MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWA EVEN AFTER THE ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS AND THE 'COMPLETE SOVEREIGNTY' OVER (OKINAWA) ARE RETURNED TO JAPAN." HE ALSO SHOWED HIS VIEW THAT THE FOLLOWING WOULD BE THE CONDITIONS FOR THE REVERSION: (1) ACCEPTANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND (2) U.S. FORCES' FREE USE OF BASES WITHOUT OBTAINING APPROVAL FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

FURTHERMORE, THE AMBASSADOR AGREED WITH SECRETARY OF THE

ARMY REIZER (?) ON HIS PROPOSAL THAT TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO INSTALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS (IN OKINAWA), A REVERSION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE DRAWN UP TO EXCLUDE OKINAWA FROM THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION, BY NOTING: "THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EXPLICITLY PROHIBIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT SUCH A SORT OF PACT WILL LIKELY BE NECESSARY."

IN ANSWERING TO A QUESTION OF WHETHER THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD ACTUALLY ACCEPT SUCH A PACT, THE AMBASSADOR INDICATED HIS OPTIMISTIC PERSPECTIVE: "IF OKINAWA IS ACTUALLY REVERTED, DEBATES ON JAPAN'S RIGHT TO RECEIVE CONSULTATIONS (FROM THE U.S. IN TIMES OF EMERGENCIES) WILL BECOME OBSCURE."

IN THIS CONNECTION, DEFENSE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN THE EVENT OF CHINA'S FULL-SCALE INTERVENTION IN THE VIETNAM WAR WAS HYPOTHESIZED AND IT WAS ALSO AMONG THE PURPOSES OF U.S. FORCES' USING BASES ON OKINAWA. SINCE IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE VIETNAM WAR WOULD CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME, THE AMBASSADOR WAS SAID TO INSIST THAT SUCH A PACT SHOULD BE CONTINUED INDEFINITELY.

INDUSTRY PROPOSES PLAN TO BUILD OFFSHORE HELIPORT
(NIHON KEIZAI - PAGE 13)

AN OFFSHORE HELIPORT PLAN, COMPILED JOINTLY BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS ONE OPTION FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO REPLACE THE ONE IN U.S. FUTENMA AIR STATION, HAS BEEN REVEALED. THIS PLAN TO CONSTRUCT A HELIPORT WITH FLOATING BOX-TYPE STEEL UNITS WAS DRAFTED BY THE MARINE FLOAT PROMOTION ORGANIZATION (CHAIRMANED BY HIROSHI ONIWA, PRESIDENT OF KAWASAKI HEAVY INDUSTRIES), AN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION COMPOSED OF 99 LEADING COMPANIES OF SHIPBUILDING, STEEL, CONSTRUCTION, AND MARINE ENGINEERING. PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO IS SUPPORTING THE FLOATING-TYPE PIER ENGINEERING METHOD (SEP) THAT REQUIRES HAMMERING THOUSANDS OF STEEL PILES INTO THE SEABED TO SUPPORT A 1,500-METER RUNWAY. BUT THE INDUSTRY IS PLANNING TO WORK ON THE GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT THE FLOATING STEEL-UNIT ENGINEERING METHOD, WHICH IS TECHNICALLY EASIER TO CONSTRUCT AND USE.

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 07 TOKYO 008999

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 27

THE MARINE FLOAT'S PLAN IS TO CONSTRUCT A BREAKWATER 3,800 METERS LONG ON THE SEA 1,700 METERS OFF THE COAST, INSTALL WITHIN THE BREAKWATER A MEGA-FLOAT BASE MEASURING 1,800 METERS BY 600 METERS, AND CONNECT THE HELIPORT WITH THE SHORE WITH A 900-METER PIER.

THE TOTAL SPACE WOULD BE 1.08 MILLION SQUARE METERS. IF ADOPTED, THE REMOVABLE BASE EQUIPPED WITH A 1,500-METER RUNWAY AND SIX HELIPORTS WOULD COST OVER 250 BILLION YEN IN TOTAL. THE RUNWAY CAN ACCOMMODATE U.S. ARMED FORCES' KC-130 PROPELLER-TYPE REFUELING AIRCRAFT NOW STATIONED IN FUTENMA AIR STATION.

IN THE MEANTIME, THE U.S. SIDE HAS BEEN CALLING FOR A MOVABLE OFFSHORE BASE (MOB).

AT THIS POINT, THE MEGA-FLOAT TYPE HAS NOT BEEN ADOPTED AS AN JAPANESE OPTION. THE INDUSTRY, AS A TEST CASE, HAS CONSTRUCTED A 300 M X 60 M EQUIPMENT OFF YOKOSUKA. THE INDUSTRY IS PLANNING TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT THE MEGA-FLOAT SYSTEM WHICH HAS BEEN PROVEN FEASIBLE.

LDP HAS ALREADY LOCKED IN 200 SEATS IN NEXT ELECTION; SHINSHINTO 130 (SANKEI - TOP PLAY)

THE SANKEI HAS CONDUCTED A NATION-WIDE SURVEY THAT ENDED ON SEPTEMBER 26 REGARDING THE NEXT LOWER-HOUSE ELECTION AND ANALYZED EACH PARTY'S CANDIDATES, BOTH THE 300 SINGLE-SEAT PORTION AND THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SECTION. THE RESULTS SHOWED THAT THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP) WAS CONFIDENT TO WIN ABOUT 200 SEATS, THE SINGLE-SEAT AND THE REPRESENTATION PORTION COMBINED; SHINSHINTO (NEW FRONTIER PARTY) ABOUT 130, CENTERING ON URBAN AREAS THANKS TO SOKA GAKKAI'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH; MINSHUTO (DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN) SLIGHTLY LESS THAN 30, MOSTLY INCUMBENTS; JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY (JCP) 15, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE PROPORTIONAL PORTION. ALL PARTIES ARE AIMING AT ADDITIONAL SEATS. NEVERTHELESS, OF THE 300 SINGLE SEATS, NEARLY 100 ARE HIGHLY COMPETITIVE AREAS AND PREDICTING WINNERS IS NOT EASY. IN ADDITION, THE LEVEL OF MINSHUTO'S "NEW-PARTY BREEZE" IS ALSO UNPREDICTABLE. THE FATE OF EACH PARTY DEPENDS LARGELY ON THEIR ELECTION CAMPAIGN FROM NOW ON.

NUMBER OF CANDIDATES INFORMALLY DETERMINED BY EACH PARTY

(AS OF SEPTEMBER 26)

PARTY	SINGLE- SEAT PORTION	PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PORTION	TOTAL
LDP	286	41	327
SHINSHINTO	237	59	296
MINSHUTO	113	7	120
SDP	43	0	43
JCP	299	47	346
SAKIGAKE	13	0	13
OTHER PARTIES	91	0	91

INDEPENDENTS	86	0	86
TOTAL	1168	154	1322

NOTE: OTHER PARTIES INCLUDE DEMOCRATIC REFORM PARTY, JIYU RENGO, AND NEW SOCIAL PARTY. THE PROPORTIONAL PORTION INCLUDES SOME CANDIDATES ALSO RUNNING IN THE SINGLE-SEAT PORTION.

LDP SHOCKED BY DOI CONDITONS: COALITION REASSESSING HIKE IN CONSUMPTION TX (YOMIURI - PAGE 2)

THE RULING COALITION HELD AMEETING OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS ON THE 26TH. INIT, IT WAS DECIDED THAT RE-COORDINATION WOULD B MADE AMONG THE THREE PARTIES ON THE ISSUE OF A EVIEW OF THE PROPOSED CONSUMPTION TAX RATE HIKE HROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AMONG POLICY BOARD AND POLICY UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 07 TOKYO 008999

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 27

WITHIN THE PARTY. A CERTAIN SENIOR MEMBER WHO IS PROMOTING THE FORMATION OF THE NEW PARTY CRITICIZED SUCH A STANCE, "(THE PROPOSAL FOR RETURNING TO A CLEAN-SLATE CONDITION) IS TANTAMOUNT TO A DECLARATION TO BECOME AN OPPOSITION PARTY. IT DOES NOT STAND TO REASON THAT CHAIRMAN MURAYAMA RUNS IN THE RACE UNDER THAT PLEDGE." HIS STATEMENT INDICATES THAT IN CASE THE SDF FIGHTS THE NEXT ELECTION UNDER DOI'S POLICY LINE, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SDP TO FORM AN ALLIANCE WITH THE LDP, WHICH WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE COALITION FRAMEWORK AFTER THE ELECTION.

THE SDP AFFIRMED AT A MEETING OF ITS STAFF MEMBERS COUNCIL HELD ON THE SAME DAY, "WE WILL MAKE EFFORTS TO REALIZE" THE PROPOSAL MADE BY DOI, " IN A CONCRETE MANNER." IN IT, PARTY VICE PRESIDENT KUBO (FINANCE MINISTER) STRESSED, "WE HAVE TO BE AWARE THAT A 5-PERCENT HIKE IS STIPULATED UNDER LAW."

ON THE SAME DAY, MURAYAMA INDICATED TO JOURNALISTS THAT THE SDP IS NOW FIXING ITS ATTENTION ON COUNTERMEASURES TO HELP THE SOCIALLY WEAK AND THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING (THE CONSUMPTION TAX) A WELFARE-PURPOSE TAX, STATING, "THAT (HIKE) HAS ALREADY BEEN DECIDED IN THE DIET." IT IS NOT CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT HIS PERCEPTION IS IN LINE WITH THAT OF DOI, WHO IS CALLING FOR "RETURNING TO A CLEAN-SLATE CONDITION." THE SDP'S PRESENT STATE, WHERE IT IS LOST

ITS REGARD FOR APPEARANCES FOR THE SAKE OF SURVIVAL, HAS APPARENTLY COME INTO THE OPEN LIGHT.

SDP DAMAGED BY SECRETARY GENERAL'S DEFECTION TO NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SANKEI - PAGE 2)

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP) SECRETARY GENERAL KANJU SATO HAS PRESENTED A NOTIFICATION OF BOLTING THE PARTY. IT IS SAID THAT THE REASON FOR HIS ACTION IS HIS HAVING CLASHED WITH PARTY HEAD TOMIICHI MURAYAMA OVER THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE PARTY WOULD ALLOW ITS MEMBERS TO JOIN THE SOON-TO-BE FORMED MINSHUTO (DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN). THERE WAS ALSO THE SEVERE ENVIRONMENT HE WILL FACE IN HOME ELECTORAL DISTRICT. THE SDP HAS BEEN BADLY DAMAGED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPLINTERING OFF FROM THE PARTY.

IN AICHI PREFECTURE, SATO'S HOME CONSTITUENCY, HIROTAKA AKAMATSU, A FORMER SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN (SDPJ) SECRETARY GENERAL, AND SOME OTHER SDP MEMBERS JOINED THE MOVEMENT TO FORM THE MINSHUTO FROM THE EARLY STAGE. UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF AKAMATSU, SDP MEMBERS THERE, EXCEPT FOR SATO AND SOME OTHERS, HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MINSHUTO. IN ADDITION, THE SDP AICHI PREFECTURAL CHAPTER HAS ANNOUNCED SUPPORT FOR THE MINSHUTO.

SEEMINGLY SATO ALSO HAS CONSIDERED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANCE FOR AN SDP-BACKED CANDIDATE TO WIN BOTH IN THE SINGLE-SEAT AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION CONSTITUENCIES.

SATO ONCE BELONGED TO THE NEW PARTY PROMOTION GROUP WITH FORMER SDPJ CHAIRMAN SADA OYAMAHANA, WHO LEFT THE SDPJ AND ESTABLISHED THE CITIZENS GROUP. BUT HE WAS PICKED AS SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE PARTY CONVENTION IN THIS JANUARY. AS A RESULT, "HE HAS BEEN DRIVEN INTO THE MURAYAMA SIDE" (NEW PARTY PROMOTION GROUP MEMBER). HOWEVER, WHILE REMAINING IN THE PARTY, HE INSISTED THAT ALL SDP LOWER-HOUSE MEMBERS BE ALLOWED TO JOIN THE MINSHUTO. HE STRONGLY REACTED TO MURAYAMA'S WITHDRAWAL OF THE PARTY POLICY LINE TO ALLOW PARTY MEMBERS TO JOIN THE MINSHUTO. THIS HAS DEEPENED THEIR ANTAGONISM. CRANE

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(1) EDITORIAL: Growing "Defense Secrecy" Should Be Stopped

ASAHI (Page 5) (Full)
September 27, 1996

A chain of events occurred recently that are noteworthy in terms of facilitating information disclosure.

One of them was Miyagi Prefecture's adoption of a policy decision to go public with its foodstuff expenses in compliance with Sendai District Court's decision. The other was the decision on September 24 by the Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch that turned down the state's move to "halt" the public disclosure of materials related to construction of Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) facilities.

In other words, both the district and high courts rejected "interference" by the state supposedly necessary to defend defense secrecy. Naha's case was particularly noteworthy to see how the state will handle diplomatic and defense information as well as to determine the role of the judiciary in the new age of information disclosure.

Needless to say, defense intelligence is no sacrosanct area in terms of the general public's right to knowledge. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) has about 1.8 million pieces of "agency secrets." Learning lessons from the past War, which the state carried out by shielding military intelligence from the eyes and ears of the general public, we definitely should put a stop to the ever-growing defense secrecy.

"Secrecy" is one sticky area to handle. Once a

precedent is made, the loophole would expand endlessly, allowing the state to proclaim, "This is secret. The reason for that is also secret." But once people catch a glimpse of what is supposed to UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 13 TOKYO 009122

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be secret behind all those thick veils, the pompous logic of secrecy would lose its glow quickly.

The lawsuit over the information disclosure of materials related to SDF facilities was a prime example. The case originated from some materials, including a blueprint, presented to Naha City by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) Naha Branch to construct an anti-submarine strategic center in its Naha base. In reaction, Naha City decided to make public those materials in accordance with its municipal ordinance stipulating information disclosure. The state then filed a lawsuit against Naha City calling for the cancellation of its decision, reasoning, "Such would greatly hinder defense administration."

In turn, the district court handed down a remarkable decision. It not only found the central government's claim illegal but also examined closely whether or not the construction materials in question deserved to be handled as secret.

The court projected the center's overall picture in detail by using the data revealed and turned down the state's argument altogether, concluding, "The plan is weak as a whole, not to mention the (facilities') durability against attacks." It thus ruled that disclosing such information to the public would not cause any harm.

This case has proven that defense secrecy sometimes lacks sound logic when examined closely.

Naha City decided to call for information disclosure regarding the DFAA's project, perceiving, "If it is the central government's decision to construct dangerous military facilities in this vicinity, the citizenry should be informed of the project clearly."

Naha City's decision derived from historical lessons. During the War, information came only through the "Imperial headquarters," and anyone even mentioning the airfield was arrested in violation of the military aircraft protection law. Defense information should be made known to the public and should be overseen by them.

The Administrative Information Disclosure Working Group under the Administrative Reform Council has been in the final stage of drafting an information disclosure law. Amid the JDA's vocal call for "extra caution" in releasing diplomatic and defense information, how to handle the law is already drawing attention.

Secrecy should not be augmented based on such abstract reasons as "serious hindrance to the state's defense administration." Those mapping out an information disclosure law should bear in mind such a perspective.

In addition, we should look into the option of introducing an "in-camera method" that would allow only the judge to see undisclosed documents to
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determine if such should really be kept in secret.

The judiciary has been playing a significant role in facilitating information disclosure. We hope for a greater role of the judiciary to put a stop to the bureaucracy's "secrecy-oriented" mentality.

(2) EDITORIAL: General Election and Japan's Future; Nightmare at South Bronx; Policy Now Needed That Is Never Considered "Broken Promise"

SANKEI (Page 2) (Full)
September 30, 1996

In the 1980 presidential race in the United States, Ronald Reagan, who challenged President Jimmy Carter, scathed, in a debate with him, his Administration for the way it dealt with the

jobless rate and the tax system, and pursued the responsibility of the President for his lack of policy. Arguing how devastated the U.S. was, Reagan added: "I stood at a corner of South Bronx (in New York City) and looked around. What I saw there was a town that was destroyed as if it were bombed. Every window was broken and every building stood like a skeleton. Graffiti were found everywhere, like 'Broken Promise' or 'Hopeless.'"

We have no knowing about whether Japan is following in the U.S.' footsteps, but the scene of miserable streets in the worm-eaten-like city after the burst of the bubble economy in Japan recollect the above argument by Reagan, though there may be no comparison between Japan and the U.S. of those days, when it was in the midst of corruption full of crimes and illegal narcotics deals, the phenomenon which might have been looked on as after-effects of the Vietnam War. Now in Japan, there is a group of homeless people found at West Exit of Shinjuku Station, suicidal acts by schoolboys because of their being bullied at schools, junior and senior high schoolgirls-turned "comfort women," and a tremendous increase in crimes committed by foreigners

People are badly off due to loans and pensioners are suffering from low-interest rates. Companies, despite their efforts to tackle restructuring, have been in the end pressed to shift production bases into other countries. As a result, the unemployment rate alone still remains at a high level.

Unfathomable Thriller

What will become of the financial crisis, the base of the national budget? According to simulations by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), 10 years henceforth the balance of government bonds would rise to 480 trillion yen -- twice as large as the current amount -- even if the nominal growth rate of 3.5 percent continues into the future. And at the mere thought of what it means, we shudder.

It does not mean simply that our grandsons' generation will have to pay the bill. Our country
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would enter into the dangerous waters that could trigger crowding out anytime with the balance of government bonds coming to 68 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). To put it another way, issuing a large number of government bonds would absorb market funds, causing interest rates to rise. And private-sector investment, a source for growth, would be held down greatly. This is a nightmare called an impact of crowding out. In reality, this trend came out temporarily around 1980.

If the economic conditions worsen, naturally it will affect the currency value of the country. The Government would lose trust and the yen would plummet. At the same time import-inflation would move forward, helping the currency value to fall even further while a lower yen sets in. Japan will fall into that vicious cycle. What is worse, an aging society will actually come, and the savings, now regarded as being excessive, will be tapering off. Accordingly, it might become difficult to buy government bonds by domestic funds.

If that is the case, what shall we do? We will leave finances of national finances to other countries' hands like the U.S. And a similar phenomenon would occur in Japan to that seen in the U.S. that the dollar would crash if Japan held back from buying dollars. But the U.S.' case is not so serious as Japan's because the dollar is the key currency, so the U.S. can pay interest if it issues dollar notes. Japan however will have no means to surmount a national bankruptcy.

The above is an overly pessimistic simulation, but such a possibility is never eliminated. If the balance of government bonds goes on expanding, no one can conclude a phenomenon of distress caused by reckless loans from finance firms will never occur.

Bravery Needed to Tell the Truth

To revamp national finance that has been on the edge of a bankruptcy, radical reduction in budget expenditures is indispensable, but things are not so easy as pledged by political parties, which have advocated a shift from "government-leadership" to "private-sector leadership" with administrative reform and deregulation. They have to be poised to face fierce resistance possibly coming from policy-clique lawmakers (zoku Dietmembers), bureaucrats and industrialists, all of whom have clung to vested rights. In the recent budget requests for

the next fiscal year, the Construction, Transport and Agriculture-Forestry-Fisheries Ministries, the three that are called the big three in terms of requests for public works projects, showed their strength, and despite the wind of reform, they have gained more strength. No one was unable to call a halt to their moves. Political parties' 'having broken their promises' have already been proved in that course.

Fundamentally, the responsibility of political parties is to show the way the consumption tax
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should be, including a tax rate in proportion to demand for finances in preparation for the coming of an aging society and then to ask the people's judgment. Even if parties win the people's favor by pledging to reconsider the consumption tax -- an argument simple enough to be understood by the masses, they will have no other means to throw it into a wastebasket at some point after the election once they face the serious financial situation in Japan. Their breaking their pledge would only help the people become more distrustful of politicians.

In the U.S., however, the strong leadership of the Administration and deregulation are putting back the economy on the right track. In Japan, too, some of administrations carried out reform policies, such as privatization of the state-run Japan National Railways and the introduction of the consumption tax, but such reform was carried out only by the able administrations even in the heyday of the Liberal Democratic Party-single rule. If an administration that is soft and lenient to voters comes into being, it is the turn of Japan to fall into a "hopeless situation," something like in South Bronx.

(3) An Opinion Poll with 50 People Residing in the Metropolitan Area

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 26) (Full)
September 28, 1996

The Lower House was dissolved on the 27th for an election that will be carried out for the first time under the single-seat electoral system. The following is excerpts from the opinion poll this newspaper conducted with 50 voters living in the metropolitan area regarding what they expect of the next election:

- 1) -- Occupation
- 2) -- Sex
- 3) -- Age
- 4) -- Response

(Tokyo)

- 1) No fixed job
- 2) M
- 3) 32
- 4) Do not expect anything. Fed up with politicians bolting parties and launching new parties.

- 1) Agricultural and forestry-related
- 2) M
- 3) 49
- 4) Facilitate administrative reform and freeze the three-percent consumption tax rate.

- 1) Housewife
- 2) F
- 3) 41
- 4) Candidates are saying the same thing. Points at issue are not clear.

1) School teacher
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- 2) F
- 3) 30
- 4) Would like to see if the new party is real through the upcoming election.

- 1) College student
- 2) F
- 3) 22
- 4) Each party should work hard so that their goal would not end as a castle in the air.

1) Housewife
2) F
3) 46
4) Looking forward to seeing how politics will change by the introduction of the new single-seat electoral system.

1) Unemployed
2) M
3) 66
4) What is the point of dissolving the lower house when there is a mountain of pressing issues?

1) Public servant
2) F
3) 45
4) Politics should be carried out in a more visible way for the general public.

1) Company employee
2) M
3) 31
4) Hoping to see clean election campaigns that do not cost money

1) Self-employed
2) M
3) 46
4) Election is welcome, but don't forget economic measures as well.

1) Company employee
2) M
3) 47
4) Politicians change partners so often that the overall picture is not clear.

1) Part-timer
2) F
3) 46
4) Policies seem all the same, except for that of the Japan Communist Party (JCP).

1) College student
2) F
3) 20
4) Change is necessary to purify the political community.

1) Company worker
2) M
3) 41
4) The option of freezing the consumption-tax rate is obviously just to surmount the election.

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- 1) No fixed job
- 2) M
- 3) 38
- 4) Factors directly related to our livelihood should be made into points at issue

- 1) Housewife
- 2) F
- 3) 42
- 4) Implementing the nursing-care insurance system is an urgent task.

- 1) Housewife
- 2) F
- 3) 70
- 4) The consumption tax is too heavy on pensioners. They should be exempted from the system.

- 1) Self-employed
- 2) M
- 3) 83
- 4) Put the economy on a recovery course quickly.

- 1) Unemployed
- 2) M
- 3) 76
- 4) The planned consumption-tax hike should be canceled. Will give thought to the rest later.

- 1) Housewife
- 2) F
- 3) 60
- 4) If abolishing the consumption tax is not possible, then at least keep the rate at the present level.

(Gumma)

- 1) Farmer
- 2) M
- 3) 71
- 4) Carry out administrative reform at all costs.

- 1) Singer
- 2) F
- 3) 57

4) Do not raise the consumption tax because such would affect our livelihood seriously.

- 1) Barber
- 2) M
- 3) 46
- 4) Implement a sound nursing system for the aged.

- 1) Company employee
- 2) F
- 3) 24
- 4) All lawmakers should work hard to make the Diet into a more attractive place.

- 1) Company employee
- 2) F
- 3) 38
- 4) Boost the economy and achieve stable politics free of graft.

UNCLAS SECTION 08 OF 13 TOKYO 009122

DEPT FOR E, P, PM, EB, EAP/J AND S/AL
USIA FOR MR AND REA
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC ROTH
WHITE HOUSE FOR NEC CUTTER
TREASURY FOR OASIA/IMI/JAPAN
DEPT PASS USTR FOR SHAPIRO/WOLD
DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 09/30/96

(Chiba)

- 1) College student
- 2) F
- 3) 22
- 4) No hope because (politics) will not change.

- 1) Company worker
- 2) M
- 3) 45
- 4) Political parties should differentiate their policy more clearly.

- 1) Housewife
- 2) F
- 3) 41
- 4) Put an end to the era of coalition administration.

- 1) Restaurant worker
- 2) M
- 3) 56
- 4) Tackle seriously the drive to block the planned consumption-tax hike

- 1) Public servant
- 2) M
- 3) 31
- 4) Implement sound policy.

(Saitama)

- 1) Unemployed
- 2) F
- 3) 38
- 4) Will go to the polls but have no expectation on any party.

- 1) Company employee
- 2) M
- 3) 64
- 4) Parties should underline their policy, instead just seeking power.

- 1) Food product sales
- 2) M
- 3) 45
- 4) Hope to see a high-level election race over policies.

- 1) Salesperson
- 2) M
- 3) 22
- 4) Do not and cannot harbor hope on any party. No expectation.

- 1) Housewife
- 2) F
- 3) 52
- 4) Give seats to able politicians

(Ibaraki)

- 1) Public servant
- 2) F
- 3) 25

UNCLAS SECTION 09 OF 13 TOKYO 009122

DEPT FOR E, P, PM, EB, EAP/J AND S/AL
USIA FOR MR AND REA
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC ROTH
WHITE HOUSE FOR NEC CUTTER
TREASURY FOR OASIA/IMI/JAPAN
DEPT PASS USTR FOR SHAPIRO/WOLD
DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, JA

SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 09/30/96

- 4) Will go to the polls but have only little interest in politics.

- 1) Self-employed
- 2) F
- 3) 56
- 4) Only candidates and the media are making fuss about the election

- 1) Company employee
- 2) M
- 3) 30
- 4) I don't understand why the lower-house was dissolved at this point.

- 1) Company worker
- 2) M
- 3) 48
- 4) Disappointed with the ongoing power game. No expectation.

- 1) Housewife
- 2) F
- 3) 35
- 4) Will vote for a party that will oppose the planned consumption tax hike to five percent.

(Kanagawa)

- 1) Company employee
- 2) F
- 3) 26
- 4) With a great gap existing between our lifestyle and politics, I cannot expect anything of politics.

- 1) Housewife
- 2) F
- 3) 49
- 4) Create a society comfortable for the aged.

- 1) Company worker
- 2) M
- 3) 29
- 4) What's the point of carrying out an election when there is no points at issue?

- 1) Proprietor
- 2) M
- 3) 56
- 4) The consumption tax should not be raised under any circumstances.

- 1) Unemployed
- 2) F
- 3) 78
- 4) Create a society gentle to pensioners.

(Tochigi)

- 1) Transportation business

- 2) M
- 3) 52
- 4) Do not raise the consumption tax. Keep it at three percent.

1) Housewife
UNCLAS SECTION 10 OF 13 TOKYO 009122

DEPT FOR E, P, PM, EB, EAP/J AND S/AL
USIA FOR MR AND REA
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC ROTH
WHITE HOUSE FOR NEC CUTTER
TREASURY FOR OASIA/IMI/JAPAN
DEPT PASS USTR FOR SHAPIRO/WOLD
DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 09/30/96

- 2) F
- 3) 68
- 4) Do not understand the new electoral system. No interest in the election.

- 1) Corporate executive
- 2) M
- 3) 45
- 4) Stabilize political forces to bolster the economy.

- 1) Public servant
- 2) M
- 3) 24
- 4) Conduct politics in a way that can satisfy the people.

- 1) Company employee
- 2) F
- 3) 21
- 4) Politicians should keep their public pledges.

(4) JDA Planning Two Offshore Heliport Options;
Floating Type -- Off Urasoe City, Mobile Type --
Off White Beach

ASAHI (Page 1) (Full)
September 30, 1996

Regarding the issue of where to construct a sea-based heliport as one of the options for a place to relocate the U.S. Forces' Futenma Air Station, the Japan Defense Agency has revealed its plan to construct it in an area off Urasoe City on the main island of Okinawa in the case of citing the 'floating-body quay installation process' (QIP) as asserted by the Japanese side, or construct it in a U.S. military training area off White Beach located

in Katsuren Town in the case of adopting a 'mobile offshore base' (MOB) as maintained by the U.S. side. JDA is going to work out the details between the Japanese and U.S. sides in the direction of making a final option at a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2-plus-2) meeting in November.

The QIP method upheld by the Japanese side is to sink steel posts into the sea bottom to prop up the heliport structure on the sea surface. A senior JDA official explains, "Compared with the MOB method, its technical feasibility is high, and it is also easy to estimate its costs."

JDA is considering an area about one to two kilometers off Urasoe City as where to construct the heliport. Regarding this plan, JDA points out such circumstances as that the sea waters there are shallow, the Naha military port facilities also are expected to be relocated, and the area is close to Camp Zukeran where many of the Marines assigned to the Futenma airfield live. Also, JDA's idea is bridge the heliport and the main island.

However, the U.S. side is reluctant about that construction method, claiming that it is vulnerable to attacks. The Japanese side also has now begun
UNCLAS SECTION 11 OF 13 TOKYO 009122

DEPT FOR E, P, PM, EB, EAP/J AND S/AL
USIA FOR MR AND REA
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC ROTH
WHITE HOUSE FOR NEC CUTTER
TREASURY FOR OASIA/IMI/JAPAN
DEPT PASS USTR FOR SHAPIRO/WOLD
DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 09/30/96

to look into whether or not it will be possible to employ the MOB method for a self-movable floating heliport.

If the Futenma airfield's current functions, such as heliport hangars and maintenance service facilities, are entirely relocated to an MOB heliport, its construction cost will increase accordingly. So, JDA has firmed up its plan to construct it mainly for training purposes in the case of installing an MOB heliport.

JDA's idea is to construct such alternative facilities as helicopter aprons and maintenance service workshops on Kadena Air Force Base. In this meaning, JDA, according to its senior

official, positions such an idea as "a different form of the plan for absorption into Kadena AFB" which the Japanese side used to call for.

As for where to construct that MOB heliport, JDA is considering the training area off White Beach for such reasons as that the depth of water is enough there, the sea is calm, the area is not remote from Kadena AFB and Camp Zukeran, and its airspace does not overlap those of Kadena AFB and Naha Airport. Furthermore, JDA cites another reason: "In the case of White Beach, it will be possible to avoid providing another training area or other facilities. So, we think it will be easy to obtain Okinawa's understanding."

(5) Yomiuri Shimbun's Survey of Lower House Election in 1996: SDP Local Chapters Straining; Tohoku Bloc Alone to Support SDP as "One Body" in the Proportional Representation Constituencies, 18 Its Prefectural Chapters to Back "Minshuto" in Single-Seat Districts

YOMIURI (Page 2) (Excerpt)
September 26, 1996

The Yomiuri Shimbun as of the 25th has conducted a survey of the strategies of Social Democratic Party's (SDP) prefectural chapters toward the lower-house election. According to the results of the survey, the chapters of the Tohoku (Northern Honshu) bloc alone among the country's 11 proportional representation blocs have decided to fight the election only for the SDP. Of the SDP's 47 prefectural chapters, 18 have set a policy line backing Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)) candidates for single-seat constituencies. In addition, some chapters have taken different responses in single-seat and proportional districts. Given such circumstances, the turmoil that exists already in the SDP has been underscored.

The reason for SDP's prefectural chapters' taking different responses in the single-seat and proportional constituencies is because of the decision by the party leadership to fight as the "SDP" in both constituencies, while allowing candidates-to-be to join the Minshuto. The Hokkaido Prefectural Chapter has revealed that it

UNCLAS SECTION 12 OF 13 TOKYO 009122

DEPT FOR E, P, PM, EB, EAP/J AND S/AL
USIA FOR MR AND REA
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC ROTH
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TREASURY FOR OASIA/IMI/JAPAN
DEPT PASS USTR FOR SHAPIRO/WOLD

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E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, JA

SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 09/30/96

will dissolve itself " before the year's end" and integrate into the Minshuto. Seemingly after the lower-house election, SDP's prefectural chapters supporting the Minshuto will gradually shift to Minshuto local chapters.

Under the new mixed electoral system of small and proportional representation constituencies, vote-counting in the proportional constituencies, in which voters write the name of a party for which he or she wish to vote, will be carried out in each of the 11 proportional representation blocs.

Moves of SDP's Prefectural Chapters

14 Chapters to Support SDP both in Single-Seat and Proportional Representation Constituencies:

Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima, Saitama, Tottori, Shimane, Hiroshima, Kagawa, Ehime, Saga, and Oita.

16 Chapters to Support Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) both in Small and Proportional Representation Constituencies:

Hokkaido, Tochigi, Gunma, Chiba, Yamanashi, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Gifu, Aichi, Shiga, Osaka, Nara, Wakayama, Yamaguchi, and Tokushima.

10 Chapters Taking Different Responses toward Single-Seat Districts and Proportional Constituencies:

Ibaraki (to support DPJ in the single-seat district, but which party to support in the proportional constituency undecided); Tokyo (decision on which party to support in the single-seat district to be made by individual branch offices, but which party to support in the proportional district undecided); Kanagawa (which party to back both in the single-seat and proportional districts to be decided by each branch office); Mie (individual branch offices to decide on which party to support in the single-seat district, and to support the SDP in the proportional districts); Kyoto (to vote based on individuals' decisions in the single-seat districts, and which party to support in the proportional constituencies undecided), Okayama (individual chapter offices to decide on which party to support in the single-seat, but decision

for the proportional undecided); Fukuoka (each party to decide on a party to support, and to support the SDP in the proportional constituency); Nagasaki (to support the DPJ in the single-seat, and the SDP in the proportional); Kumamoto (not decided on which party to support in the single-set, but to back the SDP in the proportional) and Okinawa (individual branch offices to decide on which party to support in the single-seat, and the prefectural chapter to support SDP in the proportional).

7 Chapters Undecided:

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DEPT FOR E, P, PM, EB, EAP/J AND S/AL
USIA FOR MR AND REA
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC ROTH
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DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE DAILY PRESS SUMMARY 09/30/96

Niigata; Nagano; Shizuoka; Hyogo; Kochi; Miyazaki
and Kagoshima.

(6) Ministry of Health and Welfare to Put Scalpel
into Distribution Channels of Medical Equipment;
Guidance to Be Given to Hold Down Prices

NIHON KEIZAI (Page 1) (Full)
September 28, 1996

In a bid to hold down prices of medical equipment, such as cardiac pacemakers, which are more expensive than in Europe and the United States, a factor for ballooning medical expenses, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) will shortly launch into a first survey of the distribution channels of such equipment. It will probe into the reasons for causing internal and external price differentials, including distribution channels, and then give guidance to vendors to improve the situation. In the meantime, an industrial organization for medical equipment manufactures will establish a fair trade panel possibly in fiscal 1997, after making coordination with the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), and start checking distribution channels independently.

Medical equipment runs more than 100,000 items, including injectors. The MHW estimates the size of the market to be 1.5 trillion yen. In particular,

The Consultative Council for Medical Equipment-related Organizations of Japan (Bunkyo War, Tokyo), in which medical equipment manufacturers and sales agents hold membership, will establish a fair trade advisory panel. The panel will review regulations that unduly restrict market entry regarding the medical market as a whole. It will also aim at preventing extravagant advertisements and enticement of customers with premiums. Efforts will be made to promote transparent price formation in line with market principles through free competition among vendors.

MONDALE

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 13

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	Re: Digest Executive Edition 187-96 (13 pages)	10/01/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1996 - 10/03/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1883

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	Re: Diet Election, Okinawa (9 pages)	10/01/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1996 - 10/03/1996]

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005. cable	Re: Support Cable for East Asia Brief 96/231 (3 pages)	10/02/1996	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
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Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1996 - 10/03/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1883

RESTRICTION CODES

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006. cable	Re: September 17 Meeting - Special Action Committee on Okinawa (11 pages)	10/02/1996	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1996 - 10/03/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1883

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
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LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3: O 030354Z OCT 96
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
OSRI: RUEHKO
DTG: 030354Z OCT 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO: RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1352
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7956
INFO: RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUYNJDK/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUALSEFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOG/USDOC WASHDC
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RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N5//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
SUBJ: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS OCTOBER 3
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 009240
USIA
FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR
EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA
WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS;
USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA;
COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS OCTOBER 3
TOP HEADLINES:
ASAHI: HANEDA TO BECOME 24-HOUR-SERVICE AIRPORT POSSIBLY
FROM NEXT APRIL; MAY EXTEND OPERATION HOURS TO TWELVE
MIDNIGHT; 40-FLIGHT INCREASE POSSIBLE DUE TO RELOCATION
OF RUNWAY; TRANSPORT MINISTRY CONVEYS ITS POLICY LINE TO
OTA WARD, ETC.
NIHON KEIZAI: GOVERNMENTAL TAX PANEL INTENDS TO REINFORCE
TAXATION ON FRINGE BENEFIT COSTS, SUCH AS COMPANY
HOUSING, RESORT HOUSES, FREE MEDICAL HEALTH CHECK; TO PUT

RESTRICTIONS ON ADDING UP SUCH COSTS TO LOSSES

TOKYO SHIMBUN: INTERVIEW WITH SUU KYI: "WILL HOLD A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NLD"; SLAMS MILITARY REGIME WITH BULLISH STANCE

MAINICHI: "BEHIND-THE-SCENES PROMISE" CONCLUDED TO AVOID ANNOUNCEMENT OF NAMES OF HOSPITALS THAT HAD GIVEN PATIENTS UNTREATED BLOOD PRODUCTS; BETWEEN HEALTH AND WELFARE MINISTRY AND JAPAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION; UNDER CONDITION OF "VOLUNTARY INVESTIGATIONS"; 600 MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS "WILL BE JUST QUESTIONED"

YOMIURI: OPINION POLL ON GENERAL ELECTION: 33 PERCENT SAY, "WILL VOTE FOR LDP"; MINSHUTO CATCHING UP WITH SHINSHINTO WITH SUPPORT FROM 8 PERCENT; AS LOW AS 52 PERCENT INDICATE, "WILL GO TO POLLS WITHOUT FAIL" (TRANSLATION BELOW)

SANKEI: HIV INFECTION THROUGH FOURTH ROUTE; "IMPOSSIBLE TO TRACK" 378 HOSPITALS; OF THEM, AS MANY AS 31 IN TOKYO; 44 PREFECTURES SURVEYED; TO MAKE THE RESULTS PUBLIC ON OCT. 7

LDP SUPPORTED BY 33 PERCENT, DPJ CLOSE TO NFP (YOMIURI - TOP PLAY)

THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN CARRIED OUT A NATIONWIDE OPINION POLL ON SEPTEMBER 28 AND 29 JUST AFTER THE LOWER HOUSE WAS DISSOLVED, IN ORDER TO SEEK VOTERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE GENERAL ELECTION ON OCTOBER 20 AND SUPPORTING POLITICAL PARTIES. IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS "WHICH POLITICAL PARTY'S CANDIDATE WILL YOU VOTE FOR UNDER THE SINGLE-SEAT CONSTITUENCY SYSTEM?" AND "WHICH POLITICAL PARTY WILL YOU VOTE FOR UNDER THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM?", 33 PERCENT OF THE RESPONDENTS -- THE GREATEST SUPPORT -- FAVORED THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP), SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN THAT RECORDED IN THE ELECTION IN 1993, IN WHICH IT SUFFERED A TOTAL DEFEAT. THE OPPOSITION PARTY SHINSHINTO AND THE MINSHUTO (DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN) FOLLOWED THE LDP. BUT THE RATE OF RESPONDENTS WHO REPLIED THEY "WOULD VOTE FOR THE MINSHUTO" (8 PERCENT) UNDER THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM" WAS TWICE AS HIGH AS THE SUPPORT RATE FOR THE PARTY. THIS IS SIMILAR TO THE TREND SHOWN IN THE PREVIOUS ELECTION WHERE THE JAPAN NEW PARTY ENJOYED A REMARKABLE DEVELOPMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THOSE WHO REPLIED THEY "WOULD PLACE NO EXPECTATION" ON THE NEW PARTY REACHED 55 PERCENT. THIS INDICATES THE NEW PARTY LACKS A POLITICAL MOMENTUM. IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION ASKING IF THEY WILL GO THE POLLS, ONLY 52 PERCENT REPLIED "I WILL, WITHOUT FAIL." THIS RESULT UNDERSCORED THAT PEOPLE'S INTEREST IN THE UPCOMING ELECTION IS NOT VERY HIGH.

ANALYSIS: TURNOUT OF VOTERS THE KEY TO POLITICAL PARTIESQ FUTURE (YOMIUYRI - PAGE 2)

(ANALYSIS)

IN THE GENERAL ELECTION ON THE 20TH, A JUDGMENT WILL BE HANDED DOWN FOR THE THREE-YEAR-OLD COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE MAIN FOCUS IS ON WHETHER THE VOTERS WILL CONTINUE TO OPT FOR THE COALITION OR TO GIVE A MAJORITY TO A SINGLE POLITICAL PARTY.

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 08 TOKYO 009240

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS OCTOBER 3

ACCORDING TO THE RESULTS OF AN OPINION POLL CONDUCTED BY THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN, (1) THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP) ENJOYS GREATER PUBLIC SUPPORT UNDER BOTH THE SINGLE-SEAT CONSTITUENCY SYSTEM AND THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM, OUTDISTANCING OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES, BUT WHETHER THE BIRTH OF A "SINGLE-PARTY ADMINISTRATION" OF THE LDP WILL BE REALIZED OR NOT IS STILL UNKNOWN; (2) THE MINSHUTO (DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN) HAS ATTRACTED EXPECTATIONS TO SOME EXTENT, BUT IT LACKS SUCH A POLITICAL MOMENTUM AS ONCE ENJOYED BY THE JAPAN NEW PARTY; AND (3) WITH DISTRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES AMONG THE VOTERS DEEPENING FURTHER, A HIGH VOTING RATE CANNOT BE EXPECTED. THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY IS LIKELY TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON EACH PARTY'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN STRATEGY.

ASKED ABOUT POLITICAL PARTIES, 32 PERCENT OF THE RESPONDENTS FAVORED THE LDP, FOLLOWED BY 7 PERCENT OF THOSE FOR THE OPPOSITION PARTY SHINSHINTO. AS FOR THE RATIO OF THOSE WHO SUPPORTED A POLITICAL PARTY AND OF THOSE WHO WOULD VOTE FOR THE CANDIDATE OF THAT PARTY, THERE IS ALMOST NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM IN THE CASE OF SUCH EXISTING POLITICAL PARTIES AS THE LDP.

THE LDP IS EXPECTED TO BECOME THE FIRST POLITICAL PARTY, ALTHOUGH WHETHER IT WILL SECURE A MAJORITY STILL REMAINS UNKNOWN. THE SHINSHINTO MIGHT OBTAIN MORE VOTES THAN THE RESULT OF THE SURVEY, DUE TO SOME ELEMENTS.

THE NEW PARTY MINSHUTO IS PRESSING THE SHINSHINTO. THOSE WHO REPLIED THEY WOULD VOTE FOR THE MINSHUTO TOPPED THE SUPPORTING RATE FOR THE PARTY. THE FEATURE IS THAT DOUBLE RESPONDENTS REPLIED THEY WOULD VOTE FOR THE MINSHUTO UNDER THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM. THE ATTITUDE OF VOTERS TOWARD MINSHUTO IS SIMILAR TO THAT THEY EXPRESSED ABOUT THE JAPAN NEW PARTY IN THE SURVEY CARRIED OUT JUST BEFORE THE GENERAL ELECTION IN 1993.

IN THE CASE OF THE NOW DEFUNCT JAPAN NEW PARTY, ITS SUPPORTING RATE WAS 5 PERCENT, BUT THOSE WHO SAID THEY WOULD VOTE FOR THE PARTY ACCOUNTED FOR 12 PERCENT, GENERATING A NEW PARTY BOOM IN THE PREVIOUS ELECTION. HOWEVER, IN THE CASE OF THE MINSHUTO, MORE THAN HALF SAID THE NEW PARTY GAVE THEM NO CAUSE FOR HOPE. EVEN SO, THE MINSHUTO MIGHT SERVE AS THE "EYE OF THE TYPHOON."

ASKED ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO GO TO THE POLLS, THOSE WHO REPLIED "WILL GO, DEFINITELY," STAYED AT 52 PERCENT. THE MAJOR KEY FOR EACH POLITICAL PARTY IS HOW TO ACHIEVE A HIGH VOTER TURNOUT BY HEIGHTENING VOTERS' INTEREST IN THE ELECTION.

ANOTHER POLL SHOWS DPJ AT 12.4 PERCENT (SANKEI - PAGE 2)

KYODO NEWS SERVICE CONDUCTED A PERIODIC INTERVIEW-BASED SURVEY ON SEPTEMBER 28 AND 29 TO PROBE INTO THE TRENDS OF SUPPORT FOR VARIOUS PARTIES INCLUDING THE NEWLY INAUGURATED MINSHUTO (DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN (DPJ)), AS WELL AS SUPPORT RATING FOR THE HASHIMOTO CABINET.

AS A RESULT, THE DPJ, WHICH WAS FORMED ON SEPTEMBER 18 WITH YUKIO HATOYAMA AND NAOTO KAN AS ITS REPRESENTATIVES, ENJOYED A SUPPORT RATE OF 12.4 PERCENT, MAKING IT THE THIRD MOST POPULAR PARTY FOLLOWING THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AT 38.5 PERCENT, AND THE SHINSHINTO (NEW FRONTIER PARTY) AT 12.8 PERCENT.

THE RATE OF SUPPORT FOR THE HASHIMOTO CABINET WAS 52.3 PERCENT, UP 5.3 POINTS FROM THE PREVIOUS SURVEY IN JULY. THE CABINET HAS RECOVERED THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT POSTED IN THE MAY SURVEY (52.7 PERCENT) WHICH TOOK PLACE RIGHT AFTER THE JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS HAD REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE RETURN OF A UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 08 TOKYO 009240

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS OCTOBER 3

HELIPORT ON U.S. MILITARY'S FUTENMA AIR STATION. THE NON-SUPPORT RATE FOR THE CABINET DROPPED 1.6 POINTS FROM THE JULY SURVEY TO 41.1 PERCENT.

THE RATE OF THOSE HAVING "NO PARTY TO SUPPORT" SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED 20 PERCENTAGE POINTS FROM THE LATEST SURVEY IN JULY TO 18.1 PERCENT.

APPROVAL RATE FOR VARIOUS PARTIES

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)	38.5 PERCENT (UP 3.5 POINTS)
SHINSHINTO (NEW FRONTIER PARTY)	12.8 PERCENT (UP 2.6 POINTS)
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP)	6.8 PERCENT (PREVIOUS RATE AT BELOW 5.0 PERCENT)
SAKIGAKE PARTY	1.1 PERCENT (PREVIOUS RATE AT 2.7 PERCENT)
JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY (JCP)	4.1 PERCENT (PREVIOUS RATE AT 3.7 PERCENT)
DEMOCRATIC REFORM LEAGUE	0.2 PERCENT
LIBERAL LEAGUE	0.1 PERCENT
SHIN SHAKAITO (NEW SOCIALIST PARTY)	1.1 PERCENT

ALL MAJOR PARTIES AIR CAMPAIGN PLEDGES WITH EMPHASIS TO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, BUT DIFFER ON CONSUMPTION TAX ISSUE (YOMIURI -PAGE 3)

AS OF YESTERDAY, SIX MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE COME UP WITH THEIR PUBLIC PLEDGES FOR THE UPCOMING LOWER-HOUSE ELECTION. DIFFERENCES AMONG PARTIES ARE PARTICULARLY EVIDENT OVER THE PLANNED CONSUMPTION TAX HIKE. SUCH PARTIES AS THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP), MINSHUTO (DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN) AND SAKIGAKE ARE ALL SUPPORTING THE PLANNED CONSUMPTION TAX HIKE, WHILE SHINSHINTO (NEW FRONTIER PARTY) AND THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY (JCP) ARE AGAINST IT. AS FOR A PERMANENT SEAT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC), BOTH THE LDP AND SHINSHINTO ARE IN STEP TO GO FOR IT ACTIVELY. LIKEWISE, COMMON ELEMENTS AND DIFFERENCES ARE CRISSCROSSING. ALL THE MORE BECAUSE DEPENDING ON HOW THE RESULTS TURN OUT, ANY PARTY COULD BE A RULING PARTY, THEIR PUBLIC PLEDGES CARRY SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT, WITH EYES TOWARD THE NEXT STAGE OF POLITICAL REALIGNMENT.

OUTLINE OF PUBLIC PLEDGES OF SIX PARTIES

-- LDP --CONSUMPTION TAX, ECONOMIC MEASURES--

RAISE THE CONSUMPTION TAX TO FIVE PERCENT. LOOK INTO MEASURES TO GIVE A SPECIAL BENEFIT TO LOW-INCOME PENSIONERS. STUDY MEASURES TO LIGHTEN CORPORATE TAXES AND LAND OWNERSHIP TAXES.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REFORM--

HALVE THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES THAT TOTAL 22 TODAY. COMPILE A SUBSIDIES REDUCTION PLAN IN FIVE YEARS. LOOK INTO STEPS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF NATIONAL PUBLIC SERVANTS AS WELL AS TO INTRODUCE A UNIFIED HIRING SYSTEM. DIPLOMACY, SECURITY, ETC.--AIM AT A PERMANENT UNSC SEAT AND UN REFORM. STIPULATES JAPAN'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER SENKAKU ISLANDS AND TAKESHIMA ISLAND. FACILITATE MEASURES TO REDUCE U.S. OKINAWA BASES AND A COMPREHENSIVE REHABILITATION PACKAGE.--SHINSHINTO--CONSUMPTION TAX, ECONOMIC MEASURES--KEEP THE CONSUMPTION-TAX RATE AT THREE PERCENT. REDUCE INCOME TAXES AND RESIDENT TAXES BY 50

PERCENT AND CUT BACK CORPORATE TAXES BY 18 TRILLION YEN.
LOWER PUBLIC SERVICE CHARGES BY 20 - 50 PERCENT.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REFORM--
REALIGN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INTO 15 AND THEN
ULTIMATELY INTO 10. COMPLETELY ABOLISH GOVERNMENT
SUBSIDIES. BRING THE NUMBER OF CITIES, TOWNS, AND
VILLAGES TO ABOUT 30 AND ALSO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF DIET
SEATS BY 20 PERCENT.
DIPLOMACY, SECURITY, ETC.--ESTABLISH A SECURITY BASIC
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 08 TOKYO 009240

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RE, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR
EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA
WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS;
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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS OCTOBER 3

LAW. AIM AT A PERMANENT UNSC SEAT AND UN REFORM. REDUCE
U.S. OKINAWA BASES. UPHOLD A SELF-SUFFICIENT SYSTEM IN
FOODSTUFF.--MINSHUTO--CONSUMPTION TAX, ECONOMIC MEASURES--
--RAISE THE CONSUMPTION TAX TO FIVE PERCENT. EASE THE
REGRESSIVE TAX SYSTEM FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE. PRESENT A
FISCAL REFORM BILL.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REFORM--

REALIGN THE EXISTING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INTO
EIGHT AREAS. UPGRADE THE CABINET SECRETARIAT TO A
"CABINET OFFICE (NAIKAKU FU) WITH RIGHT TO BUDGET
COMPILATION. STEP UP SUFFRAGE AND REDUCE THE NUMBER OF
DIET SEATS.

DIPLOMACY, SECURITY, ETC.--CLEARLY MENTION REMORSE AND
APOLOGY FOR (JAPAN'S) COLONIAL RULE AND WAR OF AGGRESSION
IN THE PAST. LOOK INTO MEASURES TO ESTABLISH AN ODA
(OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE) BASIC LAW. PROMOTE UN
REFORM AND PARTICIPATE IN MAIN PKO (PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS) WORK.--SDP--CONSUMPTION TAX, ECONOMIC
MEASURES--PROVIDE REFUND TO LOW-INCOME EARNERS AND
INTRODUCE A LIGHTER TAX ON FOODS. CARRY OUT BOLD
CONSUMPTION-TAX REFORM. INTRODUCE A TAXPAYER NUMBERING
SYSTEM. PROMOTE DEREGULATION.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REFORM--

REALIGN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PROMOTE DECENTRALIZATION.
ESTABLISH AN INFORMATION DISCLOSURE LAW. LOWER THE
ELECTION AGE TO 18 AND INTRODUCE A NATIONAL REFERENDUM
SYSTEM. RESTRICT GOLDEN PARACHUTING FURTHER.

DIPLOMACY, SECURITY, ETC.--REVISE THE REDUCTION AMOUNT IN
THE MEDIUM-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (CHUKIBO) TO ENSURE COSTS
NECESSARY TO REDUCE U.S. OKINAWA BASES. STRICTLY FOLLOW
THE FIVE PKO PRINCIPLES AND CONSOLIDATE SEPARATE ORGANS
GRADUALLY.--JCP--CONSUMPTION TAX, ECONOMIC MEASURES--
BLOCK THE PLANNED INTRODUCTION OF THE FIVE-PERCENT
CONSUMPTION TAX RATE. CUT BACK GREATLY PUBLIC WORKS

EXPENSES AND MILITARY OUTLAYS. ABOLISH PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT GIVEN TO LARGE CORPORATIONS AND HIGH-INCOME EARNERS.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REFORM--
ABOLISH THE SINGLE-SEAT ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE POLITICAL SUBSIDIES SYSTEM. PROHIBIT CORPORATE DONATIONS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTING BY HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS. STOP REDUCING WELFARE MEASURES NOW BEING CARRIED SUPPOSEDLY FOR THE NOBLE CAUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM.
DIPLOMACY, SECURITY, ETC.--SCUTTLE THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY AND INSTEAD CONCLUDE A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. REMOVE COMPLETELY U.S. OKINAWA BASES BY THE YEAR 2015. REMOVE IMMEDIATELY THE U.S. MARINES STATIONED IN JAPAN.--SAKIGAKE--
CONSUMPTION TAX, ECONOMIC MEASURES--UPHOLD THE FIVE-PERCENT CONSUMPTION TAX RATE. INTRODUCE AN INVOICE SYSTEM TO DISSOLVE PROFIT TAXES. ESTABLISH A

ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REFORM--
FISCAL REFORM LAW. REMOVE THE BAN ON HOLDING COMPANIES. LAUNCH AN ADMINISTRATIVE-REFORM ADMINISTRATION AND COMPILE AN ACTION PLAN. ESTABLISH PERMANENT PRIME MINISTERIAL ASSISTANT POSTS. REDUCE GREATLY THE NUMBER OF DIETMEN.
DIPLOMACY, SECURITY, ETC.--
REALIZE UN REFORM AND MAKE ODA-CENTERED, NON-MILITARY COMMITMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. MAP OUT A NEW SET OF CRITERIA ON PKO PARTICIPATION. MAKE GREATER EFFORT FOR DISARMAMENT AND STEP UP THE CRISIS-MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

U.S. SENATE MADE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENKAKUS AND OKINAWA (SANKEI - PAGE 2)

(WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 2, YOSHIHISA KOMORI) ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, "THE DISPUTE OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS (DIAOYU ISLANDS) AND THE UNITED STATES' LEGAL INVOLVEMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY," COMPILED ON OCTOBER 1 BY THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IT IS MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S.' RESPONSIBILITY FOR JOINT DEFENSE OF JAPAN UNDER THE UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 08 TOKYO 009240

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS OCTOBER 3

U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY WILL COVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS. IN ADDITION, THE REPORT EMPHASIZES THE U.S. CONGRESS DID NOT SET ANY RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE

SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ISLANDS WHEN OKINAWA WAS REVERTED TO JAPAN.

THE REPORT INDICATES U.S. OFFICIALS INVOLVED ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DISPUTE AMONG JAPAN, CHINA AND TAIWAN OVER THE SENKAKUS, AND AT THE SAME TIME EXPRESSES THE NOTION THAT IF THE ISLANDS THAT ARE EFFECTIVELY UNDER JAPAN'S RULE COME UNDER A MILITARY ATTACK FROM A THIRD COUNTRY, AND ON THAT OCCASION, IF THE JAPANESE SIDE FOLLOWS THE STEPS TO INVOKE THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY, THE TREATY WILL BE APPLIED TO SUCH A CASE.

AS FOR DELIBERATIONS ON THE OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT CONDUCTED IN THE U.S. SENATE AROUND 1971, THE REPORT EMPHATICALLY STATES: "THE SENATE, WHICH WAS ENGAGED IN DELIBERATIONS ON THE OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT FOR ITS RATIFICATION, ELIMINATED A REQUEST MADE BY SOME MEMBERS WHO INSISTED ON SETTING RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE SENKAKUS (SO THAT A LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN BETWEEN OKINAWA AND THE SENKAKUS TO DEAL WITH DEMANDS BY CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES FOR SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKUS)."

REGARDING THE SENKAKUS ISSUE OVER WHICH JAPAN HAS BEEN IN DISPUTE WITH CHINA AND TAIWAN AS TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS, IF THE U.S. HAD DESIRED TO KEEP IN A COMPLETELY NEUTRAL POSITION, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN NATURAL THAT THE U.S. INCORPORATED "RESERVATIONS" IN THE OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO SEPARATE THE SENAKUS FROM THE OKINAWA ISLANDS GROUP.

BUT THE SENATE TURNED DOWN SUCH A REQUEST AND CONSEQUENTLY INDICATED ITS UNDERSTANDING TOWARD JAPAN'S POSITION REGARDING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SENKAKUS. THIS MIGHT HAVE GIVEN AN IMPRESSION OF RATHER INCLINING TO SUPPORT THAT POSITION.

CHINA RECOGNIZED SENKAKUS AS PART OF JAPANESE TERRITORY (SANKEI - PAGE 1)

(HONG KONG, OCTOBER 2, MASARU SOMA) ALTHOUGH JAPAN HAS EFFECTIVELY RULED THE SENKAKU ISLANDS (DIAOYU ISLANDS IN CHINESE), BOTH CHINA AND TAIWAN CLAIM THEIR SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS. REGARDING THE DISPUTE OVER THE SENKAKUS, IT WAS LEARNED YESTERDAY THAT THE PEOPLE'S DAILY, AN ORGAN PAPER OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, HAD SHOWN IN ITS EDITION DATED JANUARY 8, 1953 THE POSITION THAT THE SENKAKU ISLANDS COME UNDER THE NANSEI ISLANDS OF JAPAN, BY USING THE WORDING, "THE RYUKYU ISLANDS INCLUDE THE SENAKUS."

IN THE ARTICLE, THE CHINESE NAME, "THE DIAOYU ISLANDS," WAS NOT USED. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS CLAIMED "THE DIAOYU ISLANDS ARE AN ISLANDS GROUP OF TAIWAN," BUT ACCORDING TO THAT ARTICLE, CHINA'S CURRENT POSITION IS DENIED.

THE ARTICLE CARRIED BY THE PEOPLE'S DAILY WAS A LONG

COMMENTARY ENTITLED, "A STRUGGLE OPPOSING THE UNITED STATES' OCCUPATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THEIR PEOPLE."

WHAT IS TO BE NOTED IN THE ARTICLE IS THE RECOGNITION THAT THE SENKAKU ISLANDS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE INCLUDED IN "THE RYUKYU ISLANDS," SO THEY ARE SEEN AS A PART OF THE NANSEI ISLANDS OF JAPAN. ANOTHER NOTICEABLE POINT IS THAT IN THE ARTICLE, THE CHINESE NAME, "THE DIAOYU ISLANDS" WAS NOT USED BUT INSTEAD THE JAPANESE NAME, "THE SENKAKU ISLANDS" WAS USED.

THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT THROUGH AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 08 TOKYO 009240

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS OCTOBER 3

ON THE CHINESE SIDE LIKE THAT OF THE PEOPLE'S DAILY, THE NOTION WAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE SENKAKU ISLANDS ARE INCLUDED IN THE NANSEI ISLANDS.

ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, "JAPAN SHOULD NOT BEHAVE STUPIDLY," SENT ON AUGUST 30 BY CHINA'S STATE-RUN NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE SENKAKUS ARE AN "ISLAND GROUPS OF TAIWAN," AND JAPAN "EXPLOITED" THE SENKAKUS IN THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR.

IN 1971, JAPAN AND THE U.S. AGREED TO CONSIDER THE SENKAKUS TO BE "AN AREA TO BE RETURNED TO JAPAN," BUT THE REPORT BY THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY STRESSES IT IS "ENTIRELY ILLEGAL."

HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE EARLY 1970'S THAT CHINA BEGAN TO CLAIM THE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS ABROAD. IT IS OBVIOUS THROUGH THE (PEOPLE'S DAILY) ARTICLE THAT CHINA'S CLAIM, "THE DIAOYU ISLANDS IS A TERRITORY OF CHINA FROM OLD TIMES" (CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN), AS IS SEEN IN THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL VIEW, HAS NOT BEEN CONSISTENT.

FINANCE MINISTER KUBO VOWS STUDY ON PREMIUM LIBERALIZATION FOR AUTO INSURANCE (NIHON KEIZAI - PAGE 7)

THE DETAILS OF A CONFIRMATION DOCUMENT WHICH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FINANCE MINISTER WATARU KUBO AND ACTING UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR) BARSHEFSKY ON

SEPTEMBER 30 DURING THE ONGOING INSURANCE TALKS HAVE BEEN REVEALED. THE TWO COUNTRIES AGREED IN THE DOCUMENT TO LOOK INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF LIBERALIZING PREMIUM RATES FOR AUTO INSURANCE POLICIES SOLD THROUGH MAIL ORDER. REGARDING DOMESTIC INSURERS' ENTRY INTO THE THIRD SECTOR -- A GRAY ZONE, WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS OPPOSING, A BAN HAS BEEN PLACED ON THEIR SELLING ANY PRODUCTS, INCLUDING ACCIDENT, MEDICAL AND CANCER INSURANCE POLICIES, UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR.

IN THE INSURANCE TALKS, THE U.S. REQUESTED JAPAN TO DIFFERENTIATE PREMIUM RATES FOR AUTO INSURANCE SOLD THROUGH MAIL ORDER, ACCORDING TO AREAS SUBSCRIBERS LIVE AND THEIR AGES, BUT JAPAN HAS REJECTED SUCH A PROPOSAL, CITING THAT SUCH A METHOD HAS MANY HARMFUL EFFECTS, SUCH AS A POSSIBLE INCREASE IN UNINSURED CARS. THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE'S (MOF) INDICATING ITS POSITIVE STANCE TOWARD SUCH A PROPOSAL IN THE CONFIRMATION DOCUMENT IS LIKELY TO INCUR NEGATIVE REACTIONS FROM NON-LIFE INSURERS, WHICH ARE OPPOSED TO LIBERALIZING INSURANCE PREMIUM RATES. MOF ON OCTOBER 1 LIFTED THE BAN ON SELLING AUTO INSURANCE POLICIES THROUGH MAIL ORDER, BUT THE SETTING OF PREMIUM RATES AS BEFORE HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER OBLIGATION.

REGARDING THE TIMING FOR ALLOWING DOMESTIC INSURERS TO ENTER THE THIRD SECTOR, THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED THAT MOF MAKES A DECISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, "WHEN (THE INSURANCE TALKS) WERE WRAPPED OUT SMOOTHLY AND IN A TIMELY MANNER." AS PRODUCTS THAT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BE SOLD FOR THE TIME BEING, NURSING-CARE INSURANCE HAS BEEN INCLUDED AT THE FINAL STAGE AT THE REQUEST OF THE U.S., IN ADDITION TO ACCIDENT AND MEDICAL INSURANCE AS MOF HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO INCORPORATE.

KUBO HINTS AT ACCESS TO THIRD-SECTOR MARKET POSSIBLY NEXT YEAR, IF TALKS FAIL TO AGREE (NIHON KEIZAI - PAGE 7)

ON RETURNING FROM A SERIES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONFERENCES, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FINANCE MINISTER WATARU KUBO HELD A PRESS BRIEFING AND INDICATED A PERCEPTION: "IN CASE THE JAPAN-U.S. INSURANCE TALKS FAIL TO REACH A SETTLEMENT BEFORE DECEMBER 15, SUBSIDIARIES OF LIFE AND NON-LIFE INSURERS WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE PART IN UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 08 TOKYO 009240

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RE, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS OCTOBER 3

MEDICAL AND CANCER INSURANCE SECTOR FROM NEXT JANUARY."

THIS IS THE CLEAR ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS PERCEPTION THAT IN CASE THE TWO COUNTRIES FAIL TO STRIKE A DEAL, INSURANCE SUBSIDIARIES CAN ENTER THE THIRD SECTOR, SUCH AS PERSONAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE, FROM NEXT YEAR. HE TOTALLY REJECTED THE STATEMENT OF ACTING UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR) BARSHEFSKY: "THOSE INSURANCE SUBSIDIARIES' ENTRY INTO THE THIRD SECTOR IS TO BE BANNED."

REFERRING TO HIS STATEMENT MADE IN A SPEECH MEETING IN THE U.S. BEING TAKEN AS A CHECK AGAINST A HIGHER DOLLAR, HE SAID, "I NEVER MENTIONED ANYTHING LIKE THE DOLLAR SHOULD BE DEPRECIATED OR APPRECIATED."

AS TO THE PROBLEM OF THE FORMER MOF NATIONAL TAX DISSATISFACTION REVIEW COMMITTEE VICE CHAIRMAN AFTER RETIREMENT LANDING A JOB AT THE LIFE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION IN JULY AS MANAGING DIRECTOR, HE NOTED, "IF IT IS FOUND THAT THE CASE IS CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE OF SELF-RESTRAINTS, THEN WE WILL DEAL WITH IT STRICTLY."

DISCREPANCY IN INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENT OVER THIRD-SECTOR MARKET ENTRY (ASAHI - PAGE 11)

(WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 1, KAZUHIKO YAMASE) A GAP ALREADY SURFACED ON THE 1ST OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PAPER EXCHANGED BETWEEN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FINANCE MINISTER WATARU KUBO AND ACTING UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE BARSHEFSKY TO CONFIRM THE DETAILS OF THE BILATERAL INSURANCE TALKS. THE PURPOSE OF THE EXCHANGE OF THE PAPER WAS "NOT TO GIVE RISE TO DISPARITY IN THE INTERPRETATION (OF THE RESULTS OF THE BILATERAL INSURANCE TALKS)" (SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF)), BUT THE EFFORT HAS SUFFERED A SETBACK RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING.

THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE AT ODDS OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF THE POINT: WHETHER LIFE AND NON-LIFE INSURERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE THIRD SECTOR, SUCH AS ACCIDENT INSURANCE, THROUGH SUBSIDIARIES, EVEN IN CASE NO AGREEMENT IS REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR.

ACTING USTR BARSHEFSKY ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 1ST NOTED, "IT HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT THEIR ENTRY INTO THE THIRD SECTOR BE BANNED UNTIL THE TWO COUNTRIES STRIKE A COMPREHENSIVE DEAL," WHICH MEANS THAT ENTRY INTO THE THIRD SECTOR BY JAPAN'S LIFE AND NON-LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES THROUGH SUBSIDIARIES IS IMPOSSIBLE BEFORE REACHING A SETTLEMENT.

IN CONTRAST, MOF EXPLAINED IN THE EARLY HOURS OF THE SAME DAY THAT THEY COULD ENTER THAT SECTOR EVEN IF AN AGREEMENT IS NOT REACHED WITHIN THE YEAR.

THE PRIMARY CONCERN OF THE FUTURE INSURANCE TALKS IS HOW LONG SUCH AN ENTRY SHOULD BE BANNED. IF AN ACCORD IS REACHED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, THE DIFFERENCE IN THE INTERPRETATION WILL NOT AFFECT THE SITUATION, BUT IF THE NEGOTIATIONS GO SOUR, THE DIFFERENCE IN THE INTERPRETATION ITSELF WILL LIKELY AFFECT THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES IN A DELICATE WAY. THE ORIGINAL REASON WHY THE INSURANCE TALKS HAVE BECOME STALEMATED IS TRACEABLE TO DISPARITY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE DOCUMENT OF AGREEMENT ISSUED IN OCTOBER, 1994. THE NEGOTIATORS ARE DETERMINED TO WIND UP THE NEGOTIATIONS BY OCTOBER 25, BUT COMPLICATIONS ARE EXPECTED UNTIL A DEAL IS REACHED.

PRIME MINISTER ORDERS SPECIFIC HELIPORT PLAN IN SPECIAL TEAM FOR FUTENMA (SANKEI - PAGE 2)

PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO ON OCTOBER 2 CALLED IN UNCLAS SECTION 08 OF 08 TOKYO 009240

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FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

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THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL MASAKI ORITA AND THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY'S DEFENSE POLICY BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL MASAHIRO AKIYAMA TO HIS OFFICIAL RESIDENCE AND ORDERED THEM TO LAUNCH A 'SPECIAL TASK FORCE' OF JAPAN AND THE U.S. TO STUDY ON THE ISSUE OF CONSTRUCTING AN ALTERNATIVE HELIPORT ACCOMPANYING THE RETURN OF THE U.S. FORCES' FUTENMA AIR STATION IN OKINAWA.

AS FOR THE IDEA OF SETTING UP A SPECIAL TASK FORCE, THE JAPANESE AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS AGREED TO IT IN A BILATERAL SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (2-PLUS-2) MEETING HELD IN SEPTEMBER, AND THE TASK FORCE IS GOING TO REACH A CONCLUSION BY THE END OF NOVEMBER. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO PLANNING TO SET UP A DOMESTIC FOLLOW-UP TEAM WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF PRIVATE-SECTOR ENGINEERING EXPERTS TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. CHAN, ACTING

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ARTICLES:

(1) EDITORIAL: Offshore Heliport Plan Dogged by Concerns

MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full)
October 1, 1996

An offshore heliport plan has surfaced to replace the one on U.S. Marine Futenma Air Station for the planned realignment and reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa.

The top leaders of Japan and the U.S. held summit talks on September 24 and reaffirmed to continue to look into alternative approaches, centering on the offshore plan.

Having Futenma Airfield back altogether has long been an earnest wish for the people of Okinawa.

However, local municipalities are against the plan to absorb and integrate the alternative heliport into Kadena Air Base, suspecting a serious noise problem. The U.S. armed forces have also reacted negatively to this plan that would force them to operate fixed-wing aircraft like jets, and rotorcraft, like helicopters, simultaneously at the same air base -- a condition that would deteriorate the level of safety significantly.

There was another plan, that was, to relocate the heliport to Camp Schwab. But again, opposition has been gaining ground to this plan, suspecting environmental destruction possibly resulting from reclamation of tracts.

Then in deadlock came the offshore heliport plan as the third alternative plan.

In fact, Japan has been looking into a similar plan since the 1970. Japan has even drafted a floating runway plan and presented it to the U.S. side in an effort to reduce the level of noise coming from night landing practice (NLP) at U.S. Atsugi Naval Air Station. The U.S. has turned it down, reasoning some uncertainties in the technological aspect.

But owing to years of joint studies conducted after

that between Japan and the U.S., tremendous progress has been made in the area of constructing floating structures. And today in Japan, the "megalo-float" project is underway by shipbuilding
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and steel companies. In the U.S., an offshore oil-bed exploitation company has been carrying out studies on offshore-base construction at the request of the Department of Defense.

What incited Japan and the U.S. to reach agreement on the offshore heliport plan was presumably the common motive to prevent a further entanglement of the "Okinawa problem," with the general election and the presidential election approaching for each country.

According to the Japanese Government, advantages of the offshore heliport plan include: "Being removable, facilities will not remain permanently," and "Burden on the Okinawans, such as the noise and safety level, will diminish." If such is true, the plan is worth studying.

But objection is still strong in Okinawa, reasoning, "Offshore or on land, there is no change in its being a relocation within Okinawa." But we believe that people would understand it if it is the fruit of state-of-the-art technology, highly safe, and gentle to the environment. But the, the plan is not free of concerns.

Japan is hypothesizing the floating-type pier engineering method that requires steel pipes to support the heliport, whereas the U.S. is considering a "mobile offshore base." Although its relationship with Okinawa is not clear, reportedly the U.S. Marine has a plan to "let its personnel station in the Philippines from time to time to carry out training, like a "lotus leaf" traveling freely from one place to another.

If it is a mobile base, it would be more like an aircraft carrier rather than a "base." In addition, possessing an aircraft carrier runs

counter to the Japanese Government's defense policy denouncing attack-type weaponry altogether. With China and other Asian countries still on alert toward the "redefined" Japan-U.S. security arrangement, "aircraft carrier-type" is expected to elicit resentment from those countries.

The Government needs to make a final decision after bringing all those elements to light and explaining thoroughly to the people. If the plan is implemented, will the U.S. have to keep its Marines stationed in Okinawa? Japan definitely needs to conduct negotiations persistently with the U.S. side in the direction of reducing the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ).

(2) MOF Sets up New Four-Item Guidance Standards for Bank Management, Including Deficit Ratio

NIHON KEIZAI (Top Play) (Full)
Evening, September 30, 1996

In an effort to strengthen its oversight function over the management of banks, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) today decided on new standards for identifying banks whose management needs to be
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improved and notified banks of the decision, effective from today. Under the plan, it has set four-item standards, such as a "ratio of reserve for losses," as criterion for identifying banks whose non-performing loans are noticeably increasing in comparison with their earning capability. It will place banks whose standards are greater than the regulated figures under its strict oversight, such as that it will have those banks submit management improvement plans and reports on their management circumstance in each accounting term. The outlook is that most of second-tier regional banks will likely exceed those regulated standards. New MOF regulation is bound to violently rattle the banking industry.

Implemented on the Same Day, Frontloading Early Correction Measures;

The "Law for Securing Soundness of the Management of Financial Institutions, Etc." was enacted in the previous Diet session, aiming at driving a self-responsibility principle home and securing transparency of banking administration. In accordance with this Law, MOF will introduce "early correction measures" from fiscal 1998. The setting of those standards this time is designed to secure transparency of banking regulation, by frontloading efforts for that until the time when such early correction measures are introduced,. Chances are high that those standards will be implemented in a more lenient manner than the planned early correction measures. Banks will become subject to the standards, but MOF is looking into a possible application of such to credit cooperatives as well.

The ratio of reserve for losses is an index that indicates the ratio of debts estimated to become delinquent to net operational profits. If banks fall under the following four cases, they become subject to receiving improvement guidance: (1) When the ratio of reserve for losses (A) held by the bank exceeds 400 percent; (2) when the ratio of reserve for losses (A) is greater than 300 percent, and the ratio of net worth is below 3.5 percent; (3) when the ratio of bad loans (so-called classified loans) to the bank's total assets is greater than 10 percent, and there is fear of such a state having a grave impact on its closing of account; and (4) in case there are important problems about the bank's management, and it needs guidance for improving its management.

(In calculating) the ratio of reserve for losses (A), the denominator is limited to 30 percent of the bank's half-year net operating profits. It is, therefore, considered that "it would be fairly difficult for such a ratio of banks other than blue-chip banks whose creditworthiness is ranked A to fall below the regulated standards" (senior executive of a leading bank).

However, MOF noted that banks whose ratio of reserve for losses with 5 percent of latent profits added to the denominator (B) is less than 200 percent and those that are most likely to

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depreciate non-performing loans will not become subject to management improving guidance by MOF. As it stands, higher-ranked city banks which have great latent profits and leading regional banks will likely be exempted from the plan.

MOF will ask banks that have become subject to MOF guidance to submit management improvement plans, by setting improvement items and a deadline (within 30 days in principle). It will continue to check their management conditions after that as well. It is determined to pursue strict oversight and guidance equivalent to the usual procedures taken for granting approval to banks for their accounts settlement. In the notification, MOF also pointed out the possibility that in case no improvement is seen, it would issue an order that will place the bank on probation.

(3) Ronten Column: Redefinition of the Security Alliance and Japan's Role, by Takeshi Igarashi, Professor at the Law Faculty of Tokyo University

YOMIURI (Page 22) (Full)
October 3, 1996

Looking at the recent Japan-United States relationship, we have noted the seasonal changes in the relationship into the security season from the economic one. Until the end of June 1995, the Japanese and U.S. Governments held negotiations over and over again on economic disputes, making themselves feel uneasy. On the U.S. side, irritated with the Japanese side for not making concession with the U.S., a press officer of the White House remarked as if to intimidate Japan that if the economic dispute were not finalized, the entire bilateral relationship would be badly affected. But now the attention of the public is focused solely on the security problems, such as forced use of land as U.S. military facilities on Okinawa and reinforcement of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.

This change of interest, needless to say, is owing to the changes of current topics. But when the matter of interest is rapidly changing in a year, our mind might be carried away only by the problem of the times.

One reason why crucial issues crop up in succession may be for the Japan-U.S. relationship to be in transition. But what is needed in the transition period is not for us to be swamped with handling

the outstanding issues accumulated until now. Rather we need to have prospects for the future while scrutinizing the nature of such pending issues despite our being busy doing daily work. To put it another way, we have to reconsider what is the task for us to tackle for now. This effort would lead to reexamining current topics from angles different from the past ones and then to elaborating a new measure.

What is essential for us to ascertain the current Japan-U.S. relationship is to turn our eyes to the UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 TOKYO 009294

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reality that the changes emerging in the international situation after the end of the cold war have a more serious impact on domestic politics in the U.S. than in Japan. The 1992 presidential election was the first one after the end of the cold war. Although incumbent President Bush at the time obtained the highest ever approval rate in history, he was defeated by young presidential candidate Clinton, who seemed unlikely. The reason was that (Bush) was unable to come up to voters who felt uneasy about economic conditions surrounding them.

Clinton elected President placed emphasis on meeting voters' expectations and made reconstruction of the American economy the top priority task for his Administration. In addition, unlike in the cold-war period, he has unfolded foreign policy based on that domestic task. His policy approach in that sense was most conspicuously reflected in his economic policy toward Japan. With the U.S. side setting improvement in its trade imbalance as the highest priority policy, friction in the Japan-U.S. relationship was brought to the fore.

How to rebuild friendly ties between Japan and the U.S. came up as a task for Japan and the U.S. to grapple with in the post-cold-war period. This task was tackled by Japanese and U.S. officials for the security problem. The fruit of their efforts was the so-called Nye report, and the two countries

confirmed that the objective of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement is to make sure the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region, and that they have the common task to solve even after the post-cold-war period. But Japan's role has been set to contribute more vigorously to realizing regional and international peace in the security area, unlike in the past, and the policy line of beefing up Japan-U.S. defense cooperation was worked out. When the Nye report was unveiled in February 1995, it was unknown whether it would be made the basic policy line for the Clinton Administration. But a rape incident involving an elementary schoolgirl occurred in September (1995) in Okinawa, and the anxiety grew stronger over whether the Clinton Administration might be unable to maintain U.S. military bases there. Under those circumstances, proposals made in the Nye report were gradually being forged into a basic policy line.

What was made clear from such a process is that the redefinition of the bilateral security treaty has been made the cornerstone of the Japan-U.S. relationship in the post-cold-war period to surmount the bilateral economic disputes as well as to stabilize Japan-U.S. bonds. This U.S. standpoint is reflected in the U.S. side's acceptance of the request for return of Futenma Air Station, faced with an outcry emerging in Okinawa, though a year before, it was inconceivable for the U.S. to accept it. For now, the propriety of the presence of U.S. Marines in Okinawa is openly discussed, and both Japanese and U.S. officials, who were in charge of security affairs, assert it

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is possible to withdraw them even at present. This phenomenon seems to be quite different from in the cold-war period.

As for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in preparation for Far-East emergencies and the need for emergency legislation for that purpose, measures must be formulated within the framework of the Constitution. To add to that, a cautious judgment should be made regarding the right of

collective self-defense. Furthermore, the prior consultation system under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has to be more effectively utilized. But we are lucky in the sense that it does not look as if a full-scale armed conflict is about to break out at any moment on the Korean Peninsula. For now, therefore, we need to pay attention to an aspect that strengthening Japan-U.S. defense cooperation will help fortify the U.S.' diplomatic footing. In this connection, the question is no enthusiastic conception has yet been offered to secure the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region, the purpose that is stipulated in the redefined U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Judging from defiant moves made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the hard-line policy approach by the Republic of Korea (ROK), it seems quite difficult for now to make a breakthrough by means of direct dialogues between North and South Korea in their strained relations. In addition, China-Taiwan relations -- which are asserted by the two countries to be a "domestic issue" -- have a great impact on the international community. To make sure the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, what is most urgent for now is a conception that transcends various types of nationalism in various countries. To relax tensions in Northeast Asia, the desirable approach in line with the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is for the Japanese Government to suggest Japan, the U.S., China and Russia work together for security cooperation and to ask the U.S. to enthusiastically tackle it.

Hiroshi Igarashi: expert on the diplomatic history of U.S. politics; author of such books as Formation of the Post-World War II Japan-U.S. Relations and Politics for Innovative Policy.

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