

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Okinawa base Issues: Positive Reaction (3 pages)	09/19/1996	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Japan-U.S. / Okinawa Base Issue (3 pages)	09/19/1996	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: Futenma Replacement Heliport (2 pages)	09/20/1996	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: Digest Executive Edition/ Weekend 3-96 (7 pages)	09/21/1996	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: Your Meeting (3 pages)	09/21/1996	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Re: Ambassador's Meeting (5 pages)	09/23/1996	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: FBIS Foreign Media Note-23SEP96 [partial] (1 page)	09/23/1996	P3/b(3)
008. cable	Re: Heliport Consolidation (5 pages)	09/24/1996	P1/b(1)
009. cable	Re: Japan-U.S. / Okinawa Base Issue (6 pages)	09/25/1996	P1/b(1)
010. cable	Re: FBIS FMN [Foreign Media Note] 0 Okinawan Division Over Heliport [partial] (1 page)	09/25/1996	P3/b(3)
011. cable	Re: Apraisal of Situation (8 pages)	09/26/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1996 - 09/26/1996]

2016-0420-F

sb1882

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Cable

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(PART 1)

TEXT:

////////////////////////////////// INCOMPLETE MESSAGE //////////////////////////////////

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- (4) Japan-U.S. Security: Emergency Study (Section 3) -- Emergency on Korean Peninsula: Government Studying Cooperation with U.S. for Rescue of Japanese Citizens
- (5) Easy Economics Column; Chuo University Professor Tomoko Furukori: Systematic Problem regarding Non-Regular Labor; Poor Treatment (Part 2)

ARTICLES:

- (1) EDITORIAL: Three Questions on Insurance Talks

NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full)
September 19, 1996

Japan-United States talks remain at a standstill over the liberalization of the Japanese market. The talks are expected to be protracted. Regarding the bogged-down talks, there are several questions.

The first point is the U.S. negotiating stance itself. The U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR) "unilateral" negotiating method of posing a threat by hinting at the possibility of imposition of sanctions under Super 301 of the Trade Act is indisputably a problem. But that is not all.

At the root of the talks is the interests of a specific insurance company of the U.S. after all. Despite this, the U.S. has made assertions as if the insurance issue is serious enough to affect the U.S. economy and Japan-U.S. relations as a whole. The aim of the insurance talks is to coordinate specific interests, quite different in nature from Okinawa talks. We must not get hold of the wrong end of the stick.

The so-called "third sector" -- the boundary line between life and non-life insurance -- is a cash cow for the U.S. The U.S. therefore has been calling for continuing restrictions on market access to that sector. Such a call is contradictory to its long-term stance of insisting

on "liberalization." The U.S. has asserted, "Unless the entire insurance market is liberalized, the U.S. will continue to oppose the liberalization of the third-sector market." Such is a distorted argument.

The second point is the Finance Ministry's murky administrative stance. It seems the ministry,
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without sufficient debate, has adopted insurance-related policy steps, which will directly effect the people's livelihood. Such cards as mail-order sales of automobile insurance, presented by the ministry during talks with the U.S. proposals, also appear to have come out of the blue, without full discussion in Japan. A ministry official explains, "Both sides have the right to withdraw their own proposals they have presented so far." Such a negotiating style itself shows the non-transparency and arbitrariness of its administrative stance.

The third point is the lack of competition and efforts for development of new products that meet consumers' needs in the Japanese insurance industry. This is a result of the industry having been overly protected by the Finance Ministry. It might be correct to say that Japanese insurers have made light of the "third sector," viewing the sector as unattractive. It is also true that the Finance Ministry opened up the "third-sector market" in order to constrain the market entry of foreign capital into the entire insurance market.

It is now necessary for both Japan and the U.S. to return to the starting point of securing consumers' benefits and to accelerate liberalization.

(2) Behind-the-Stage Efforts Made for an Offshore Floating Heliport: Prime Minister Himself Laid the Groundwork; Tantamount to Aircraft Carrier in Functions, So Repercussions Unavoidable

NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full)
September 19, 1996

As an alternative facility in response to the decision to return the United States forces' Futenma Air Station on Okinawa, an idea of constructing an offshore floating heliport has emerged. The plan, according to what was revealed, came out as a result of efforts made by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, who personally suggested constructing such a heliport based on the "floating pier construction method" (QIP method), and informally asked the U.S. Government about it. The U.S. Government, taking account into the now-bogged-down bilateral consultations, studied the feasibility of constructing it, and after getting approval from President Clinton, it made a "reply" to the Prime Minister in the way the U.S. side proposed it. The two top leaders' forward-looking stance toward the plan has made it the likeliest at a gallop, but a mountain of problems lie ahead, such as difficulties in operating it and legal matters that will arise if Japan and the U.S. jointly construct it. Confusion is also arising in the Government.

The Prime Minister's efforts to scrutinize that plan began one month before Japan-U.S. negotiations came to a deadlock owing to the confrontation between the Japanese side's plan to merge (Futenma) into Kadena Air Base and the U.S. side's proposal to relocate (Futenma) into Camp Schwab. After much
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examination about the artificial-island construction method and the reclamation engineering method, the Prime Minister arrived at this QIP method, which was employed in disaster-prevention construction works carried out on Oki-no-Torishima Island.

Unlike a "megafloat," a semi-permanent structure, a floating pier structure based on the QIP method does not need to build a breakwater nor moorings, so "it is possible to remove it if it is no longer necessary." It therefore can avoid fixing a military facility. And it would serve as part of

preparations for realignment of U.S. forces on Okinawa. The Prime Minister then concluded it would be easier to obtain an understanding from local residents. In addition, conjecturing that the effects on the natural environment, such as the ocean currents, and compensation for fishing rights, the construction cost and other problems would be more smoothly cleared, compared with "megafloat," he informally sounded out the U.S. side about that idea.

"This plan was discussed only within the secretaries' office," said the Prime Minister. In fact, only a handful of the staff working at the Prime Minister's residential office (Kantei) were engaged in elaborating the plan. In a working group meeting of the Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) held on the 13th, that plan was floated as a proposal from the U.S. side. Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda, Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Hideo Usui and other officials reported it to the Prime Minister, but a participant revealed: "The Prime Minister had already known about the offshore floating heliport plan."

The JDA takes a cautious stance about the plan because there are, it thinks, a number of difficulties in operational aspects, such as where to construct a floating heliport, how to transport troops to the sea, related facilities on the ground, such as housing. But the Prime Minister telephoned Okinawa Governor Masahide Ota on the 13th to convey that plan to him. He made arrangements to announce it to the prefectural citizens during his Okinawa visit on the 17th. Everything was prepared under the leadership of the Kantei side.

But no detailed discussion has been held among working-level officials, so some in the Government have mistaken it for "megafloat," causing the Prime Minister to complain: "They are confused." Regarding "megafloat," a test facility is constructed by the Ministry of Transport (MOT), and it is now being tested, but it will take a long way to go to put it into commercial use. Furthermore, it will not be completed in five to seven years, during which Futenma Air Station will be returned.

Furthermore, many other problems still remain to be solved. The Prime Minister refers to a blueprint
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decided to secede from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (but the North withheld its secession in June). Consequently, the tensions became high, and the U.S. Capitol Hill openly discussed even the possibility of making an aerial attack on the nuclear facilities located near Nyungbyon (Yeongbyeon). Moreover, there were also arguments calling for economic sanctions based on a U.N. Security Council resolution or sanctions under the initiative of countries concerned.

Against such moves, a key figure of Pyongyang repeatedly made hard-line remarks: "Economic sanctions mean a war." "Seoul will become a sea of fire." In the spring of 1994, the situation became strained.

Study right after withdrawal decision

A former high-ranking government officials says it was before former Prime Minister Hata's assumption of office when the government began its secret studies on how to cope with an emergency on the Korean Peninsula.

Right after North Korea decided to withdraw from the NPT, the Cabinet set up a joint intelligence conference, which was presided over by the then deputy chief cabinet secretary, Nobuo Ishihara, and the government began to study countermeasures to be taken in the event of an emergency and also studied law revisions required for that purpose.

The joint conference was made up of intelligence-related officials at the bureau director general level from various government ministries and agencies, including the chief of the Cabinet Information Research Office, the chief of the Cabinet Security Affairs Office, the director general of the Japan Defense Agency Defense Policy Bureau, the director general of the National Police Agency Security Bureau, the deputy director general of the Public Security Investigation Agency, and the director general of the Foreign Ministry Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau. It used to meet once or twice a month from before.

Thereafter, with the tensions growing high, the government made studies on such emergency measures

as Japan's extending cooperation in case the UNSC decided on economic sanctions, Japan's giving support to the U.S. in the event of a war breaking out, and the Self-Defense Forces' carrying out such activities as going into defense operations to guard atomic power plants and other important facilities, rescuing Japanese nationals abroad, and transport foreign refugees. Regarding such measures, the government pushed ahead with its studies, classifying and clearing up what is possible under the existing laws, what is partially possible, and what will require new legislations or law amendments.

At the stage where that work was suspended with Carter's visit to North Korea, the government was
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not in a state of creating bills in concrete terms.

Attacks on government offices and bases also
hypothesized

What became a particularly difficult problem was engaging the SDF in minesweeping activities and defense operations. The U.S. was thinking of dispatching naval and marine troops to carry out landing operations along the shore of North Korea. But the U.S. side was lacking minesweeping capabilities that were required to remove mines. So, there was no formal request from the U.S., but JDA had predicted that "the U.S. side would probably ask Japan to dispatch minesweepers."

However, clearing the sea within the range of coastal guns and anti-ship missiles is an extremely dangerous, direct combat action, and such is obviously out of the bounds of the right of individual self-defense (kobetsuteiki jieiken). So, the government decided to extend cooperation only on disposing of floating mines in international waters.

On the other hand, the government, in its studies on SDF defense operations, hypothesized the

possibility of North Korean special forces infiltrating into Japan to attack such facilities as atomic power plants located at 17 places in the country (including 10 places on the Sea of Japan side), U.S. military bases, Shinkansen (bullet-train) lines, and government offices in Tokyo. Such operations were studied because police cannot cope with such a situation.

Defense operations, stipulated in Article 76 of the SDF Law, are ordered by the Prime Minister in case there is "an armed attack from outside" (including cases where Japan may sustain such an attack). The SDF is not allowed to assign its troops to guard activities outside its bases unless there is an order for such defense operations or public security mobilization. However, a foreign special unit's attack corresponds to "an attack from outside," and it therefore differs from 'indirect aggression' that is considered for public security mobilization.

In the case of defense operations, however, Japan will be under wartime structure, and the SDF will be allowed to control private-sector hospitals, expropriate land and housing property, and issue orders to those engaged in such jobs as medical service, construction, and transportation. Local public entities, police organizations, and fire stations also will be required to cooperate with the SDF. As seen from such, the SDF will have great authority. For this reason, invoking defense operations require the Diet's approval in advance, and the SDF is to obtain the Diet's ex post facto approval in case there is a particularly urgent situation.

The case where Japan "may sustain an attack" is not UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 10 TOKYO 008753

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a mere possibility, and the government's interpretation of such a case is that it should be highly probable. However, special rangers' activities can hardly be predicted. Therefore, the government checked into measures that would enable

the SDF to take 'security activities' differing from defense operations and public security mobilization. The former high-ranking official says that the government planned time-limit legislations that will be effective just during a contingency so as to avoid criticism as far as possible and legislate such as early as possible, and then intended to introduce a large number of bills in a package and set up a special committee to expedite deliberations.

(Japan-U.S. Security Affairs Coverage Team)

(4) Japan-U.S. Security: Emergency Study (Section 3)

Emergency on Korean Peninsula: Government Studying Cooperation with U.S. for Rescue of Japanese Citizens; 1994 Plan under Review; Japan Expected to Take on Overseas Transportation; SDF Ship Dispatch Also Envisioned

ASAHI (Top Play) (Full)
September 17, 1996

Regarding rescue operations for Japanese nationals in the event of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, the Government has decided to make an overall review of its plan formulated in 1994 and to rescue foreign citizens, including Japanese nationals as well, in cooperation with the U.S. Based on this decision, the Government is now conducting studies with the U.S. Government. The plan is that the U.S. is to undertake overland transportation in the Republic of Korea and Japan is to take on airborne and seaborne transportation out of that country and receive those foreign residents for a while. Moreover, the Government, as one of its studies on emergency situations, is going to look also into the possibility of revising the Self-Defense Forces Law while considering such operations as dispatching Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels.

The Japanese and U.S. cabinet members in charge of foreign and defense affairs will discuss a review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation at a 2-plus-2 meeting of the two countries' security consultative committee to be held in Washington on September 19. A progress report is expected to be submitted on that occasion, and is also expected to list the "protection of non-combat personnel" as the first matter to be discussed.

After the 1994 strain over the Korean Peninsula came to a pause, the Japanese Government repeatedly held informal consultations with the U.S. side to

ask if it would be possible to carry out rescue operations for Japanese nationals in the form of UNCLAS SECTION 08 OF 10 TOKYO 008753

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being included in U.S. non-combat personnel rescue operations (NEO).

The Japanese side first considered providing U.S. citizens evacuated from the ROK with lodgings and meals if and when they stop over in Japan. At the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in April this year, however, the two countries agreed to review the Guidelines as a step to tighten defense cooperation. The Japanese side later began to look into the possibility of facilitating transportation for them to escape from South Korea as requested by the U.S. side in that review work.

A U.S. Government source has said, "First of all, we want Japan to charter civilian aircraft and ships. We're not expecting Japan's cooperation after a battle sets in." So, Japan is expected to center its role on the task of facilitating transportation in a pre-battle strained situation.

The U.S. has several NEO plans for its citizens in South Korea. One of them is that U.S. citizens in that country are supposed to assemble at a certain place in the city of Seoul, make use of such traffic means as railways to go to southern cities that are comparatively safer, and leave that country by air or water. The ROK Government consents informally to foreign residents' making use of railways for evacuation even under its control in the event of an emergency, and both Britain and Canada also are said to have worked out their own plans to rescue their respective citizens on the basis of cooperation to be extended by the U.S.

Many in the Foreign Ministry and the Japan Defense Agency say unanimously, "It's a give-and-take measure to rescue Japanese national overseas. If Japan does not contribute to the rescue of foreign nationals in the event of an emergency around

Japan, we can't ask other countries to rescue Japanese nationals in Africa or in the Middle East. In my own view, I think it's only natural to dispatch MSDF vessels."

As for studies on such activities as dispatching SDF troops for the rescue of Japanese citizens abroad, the Government, in the wake of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's order given in May, has been conducting such studies in a Cabinet Security Affairs Office working group for emergency studies on the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas.

The working group, according to an official, is now studying such activities, including the possibility of the following three points: (1) dispatching SDF vessels; (2) dispatching (SDF ships) in case the safety of government aircraft is not confirmed; and (3) promoting cooperation with various countries for the rescue of foreign residents.

(Japan-U.S. Security Affairs Coverage Team)

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(5) Easy Economics Column; Chuo University
Professor Tomoko Furukori: Systematic Problem
regarding Non-Regular Labor; Poor Treatment (Part
2)

NIHON KEIZAI (Page 23) (Full)
August 15, 1996

There is a pay differential between regular employees and non-regular employees. The hourly wage of female part-time workers, who command the majority of non-regular employees, is approximately 58 percent of female full-time employees ("Wage Census" issued by the Ministry of Labor (MOL) in 1996)

Wages are remunerations for labor. The principle of equal pay for equal work is supposed to work if the competition mechanisms completely functions in

the labor market. Therefore, if the labor market is competitive, long-existing wage disparities are basically supposed to manifest differentials in the quality of labor. In reality, however, it is differentials in the employment form that have brought about differentials in wages and allowances.

I have surveyed wages paid to female full-time and part-time workers at supermarkets. The survey has revealed that the ratio of the wages of part-time workers to those of full-time workers was 62 percent in Japan and 72 percent in the United States. Differentials in the number of years they received education are small both in Japan and the U.S. Many of those female employees who responded to the survey replied, "Full-time employees do similar jobs to part-time workers."

The treatment of part-timers is by far inferior to that of full-timers even if they do equal work and work for the same hours and if the length of their service is the same. The wages of female part-timers have not increased in proportion to those of male and female full-timers. They have stayed almost flat regardless of the length of their service.

Workers receive various kinds of allowances and benefits in addition to wages. If these items are included, employment differentials between full-timers and part-timers become even wider. Most firms do not provide non-regular employees with allowances, such as family allowance, housing allowance, allowance paid to those in titled positions and merit allowance. When it comes to the welfare aspect, 40 percent of non-regular employees are not covered by employment insurance, health insurance and welfare pension insurance ("Fact-Finding Survey and Research of Part-Time Workers" issued by the Japan Labor Research Organ in 1991).

As a recent trend, part-timers work for more years and they are becoming stable and regular work force. The average length of their service is
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approximately 5 years. However, only 60 percent of business entities that employ them give them bonuses. About 40 percent of such regularly raise their salaries and basic wage rates. Almost no business entities give non-regular employees retirement allowances. Even if they do, the amounts are only nominal.

Part-time employees can be dividedn into two categories -- "short-hour part-timers" who work for shorter hours and "long-hour part-timers" who work for almost the same hours as regular employees. Despite differences in working hours, both are regarded as the same "part-timers" who receive the same wages, allowances and benefits.

MONDALE

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 10

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SUBJ: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 20

TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 008773

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR
EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA
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COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 20

TOP HEADLINES:

ASAHI: U.S. PREFERS MOVABLE-TYPE, WHILE JAPAN FAVORS FIXED-
TYPE IN PLAN FOR "FLOORING OFFSHORE HELIPORT" AS
ALTERNATIVE FOR FUTENMA'S HELIPORT; GAP SEEN IN BASIC
CONCEPT; 10 KNOTS SPEED AT MAXIMUM CONSIDERED BY U.S.
(TRANSLATION BELOW)

NIHON KEIZAI: ILLEGAL COPPER DEALS: SUMITOMO
CORPORATION'S LOSSES REACH AS MUCH AS 285.0 BILLION YEN;
DEFICIT AMOUNT TO TOTAL 150 BILLION YEN FOR THIS BUSINESS

TERM; CHAIRMAN AKIYAMA TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY AND RESIGN

TOKYO SHIMBUN: GREEN CROSS'S FORMER AND INCUMBENT THREE PRESIDENTS ARRESTED ON CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE RESULTING IN DEATH REGARDING AIDS-INFECTION; HAD OVERLOOKED SHIPMENT OF "UNTREATED BLOOD PRODUCTS"; OSAKA PUBLIC PROSECUTORS' OFFICE TO PURSUE HEALTH AND WELFARE MINISTRY FOR ITS RESPONSIBILITY

MAINICHI: SUCCESSIVE PRESIDENTS OF GREEN CROSS ARRESTED -
- MATSUSHITA, SUYAMA, KAWANO; OSAKA DISTRICT PUBLIC PROSECUTORS' OFFICE TO INVESTIGATE INTO IRON TRIANGLE AMONG INDUSTRY, BUREAUCRACY AND ACADEMICS

YOMIURI: THREE PRESIDENTS, INCLUDING FORMER AND INCUMBENT ONES, OF GREEN CROSS ARRESTED; FORMER SENIOR MANAGING DIRECTOR ALSO INVESTIGATED; CORPORATE TOP LEADERS PURSUED FOR THEIR RESPONSIBILITY OVER AIDS SCANDAL

SANKEI: THREE SUCCESSIVE PRESIDENTS OF GREEN CROSS ARRESTED BY OSAKA PUBLIC PROSECUTORS' OFFICE IN CONNECTION WITH HIV SCANDAL; ON CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE RESULTING IN DEATH; CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY PURSUED BECAUSE OF CONTINUED SHIPMENT OF "UNTREATED BLOOD PRODUCTS"

BASIC CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPAN ON OFFSHORE HELIPORT (ASAHI - TOP PLAY)

THE 'SEA-BASED HELIPORT' PLAN, NEWLY BROUGHT UP BY THE U.S. AS AN ALTERNATIVE FACILITY FOR THE U.S. MARINE CORPS' FUTENMA AIR STATION ON OKINAWA, IS FOR A SELF-PROPELLED FLOATING-BODY STRUCTURE. IN CONTRAST, THE JAPANESE SIDE'S BLUEPRINT CITES THE FORMULA OF LAYING A RUNWAY ON POSTS DRIVEN INTO THE SEA BOTTOM. SUCH A CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE HAS NOW BEEN REVEALED IN THE TWO COUNTRIES' RESPECTIVE BASIC CONCEPTS. AT A JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (2-PLUS-2) MEETING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 19, BOTH SIDES CONFIRMED THEIR INTENTION OF REACHING A CONCLUSION BY THE END OF NOVEMBER AFTER LOOKING INTO THE FEASIBILITY OF SUCH A FLOATING HELIPORT CONCEPT AS ONE OF THEIR OPTIONS IN ADDITION TO THEIR RESPECTIVE PLANS FOR ABSORPTION INTO KADENA AIR FORCE BASE AND RELOCATION TO CAMP SCHWAB. HOWEVER, BOTH COUNTRIES ARE VIRTUALLY REGARDING THIS HELIPORT PLAN AS "THE MOST LIKELY OPTION" (ACCORDING TO A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL). ALL THE MORE FOR THIS REASON, ADOPTING SUCH AN OPTION IS PREGNANT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF CAUSING MUCH CONFUSION BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF THE JAPANESE AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS AND WITH OKINAWA PREFECTURE ON THE LOCAL SIDE.

THE U.S.-PROPOSED CONCEPT IS CALLED A 'MOBILE OFFSHORE BASE' (MOB), WHICH IS BASED ON TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW FOR SUBMARINE OIL-FIELD RIGS. IT WAS DEVELOPED BY BROWN AND ROUTE CO. (TN: PHONETIC) (HEADQUARTERED AT HOUSTON), A CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND ENERGY RESOURCES DEVELOPER, AT THE REQUEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MAINLY AS A

STATION TO PREPOSITION WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE STUDIED SPECIFIC UTILIZATION.

ACCORDING TO THE COMPANY'S ACCOUNT, THE CONCEPT IS TO BUILD A "SEABASE" BY JOINING STEEL FABRIC UNITS -- EACH UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 07 TOKYO 008773

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 20

OF WHICH IS ABOUT 150 METERS LONG, ABOUT 90 METERS WIDE, AND ABOUT 60 METERS HIGH -- AT NEED. THEY CAN BE JOINED AND DISJOINED AT SEA. IT IS AN ARCHITECTURE OF THE ALL-WEATHER TYPE AND CAN BE USED ALSO AS A RUNWAY FOR SUCH FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AS C-130 TRANSPORTS. ONCE SUCH IS CONSTRUCTED, IT "CAN BE USED FOR AT LEAST 40 YEARS," SAYS AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMPANY.

EACH OF THOSE MOB UNITS IS EQUIPPED WITH A TOTAL OF SIX 'LEG' POSTS, AND ITS BUILT-IN PROPELLERS ENABLE ITS CONFIGURATIONAL CONTROL AND MOVING. IN THE CALM SEA, ITS MAXIMUM SPEED REACHES 10 KNOTS. IN THE OPEN SEA, THE SEABASE IS PULLED BY OTHER SHIPS TO MOVE AROUND, THE COMPANY EXPLAINS. AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMPANY REMARKS, "WE'VE ALREADY FINISHED 85 PERCENT OF OUR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT." THE COMPANY HAS EXPERIMENTED MOB WITH THE USE OF A SCALE MODEL, BUT HAS YET TO BUILD A REAL UNIT. THE COST OF CONSTRUCTION IS ESTIMATED AT "APPROXIMATELY 200 BILLION YEN" FOR A MOBILE SEABASE OF SIX UNITS.

WHAT LIES BEHIND THIS CONCEPT IS THE U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET'S TENDING TO BE CUT BACK IN THE POST-COLD WAR SITUATION. ANOTHER BACKGROUND FACTOR IS THAT A NUMBER OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, NOW TURNING INTO MAIN THREATS AFTER THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION, HAVE PROLIFERATED IN VARIOUS REGIONS. IN ORDER FOR THE U.S. TO MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF ITS MILITARY STRENGTH UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS, ITS ARMED FORCES WILL BE CALLED TO THE NECESSITY OF PREPOSITIONING WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES AT VARIOUS PLACES IN THE WORLD. THE U.S. NAVY ALREADY POSSESSES A FLEET OF VESSELS CALLED OVERSEAS-PREPOSITIONED SHIPS, AND THE CONCEPT PROPOSED THIS TIME IS ON AN EXTENSION LINE OF THAT STRATEGY.

FURTHERMORE, IT IS GRADUALLY BECOMING EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO MAKE USE OF BASES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES -- AS IS SYMBOLIZED BY THE FACT THAT VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE RELUCTANT TO EXTEND COOPERATION TO THE U.S. ON ITS MILITARY ATTACK ON IRAQ THIS MONTH.

THE OTHER CONCEPT, NOW BEING STUDIED ON THE JAPANESE SIDE, IS CALLED THE 'MEGAFLOAT QUAY INSTALLATION PROCESS' (QIP), IS A PLAN TO LAY A RUNWAY -- ELEVATED TO A HEIGHT SO AS NOT TO BE WASHED BY THE WAVES -- ON STEEL POSTS DRIVEN INTO THE SEA BOTTOM. SUCH IS "REMOVABLE," BUT IT IS FIXED TO THE SEA BOTTOM, AND IT THEREFORE HAS NO SELF-PROPELLING CAPABILITY.

ACCORDING AN INFORMED SOURCE, SUCH IS NOW ALREADY USED FOR A PORTION OF LA GUARDIA AIRPORT IN NEW YORK, AND IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONSTRUCT A RUNWAY WITH AN OVERALL LENGTH OF UP TO 1,500 METERS AS DESIGNED. THE SOURCE ALSO SAYS SUCH CAN BE CONSTRUCTED IN ABOUT THREE AND A HALF YEARS. THE COST OF CONSTRUCTION IS ESTIMATED AT "210 TO 230 BILLION YEN" -- PARTLY DEPENDING ON THE SOIL NATURE OF THE SEA BOTTOM.

REGARDING THE U.S. PROPOSAL, A GOVERNMENT SOURCE ADMITS, "THE FACILITY THE PRIME MINISTER TALKED ABOUT IN OKINAWA AND THE ONE PROPOSED BY THE U.S. ARE BASICALLY DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER." THE SOURCE ADDS, "IF AND WHEN WE ARE GOING TO DO IT ACTUALLY, THERE WOULD BE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS, SUCH AS WHERE TO CONSTRUCT IT AND HOW TO CARRY IT." THE SOURCE SO POINTS OUT THAT THERE WILL BE MANY PROBLEMS TO BE IRONED OUT FOR MATERIALIZATION.

SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HAS YET TO ELUCIDATE ITS FLOATING HELIPORT PLAN IN DETAIL, OKINAWA PREFECTURE'S GOVERNOR MASAHIDE OTA ALSO REMAINS CAUTIOUS ABOUT EVALUATION, SAYING, "ITS CONTENTS HAVE NOT BEEN MADE KNOWN YET."

JAPAN OFFERS AIRFIELDS AND PORTS TO U.S. IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY; PANEL MAY BE SET UP (MAINICHI - PAGE 1)

(WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 19, NATSUKI MOTOTANI) ATTENDED BY UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 07 TOKYO 008773

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 20

THE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, A JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL MEETING (2-PLUS-2) STARTED ITS SESSION ON THE MORNING OF THE 19TH (LATE HOURS OF THE 19TH, JAPAN TIME). IN THE SESSION, THE TWO SIDES APPROVED AN INTERIM REPORT COMPILED BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE COOPERATION" (SDC) REGARDING A REVIEW OF THE GUIDELINE FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE

COOPERATION. IN REGARD TO THE MAIN FOCUS ON "CONTINGENCIES NEAR JAPAN," THE MEETING SUGGESTED FEASIBILITY STUDIES OF FIVE TOPICS, INCLUDING THE SUPPLYING OF PRIVATE AIRPORTS AND HARBORS FOR USE BY THE U.S. ARMED FORCES. IN ADDITION, IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE, WHICH IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION, THE TWO SIDES, AIMING TO COMPILE A NEW GUIDELINE NEXT FALL, STARTED TO LOOK SERIOUSLY INTO HOW BILATERAL DEFENSE COOPERATION SHOULD BE SET IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH AN EMERGENCY NEAR JAPAN, A PENDING ISSUE SINCE THE PRESENT SET OF GUIDELINES WAS ADOPTED IN 1978.

INTERIM DEFENSE COOPERATION REPORT: MAKES EMERGENCY LEGISLATION INDISPENSIBLE (SANKEI - PAGE 2)

FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OF JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES YESTERDAY ACCEPTED AN INTERIM REPORT FOR RECONSIDERING THE GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION. THE REPORT INCLUDES A CONCRETE STUDY OF DEFENSE COOPERATION AIMED AT PREVENTING DISPUTES FROM BREAKING OUT. THE MAJOR AIM FOR SUCH AN INCLUSION IS TO TRY TO BUILD AN ALL-OUT COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE FOR A "PREVENTIVE DEFENSE STRATEGY," A PLAN ON WHICH THE U.S. HAS PLACED EMPHASIS IN THE POST-COLD-WAR PERIOD.

IN THE 1996 NATIONAL DEFENSE REPORT RELEASED IN MARCH THIS YEAR, IN PLACE OF THE CRISIS-MANAGEMENT CONCEPT OF GIVING THE TOP PRIORITY TO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POWER ADOPTED UNDER THE COLD-WAR PERIOD, THE U.S. UNVEILED ITS THREE-STAGE STRATEGY TO BRING DISPUTES UNDER CONTROL. THE STRATEGY CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING: (1) PREVENTION OF EMERGENCE OF THREATS; (2) DETERRENCE OF AN EMERGED THREAT; AND (3) PREVENTION OF EXPANSION IF DETERRENCE EFFORTS FAIL.

AS A "PREVENTIVE" POLICY DIRECTED AT ASIA, THE U.S. HAS ALREADY BEEN BUILDING AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK TO CONVINCE NORTH KOREA TO ABANDON PLANS FOR DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A REVIEW OF THE ABOVE GUIDELINES IMPLIES ENHANCEMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF "DETERRENCE" TO ANY DISPUTE BECAUSE THE U.S. FORCES' FORWARD-DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY WILL BE UNDERWRITTEN IN THE FORM OF JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION.

FOR JAPAN TO FACE SECURITY CONCERNS NEARBY, SUCH AS THE KOREAN PENINSULA SITUATION, THE DISPUTE BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN, AND THE ISSUE OF CLAIMS TO THE SPTRATLY ISLANDS, IT SERVES NATIONAL INTERESTS, NEEDLESS TO SAY, TO MAKE THE "DETERRENCE" FRAMEWORK THAT CENTERS ON THE U.S. TO BE CERTAIN.

HOWEVER, ON SUCH "LOGISTICAL SUPPORT" FOR THE U.S. FORCES AS MEDICAL TREATMENT, SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORTATION, AS WELL AS COOPERATION FOR MOBILIZING TROOPS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PATROLLING/MONITORING AND MINE-SWEEPING, WHAT WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE FUTURE STUDY PROCESS IS TO CLEAR UP THE SO-CALLED "GRAY ZONE" LYING BETWEEN THE EXERCISE OF THE

RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE THAT IS SAID TO BE PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENSE.

IN ADDITION, TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSE COOPERATION, THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES (SDF) AND THE U.S. FORCES NEED TO DRAW UP A "JOINT OPERATION PLAN," AND FOR THAT EMERGENCY LEGISLATION WILL BE INDISPENSABLE. WITH THE RELEASE OF THE INTERIM REPORT, THE JAPANESE SIDE UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 07 TOKYO 008773

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 20

SEEMS TO HAVE SHOULDERED A HEAVIER RESPONSIBILITY.
(RYUJI SATO FROM WASHINGTON)

COALITION LEADERS AGREE TO CONVENING DIET ON 27TH, THEN DISSOLVING IT FOR OCTOBER 20 ELECTION (MAINICHI - PAGE 1)

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RULING COALITION YESTERDAY HELD A MEETING OF THE THREE PARTY HEADS AND AN EXECUTIVE LIAISON COUNCIL MEETING. AS A RESULT, THEY DECIDED TO CONVENE THE 137TH EXTRAORDINARY DIET ON SEPTEMBER 27. PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO IS PLANNING TO DISSOLVE THE DIET AT THE OUTSET OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION. AS A RESULT, THE TIMETABLE OF "PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT FOR OCTOBER 8 AND ELECTION FOR OCTOBER 20" HAS VIRTUALLY BEEN DECIDED. AS THE NEXT STEP, IN TODAY'S CABINET MEETING THE GOVERNMENT WILL FORMALLY DECIDE ON THE CONVOCAION OF THE NEXT EXTRAORDINARY DIET TO CARRY OUT A GENERAL ELECTION FOR THE FIRST TIME UNDER THE NEW PARALLEL ELECTORAL SYSTEM.

PRIOR TO THIS SESSION, THE PRIME MINISTER (PRESIDENT OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)) MET WITH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP) CHAIRMAN TOMIICHI MURAYAMA AND SAKIGAKE PRESIDENT SHOICHI IDE. THE THREE LEADERS AGREED TO CONVENE THE DIET ON THE 27TH. THE PLAN WAS ALSO APPROVED BY THE COALITION RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS MEETING AND THE GOVERNMENT AND RULING COALITION EXECUTIVE OFFICERS COUNCIL MEETING THAT FOLLOWED. WITH THAT DECISION IN HAND, CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY SEIROKU KAJIYAMA REVEALED THE GOVERNMENT'S PLAN IN THE STEERING COMMITTEE MEETINGS OF THE TWO HOUSES. (AKIO NAKAJIMA)

ECONOMIC AND REFORM POLICY AGENDA SHELVED BY EARLY DIET-DISSOLUTION DECISION (MAINICHI - PAGE 9)

THE HEADS OF THE THREE RULING COALITION PARTIES IN A MEETING HELD YESTERDAY AGREED TO CONVENE AN EXTRAORDINARY DIET SESSION ON THE 27TH, AS PART OF A PLAN TO DISSOLVE THE LOWER HOUSE AND CALL A SNAP GENERAL ELECTION. THIS LEAVES THE TACKLING OF A NUMBER OF ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES BY THE GOVERNMENT AND RULING PARTIES FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION. WITH THE FOOTING OF THE RECOVERING ECONOMY STILL UNSURE, THERE ARE MANY CONTENTIOUS AND DIFFICULT ISSUES TO TACKLE, SUCH AS THE WHETHER TO COMPILE AN ECONOMIC STIMULUS PACKAGE AND THE SETTING OF A TARGET FOR FISCAL REFORMS. DEALING WITH A MOUNTAIN OF PRIORITY ISSUES, SUCH AS WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE CONSUMPTION TAX (HIKE) ISSUE, A REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, WILL BE DEPENDENT LARGELY ON A NEW ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY APPROACH. AS IT STANDS, ATTENTION NOW IS ONLY FOCUSED ON THE OUTCOME OF THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTION. (KAZUO OTAKA)

-- ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES

THE GOVERNMENT HAS PUT OFF THE COMPILING OF A SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET IN THE EXTRAORDINARY DIET SESSION, CITING, "THE ECONOMY IS STAGING A MODERATELY-PACED RECOVERY." HOWEVER, THE VIEW FOR DRAFTING A SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET AFTER THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTION IS BOUND TO RISE AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PERSISTING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE TREND IN PERSONAL CONSUMPTION.

THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF), WHICH WANTS TO AVOID A LARGE-SCALE SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET IN CONSIDERATION OF THE NATION'S TIGHT FISCAL CONDITION, IS FOCUSING ITS ATTENTION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION, ONE OFFICIAL NOTING, "IF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP) AND THE SHINSHINTO, WHICH ARE CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE, PRESSURE FOR A SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET WILL LIKELY RISE. IF THE MINSHUTO (DEMOCRATIC PARTY), WHICH IS CRITICAL OF A POLICY LINE OF GIVING PRIORITY TO PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS, UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 07 TOKYO 008773

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 20

COMES TO HAVE A STRONG VOICE, A SITUATION OF JUST THE OPPOSITE COULD OCCUR."

WHETHER 2 TRILLION YEN IN SPECIAL TAX BREAKS SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN FISCAL 1997 WILL ALSO LIKELY BE INFLUENCED BY HOW VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC IN THE ELECTION BATTLES. THIS ISSUE IS MIXED WITH THE HIKE OF THE CONSUMPTION TAX RATE PLANNED FROM NEXT APRIL.

-- FISCAL STRUCTURAL REFORM

THE FISCAL ADVISORY COUNCIL (ADVISORY PANEL TO THE FINANCE MINISTER) WILL DRAW UP BY THE END OF THE YEAR RECOMMENDATIONS THAT INCLUDE A TARGET FOR FISCAL STRUCTURAL REFORMS. IT IS FAIRLY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN THE CONSENSUS OF THE PEOPLE REGARDING A REVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF EXPENDITURES, BECAUSE NOT ONLY DOES SUCH A REVIEW INVOLVE A PROCESS OF TAKING A SECOND LOOK AT THE VESTED INTERESTS OF EACH GOVERNMENT AGENCY, BUT THERE IS FEAR THAT IT MAY LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THE LOAD TO BE BORNE BY THE PEOPLE AND A CUT IN SERVICE. STRONG LEADERSHIP IS REQUIRED IN SETTING SUCH TARGETS OR IMPLEMENTING SPECIFIC ISSUES. THE CAPABILITY OF A NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL BE PUT TO THE TEST.

-- TAX SYSTEM REFORM

THE GOVERNMENT'S TAX SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL HAS MADE EFFORTS IN ORDER TO MAP OUT WITHIN THIS YEAR MID-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS, CENTERING ON FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE CONSUMPTION TAX AND A REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM. IT WILL, HOWEVER, SUSPEND ITS ACTIVITIES FOR THE TIME BEING, BECAUSE TAX PROBLEMS ARE CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE MOTIVES OF VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES, AND SO, "OUR WORK SHOULD NOT BLOCK OR GIVE SUPPORT TO (ANY SPECIFIC POLITICAL PARTIES)" (CHAIRMAN HIROSHI KATO). THE CONSUMPTION TAX IS SET TO BE HIKE TO 5 PERCENT FROM NEXT APRIL, BUT A POSSIBILITY OF A RISE IN AN ARGUMENT CALLING FOR FREEZING SUCH A HIKE CANNOT BE RULED OUT, DEPENDING ON THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY APPROACH.

-- ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

THE MOOD IS THAT THE PROPOSED REFORM OF MOF WILL DIE OUT AS INSUFFICIENT. IN ELECTION BATTLES, EACH POLITICAL PARTY WILL MAKE AN APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE, BY PLEDGING A PLAN TO BOLDLY REFORM KASUMIGASEKI (THE BUREAUCRACY).

ECONOMIC POLICY TASKS TO BE WORKED OUT IN FUTURE

--ECONOMIC STIMULUS MEASURES

PROPRIETY OF COMPILING A SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET AND CONTINUING SPECIAL TAX BREAKS--ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

REALIZATION OF REFORM OF MOF AND RESTRUCTURING OF KASUMIGASEKI

--FISCAL STRUCTURAL REFORM

SETTING A TARGET FOR A SOUND FISCAL STATE

--TAX SYSTEM REFORM

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE CONSUMPTION TAX AND A REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM

--CONSOLIDATION OF SHINKANSEN (BULLET TRAIN) NETWORKS

PROPRIETY OF STARTING CONSTRUCTING WORK FOR THE REMAINING SECTIONS AND A FISCAL PROBLEM

--LIQUIDATION OF LONG-TERM DEFICITS CARRIED BY THE FORMER JAPANESE NATIONAL RAILWAYS

UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 07 TOKYO 008773

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 20

MAPPING OUT AN APPROACH TO SUCH HANDLING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE BURDEN TO BE SHOULDERED BY THE PEOPLE

--OKINAWA DEVELOPMENT MEASURES

TURN INTO A CONCRETE DEAL A PROPOSED SPECIAL ADJUSTMENT APPROPRIATION OF 5 BILLION YEN

--TRADE ISSUES

INSURANCE TALKS AND PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM PROBLEM BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES--NURSING-CARE INSURANCE FINALIZING LEGISLATION

SUPER 301 PREPARATIONS TO START AS GULF WIDENS IN U.S.- JAPAN INSURANCE TALKS (MAINICHI - PAGE 9)

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES CONTINUED WORKING-LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS OF THE JAPAN-U.S. INSURANCE TALKS AT THE FINANCE MINISTRY OFF AND ON FROM THE MORNING OF THE 18TH THROUGH THE EARLY DOWN OF THE 19TH, BUT THEY DID NOT GO ANY FURTHER THAN TO RECONFIRM THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPOSALS THEY PRESENTED DURING THE TALKS IN VANCOUVER, CANADA, IN EARLY AUGUST, WHICH ENDED IN RUPTURE. THE GAP IN BOTH SIDES' VIEWS REMAINS WIDE. THE U.S. IS NOW LIKELY TO START CONSIDERATION OF IMPOSING THE SUPER-301 SECTION OF THE TRADE ACT AS EARLY AS LATE SEPTEMBER.

IN ITS 1996 FOREIGN TRADE BARRIER REPORT RELEASED THIS APRIL, THE U.S. INCLUDED THE INSURANCE AREA IN THE LIST OF ITEMS LIKELY TO FALL WITHIN APPLICATION OF SANCTION MEASURES BASED ON SECTION 301. THE DEADLINE FOR STARTING

SANCTION PROCEDURES HAS BEEN SET AT THE END OF THIS MONTH. A U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL HAS INDICATED THAT IF JAPAN DECIDES TO LIBERALIZE THE ACCIDENT INSURANCE MARKET, THE U.S. WOULD PREPARE NEW PROCEDURES, INCLUDING SANCTIONS. HE STATED, "UNLESS JAPAN RESPECTS THE 1994 BILATERAL PACT, THE U.S. WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES."

SHOULD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE END OF THIS MONTH THAT THE INSURANCE AREA IS SUBJECTED TO SANCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 301, IT WILL START AN INVESTIGATION WITHIN 21 DAYS AFTER THAT, REACHING A CONCLUSION WITHIN A YEAR. ACCORDING TO AN INFORMED SOURCE, THE IDEA OF DESIGNATING THE INSURANCE AREA AS AN ITEM THAT NEEDS CLOSER WATCH BASED ON THE SECTION 301 AND CONTINUING THE INSURANCE TALKS HAS ALSO EMERGED. THE U.S., WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION COMING IN NOVEMBER, FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO COMPROMISE IN ECONOMIC TALKS WITH JAPAN. GIVEN SUCH A SITUATION, SOME OBSERVERS ANALYZE THAT THE U.S. AIMS TO TAKE A STRATEGY OF PROLONGING THE TALKS WHILE HINTING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPOSING SANCTIONS.

HIGH U.S. OFFICIAL: SANCTIONS IF LIFE SUBSIDIARIES ENTER ACCIDENT INSURANCE MARKET (NIHON KEIZAI - PAGE 7)

A HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT NOW IN JAPAN FOR JAPAN-U.S. INSURANCE TALKS STATED YESTERDAY THAT IF THE FINANCE MINISTRY APPROVED THE ENTRY INTO THE ACCIDENT INSURANCE MARKET OF NON-LIFE INSURANCE SUBSIDIARIES OF LIFE INSURERS, NOW SCHEDULED TO BE PUT INTO OPERATION IN OCTOBER, "THE U.S. WILL TAKE DUE COUNTERMEASURES, JUDGING IT AS A VIOLATION OF THE BILATERAL INSURANCE ACCORD REACHED IN 1994." HE THUS INDICATED THAT THE U.S. WOULD START CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING RETALIATORY MEASURES. HE MADE THIS STATEMENT, BEARING IN MIND APPLICATION OF SECTION 301 OF THE U.S. TRADE ACT. YET, HE REFRAINED FROM MAKING A SPECIFIC COMMENT, ONLY SAYING, "SINCE JAPAN HAS INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE BY TALKS, IT WOULD NOT BE PROPER NOW TO REFER TO WHAT COUNTERMEASURES WE HAVE IN MIND."

REGARDING THE TALKS HELD IN TOKYO ON THE 18TH, THE OFFICIAL CRITICIZED, "WE NOW FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SETTLE UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 07 TOKYO 008773

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 20

THE ISSUE AT AN EARLY DATE DUE BECAUSE OF JAPAN'S WITHDRAWAL OF THE RESTRICTION-EASING MEASURE IT HAD PRESENTED IN EARLY AUGUST."

PUZZLE: U.S. SAYS TRADE DEFICIT WITH JAPAN JUMPED; JAPAN SAYS ITS SURPLUS WITH U.S. DROOPED (SANKEI - PAGE 10)

U.S. TRADE STATISTICS FOR JULY REVEALED BY THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT ON THE 18TH SHOWED AN INCREASE OF 42.6 PERCENT IN THE OVERALL TRADE DEFICIT FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH, WITH THE SURPLUS WITH JAPAN INCREASING 32.9 PERCENT. BUT ACCORDING TO A SPOT TRADE REPORT FOR AUGUST ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY BY JAPAN'S MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF), JAPAN'S TRADE SURPLUS WITH THE U.S. DROPPED BY 16.9 PERCENT POINTS ON A YEAR-OVER-YEAR BASIS, RECORDING A MINUS FIGURE FOR THE 18TH CONSECUTIVE MONTH.

COMPARING FIGURES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES FLATLY WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE BECAUSE JAPAN'S FIGURES ARE OBTAINED ON A YEAR-ON-YEAR BASIS, WHEREAS U.S.' STATISTICS ARE CALCULATED IN COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUS MONTH. BUT IN THEORY, WHEN JAPAN'S SURPLUS WITH THE U.S. DROPS, THE U.S. TRADE DEFICIT WITH JAPAN SHOULD ALSO DECLINE.

ACCORDING TO MOF CUSTOMS AND TARIFF BUREAU'S INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH DIVISION, TAKING AS AN EXAMPLE FOR COMPARISON THE MONTH OF JULY, JAPAN'S TRADE SURPLUS WITH THE U.S. DROPPED, DOWN 6.5 PERCENT FROM THE PREVIOUS MONTH TO 310 BILLION YEN, WHILE THE U.S.' TRADE DEFICIT WITH JAPAN ALSO WAS LOWER, DROPPING 15.1 PERCENT UNDER THE PREVIOUS MONTH TO 4.307 BILLION DOLLARS. AS FOR JUNE, JAPAN'S TRADE SURPLUS WAS 295.2 BILLION YEN, WHICH CORRESPONDED TO THE U.S. DEFICIT. JAPAN'S SURPLUS FOR THAT MONTH JUMPED SLIGHTLY.

THE GAP IN TRADE STATISTICS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IS ASCRIBABLE TO SUCH FACTORS AS DIFFERENT STATISTICAL STANDARDS AND THE YEN-DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE.

FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER SAKURAUCHI REJECTS STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF NANKING MASSACRE (SANKEI - PAGE 2)

FORMER SPEAKER OF THE LOWER HOUSE (AND FOREIGN MINISTER) YOSHIO SAKURAUCHI OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP) IN A SPEECH GIVEN YESTERDAY IN MATSUE CITY CRITICIZED SCHOOL-TEXTBOOK DESCRIPTIONS RELATED TO THE PACIFIC WAR: "ALTHOUGH THANKS TO THE WAR, SOME COUNTRIES WERE LIBERATED (FROM COLONIALISM), SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS NEVERTHELESS DO NOT CARRY ANY OTHER DESCRIPTION THAN (JAPANESE) AGGRESSION."

HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE NANKING MASSACRE THAT OCCURRED IN 1937. HE MADE STATEMENTS THAT CAST DOUBT ON DESCRIPTIONS OF IT IN SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS, SUCH AS, "WHEN I AS A SOLDIER HOSPITALIZED IN NANKING, I DID NOT HEAR ANYTHING ABOUT SUCH A MASSACRE FROM THE LOCAL PEOPLE. SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS THAT WILL BE ADOPTED NEXT YEAR DESCRIBE

THAT (THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS) CAME TO 200,000 OR 300,000
PEOPLE, BUT THAT IS DOUBTFUL." CRANE

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 07

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 07

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	Re: Futenma Replacement Heliport (2 pages)	09/20/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1996 - 09/26/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1882

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
LINE1: RAAUZYUW RUWFSGG2293 2641001-UUUU--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY TEXT 502)
LINE3: R 201001Z SEP 96
LINE4: FM AMCONSUL NAHA
OSRI: RUWFSGG
DTG: 201001Z SEP 96
ORIG: AMCONSUL NAHA
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3642
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/OATSD:PA/DPL/DDI//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO//1141//
INFO: RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA/00//
RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//00//
RUHEHMS/COMMARFORPAC//CG/DCG/PAO//
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//PP&O/DIRPA/POLAD/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUAHYAF/5AF YOKOTA AB JA
RUATJHU/CDRUSARJ-IX CORPS CP ZAMA JA//APAJ-CG/GE//
RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT//00//
SUBJ: OKINAWA ASSEMBLY LEADERS ON FUTENMA RELOCATION,
THE ECONOMY AND OKINAWA'S CONTRADICTIONS
TEXT:

////////////////////// DUPLICATE SECTION ////////////////////////

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAHA 000552

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION INFORMATION)

USCINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA TEARE
TOKYO PLEASE PASS FUKUOKA
DOD/ISA PLEASE PASS TO SAKODA

E.O. 12958:N/A

TAGS: MARR, PGOV, PINR, ECON, JA

SUBJECT: OKINAWA ASSEMBLY LEADERS ON FUTENMA RELOCATION,
THE ECONOMY AND OKINAWA'S CONTRADICTIONS

REF: NAHA 0547

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

1. (SBU) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: IN A SEPTEMBER 18
DISCUSSION, OKINAWA PREFECTURAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER SHINSUKE
TOMOYORI (SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY) AND VICE SPEAKER SEIZEN
HOKAMA (NEW FRONTIER PARTY) SPOKE CANDIDLY WITH CONGEN
ABOUT A RANGE OF POL/MIL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES. BOTH
ASSEMBLY MEMBERS EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN THE FLOATING

HELIPORT OPTION WHICH PM HASHIMOTO HAD REVEALED THE PREVIOUS DAY (REFTEL), BUT WERE SKEPTICAL ABOUT ITS PROSPECTS. TOMYORI ASKED IF A NAVY HELICOPTER CARRIER COULD BE USED AS A SIMPLER SUBSTITUTE FOR A FLOATING HELIPORT. HE AND HOKAMA ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING MARINE UNITS TO THE JAPANESE MAINLAND OR TO U.S. TERRITORY. THE TWO ALSO VOLUNTARILY ACKNOWLEDGED MANY CONTRADICTIONS IN OKINAWAN ATTITUDES TO THE BASE PROBLEM. TOMOYORI IN PARTICULAR STATED THAT THERE WAS NO PRACTICAL WAY TO REPLACE THROUGH ADDITIONAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY THE HUGE AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT THE BASES BRING INTO OKINAWA. THE TWO SAID THAT THE SEPTEMBER 8 REFERENDUM HAD BEEN ILL-CONCEIVED AND NOT WELL PREPARED BUT DID DRAW NATIONWIDE ATTENTION TO OKINAWA. THE AMBIVALENCE REVEALED IN THE RESULTS WAS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE CONTRADICTIONS IN THE OKINAWA BASE SITUATION. TOMOYORI ALSO SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN THE OKINAWA BASES WERE CLOSELY LINKED TO THE REGIONAL SECURITY SITUATION. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

RELOCATING HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

2. (U) IN A SEPTEMBER 18 DISCUSSION, PREFECTURAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER TOMOYORI AND VICE SPEAKER HOKAMA SPOKE TO CONGEN AT SOME LENGTH ON THE ISSUE OF RELOCATING FUTENMA'S HELICOPTER OPERATIONS TO ANOTHER FACILITY IN OKINAWA. BOTH SAID THAT THE USG/GOJ PLAN TO RELOCATE IT WITHIN THE PREFECTURE UPSET MANY OKINAWANS. THEIR INTEREST WAS CLEARLY PIQUED, HOWEVER, BY PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO'S ANNOUNCEMENT THE PREVIOUS DAY OF A "THIRD OPTION"-- THE OFFSHORE FLOATING HELIPORT (REFTEL) -- ALTHOUGH THEY WERE SKEPTICAL OF ITS FEASIBILITY.

3. (U) TOMOYORI ASKED IF THE U.S. FORCES COULD NOT SIMPLY EMPLOY THE SEVENTH FLEET'S HELICOPTER CARRIER AS AN OFFSHORE HELIPORT AND THUS ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR THE OTHER ALTERNATIVES NOW UNDER STUDY. CONGEN RESPONDED THAT THE "BELLEAU WOOD" WAS NOT ONLY TOO SMALL FOR THAT PURPOSE BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY WAS THE CENTERPIECE OF AN AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP THAT HAD TO BE CONSTANTLY AVAILABLE FOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES. IT COULD NOT BE TIED DOWN TO ONE LOCATION. WHEN THE TWO LEGISLATORS ASKED ABOUT RELOCATING THE MARINE HELICOPTER UNITS TO THE JAPANESE MAINLAND OR TO U.S. TERRITORY SUCH AS GUAM (A COMMON QUESTION HERE), CONGEN NOTED THAT THE HELICOPTERS WITH THEIR SHORT RANGE HAD TO BE BASED NEAR THE GROUND UNITS THAT THEY TRANSPORT AND

SUPPORT.

THE OPG'S BASE RETURN ACTION PLAN

4. (SBU) SPEAKER TOMOYORI WAS SURPRISINGLY CANDID ABOUT THE OPG'S "BASE RETURN ACTION PLAN," WHICH CALLS FOR CLOSING ALL U.S. BASES BY 2015, AND THE RELATED "21ST CENTURY INTERNATIONAL CITY PROGRAM" FOR DEVELOPING RETURNED LAND. HE DESCRIBED THESE PLANS AS AN "IDEAL GOAL" BUT HE HIMSELF DID NOT EXPECT ALL THE BASES TO BE GONE BY 2015. HE SAID THE GREAT MAJORITY OF OKINAWANS SOUGHT REDUCTION

AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE BASES, COUPLED WITH GOJ ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANT LINKS BETWEEN THE MILITARY BASES AND THE LOCAL ECONOMY. TOMOYORI ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE GOJ TO RELAX ECONOMIC REGULATIONS AS A WAY TO HELP OKINAWA, E.G., BY ESTABLISHING A SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE AND THROUGH OTHER ECONOMIC INCENTIVES. CONGEN AGREED AND SAID HE HAD MADE SIMILAR POINTS OVER THE PAST YEAR TO DIET MEMBERS AND OTHER TOKYO VISITORS. CONGEN ALSO OBSERVED THAT THE BIGGEST WEAKNESS IN THE OPG'S PLANS IS THAT THEY DID NOT EMPHASIZE CREATING WEALTH BUT ARE HEAVILY WEIGHTED TOWARD RESEARCH INSTITUTES AND SIMILAR PROJECTS THAT WOULD JUST NEED CONTINUED GOJ SUBSIDIES. HE NOTED THAT SUCCESSFUL REDEVELOPMENT OF RETURNED U.S. BASE AREAS, E.G, ON THE WEST COAST NEAR CAMP FOSTER, FOCUSED ON MONEY-MAKING OPERATIONS LIKE RESTAURANTS, SHOPS AND HOUSING.

5. (SBU) THE SPEAKER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT CHANGES WOULD BE NEEDED IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION TO BRING ABOUT MAJOR CHANGES IN THE BASE STRUCTURE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT OKINAWA'S LOCATION WHICH GAVE IT MILITARY IMPORTANCE COULD ALSO BE TURNED TO ITS ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE. TOMOYORI OBSERVED THAT MUCH OF THE BASE-RELATED INCOME, ESPECIALLY LAND RENTS FROM DFAB, IS NET PROFIT RATHER THAN GROSS. REFERRING TO 67 BILLION YEN IN LAND RENTS IN THIS FISCAL YEAR, HE CALCULATED THAT PRODUCING THAT MUCH PROFIT THROUGH REGULAR COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS WOULD REQUIRE ABOUT SIX TRILLION YEN WORTH OF BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS. HE WAS SKEPTICAL THAT OKINAWA COULD POSSIBLY GENERATE SO MUCH

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02

SSN: 2293

TOR: 960920075901 M2409529

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	Re: Digest Executive Edition/ Weekend 3-96 (7 pages)	09/21/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
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FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1996 - 09/26/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1882

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. cable	Re: Your Meeting (3 pages)	09/21/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED

LINE1: OAAUZYUW RUEHCAA7322 2650851-UUUU--RHEHNSC.

LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZEX

LINE3: O P 210846Z SEP 96

LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC

OSRI: RUEHC

DTG: 210846Z SEP 96

ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: ALL EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 6913

RUEHKON/AMCONSUL NAGOYA PRIORITY 0535

RUHBBMA/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0417

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 3101

RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 3064

RUATNPP/AMCONSUL PUSAN PRIORITY 4337

RUEHKOS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 5902

RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 1866

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4030

INFO: RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0304

RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 4501

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7389

RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 7848

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4745

RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1497

RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8458

RHHMBRACINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY

RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

RUAGAAA/CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS PRIORITY

RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//CC/BJ/CJ/EJ/PAJ/SJS// PRIORITY

RUAGAAA/SACINCUNC KS PRIORITY

RUAGAAA/USCINCUNC SEOUL KS PRIORITY

RUEKCCG/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA PRIORITY 5800

SUBJ: SEPTEMBER 20 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIA

SECDEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE

TEXT:

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 197322

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR FERGIN

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: OPRC XE US

SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 20 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALL POSTS -- ALSO FOR USIA

SECDEF -- ALSO FOR OASD/PA

USCINCPAC FOR FPA TEARE
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
PARIS FOR ZEYA

1. INDEX

--KOREA: SUBMARINE INCIDENT (PARAS 2-3)
--FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-63, VOLUME XXII, NORTHEAST ASIA (PARAS 4-5)
--JAPAN: SEA-BASED HELIPORT PROPOSAL (PARAS 6-7)

2. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE FIRST ANSWER AND THE SECOND ANSWER FROM THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE, PREPARED ON 9/20/96, WERE USED AT THAT DAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM THE REMAINDER ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

3. KOREA -- SUBMARINE INCIDENT

Q: WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE INCIDENT?

A: IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS INCURSION REPRESENTS A SERIOUS PROVOATION AND IS A VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. WE CONDEMN IT, AND STRONGLY URGE THE DPRK TO REFRAIN FROM ALL SUCH ACTS IN THE FUTURE.

SUCH MILITARY ACTIVITIES CLEARLY RUN COUNTER TO U.S. AND ROK EFFORTS TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

THE U.S. CALLS ON NORTH KOREA TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE ACTS.

Q: WHAT EFFECT WILL THIS INCIDENT HAVE ON OUR POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA?

A: WE AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARE ASSESSING THE FACTS ABOUT THIS INCURSION. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WILL MEET WITH SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER GONG RO-MYUNG ("GONG NOH-MEYUNG") NEXT WEEK AT THE UN. I AM SURE THAT THIS ISSUE WILL BE ON THE AGENDA.

(IF ASKED)

Q: WAS CONGRESSMAN RICHARDSON PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO NORTH KOREA? WHY DID HE CANCEL HIS TRIP?

A: I WOULD REFER YOU TO CONGRESSMAN RICHARDSON'S OFFICE.

4. THE FOLLOWING NOTICE TO THE PRESS, REFERRED TO BY SPOKESMAN NICHOLAS BURNS AT THE 9/20/96, PRESS BRIEFING, WAS POSTED IN THE DEPARTMENT FOLLOWING THE BRIEFING.

5. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-63, VOLUME XXII, NORTHEAST ASIA

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS RELEASING TODAY FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-63, VOLUME XXII, NORTHEAST ASIA, A VOLUME IN THE DEPARTMENT'S LONG-STANDING HISTORICAL DOCUMENTARY SERIES. VOLUME XXII

IS ONE OF MANY VOLUMES DOCUMENTING THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY.

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 STATE 197322

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR FERGIN

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: OPRC XE US

SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 20 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

THE VOLUME DOCUMENTS U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA, KOREA, AND JAPAN, EACH OF WHICH WAS UNDERGOING SIGNIFICANT CHANGE DURING THIS PERIOD: THE NATIONALISTS' DREAM OF RETAKING THE CHINESE MAINLAND WAS FADING; TAIWAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WAS UNDERWAY; THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE WAS GROWING INCREASINGLY SHRILL AND INTENSE; THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WAS IN THE MIDST OF MOVING FROM A BRIEF PERIOD OF DEMOCRACY TO MILITARY DOMINANCE; AND JAPAN WAS EMERGING AS A FIRST CLASS ECONOMIC POWER AND BEGINNING TO ASSERT ITSELF ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. THE UNITED STATES SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE THIS EMERGENCE AND CONVINCE JAPAN TO ALLOT MORE RESOURCES TO ITS OWN DEFENSE. IN KOREA, THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION TRIED TO MOVE THE GOVERNMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND REDUCE THE COST OF DEFENDING IT. THE CHINA COMPILATION IN THIS VOLUME DOCUMENTS SUPPORT WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION FOR A SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA AND SUGGESTS THAT THIS WAS KENNEDY'S INITIAL INCLINATION, BUT IT CASTS DOUBT ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANY MAJOR POLICY CHANGE. THE PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS HIGHLIGHT THE ISSUE OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT ON TAIWAN, WHICH WAS SERIOUSLY SHAKEN BY HINTS OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY.

IN THE JAPAN COMPILATION, THE DOCUMENTS CONCENTRATE ON U.S.-JAPANESE TRADE RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY TEXTILES, THE ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF THE RYUKUYU ISLANDS, EFFORTS TO FOSTER CLOSER U.S.-JAPANESE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY RELATIONS, AND U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT OF JAPAN'S EXPANDED ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. OF THE MATERIAL SELECTED FOR PUBLICATION, 13.5 PERCENT WAS NOT DECLASSIFIED. THE STILL-CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS RELATE TO RAMIFICATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS ARISING FROM CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY OF 1960 AND CONCERNS AND ACTIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN JAPAN DURING 1958-1960. BECAUSE OF THE DELETION OF THREE DOCUMENTS FROM THE 1958-1960 PERIOD, THE VOLUME'S PREFACE INCLUDES A DISCLAIMER THAT THE COMPILATION IS "NOT A THOROUGH, ACCURATE, AND RELIABLE DOCUMENTARY RECORD" OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS CONCERNING JAPAN.

AN ANNOUNCEMENT AND A SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXII ARE AVAILABLE IN THE PRESS OFFICE. ORDERING INFORMATION IS INCLUDED IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT. A COPY OF THE VOLUME IS AVAILABLE FOR READING AND CONSULTATION IN THE PRESS OFFICE, AND OTHER COPIES ARE AVAILABLE FOR

CONSULTATION IN THE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN.

6. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE, PREPARED ON 9/20/96, WAS NOT USED AT THAT DAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. POSTS MAY DRAW FROM IT ON AN IF ASKED BASIS.

7. JAPAN -- SEA-BASED HELIPORT PROPOSAL

(IF ASKED:)

Q: WHAT CAN YOU SAY ABOUT THE DEEP DIVISIONS WHICH HAVE ALREADY EMERGED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN ABOUT THE SCOPE AND FUNCTION OF A SEA-BASED HELIPORT?

A: STORIES OF DIVISIONS ARE INCORRECT.

IN FACT, AS WAS ANNOUNCED AT THE RECENT U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERIAL TALKS (THE "2&2" MEETING) THAT TOOK PLACE IN WASHINGTON, THE USG AND GOJ HAVE JUST COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO STUDYING THREE POSSIBLE UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 STATE 197322

USIA FOR EA; TOKYO FOR YAMAUCHI; MOSCOW FOR FERGIN

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: OPRC XE US

SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 20 PRESS GUIDANCES FOR THE EAP REGION

ALTERNATIVE RELOCATION SITES FOR THE FUTENMA MARINE AIR CORPS STATION.

THIS WILL BE A JOINT EFFORT.

UNTIL THE FEASIBILITY STUDY IS COMPLETED, ANY COMMENT ABOUT WHAT A SEA-BASED HELIPORT WILL OR WILL NOT LOOK LIKE IS SIMPLY SPECULATION.

CHRISTOPHER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 7322

<^SSN>7322

<^SSN>7322

TOR: 960921045643 M2411363

<^TOR>960921045729 M2411364

<^TOR>960921045729 M2411365

DIST:

SIT: NSC

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	Re: Ambassador's Meeting (5 pages)	09/23/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1996 - 09/26/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1882

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
LINE1: PAAUZYUW RUCWAAA3351 2672321-UUAA--RHEHWSR.
LINE2: ZNR UUUA ZYN
LINE3: P 232321Z SEP 96
LINE4: FM FBIS RESTON VA
OSRI: RUCWAAA
DTG: 232321Z SEP 96
ORIG: FBIS RESTON VA
TO: RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD/ISA/EAPR FOR LEW STERN//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/JAPAN//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR/EAP/NA/FOR/BROOKS//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/JAPAN/FOR SCOTT/LUDAN//
RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE
RUEHKOS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK//POL//
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE//FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS//
RUHPHQ/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
RUAGTBU/CDRISTBN1STSFGA TORII STA JA//SSO//
RUAGYIN/CDRCSTTHREE YONGIN KOR//EACT-T-I//
RUAGAMS/CINC UNC CFC SEOUL KOR//UNCMAC//
RUHDBKT/DATT-TLO BANGKOK TH
RUEALGX/DEFINTAGENCY WASH DC
RUCPDC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC//O/IL//
RUCPDC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC//ITA/IEP/JAPAN//
RAYWBBK/DIO CANBERRA AS
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESFG/FBIS BANGKOK TH
RUESDG/PTS HONG KONG
RUDKMKE/FBIS LONDON UK
RUDKMKB/FBIS LONDON UK//BBC//
RUESDJ/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUESDP/FBIS SEOUL KOR
RUALJDT/JDET YOKOTA AB JA
RUDGAFTHQ AFTAC PATRICK AFB FL//DOB//
RUEBNA/HQ AFTAC-IN PATRICK AFB FL
RHHJDHA/HQ PACAF IDHS HICKAM AFB HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC//IEG EXEC OFF//
RAYWBFA/ONA CANBERRA AS
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUWTNOK/HQ USSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO//POLAD//
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA
RUESTO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON UK
RUEAIIS/STORAGE CENTER FBIS RESTON VA

ACCT FBWA-EWDK

INFO: ////

SUBJ: FBIS FOREIGN MEDIA NOTE-23SEP96

TEXT:

UNCLAS 4Z/LD

WARNING: (THE FOLLOWING ITEM IS INTENDED FOR USE ONLY BY
U.S. GOVERNMENT CONSUMERS. IT IS BASED ON
FOREIGN MEDIA CONTENT AND BEHAVIOR AND IS ISSUED
WITHOUT COORDINATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT
COMPONENTS.)

SERIAL: WA2309232196

PASS: ATTN BLOUGH/MILLER
ATTN BBC RDSUP

COUNTRY: JAPAN

SUBJ: FBIS FOREIGN MEDIA NOTE-23SEP96

SOURCE: FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

TEXT:

Japan-U.S.: Japanese Media Comment on 2 Plus 2 Talks
Highlights Potential Roadblocks to Defense Cooperation, Heliport
Issue

[FBIS Media Analysis] Japanese media commentary on the results
of the recent bilateral 2 plus 2 talks has tended to highlight
differences both within Japan and between Tokyo and Washington
that could hamper plans to study expanded defense cooperation and
to find a mutually acceptable relocation site for the Futenma
heliport.

Newspapers that have in the past supported strong U.S.-Japan
security relations generally praised many of the specific issues
to be studied in the review of defense cooperation.

-- For example, Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's most widely read
newspaper, described cooperation in emergencies in areas
surrounding Japan as "appropriate" in view of the "number of new
factors" that have "undermined the stability" of the Asia-Pacific
region in the wake of the Cold War.

However, several newspapers pointed out that there are still
broad disagreements among Japanese politicians and the Japanese
public over the scope of defense cooperation with Washington that
could hinder these plans.

-- The Yomiuri editorial criticized the plans for "failing to
give details," and attributed this to Japanese Government
sensitivities about "friction" within the ruling coalition over the
issue.

-- The 20 September Nihon Keizai Shimbun warned that a "national
consensus" has not been reached over the issue, raising questions
about how far Tokyo can go in providing "concrete" assistance to
Washington on many of the issues under review.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	Re: FBIS Foreign Media Note-23SEP96 [partial] (1 page)	09/23/1996	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1996 - 09/26/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1882

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Highlighting Differences on Heliport

Several major national-level newspapers have highlighted reports about differences between Washington and Tokyo over the construction of a floating heliport to replace the Futenma helipads.

-- In the lead article in its 20 September edition, Asahi Shimbun, Japan's second most widely read newspaper, reported that Washington favors a mobile structure that can be towed by aircraft carriers, while Tokyo prefers a fixed structure attached to steel posts driven into the ocean floor.

-- The same day, Nihon Keizai Shimbun carried a similar report on its front page.

Some of this reporting has suggested that some parts of the Defense Agency may have reservations about the heliport.

-- The Nihon Keizai Shimbun article quoted Defense Agency Director General Hideo Usui as telling Japanese reporters who accompanied him to Washington that there is a "gap" between Washington's and Tokyo's conception of the heliport.

-- The 23 September Okinawa Times reported that some Defense Agency officials are concerned that the plan may be technically unfeasible and difficult to manage.

Okinawan Media on Heliport

The two major Okinawan newspapers, meanwhile, have denounced the plan for a floating heliport, strengthening the impression created by earlier guarded comments from Okinawan officials that the plan may encounter resistance on Okinawa.

-- A 19 September Okinawa Times editorial warned that the plan may "upset" Okinawa's economic development plans and that the use of Japanese technology in the construction of such a facility "will only increase concerns of Japan's Asian neighbors that Japan may again become a military superpower."

-- Similarly, a 21 September Ryukyu Shimpo editorial stated that it "cannot give a positive assessment" to the new base "wherever it is built." It warned that the floating heliport would entail "massive" costs and might "restrict" fishing in its vicinity, "destroy" coral reefs, and have a "great impact" on tourism and the lives of local inhabitants if it is located near resort areas.

(b)(3)

007

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(endall) EAG/HH/JD 23/2321Z Sep

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 3351

TOR: 960923193327 M2413656

DIST:

SIT: NSC

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. cable	Re: Heliport Consolidation (5 pages)	09/24/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1996 - 09/26/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1882

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3: O 250119Z SEP 96
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
OSRI: RUEHKO
DTG: 250119Z SEP 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7563
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1195
INFO: RUYNJDK/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUEBBEA/USDOT WASHDC
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N5//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCPDOG/USDOC WASHDC
SUBJ: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 25
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 008909

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR
EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA
WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS;
USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA;
COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.j
E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 25

TOP HEADLINES:

ASAHI: LDP'S CAMPAIGN PLEDGES INCLUDES ABROGATION OF
SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL TEXTBOOK SCREENING SYSTEM

NIHON KEIZAI: RULING PARTIES AGREE TO COMPLETELY SEPARATE
BANKING INSPECTION/SUPERVISION FUNCTIONS FROM FINANCE
MINISTRY; LIKELY TO ADOPT FAIR-TRADE-COMMISSION TYPE IN
ORDER TO ELIMINATE INFLUENCE; ADMINISTRATIVE STANCE
UNDERScoreD (TRANSLATION BELOW)

TOKYO SHIMBUN: "WISEMEN'S COUNCIL" URGED FOR PREVENTIVE

DIPLOMACY; PRIME MINISTER TO SUGGEST IN HIS UN SPEECH; TO SHOW ZEAL FOR ENTRY INTO UNSC AS PERMANENT MEMBER

MAINICHI: "ABROGATION OF COURSE OF STUDY NOW ADOPTED FOR SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS"; LDP'S CAMPAIGN PLEDGE; LIKELY TO PUT END TO SCHOOL TEXTBOOK SCREENING SYSTEM; THOROUGH LIBERALIZATION OF HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION; WILL DISCUSS WITH EDUCATION MINISTRY

YOMIURI: CTBT SIGNED AT UN; TOP LEADERS OF 65 COUNTRIES JOIN; INDIA, PAKISTAN DO NOT SIGN

SANKEI: REVIEW OF ENTIRE POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA ANNOUNCED BY ROK PRESIDENT; ARMED OPERATIVES INCIDENT TAKEN AS APPARENT MILITARY AGGRESSION

HASHIMOTOQS UN SPEECH FOCUSES ON JAPANQS DESIRE FOR SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT (ASAHI - PAGE 2)

(NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 24, AKIRA TATEMATSU) PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO WILL DELIVER A SPEECH AT THE UNITED STATES GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN NEW YORK ON THE EVENING OF THE 24TH (JAPAN TIME, MORNING OF THE 25TH). IN IT, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL EXPRESS EAGERNESS FOR JAPAN'S ASSUMING PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP, SAYING "JAPAN IS READY TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM MANY COUNTRIES AND FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN LINE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NOT EXERCISING ARMED FORCE BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN." THIS EXPRESSION WAS USED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN 1994 AND 1995. HE WILL ALSO PROPOSE CALLING AN "EMINENT PERSONS CONFERENCE" OF PERSONS CONCERNED FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO MAP OUT MEASURES TO PREVENT REGIONAL DISPUTES.

HE WILL BE THE THIRD JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER TO GIVE A SPEECH AT A UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FOLLOWING YASUHIRO NAKASONE IN 1987 AND MORIHIRO HOSONAWA IN 1993.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO, COMMENTING ON UN REFORMS, WILL REITERATE, "IT IS ESSENTIAL TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THE REFORMS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, FISCAL ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC SOCIETY IN A BALANCED FORM." REFERRING TO THE COMING ELECTION FOR THE NON-PERMANENT SEAT, IN WHICH JAPAN WILL BE VYING WITH INDIA, HE WILL STRESS, "JAPAN HOPES TO PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO REPAY THE SUPPORT AND CONFIDENCE (OF OTHER COUNTRIES)." BEARING ITS BID FOR PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP ALSO IN MIND, HE WILL REMARK, "I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE JAPAN'S DESIRE TO JOIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES."

THE PROPOSAL FOR AN "EMINENT PERSONS CONFERENCE" IS BASED ON THE PERCEPTION THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO PUT EVERY EFFORT INTO WORKING OUT MEASURES TO PREVENT CONFLICTS, THOSE IN SOMALIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES HAVING ENDED IN FAILURE DESPITE EFFORTS FOR A SETTLEMENT BY THE UN.

REFERRING TO THE INTRUSION OF NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE'S CREW MEMBERS INTO SOUTH KOREA, THE PRIME MINISTER WILL POINT OUT, "THE INCIDENT ANEW MADE US RECOGNIZE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO EASE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 08 TOKYO 008909

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RE, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 25

PENINSULA." AS FOR THE ATTACK OF IRAQ INTO KURDS' SELF-RULE DISTRICT, HE WILL EXPRESS, "I STRONGLY HOPE IRAQ WILL ABIDE BY THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT THE SITUATION WILL BE STRAIGHTENED OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE."

HASHIMOTO-CLINTON MEETING: RESOLVE FUTENMA BY LATE NOVEMBER; GOAL OF OKINAWA BASE REDUCTION (NIHON KEIZAI - PAGE 1)

(NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 24, ATSUSHI IJUIN) PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO HELD AN APPROXIMATELY 40-MINUTE MEETING WITH U.S. PRESIDENT CLINTON AROUND NOON TODAY (EARLY HOURS OF THE 25TH IN JAPAN) AT THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK. THE PRIME MINISTER EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED EFFORTS BY JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES TO CONSOLIDATE, REALIGN, AND REDUCE THE U.S. BASES ON OKINAWA. ON THE QUESTION OF AN ALTERNATE HELIPORT TO ACCOMPANY THE REVERSION OF FUTENMA AIR STATION, BOTH LEADERS CONFIRMED THE AGREEMENT OF THE SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE (2 PLUS 2) TO CARRY OUT JOINT JAPAN-U.S. STUDY OF THREE PROPOSALS, INCLUDING CONSTRUCTION OF A FLOATING OFFSHORE HELIPORT, AND TO MAKE A DECISION BY THE END OF NOVEMBER.

SUMMIT MEETING EMPHASIZES PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS, WITH ELECTION IN MIND (NIHON KEIZAI - PAGE 2)

(NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 24, ATSUSHI IJUIN) IN HIS MEETING WITH U.S. PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON ON THE 24TH, PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO EXPLAINED THAT THE OKINAWA PROBLEM, AN ISSUE PENDING SINCE LAST FALL BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF JAPAN AND THE US. AND ALSO BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND OKINAWA, HAS BEEN SETTLED FOR THE TIME BEING. HE THUS HAS TAKEN THE NEXT STEP FORWARD TOWARD DISSOLVING THE LOWER HOUSE FOR A GENERAL ELECTION. THE SUMMIT MEETING WAS REALIZED DESPITE THE TWO LEADERS' TIGHT SCHEDULES OBVIOUSLY FOR THE SAKE OF THE NEXT ELECTION, WHICH IS THEIR COMMON GOAL FOR NOW.

NEVERTHELESS, THE TWO FAILED TO REFER TO ANY SPECIFICS ABOUT THE OKINAWA ISSUE, SUCH AS ALTERNATIVE FACILITIES FOR FUTENMA AIR STATION.

EARLIER IN SEPTEMBER, OBSERVING THE DIFFICULTY IN SETTING THE TIMETABLE FOR HIS SESSION WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON, THE PRIME MINISTER OFTEN SAID, "IF IT IS INCONVENIENT FOR THE PRESIDENT, I DON'T HAVE TO SEE HIM AT THIS TIME WHEN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS APPROACHING." AT THE SAME TIME, HE WAS EAGER TO "DISCUSS VARIOUS ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THE OKINAWA BASE ISSUE," IF THE MEETING WAS SET. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS FULLY AWARE THAT SEEING THE PRESIDENT IN PERSON TO REAFFIRM THEIR CONTINUOUS EFFORTS FOR THE REALIGNMENT AND REDUCTION OF U.S. OKINAWA BASES AUTOMATICALLY GUARANTEED A CERTAIN LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT.

MEANWHILE, PRESIDENT CLINTON'S MIND WAS MORE ON THE TRADE AREA, LIKE AVIATION AND INSURANCE, AS WELL AS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SUCH AS THE SITUATIONS IN IRAQ AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. THE PRESIDENT WAS SADDLED WITH LOW INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE U.S.' INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ. SO THE PRESIDENT HAD TO TREAT PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO WARMLY, FOR HE HAD INDICATED SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. ACTION AHEAD OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO IS THE ONLY FOREIGN LEADER THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO MEET DURING THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DESPITE HIS TIGHT ELECTION SCHEDULE. HE SEEMS TO HAVE JUDGED THAT MEETING PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO DISPLAY HIS ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE ELECTION.

SETTING ASIDE SUCH POLITICAL MOTIVES, SPECIFIC APPROACHES ARE HARDLY SEEN IN THE POLICY SIDE. THE SURFACED OFFSHORE HELIPORT PLAN SEEMS TO BE A RAY OF HOPE FOR THE FUTENMA AIR STATION ISSUE. BUT THE TWO COUNTRIES STILL UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 08 TOKYO 008909

USIA

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 25

NEED TO IRON OUT EACH OTHER'S PLAN AND MAKE FEASIBILITY STUDIES TO MAKE A FINAL DECISION.

IN ADDITION, UPGRADING JAPAN'S LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AS PART OF THE PLANNED REVIEW OF THE GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION TO BE COMPLETED NEXT FALL IS A SERIOUS SUBJECT THAT MIGHT SHAKE THE FOUNDATION OF THE PRESENT COALITION ARRANGEMENT. THE WORK TO MAP OUT

SPECIFIC MEASURES SEEMS TO BE LEFT VIRTUALLY FOR THE ADMINISTRATIO TO LAUNCH AFTER THE ELECTION.

PRIME MINISTER SCCUMBS TO JETLAG (NIHON KEIZAI - PAGE 2)

PRIME MNISTER HASHIMOTO ATTENDED THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE MORNING OF THE 24TH (LATE HOURS OF THE 24T, JAPAN TIME), AT WHICH TIME U.S. PRESIDENT BILLCLINTON WASDELIVERING HIS SPEECH. BUT DURING TH SESSION THE PRIME MINISTER FELL ASLEEP. THE TELEVISION SCREEN COLDLY AIRED THE DOZING PRIME MINITER DURING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. TAKING PRECAUTIONS, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD GONE TO BED EARLY THE NIGHT BEFORE THE SESSION. IT APPEARS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE END WAS NOT ABLE TO OVERCOME JETLAG IN HIS OVERNIGHT-THREE DAY TRIP. (NEW YORK, TETSURO TAKASAKA)

COMBAT ROLE OF OKINAWA MARINES REDUCED IN 1993QS STRATEGY CHANGE (ASAHI - PAGE 3)

THE ASAHI SHIMBUN HAS SECURED (A COPY OF) THE REPORT THAT INDICATES THAT THE U.S. 3RD MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, WHICH EXERCISES GENERAL CONTROL OVER THE MARINES IN OKINAWA, HAD BEEN PUSHING AHEAD WITH THE WORK OF REVISING ITS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL PLAN FOR OPERATIONS CODE-NAMED "5027" IN COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIED FORCE OF THE U.S. AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA SINCE 1993 WHEN THE KOREAN PENINSULA WAS HIGHLY TENSE. THE REPORT TELLS THAT THE MARINES IN OKINAWA ARE EXPECTED TO PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE IN LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES RATHER THAN TO ENGAGE IN ACTUAL COMBAT SITUATIONS ON THE FRONTLINE. THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE MARINES IN OKINAWA ALSO WILL LIKELY BECOME A POINT AT ISSUE IN THE JAPAN-U.S. JOINT WORK OF PROBING INTO A LONG-TERM REDUCTION OF MILITARY STRENGTH AS SUCH IS INTERTWINED ALSO WITH THE DIRECTION OF REALIGNING AND REDUCING THE U.S. MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWA.

AS FOR THE MARINES IN OKINAWA, A TOTAL OF 17,000 TROOPS ARE STATIONED THERE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE 3RD MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. THE MARINE CORPS IS CALLED A 'STORMING CONTINGENT' OF THE U.S. FORCES. BUT THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE STATIONED IN OKINAWA IS THE ONLY OVERSEAS-BASED UNIT WHILE THE U.S. HAS THREE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AS THE LARGEST UNITS OF COMBAT TROOPS, AND OKINAWA USED TO BE REGARDED AS A STRATEGIC BASE FOR FORWARD-DEPLOYED TROOPS TO BE RUSHED AS MAINSTAY CONTINGENTS TO THE FRONTLINE. HOWEVER, THE SEMIANNUAL OPERATIONS REPORT, SUBMITTED BY THE 3RD MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE'S STAFF TO THE USMC COMMANDANT AT HOME, IMPLIES ACTUAL CONDITIONS THAT DIFFER FROM SUCH A GENERAL IMAGE OF THE MARINES.

THE MARINE STAFF OFFICERS IN OKINAWA WERE REVIEWING OPERATIONS PLAN 5027 DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME FROM 1993, WHEN THE TENSIONS OVER THE KOREAN PENINSULA GREW HIGH, TO THE FIRST HALF OF LAST YEAR, AND THE GREATER PART OF SUCH WORK WAS SPARED TO MULLING OVER SUCH REAR SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AS WHAT TO DO ABOUT SUPPLY VIA OKINAWA AND

MILITARY DEPLOYMENT.

SUCH DESCRIPTIONS IN THE REPORT ENDORSE THAT THE MARINES IN OKINAWA ARE STRONGLY CHARACTERIZED AS A BACKUP AND COMPLEMENTARY FORCE IN ACTUAL OPERATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HOWEVER, THE REPORT LITTLE INDICATES STUDIES ON HOW TO USE THEIR MEN IN ACTUAL COMBAT SITUATIONS.

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USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RE, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIH AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 25

AS ONE OF THE FEW EXAMPLES REFERRING TO (OPERATIONS IN) ACTUAL WARFARE, THE REPORT FOR THE FIRST HALF OF 1994 STATES: "IN AUGUST, WE CREATED A TEAM TO ANALYZE THE MARINES' MISSION AT 'STAGE 4' IN OPERATIONS PLAN 5027 FOR THE U.S. FORCES IN THE ROK." THE TERM 'STAGE 4' -- ACCORDING TO A PRESS REPORT IN THE ROK OVER EMERGENCY SITUATIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA -- IS THE LAST STAGE OF SUCH COMBAT OPERATIONS AS CONTAINING AND CONQUERING PYONGYANG.

HOWEVER, THE REPORT, REGARDING EVEN SUCH WORK, NOTES ADDITIONALLY THAT SUCH OPERATIONS ARE TO BE CONDUCTED "WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE MARINE FORCE PACIFIC, HEADQUARTERED IN HAWAII, AND ALSO WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE 1ST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE HEADQUARTERED IN CALIFORNIA."

THE 3RD MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, IN ACTUAL OPERATIONS, IS OF A STRONG NATURE AS A COMPLEMENTARY CONTINGENT FOR THE 1ST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE STATIONED ON THE U.S. MAINLAND.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE FACT THAT THE MARINE FORCE IN OKINAWA HAD WORKED TO CREATE COUNTERACTION PLANS FOR EMERGENCY SITUATIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA REFLECTS ANOTHER ASPECT THAT THE CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF THE MARINES ASSIGNED THERE IS NOT FIT FOR ACTUAL COMBAT SITUATIONS.

THE 3RD MARINE DIVISION (IN OKINAWA) (CONSISTING OF ABOUT 7,000 MEN) IS SUPPOSED TO BECOME THE MAINSTAY COMBAT UNIT, BUT THE DIVISION IS A REDUCED ORGANIZATION THAT DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A DIVISION, AND IT IS LACKING IN READINESS FUNCTIONS SINCE IT CANNOT MAKE QUICK USE OF NAVAL LANDING CRAFT FOR TRANSPORTATION. IN THE

EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE ALLIED MARINE UNIT OF THE U.S. AND ROK FORCES ALONE IS EXPECTED TO CONSIST OF ABOUT 100,000 TO 150,000 TROOPS, AND THE ROLE (OF THE MARINES IN OKINAWA) IS LIMITED IN THE TOTAL DISPATCH OF 1,000,000 TROOPS.

TRANSFER FROM OKINAWA POSSIBLE

YUKIHIDE KOZU (OR KAWATSU?), A COMMENTATOR ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, SAYS: "FROM THE REPORT I CAN SEE THE SITUATION THAT THEY ARE NOW CREATING THEIR OWN ROLE FOR REAR SUPPORT THAT CAN BE DONE WITH THEIR CURRENT SETUP OF TROOPS. THE TROOPS ASSIGNED TO THE 3RD MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CANNOT PLAY THE MAIN ROLE IN A LARGE-SCALE CONFLICT. SOME IN THE MARINE CORPS ALSO HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT PLACING A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE JUST IN NAME, SO I GUESS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REDUCE THE TROOPS THERE."

ROLE OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN CLOSELY CONNECTED TO MIDDLE-EAST SITUATION (MAINICHI - PAGE 3)

IT SEEMS THE UNITED STATES HAS RECEDED FOR THE TIME BEING FROM ATTACKING IRAQ, BUT A CHAIN OF U.S. ATTACKS ON IRAQ WERE JOINED BY TROOPS SENT BY THE U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN (USFJ). FOR EXAMPLE, OIL TANKER PLANES STATIONED ON OKINAWA JOINED OPERATIONS TO SUPPLY FUEL TO ATTACK-BOMBERS. THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE ATTACKS THIS TIME INDICATES THE USFJ, WHOSE ROLE HAS BEEN REINFORCED AS WAS EARLIER ISSUED IN THE JAPAN-U.S. JOINT SECURITY DECLARATION, HAS BEEN CLOSELY LINKED TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION.

THE HEWITT (PHONETIC), A DESTROYER BELONGING TO THE U.S. NAVY'S SEVENTH FLEET, WHOSE HOME PORT IS YOKOSUKA, LEFT ON JUNE 3 AND WAS DEPLOYED IN THE (PERSIAN) GULF IN LATE JUNE. IN ADDITION, THE CARL VINSON, A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE CARRIER, WHICH STOPPED AT YOKOSUKA PORT TO LET ITS CREW TAKE A REST AND REFUEL THIS SPRING AND LEFT ON JUNE 2, UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 08 TOKYO 008909

USIA

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JOINED OPERATIONS IN THE PERCIAN GULF TOGETHER WITH THE JEFFERSON CITY, AN ATTACK SUBMARINE.

ACCORDING TO THE HOME PAGE OFFERED ON THE INTERNET BY THE

U.S. NAVY, IN THE SECOND WAVE ATTACK CARRIED OUT ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 4, THE HEWITT AND THE JEFFERSON CITY FIRED CRUISE MISSILES AT IRAQ'S AIR-DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER FACILITIES.

THE KC135 AIR-REFUELING UNIT (CONSISTING OF EIGHT PLANES) BELONGING TO THE U.S. AIR FORCE'S 18TH AIR WING STATIONED ON KADENA AIR BASE WAS DEPLOYED IN THE PACIFIC REGION AND AIR-REFUELED AIRCRAFTS THAT TOOK PART IN THE ATTACK OPERATIONS. IT SEEMS THE ROLE-SHARING HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN THE FORM OF REAR SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE USFJ AT THE TIME OF MILITARY OPERATIONS BY U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

FURTHERMORE, A MILITARY INSIDER SAID 12 F-16 FIGHTERS BELONGING TO THE 13TH FLIGHT SQUADRON OF THE 35TH FIGHTER WING STATIONED ON U.S. MISAWA AIR BASE MOVED INTO SAUDI ARABIA ON JULY 8. THE U.S. FORCES ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY DISPATCHED THEIR UNIT -- "ABOUT 10 FIGHTER PLANES" ACCORDING TO THE U.S. SIDE'S ACCOUNT -- AND EXPLAINED THEY DID SO TO LET THEM INSTALL IN THE DUTIES TO MONITOR THE NO-FLY ZONE OVER IRAQ. THOSE FIGHTERS ARE CALLED THE WILD WEASEL, AND THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH ANTI-RADIO WAVE RADIATION MISSILES (HARM) WHICH DESTROY THE SOURCE OF RADIO WAVES.

THE U.S. FORCES CARRIED OUT THE THIRD ROUND OF MISSILE-ATTACK (ON IRAQ) (ON THE 4TH (5TH, JAPAN TIME)). THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) ANNOUNCED THE ATTACK WAS MADE BECAUSE THE F-16 THAT WAS MONITORING THE NO-FLY ZONE WAS CAPTURED BY RADAR. A MILITARY-RELATED SOURCE CONSIDERS: "HARM WOULD HAVE BEEN USED. A GROUP COMING FROM MISAWA AIR BASE MIGHT HAVE JOINED." BUT THE PRESS OFFICE OF THE BASE SAYS: "WE CANNOT MAKE A REPLY BECAUSE IT IS A MILITARY SECRET WHETHER THE F-16 UNIT THAT DISPATCHED JOINED (MILITARY OPERATIONS) AND WHETHER HARM WAS USED."

JAPAN SHAKY SUPPORT FOR U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST IRAQ
(MAINICHI - PAGE 3)

REGARDING THE (UNITED STATES) ATTACKS ON IRAQ, PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO ISSUED A STATEMENT ON THE 3RD: "IF THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE U.S. WAS NEEDED TO MAKE SURE IRAQ WILL IMPLEMENT THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, WE UNDERSTAND IT AND SUPPORT IT." HIS STATEMENT WAS A CLEAR ENDORSEMENT. BUT THE UNSC DID NOT SUPPORT THE U.S. ACTION; CONSEQUENTLY, JAPAN'S STANCE SEEMED TO STAND OUT. THE GOVERNMENT HOWEVER CONTINUED TO TAKE THE BULLISH STANDPOINT, ONE OFFICIAL REMARKING, "WE DON'T THINK OUR JUDGMENT WAS A MISTAKE" (HIGH-LEVEL FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL), BUT ON THE 18TH, FOREIGN MINISTER YUKIHIKO IKEDA IN HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER CALLED FOR SELF-RESTRAINT, ADDING, "WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO GIVE A PERSUASIVE EXPLANATION NOW SO THAT SUPPORT WILL BE OBTAINED FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY." GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES ARE STARTING TO WAVER.

THE GROUNDS FOR SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. ACTION ARE:

1. IRAQ'S MOVES VIOLATE THE UNSC RESOLUTION NO. 688 THAT SEEKS DISCONTINUATION OF OPPRESSION OF THE KURDS; AND
2. THE U.S. ACTION WAS TAKEN IN LINE WITH WHAT IS SET FORTH IN THE UNSC RESOLUTION NO. 678 THAT GOES, "THE RIGHT TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS IS GIVEN."

BUT IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY (MOFA), SOME EXPLAIN: "FROM A POLITICAL JUDGMENT, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ANNOUNCE SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. IT IS EASY TO FIND SOME SORT OF PRETEXT."

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USIA

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 25

THEREFORE IT SEEMS THAT THE CONCLUSION OF GIVING SUPPORT TO THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE COME FIRST BEFORE EVERYTHING. THAT IS PERHAPS BECAUSE IT WAS CONVEYED IN THE ADVANCE NOTICE THAT "ATTACK WILL BE LIMITED, AND ANY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND THE LIKE WILL NOT BE ASKED FOR."

ON PARTICIPATION IN THE ATTACK BY THE U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN (USFJ), THE GOVERNMENT NOTES: "THEY DID NOT MAKE A SORTIE DIRECTLY FROM JAPAN NOR DID THEY MAKE A TACTICAL MOVE. THEY WERE NEAR THE SCENE OF ATTACK. THERE HAS BEEN THIS KIND OF CASE BEFORE" (HIGH-LEVEL MOFA OFFICIAL). ITS POSITION IS THERE IS NO PROBLEM. UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY, PRIOR CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE HELD IN THE FOLLOWING CASES: (1) CHANGE IN KEY DEPLOYMENTS; (2) CHANGE IN IMPORTANT EQUIPMENT; AND (3) COMBAT OPERATIONS TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM BASES IN JAPAN. BUT REGARDING THE ATTACKS THIS TIME, THE GOVERNMENT JUDGES THEY DID NOT FALL UNDER SUCH CASES.

COALITION AGREES TO REMOVE FINANCIAL INSPECTION AND MONITORING FUNCTIONS FROM FINANCE MINISTRY (NIHON KEIZAI - TOP PLAY)

RULING COALITION OFFICERS RESPONSIBLE FOR POLICY DECISIONS MET AT A HOTEL IN TOKYO YESTERDAY AND PURSUED HOME-STRETCH NEGOTIATIONS ON REFORM OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF). THE MEETING REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE POLICY APPROACH OF MAKING FINANCIAL INSPECTION AND OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED TO MOF COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF IT. THEY REACHED COMMON GROUND REGARDING ESTABLISHING A "FAIR TRADE COMMISSION-TYPE ORGAN IN

COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 3 OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION LAW (NGOL). THE DECISION WILL BE FORMALLY NAILED DOWN AT A MEETING OF THE SECRETARIES GENERAL AND POLICY-DECISION OFFICERS TO BE HELD ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 25TH.

THE PREVALENT VIEW IN THE RULING PARTIES IS NOW THAT TRANSFERRING MOF'S FUNCTIONS TO INSPECT AND OVERSEE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO A "FTC"-TYPE ORGAN WILL BECOME AN OCCASION TO CHANGE THE CONVENTIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION MOF HAS ADMINISTERED AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE, DEPRIVING IT OF EXERCISING INFLUENCE OVER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

HOWEVER, MOF IS FIERCELY RESISTING THE PROPOSAL, REASONING, "UNDER THE FTC FORMULA, LOCAL OF RESPONSIBILITY WILL BECOME LAX" (VICE MINISTER OGAWA). COORDINATION ON THE ISSUE HAS BEEN DELAYED WITH MOF MAINTAINING, INVOLVING SOME LDP MEMBERS, THAT A "SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS, ETC., MONITORING"-TYPE COMMITTEE ATTACHED TO MOF BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NGOL AND THE INSPECTION FUNCTION ALONE BE TRANSFERRED AN ORGAN TO BE NEWLY ESTABLISHED."

IN THE MEANTIME, THE ISSUE OF HANDLING THE PROBLEM OF "SPLITTING FINANCIAL AND FISCAL FUNCTIONS" AS STRONGLY SOUGHT BY THE SAKIGAKE PARTY HAS BEEN MADE AN AGENDA ITEM TO BE TACKLED AFTER THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTION, THE ARGUMENT BEING, "A COURSE HAS BEEN SET FOR THE TIME BEING, BY TRANSFERRING INSPECTION AND OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS AS A PACKAGE TO A NEW ORGAN" (SENIOR SAKIGAKE OFFICER).

THE THREE RULING PARTIES HAVE MANAGED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON REFORM OF MOF JUST IN TIME FOR THE SCHEDULED DISSOLUTION OF THE LOWER HOUSE, SPURRED BY THE DESIRE TO MAKE A POPULAR APPEAL WITH AN EYE ON THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTION ON THEIR STANCE OF SERIOUSLY DEALING WITH ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM.

OF ITEMS PROPOSED IN THE DRAFT PLAN FOR REFORMING MOF, THE RULING PARTIES HAVE ALREADY ROUNDED OUT THEIR VIEWS ON: (1) CONSOLIDATING THE BANKING AND SECURITIES BUREAUS AND ESTABLISHING A FINANCIAL BUREAU; (2) DRASTICALLY UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 08 TOKYO 008909

USIA

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 25

REVIEWING THE BANK OF JAPAN LAW AND (3) SUBMITTING A BILL TO THE NEXT REGULAR DIET SESSION TO AMEND THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE ESTABLISHMENT LAW. NOW THAT A SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON WHAT TO DO ABOUT MOF'S FINANCIAL INSPECTION AND OVERSIGHT SYSTEM, THE FOCUS OF THE RULING PARTY-FACILITATED DEBATE ON REFORM OF MOF, WHICH HAS BEEN TRIGGERED BY CRITICISM OF ITS SLOPPY HANDLING OF HOUSING LOAN CORPORATIONS (JUSEN), WILL SHIFT TO WHETHER THE RULING PARTY-SPONSORED PLAN CAN BE REALIZED AS IS, REPELLING THE UPHILL FIGHT FOR A ROLLBACK TO BE STAGED BY MOF.

LDP RECONFIRMS INTENTION TO RAISE CONSUMPTION TAX TO 5 PERCENT (TOKYO SHIMBUN - PAGE 1)

THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP) DECIDED YESTERDAY AT A MEETING OF ITS EXECUTIVE OFFICERS TO FIRMLY UPHOLD ITS POLICY INTENTION OF RAISING THE CONSUMPTION TAX RATE TO 5 PERCENT (NOW 3 PERCENT) FROM NEXT APRIL. IT HAS ALSO REACHED THE JUDGMENT THAT THERE IS STILL INSUFFICIENT UNDERSTANDING BY THE PEOPLE OF THE PROPOSED HIKE IN THE CONSUMPTION TAX RATE. KEEPING THIS IN MIND, THE LDP HAS STARTED LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING A MEASURE TO REDUCE THE PEOPLE'S LOAD, CENTERING ON THE FRONTLOADING OF PLANNED RAISES IN PENSION PAYMENTS.

FINANCE MINISTRY TO PUT OFF UNTIL LATE NOVEMBER ENTRY INTO PERSONAL NON-LIFE INSURANCE (NIHON KEIZAI - PAGE 7)

CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBSIDIARIES BY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANIES FOR MUTUAL ENTRY INTO THE MARKET, THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) HAS MADE CLEAR THE CONTENTS OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS APPROVED FOR ENTRY AT THE TIME OF BUSINESS BEING STARTED NOVEMBER 1 IN THE THIRD SECTOR, WHICH IS MID-WAY BETWEEN LIFE AND NON-LIFE INSURANCE. IT WILL ALLOW IMMEDIATE ENTRY INTO THE MARKET FOR NURSING-CARE INSURANCE AND THE LIKE, BUT FOR INDIVIDUAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE, AS WELL AS MEDICAL AND CANCER INSURANCE, (ENTRY OF) WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS OPPOSED IN BILATERAL INSURANCE TALKS, MOF HAS PUT OFF THE ISSUE, SETTING AS A CONDITION FOR ENTRY THE TIME OF LATE NOVEMBER. THE POLICY COURSE WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY MOF MINISTER KUBO TO U.S. AMBASSADOR MONDALE ON THE MORNING OF THE 25TH, WITH THE MINISTER SEEKING THE U.S.' UNDERSTANDING.

MOF'S SETTING A TIME DIFFERENCE ON ENTRY OF THE DIFFERENT PRODUCTS WAS DONE IN ORDER TO EASE THE RADICAL CHANGE IN THE MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT FOR FOREIGN INSURERS WHOSE SOURCE OF PROFITS IS IN THE THIRD SECTOR. THE MINISTRY HAS GIVEN CONDITIONAL PERMISSION TO SUBSIDIARIES THAT RESTRICTS THEIR SALES OF THIRD SECTOR INSURANCE UNTIL THE END OF SEPTEMBER. THE NEW MEASURE ACCOMPANIES THAT AND WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO EACH SUBSIDIARY AT THE END OF THE MONTH.

SDP CHAIRMAN MURAYAMA IMPLORES DOI TO TAKE OVER POST AS PARTYQS LAST CHANCE (MAINICHI - PAGE 2)

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP) HEAD TOMIICHI MURAYAMA YESTERDAY AFTERNOON MET WITH LOWER HOUSE SPEAKER TAKAKO DOI (FORMER SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN (SDPJ) CHAIRMAN) IN THE DIET BUILDING TO ASK HER TO RETURN TO THE PARTY AND HER COOPERATION FOR THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. DOI, HOWEVER, DID NOT GIVE HER ANSWER TO HIS REQUEST, SAYING "I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THE PEOPLE'S VIEWS." SHE HAS CARRIED OVER HER DECISION TO ON AND AFTER THE 25TH. FOR THE SDP, WHICH WAS COMPELLED TO SPLIT INTO TWO DUE TO THE FORMATION OF THE "MINSHUTO (DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN)," PICKING POPULAR DOI AS PARTY HEAD IS THE LAST CHANCE FOR ITS SURVIVABILITY. IT IS TRUE THAT DOI HAS GRIEVE AT THE PARTY'S SITUATION. SEEMINGLY SHE IS CONSIDERABLY WAVERING IN HER JUDGMENT.

UNCLAS SECTION 08 OF 08 TOKYO 008909

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 25

THE REASON FOR HER UNABLE TO MAKE A DECISION IS BECAUSE HER SUPPORTERS, WHO HAVE BACKED HER FROM HER TENURE AS SDPJ CHAIRMAN, ARE DISAPPOINTED AT THE SDP AND WANT HER TO RUN IN THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION AS AN INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE. BUT IN A PRESS BRIEFING AFTER THE MEETING, DOI REMARKED: "SINCE THE SDP IS MY OLD HAUNT, I CANNOT BUT HOPE THE SHAPE AND CHARACTER OF THE PARTY WILL BE SPELLED OUT IN THE POLICIES." WITH THIS, SHE STRESSED THAT SHE WAS PAYING FULL ATTENTION TO THE SDP'S PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES. SHE APPEARS TO BE THINKING THAT "IF THE ENVIRONMENT IS SET" (SDP SOURCE).

DOI HAS REPEATEDLY MADE CAUTIOUS COMMENTS ON MATTERS SINCE SHE SERVES AS SPEAKER OF THE LOWER HOUSE. IN HER SPEECH DELIVERED ON THE 23RD IN NISHINOMIYA CITY, HYOGO PREFECTURE, HER HOME CONSTITUENCY, SHE REFERRED TO A CONTROVERSIAL CONSUMPTION TAX HIKE ISSUE AND REMARKED: "I HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MATTER BECAUSE I FOUGHT IN THE LAST ELECTION WHILE STRONGLY OPPOSING (TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONSUMPTION TAX) (WHEN IT WAS CONSIDERING)." WHEN ASKED ABOUT CONDITIONS FOR HER RETURN TO THE SDP BY HER FRIEND, SHE REPORTEDLY POINTED OUT "PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION" AS A CONDITION FOR HER RETURN.

AS IT STANDS, SCHOLARS WHO ARE CLOSE TO DOI HAVE SENT THEIR VIEWS: "REGARDING THE ISSUES OF A CONSUMPTION TAX

INCREASE AND SECURITY, THE SDP IS NEEDED TO SET FORTH ITS POLICIES THAT ENABLE DOI TO ACCEPT THE OFFER AS PRECONDITIONS."

ON THE 23RD IN A MEETING OF SECRETARIES GENERAL PREFECTURAL CHAPTERS, MURAYAMA STATED: "IN THE THREE COALITION GOVERNMENT, THE EXISTENCE OF THE SDP HAS BECOME AMBIGUOUS. I UNDERSTAND OUR PARTY'S HAS LOST THE PEOPLE'S CONFIDENCE BECAUSE THE PARTY'S POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES ARE UNCLEAR. WHEN THINK ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE PARTY, REVITALIZING THE PARTY IS IMPORTANT WITH SUCH IN MIND." HE MADE THE REMARK TO PAVE THE WAY FOR DOI'S RETURN TO THE PARTY. DOI'S BECOMING THE PARTY HEAD MEANS TO CLEAR AGAIN THE PARTY'S BASIC PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES THAT HAVE BEEN HELD FROM THE SDPJ DAYS.

HOWEVER, SINCE THE POLICY LINE OF RAISING THE CONSUMPTION TAX RATE WAS ADOPTED BY THE MURAYAMA ADMINISTRATION, VOTERS SEE A REVIEW OF THE TAX INCREASE "BEING EASY-GOING POLICY STANCE." IN THE SDP, THERE HAS APPEARED A VIEW THAT "WE WANT TO FIGHT THE (ELECTION) UNDER A MURAYAMA-DOI LEADERSHIP." (MASAO YORA, KEN YAMADA) CRANE

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 08

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 08

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 08

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DIST:

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
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LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3: O 250715Z SEP 96
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
OSRI: RUEHKO
DTG: 250715Z SEP 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO: RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1206
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDA;ISA// PRIORITY
RUHBANB/OAFO CAMP BUTLER JA PRIORITY
RUYNJDK/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA PRIORITY
RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA// PRIORITY
RUCPDOG/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA// PRIORITY
RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N541// PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7590
INFO: RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 8491
RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 1774
SUBJ: MEDIA REACTION, CLINTON-HASHIMOTO MEETING;
TOKYO

TEXT:
UNCLAS TOKYO 008939

USIA

FOR: USIA FOR I/RF, I/RFW, I/GEA, EA, R/MR; STATE/EAP/J,
EAP/P, PM, STATE DEPT. PLS PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; NSC; SECDEF FOR OASD/PA; CP
BUTLER OKINAWA FOR AREA FIELD OFFICE

E.O. 12958; N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION, CLINTON-HASHIMOTO MEETING;
TOKYO

LEAD STORIES: THE WEDNESDAY MORNING YOMIURI GAVE TOP
COVERAGE TO THE SIGNING OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
TREATY AT THE UNITED NATIONS. THE SANKEI GAVE TOP PLAY
TO SOUTH KOREA'S PLAN TO REVIEW POLICY TOWARD NORTH
KOREA FOLLOWING THE INFILTRATION OF NORTH KOREAN AGENTS
INTO THE SOUTH. MOST PAPERS FRONT-PAGED THE START OF
CLINTON-HASHIMOTO TALKS IN NEW YORK.

1. THE WEDNESDAY MORNING NEWS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL
NHK-TV AND THE NOON NEWS OF FIVE COMMERCIAL TV NETWORKS
GAVE TOP COVERAGE TO THE CLINTON-HASHIMOTO MEETING IN

NEW YORK. THERE WERE NO COMMENTARIES.

2. "CLINTON, HASHIMOTO DISCUSS OKINAWA, TRADE ISSUES" THE QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL NHK-TV SAID, "DURING THEIR TALKS AT THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS EARLY WEDNESDAY MORNING (JAPAN TIME), PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO AGREED TO WORK MORE CLOSELY TO SETTLE THE FUTENMA ISSUE (REVERSION OF THE PRESENT MARINE CORPS AIR STATION AND RELOCATION OF ITS HELIPORT). THE PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF AN OFFSHORE HELIPORT ON OKINAWA WAS THE FOCAL POINT. CLINTON SAID THE US MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD BE MAINTAINED INTACT NO MATTER WHERE THE PROPOSED FLOATING HELIPORT MIGHT BE CONSTRUCTED. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE U.S. AND JAPAN WOULD SETTLE THE FUTENMA ISSUE IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER.

"TURNING TO TRADE, THE PRESIDENT ASKED HASHIMOTO TO MAKE GREATER EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CIVAIR, INSURANCE AND OTHER ISSUES. THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT FINANCE MINISTER KUBO IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH ACTING USTR BARSHEFSKY IN WASHINGTON SOON. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE PROGRESS ON TRADE ISSUES."

3. THE FIVE COMMERCIAL NETWORKS CARRIED SIMILAR REPORTS. HEADLINES: "U.S. AND JAPAN AGREE TO STUDY OFFSHORE HELIPORT PLAN" (NTV); "CLINTON, HASHIMOTO DISCUSS OKINAWA, TRADE AND IRAQ" (TBS); "CLINTON HOPES U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE WILL BE MAINTAINED INTACT NO MATTER WHERE OFFSHORE HELIPORT MAY BE CONSTRUCTED" (FUJI-TV); "CLINTON, HASHIMOTO DISCUSS OFFSHORE HELIPORT ISSUE" (TV ASAHI); AND "CLINTON, HASHIMOTO AGREE TO SETTLE FUTENMA ISSUE BY NOVEMBER" (TV TOKYO). CRANE

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 8939

TOR: 960925044652 M2416059

DIST:

SIT: KRISTOFF PRITCHARD SUETTINGER
SIT: NSC

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	Re: Japan-U.S. / Okinawa Base Issue (6 pages)	09/25/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1996 - 09/26/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1882

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
LINE1: PAAUZYUW RUCWAAA3615 2692351-UUAA--RHEHWSR.
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LINE3: P 252350Z SEP 96
LINE4: FM FBIS RESTON VA
OSRI: RUCWAAA
DTG: 252350Z SEP 96
ORIG: FBIS RESTON VA
TO: RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD/ISA/EAPR FOR LEW STERN//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/JAPAN//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR/EAP/NA/FOR/BROOKS//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/JAPAN/FOR SCOTT/LUDAN//
RUEHKOF/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE
RUEHKOS/AMCONSUL SAPPORO
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK//POL//
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE//FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS//
RUHPHQ/CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//
RUAGTBU/CDR1STBN1STSFGA TORII STA JA//SSO//
RUAGYIN/CDRCSCTTHREE YONGIN KOR//EACT-T-I//
RUAGAMS/CINC UNC CFC SEOUL KOR//UNCMAC//
RUHDBKT/DATT-TLO BANGKOK TH
RUEALGX/DEFINTAGENCY WASH DC
RUCPDC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC//O/IL//
RUCPDC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC//ITA/IEP/JAPAN//
RAYWBBK/DIO CANBERRA AS
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESFG/FBIS BANGKOK TH
RUESDG/PTS HONG KONG
RUDKMKE/FBIS LONDON UK
RUDKMKB/FBIS LONDON UK//BBC//
RUESDJ/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUESDP/FBIS SEOUL KOR
RUALJDT/JDET YOKOTA AB JA
RUDGAFT/HQ AFTAC PATRICK AFB FL//DOB//
RUEBNBA/HQ AFTAC-IN PATRICK AFB FL
RHHJDHA/HQ PACAF IDHS HICKAM AFB HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC//IEG EXEC OFF//
RAYWBFA/ONA CANBERRA AS
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUWTNOK/HQ USSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO//POLAD//
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA
RUESTO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON UK
RUEAIIS/STORAGE CENTER FBIS RESTON VA

ACCT FBWA-EWDK

INFO: ////

SUBJ: FBIS FMN-25SEP96--OKINAWAN DIVISION OVER HELIPORT

TEXT:

UNCLAS 4z/LD

WARNING: (THE FOLLOWING ITEM IS INTENDED FOR USE ONLY BY
U.S. GOVERNMENT CONSUMERS. IT IS BASED ON
FOREIGN MEDIA CONTENT AND BEHAVIOR AND IS ISSUED
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COMPONENTS.)

SERIAL: WA2509235596
PASS: ATTN BLOUGH/MILLER
ATTN BBC RDSUP

COUNTRY: JAPAN

SUBJ: FBIS FMN-25SEP96--OKINAWAN DIVISION OVER HELIPORT

SOURCE: FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

TEXT:

Japan-U.S.: Media Report Divisions in Okinawa
Over Floating Heliport

[FBIS Media Analysis] Recent reporting in the Okinawan press has suggested that local opinion on the proposal to move some of Futenma Air Station's functions to a floating heliport concept is divided, with many local officials, antibase activists and the traditionally antibase Okinawan media opposing the concept, and local members of the Liberal Democratic Party supporting it.

Local Okinawan officials have continued to speak out against the proposed heliport since Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto proposed it during a speech on 17 September.

-- Okinawa Governor Masahide Ota, who initially refused to comment on the proposal, told Ryukyu Shimpo on 24 September that he and the "Okinawan people" hope that Futenma Air Station will be returned "without relocation" of any of its functions, suggesting that he may come out against the floating heliport if there is strong local reaction against it (Ryukyu Shimpo, 25 September).

-- Four local mayors, including the mayor of Okinawa City, reacted negatively to a Japanese press report that the offshore heliport may be built off White Beach in Nakagusuku Bay.

-- They told the 25 September Ryukyu Shimpo that they "strongly object" to the proposal because the heliport will disrupt fishing in a "rich fishing ground," generate noise that will "annoy" residents, and conflict with plans to develop a commercial harbor in the area.

-- The heads of three local fishermen's cooperatives also objected to the plan, telling the paper that the proposed heliport would make the bay "dangerous" and reduce their catch (Ryukyu Shimpo, 25 September).

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	Re: FBIS FMN [Foreign Media Note] 0 Okinawan Division Over Heliport [partial] (1 page)	09/25/1996	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([Futenma])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/19/1996 - 09/26/1996]

2016-0420-F
sb1882

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Local Activists Object

Local antibase activists have also begun to attack the proposal.

-- According to the 23 September Okinawa Times, 70 activists, including landowners and labor union officials, held a rally in Naha the previous day, during which they decided to "take action against," among other issues, the construction of an offshore heliport.

Media Opposition

Both of Okinawa's two main newspapers, which in the past have strongly opposed the U.S. bases on the island, have denounced the proposal.

-- A 19 September Okinawa Times editorial warned that the plan might "interfere with" Okinawa's economic development plans and "increase concerns of Japan's Asian neighbors that Japan may again become a military superpower."

-- In a 21 September editorial entitled "A base is a base, even if it is floating at sea," Ryukyu Shimpō complained that the floating heliport would involve "massive" costs and might "restrict" local fishing, "destroy" coal reefs, and have a "great impact" on tourism and the lives of local inhabitants.

Support of Okinawan LDP

By contrast, local LDP members appear to be trying to promote the floating heliport.

-- On 24 September, the Okinawa Federation of the LDP sponsored a briefing for prefectural assembly members by a group of companies studying megafloat technology.

-- According to a 25 September Ryukyu Shimpō article on the briefing, representatives of the companies expressed hope that they would be able to put their new technology "to practical use."

(b)(3)

010

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(endall) EAG/HH/dh 25/2338Z sep

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 3615

TOR: 960925200350 M2417502

DIST:

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SIT: NSC

Cable

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LINE3: O 260212Z SEP 96
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DTG: 260212Z SEP 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO: RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1215
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7614
INFO: RUYNJDK/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOG/USDOC WASHDC
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RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N5//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
SUBJ: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 26

TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 008959

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR
EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA
WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS;
USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA;
COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 26

TOP HEADLINES:

ASAHI: PARENT INFECTED WITH POLIO THROUGH HIS POLIO-
VACCINATED CHILD; SUSPICION OF "SECONDARY INFECTION" OF
POLIO; MAN IN HIS THIRTIES INFECTED, ACCORDING TO SURVEY
BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH; 30 PERCENT OF THOSE AGED
FROM 19 TO 20 "HAVE NO ANTIBODIES"

NIHON KEIZAI: MARUBENI, HITACHI WILL PROVIDE CATV
SERVICE; NTT'S OPTICAL FIBER CIRCUITS TO BE UTILIZED; TO
JOINTLY UNDERTAKE BROADCASTING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

BUSINESSES; TO EXPAND TWO-WAY SERVICES FROM NEXT JULY

TOKYO SHIMBUN: DOI HINTS AT RETURNING TO SDP AFTER DIET RESOLUTION; SDP MUST ACCEPT HER FIVE CONDITIONS, INCLUDING RECONSIDERATION OF THE CONSUMPTION-TAX HIKE

MAINICHI: EX-HEALTH AND WELFARE MINISTRY OFFICIALS OBTAINED HIGH POSITIONS IN 11 PHARMACEUTICAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS DIRECTOR; "AMAKUDARI" PRACTICE CONTINUING FOR AS LONG AS 30 YEARS, ACCORDING TO THIS NEWSPAPER'S SURVEY

YOMIURI: REPORT BY AUM CULT'S OFFICIAL RECEIVER: DEBTS REACH 4.9 BILLION YEN, WITH 1.3 BILLION YEN IN ASSETS; FIRST ASSEMBLY OF CREDITORS HELD; "DIVIDEND" MAY BE 10 TO 20 PERCENT

SANKEI: SENKAKUS ALSO COVERED BY U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY, AS SPECIFIED IN U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS; "BOTH GOVERNMENTS GAVE THEIR CONSENT" AT TIME OF REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN (TRANSLATION BELOW)

PRIME MINISTER TO DISSOLVE DIET TOMORROW AND CALL SNAP ELECTION (NIHON KEIZAI - PAGE 1)

PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO (PRESIDENT OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)) WILL DISSOLVE THE LOWER HOUSE TOMORROW. PRIOR TO THIS, THE PRIME MINISTER TODAY AT THIS RESIDENTIAL OFFICE WILL MEET WITH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP) CHAIRMAN TOMIICHI MURAYAMA AND SAKIGAKE PRESIDENT SHOICHI IDE TO CONVEY THEM FORMALLY HIS DECISION ON A LOWER-HOUSE DISSOLUTION FOR A GENERAL ELECTION. THE PRIME MINISTER'S DECISION IS LIKELY TO LEAD TO THE CONVOCAION OF THE 137TH EXTRAORDINARY DIET ON THE 27TH, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE LOWER HOUSE AT THE OUTSET OF THE LOWER HOUSE PLENARY SESSION TO BE HELD NOON THAT DAY. FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE NEXT LOWER-HOUSE ELECTION, WHICH WILL BE CARRIED OUT FOR THE FIRST TIME UNDER THE NEW PARALLEL ELECTORATE SYSTEM, WILL BE MADE ON OCTOBER 8 FOR THE ELECTION ON OCTOBER 20.

THE PRIME MINISTER IS GOING TO DISSOLVE THE LOWER HOUSE, JUDGING THAT SUCH STICKY ISSUES AS THE U.S. OKINAWA BASE PROBLEM AND THE DISPOSITION OF THE JUSEN (HOUSING LOAN COMPANIES) PROBLEM, WHICH HAVE BEEN TORMENTING THE GOVERNMENT SINCE IT WAS LAUNCHED IN JANUARY, HAVE BEEN SETTLED FOR NOW. AS A RESULT, THE LOWER HOUSE WILL BE DISSOLVED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THREE YEARS AND THREE MONTHS, WITH THE MIYAZAWA ADMINISTRATION BEING THE LAST IN JUNE 1993. THE MOVE TO LAUNCH THE MUCH-PUBLICIZED MINSHUTO (DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN) HAS BEEN PICKING UP SPEED TO GROW INTO A "THIRD POLITICAL FORCE" TO COUNTER THE TWO GIANTS -- THE LDP AND SHINSHINTO (NEW FRONTIER PARTY). THE UPCOMING ELECTION AND A NEW POST-ELECTION ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK ARE LIKELY TO AFFECT THE TREND OF POLITICAL REALIGNMENT GREATLY.

POSSIBLE POINTS AT ISSUE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTION INCLUDE

FUNDAMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM WITH EMPHASIS ON THE
REALIGNMENT OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES; THE PLANNED
CONSUMPTION-TAX HIKE FROM THE PRESENT THREE PERCENT TO
FIVE PERCENT NEXT SPRING; AND OVERALL SECURITY POLICY,
INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE.

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 08 TOKYO 008959

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR
EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA
WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS;
USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA;
COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 26

THE LOWER HOUSE STEERING COMMITTEE AT ITS DIRECTORS
MEETING YESTERDAY REACHED AGREEMENT TO HOLD A PLENARY
SESSION AT NOON OF THE 27TH SOON AFTER THE EXTRAORDINARY
DIET IS CONVEYED. IN THE SESSION, SHINSHINTO PROPOSED TO
CONTINUE THE SESSION FOR 14 DAYS UNTIL OCTOBER 10, HOLD
AN OPENING CEREMONY AND DELIVER (THE PRIME MINISTER'S) A
POLICY SPEECH ON SEPTEMBER 30, DIET INTERPELLATIONS ON
OCTOBER 2 AND 3. THE LDP ONLY REPLIED, "WE WOULD LIKE TO
BRING IT BACK TO THE PARTY BECAUSE WE HAVE TO WORK IT OUT
AMONG THE RULING PARTIES." THEY DECIDED TO MEET AGAIN ON
THE 26TH.

ALSO TODAY, ON THE 26TH, THE GOVERNMENT WILL HOLD A
SPECIAL CABINET MEETING TO EXAMINE THE CONTENTS OF THE
PRIME MINISTER'S POLICY SPEECH, WHICH HAS BEEN PREPARED
FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY DIET. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRIME
MINISTER HAS ALREADY MADE UP HIS MIND TO DISSOLVE THE
LOWER HOUSE AT THE OUTSET OF THE EXTRAORDINARY DIET. THE
LDP IS PLANNING TO OBTAIN FINAL UNDERSTANDING FROM THE
SDP AND THE SAKIGAKE PARTY IN TODAY'S HASHIMOTO-MURAYAMA-
IDE SESSION AS WELL AS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND RULING
COALITION LEADERS LIAISON CONFERENCE THAT WOULD FOLLOW.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK DID LITTLE TO ENHANCE
ELECTION APPEAL (ASAHI - PAGE 3)

BOOST THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTION BY WINDING UP THE
OKINAWA PROBLEM IN A SUMMIT MEETING WITH U.S. PRESIDENT
CLINTON: SUCH WAS THE INTENTION PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO
HASHIMOTO WHEN HE VISITED NEW YORK TO ORCHESTRATE A
"SUCCESS" IN RESOLVING THE OKINAWA PROBLEM AND TO BUILD A
STRONG RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST WITH THE PRESIDENT.
HOWEVER, WITH THE U.S. MASS MEDIA SHOWING LITTLE
INTEREST, THE PRIME MINISTER'S "LAST REQUEST," WHICH WAS
PLANNED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MOFA), AIMING
AT A UN ELECTION FOR THE NON-PERMANENT UN COUNCIL
MEMBERSHIP, TURNED OUT TO BE RATHER INEFFECTIVE.

THE PRIME MINISTER USED A MAGNIFICENT GESTURE IN A SPEECH MADE AT THE DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS COUNCIL ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 24TH, STRESSING, "I INTEND TO FIGHT STRONG RESISTANCE, BY DISPLAYING MY STRONG POLITICAL LEADERSHIP." IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HE WAS WELL AWARE THAT A SPEECH ON THAT OCCASION WAS "ONE IN PLACE OF A POLICY SPEECH (FOR A DOMESTIC AUDIENCE)" FOR THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO IS TO CALL A LOWER-HOUSE DISSOLUTION AND SNAP GENERAL ELECTION IMMEDIATELY AFTER RETURNING HOME. LOOKING TOWARD A "SECOND HASHIMOTO ADMINISTRATION," HE DEVOTED MORE THAN HALF OF HIS SPEECH TO HIS POLICY APPEAL DIRECTED BOTH AT U.S. AND JAPANESE AUDIENCES.

IN CONCLUDING HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT, TOO, HE BROUGHT UP THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES AS THE TOPIC.

PRIME MINISTER: "I THINK THAT YOU ARE BUSY WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION JUST AHEAD."

PRESIDENT: "IS JAPAN'S (CAMPAIGN PERIOD) FOUR WEEKS?"

PRIME MINISTER: "NO, TWO WEEKS."

PRESIDENT: "IT IS GOOD THAT IT IS SHORT."

THEIR TALKS WERE EXTENDED FROM 15 MINUTES AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO 40 MINUTES AS IF THE PRESIDENT GAVE CONSIDERATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO IS AWARE OF THE "EFFECTS OF HIS VISIT TO THE U.S." ON THE UPCOMING GENERAL ELECTION IN JAPAN. HOWEVER, REGARDING THE ISSUE OF RELOCATING THE HELIPORT FROM FUTENMA AIR STATION IN OKINAWA, NEITHER SIDE TOUCHED ON THORNY PROBLEMS, SUCH AS RELOCATION COSTS AND THE TECHNICAL ASPECT. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT FORGET TO GIVE A WARNING REGARDING ECONOMIC UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 08 TOKYO 008959

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 26

ISSUES, INCLUDING INSURANCE.

U.S. MASS MEDIA INDIFFERENT

THE PRIME MINISTER AIMED AT MAKING A POPULAR APPEAL BOTH TO DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AUDIENCES, BUT THE U.S. MASS MEDIA'S RESPONSE TO HIS SPEECH WAS AN UTTER

"DISAPPOINTMENT." THE 25TH MORNING EDITION OF THE NEW YORK TIMES CARRIED A SMALL ARTICLE ON THE JAPAN-U.S. SUMMIT MEETING, REPORTING THAT THE PRESIDENT GAVE HIM REGARDS FROM COMMERCE SECRETARY KANTOR, WITH WHOM HE HAD EXCHANGED BLOWS DURING IN BILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS. IT HARDLY REPORTED THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT THE UN.

THE PRIME MINISTER WAS MOST CONSPICUOUS ON CNN, WHICH SPECIALIZES IN NEWS. CNN NEWS SCREENED THE PRIME MINISTER LISTENING TO A SPEECH BY PRESIDENT CLINTON AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY HALL: THE TELEVISION CAMERA CLOSELY-FOCUSED ON THE PRIME MINISTER WITH HIS EYELIDS DROOPING AT GREAT LENGTH UNTIL HE COMPLETELY FELL ASLEEP, INCURRING LAUGHS AT UN HEADQUARTERS.

MOFA HELD TWO SESSIONS OF PRESS BRIEFING FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO UNDERSCORE ACTIVITIES OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HOWEVER, IN THOSE PRESS CONFERENCES, QUESTIONS MAINLY ASKED BY HONG KONG AND TAIWANESE JOURNALISTS CONCENTRATED ON THE PROBLEM OF THE SENKAKU ISLANDS, SUCH AS "WILL IT NOT AFFECT JAPAN'S CAMPAIGN FOR OBTAINING A PERMANENT MEMBER SEAT ON THE UNSC?," "DID THE PRIME MINISTER TALK ABOUT THIS PROBLEM WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON?," OR "WHY DID THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT NOT STOP SUCH ACTIVITIES BY RIGHT-WING ORGANIZATIONS?" MUCH OF THE QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION WAS SPENT ON THIS PROBLEM. MOFA OFFICIALS WERE SEEN HAVING TROUBLE GIVING EXPLANATIONS ON THAT ISSUE FOR A NUMBER OF TIMES.

PRIME MINISTER RETURNS HOME

PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO, WHO HAS BEEN VISITING NEW YORK TO ATTEND THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RETURNED HOME AT HANEDA AIRPORT BY A PLANE FOR EXCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT USE BEFORE 11:00 P.M. ON THE 25TH.

32 HOURS OF HASHIMOTO DIPLOMACY IN NEW YORK
(TOKYO SHIMBUN - PAGE 3)

PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO HAS RETURNED HOME AFTER TWO DAYS OF ATTENDING THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA). HIS SPEECH AT THE UNGA AND HIS SUMMIT MEETING WITH U.S. PRESIDENT CLINTON WERE OPPORTUNITIES FOR HIM TO DISPLAY TO DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCES THE "HASHIMOTO DIPLOMACY" LINE, WITH THE PRIME MINISTER CONSCIOUS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION APPROACHING SOON. WE PURSUE THE PRIME MINISTER AS HE SCAMPERS THROUGH NEW YORK FOR 32 HOURS. (NEW YORK, EDITORIAL WRITER TADAHIKO NASA)

THE OKINAWA PROBLEM

THE PRIME MINISTER PUT AS MUCH ENERGY INTO HIS SUMMIT MEETING WITH THE U.S. (PRESIDENT) AS HE DID HIS UNGA APPEARANCE. AT FIRST THE MEETING WAS SCHEDULED FOR ONLY 15 MINUTES, SINCE IT WAS IN BETWEEN BREAKS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN, BUT IN THE END THAT WAS

DOUBLED TO ABOUT 30 MINUTES. IT APPEARS THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENT GAVE HIM SPECIAL SERVICE IN DEFERENCE TO THE "BILL-RYU RELATION."

ON THE HOT ISSUE OF THE LOCATION OF AN ALTERNATE AIR FIELD FOR FUTENMA AIR STATION, NO FINAL CONCLUSIONS WERE REACHED, BUT THE PRESIDENT STATED, "WE NEED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE IN A FORM THAT NO MORE ISSUES LIKE FUTENMA AIR BASE ARISE IN THE FUTURE." SINCE THE LOCAL COMMUNITY HAS UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 08 TOKYO 008959

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INDIRECTLY REJECTED THE PROPOSAL TO MOVE FUTENMA'S AIR STRIP TO KADENA AIR BASE, THE PROPOSAL FOR A FLOATING FACILITY OFFSHORE HAS BECOME EXTREMELY LIKELY.

THE SENSE IS THAT THE JAPAN-U.S. SPECIAL ACTION COMMITTEE ON OKINAWA (SACO) WILL LIKELY COME OUT WITH THE OUTLINE OF ITS FINAL CONCLUSIONS BY LATE NOVEMBER, AND RESOLVING THE BASE ISSUE ALONG THAT LINE WAS SET AT THE SUMMIT MEETING, AS INTENDED BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

JAPAN-CHINA TIES: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO YASUKUNI SHRINE REMAINS A THORNY ISSUE (ASAHI - PAGE 2)

(NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 25, JUNICHI SAITO) JAPAN-CHINA FOREIGN MINISTERIAL TALKS WERE HELD ON THE 24TH FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WAS AGGRAVATED BY THE DISPUTE OVER SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS AND THE VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO TO YASUKUNI SHRINE. IN THE TALKS, THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER LASHED OUT AT JAPAN OVER ITS RESPONSES TO THE ISSUES OF HISTORICAL PERCEPTION, CLAIMS TO THE SENKAKU ISLANDS, AND THE "REDEFINITION" OF THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY ARRANGEMENT. JAPAN WAS UNDER PRESSURE TO MAKE EXPLANATIONS. THE TALKS ENDED UP WITH UNDERSCORING CHINA'S POSITION BASED ON PRINCIPLE BUT THERE WERE ALSO HINTS THAT BOTH SIDES WISHED TO AVOID THE SITUATION FROM GETTING WORSE. YET, THE PRIME MINISTER SWEEPED THE YASUKUNI ISSUE UNDER THE RUG, ONLY SAYING "THIS IS A MATTER ON MY MIND." BOTH SIDES THUS REMAINED UNABLE TO MAKE A START IN REPAIRING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THE GOVERNMENTS AND JAPAN AND CHINA WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO FIND COMMON GROUND TO DISSOLVE THESE STICKY ISSUES.

SET OFF BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE YASUKUNI

SHRINE IN LATE JULY FOR THE REASON OF THAT DAY BEING HIS BIRTHDAY, CHINA HAS BEEN HURLING ACCUSATIONS AGAINST JAPAN. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A "LIGHTHOUSE" BY JAPANESE RIGHTISTS ON ONE OF THE SENKAKU ISLANDS ADDED FUEL TO CHINA'S FIRE. IN THE MIDST OF EACH COUNTRY'S ATTENTION DRAWN TO THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP, CHINESE DEPUTY PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN, KNOWN TO BE A MODERATE, HARSHLY ATTACKED JAPAN. IN THE BACKGROUND, THERE IS CONCERN IN CHINA AB'-t2."THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY ARRANGEMENT WAS A MANIFESTATION OF HIS APPREHENSION ABOUT AN ATTEMPT BY JAPAN AND THE U.S. TO BREAK DOWN THE BALANCE OF POWER THAT HAS BEEN PRESERVED BY THE TWO SIDES' (THE TWO COUNTRIES AND CHINA) INDIRECTLY HOLDING THE OTHER SIDE'S MOVEMENTS IN CHECK.

PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO EXPRESSED IN THE JUNE LEON SUMMIT AND OTHER OCCASIONS HIS SUPPORT FOR CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO). SUCH CONSIDERATION WAS SET OFF BY THE YASUKUNI SHRINE ISSUE AND THE MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY'S STANCE TO THE SENKAKU ISLANDS ISSUE. WHILE JAPAN HAD BEEN PREOCCUPIED OVER THE OKINAWA ISSUE, CHINA'S ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT DETERIORATED FURTHER. THE PRIME MINISTER SEEMS TO HAVE NOT EXPECTED SUCH A PROCEEDING IN THE TALKS.

JAPANESE AND CHINESE OFFICIALS IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAVE BELIEVED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S EXPRESSION OF HIS DECISION OF NOT VISITING THE YASUKUNI SHRINE BEFORE OR AFTER THE FALL'S GREAT FETE WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE MESSAGE TO SEND TO CHINA. BUT THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD REPORTERS IN NEW YORK THAT "I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT THIS ISSUE. EVEN IF I WERE TO EXPLAIN WHAT WAS ON MY MIND, THE OTHER SIDE WOULD NOT FRANKLY ACCEPT IT."

AS LONG AS THE PRIME MINISTER KEEPS SILENT REGARDING THE YASUKUNI SHRINE ISSUE, THERE WILL BE NO OTHER WAY BUT TO CONTINUE UNOFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS TO BREAK THE IMPASSE IN UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 08 TOKYO 008959

USIA

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SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 26

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS REVEAL U.S.-JAPAN AGREED TO APPLY SECURITY ARRANGEMENT TO SENKAKUS (SANKEI - TOP PLAY)

(WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 25, YOSHIHISA KOMORI) IT WAS LEARNED AS OF THE 25TH THAT AT THE TIME OF THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN, IT WAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE SENKAKU ISLANDS (DIAOYU ISLANDS IN CHINESE), WHICH ARE EFFECTIVELY UNDER JAPANESE CONTROL BUT WHOSE SOVEREIGNTY IS CLAIMED BY CHINA AND TAIWAN, ARE COVERED UNDER THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY AS THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN. THE PRESENT U.S. GOVERNMENT HOWEVER HAS SHOWN A NEUTRAL POSITION ABOUT THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE INVOLVING THE SENKAKUS AND ALSO HAS AVOIDED EXPLICITLY REFERRING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY TO THE ISLANDS. BUT ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT ALREADY REACHED BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S., IF A MILITARY CONFLICT WERE TO OCCUR OVER THE ISLANDS, (JAPAN) CAN ASK FOR THE U.S. FORCES' ASSISTANCE BY INVOKING ARTICLE 5 OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY.

DETAILS ABOUT THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY COVERING THE SENKAKU ISLANDS ARE EXPLAINED IN A REPORT ENTITLED, "COMPETITION FOR SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SENKAKU ISLANDS," COMPILED IN MAY 1974 BY THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. THE REPORT CONCLUDES SPECIFICALLY: "THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY COVERING THE U.S.' RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFEND JAPAN IS APPLICABLE ALSO TO THE SENKAKU ISLANDS." THE GROUNDS FOR SUCH A CONCLUSION IN THE REPORT ARE OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS OF AROUND 1972, WHEN THE SENKAKUS, AS WELL AS OKINAWA, WERE REVERTED BY THE U.S. TO JAPAN.

ACCORDING TO DESCRIPTIONS IN THE REPORT AND ACCOUNTS BY U.S. OFFICIALS CONCERNED AT THE TIME, THE REASONS WHY THE ISLANDS ARE COVERED BY THE SECURITY TREATY ARE:

1. IN ARTICLE 2 OF THE OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT SIGNED IN 1971, IT IS STIPULATED THAT THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY "SHOULD BE UNRESTRICTEDLY APPLIED TO THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS," ALL OF WHICH ARE TO BE RETURNED TO JAPAN;

2. THE MEMORANDUM UNDER THE ABOVE AGREEMENT DEFINES "THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND DAITO ISLANDS" AS A TERRITORY AND A TERRITORIAL WATER THAT HAD BEEN UNTIL THEN ADMINISTERED BY THE U.S. AND INCLUDING ALL ISLANDS, ISLES, ATOLLS AND REEFS IN THE AREA INDICATED BY A PROCLAMATION ISSUED IN 1953 BY THE U.S.-CONTROLLED RYUKYU GOVERNMENT (USCAR), AND THE AREA INCLUDES ALL OF THE SENKAKUS (THE AREA EXTENDS WESTWARD FROM THE OKINAWA ISLANDS TO THE POINT OF 24 DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE AND 122 DEGREES OF EAST LONGITUDE, FURTHER TO THE SOUTHWEST OF THE SENKAKU ISLANDS);

3. REGARDING THE EXPLANATIONS ABOUT WHAT WOULD BE COVERED BY THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS BUREAU'S LEGAL ADVISOR ROBERT STARR (PHONETIC) IN A LETTER ADDRESSED IN OCTOBER 1971 TO THE U.S. CONGRESS EMPLOYED THE WORDING,

"THE SOUTHEAST ISLANDS SOUTH OF THE POINT OF 29 DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE," THE EXPRESSION THAT IS THE SAME AS SAYING "THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS," AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT "BOTH THE JAPANESE AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS AGREED THAT THE SENKAKU ISLANDS ARE INCLUDED"; AND

4. APART FROM THE ACTUAL SITUATION WHEN THE REVERSION WAS MADE, ARTICLE 5 OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY STIPULATES THAT THE U.S. WILL TAKE ACTION TO DEAL WITH "AN ARMED ATTACK ON EITHER SIDE IN THE AREA ADMINISTERED BY JAPAN," SO THE REQUIREMENT, THAT IS, THE AREA UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 08 TOKYO 008959

USIA

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ADMINISTERED BY JAPAN, IS MET.

BASED ON THOSE DESCRIPTIONS, IF AN ARMED ATTACK WERE TO OCCUR AGAINST THE SENKAKU ISLANDS SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO PERFORM ITS DUTY TO JOINTLY DEFEND THE SENKAKUS WHEN JAPAN FOLLOWS THE STEPS TO INVOKE THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY. HOWEVER, THE CURRENT U.S. GOVERNMENT IS EXCEEDINGLY RELUCTANT TO INDICATE A CLEAR-CUT STATEMENT ABOUT THE APPLICATION OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY TO THE SENKAKUS. IN FACT, ON THE 24TH, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) DECLINED MAKING A COMMENT ON THIS MATTER. IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ON THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SENKAKUS, ITS PRESS OFFICER WOULD GO NO FURTHER THAN TO SAY: "THE U.S. DOES NOT ENDORSE ANY PARTICULAR COUNTRY, NOR WE RECOGNIZE ANY COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY. WE HOPE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WILL BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED."

INVESTIGATION OF RAPE BY U.S. SERVICEMAN IN OKINAWA
(MAINICHI - PAGE 30)

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN JAPAN (YOKOTA AIR BASE) ON THE 25TH REVEALED THAT IT IS INVESTIGATING CHARGES THAT A U.S. STAFF SERGEANT STATIONED AT KADENA AIR BASE IN OKINAWA RAPED A JAPANESE WOMAN (29) ON THAT BASE. THE RAPE OF A SCHOOLGIRL LAST YEAR IN SEPTEMBER DEVELOPED INTO A BASE ISSUE. PRIME MINISTER RYUTARO HASHIMOTO IN HIS TRIP TO THE U.S. HAS JUST CONFIRMED THAT THE JAPANESE AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS WOULD SERIOUSLY TACKLE THE SETTLEMENT OF THE BASE PROBLEM. (WITH THE NEW INCIDENT,) A REACTION BY THE CITIZENS OF OKINAWA IS

INEVITABLE AND MIGHT EVEN HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE BASE PROBLEM. BASED PARTLY ON LOCAL REPORTS.

ACCORDING TO THE PRESS AFFAIRS OFFICE OF KADENA A.B., A HEARING WILL BE HELD ON THE 26TH ON THE CHARGE THAT AIRMAN 2ND CLASS MICHAEL OWENS (31), WHO IS ATTACHED TO THE 18TH MILITARY POLICE SQUADRON, RAPED A JAPANESE WOMAN. THE AIRMAN IS BEING HELD ON CHARGES HE RAPED THE JAPANESE WOMAN IN A ROOM ON KADENA BASE THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 10. THE AIRMAN REPORTEDLY DID NOT KNOW WHO THE IDENTITY OF HIS VICTIM WAS.

IN THE SAME PREFECTURE LAST YEAR IN SEPTEMBER, THREE U.S. SERVICEMEN KIDNAPPED AND RAPED A SCHOOLGIRL. THIS RESULTED IN THE SPREADING OF A BASE-REVERSION MOVEMENT. WITH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS AND BETWEEN THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE PREFECTURE ON REALIGNING AND REDUCING BASES, A SIMILAR INCIDENT AGAIN HAS OCCURRED. (SIMILAR COVERAGE IN MOST DAILIES.)

LDP SECRETARY GENERAL KATOQS 10 MINUTES OF QUESTIONING IN ETHICS COMMITTEE (MAINICHI - PAGE 2)

YESTERDAY THE POLITICAL ETHICS COUNCIL (SEIRINSHIN, CHAIRED BY SEISUKE OKUNO) HELD A SESSION, IN WHICH LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL KOICHI KATO AND OTHER LDP OFFICIALS TRIED TO "TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE (SPREAD OF POLITICAL DISTRUST) BEFORE THE EXPECTED GENERAL ELECTION." THE SESSION WAS HELD TO EXAMINE THE ILLEGAL DONATION ALLEGEDLY GIVE TO KATO. INSTEAD, THE ETHICS COUNCIL HAS EXPOSED ITS SYSTEMATICALLY DRAWBACKS: 1) A CLOSED SESSION; 2) ONLY EXPLANATIONS ALLOWED; AND 3) 10 MINUTES, EXTREMELY SHORT QUESTIONING-TIME, GIVEN TO EACH PARTY. ALTHOUGH IT WAS THE FIRST SESSION FOR THE ETHICS COUNCIL, THERE WERE NO ELEMENTS FOR CLEANING EFFORTS IN THE DIET. (OSAMU KOGA)

FOLLOWING THE CONVICTION OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER KAKUEI TANAKA IN THE LOCKHEED SCANDAL, POLITICAL ETHICS COUNCILS WERE ESTABLISHED IN BOTH HOUSES OF THE DIET IN 1985. IN JUNE 1985, THE DIET ADOPTED A POLITICAL ETHICS OUTLINE UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 08 TOKYO 008959

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THAT SPELLS OUT: THE ETHICS COUNCILS WILL "CARRY OUT HIGH ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES THAT WILL MERIT THE PEOPLE'S TRUST IN POLITICS."

WHEN THE COUNCILS WERE SET UP, IT WAS DECIDED A SESSION COULD BE HELD AT THE "REQUEST" OF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF DIETMEMBERS, BUT IN DECEMBER 1992, A RULE WAS ADDED TO ALLOW A LAWMAKER WHO BELIEVES SUSPICIONS OF HIS OR HER POLITICAL ETHICS ARE UNFAIR TO ASK FOR A SESSION TO BE HELD. BASED ON THIS REGULATION, KATO SOUGHT THE SESSION.

IN YESTERDAY'S SESSION, KATO TOTALLY REJECTED THE ALLEGATION OF HIS RECEIVING AN ILLICIT DONATION OF TEN MILLION YEN FROM KYOWA, THE NOW BANKRUPT STEEL-FRAME PROCESSING FIRM. HE ALSO REMARKED ON A LIBEL SUIT CLAIMED BY SHIGENORI MIZUMACHI, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF KATO'S SUPPORT GROUP, THAT HE LOST, SAYING "A CIVIL SUIT IS NOT TO BRING ABOUT THE TRUTH. I DID NOT PROFANE THE DIET AND THE JUSTICE."

BUT KATO'S STANCE ABOUT NOT FIGHTING IT OUT IN THE COURT TO CLEAR UP SUSPICIONS ABOUT HIM IS FULL OF CONTRADICTIONS.

THE POLITICAL ETHICS COUNCIL STIPULATES THAT IF THE COUNCIL JUDGES THAT AN ALLEGED LAWMAKER HAS RESPONSIBILITY, THAT LAWMAKER WILL BE "ADVISED" TO "REFRAIN FROM ATTENDING THE DIET SESSION FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME," BY A MAJORITY OF MORE THAN TWO-THIRDS OF ATTENDED COUNCIL MEMBERS. AFTER THE SESSION, CHAIRMAN OKUNO COMMENTED: "IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SUSPECTED PERSON VOLUNTARILY ATTENDED THE SESSION. I WANT TO HAVE THE POLITICAL ETHICS COUNCIL BE AN ORGAN THAT WILL ESTABLISH POLITICAL MORALITY, NOT A SCENE FOR POLITICAL DISPUTES. THE SESSION THIS TIME IS OVER." HOWEVER, SUCH A POLITICAL ETHICS COUNCIL SYSTEM MIGHT INCREASE THE PEOPLE'S DISTRUST IN POLITICS.

TAKAKO DOI LAYS DOWN FIVE CONDITIONS FOR HER ACCEPTANCE OF SDP CHAIRMANSHIP (TOKYO SHIMBUN - TOP PLAY)

THE SECOND ROUND OF TALKS BETWEEN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP) CHAIRMAN TOMIICHI MURAYAMA AND LOWER HOUSE SPEAKER TAKAKO DOI TOOK PLACE LATE YESTERDAY TO DISCUSS MEASURES TO SAVE THE CRUMBLING SDP. IN IT, CHAIRMAN MURAYAMA REQUESTED DOI TO RETURN TO THE PARTY POSSIBLY AS THE NEW PARTY CHAIRPERSON. IN RETURN, DOI PRESENTED A FIVE-POINT COUNTERPROPOSAL CALLING FOR, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, A RECONSIDERATION OF THE CONSUMPTION-TAX INCREASE. HER COUNTERPROPOSALS APPEAR TO BE A VIRTUAL CONDITION FOR HER RETURN TO THE PARTY. UPON RECEIVING A REPLY FROM MURAYAMA, DOI IS EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE HER DECISION AFTER THE LOWER HOUSE IS DISSOLVED AS TO WHETHER SHE WILL RETURN TO THE PARTY.

SDP EXECUTIVES, INCLUDING CHAIRMAN MURAYAMA, MET LATE YESTERDAY TO DISCUSS THE DOI PROPOSALS. AS A RESULT, MEMBERS REAFFIRMED THE POLICY DIRECTION TO ACCEPT THE DOI

PLAN IN PRINCIPLE AND WORK OUT SPECIFICS WITH DOI.

AFTER HER MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN MURAYAMA, DOI STATED TO THE PRESS: "I WAS CHAIRPERSON WHEN THE SDP WAS STILL CALLED THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN (SDPJ), SO I AM NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE SDP ERA. THE CHARACTER OF THE SDP AS A PARTY HAS BECOME UNCLEAR. SO I AM WAVERING BETWEEN RETURNING OR NOT RETURNING TO THE PARTY." SHE ALSO EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION TOWARD THE SDP'S POLICY SWITCHES REGARDING SECURITY. Q8*3MA REMARKED: "(DOI'S) PROPOSAL INCLUDES ELEMENTS THAT REQUIRE OUR IMMEDIATE ACTION AS WELL AS ELEMENTS THAT CONCERN THE PARTY BEDROCK. WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE IT HUMBLY AND LOOK INTO IT CAREFULLY." HE THUS UNCLAS SECTION 08 OF 08 TOKYO 008959

USIA

FOR: USIA D/P, I/GEA, I/RF, I/RFW, EA, RMR; STATE FOR EAR/J; STATE PASS TO USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; CIA WASHDC; SECDEF FOR JCS/J-5/JAPAN, OASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI; WHITE HOUSE; COMMERCE FOR DAS; USCINCPAC/PA; CINCPACFLT/PA; COMUSJ/PA; COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: JAPANESE MORNING PRESS HIGHLIGHTS SEPTEMBER 26

SUGGESTED HIS PLAN TO MEET AGAIN WITH DOI TO CONVEY THE PARTY'S DECISION AND WORK OUT SPECIFICS.

DOI ALSO REMARKED, "IT IS NOT THAT SIMPLE FOR ME TO RETURN TO THE PARTY IMMEDIATELY (AFTER CONSIDERING THE REPLY)." BUT SHE ALSO EXPRESSED HER EAGERNESS TO RETURN TO THE PARTY, NOTING, "BECAUSE I AM NOW SERVING AS SPEAKER OF THE LOWER HOUSE, I CANNOT BELONG TO ANY PARTY."

FIVE CONDITIONS SET BY DOI

1. RETRIEVE SINCERITY TOWARD THE PEOPLE AND PASSION TOWARD A POLITICAL GOAL
2. RE-ESTABLISH STRONG TIES WITH WOMEN, THE AGED, THE HANDICAPPED, CHILDREN, AND WORKING PEOPLE
3. RETURN THE CONSUMPTION-TAX ARGUMENT TO A CLEAN-SLATE STATE
4. MAKE CLEAR HOW THE PARTY SUBSIDIES ARE USED AND ABOLISH CORPORATE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS; AND
5. THE USE OF ARMED FORCES OVERSEAS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED. REDUCE THE BASES. CRANE

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 08

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]