

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0527

April 14, 1999

Mr. Christopher C. Jennings
Deputy Assistant Secretary to the
President for Health Policy
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Jennings:

We are writing to draw your attention to health legislation we will be introducing later this month. Our bill provides an excellent opportunity for bipartisan action on the problem of uninsured Americans.


The bill offers working Americans who are not provided health insurance by their employer a partially refundable tax credit worth 30% of the cost of their health insurance premiums. As you know, this would approximately equalize the tax treatment between workers with employer-provided health coverage and those without.

Using the current Individual Retirement Account (IRA) limits, the credit would only apply to single/head of household taxpayers with incomes at or below \$30,000 and married taxpayers filing jointly with incomes at or below \$50,000. Self-employed taxpayers fitting specific criteria would have the option of choosing either the current self-employed deduction or the proposed credit.


We respectfully request you give our proposal every consideration as it moves through the legislative process. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions or comments. You may also contact our staff members Peter Rubin (225-3106) or Wendi Lynagh (225-4176).

We look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,



JAMES E. ROGAN
Member of Congress



JIM McDERMOTT
Member of Congress

Office of Economic Policy

Department of the Treasury
Washington, D.C. 20220

FAX

Date: 6 / 2 / 99Number of pages including cover sheet:

	Name	Fax Number	Phone Number
To:	<i>Chris Jennings</i>	<i>456-5557</i>	
From:	<i>Mark McClellan</i>	<i>202-622-2633</i>	<i>202-622-0563</i>

Remarks: ☐ URGENT ☐ For your review ☐ Reply ASAP ☐ Please comment

TO: Chris Jennings

FROM: Mark McClellan

RE: Rogan-McDermott Letter

As you might suspect, I am skeptical that this proposed credit will have a significant impact on health insurance coverage. I am also concerned about the potentially harmful effects on employer-provided health insurance markets. The attached note provides a little background on these concerns. We and specialists in our Tax Policy office would be glad to discuss our concerns in more detail with the Congressional staffers, and would also be glad to help with your response letter.

Problems with Most Tax Credit Proposals

- *Discourages employer coverage and risk pools, and encourages workers to switch to individual insurance, even though insurance markets for individuals provide lower-quality insurance.* Even in states that have aggressively tried to regulate and improve their individual markets, significant problems of cost and access exist for individuals who develop chronic illnesses because of risk selection. Individual coverage is seductive: lower-cost policies may be available for workers who are healthy, but they can become very expensive or low-quality as soon as a chronic illness occurs. Employer coverage permits better pooling of high- and low-risks, and thus provides better insurance.
- *Costly.* A good family insurance policy today costs close to \$5000 per year. Most proposals would cover only a fraction of this cost, and so would not provide very strong incentives to buy insurance for those who do not have it now. At the same time, most proposals would provide a large tax break for a larger number of individuals who already have coverage. Thus, the increase in insurance coverage is likely to be small relative to the cost of the credit.
- *Unlikely to benefit low-income workers who need help the most.* Because low-income families generally have little income-tax liability, most of even a partially-refundable credit would go to relatively high-income workers. Making the credit fully refundable would reduce this "targeting" problem, but it would risk reopening difficult political battles over the EITC.

Steps to Make Credits More Cost-Effective


This does not constitute an endorsement of any credit proposal. The Durbin-Schumer proposal addresses the first two bullets.

- *Encourage employer-provided coverage for small or all firms.* Small firms have the lowest rates of offering health insurance and have a higher proportion of low-income workers. By providing an extra subsidy for employer insurance for these firms, the credit could induce more of an increase in coverage for the cost. More generally, providing additional credits to encourage firms to offer health insurance is likely to be more cost-effective than providing tax credits for their employees to obtain health insurance individually.
- *Required waiting period.* To be eligible, an individual must have had no access to coverage through their firm or other sources for a significant period of time, at least a year. This provision discourages firms from dropping or limiting health insurance in order to make its workers eligible for the credit.
- *Encourage reforms to improve the individual insurance market.* In order to be eligible for the credit, individuals would have to buy insurance policies that are likely to be offered only in states with relatively well-functioning individual markets. These

requirements might include community rating, purchase through an insurance purchasing group, and/or minimum quality standards (so that individuals would not purchase low-quality plans such as plans with low fixed-dollar limits on coverage). In practice, such requirements would make the credits only be available in states that regulated their individual markets effectively.

- *Encourage individual purchasing groups.* For example, the CHIP program has been successful in expanding coverage for children whose parents did not have access to affordable family coverage through their employers. This program could be expanded to cover parents as well, providing an affordable insurance pool for individual coverage.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT



<u>Name</u>	<u>Fax</u>
Harry Sullivan	647-9959
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Jane Coffin	482-1865
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From: Laura Lane **Phone:** 202/395-9569 **Fax:** 202/395-3891

Subject: TEP SERVICES/GEC Working Group Meeting Agenda for June 4

For everyone's info: We will NOT be meeting with the EU on Thursday June 3. We will be meeting with them on Friday June 4 at 1724 F St room 3. The schedule is as follows:

9:30 to 10:00 - TEP/Global Electronic Commerce
10:00 to 11:00 - TEP Services/Bilateral Agenda/MRA framework
11:00 to 12:30 - TEP Services/Multilateral Agenda
2:30 to 5:00 - TEP Services/MRA framework

Regards, Laura

Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress**Item 4 of 17**

PREVIOUS BILL | NEXT BILL
PREVIOUS BILL:ALL | NEXT BILL:ALL
NEW SEARCH | HOME | HELP

S.135SPONSOR: Sen Durbin, Richard J. (introduced 01/19/99)

Jump to: Titles, Status, Committees, Amendments, Cosponsors, Summary

TITLE(S):

- SHORT TITLE(S) AS INTRODUCED:
Health Insurance Tax Equity for Self-Employed Act
- OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the deduction for the health insurance costs of self-employed individuals, and for other purposes.

STATUS: Floor Actions

NONE

STATUS: Detailed Legislative Status**Senate Actions****Jan 19, 99:**

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance.

STATUS: Congressional Record Page References

NONE

COMMITTEE(S):

- COMMITTEE(S) OF REFERRAL:
Senate Finance

AMENDMENT(S):

NONE

COSPONSORS(18):

<u>Sen Collins, Susan M.</u> - 01/19/99	<u>Sen Specter, Arlen</u> - 01/19/99
<u>Sen Baucus, Max</u> - 01/19/99	<u>Sen Kerrey, J. Robert</u> - 01/19/99
<u>Sen Landrieu, Mary L.</u> - 01/19/99	<u>Sen Boxer, Barbara</u> - 01/19/99
<u>Sen Jeffords, James M.</u> - 01/19/99	<u>Sen Hagel, Chuck</u> - 01/20/99
<u>Sen Kohl, Herb</u> - 01/20/99	<u>Sen Roberts, Pat</u> - 01/25/99
<u>Sen Bingaman, Jeff</u> - 01/26/99	<u>Sen Wellstone, Paul D.</u> - 01/26/99
<u>Sen Johnson, Tim</u> - 01/26/99	<u>Sen Harkin, Tom</u> - 01/26/99
<u>Sen Murray, Patty</u> - 01/28/99	<u>Sen Lautenberg, Frank R.</u> - 02/08/99
<u>Sen Leahy, Patrick J.</u> - 02/08/99	<u>Sen Mikulski, Barbara A.</u> - 03/04/99

SUMMARY:

(AS INTRODUCED)

Health Insurance Tax Equity for Self-Employed Act - Amends the Internal Revenue Code to increase the deduction allowed for health insurance costs for self-employed individuals to 100 percent.

S 135 IS

106th CONGRESS

1st Session

S. 135

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the deduction for health insurance costs of self-employed individuals, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 19, 1999

Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. KERREY, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mrs. BOXER, and Mr. JEFFORDS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the deduction for health insurance costs of self-employed individuals, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the 'Health Insurance Tax Equity for Self-Employed Act'.

SEC. 2. DEDUCTION FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS OF SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS INCREASED.

(a) IN GENERAL- Section 162(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to special rules for health insurance costs of self-employed individuals) is amended to read as follows:

“(1) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION- In the case of an individual who is an employee within the meaning of section 401(c)(1), there shall be allowed as a deduction under this section an amount equal to the amount paid during the taxable year for insurance which constitutes medical care for the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, and dependents.”.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendment made by this section applies to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1998.

END

FACSIMILE FROM THE OFFICE OF

Congressman Jim McDermott

7th District, Washington

To: DEVOLA

Fax Number: _____

This fax is from:

☐ Jim McDermott

☐ Mike Williams

☐ Beverly Swain

☒ Peter Rubin

☐ Jennifer Crider

☐ Christopher Dumm

☐ Casey Sixkiller

Notes: _____

MMT

Including this cover sheet, you should find _____ pages.

If there are problems with this fax, please call 202/225-3106.

U.S. Rep. Jim McDermott
1035 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515



United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Health, Education, and
Human Services Division

RECEIVED

7/29

B-280606

July 22, 1998

The Honorable Charles B. Rangel
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives

Subject: Private Health Insurance: Estimates of a Proposed Health Insurance
Tax Credit for Those Who Buy Individual Health Insurance

Dear Mr. Rangel:

This letter responds to your request for information on the potential tax benefit that individuals without employment-based health coverage would receive if a tax credit were available for the premiums of individually purchased health insurance. In particular, you requested that we estimate the number of people who would possibly benefit from a tax credit and the potential value of the tax credit as proposed in H.R. 539.

Under current law, self-employed individuals may deduct 45 percent of health insurance expenses if they are not eligible to participate in an employer-subsidized health plan.¹ In addition, any individual may claim an itemized deduction for health insurance premiums to the extent that they and all other medical expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income (AGI). Some congressional proposals would expand the tax advantages of individually purchased health insurance by allowing individuals either to deduct the premiums they pay from their taxable income or to receive a tax credit that reduces the amount of taxes they owe.

We have previously reported that about 33 million Americans who were uninsured or purchased individual health insurance in 1996 would have been eligible for a proposed tax deduction if it had been available, if they had purchased individual health insurance, and if they itemized deductions for their income tax returns rather than claimed a standard deduction. The value of a

¹The portion of these expenses that are deductible will be phased in to 100 percent by 2007.

Johnson
Few eligible
Those who are
2/3 = 15% reduction

health insurance tax deduction would be directly proportionate to marginal tax rates so that individuals in higher tax brackets would receive a larger tax advantage than those in lower tax brackets.² Thus, if the premiums were fully deductible, an individual in the highest tax bracket would receive nearly a 40-percent reduction in the cost of health insurance. Most eligible individuals—about two-thirds—are in the 15-percent marginal tax bracket, however, and therefore would receive only a 15-percent reduction.³ Individuals who did not have any tax liability and individuals who chose not to itemize tax deductions would receive no reduction in their health insurance cost from a tax deduction. In 1995, only 5 percent of taxpayers with an AGI of less than \$20,000 chose to itemize.

Unlike a tax deduction, in which the tax benefit increases according to one's taxable income, a tax credit typically operates to effect the same tax benefit among all marginal tax rates, although the credit may only be available up to a certain taxable income. Under H.R. 539, tax filers without employer-based health insurance would be eligible to receive a tax credit for up to 30 percent of the cost of individually purchased health insurance within certain limits on the basis of tax filers' AGI and amount of federal taxes paid.

To determine the possible tax benefit of this credit, we used the 1997 Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplement and estimates of single and family health insurance premiums available through the individual market to estimate the number of nonelderly individuals without employer-based coverage that could possibly receive a full, partial, or no tax credit for health insurance premiums as proposed by H.R. 539. Although the Bureau of the Census does not directly collect information on AGI, federal tax payments, and Social Security tax payments, it derives estimates from simulations based on CPS data, statistical summaries of individual income tax returns compiled by the Internal Revenue Service, and data from the American Housing Survey. Our work was conducted in July 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

In summary, nearly 40 million nonelderly Americans who were uninsured or purchased individual insurance in 1996 would have been eligible for the proposed tax credit if it had been available and they had purchased health insurance in the individual market. Those eligible for the proposed tax credit

²See Private Health Insurance: Estimates of Expanded Tax Deductibility of Premiums for Individually Purchased Health Insurance, (GAO/HEHS-98-190R, June 10, 1998).

³In 1996, the 39.6-percent tax brackets included taxable incomes of more than \$263,750. The 15-percent tax bracket included taxable incomes of less than \$24,000 for single tax filers, \$32,150 for head of household tax filers, and \$40,100 for joint tax filers.

could have reduced the net cost of their health insurance by as much as 30 percent. The net reduction in the cost of health insurance, however, would have been less than 30 percent for many of those eligible, particularly for those buying higher priced health insurance whose income and Social Security tax payments would have been insufficient to offset the full value of the tax credit. In addition, about 10 percent of those eligible would have received only a partial tax credit because their AGI would have been too high for a full tax credit and within the range where the credit would be phased out. About 8 million nonelderly Americans who were uninsured or purchased individual insurance would not have been eligible for the tax credit because their AGI would have exceeded the maximum level set by the bill.

10% excluded
w/ income too high

BACKGROUND

The tax credit proposed in H.R. 539 would be available to individuals without employer-based health insurance who purchased individual health insurance. The credit would be worth up to 30 percent of the amount paid for individual health insurance premiums limited by two factors: (1) the individual's AGI with the credit phased out at higher AGI amounts and (2) whether the individual made enough income and Social Security tax payments to offset the tax credit. Specifically, taxpayers filing joint returns with AGIs of \$40,000 or less would be eligible for a full credit as would single or head of household tax filers with AGIs of \$25,000 or less. Individuals with AGIs of up to \$10,000 more than these amounts would receive a partial credit, and those with higher AGIs would receive no credit.

The bill provides that if the value of the full credit exceeds the amount of federal income taxes paid, then the tax filer may receive a refund up to the amount of Social Security taxes paid during the year. Thus, a tax filer's combined federal income and Social Security tax payments limit the total tax credit that he or she would be eligible to receive. As a result, while an individual could qualify for a full 30-percent credit toward his or her health insurance premiums on the basis of AGI, his or her actual credit could be less because the full credit amount exceeds the sum of the individual's federal income and Social Security tax payments. Moreover, those with no federal income or Social Security taxes would receive no tax credit.


MOST INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT EMPLOYER-BASED COVERAGE WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR THE TAX CREDIT, BUT MANY WOULD NOT RECEIVE THE FULL AMOUNT

On the basis of AGI alone, we estimate that 39.7 million nonelderly individuals without employer-based health coverage—about 74 percent—would have been eligible for the proposed tax credit in 1996 had it been available at that time and had they purchased individual health insurance. As shown in figure 1, 35.7 million (90 percent) of these individuals would have been eligible for a full credit



on the basis of their AGI (if the credit did not exceed their tax payments). In addition, 31.9 million (80 percent) of the eligible individuals were uninsured and would have received a tax credit if they had purchased individual health insurance. About 8 million nonelderly individuals who were uninsured or purchased individual health insurance, however, had incomes too high to qualify for the tax credit.⁴

Figure 1: Number of People Who Were Uninsured or Purchased Individual Insurance by Potential Tax Credit Level (Based on AGI Only), 1996



Note: Under H.R. 539, a full 30-percent tax credit would be available to joint tax filers with an AGI of \$40,000 or less and single and head of household tax filers with an AGI of \$25,000 or less. A partial credit would be available for joint tax filers with an AGI of between \$40,000 and \$50,000 and single and head of household tax filers with an AGI of between \$25,000 and \$35,000. However, they would receive less than the full value of the tax credit if the full value of the credit exceeded their combined federal income and Social Security tax payments.

In addition to AGI, however, the amount of tax credit eligible individuals would receive is limited by the difference between (1) their combined federal income tax and Social Security tax payments and (2) the amount of the full tax credit (30 percent of the amount paid in health insurance premiums). Thus, even if an


⁴About 1.1 million eligible tax filers did not pay any federal income taxes or Social Security taxes in 1996 and therefore would not have received the tax credit. In addition, about 6 million Americans who were uninsured or purchased individual health insurance did not file federal income taxes and thus would not have been eligible for a tax credit.

* maximize efficiency cost

individual were eligible for a full 30-percent tax credit, he or she could receive less because the full credit amount would exceed his or her total tax payments. In particular, for taxpayers in a given income group, those with higher health insurance premiums would be less likely to receive a full credit than would those with lower insurance premiums. This is because the tax credit is worth more for higher priced health insurance and fewer tax filers would have enough combined tax payments to offset the full value of the resulting tax credit than if the credit were based on low-priced health insurance.

Figure 2 shows how the average amount of combined federal income and Social Security taxes paid by joint tax filers in 1996 would increase according to filers' AGI. Among those joint tax filers eligible for a full tax credit on the basis of an AGI of \$40,000 or less, the average 1996 combined federal income and Social Security tax payments varied from \$200 for those with less than \$5,000 of AGI compared with \$5,232 for those with \$35,001 to \$40,000 of AGI.

Figure 2: Average Combined Income and Social Security Tax Payments for Joint Tax Filers, 1996



This variation in combined federal income and Social Security tax payments suggests that individuals with AGIs closer to the maximum allowed for a full tax credit would be more likely to receive its full value than would those with lower AGIs. This is because individuals with lower AGIs typically do not have enough income and Social Security tax payments to offset the full value of the tax credit. For example, on a medium-priced family premium of \$5,664, a full tax credit

would be valued at about \$1,700—that is, 30 percent of the premium paid.⁵ We estimate that about 40 percent of all tax filers eligible for the full tax credit on the basis of their AGI would have enough income and Social Security tax payments (at least \$1,700) to receive the full tax credit at this premium level. Families with less than \$20,000 of AGI typically would have received only a portion of the full tax credit at this premium level because the average combined federal income and Social Security tax payments for joint tax filers with \$15,001 to \$20,000 of AGI is only \$1,356 and less at lower AGI categories (see fig. 2).

As shown in table 1, more tax filers would have received the full value of the tax credit if they could have purchased lower priced health insurance; fewer tax filers would have received the full value of the tax credit if their health insurance premiums were higher.⁶ For example, a low-priced premium of \$667 for a single person would have resulted in a potential tax credit of about \$200. Because only about 14 percent of single tax filers eligible for a full tax credit had total federal income and Social Security tax payments of less than \$200 in 1996, nearly 86 percent of these tax filers would have had enough combined tax payments to receive the full value of this tax credit. In contrast, a high-priced family premium of \$10,000 would have resulted in a potential tax credit of about \$3,000. In this case, only about 31 percent of eligible joint tax filers would have made enough income and Social Security tax payments to receive the full value of the tax credit.

BETWEEN
FOR
INDIVIDUALS
THAN
FAMILIES
(PRICE OF
POLICY)

⁵Premiums vary widely in the individual health insurance market depending on the age, sex, and health status of the enrollee; geographic variations; the extent of state-imposed rate restrictions; and the characteristics of the health plan (particularly deductible levels). See Private Health Insurance: Millions Relying on Individual Market Face Cost and Coverage Trade-Offs (GAO/HEHS-97-8, Nov. 25, 1996). In our earlier letter on tax deductions for individual health insurance premiums (GAO/HEHS-98-190R) and in tables 1.1 to 1.3 in the enclosure of this letter, we base our estimates on actual low, medium, and high premiums of \$684, \$2,100, and \$6,384 for single coverage and \$2,940, \$5,664, and \$10,140 for family coverage.

⁶By purchasing a health plan with higher deductibles and other cost sharing, individuals can typically reduce their premium costs. However, this could result in higher overall out-of-pocket costs if they are required to pay more for health care services. Particularly for lower income families, this premium/cost sharing trade-off can pose a difficult decision.

Table 1: Examples of Percentage of Tax Filers Eligible for a Full Tax Credit on the Basis of AGI That Would Have Had Enough Tax Payments to Receive a Full Credit at Different Premium Levels, 1996

Premium	Full tax credit	Percentage of tax filers		
		Single	Head of household	Joint
\$ 667	\$ 200	85.9%	84.8%	94.3%
\$ 2,000	\$ 600	64.9%	58.3%	84.5%
\$ 4,000	\$1,200	47.4%	25.4%	60.9%
\$ 6,000	\$1,800	31.5%	14.7%	48.9%
\$ 8,000	\$2,400	21.1%	6.8%	39.0%
\$10,000	\$3,000	12.7%	3.1%	30.7%

Notes: Under H.R. 539, a full 30-percent tax credit would be available to joint tax filers with an AGI of \$40,000 or less and single and head of household tax filers with an AGI of \$25,000 or less. However, they would receive less than the full value of the tax credit if the full value of the credit exceeds their combined federal income and Social Security tax payments.

Single taxpayers are more likely to purchase single health coverage, which has lower premiums, than comparable family coverage more likely to be purchased by joint and head of household taxpayers.

Tables 1.1 to 1.3 in the enclosure provide more detail on the number of people who were uninsured or covered by individual health insurance in 1996 who would have been eligible to receive full, partial, or no tax credit depending on their AGI, combined tax payments, and premium level.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days after its issue date. At that time, we will make copies available to interested parties on request.

If you have any further questions about this letter or if we can be of further assistance, please call me at (202) 512-7114. The analysis presented in this letter

B-280606

was developed by John Dicken, Assistant Director, and Mark Vinkenens, Senior Social Science Analyst. Paula Bonin, Senior Computer Specialist, conducted the computer analysis of the CPS data used in this letter.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Kathryn G. Allen".

Kathryn G. Allen
Associate Director, Health Financing
and Systems Issues

Enclosure

**ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF A FEDERAL TAX CREDIT
FOR INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE**

Tables 1.1 to 1.3 present estimates of the effect of the tax credit proposed in H.R. 539 for single (table 1.1), head of household (table 1.2), and joint (table 1.3) tax filers and their dependents. The tables initially show the adjusted gross income (AGI) levels associated with each credit level and that some tax filers who are eligible for the full tax credit on the basis of their AGI would receive only a partial credit because they did not have sufficient combined federal income and Social Security tax payments to offset the full value of the tax credit.

Because estimates of the number of individuals eligible for each credit level also depend on the amount paid for health insurance premiums, the tables next present examples of low, medium, and high premium amounts. For single filers, we used premiums available in different markets for a single person in 1996. For head of household and joint tax filers, we used premiums available in different markets for a family of four in 1996. We also calculated the net cost of the health insurance after subtracting the value of the credit for tax filers with different tax credit levels and premium amounts.

* Finally, the tables demonstrate that the number of people who would receive a full credit or a partial credit varies depending on combined federal tax payments and total premiums paid. As shown in table 1.1, assuming all uninsured single tax filers purchased the low-cost insurance of \$684, about 8.7 million could receive a full credit, 1.2 million would receive a partial credit due to the limit of their total tax payments, 0.9 million would receive a partial credit due to their AGI, and 0.7 million would receive no credit because of their AGI. At higher premium levels, fewer tax filers would have made sufficient combined tax payments to receive the full level of the tax credit than at lower premium levels.

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

Table 1.1: Estimates of the Effect of Individual Health Insurance Premium Credits for Single Tax Filers, 1996

AGI	Potential level of credit	Credit percentage	Cost of individual health insurance (examples of rates for single coverage) ^b	Net insurance cost after tax credit	Estimated number of nonelderly at each credit level ^a	
					Uninsured total = 11.7 (millions)	Individually insured total = 3.5 (millions)
\$25,000 or less	Full	30%	Low: \$684	\$479	8.7	2.1
			Medium: \$2,100	\$1,470	6.5	1.5
			High: \$6,384	\$4,469	3.1	0.7
	Partial ^c (full credit exceeds combined tax payments)	0.1 - 29.9%	Low: \$684	\$480 - \$683	1.2	0.3
			Medium: \$2,100	\$1,471 - \$2,009	3.3	1.0
			High: \$6,384	\$4,470 - \$6,383	6.8	1.8
\$25,001 to \$34,999	Partial (based on AGI)	0.1 - 29.9%	Low: \$684	\$480 - \$683	0.9	0.3
			Medium: \$2,100	\$1,471 - \$2,009		
			High: \$6,384	\$4,470 - \$6,383		
\$35,000 or more	None	0%	Low: \$684	\$684	0.7	0.6
			Medium: \$2,100	\$2,100		
			High: \$6,384	\$6,384		

^aThe portion of people receiving the full 30-percent tax credit or a partial amount depends on the amount of premiums and federal taxes paid. At higher premium levels, the value of a full tax credit would also be higher and fewer people would have paid sufficient combined income and Social Security taxes to offset the full credit amount. For example, assuming all uninsured single tax filers purchased the low-cost insurance of \$684, about 8.7 million could

ENCLOSURE

receive a full credit, 1.2 million would receive a partial credit due to the limit of their total tax payments, 0.9 million would receive a partial credit due to their AGI, and 0.7 million would receive no credit because of their AGI. If these uninsured individuals purchased the high-cost insurance of \$6,384, only about 3.1 million could receive a full credit and about 6.8 million would receive a partial credit due to the limit of their total tax payments.

^bThese premiums are examples of actual individual insurance premiums available in 1996. The low premium represents an Arizona preferred-provider organization's premium for a 25-year-old healthy male with a \$250 deductible; the medium premium represents a community-rated fee-for-service plan in Vermont with a \$1,000 deductible; and the high premium represents an urban Illinois fee-for-service plan's premium for a 60-year-old healthy male smoker. While some individuals may face either lower or higher rates than found in this range, using low, medium, and high premium estimates better represents the variation in individual health insurance premiums that exist nationally than a single "average" premium.

^cIn addition, nearly 300,000 otherwise eligible nonelderly single tax filers would not receive any tax credit because they did not make any income or Social Security tax payments.

Sources: Our analysis of Mar. 1997 Current Population Survey (CPS) data and Bureau of the Census estimates of AGI, federal income taxes, and Social Security taxes. Premium ranges are based on actual selected health insurers' rates available in 1996. For more information on how premiums vary, see Private Health Insurance: Millions Relying on Individual Market Face Cost and Coverage and Tradeoffs (GAO/HEHS-97-8, Nov. 25, 1996).

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Table 1.2: Estimates of the Effect of Individual Health Insurance Premium Credits for Head of Household Tax Filers, 1996

AGI	Potential level of credit	Credit percentage	Cost of individual health insurance (examples of rates for a family of 4) ^b	Net insurance cost after tax credit	Estimated number of nonelderly at each credit level ^a	
					Uninsured total = 6.6 (millions)	Individually insured total = 1.7 (millions)
\$25,000 or less	Full	30%	Low: \$2,940	\$2,058	2.1	0.6
			Medium: \$5,664	\$3,965	0.8	0.3
			High: \$10,140	\$7,098	0.1	0.1
	Partial (full credit exceeds combined tax payments) ^c	0.1 - 29.9%	Low: \$2,940	\$2,059 - \$2,939	3.3	0.5
			Medium: \$5,664	\$3,966 - \$5,663	4.6	0.8
			High: \$10,140	\$7,099 - \$10,139	5.3	1.0
\$25,001 to \$34,999	Partial (based on AGI)	0.1 - 29.9%	Low: \$2,940	\$2,059 - \$2,939	0.5	0.2
			Medium: \$5,664	\$3,966 - \$5,663		
			High: \$10,140	\$7,099 - \$10,139		
\$35,000 or more	None	0%	Low: \$2,940	\$2,940	0.5	0.3
			Medium: \$5,664	\$5,664		
			High: \$10,140	\$10,140		

^aThe portion of people receiving the full 30-percent tax credit or a partial amount depends on the amount of premiums and federal taxes paid. At a higher premium level, the value of a full tax credit would also be higher and fewer people would have paid sufficient combined income and Social Security taxes to offset the full credit amount. For example, assuming all uninsured head of household tax filers purchased the low-cost insurance of \$2,940, about 2.1 million

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could receive a full credit, 3.3 million would receive a partial credit due to the limit of their total tax payments, 0.5 million would receive a partial credit due to their AGI, and 0.5 million would receive no credit because of their AGI. If these uninsured individuals purchased the high-cost insurance of \$10,140, only about 0.1 million could receive a full credit and about 5.3 million would receive a partial credit due to the limit of their total tax payments.

*These premiums are examples of actual individual insurance premiums available in 1996 for a family of four. The low premium represents an Arizona preferred-provider organization's premium for two parents under 30 years old with a \$250 deductible; the medium premium represents a community-rated fee-for-service plan in Vermont with a \$1,000 deductible; and the high premium represents an urban Illinois fee-for-service plan's premium for two parents over 50 years old who smoke. While some families may face either lower or higher rates than found in this range, using low, medium, and high premium estimates better represents the variation in individual health insurance premiums that exist nationally than a single "average" premium. In addition, families with fewer than four members would most likely face relatively lower premiums.

*Also, about 300,000 otherwise eligible nonelderly head of household tax filers would not receive any tax credit because they did not make any income or Social Security tax payments.

Sources: Our analysis of Mar. 1997 CPS data and Bureau of the Census estimates of AGI, federal income taxes, and Social Security taxes. Premium ranges are based on actual selected health insurers' rates available in 1996. For more information on how premiums vary, see GAO/HEHS-97-8, Nov. 25, 1996.

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Table 1.3: Estimates of the Effect of Individual Health Insurance Premium Credits for Joint Tax Filers, 1996

AGI	Potential level of credit	Credit percentage	Cost of individual health insurance (examples of rates for a family of 4) ^b	Net insurance cost after tax credit	Estimated number of nonelderly at each credit level ^c	
					Uninsured total = 18.1 millions)	Individually insured total = 6.5 (millions)
\$40,000 or less	Full	30%	Low: \$2,940	\$2,058	9.5	2.3
			Medium: \$5,664	\$3,965	6.4	1.8
			High: \$10,140	\$7,098	3.7	1.2
	Partial (full credit exceeds combined tax payments) ^c	0.1 - 29.9%	Low: \$2,940	\$2,059 - \$2,939	3.6	0.5
			Medium: \$5,664	\$3,966 - \$5,663	6.7	0.9
			High: \$10,140	\$7,099 - \$10,139	9.4	1.5
\$40,001 to \$49,999	Partial (based on AGI)	0.1 - 29.9%	Low: \$2,940	\$2,059 - \$2,939	1.4	0.7
			Medium: \$5,664	\$3,966 - \$5,663		
			High: \$10,140	\$7,099 - \$10,139		
\$50,000 or more	None	0%	Low: \$2,940	\$2,940	3.2	2.9
			Medium: \$5,664	\$5,664		
			High: \$10,140	\$10,140		

^aThe portion of people receiving the full 30-percent tax credit or a partial amount depends on the amount of premiums and federal taxes paid. At a higher premium level, the value of a full tax credit would also be higher and fewer people would have paid sufficient combined income and Social Security taxes to offset the full credit amount. For example, assuming all uninsured joint tax filers purchased the low-cost insurance of \$2,940, about 9.5 million could receive

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a full credit, 3.6 million would receive a partial credit due to the limit of their total tax payments, 1.4 million would receive a partial credit due to their AGI, and 3.2 million would receive no credit because of their AGI. If these uninsured individuals purchased the high-cost insurance of \$10,140, only about 3.7 million could receive a full credit and about 9.4 million would receive a partial credit due to the limit of their total tax payments.

*These premiums are examples of actual individual insurance premiums available in 1996 for a family of four. The low premium represents an Arizona preferred-provider organization's premium for two parents under 30 years old with a \$250 deductible; the medium premium represents a community-rated fee-for-service plan in Vermont with a \$1,000 deductible; and the high premium represents an urban Illinois fee-for-service plan's premium for a two parents over 50 years old who smoke. While some families may face either lower or higher rates than found in this range, using low, medium, and high premium estimates better represents the variation in individual health insurance premiums that exist nationally than a single "average" premium.

*Also, about 500,000 otherwise eligible nonelderly joint tax filers would not receive any tax credit because they did not make any income or Social Security tax payments.

Sources: Our analysis of Mar. 1997 CPS data and Bureau of the Census estimates of AGI, federal income taxes, and Social Security taxes. Premium ranges are based on actual selected health insurers' rates available in 1996. For more information on how premiums vary, see GAO/HEHS-97-8, Nov. 25, 1996.

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**Employees without Employer-Provided
Insurance: the Road to A Solution**

Remarks by
U.S. Rep. Jim McDermott
before the
National Center for Policy Analysis
and the
National Association of
Business Economics

Thank you. We are all here today because we are stymied by the health care paradox of the Clinton economy. If you read the newspapers, our economy is booming -- the longest sustained economic expansion in the history of the U.S -- and inflation remains low.

Unfortunately, parallel to this economic growth is the growing number of uninsured. There are now 44 million uninsured people in this country -- at least a 5 million person increase since 1993.

I am here today to talk with you about my proposal to help stop the increase in the uninsured by targeting a 30% health insurance tax credit to the working uninsured. To qualify for the partially refundable credit, the beneficiary must not currently have health insurance through their employer and have an individual income below \$30,000/yr or a joint income less than \$50,000/yr.

The benefits of this proposal are not only that it provides a tax benefit for those who need it most, it also would encourage health consumers to be cost-conscious when choosing their health insurance plans so that they could maximize the value of the credit.

When the General Accounting Office evaluated my proposal, it found that almost 36 million individuals without employer-based coverage would be eligible for the full credit on the basis of their adjusted gross income.

As you consider my proposal, keep in mind three concepts: 1) who the uninsured are, 2) how the tax code impacts health insurance in this country, and 3) what can Congress realistically do in the immediate future to begin to address this important social policy issue.

Who are the uninsured? Contrary to what many people might think, roughly 75% of the uninsured work full or part time. The remaining 25% are split evenly between those

who are unemployed and those who are not in the labor force.

There isn't enough time today to talk at length about the demographics of the working uninsured. If we did, we'd find that the majority of them are age 18-34, that a disproportionate number of them are minority, that working poor parents are twice as likely to be uninsured as poor parents who are unemployed, and that the highest rate of uninsurance impacts pre-seniors between the age of 62-64.

Why is health care unavailable to a large number of working Americans? It is not that Americans are lazy and not working, but access to affordable health care simply is not an option.

Since WW II, America has relied on employers to provide health insurance and have rewarded them accordingly through the tax code. But, a growing number of workers lack employer-based insurance which policy-makers once took for granted.

Many big employers rely on low-paying minimum wage jobs and do not offer health insurance benefits.

Another class of workers that lacks coverage is employees of small employers. Think of these folks as the secretary who works for the small law firm or the waiter who works for a neighborhood bistro.

Finally, there is this growing number of perma-temps. This is the group of temporary employees that are working full time, with no benefits, in jobs that previously offered benefits.

As someone who cares deeply about health care policy, I find it unacceptable for a person who works full time in this country not to be able to afford health insurance.

So how do we address the issue of the working uninsured?

I am a strong believer in universal health insurance and that the most efficient way of providing it is through a single payer financing system. A system that would lift the prohibitive burden of health insurance administration from employers and replace it with a public premium that shares responsibility throughout society.

If there is a way for us to guarantee universal coverage without single payer -- through a plan based on tax credits, Clinton-care, or Medicare for all -- I am willing to look at the proposal, *as long as the plan guarantees access to quality care that's affordable.*

Unfortunately, just because something is efficient -- such as a single payer system -- doesn't always mean it is the most likely. The reality is, nobody wants to have an

honest debate about universal coverage.

As a policymaker, the next question for me then becomes, what can we do in the near term to help folks who need health insurance the most, and, that is less threatening to opponents of universal coverage.

The tax code is a good place to look. I say this not only because that is how social priorities must be financed in a Republican Congress, but it is the kitty that our country relies on to finance the employer-based health insurance system.

The tax code subsidizes the purchase of health insurance for working Americans in three major ways.

Under current law, the money that an employer contributes to its employee's health insurance premium can be fully deducted by the employer.

Employer provided coverage is also considered tax-free income for the employee. (The value of the McDermott credit is roughly equal to this amount).

And finally, if you are self-employed, you will soon be able to deduct 100 percent of the cost of health insurance from your taxes.

Those who are left behind are those workers whose employer doesn't offer health insurance.

For a number of years now, this issue for me has been about simple fairness. Since 1995, I have attempted to equalize the tax treatment of health insurance benefits by offering amendments on the House floor and in the Ways and Means Committee, and by introducing H.R. 539 in the last Congress.

My rallying cry -- which I am glad to see is starting to take hold -- has been the rhetorical question: Why should a doctor or attorney who is self-employed be able to deduct a portion of the cost of his/her health insurance, while a secretary, who must buy his/her own health insurance policy, not be able to deduct one cent of the cost!

So as a simple matter of fairness, this inequity in the tax code needs to be fixed.

According to the Lewin Group, the average federal health benefits tax expenditure is \$918 per family. That sounds pretty good until you realize that a family whose income is below \$40,000 receives an average of \$766 in tax benefits, a \$30,000 family receives just \$500 in tax subsidies -- and the numbers get more depressing if I continue down the income scale.

The bulk of the tax subsidy is going to those who need it least. If you make \$100,000 or more, the tax code subsidizes your health insurance each year by more than \$2,000.

So it seems to me that if Congress wanted to address the issue of tax fairness and assist a group of people who are in most need of health insurance purchasing assistance, it would look at my proposal for a 30% credit.

This issue is not about getting something done for the sake of doing it. An important question remains, how do you write a proposal that works? I have started the debate with a less is more approach. My legislation is less than 6 pages long.

I am hopeful that the sudden interest in tax code equalization -- through discussions like this one today -- will allow for peripheral issues to be examined.

In particular, as policymakers put forward proposals, they need to consider what the take up rate will be (will people use the credit if they are eligible), how does it impact existing employer health care contributions, and how much does the proposal cost.

For years I've been trying to get the Joint Committee on Taxation to score my proposal. Maybe now that the Majority Leader is interested in a similar proposal, they actually will get it scored.

I don't want to leave you with the impression that my proposal is the answer. I view it as a first step toward finding a solution for the uninsured.

I am proud of the fact that it is a moderate proposal because there are so many uncertainties about how it would work.

I would be especially cautious about more ambitious tax credit proposals because major overhaul proposals run into serious financing problems. How do you pay for it without running a deficit? Even in this era of expected budget surpluses, a hefty price tag simply is prohibitive given our other national policy priorities.

More importantly, current comprehensive tax credit proposals may not be such a good deal for either the insured or the uninsured. If they appear generous enough, employers will drop coverage and allow for their existing costs to be replaced with an inadequate government voucher, a voucher that would not come close to equaling their existing coverage.

Letting employers off the hook while increasing government and beneficiary costs could make the problem worse.

I am the first one to say that my credit should not replace the current system. If it did, it

would be inadequate. That is not to say, however, that I wouldn't mind seeing the current system totally overhauled.

I view my proposal as a targeted effort to stop the current health insurance hemorrhaging, as an achievable goal in a very divided Congress, and a stimulant of the necessary discussion we need to have about how this country can create an efficient means of providing universal health care coverage.

Thank you.

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0527

April 14, 1999

Mr. Christopher C. Jennings
Deputy Assistant Secretary to the
President for Health Policy
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Jennings:

We are writing to draw your attention to health legislation we will be introducing later this month. Our bill provides an excellent opportunity for bipartisan action on the problem of uninsured Americans.


The bill offers working Americans who are not provided health insurance by their employer a partially refundable tax credit worth 30% of the cost of their health insurance premiums. As you know, this would approximately equalize the tax treatment between workers with employer-provided health coverage and those without.


Using the current Individual Retirement Account (IRA) limits, the credit would only apply to single/head of household taxpayers with incomes at or below \$30,000 and married taxpayers filing jointly with incomes at or below \$50,000. Self-employed taxpayers fitting specific criteria would have the option of choosing either the current self-employed deduction or the proposed credit.

We respectfully request you give our proposal every consideration as it moves through the legislative process. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions or comments. You may also contact our staff members Peter Rubin (225-3106) (Mc Dermott) or Wendi Lynagh (225-4176).

We look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,


JAMES E. ROGAN
Member of Congress


JIM McDERMOTT
Member of Congress

- Call to see if they have
any Jti data cost estimates
= I assume no offset, right
- do they anticipate much of a
take up rate? How much?
= have any idea the break-out between
proposed beneficiaries between those who
have health care now & those who don't?

- need to draft a response

MCDERMOTT PROPOSAL

parity for
self-employed
any # from
treasury

no cost estimates yet; trying to get CBO
score

no offsets identified; don't think that
cost will be exorbitant

UNHS
or
not?

this would folded into any kind of tax
cut proposal (hopefully)

illustrate

no firm breakout & whom who has health
insurance currently; top fairness
& equity issue

Short.

of
tax
Credit
approach

dropped last time around; just sat
last year; offered in 1995 too.

take up rate estimate not big →
something as a way to stop the
hemorrhage 8.7 mil full credit
1-2 partial credit

HCF; Chicago tribune EPD & Lupin

whole angle is that we're not
moving aggressively enough

Bruce Vladek told her prior
to BBA 1997, we had admin
authority so we didn't do it
administratively → isn't
this worse? if so, why

Bruce said
scored savings to save \$ in budget EPD

IRA
Physician
Part B
690
7600

Q10 75% of the uninsured will be eligible for the credit

only for people not offered insurance through employer substitution argument