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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1997

The Honorable Timothy E. Wirth
Under Secretary of State
for Global Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520-7250

Dear Tim:

This is, in part, my response to your letter of June 23, 1997. I support the continuation of the lunch meetings and want to attend as many as possible. The format is fine. I'd like to propose Todd Stern, Assistant to the President and Staff Secretary, and Janet Yellen, Chair, Council of Economic Advisors, as regular invitees.

I hope that each time, in addition to the "regulars," you can add a few "multipliers" to help raise awareness. For example, after the President's speech I expect that other Cabinet Members will be wanting to do more of these things, especially when the particular topic engages their agency mission. I also suggest that you include a key member or two of Congress when appropriate, such as Byrd, Chafee, Dominici, Rockefeller, Frist, Sensenbrenner, Brown, Ehlers, Boehlert.

I suggest that the issues of emissions trading and joint implementation be given sustained attention, since they can both make the implementation less costly and help developing countries fund high tech development paths.

Very best regards.

Sincerely,

Jack

John H. Gibbons
Assistant to the President
for
Science and Technology

United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State
for Global Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520–7250

Rec'd 6/24/97
action: JHG
cc: Swing
Smith
Birnbaum

June 23, 1997

Dear John,

We are now through the first list of invited luncheon speakers and are looking ahead to the next five months. It is time for an evaluation of the luncheon series, and I would appreciate your comments on the questions below:

1. Do you think the luncheon group has been worthwhile and should continue?
2. Would you like to be taken off the invitation list?
3. What changes would you recommend in the format?
4. Would it be helpful to allow substitutes when you cannot come?
5. Do you have suggestions for future speakers? (A copy of the list of our guests is attached.)

Thank you for your attention and continuing interest. I look forward to hearing from you.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Tim Wirth

Timothy E. Wirth

Dr. John T. Gibbons
Assitant to the President
Office of Science & Technology Policy
424 OEOB
Washington, DC 20501

1997 Guest Speakers
Interagency Climate Change Deputies Luncheon

Name	Title/Organization	Date of Lucheon
Bert Bolin	Chairman, Intergovern-mental Panel on Climate Change	January 22 12:30 - 2:00 p.m. Livingston Room
Robert Williams	Senior Scientist, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies	Wednesday, January 29 12:00 - 1:30 pm Henry Clay Room
Roger Rainbow	Vice President, Shell International Limited	Thursday, February 13 12:15 - 1:45 pm Henry Clay Room
Paul Krugman	Professor of Economics at MIT	Thursday, March 13 12:00 - 1:30 p.m. Henry Clay Room
Paul Epstein	Associate Director, Center for Health and Global Environment	Thursday, March 27 12:00 - 1:30 p.m. Henry Clay Room
E. Linn Draper	Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer, American Electric Power Company	Thursday, April 1 12:00 - 1:30 pm Henry Clay Room
Robert Shapiro	Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, Monsanto	Wednesday, April 16 1:00 - 2:30 p.m. Henry Clay Room
Kenneth Lay	Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Enron Corporation	Wednesday, April 30 12:00 - 1:30 p.m. Henry Clay Room
Paul O'Neill	Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Alcoa	Friday, May 30 12:00 - 1:30 p.m. Henry Clay Room

MEMORANDUM

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

July 1, 1997

TO: JANET YELLEN

FROM: MARK MAZUR Mark

SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS REPORTS UNDERWAY

You asked about climate change reports that could be broadly construed as "economic analysis" that were in preparation. Several of these are listed below. I am almost certain that there are more being worked on by various people at the agencies (and by the White House Climate Change Task Force), but it is hard to uncover them all.

Interagency Analytic Team Report. This is the main report from the economic modeling group. As you know, a draft was leaked by one of the reviewers. This report is being redrafted to be more of a literature review, with less emphasis on the results of the modeling group.

Department of Energy Argonne Lab Jobs Study. The Argonne Lab conducted a survey of business representatives, asking about the job effects of a hypothetical $200 per ton carbon tax. The survey results indicate substantial job dislocations (as should be expected in a survey of this type). This study is complete, but has not been released. (A draft, however, was leaked to *Inside EPA*, where it received some coverage.)

Department of Energy InterLab Study. The five national laboratories that collaborated on this study find that there are many energy-efficient and greenhouse-gas-friendly technologies available at low cost. The report was funded by the Department of Energy's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy and the results support policies favored by this Office. The "bottom's up" analysis indicates that efficiency gains can reduce carbon dioxide emissions a lot and that 30-50 percent of the emissions reductions needed to reach 1990 levels by 2010 can be achieved at no cost to the economy (or even a slight gain). In addition, at a carbon price of about $50 per ton, enough fuel switching (generally coal to natural gas in the electric utility sector) occurs to meet the 1990 emissions targets by 2010. (Many economists would consider this outcome to be very optimistic.) This report is likely to be released by the Department of Energy sometime in July.

Commerce Department "Sectors" Paper. Jeffrey Hunker of the Commerce Department has long wanted to write a report detailing the effect of climate change policies on various sectors of the economy. The current draft includes many of the results from the draft IAT report and is very positive on the role that technology improvements can play in meeting emissions targets. The White House Climate Change Task Force views this paper as important in their "outreach" effort to businesses and is eager to get this draft completed for distribution.

Glauthier Report on Policies Supporting Emissions Targets. T.J. Glauthier (OMB) has gathered a group of agency people together for several weeks to work on understanding what the economic models tell us about policies that would be necessary to meet a given emissions target. The goal is to generate a series of short (2-5 page) papers that cover specific areas of the economy and provide a sense of the policy initiatives required. For example, if the models indicate that new cars in 2010 would need to get 45 miles per gallon on average to meet the emissions targets, then PNGV (Program for a New Generation of Vehicles) goals for diffusing advanced vehicle technology into the fleet may need to be accelerated. This paper is in the early stages of preparation.

As I mentioned earlier, there are almost certainly other papers in preparation, but this listing should give you a sense of the broad areas of economic analysis already going on.

Please let me know if you wish to discuss this.

cc: AM, JF, JS, MJolin

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE
NEWS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, June 20, 1997

CONTACT: Maria Cardona
202-482-4883

Remarks by U.S. Secretary of Commerce William M. Daley
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Policy Forum

[As Prepared for Delivery]

Good afternoon. I am delighted to join you. It's a special pleasure to be here at the Union League Club. I have hanging over the fireplace in my office in Washington a portrait of Theodore Roosevelt -- the president who signed the bill creating the Commerce Department -- which the Club was kind enough to lend me.

Let me begin today by congratulating the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Earth Council for launching this important environmental initiative. The move towards an international greenhouse gas emissions market, similar to the successful U.S. program for cost-effectively lowering acid rain, is both timely and appropriate. I also want to recognize Chicago executive, Dr. Richard Sandor, and the government of Costa Rica for their trail-blazing efforts in this regard.

The Clinton Administration is deeply committed to, in the President's words, giving our children a world worth living in. Last week in a meeting with U.S. business CEOs, President Clinton challenged the group to prove that an economy can grow, while not only preserving, but actually enhancing the environment. No one has been more out front on this issue than Vice President Gore, who is actively working with both government and industry to help our nation meet its economic and environment goals.

The President and Vice President -- all the members of this Administration -- strongly believe that environmental commitments can complement economic objectives. Through far-reaching dialogues, healthy debate, and public-private partnerships, we can find responsible, cost-effective ways to foster family and community friendly growth.

The Administration's Clean Car Initiative, officially known as the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles, is a prime example of this approach. Working together, seven federal agencies, the "Big Three" auto makers, 20 national laboratories, and over 300 auto suppliers and universities are developing vehicles with three times the energy efficiency of today's automobiles -- with no sacrifice in cost, comfort or safety. I have met with the executives involved. The progress is real. Even those who were skeptical originally are now excited.

Public-private partnerships can work. And if ever an issue called out for a cooperative approach, it is climate change. This isn't about dotting the i's in a regulatory finding or making minute calculations that will affect a small handful of people. This is not a single industry problem. It is not single city problem. It is not a single country problem. It is a human problem that, unlike other environmental issues, affects every person, every business and every government in this world.

To solve it, to promote the best interests of our businesses and workers and generations to come, we need cooperation, not confrontation. This battle will be won by industry and government reasoning and working together.

So let me be clear at the start what my message is. We believe that the long-term threat of global climate change is real. We believe that we must take action now. We also believe that we can shape an agenda that allows us to preserve our environment and grow the economy. As Teddy Roosevelt said, "The nation behaves well if it treats the natural resources as assets which it must turn over to the next generation increased, and not impaired, in value."

We can do this by working creatively and responsibly at home and with other nations to develop a climate change policy. The key questions that confront us at this moment are how and when to begin. Let me answer that second question first. Again I say, we must begin now. Not because of the danger of an imminent disaster. But studies do show that emissions are growing. If we are to avert a greater problem later, we need to act now.

What do we know about climate change? We know that carbon dioxide warms the planet and that by pumping more of it into the atmosphere, we are changing our climate. We know that we've had more extreme weather conditions in the United States in the last five years than we had in the previous 30. We know that rising emissions of greenhouse gases trap heat within the earth's atmosphere. We know that global average surface temperature has increased, and the last few years have been the warmest of the past century. We know that, despite the naysayers, the science is compelling: there is a discernible human influence on global climate. We know that while we cannot precisely predict what or where the effects of the climate changes taking place will be, the net effect is unlikely to be good -- and the shift in temperature may be abrupt and occur in ways that we may not predict. And, finally, we know deep in our hearts that we do not want to gamble with our children's future.

I have talked to the experts. From Commerce Department scientists who are among the world's leading researchers into the atmospheric phenomenon and effects surrounding climate change and its likely impacts -- and from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, comprised of the world's preeminent scientists -- the best scientific evidence indicates that global warming is occurring. And that it could have profound consequences for the economy and the quality of life for us -- and for future generations. The time to address this threat is now.

I have reviewed with the Commerce Department economists who managed an interagency climate change analysis their recommendations on responses to the impact of climate change.

Chief among these is a far-sighted technology program that targets emission control and reduction. We need to sit down with concerned industry leaders and find ways to accelerate the development and diffusion of innovations that achieve these goals. We need to start thinking big and "out of the box." The benefits would be multiple. Reduced emissions and a healthier environment foremost. And beyond this, well-designed processes reduce total business costs and drive economic growth.

By some estimates, up to half of U.S. economic growth since World War II has been fueled by advanced technologies. New energy and energy efficiency technologies, as well as wholesale new ways to make and use products and services, will create new markets and new opportunities for U.S. companies and businesses worldwide.

Also noteworthy is the recent study which shows that establishments that use advanced technologies are more productive, pay higher wages, offer more secure jobs and increase employment more rapidly than firms that do not.

The interagency analysis indicates that capital incentives are important to managing climate change. Investment triggers capital stock turnover and technology advances, the key to emission reduction. Technological innovation is the principal means for moving beyond the outdated tradeoff between jobs and the environment. Therefore, investment incentives must be considered as part of climate change strategy. We believe that pro-investment policy is pro-environment, pro-growth policy.

At the same time, we realize that though the economic costs of dealing with greenhouse gases are transitional and relatively small -- the equivalent of a 25 cent increase in the price of gasoline by some estimates -- these should include compensation for those workers adversely impacted.

The United States is committed to constructing a climate change strategy that is both responsible and reasonable -- a strategy that recognizes the near-term concerns of American workers and businesses -- and the long-term benefits to all of America and all of the world that a healthy environment brings. I will be working closely with the American business community to develop a plan that achieves our twin goals of promoting economic growth and preserving the environment.

I have one final and very important point. As this forum pointedly demonstrates, solving the climate change problem cannot be a sole source endeavor. The whole world must be involved. All nations -- developed and developing -- must participate. We cannot and will not agree to a international system that imposes constraints on developed countries, but leaves developing countries without obligations. We won't agree to such a system because it wouldn't work. It wouldn't solve the global challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. And it would unfairly hurt U.S. business. This will be a key element of the U.S. proposal for any worldwide effort.

As British Petroleum CEO John Browne told a university group last month in a speech on climate change, "The cultures of politics, science and enterprise must work together if we are to match and master the challenges we all face. Our future is a common one. So too needs to be our resolve."

I want to again congratulate you for promoting this forum and putting together this important initiative. I look forward to working with all of you toward a healthy global environment.

Thank you.

4TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Chicago Sun-Times

June 21, 1997, SATURDAY, Late Sports Final Edition

SECTION: NWS; Pg. 9

LENGTH: 264 words

HEADLINE: Global-warming focus is needed -- Bill Daley

SOURCE: KEITH HALE

BYLINE: BY BRENDA WARNER ROTZOLL

BODY:

U.S. Commerce Secretary William M. Daley said Friday that American industry could profit greatly by developing and adopting technology to reduce production of gases that cause global warming.

It won't happen if government doesn't help fund basic research on advanced technology, or if business is not involved in all efforts to reduce pollution, said Daley, during a meeting with the Sun-Times editorial board and a speech to the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Policy Forum at the Union League Club.

"By some estimates, up to half of U.S. economic growth since World War II has been fueled by advanced technologies," Daley said. "New energy and energy efficiency technologies, as well as wholesale new ways to make and use products and services, will create new markets and new opportunities for U.S. companies and businesses worldwide."

Daley said government must fund basic research because business won't -- it is too focused on immediate returns.

On his first official trip home to Chicago since joining the Cabinet, Daley said much government-funded research has stopped since the end of the Cold War. "Japan will spend in research and development 20 times what we do. It's crazy," he said.

The whole world must participate in the battle against global warming, Daley said. "We cannot and will not agree to an international system that imposed constraints on developed countries, but leaves developing countries without obligations," he said.

Real change in controlling harmful emissions will take place "only if the business community is involved," he said.

GRAPHIC: Commerce Secretary William M. Daley said Friday that the government should help fund research to end global warming.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20230

March 20, 1997

Prof. Dale Jorgenson
Harvard University
Littauer Center
Room 122
1875 Cambridge St.
Cambridge, MA 02138

Reviewer

Dear Prof. Jorgenson,

I appreciate greatly your taking the time to review the progress of our efforts to analyze the effects of possible policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The Administration is committed to an analysis of this issue that is expert, objective, and that reflects the seriousness of the issue. As the chair of the Administration's interagency task force performing this analysis, I look forward to the opportunity to have your reactions to our work as we pursue that objective.

The materials I am forwarding to you today include everything short of actual model runs. The two broad classes of materials in this package include:

- base line assumptions regarding energy use and emissions over the period of analysis; and
- materials documenting the three models we are using to perform the analysis (DRI, Markal Energy-Macro, and the Baetelle Second Generation Model).

We welcome any and all comments and guidance that you may have to offer. I am particularly interested in your views regarding the following questions.

- Do the baseline assumptions regarding the economy's energy/emissions path over the next two decades conform to your view of a reasonable projection of the same?
- Are there particular assumptions that stand out as surprising or that, by virtue of their importance, appear to require greater investigation?
- Are any or all of the models structured in ways that make them particularly appropriate or inappropriate for performing this analysis? What biases in our results might be expected from the structure of these models as you understand them?
- More generally, which of the many and various economic analyses of the climate

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change issue that have been performed to date and reported in the literature would you recommend as being the best examples of a sound approach to this topic? What modeling approaches, assumptions, or other analytic features would best contribute to our goal of an "expert and objective" analysis?

I am available at your convenience to discuss these issues with you (my phone, if you desire, is 202 482 3727). I might also ask, at some point, that your share your views with a member of the Council of Economic Advisors or National Economic Council staff. I would also appreciate a letter from you providing your views in a form that might be shared with other key economics officials of the Administration.

Once again, many thanks for your time and assistance.

With best regards,

Everett M. Ehrlich

* Call Peer review commenters – to let them know we are sending to Hill

Statement before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works

Dr. Janet Yellen

Chair, Council of Economic Advisers

Thursday, July 17, 1997

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the economics of global climate change.

Introduction

In his speech to the United Nations in June, President Clinton emphasized that the risks posed by global climate change are real and that sensible preventive steps are justified. This assessment accords with the views of the more than 2300 economists, including 8 Nobel laureates, who signed a statement supporting measures to reduce the threat of climate change.

At this time the Administration has not settled on a particular set of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, the President indicated in his U.N. speech that he intends to engage in a discussion with all interested parties -- Members of Congress and other elected officials, scientists, economists, business and labor leaders -- about the problems posed by greenhouse gas accumulations and the costs and benefits of corrective action. This discussion is intended to inform the Administration's decision-making process, which will culminate in a U.S. policy position in the international negotiations in Kyoto in December of this year.

An important step in this -- and any -- policy process is determining the impact a policy will have on the American economy. President Clinton's top priority, since his first days in office, has been revitalizing the U.S. economy, creating jobs and investing in people and technology to enhance long-term growth. And, we have made tremendous progress. Any policy the President ultimately endorses on climate change will be informed by his commitment to sustaining a healthy and robust economy.

In my testimony today, I would like to describe some of the principal lessons that emerge from the voluminous literature -- much of it relatively recent -- on the economic impacts of policies to address global climate change.

Underlying Uncertainties

Before I begin my discussion of the economic literature, however, I would like first to emphasize the uncertainties associated with estimating both the costs and benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. To provide some perspective: as you all know, it is difficult to gauge exactly what impact the balanced budget agreement will have on the U.S. economy's growth rate, levels of employment, interest rates and consumption over the next five years. But with global climate change, it is orders of magnitude more difficult to gauge the effects of policies on the economy: we are concerned with not just the next five years and not just the American economy -- but, rather, we are concerned with economic and physical processes that operate globally and over decades, if not centuries. Both the costs and benefits of climate protection are very difficult to quantify or predict with any certainty. In short, if anybody tells you that he or she has the definitive answer as to the costs and benefits of particular climate change policies, I would suggest that you raise your collective eyebrows.

Lessons from the Economic Literature

Let me now turn to the economic literature and try to summarize what I think we know so far about this difficult topic.

The economic literature includes estimates using many different models to evaluate numerous alternative emission reduction strategies. In fact, because there are so many different models, economists initially faced difficulties in comparing results. To solve this problem, thereby enabling meaningful comparisons, many economists have calibrated the various models by performing a standardized simulation -- specifically, they have assessed the consequences of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by 2010 or 2020.

Within the Administration, a staff level working group -- the Interagency Analytical Team (IAT) -- has attempted to estimate some of the economic implications of climate change policies. They took the emissions scenario most often used in academic literature -- that is, stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by 2010 -- as the starting point for their own analysis. I would emphasize that this scenario is not Administration policy; instead, it was picked to make comparisons with other models easier. This modeling effort produced some useful lessons, but as we found from the peer reviewers' comments, it also suffered from some serious shortcomings. Both the lessons and the shortcomings point to one clear conclusion: the effort to develop a model or set of models that can give us a definitive answer as to the economic impacts of a given climate change policy is futile. Rather, we are left with a set of parameters and relationships that influence estimates of the impacts.

I understand that a draft of the staff analysis was given to the Committee earlier this week, along with the reviewers' comments. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have about this modeling effort.

The Lessons. Modeling efforts both inside and outside the Administration clearly indicate that economic analysis can do no more than estimate a range of potential impacts from particular policies and highlight how outcomes depend on underlying assumptions about how the economy works and the ways in which policy is implemented.

Let me briefly summarize the lessons we have learned from the economics literature so far: :

1) First, the magnitude of the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the various models depends crucially on a number of key assumptions about how the economy works. Essentially, the lesson we've learned is that the greater the substitution possibilities and the faster the economy can adapt, the lower the costs.

2) Second, costs depend critically on how emission reduction policies are implemented.

It boils down to this: if we do it dumb, it could cost a lot, but if we do it smart, it will cost much less and indeed could produce net benefits in the long run. The over 2300 signatories of the economists' statement argued that any global climate change policy should rely on market-based mechanisms. Such mechanisms allow for flexibility in both the timing and location of emission reductions, thereby minimizing the costs to the U.S. economy. The economists concluded that "there are policy options that would slow climate change without harming American living standards, and these measures may in fact improve U.S. productivity in the longer run."

3) The third lesson that emerges from a study of the economics of climate protection is that developing, as well as developed, countries must be part of the process. While developed countries are responsible for most of the greenhouse gas currently in the atmosphere, developing countries are starting to catch up. And, the timetable for the inclusion of developing countries is also important. The sooner that developing countries face incentives to move away from carbon intensive energy sources, the less likely it is that they will become dependent on those types of fuels to spur their economic growth. In short, global problems require global solutions.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying: Policies to promote economic growth, create jobs, and improve the living standards and opportunities of all Americans have been and -- always will be -- the top priority of the President and his Administration. In his remarks to the Business Roundtable on global climate change, the President said "[l]et's find a way to preserve the environment, to meet our international responsibilities, to meet our responsibilities to our children, and grow the economy at the same time."

I believe that some of the lessons we have learned from the economic literature will help us to achieve the President's goal.

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Statement before the House Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power

Dr. Janet Yellen

Chair, Council of Economic Advisers

Tuesday, July 15, 1997

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the economics of global climate change.

Introduction

In his speech to the United Nations in June, President Clinton emphasized that the risks posed by global climate change are real and that sensible preventive steps are justified. This assessment accords with the views of the more than 2300 economists, including 8 Nobel laureates, who signed a statement supporting measures to reduce the threat of climate change.

At this time the Administration has not settled on a particular set of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, the President indicated in his U.N. speech that he intends to engage in a discussion with all interested parties -- Members of Congress and other elected officials, scientists, economists, business and labor leaders -- about the problems posed by greenhouse gas accumulations and the costs and benefits of corrective action. This discussion is intended to inform the Administration's decision-making process, which will culminate in a U.S. policy position in the international negotiations in Kyoto in December of this year.

An important step in this -- and any -- policy process is determining the impact a policy will have on the American economy. President Clinton's top priority, since his first days in office, has been revitalizing the U.S. economy, creating jobs and investing in people and technology to enhance long-term growth. And, we have made tremendous progress. Any policy the President ultimately endorses on climate change will be informed by his commitment to sustaining a healthy and robust economy.

In my testimony today, I would like to describe some of the principal lessons that emerge from the voluminous literature -- much of it relatively recent -- on the economic impacts of policies to address global climate change.

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Within the Administration, a staff level working group -- the Interagency Analytical Team (IAT) -- has attempted to estimate some of the economic implications of climate change policies. They took the emissions scenario most often used in academic literature -- that is, stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by 2010 -- as the starting point for their own analysis. I would emphasize that this scenario is not Administration policy; instead, it was picked to make comparisons with other models easier. This modeling effort produced some useful lessons, but as we found from the peer reviewers' comments, it also suffered from some serious shortcomings. Both the lessons and the shortcomings point to one clear conclusion: the effort to develop a model or set of models that can give us a definitive answer as to the economic impacts of a given climate change policy is futile. Rather, we are left with a set of parameters and relationships that influence estimates of the impacts.

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The Lessons. Modeling efforts both inside and outside the Administration clearly indicate that economic analysis can do no more than estimate a range of potential impacts from particular policies and highlight how outcomes depend on underlying assumptions about how the economy works and the ways in which policy is implemented.

Let me briefly summarize the lessons we have learned from the economics literature so far: :

1) First, the magnitude of the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the various models depends crucially on a number of key assumptions about how the economy works. Essentially, the lesson we've learned is that the greater the substitution possibilities and the faster the economy can adapt, the lower the costs.

2) Second, costs depend critically on how emission reduction policies are implemented.

It boils down to this: if we do it dumb, it could cost a lot, but if we do it smart, it will cost much less and indeed could produce net benefits in the long run. The over 2300 signatories of the economists' statement argued that any global climate change policy should rely on market-based mechanisms. Such mechanisms allow for flexibility in both the timing and location of emission reductions, thereby minimizing the costs to the U.S. economy. The economists concluded that "there are policy options that would slow climate change without harming American living standards, and these measures may in fact improve U.S. productivity in the longer run."

3) The third lesson that emerges from a study of the economics of climate protection is that developing, as well as developed, countries must be part of the process. While developed countries are responsible for most of the greenhouse gas currently in the atmosphere, developing countries are starting to catch up. And, the timetable for the inclusion of developing countries is also important. The sooner that developing countries face incentives to move away from carbon intensive energy sources, the less likely it is that they will become dependent on those types of fuels to spur their economic growth. In short, global problems require global solutions.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying: Policies to promote economic growth, create jobs, and improve the living standards and opportunities of all Americans have been and -- always will be -- the top priority of the President and his Administration. In his remarks to the Business Roundtable on global climate change, the President said "[l]et's find a way to preserve the environment, to meet our international responsibilities, to meet our responsibilities to our children, and grow the economy at the same time."

I believe that some of the lessons we have learned from the economic literature will help us to achieve the President's goal.

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Draft

Close hold

GCC brief

JF Aug. 4, 1997

I. Targets and timetables

A. The economically optimal path for a given concentration target

1. The importance of allowing time for turnover of capital stock + for development of technology

2. Estimates from Manne and Richels: emissions peak in 2050; Nordhaus; others?

3. The role of uncertainty

a. Another reason to go slow: resolution of uncertainty

b. A reason to go faster: risk-aversion, particularly re discontinuities

4. The main argument for going faster: A plan to wait until 2050 is not politically credible. Firms will not begin to make the adjustments envisioned in the models until some serious policy measures are taken.

B. Alternative definitions of "stabilization"

C. Targets & timetables for Kyoto

1. Reducing emissions growth
2. Eliminating emissions growth
3. Returning emissions to levels from a past benchmark
   a. The argument for 1990
4. Reducing emissions below 1990 levels

1. The low ~~the~~ cost/benefit ratio of 1990 levels by 2010.

5. Concentrations
6. "Eliminate emissions growth by 2010-2020, and reduce below 1990 levels thereafter"

...terative:

C. Intertemporal ("when") flexibility

1. Multi-year averages for targets
2. Multiple periods
3. Banking
4. Borrowing
5. Proposals for a safety-valve escape clause on price
6. Proposals to make targets contingent on:
   a. climate conditions or forecasts
   b. growth of output or population
   c. participation of LDCs

D. Negotiating with other countries for Kyoto

1. Their positions on targets, timetables and flexibility
2. What can we expect to get? How firmly do we hold to our line?

II. Domestic Implementation

A. The advantages of market-based solutions

B. Tradeable permits

1. Where is the permit requirement imposed?
   a. Well-head and mine-mouth?

Xerox...

b. Power generators, buildings, and vehicles?
2. To whom are they allocated?
a. Grandfathering
(1) The illusion of neutral distribution
(2) Incidence
b. Advantages of auctioning over grandfathering
(1) The case for auctions (standard econmist's argument; reduced bureaucracy; past successes: spectrum)
(2) Uses for revenue (whether auction or T)
(a) For deficit reduction/21st-century entitlement deficits
(b) For tax cuts
i) Pro-capital, e.g., corporate (reduces GDP costs, but regressive)
ii) Income tax
iii) ~~Progressive, e.g.,~~ payroll tax (↓)
(c) For politically-facilitating redistribution
i) Adversely-affected firms (e.g., coal)
ii) Adversely-affected workers (e.g., coal)
iii) Other (e.g., key states)

C. T vs. auctioning
1. Politics of T?
2. Price vs. quantity, under uncertainty
3. Enforcement
4. Transactions costs
5. "Reluctance to trade" [What is SO2 record?]

D. Blend
1. Grandfather a fraction of permits
2. The argument for phasing out grandfather rights over time

E. How big would the effects be?
1. How high would the price have to go?
a. IAT results
b. Other results
2. What would be the aggregate cost?
a. In lost output?
b. In lost consumption?
3. The precedent of the 1970s oil shocks
4. Who would be most adversely affected?

F. Technology
1. What changes in technology and use could we expect?
a. truly autonomous ("business as usual")
(1) the shift from manufacturing to services
(2) other technical change
b. from price change
(1) conservation, and adoption of known technologies

(2) likely effects on true technological change, estimated from the historical record

c. from government R&D and dissemination programs

d. from announcement effect

2. The dangers of Wishful Thinking

a. Do money-saving technologies exist, and why aren't they adopted now?

(1) High Discount rates and risk-aversion

(2) The usefulness of government programs

(3) The effect of price

G. Possible U.S. actions before a treaty is ratified

1. When should the nature of U.S.measures be decided/declared?

a. Before Kyoto ?

b. During ?

c. After ?

2. What if there is no agreement in Kyoto?

a. Next step in international negotiations

(1) Suspend

(2) Continue

(3) Fundamental rethinking of framework

(a) Consider abandoning "no common measures"

(b) The other issues ← i) Nordhaus proposal ii) McKibbin Wilcoxen proposal ...

b. Possible US actions in the interim

(1) Unilateral

(a) Same as proposed, or a milder version

i) Price measures

ii) Technology programs

(b) Cap and trade CO2 for utilities

(a) (c) ~~Ban energy subsidies~~

(2) With a subset of other countries

3. The argument for deciding/declaring implementation before necessary

a. Internal deliberations: it is good to face the implications before making an international commitment

b. Public dynamics: The information that the Administration was considering serious [price-raising] measures would accelerate a controversial national debate; but

(1) that debate has to take place eventually anyway

(2) announcing the measures and having the debate early would add credibility to U.S. stance, deflating pressure from both environmentalists and rest of world, thereby allowing US to hold to the more reasonable positions in Kyoto negotiations.

Domestic Externalities pollution congestion..

III. International Dimension

A. Allocation

B. International trading

1. Former Soviet Union
2. How big would international transfers be?
   a. For other countries
   b. For the US. (Does the US buy or sell permits?)
3. How much does trading among Annex I countries reduce the cost?
   a. Worldwide
   b. For U.S.
4. Technical details (trading by governments only?)

C. Monitoring and Enforcement

D. Participation of Developing Countries

1. What is efficient?
2. What is fair?
3. What is in the US interest?
4. Possible formulas to make "evolution" more concrete
5. JI
   a. Defined with LDC targets/participation in tradable system
   b. defined without LDC targets (e.g., agreement not to build a coal-fired plant)
   c. defined as subsidy for renewables technology
   d. US policy toward N

E. Implications for US "Competitiveness" if LDCs ~~missing~~ don't agree to limits

1. Loss of foreign demand for US energy-intensive exports
2. Fall in demand for import-competing e-intensive goods
3. Decrease in US oil imports and in world price of oil
4. Other offsets (expansion of non-e-intensive manuf.s?)

F. Implications for the US Trade Deficit

1. Trade balance vs. current account balance
   a. likely to move in opposite directions (transfer problem)
2. Likely size and magnitude of international capital flows

DRAFT --May 30, 1997

Economic Effects of

Global Climate Change Policies

Results of the Research Efforts of the

Interagency Analytical Team

June 1997

Executive Summary

Using a group of economic models with different strengths and weaknesses, the Administration's Interagency Analytic Team has analyzed the economic effects of policies to limit emissions that lead to changes in global climate.

The starting point for this analysis was a scenario in which carbon emissions in the year 2010 were reduced to their 1990 levels. This starting point was selected because it was presented in previous Administration analyses of the issue and because it has been the subject of numerous analyses by academic researchers. Cross-border trading of emissions rights (or permits) was then allowed to reduce transitional economic losses created by such a policy. This is particularly true in the short term. A dramatic acceleration of technological progress also has made the potential to reduce further economic losses, if it can be achieved, but over a longer time period. The economic losses are also reduced by policies that use any resulting revenues for the Federal budget deficit reduction or other policies, which favor investment and long-term growth.

The starting point scenario would raise the implicit price of carbon in the economy by about $100 per ton of carbon. (Actual household burdens would be somewhat offset by conservation and presumed subsequent efficiency improvements.) These higher energy costs would produce GDP losses, at peak, between 0.2 percent and 1.0 percent of GDP. The economy would thereafter bounce back, or in the worst case stabilize, so that it would soon reach its pre-policy growth path. Thus, the losses of economic output resulting from such a policy are real, but relatively small and transient. These losses are disproportionately greater for stricter targets and disproportionately smaller for more lenient ones. However, if international permit trading were established it would moderate the losses to GDP. The maximum effect on GDP under international permit trading is about half of that under no trading.

While the economy-wide losses are small, some sectors bear large burdens, particularly energy producers. Energy-intensive industries also face greater losses. But there is no evidence of a wholesale "capital flight" from the United States resulting from an emissions reduction policy. Moreover, some industries expand as the economy undergoes the adjustment to a world with fewer carbon emissions.

DRAFT --May 30, 1997

Introduction

In June 1996, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sponsored a joint workshop where more than 50 experts from inside and outside the government made presentations on technical issues associated with our emissions trends and capability to reduce emissions trends in the next century. As a part of that workshop, the Interagency Analytical Team (IAT) released what were then preliminary results on the economic effects of emissions reduction proposals.

Since that June 1996 workshop, the IAT has reviewed its work, selected new modeling instruments, improved its approach to old ones, and developed a new set of modeling runs that lead to a better understanding of the economic dimensions of the climate change policy problem. This paper describes those efforts. It first summarizes the IAT model selection process. Second, it discusses the (pre-policy) base case used to measure the effects of various policy options. Third, it discusses the IAT's core emissions reduction scenario. Finally, the bulk of this paper discusses the results of the IAT's analysis.

The modeling work performed for this analysis was done by economists at DOE and EPA. The IAT also included members from the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Labor, and State, as well as members of the White House staff. The majority of the IAT members are still primarily from DOE and EPA --the agencies that have the primary responsibility for the Administration's energy and environmental policies.

Model Selection

The first task that the IAT confronted was to review the analytic "toolbox" to assure that it had all the tools necessary to specify the economic effects of a broad range of climate change proposals. At the time, the IAT relied primarily on the Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) macro model to measure economic effects. After this reevaluation of our modeling needs, it was apparent that the complexity of the analysis would require a broader range of analytical tools.

At a public meeting last November, the IAT announced the selection of three models for its analysis. It decided to continue to use the DRI model, but also included two additional models: the Second Generation Model (SGM) and the Markal-Macro model. Each of these three models met the criteria of being available in the public sphere; being well documented; having a track record of analysis in the climate change area; being widely understood within the energy-environment community; and bringing a unique capability to the IAT's work. Used separately, but in concert with each other, they provide the broad analytical capability needed to examine the many complex economic effects of potential global climate change policies.

The DRI model is a large disequilibrium model of the domestic economy that is particularly well suited to identify transition issues based on short-run behavior embedded into a long-run model. The DRI macroeconomic model is linked to energy, regional, and industry sub-models so that macroeconomic effects of policies are translated into the effects on specific industries and regions of the country. The link to energy sub-models provides specific detailed information about the interaction of the energy sector with the rest of the economy.[1] The DRI model also includes the interaction of the financial markets with markets for goods and services and enables the analysis of the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy with the rest of the economy.

The SGM model is a computable general equilibrium good at identifying an economy's long-term trends in response to climate policies. As such, it is particularly good at describing the economy's long-term path while not as good at describing short-term transition issues. In this sense, its strengths and weaknesses are counterpoised to those of DRI. International in scope, SGM also provides detail for 12 global regions that allows the IAT to examine the effects of permit trading and joint implementation. SGM assesses the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions policies on economic growth, consumption, and energy.

The DRI model and SGM can be thought of as lying at opposite ends of an axis that measures time horizons. A second dimension of the climate change problem concerns the role of technology. Both DRI and SGM allow technological progress to move forward in response to the parameters of their models. But given the unpredictable character of innovation, the IAT concluded that a second approach would be helpful. The Markal-Macro model consists of an integrated energy supply and demand modeling system (Markal) and a macroeconomic model (Macro) useful for translating technological assumptions into economic outcomes.

The Markal-Macro model is particularly useful in answering the question, "How do we get there from here?" Markal-Macro identifies optimal, under perfect foresight, for achieving and quantified goal. Markal-Macro allows the user to control technology innovation and diffusion and its cost to the user in order to determine the levels of energy efficiencies that might be expected from a long-term policy announcement. This model also allows us to understand the implications of technology and its interaction with the economy, and helps us determine whether expected energy efficient technologies hold the key to continued economic growth.

The DRI model and the SGM model in some sense provide notional brackets for estimates of the economic effects of carbon-limiting policies. The DRI model is focused on short-term transitions and measures the economy in quarters. In some sectors, the DRI model has forward-looking behavior, but it is structured to examine the effects of short-term changes in the economy, and is often held to overstate the transitions created by broad, secular changes in the economy (and, as will be discussed below, might overstates subsequent economic improvements as well). The SGM model focuses on long-term transitions and measures the economy in five-year intervals. Thus, it risks racing past short-term transition issues, while identifying the economy's ultimate destination.

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[1] The majority of the DRI results reported by the IAT use DRI's own Energy sub-model. In a limited number of cases, DOE's National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) has been also used been used in conjunction with the DRI model to analyze various sensitivities.

The Base Case

The domestic energy and emissions baseline forecasts were taken from the Energy Information Administration's 1997 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO97). The DRI baseline is DRI's own October 1996 long-term forecast, adjusted in part for the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP). It is very similar to the AEO97 forecast, but not specifically calibrated to it. The international baseline forecast was taken from the International Energy Agency's World Energy Outlook, except for the baseline forecast of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), which came from World Bank projections. The IAT then imposed, as best possible, consistency across the models with regard to projections of baseline GDP, total energy consumption, and carbon emissions. Once these were calibrated into the 3 models, the models solved for energy prices by fuel type. Thus, the baselines of the three models are consistent, but not identical.

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the IAT baseline. In the baseline, U.S. economic growth is projected to slow over the next several decades, as the retirement of "baby boom" workers slows labor force growth and reduces the economy's potential growth rate. Energy demand therefore grows somewhat more slowly than it now does. Energy intensity, measured as energy use per dollar of GDP (the E/GDP ratio), is a key ingredient in the AEO97 forecast, because it measures the growing efficiency with which the economy uses energy. In the 1970s and 1980s, the E/GDP rate of decline averaged almost 2 percent annually--1.5 percent due to price effects and 0.5 percent due to non-price effects. Moderate price increases and the growth of more energy-intensive industries in the late 1980s led to a stabilization of energy intensity. The baseline projection used for this study incorporates a 1.0 percent annual reduction in energy consumption per unit of real output, which is taken from the EIA's Annual Energy Outlook. With these improvements included, energy demand grows at an annual rate of about 0.8 percent over the period from 1995 to 2020, tailing off at the end of the period as does economic growth.

Carbon emissions in the baseline are projected to increase by about 1.2 percent a year through 2010, and by 0.6 percent annually from 2010 to 2020, reaching 1805 million metric tons in 2020. In 1990, the year most frequently used in the international negotiating process as the reference level of carbon, carbon emissions were 1,340 million metric tons, 22 percent below EIA's projection for 2010 and 36 percent below DRI's projection for 2020.

Table 1: IAT Domestic Baseline

	Year							Average Annual Growth Rate (percent) [1]					
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	90-95	95-00	00-05	05-10	10-15	15-20
Population													
DRI-DRI Energy	250	263	276	287	299	311	323	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7
AEO97 (NEMS) [2]	250	264	276	287	299	311	n/a	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	n/a
SGM	250	263	276	287	299	311	323	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7
Markal-Macro	250	263	276	287	299	311	323	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
GDP (Billion 1992$)													
DRI-DRI Energy	$6,139	$6,743	$7,515	$8,320	$9,163	$9,996	$10,670	1.9	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.3
AEO97 (NEMS)	$6,139	$6,739	$7,544	$8,390	$9,185	$9,880	n/a	1.9	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.5	n/a
SGM	$6,139	$6,739	$7,544	$8,390	$9,185	$9,880	$10,591	1.9	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.5	1.4
Markal-Macro	$6,139	$6,739	$7,549	$8,384	$9,198	$9,880	$10,498	1.9	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.4	1.2
OMB [3]	$6,142	$6,721	$7,470	$8,343	$9,225	$9,929	$10,581	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.0	1.5	1.3
Total Energy Consumption (Quads) [4]													
DRI-DRI Energy	82.6	88.9	95.9	101.0	105.3	107.4	108.9	1.5	1.5	1.0	0.8	0.4	0.3
AEO97 (NEMS)	83.7	90.0	97.9	103.4	107.9	110.9	n/a	1.5	1.7	1.1	0.9	0.5	n/a
SGM	81.2	90.6	96.0	102.0	107.0	110.3	113.0	2.2	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.6	0.5
Markal-Macro	83.7	90.9	98.0	103.7	107.8	110.7	115.3	1.7	1.5	1.1	0.8	0.5	0.8
Energy Intensity (TBtu/$92GDP)													
DRI-DRI Energy	13.5	13.2	12.8	12.1	11.5	10.7	10.2	-0.4	-0.7	-1.0	-1.1	-1.3	-1.0
AEO97 (NEMS)	13.6	13.4	13.0	12.3	11.7	11.2	n/a	-0.4	-0.6	-1.0	-1.0	-0.9	n/a
SGM	13.2	13.5	12.8	12.2	11.6	11.2	10.7	0.4	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-0.9	-0.9
Markal-Macro	13.6	13.5	13.0	12.4	11.7	11.2	11.0	-0.2	-0.8	-1.0	-1.1	-0.9	-0.4
Minemouth Coal Price ($95/ton)													
DRI-DRI Energy	$23.92	$18.45	$15.28	$14.41	$13.76	$13.16	$12.70	-5.1	-3.7	-1.2	-0.9	-0.9	-0.7
AEO97 (NEMS)	$19.88	$18.83	$18.38	$17.47	$16.92	$15.46	n/a	-1.1	-0.5	-1.0	-0.6	-1.8	n/a
SGM	$19.88	$19.45	$18.48	$17.30	$16.47	$15.73	$14.96	-0.4	-1.0	-1.3	-1.0	-0.9	-1.0
Markal-Macro	$19.88	$18.83	$17.37	$16.39	$15.90	$16.39	$16.14	-1.1	-1.6	-1.2	-0.6	0.6	-0.3
World Oil Price ($95/Barrel)													
DRI-DRI Energy	$25.23	$17.14	$16.18	$18.93	$21.24	$22.86	$23.95	-7.4	-1.1	3.2	2.3	1.5	0.9
AEO97 (NEMS)	$24.87	$17.26	$18.20	$19.72	$20.41	$20.98	n/a	-7.0	1.1	1.6	0.7	0.6	n/a
SGM	$24.87	$17.26	$18.20	$19.72	$20.41	$20.98	$21.57	-7.0	1.1	1.6	0.7	0.6	0.6
Markal-Macro	$24.87	$17.26	$18.59	$19.75	$20.29	$21.05	$22.20	-7.0	1.5	1.2	0.5	0.7	1.1
Natural Gas Price (wellhead $95/Mcf)													
DRI-DRI Energy	$1.81	$1.46	$1.87	$2.15	$2.42	$2.54	$2.65	-4.2	5.1	2.8	2.4	1.0	0.9
AEO97 (NEMS)	$1.97	$1.61	$1.82	$1.94	$2.01	$2.13	n/a	-4.0	2.5	1.3	0.7	1.2	n/a
SGM	$1.97	$1.99	$2.07	$2.10	$2.16	$2.11	$1.97	0.2	0.9	0.2	0.6	-0.5	-1.4
Markal-Macro	$1.71	$1.55	$2.22	$2.28	$2.46	$2.77	$2.97	-1.9	7.4	0.5	1.6	2.4	1.4
Gasoline Prices ($95/Gal) [5]													
DRI-DRI Energy	$1.40	$1.21	$1.20	$1.26	$1.31	$1.37	$1.40	-2.9	-0.1	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.4
AEO97 (NEMS)	$1.34	$1.15	$1.19	$1.21	$1.22	$1.17	n/a	-3.1	0.8	0.3	0.1	-0.7	n/a
SGM	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Markal-Macro	$1.34	$1.15	$1.34	$1.39	$1.40	$1.41	$1.44	-3.0	3.1	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.4
Carbon Emissions (MMTC) -- Total													
DRI-DRI Energy	1338	1413	1516	1612	1693	1767	1805	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.4
AEO97 (NEMS)	1339	1424	1543	1639	1722	1799	n/a	1.2	1.6	1.2	1.0	0.9	n/a
SGM	1350	1480	1550	1637	1729	1808	1871	1.9	0.9	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.7
Markal-Macro	1338	1459	1574	1674	1741	1806	1914	1.7	1.5	1.2	0.8	0.7	1.2

1 Growth rates are calculated from non-rounded levels. 2 AEO97 projections extend only to 2015. 3 Office of Management and Budget fiscal year 1998 assumptions. 4 SGM projections do not include geothermal, wind, biomass waste, and other municipal waste. 5 The SGM model does not include gasoline.

Table 2: IAT International Baseline
Average Annual Growth Rates (percent)

	Real Economic Growth (GDP)			Energy Growth (Quads)			Emissions Growth (MMTC)		
	1990-00	2000-10	2010-20	1990-00	2000-10	2010-20	1990-00	2000-10	2010-20
Australia	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.1	1.5	0.9	2.0	1.5	0.9
Canada	2.6	2.5	1.2	1.7	1.0	0.4	2.2	1.4	0.7
China	8.4	7.5	5.8	3.9	2.8	2.1	3.8	2.8	2.2
Former Soviet Union	-3.5	4.6	4.2	-3.5	1.8	1.2	-4.0	1.8	1.2
Eastern Europe	-4.5	4.2	4.3	-3.0	1.3	1.2	-3.5	1.3	1.2
India	4.1	4.5	3.9	3.9	1.3	3.1	4.1	2.1	3.3
Japan	2.1	1.7	0.9	2.2	0.9	0.1	2.1	0.9	0.1
Korea	5.0	5.9	4.4	4.0	3.1	2.4	2.6	3.3	2.9
Mexico	4.0	4.0	3.2	4.2	2.9	2.3	4.2	2.9	2.4
Western Europe	2.3	2.5	2.4	1.5	1.4	0.6	1.2	1.4	0.6
United States	2.1	2.2	1.4	1.7	1.1	0.6	1.4	1.1	0.8
Rest-Of-World	3.6	3.4	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.2	2.2

The Analytical "Starting Point"

The IAT began its analysis of emissions reductions policies by examining one core emissions reduction scenario. Then we explored the economic effect of changes to this scenario. The central policy modeled -- the "starting point" scenario -- is aimed at reducing carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions by stabilizing them at 1990 levels. The "starting point" scenario pursues those reductions by issuing tradable emission permits at the earliest point of energy production or when imported into the United States. The policy is announced in 2000 and its restrictions are phased-in over a ten year period, so that the policy takes full effect in 2010. The permits are initially auctioned so that all revenues generated through permits would be recycled through the economy through deficit reduction. The initial discussion of the "starting point" scenario assumes no international cooperation. An option incorporating international trading is discussed once the dynamics of the no trading "starting point" scenario have been established.

Estimates of reductions of non-carbon emissions, such as methane and forest carbon sinks, are obtained from engineering estimates outside the models. Early in the process, the IAT estimated a strike-price for these sources of $70 per ton (which turned out to be low). Appendix Table A shows baselines for, and the quantities of emissions obtained from, these non-carbon sources at this price. These carbon tons were subtracted from the emissions targets being modeled. But the cost of obtaining them was not factored back into the models and, is therefore missing. While the engineering estimates are uncertain, the cost of abating non-carbon sources could increase the estimates of economic effects by as much as 14 percent.

The "starting point"scenario was employed as an analytical starting point for this analysis primarily because it has already been the subject of much attention within the analytical literature. Most analysts of climate change policies have used an emissions freeze in the year

2010 at 1990 levels as their framework. The IAT, therefore, used this scenario in order to facilitate comparisons of its work to that of other researchers.

Industry and regional effects, as presented here, show only the effects of the climate change policy on the industry's output (shipments plus inventory change). We considered this our first step in understanding the likely sectoral consequences of emissions reductions.

The "starting point" scenario incorporates a slight improvement in energy intensity (E/GDP) over the EIA/AEO baseline, which declines by 1.0 percent per year. This improvement could come about because the climate change policy undertaken generates foreseeable increases in the future price of energy, or because of the implementation of the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP), or other policies. The prospective "announcement effect," therefore, is what allows the model to distinguish between a change in future policy regarding carbon emissions and an exogenous shock, such as the two oil price increases in the 1970s. This leads to somewhat faster rate of diffusion of energy efficient technologies and a higher rate of innovation through R&D in anticipation of future higher energy prices. The IAT assumes an improvement in energy-intensity of 0.25 percent so that the total annual change in the ratio of energy to GDP is 1.25 percent per year. A faster technology alternative is also investigated. (More detail on energy-efficient technology improvement is provided later in this paper.)

Unless otherwise stated, the tables and figures that follow were derived using the DRI model and using the "starting point" scenario, which does not incorporate international emissions trading. These estimates, therefore, will be at the high end of the likely range, due to both model structure and the absence of trading.

"Starting Point" Results

Estimates of permit prices are around $100 per ton of carbon in 2010 and rising slightly thereafter, and are consistent across models. While the three models used for this analysis vary in structure and often in terms of macroeconomic outcomes, they generate fairly consistent results as to the implicit price of carbon in the economy. Table 3 presents the results obtained by the three models for the value of a permit to emit a ton of carbon. Figure 1 shows the path for the value of carbon in these models. All of these estimates pertain to the "starting point" option in which emissions are frozen at their 1990 level in 2010 and thereafter.

Table 3: The Implicit Price of Carbon (1995$) in 2010 and 2020
1990 Level Case, No International Trading

	2010	2020
DRI-DRI Energy	95	125
SGM	81	106
Markal-Macro	145	130
NEMS	n/a	n/a

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP. SGM permit prices are calculated using the rate of change in carbon to GDP (C/GDP), which incorporate emission rates by the different fuel types. NEMS estimates are forthcoming.

Figure 1: Price Path of the Implicit Price of Carbon (1995$)
1990 Level Case, No International Trading



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP. SGM permit prices are calculated using the rate of change in C/GDP. SGM and Markal-Macro models use data and generate results in five year intervals.

The DRI model concludes that an implicit price of $95 (1995$) per ton of carbon in 2010 would result in stabilization. The Markal-Macro model estimated $145 (1995$) while the SGM model predicted about $81 (1995$), in 2010.[2] A permit price of $100 per ton is the equivalent of a price increase of 26 cents per gallon of refined petroleum product, $1.49 per thousand cubic feet of natural gas, $52.52 per ton of coal, and 2 cents per kilowatt hour of electricity produced.

[2] The higher permit price from the Markal-Macro model reflects, in part, differences in model structure, but results mostly from differences in the calibrations of baseline emissions.

The models also agree that this implicit price of carbon grows somewhat over time. This reflects the fact that the 1990 emission ceiling becomes a progressively more binding constraint over time, given projected growth in base case emissions. By the year 2020, the implicit price of carbon rises to $125, $106 and $130 per ton (1995$) in the DRI, SGM, and Markal-Macro models, respectively.

Emissions reductions lead to small reductions in short-term economic growth (GDP), but growth later appears to recover. The burden of reducing carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions leads to short-term reductions in economic growth as measured by GDP. These reductions, however, are not large and, in many instances, are recovered in later years.

Results from the DRI model are presented in Figure 2. The results indicate that there is an initial GDP loss as the emission-limiting policy begins to be phased in. These losses cumulate to a peak loss of about one percent of total economic output in the year 2005 -- that is, the economy's growth slows until the size of the economy is, at worst, about one percent smaller in that year when compared to the base case. After 2005, the economy actually grows faster than it would have absent climate change policy and starts to make up the lost ground. By the year 2013, the economy is back to the point at which it would have been had no policy been enacted. In subsequent years, the economy improves slightly compared to the "no policy" base case--this differential reaches 0.3 percent by 2020, the last year of the model run.

Figure 2: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Gross Domestic Product



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

This improvement occurs in the DRI model because the emissions reduction policies modeled have some effects that favor savings and investment at the expense of consumption. If the Federal government auctions off emissions permits, it acquires the wherewithal to reduce the deficit (or retire debt) and, in effect, increase the nation's savings. This allows the cost of capital to fall and favors investment. The marginal profitability of investment also rises under these policies because new investment allows firms to neutralize higher energy costs. In effect, capital is a long-term substitute for energy and is favored after a transition period. Thus, the cost of investment falls and the incentive to invest is strengthened. This faster rate of investment (discussed in greater detail below) gives the economy a newer and larger capital stock: as a result the economy's ability to grow improves until it actually reaches a modestly higher growth path in the years following the transition.

Figure 3 shows comparable results for the SGM and Markal Macro models. In contrast to the DRI model, which focuses on short-term transition issues and may, therefore, tend to produce larger estimates of GDP losses, the SGM and Markal-Macro models move quickly through these issues and focus on longer-term prospects. The SGM model estimates peak losses for the economy of 0.17 percent of GDP in 2015, but the economy then stabilizes through 2020.

Figure 3: SGM and Markal-Macro 1990 Level Case
No International Trading, Gross Domestic Product



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in C/GDP.

The Markal-Macro simulation results show a reduction in GDP of 0.60 percent from baseline in 2010 in the stabilization case. GDP remains below baseline levels throughout the forecast horizon. The GDP impact profile reflects the model structure, which represents the base case solution as a set of optimal energy use and technology choices given fuel prices, technology characteristics, and discount rates. Since a carbon constraint limits the use of fuels and technologies that would otherwise be chosen, projected GDP must fall. Moreover, since the balance between investment and consumption is optimized within each case considered, economic welfare cannot be increased by an investment-oriented revenue recycling scheme. Consequently, although investment will adjust, the maximization of economic welfare under a carbon constraint does not lead to higher GDP in the future years in the Markal-Macro model.

The models used by the IAT offer a similar picture in some regards--all show initial losses in aggregate economic output that are not very large (even the DRI peak loss is spread over five years). But they also differ in predictable ways, given their structure. A recent analysis by Dr. Robert Repetto and Dr. Dunkin Austin of the World Resources Institute examined 162 analyses of climate change policy and found that model structure can account for two-thirds of the difference in results, if environmental benefits are ignored.[3]

Disequilibrium macro models, such as DRI, tend to identify deeper transitional losses and steeper transitional rebounds. Computable general equilibrium models, such as SGM, see more sanguine short-term effects and see the economy stabilizing after a more frictionless adjustment. The SGM model, however, is less flexible than some computable general equilibrium model because it does not allow instantaneous shifts in capital. The SGM model maintains vintaged capital stock in the electricity sector and retires old electricity related capital only when it cannot cover operating expenses or reaches its fixed lifetime. This feature allows the analysis to incorporate the costs of reallocating capital stock.

Which, then, is right? DRI's transitional losses may be overstated, but so would be the rebound and the shift to a higher growth path it estimates for later years. SGM and Markal-Macro probably understate the transitional problem, but also avoid the later-year growth surge that DRI sees as driven by higher levels of investment. The models probably serve as brackets for the range of reasonable estimates of the economic effects of an emissions freeze at 1990 levels in 2010 and thereafter.

Unemployment and Inflation. The effect of the emissions stabilization policy results in approximately a 0.2 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate from 2001 through 2011, with a peak increase of about 0.4 percentage points in 2015, as estimated using the DRI model. The unemployment rate first rises as GDP falls, but then returns to its pre-policy level by 2012, as shown in Figure 4. The inflation rate increases by about 0.3 percentage points until 2009, measured by the annual rate of change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The annual rate of change in the CPI declines by about 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points per year for 2010 through 2020, as shown in Figure 5.

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[3] Repetto, Robert and Dunkin Austin. "The Cost of Controlling CO2 Emissions: A Guide for the Perplexed." *World Resources Institute* (Forthcoming).

Figure 4: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Unemployment Rate



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figure 5: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Inflation Rate



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

<u>*Investment policies are key to getting the economy back on track*</u>. In the baseline forecast, slow labor force growth of 0.8% per year leads to slow potential GDP growth, which results in slow capital stock turnover. The slower rate at which the capital stock is renewed is of direct consequence to mitigating carbon and other related emissions, since improvements in energy-efficiency or carbon-abating technologies generally must be embodied in the capital stock in order to be effective. Thus, any global climate change policy, to be effective, must focus on investment at the expense of consumption. The deficit reduction policy option, one of the several revenue recycling options examined, promotes savings, which boosts this investment.

The DRI model suggests that investment under a climate change policy scenario begins to exceed investment in the baseline by 2006, as seen in Figure 6. By the time the policy is fully implemented in 2010, investment exceeds the baseline by about $50 billion (1992$), with this difference rising to about $100 billion in 2020. Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE), on the other hand, remain below the baseline level throughout the forecast period, so that PCE drops by about $80 billion in 2008, as seen in Figure 7. After the trough in 2008, PCE gradually moves toward baseline by 2020.

Figure 6: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Investment



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

The faster rate of investment drives the rebounding of real economic growth in the later years of the model simulation. But it should be noted that consumption does not rebound in the same manner, although it does recover from its peak losses, as seen in Figure 7. But consumption can be taken as the measure of economic activity that is closer to consumer "welfare" than total GDP, which includes investment, because consumption includes all activities that are of direct consequence to households. Thus, while increases in investment drive the economy's growth path back to and perhaps even above its original trend, it does so by diverting resources away from uses that allow consumers to enjoy them directly in the short term.

Figure 7: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Consumption



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

The paths of consumption and investment following the imposition of a climate change policy depend critically on assumptions regarding the manner in which revenue flows related to the allocation of emissions permits are managed and the conduct of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve. These sensitivities are discussed in a later section.

Among fuels, demand for coal bears the brunt of greenhouse gas stabilization The reduction in energy-related greenhouse emissions in the 2010 time frame will require a combination of three types of energy system changes: increased end-use efficiency, reduced end-use activity, or fuel-switching towards an increased market share of low- and no-carbon fuels in the energy mix. Increased end-use efficiency or reduced end-use activity tends to lower the demand for all fuels, while fuel-switching favors low- and no-carbon fuels, such as natural gas and renewable energy, relative to coal. The three models used by the IAT place different emphasis on these three strategies, with corresponding differences in projected fossil fuel impacts.

Table 4 presents the effects of carbon-limiting policies on the economy's energy consumption and fuel mix. Using the DRI model, total energy consumption falls from 105 quadrillion Btus (quads) in the base case in 2010 to a level of 88 quads under the policy, a reduction of 16 percent in that year. By 2020, energy consumption in the economy has declined by 20 percent, from 109 quads to 87 quads, when compared to the base case for that year. The table shows comparable results using the Markal-Macro model, when the 1990-level emissions freeze produces a decline in projected energy consumption of 14 percent in 2010 and 16 percent in 2020. SGM model results are similar to both the DRI and Markal-Macro results; energy consumption drops by 15 percent in 2010, and 20 percent in 2020.

Table 4: Effects of Carbon Stabilization on Energy Consumption and Fuel Mix (quadrillion Btus)

	1990	2010		2020	
	Actual	Base case	1990 Level Case, No International Trading	Base case	1990 Level Case, No International Trading
DRI-DRI Energy					
Total U.S. Energy Consumption	84.3	105.3	88.2	108.9	86.7
Natural Gas	19.3	27.4	22.9	29.8	24.9
Oil	33.6	41.1	35.6	44.1	37.4
Coal	19.0	24.3	17.2	25.8	15.2
SGM					
Total U.S. Energy Consumption	84.3	107.0	91.4	113.0	90.0
Natural Gas	19.3	33.2	33.1	37.7	36.7
Oil	33.6	36.5	33.1	39.0	34.0
Coal	19.0	23.9	11.3	25.8	8.5
Markal-Macro[1]					
Total U.S. Energy Consumption	84.3	107.8	92.6	115.6	96.7
Natural Gas	19.3	29.0	30.7	35.1	36.7
Oil	33.6	43.4	37.9	45.0	40.1
Coal	19.0	22.5	9.4	24.6	4.7
NEMS					
Total U.S. Energy Consumption	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Natural Gas	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Oil	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Coal	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP. SGM uses a similar rate of change in C/GDP. 1. Under the Markal-Macro results, the increase in the use of renewable energy sources, such as wind, account for the difference the total U.S. energy consumption and the sum of the component fuels. NEMS estimates are forthcoming.

DRI, Markal-Macro, and SGM demonstrate that dampened energy consumption and reduced carbon emissions are concentrated in coal use. As seen in Table 5, DRI results show that about 57 percent of the total emissions reductions in 2010 result from reduced demand for coal, 30 percent from oil, and 13 percent from natural gas. By 2020, 65 percent of emission reductions are generated from reductions in demand for coal. This translates to a 25 percent total emission reduction for coal in 2010 and a 36 percent reduction in 2020. Markal-Macro produces somewhat similar results: it shows that about 57 percent of total emissions reductions in 2010 occur due to reduced coal use; and 16 percent due to reduced oil use; while natural gas consumption is 5 percent above the base case. By 2020, coal accounts for about 80 percent of emissions reductions. The SGM model results are also similar; i.e., coal is responsible for 80 percent of emissions reductions in 2010 and 2020.

The different spread of percent of total emissions reductions by fuel occurs because renewable energy sources and increases in the consumption of natural gas play important roles in the Markal-Macro and SGM models. It is also true because DRI's model sees strong transportation demands and more limited technological prospects for serving it, while transportation choices do not take into account price expectations. This is in contrast to DRI's treatment of the utility sector, which is relatively forward looking when examining fuel choices.

Table 5: 1990 Level Case, No International Trading-- Percent of Total Emissions Reduction by Fuel

	2010	2020
DRI-DRI Energy		
Natural Gas	13	8
Oil	30	28
Coal	57	65
SGM		
Natural Gas	0	3
Oil	18	18
Coal	82	79
Markal-Macro		
Natural Gas	-5	-4
Oil	16	15
Coal	57	80
NEMS		
Natural Gas	n/a	n/a
Oil	n/a	n/a
Coal	n/a	n/a

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP. NEMS estimates are forthcoming.

On the demand side, according to DRI, about 46 percent of total emission reductions in 2010 come from the electric sector due to fuel switching and decreases in demand for electricity, 26 percent come from reduced demand for transportation and 19 percent come from reduced demand by the industrial sector, as shown in Table 6. The commercial and residential sectors contribute a combined 8 percent to the total of emissions reductions. The corresponding estimates obtained from the Markal-Macro model show that electricity uses account for 40 percent of total reduction in emissions, and transportation, industrial, and residential and commercial uses for 16 percent, 17 percent, and 15 percent, respectively.

Table 6: 1990 Level Case, No International Trading
Percent of Total Emissions Reduction by Demand Sector

	2010	2020
DRI-DRI Energy		
Residential	5	4
Commercial	3	2
Industrial	19	21
Transportation	27	25
Electricity	46	47
SGM		
Residential	n/a	n/a
Commercial	n/a	n/a
Industrial	n/a	n/a
Transportation	n/a	n/a
Electricity	n/a	n/a
Markal-Macro		
Residential and Commercial	15	15
Industrial	17	22
Transportation	16	17
Electricity	40	53
NEMS		
Residential	n/a	n/a
Commercial	n/a	n/a
Industrial	n/a	n/a
Transportation	n/a	n/a
Electricity	n/a	n/a

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP. SGM uses a similar rate of change in C/GDP. SGM does not generate data by demand sector. NEMS estimates are forthcoming.

Thus, across models and when viewed from different perspectives, the majority of reductions in emissions obtained under the broadest strategies comes from reducing utility consumption of coal. Reducing coal use under utility boilers is generally the largest, cheapest option to reduce carbon emissions in the economy. This is accomplished through better operating rates and through the substitution of gas-fired combined-cycle units for coal-fired units. The implicit price of carbon obtained in most model runs is usually the one that accomplishes this transition in electricity baseload. The range of carbon values -- generally about $100 per ton in the no trading cases -- is as high as it is because most coal-fired units are fairly old and already fully amortized. Thus, their product costs mainly consist of fuel and operating and maintenance expenses but not capital costs. The price of coal, therefore, must rise considerably to make coal-fired electricity more expensive on the margin than electricity generated by a new gas-fired plant that entails new capital costs.

International trading of carbon permits among the Annex I countries leads to sizable reductions in costs needed to stabilize emissions. The discussion so far has centered on the how the U.S. economy reacts when the United States independently reduces emissions. However, establishing an international market to trade emissions permits is a preferred to unilateral action that has been proposed by the United States for inclusion in a multinational agreement. The purpose of such a market would be to increase the efficiency and lower the cost of reducing global emissions by giving all emitters the incentive to search for least-cost solutions across national boundaries.

In brief, under a system of tradable permits, a country could either reduce emissions domestically or purchase additional emissions "rights" (i.e., permits) from other countries. Countries with opportunities to reduce emissions that cost less than the going permit price would have an incentive to reduce emissions and sell their "right to emit" for cash. Countries that had only high cost options to reduce emissions (that is, reduction options that cost more than the permit prices) could purchase emission permits. The forces of supply and demand would set the permit price and the market incentives would push the trading group, as a whole, to institute the least cost emissions reductions first. As a result, it costs less for the trading group, as a whole, to reach the target emissions levels, than it would for each country unilaterally to reduce its emissions to the target levels. Such a policy, of course, raises a variety of legal and institutional questions regarding how it would be implemented with certainty. These issues are not addressed here: instead, the simple assumption is made that the policy works as intended and least-cost approaches to abating carbon are identified and traded.

Using the SGM model, the IAT modeled two international trading scenarios. In the first, it examined the affects of establishing a permit market among the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Japan, the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and Australia (collectively known as Annex I countries under the Climate Convention). In the second scenario, it examined the effects of Joint Implementation, that is, establishing a wider permit market that includes the rest of the world. These scenarios are compared to a scenario in which each of the Annex I countries independently implemented our "starting point" scenario for stabilizing carbon emissions; that is, stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels in 2010 with a ten year phase in, where revenues are used to reduce the deficit, and under the assumption of moderate technological change (i.e., a 0.25 percent increase over the baseline in the annual increase in energy or carbon efficiency).

International emissions trading calls into question one of the basic assumptions regarding international compliance when performing the estimates. This concerns the case of the FSU. The "starting point" case assumes that all countries are restricted to their 1990 emissions level before they trade. The FSU nations, however, will have emissions below their 1990 levels for years to come. Thus, under this rule, they would be able to sell to other nations their "right to emit" up to their 1990 levels, but would not have to perform any actual emissions reductions. Thus, emissions trades would not result in "corresponding reductions" in annual emissions.

The IAT performed its analysis both with and without "corresponding reductions." The case without "corresponding reductions" allows the FSU to sell emissions rights up to its 1990 base. The case with "corresponding reductions" does not allow these trades. Instead the IAT specified that if a nation's emissions were below their 1990 level in the base case, its baseline for the purposes of trading was shifted down from the 1990 level to whatever the nation's actual emissions would be. For example, the FSU had carbon emissions of 1050 million metric tons (MMT) in 1990, and is projected to have emissions of 836 MMT in 2010. Their baseline in

2010, therefore, is 836 MMT, even though it is lower than the 1990 level. Thus, any tons "sold" from the FSU in these simulations represent actual emissions reductions. The results obtained using the SGM model appear in Tables 7a and 7b.

Under the Annex I trading scenario, the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, and Australia each bear real costs for emissions reduction. The losses experienced by the different nations reflect the economic assumptions made for them (which are presented earlier in this report, in Table 2) and their energy policies to date. Japan, for example, is projected to have relatively slow economic growth and already has relatively high energy prices and an extensive nuclear program. Thus, it is not projected to have strong growth in emissions over the next few decades. Japan has a high implicit price of carbon ($268 per ton) as shown in Table 8. Western Europe fares somewhat worse than the United States, since its economic growth is projected to be stronger, and its energy policies have already been raised.

Table 7a: SGM 1990 Level Case--GDP Impacts to Annex I Countries
No Trading vs. Annex I Trading,

	No Trading					Annex I Trading (With Corresponding Reductions)				
	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Australia	0.0%	-0.2%	-0.5%	-0.4%	-0.2%	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.3%	-0.2%	-0.1%
Canada	0.0%	-0.4%	-1.1%	-1.1%	-1.1%	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.4%	-0.3%	-0.2%
Eastern Europe	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Former Soviet Union	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.5%	0.6%	0.5%
Japan	0.0%	-0.2%	-0.6%	-0.4%	-0.3%	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.2%	-0.1%	-0.1%
Western Europe	0.0%	-0.2%	-0.7%	-0.4%	-0.2%	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.3%	-0.2%	-0.1%
United States	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.2%	-0.2%	-0.2%	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.1%	-0.1%	-0.1%

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in C/GDP.

Table 7b: SGM 1990 Level Case--GDP Impacts to Annex I Countries
No Trading vs. Annex I Trading

	No Trading					Annex I Trading (With out Corresponding Reductions)				
	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Australia	0.0%	-0.2%	-0.5%	-0.4%	-0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.2%	-0.1%
Canada	0.0%	-0.4%	-1.1%	-1.1%	-1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.2%	-0.2%	-0.2%
Eastern Europe	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.7%	0.5%
Former Soviet Union	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.5%	0.5%
Japan	0.0%	-0.2%	-0.6%	-0.4%	-0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.1%	-0.1%
Western Europe	0.0%	-0.2%	-0.7%	-0.4%	-0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.2%	-0.2%	-0.1%
United States	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.2%	-0.2%	-0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.1%	-0.1%	-0.1%

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in C/GDP.

GDP losses in Canada are the most severe among the Annex I countries. Canada is already less carbon intensive, but not as energy efficient as other Annex I countries. For example, Canada's carbon to population ratio is about 17 percent below that of the United States, while its energy to GDP ratio is about 46 percent higher. Canada also relies more heavily on non-carbon sources of energy, such as hydroelectrical generation, making emissions reductions more difficult to come by.

Table 8 shows the implicit price of carbon by country without trading, trading with Annex I countries, and with Joint Implementation with the developing countries. The United States shows smaller output losses than Japan or Western Europe predominantly because it has more "cheap" carbon-abating opportunities. Thus, it is somewhat easier for the United States to reach emission targets than other regions, which have already "picked the low fruit."

Table 8: Implicit Price of Carbon (1995$) Under Annex I Trading and Joint Implementation--SGM 1990 Level Case

	2010					2020				
	No Trading	Annex I Trading		Joint Implementation		No Trading	Annex I Trading		Joint Implementation	
		with CR	without CR	with CR	without CR		with CR	without CR	with CR	without CR
Australia	132	56	23	20	9	126	50	35	16	12
Canada	222	56	23	20	9	252	50	35	16	12
China	*	n/a	n/a	20	9	*	n/a	n/a	16	12
Former Soviet Union	0	56	23	20	9	0	50	35	16	12
Eastern Europe	0	56	23	20	9	0	50	35	16	12
India	*	n/a	n/a	20	9	*	n/a	n/a	16	12
Japan	268	56	23	20	9	257	50	35	16	12
Korea	*	n/a	n/a	20	9	*	n/a	n/a	16	12
Mexico	*	n/a	n/a	20	9	*	n/a	n/a	16	12
Western Europe	130	56	23	20	9	139	50	35	16	12
United States	82	56	23	20	9	107	50	35	16	12
Rest of World	*	n/a	n/a	20	9	*	n/a	n/a	16	12

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in C/GDP. * indicates the cell is blank because the country is a non-Annex I country. CR=corresponding reductions.

Under Annex I trading with "corresponding reductions," the implicit price of carbon falls dramatically--to $56 in 2010 and $50 in 2020. All countries gain through these lower permit prices, because as a whole they achieve stabilization at 1990 levels more cheaply. The source of these cheap emissions is the FSU and the Eastern European nations. The implicit price of carbon falls because it is cheaper for all of the industrialized nations to pay for carbon abatements in those nations (due to lax environmental standards and slow economic growth) than to pursue domestic options only. These nations gain as they become emissions permit sellers under Annex I trading. If "corresponding reductions" are not required, the FSU would be allowed to sell permits up to its 1990 level further depressing the price to $23 per ton in 2010 and $35 in 2020.

Under Annex I trading with "corresponding reductions," the United States purchases 72 million metric tons of permits from the FSU and Eastern Europe in 2010 at a cost of $4 billion ($95), which offsets $5 billion of abatement expenditures within the United States. U.S. purchases of permits abroad increases to 157 million metric tons of permits in 2020 at a cost of $7.8 billion, which offsets $12.2 billion of cost increases that would have occurred domestically if the U.S. did not participate in international trading.

<u>Joint Implementation with developing countries reduce the costs of permit prices even further</u>. Joint implementation -- emissions trading on a global scale -- reduces the permit price further, to $20 in 2010 and $16 in 2020 (with corresponding reductions). If corresponding reductions are not required the implicit price of carbon falls to $9 in 2010 and $12 in 2020. Under this broader market for tradeable emissions permits the FSU and Eastern Europe lose their monopoly on permit sales. Specifically, Joint Implementation encourages China and India to reduce their use of coal and enter the market as emissions permit sellers. As shown in Figure 8, imports of carbon permits are greater under Joint Implementation than under Annex I trading.

Figure 8: U.S. Imports of Carbon Permits Under Alternate Mitigation Targets--Annex I Trading and Joint Implementation



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in C/GDP.

<u>Using the SGM implicit carbon prices from Annex I trading to simulate macroeconomic conditions for the DRI Model moderates the short-term economic effects of emissions reductions.</u> The IAT incorporate Annex I implied permit prices estimated by the SGM model under permit trading, with corresponding reductions into the DRI model. For in 2010 SGM's Annex I trading implicit price of carbon estimate ($56) was incorporated into the DRI model.

The results from the DRI model using the SGM permit trading implied permit prices are represented in Figures 9, 10, and 11. As shown in Figure 9, the maximum effect on GDP is less than half, 0.5 percent less than the baseline in 2006 compared with about one percent in 2005. The lower permit prices also has a somewhat dampening effect on the increase in investment under the no trading case, but shows a much improved effect on the impact on consumption, a -0.7 percent change in 2010 compared with a -1.4 percent change in 2008, and reaches the baseline consumption estimates in 2018.

Figure 9: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case with and without Annex I Trading--GDP



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figure 10: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case with and without Annex I Trading--Investment



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figure 11: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case with and without Annex I Trading--Consumption



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Important Sensitivities

The following represents a number of variations from the "starting point" scenario that the IAT analysts examined to address a number of factors that will influence the climate change policy process. These include the effects of: (1) timing, including different transition periods to full implementation and delaying implementation; (2) lower or higher emission level targets; (3) different revenue recycling options, including comparing the deficit reduction case with scenarios where revenues are distributed to consumers, distributed to business, and a combination of both consumers and business; (4) policy announcement on the rate if technological innovation and diffusion as well as the steps needed to achieve a higher level of innovation and diffusion; (5) other collateral environmental benefits; and (6) international trade; and (7) Federal Reserve reaction assumptions in the DRI model.

Increasing the implementation period from 5 to 10 years dampens the negative effects on GDP. Delaying implementation until 2015 does little to improve GDP effects. The IAT examined differing effects on GDP of a 5-year and a 10-year implementation period for the "starting point" scenario with the NEMS model. These results are shown in Figure 12. A 5-year ramp-up between 2005 and 2010 results in a maximum output loss in 2010 that is 65 percent greater than that associated with a ten year ramp-up and a return to the baseline two years later. Thus, shorter transition periods result in a more pronounced economic cycle in response to policy--a sharper downturn and deferred recovery.

Figure 12: NEMS 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Sensitivity to the Length of the Implementation Period and to Implementation Timing



Note: These simulations were conducted using DRI and the NEMS Energy Model and they do not conform in detail to those conducted using DRI and the DRI Energy Model. 5-Year and 10-Year Ramp to 1990 Levels in 2010; 1990 Levels in 2015 using a 5-Year ramp-up. Revenues are used for Federal deficit reduction. assuming 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figure 12 also shows the result of delaying the implementation by 5 years, to 2015 combined with the shorter 5-year ramp-up period. GDP effects for the delayed case are less severe in the initial period, but become greater than either the 5-year or 10-year ramp-up to stabilization in 2010.

Raising or lowering emission targets lead to obvious results--more stringent emission targets lead to greater economic losses while less stringent ones have less severe impacts The three models were used to analyze how changes in the level of emissions affect the implicit price of carbon. If the emission target for the year 2010 and beyond is raised (made less severe) to a level equal to 110 percent of the 1990 emissions level (that is, to a target of 1,472 million tons as opposed to 1,338 million tons), then the DRI model estimated that the implicit price of carbon drop almost by half -- to about $50 per ton of carbon, while the SGM model dropped from $81 to $37. The very large decline in the implicit price of carbon reflects the fact that additional emissions reductions are progressively harder to find. On the other hand, a more stringent target, one that freezes emissions at 90 percent of their 1990 level in the year 2010 and beyond, leads to an implicit price of carbon of $200 per ton in 2010 and $150 per ton in 2020, according to the DRI model. The SGM model estimated that the implicit price of carbon would be $145 and $183 in 2010 and 2020, respectively. The implicit price of carbon generated by Markal-Macro for the 90 percent of the 1990 level case with no international trading would be $187 and $207 in 2010 and 2020, respectively. Table 9 and Figures 13 and 14 describe the sensitivity of these results using DRI, SGM, and Markal-Macro.

Table 9: Sensitivity of the Implicit Price of Carbon to the Stringency of the Emissions Target No International Trading

	2010	2020
DRI-DRI Energy		
Carbon Emissions 90% of 1990 Level Case	200	150
Carbon Emissions 110% of 1990 Level Case	50	85
SGM		
Carbon Emissions 90% of 1990 Level Case	145	183
Carbon Emissions 110% of 1990 Level Case	37	56
Markal-Macro		
Carbon Emissions 90% of 1990 Level Case	187	207
Carbon Emissions 110% of 1990 Level Case	101	93

Note: 10 year phase-in with revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP. SGM uses a similar rate of change in C/GDP.

Figure 13: DRI-DRI Energy No International Trading--Sensitivity of the Implicit Price of Carbon to the Stringency of the Emissions Target



Note: 10 year phase-in with revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figure 14: SGM No International Trading--Sensitivity of the Implicit Price of Carbon to the Stringency of the Emissions Target



Note: 10 year phase-in with revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in C/GDP.

In 2020, permit prices rise to about $85 compared with the $125 permit price under stabilization. Using the DRI model, an emissions target of 90 percent of 1990 level results in an implicit price of carbon of $200 per ton in 2010 and $150 in 2020. Unlike in the other cases, the implicit price of carbon falls after 2010. This is because the initial price increase is large enough to set in motion a series of capital stock improvements, particularly in utilities, that reduce the ongoing level of emissions by enough to allow the implicit price to fall in the future. Thus, this result is predicated on the idea that future price expectations could be wrong. In fact, if decision makers had perfect price expectations, the implicit price of carbon would lie somewhere between these two values over the period.

It is no surprise that the 90 percent of 1990 emissions case results in a more severe decline of GDP in the transition period. But what is surprising, and questionable, is that this scenario also has a greater long-term potential for economic recovery. As shown in Figure 15, GDP declines to a peak loss of 1.9 percent below the base case in 2005. It recovers to the base case level in 2013 and increases to 1.0 percent above the base case in 2020. The long-term rebound effect results from a greater amount of revenue used for deficit reduction (or debt retirement), which pushes interest rates down substantially and drives up investment. The magnitude of this result is questionable.

The DRI model, as discussed, is prone to depicting large effects of interest rates on investment. Thus, when confronted with a very large implicit price of carbon and, in turn, large amounts of forced saving, either through deficit reduction or by grandfathering these new property rights to firms, it produces much higher levels of investment and a higher long-term growth path. The reality is probably more moderate at both ends. In essence, this case appears to tax the ability of the model to manage these revenue flows.

Figure 15: DRI-DRI Energy No International Trading--Sensitivity of GDP to the Stringency of the Emissions Target



Note: 10 year phase-in with revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

The portion of total emission reductions from coal and oil in both the 90 percent and 110 percent of 1990 Level Case, No International Trading, increases only slightly--about 5 percentage points--while total emission reductions from natural gas change significantly. In 2010, under stabilization, about 13 percent of total emission reductions are from natural gas. Under a 10 percent increase in the target (that is, a target of 90 percent of 1990 emissions), about 9 percent of total emission reductions are from natural gas. This occurs because the substitution of gas for coal in electric utilities is not enough to achieve the bulk of the 90 percent (more stringent) target. Additional emissions reductions must be found, which forces the burden to be spread more evenly among fuel types and sectors.

Adopting a revenue recycling option that favors capital formation leads to less impact on the economy during the transition and greater returns to the economy in the long term. The IAT looked at a number of revenue recycling policies in addition to the deficit reduction case. These options are depicted in Figure 16. These include:

- "grandfathering" permits to producers, meaning that every carbon-emitter would be given sufficient permits to allow them to emit at their 1990 level. The permits allowing them to do so would then be traded freely, allowing a least-cost response to the problem to emerge;

- a 100 percent recycling of any revenues from permit auctions to consumers through a reduction in the personal income tax;
- a 100 percent return to business through a reduction in the marginal rates of the corporate income tax; or
- a 40/60 split to consumers and businesses, in proportion to their shares of energy use, through tax rate reductions.

Figure 16: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Sensitivity of GDP to Revenue Recycling Options



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

According to the IAT analysis, the revenues generated from the implementation of this policy have the most positive effect when returned through either the deficit reduction plan, grandfathered permits, or to business through lower taxes. Revenue recycled to consumers, in either case, result in a greater and longer-term reductions in GDP, when measured against the baseline, but would have correspondingly lower impacts on consumption.

The revenue recycling options that lead to better economic outcomes are all those associated with greater investment and capital formation. Deficit reduction leads to lower interest rates, which lowers the cost of capital and facilitates investment. Recycling revenues to companies has the effect of increasing savings through apparent profits and provides the wherewithal for greater investment spending. Similarly, grandfathering permits to producers allows them to "assetize" their right to produce emissions. This allows firms to realize gains on this "right" and again provides the wherewithal to invest.

Peak GDP losses during the transition period are less severe for the 100 percent to business and 40/60 split when accomplished through reductions in the marginal tax rates, (about 0.7 percent in 2005), compared with the other recycling options, (between 0.8 and 1.0 percent in that year).

Figures 17 and 18 demonstrate the effects of revenue recycling on investment and consumption, in relation to the effect on GDP, as shown in the previous figure. As these figures show, the key to economic recovery among the revenue recycling options is to improve investment in the economy.

Figure 17: DRI 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Sensitivity of Investment to Revenue Recycling Options



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figure 18: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading-- Sensitivity of Consumption to Revenue Recycling Options



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

But the economic effects of these recycling options must be separated from the economic effects of carbon limitations *per se*. That is, economic analysis can make the case -- and models are often structured to demonstrate -- that reducing taxes on capital could improve long-term economic performance. In order to separate these effects, the 1990 emissions freeze accompanied by the use of any permit auction revenues to reduce the deficit was compared to a conventional increase in the personal income tax to achieve a comparable level of deficit reduction.

An increase in the personal income tax results in smaller economic losses and a more prompt economic rebound than a "deficit-equivalent" carbon reduction policy, as shown in Figure 19. Thus, while revenue recycling options can affect significantly the outcome of a carbon-reduction policy, the gains they create are unrelated to carbon reduction itself.

Figure 19: DRI-DRI Energy, No International Trading--Comparison of GDP, Recycling Revenue Recycling through Deficit Reduction and a Personal Income Tax Increase



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Technological progress can be very helpful, especially in the long term. In its analysis of technology, the Markal-Macro model was used to determine whether higher levels of energy to GDP (E/GDP) savings are realistic. This analysis assumed two benchmarks for technological progress. In the first, the annual steady-state improvement in the economy's efficient use of energy was increased from the level of 1.0 percent in the AEO97 projections (found in the "no policy" base case) to a level of 1.25 percent. In the second case, this improvement in energy efficiency was increased to 1.75 percent. These two benchmark levels were obtained by examining the historical record and engineering estimates of potential technical progress. The point of the analysis was then to determine not only what effect technical progress might have on the economic effects of climate change policy, but also whether these rates were themselves technically feasible.

According to results from the Markal-Macro model, an improvement in the energy intensity of 0.25 percent annually, or a total annual decline of 1.25 in energy per unit of real output, can be achieved without great difficulty using both off the shelf technologies as well as new technologies that are near commercial viability. For example, such an improvement can be produced if the "hurdle rates" -- that is, the premium that households and firms appear to place in their discount rate when considering energy-efficiency investments -- declines by 81 percent. (For example, the discount rate households use when considering installing better insulation would have to fall from 46 percent to 23 percent). Thus, this improvement can be achieved through diffusion practices even without assuming a higher rate of innovation and technological progress. In fact, some analysts believe that the enactment of the CCAP gets us to the 1.25 annual reduction.

The Markal model demonstrates that the higher technological case -- an increase in the annual rate of improvement in energy-efficiency of 1.75 percent -- is more difficult to achieve. Specifically, this higher level of energy savings cannot be achieved through better diffusion of best technical practices alone. Thus, new innovation must occur if we are to move beyond the 1.25 case. To achieve the 1.75 case, a new set of advanced energy efficiency technologies was added to the pool of technologies. These are part of the DOE research portfolio. Some of these technologies are aggressive in their scope: For example, the average fuel efficiency of new cars entering the vehicle fleet in the year 2020 is 33 miles per gallon in the 1.25 case, but rises to 55 miles per gallon for new cars entering the vehicle fleet in the 1.75 case. They were all deemed viable in an outside peer-review of the DOE program. The IAT will be circulating the technological assumptions necessary to achieve this 1.75 benchmark in a separate paper.

Rather than use the specific technological assumptions developed in Markal, the IAT represented technological progress in the DRI model by targeting a 1.75 percent annual rate of energy improvement in the economy for supply and end-use technologies in all sectors. For residential and commercial sector space heating/cooling and water heating, DRI assumed improved performance and cost characteristics for various heating and cooling equipment types and allowed the model to choose the optimal technologies. The model selects equipment based on life-cycle cost estimates, which include a "first-cost bias" that weights up-front capital costs more heavily than future fuel costs. This is comparable to the higher discount rates used in Markal.

For all other residential and commercial sector energy end-uses, the DRI model uses estimates of the average efficiency of all new and retrofit equipment purchases to determine fuel use requirements. These average efficiencies were increased to reflect improvements to technology performance and higher rates of diffusion for more efficient technologies. No changes were made to the rates of capital stock turnover and replacement.

Table 10 summarizes the effects of higher technological progress (that is, the 1.75 percent annual rate versus the 1.25 annual rate) on the economic effects of carbon-limiting policies. As seen, higher rates of technological progress can dramatically cut the implicit price of carbon and the associated transitional GDP losses. In the IAT "starting point" case (assuming 1.25 percent annual efficiency improvements), the implicit price of carbon in the three models is \$95, \$81 and \$145 per ton in 2010 and \$125, \$106 and \$130 per ton in 2020, for DRI, SGM, and Markal-Macro respectively. In the more advanced technology case, the implicit price of carbon is \$88, \$53, and \$77 per ton in 2010 and \$30, \$51, and \$35 per ton in 2020, for DRI, SGM and Markal-Macro respectively.[4]

[4] SGM applied the rate of carbon-efficiency for purposes of modeling technological improvement in energy-efficiency because it is easier for SGM to manage C/GDP than E/GDP. Carbon to GDP is an equally appropriate target and the differences in the results of the two specifications is not large.

Table 10: Sensitivity of Implicit Price of Carbon (1995$) to Rate of Technological Change --1990 Level Case, No International Trading

	2010		2020	
	1.25 Case	1.75 Case	1.25 Case	1.75 Case
DRI-DRI Energy	95	88	125	30
SGM	81	53	106	51
Markal-Macro	145	77	130	35

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for deficit reduction. DRI permit prices are generated using the annual rate of change in E/GDP. SGM uses a similar rate of change in C/GDP.

The peak GDP losses change accordingly, as shown in Figure 20. Using the DRI model, the peak output loss of -0.6 percent occurs in 2005, and the economy reaches its pre-policy growth path by 2012. The economy's shift to a higher growth path is also more pronounced, but here the result is more believable, because it is achieved through technological progress rather than revenue recycling that raises savings and fosters investment (in fact, the level of revenue recycling falls dramatically along with the implicit price of carbon).

The risk, however, is that these output gains may be somewhat overstated, because they do not account for the cost of the investments needed to reach the higher rate of technological progress. For example, firms will have to perform R&D that might distract them from other R&D tasks. If other R&D in the economy fell as energy- and carbon-related R&D was performed, overall productivity could drop and offset the economy's potential growth elsewhere. Alternatively, firms might increase total R&D effort, but leave the economy with fewer resources to do other things. While it is likely that these effects are second-order when compared to the effects of the improvement in carbon-related efficiency, they are still absent from the analysis.

Figure 20: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Sensitivity of GDP to the Rate of Technological Progress



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues used for deficit reduction.

These results indicate how important technological progress especially in the long term. A substantially higher rate of technological progress will improve short-term results. But it is capable of moving the analysis significantly once its effects are allowed to accumulate.

Reducing carbon emissions would also reduce other pollutants leading to direct economic benefit. The release of CO_2 is inherent in the activity of burning fossil fuel under current technologies. When CO_2 emissions in the utility, industrial boiler, and transportation sectors are reduced--either by using less fuel or by altering the mix of fuels--emissions of nitrogen oxides (NO_X) and sulfur dioxide (SO_2) are also reduced. In the atmosphere, NO_x and SO_2 react with ammonia to form ammonium nitrate and ammonium sulfate--significant components of fine particulate matter ($PM_{2.5}$), which may cause significant respiratory health problems and mortality.[5]
To investigate this effect, the NEMS model was used to estimate SO_2 and No_x emissions from electricity generation. When emissions are frozen at 1990 levels without trading, NEMS estimates decreases in utility NO_x and SO_2 emissions of 60 percent 47 percent, respectively in 2010.

The NEMS model provided emissions for each of the thirteen NERC regions. These results were then translated into disaggregated county level emissions by calibrating the NEMS results to the county specific data from EPA's National Particulate Inventory. The results were then fed through EPA's climatological regional dispersion model, which calculates the resulting air quality changes for each county. Finally, these results were used to estimate health and welfare effects of air pollution using EPA methodology developed under Section 812 of the Clean Air Act Amendments and reviewed and endorsed by EPA's Science Advisory Board.

Health benefits from reducing utility NO_x and SO_2 emissions in the "starting point" stabilization case include avoided mortality, avoided cases of chronic bronchitis, reduced acute bronchitis, fewer upper and lower respiratory symptoms, and a decline in lost work days. The results are very sensitive to the value attributed to avoided mortality, here estimated at $5 million per episode. When monetized these benefits could have a mean value of over $4 billion per quad of coal based energy generation. Assuming the estimated 7 quad reduction found by DRI (in Table 4), this would yield benefits of about $30 billion.

NOTE TO READERS: The IAT has not yet quantified the NO_x and SO_2 emission reductions from the industrial and transportation sectors or estimated the reduction in emissions of other criteria air pollutants--e.g., carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds.

[5] This analysis assumes that no new regulations to control criteria air pollutants would be implemented at the Federal or state level. It is important to note that actions are being considered at the Federal and state levels, including proposed new National Ambient Air Quality Standards, the Clean Air Policy Initiative, and new State Implementation Plans, that could reduce NO_x and SO_2 emissions from utilities over the next decade independently of controlling CO_2 emissions.

The losses experienced by the United States by handicapping energy-intensive industries in international trade need not be large. There is widespread and legitimate concern that forcing an implicit energy price increase on U.S. producers will disadvantage them substantially through trade, particularly with those countries outside of Annex I that might not be subject to the same emissions limits. The IAT used the DRI model to examine the overall trade implications of such a possible energy price differential. Industry trade results are discussed in the Industry Results section of this report.

The DRI model examines overall trade effects by assuming a rate at which producers who export to the U.S. experience cost increases. In the aggregate, about 60 percent of imports of manufactured goods come from Annex I countries that will also experience higher implicit carbon prices (and, therefore, energy prices). The DRI model, therefore, assumes that manufactured imports, in general rise by an average of 60 percent of the full cost increase experienced by U.S. manufacturers.

This assumption, however, can be criticized as being too favorable to U.S. producers. If exporters from non-Annex I countries do not experience the cost increase that Annex I producers do, then they will no doubt substitute their production for Annex I production. Given this likely switching of export sources, the DRI model was also run with the assumption that foreign producers experience a cost increase equal to, on average, 30 percent as opposed to 60 percent of the U.S. cost increase.

Figure 21 presents the results under these two cases. The effect of the carbon-limiting policy on trade is depicted in these runs as surprisingly small. Some of the change in trade flows is reconciled in the DRI model by allowing the exchange rate to move, but as seen in Figure 22, the anticipated changes in the exchange rate themselves are not large and do not vary between the two assumptions. The small differences are not necessarily counterintuitive. There are already substantial energy price differences and differing environmental restrictions among trading nations that are larger than the price increase that results from the policies considered here.

This aggregate treatment does not capture the effects that <u>might</u> be borne by specific industries due to their varying energy intensities. This more detailed examination is presented in Table 13, in the section on industry effects

Figure 21: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Sensitivity of the Trade Balance to International Price Ratio Assumptions



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figure 22: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Sensitivity of the Exchange Rate to International Price Ratio Assumptions



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 Revenues used deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Alternative views about Federal Reserve policy can yield significantly different results. The Federal Reserve reaction function in the DRI model is an empirically derived estimation of likely Federal Reserve policy responses to changes in price inflation and the unemployment rate, among other variables. It is seen by DRI as the best proxy for Fed decisions in the model simulations. In essence, the reaction function will abate unemployment unless doing so would lead to high rates of inflation. This reaction function was used in the analysis as the default setting for the assessment of the alternative target profiles and implementation strategies. This section reports on a set of sensitivity analyses which consider different Federal Reserve actions: maintaining *nominal* non-borrowed reserves at baseline levels, and a case where *real* non-borrowed reserves are held at baseline. As can be seen from Figure 23, the effects of the alternative monetary policy assumptions are substantial.

If the Federal Reserve maintains nominal reserves at baseline, the size of the GDP loss is approximately doubled, from a 1 percent peak loss when the reaction function is on to just over 2 percent peak loss when more restrictive policies are pursued. There is essentially no difference between holding nominal non-borrowed reserves constant and holding real non-borrowed reserves constant. (The level of non-borrowed reserves in the banking system is an important Federal Reserve policy. If the Fed chooses to hold nominal reserves constant, then the funds that banks have to lend goes down when inflation rises. If real reserves are held constant, banks can lend more if prices go up.)

The sensitivity cases presented here, however, focus only on using the collected funds to reduce the federal deficit. The lower deficit (or greater surplus) makes it easier for the Fed to ease credit conditions without making inflation worse (indeed, as shown in Figure 5 inflation subsides by 2009 and inflation thereafter is lower than in the base case).The Federal Reserve can therefore do much to ease the economic transition in such an environment. But, the impact of the Federal Reserve reaction function fundamentally depends on how revenue recycling policy affects price inflation and the unemployment rate. In cases where price inflation remains high and unemployment losses are lower, the reaction function would ease credit conditions at a slower rate, and the divergence between the reaction function results and the nominal reserves at base case may be much smaller.

Figure 23: DRI-DRI Energy, No International Trading-- Sensitivity of GDP to Federal Reserve Policy Assumptions



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figures 24, 25, and 26 show projections of the Federal Funds Rate, the 10-year Long Term Bond Rate, and the Federal Deficit/Surplus, respectively, from the DRI model with the Federal Reaction Function used in the analysis of the 1990 Level Case, No International Trading ("starting point"). These results show how important the treatment of revenue flows is in the DRI model. Substantial declines in the deficit (these runs were produced before the agreement to balance the budget in 2002 was achieved in May) allow interest rates to fall, which is the key to the economy's investment response.

Figure 24: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading-- Real Federal Funds Rate



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figure 25: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading-- Real 10 Year Long-Term Bond Rate



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figure 26: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Path of the U.S. Federal Deficit/Surplus



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

The results presented in the sections below on "Industry Results" and "Regional and Employment Effects" do not include cross-border emissions trading. The IAT is in the process of generating industry and regional results based on using implicit carbon prices from SGM Annex I trading results to simulate macro economic conditions for the DRI model, which will extend the final section of the core results to the industry and regional levels.

Industry Results

Using the DRI model, the IAT examined both the industry impacts and the impacts to regional employment associated with carbon-limiting policies. Regional impacts are discussed in the next section of the report. Table 11 provides impacts to the energy producing industries and to industries that are considered to be energy intensive. Table 12 lists the industries with the greatest increase from base case output and the largest decline from base case output in 2010.

Different energy models place different emphasis on three strategies for coping with energy price increases, with corresponding differences in projected fossil fuel impacts. These strategies include increased end-use efficiency, reduced end-use activity, or fuel-switching towards an increased market share of low- and no- carbon fuels. Increased end-use efficiency or reduced end-use activity tends to lower overall fuel demand, while fuel-switching favors low- and no-carbon fuels, such as natural gas and renewable energy, relative to high carbon fuels such as coal.

The DRI energy model results (reported here) emphasize improved efficiency and reduced end-use activity. In this model, stabilization reduces the use of all fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) relative to baseline levels. In contrast, for example, the NEMS results rely more heavily on fuel switching opportunities in the utility and transportation sectors, as well as efficiency improvements in cars. The NEMS stabilization runs show greater reductions in coal use than the DRI runs, but natural gas use actually increases relative to baseline due to fuel switching and a higher level of end-use energy demand.

Table 11: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading
Impact on the Output of Energy Producing Industries and Energy Intensive Industries
(percent change from the base case)

	2010		2020	
	No trading	With International Trading	No trading	With International Trading
Energy Producers				
Electric Utilities	-11.6%	n/a	-17.7%	n/a
Petroleum Refining	-8.8%	n/a	-9.3%	n/a
Coal Mining	-25.9%	n/a	-39.3%	n/a
Natural Gas	-19.9%	n/a	-18.2%	n/a
Gas Utilities	-11.4%	n/a	-10.9%	n/a
Crude Petroleum	-11.8%	n/a	-12.4%	n/a
Fuel Oil	-13.6%	n/a	-16.7%	n/a
"Pipelines, ex. Natural Gas"	-7.8%	n/a	-8.0%	n/a
Energy Intensive Industries				
Food and Kindred Products	-0.9%	n/a	0.2%	n/a
Chemical and Allied Products	-1.9%	n/a	-1.6%	n/a
Petroleum and Coal Products	-9.2%	n/a	-10.0%	n/a
Stone, Glass, and Clay Products	0.8%	n/a	2.3%	n/a
Paper and Allied Products	-0.6%	n/a	0.4%	n/a
Primary Metals	-1.0%	n/a	-1.0%	n/a

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010 with a 10 year phase-in. Revenues are used for Federal deficit reduction, assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP. Estimates for the international trading scenario are forthcoming.

Energy intensive industries are put at a disadvantage by higher implicit prices for fossil fuels following the imposition of policy. This occurs because they are displaced through trade -- an effect that DRI depicts as relatively minor -- or because the composition of the economy's output changes in favor of less energy-intensive goods and services. These composition shifts drive the industry results. For some industries, however, composition may shift in favor of energy intensive industries because the economy's composition shifts from consumption to investment, which calls up a different mix of goods itself.

For example, a number of energy intensive manufacturing and construction sectors benefit in the long-term by the stimulus to investment created by the reduction of the deficit. Table 12 shows that 6 of the top 10 industries, in terms of output increasing above the base case, are directly or indirectly related to construction, which reflect the increase to the investment component of the economy. Figures 27 and 28 show the short-term output losses and the long-term output gains of a number of these industries.

On the other hand, industries whose production is used primarily for consumption, particularly energy products such as petroleum and coal, but also including paper, chemicals, and food and kindred products, continue to show losses in annual output. The energy producing industries show losses in output from between 8 percent for pipelines and 26 percent for coal mining. Consumer non-durable goods producing industries show losses of output that ranges from 1 percent for food processing to 10 percent for rubber and plastic footwear. In the longer-term, other than the energy producers, the consumption-oriented industries are expected to just about reach their output levels in the baseline.

This mix effect is particularly and obviously important for energy producers. The DRI model suggests output of petroleum products will decline by 9 percent in 2010 and in 2020, when compared to the base case. As seen in Table 12, coal production in the United States will be 26 percent lower in 2010 and 39 percent lower in 2020 when compared to its projected levels in the base case.

Figure 27: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Output in Key Industries--New Construction, Mill and Wood Products, Veneer and Plywood, and Concrete and Gypsum



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Figure 28: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Output in Key Industries--Motor Vehicles, Steel and Mill Products, Structural Metal and Plate Work, Aircraft, Aluminum



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Mining (including coal, oil, and natural gas extraction) employment would be 6 percent and 7 percent lower, respectively, in 2010 and 2020: these declines are lower than output losses because productivity in the industry is generally anticipated to improve and the nation's coal mix is projected to shift to more productive coal reserves. These employment losses are particularly severe in the east and west south central regions.

Electric utilities experience smaller percentage reductions in output, but their losses are larger in dollar terms. Utility output declines by about $30 billion in 2010 and $52 billion in 2020 when compared to the base case. Petroleum refining and coal mining also experience larger losses than other energy-related industries on a dollar basis.

Table 12: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading Impacts on the Output of Selected Industries (percent change from the base case)

	2010	2020
Industries with the Largest Percent Increase in Output		
Aircraft	3.0	3.7
Truck Trailers	3.0	3.7
New Construction	2.8	5.4
Truck and Bus Bodies	2.7	3.5
Partitions and Fixtures	2.5	3.9
Lawn and Garden Equipment	2.3	3.3
Elevators and Materials Handling Equipment	2.3	2.8
Structural Metal Products	2.2	2.9
Concrete and Gypsum	2.1	4.3
Plumbing and Heating Equipment	2.1	4.0
Packaging Machinery	2.1	2.7
Industries with the Largest Percent Decline in Output*		
Rubber and Plastic Footwear	-10.3	-3.9
Nonferrous Metals	-3.2	-5.4
Household Audio and Video Equipment	-3.2	-6.1
Chemical and Fertilizer Mining	-3.1	-3.3
Watches and Clocks	-2.8	-4.9
Iron and Ferroalloy Ores	-2.6	-2.8
Other Leather Goods	-2.5	0.4
Nonferrous Wire and Cable	-2.5	-2.8
Misc. Nonferrous Ores	-2.3	-3.7
Industrial Organic and Inorg. Chemicals	-2.2	-2.1
Computers	-2.1	-6.1

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.
* Excluding energy producing sectors.

As discussed earlier, the DRI model found that the effect of a carbon-limiting policy on international trade is relatively small across all industries. However, as Table 13 shows, the trade impact on some specific industries are relatively large. For example, imports by the cement industry increase by 13 percent and exports are off by 3 percent, a net trade loss of 16 percent. Steel imports increase by almost 7 percent while its exports are cut by about 1 percent, a net trade loss of about 7 percent. On the other hand, fuel oil imports decline by about 39 percent, while exports increase by about 1 percent, a net trade gain of 40 percent. Imports for the industries listed in this table generally increase, while exports decline slightly.

Table 13: DRI-DRI Energy, 1990 Level Case, No International Trading Effects on Exports and Imports in 2010 (percent change from base case)

	Imports	Exports
Paper and Allied Products		
Pulp Mills	0.9%	0.1%
Paper and Paperboard Mills	2.3%	-0.5%
Paperboard Boxes and Containers	1.6%	-0.2%
Paper Coating and Laminating	1.2%	0.1%
Sanitary Paper Products	0.8%	0.3%
Chemical and Allied Products		
Industrial Inorg. and Organic Chemicals	3.6%	-1.0%
Fertilizers	5.3%	-2.0%
Pesticides and Agr. Chemicals	0.2%	0.4%
Petroleum and Coal Products		
Petroleum Refining	-7.7%	0.5%
Fuel Oil	-38.6%	0.6%
Stone, Glass, and Clay Products		
Cement	13.3%	-2.8%
Concrete and Gypsum	5.3%	-0.2%
Cut Stone and Lime	7.4%	-1.1%
Primary Metals		
Steel and Mill Products	6.6%	-1.4%
Iron and Steel Foundries	2.7%	0.0%
Iron and Steel Forgings	3.6%	-0.1%
Aluminum	3.8%	-0.5%
Transportation Equipment		
Truck and Bus Bodies	3.4%	0.1%
Truck Trailers	4.7%	0.0%
Motor Vehicles	3.1%	-0.1%
Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories	1.4%	-0.1%
Aircraft	3.0%	3.7%
Aircraft and Missile Engines and Parts	1.5%	2.5%
Computer and Electronic Equipment		
Computers	2.7%	-0.8%
Computer Peripheral Equipment	2.3%	-0.2%
Semiconductors	0.3%	-0.6%

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Regional and Employment Effects

The effects of climate change policy on the various regions of the country are shown in Table 14. In general, states in the East North Central, East South Central, and West North Central regions will have proportionally greater losses in population, 150-, 125-, and 75-thousand, respectively, and employment, 210-, 165-, and 125-thousand, respectively, than the other regions of the country. See Figures 29 and 30. Total non-farm employment loss due to the climate change policy is about 900 thousand in 2005 compared with the baseline total non-farm employment of

135.3 million in that year. In 2010, total non-farm employment loss due to the climate change policy is only 400 thousand, compared with the baseline total non-farm employment of 140.9 million, as the economy starts to recover. The New England, Middle Atlantic, and the Pacific Southwest are expected to show long-term gains in population of 125-, 110-, and 130 thousand, respectively, and in employment of 125-, 45-, and 65-thousand, respectively, because of climate change policy implementation.

Figure 29: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading-- Population by Region (change from the base case)



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

The key to the regional effects relies on how revenue raised through permit sales is recycled to the economy. In the policy reviewed for regional effects, revenues are used to reduce the Federal budget deficit, which supports savings and, thus, increases investment. The climate change policy favors those states where production in industries support investment in structures and capital goods equipment, and of course, those areas of the country that are not as dependent on fossil fuel production. The climate change policy's effects are mitigated in those regions whose mix of industries favor investment goods industries and where the levels of industry production are large and can absorb the losses in production in industries that produce consumer goods.

Figure 30: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading--Total Non-Farm Employment by Region (change from the base case)



Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

As shown in Table 14, although the West South Central region is expected to have the greatest losses in fossil fuel employment, about 15 thousand in 2010, this represents only about 6 percent of its total mining employment in that year. On the other hand, the East South Central Region is expected to lose about 8 thousand in 2010, but this represents about 22 percent of its total fossil fuel employment in the same year.

Table 14: DRI-DRI Energy 1990 Level Case, No International Trading Regional Impacts

Year	New England	Middle Atlantic	South Atlantic	East North Central	East South Central	West North Central	West South Central	Pacific North-west	Pacific Southwest
				Disposable Income, % change from the base case					
2005	0.9	0.4	-0.1	-0.4	-0.5	-0.7	-0.2	0.3	0.3
2010	1.9	0.7	-0.1	-1.1	-1.3	-1.2	-0.4	1.1	0.6
2020	2.9	0.9	0.1	-1.4	-1.5	-1.9	-0.7	1.4	0.7
				Total Non-farm employment, % change from the base case					
2005	0.3	-0.4	-0.8	-1.0	-1.3	-0.9	-0.8	-0.4	-0.4
2010	1.7	0.3	-0.4	-1.1	-1.8	-0.8	-0.7	0.8	0.3
2020	2.7	0.5	-0.2	-1.1	-1.7	-0.9	-0.8	1.1	0.5%
				Mining, Oil, and Gas Employment, % change from the base case					
2005	0.4	-8.5	-8.3	-5.9	-10.9	-0.8	-1.4	-2.1	-0.9
2010	4.4	-10.9	-11.6	-7.8	-20.5	1.0	-6.4	-1.1	0.8
2020	9.0	-14.0	-15.6	-6.2	-27.8	4.3	-4.8	-8.3	0.6
				Population, change from the base case (millions)					
2005	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2010	0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.1
2020	0.3	0.2	0.0	-0.3	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.2
				Manufacturing Employment, change from the base case (thousands)					
2005	9.6	1.7	-32.5	-77.1	-24.7	-19.5	-21.5	-1.0	-0.6
2010	26.5	21.7	-28.4	-116.1	-32.5	-28.3	-28.5	6.7	17.3
2020	36.9	13.9	-33.8	-142.5	-32.7	-35.3	-41.8	7.3	23.9
				Transportation, Communication & Utilities, change from the base case (thousands)					
2005	1.7	-4.1	-12.1	-15.5	-4.9	-8.1	-8.7	-1.6	-6.5
2010	5.7	-2.9	-16.5	-25.9	-9.4	-13.5	-14.9	0.3	-5.5
2020	8.4	-4.8	-18.1	-31.8	-10.0	-16.1	-17.9	0.4	-5.4

Note: Emissions stabilized at 1990 levels in 2010. Revenues used for Federal deficit reduction and assuming a 1.25 percent annual decrease in E/GDP.

Appendix Table A: Assumptions Regarding Non-Carbon Greenhouse Gases (million metric tons of carbon equivalent)

	1900	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Baseline Emissions							
CH4	169	178	150	152	152	154	155
HFC PFC	24	n/a	42	69	91	115	133
N2O	37	34	31	32	34	36	37
Sinks	-136	-128	-121	-120	-119	-111	-103
Total	95	n/a	102	133	158	194	223
Cost Effective Reductions in Emissions (assuming an implicit price of carbon of $70 per ton)							
CH4					27	29	29
HFC PFC					51	75	110
N2O					4	4	4
Sinks				7	15	15	15
Total Reduction					97	123	159
Emissions with Cost Effective Reductions							
CH4	169	178	150	152	125	126	126
HFC PFC	24	n/a	42	69	40	41	23
N2O	37	34	31	32	30	31	33
Sinks	-136	-128	-121	-120	-134	-126	-118
Total Other Gas Emissions	95	n/a	102	133	61	71	64
Reductions Below 1990 Levels					34	23	31

Note: Million metric ton of carbon equivalent calculated using 100 year Global Warming Potentials (GWP) (IPCC. 1995). The $70 per ton implicit price of carbon was an estimate used by the IAT prior to generating implicit price of carbon using the IAT models.