

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Date 9/4

To: Rahm
Bruce Reed
Dan Kerrick
From: The Staff Secretary

Should this have a cover
memo on it before it goes to
POTUS?

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Washington, D.C. 20503

September 3, 1998

Personnel

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM BARRY McCaffrey

98 SEP 3 PM 1:53

SUBJECT: Organizing Drug Control Efforts along the Southwest Border

1. **PURPOSE.** The purpose of this memorandum is to update you on ONDCP's views of the challenges facing our drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border and our ideas for improving coordination among the twenty-three federal agencies involved in drug-control operations there. The enclosed *White Paper* and *Concept for Analysis* outline the general problem and offer specific suggestions for consideration by your Drug Policy Council. We intend to present a coordinated set of recommendations for your consideration this fall.

2. **CHALLENGES.** The drug-control challenges we face along the Southwest Border, though severe, are not insurmountable. About 60 percent of the cocaine entering the U.S. does so across this border, yet seizures in the border region are declining. Total 1998 cocaine seizures are projected to be less than half of the annual average seized between 1991 and 1996 and account for just a fifth of the cocaine crossing the border. Heroin seizures have declined by about a third since 1996. Over the past several years, the general trend has been one of fewer seizures of all drugs except marijuana. Our visits last month to San Diego and El Paso reinforced our belief that immediate action must be taken to address the following issues:


- **Drug smugglers coordinate their efforts.** Anecdotal evidence and seizure data in El Paso reveals that when met with resistance smugglers simply shift their methods and routes at the ports of entry (POEs) and between the POEs.
- **One agency's success will inadvertently and directly impact other agencies.** Border officials stated that an increase in inspection efforts at a POE, for example, often resulted in greater challenges for Border Patrol personnel between POEs.
- **The lack of communication and information sharing is a serious problem.** If a Border Patrol officer needs immediate assistance from a member of US Customs, he would have to radio his communications center which would then contact US Customs communications by telephone. US Customs communications would then radio their personnel to assist the Border Patrol officer. This time consuming process puts agents at risk.
- **Border Patrol, Customs, Coast Guard, National Guard, and other government personnel often use outdated technology.** In many instances, line personnel have been using obsolescent equipment for years, one explanation of the insufficient results.

3. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE. The enclosed ONDCP White Paper contains specific recommendations to attain the following objectives:

- **Ensure the rule of law along the entire border.** Federal drug control agencies must be prepared to quickly deploy resources to reinforce states and localities threatened by traffickers.
- **Control and interdict drugs along the entire border at all times.** We must develop the capacity to control the entire border at all times, preventing traffickers from merely shifting their operations to avoid detection and capture
- **Act in a coherent and coordinated manner that uses the counter-drug capabilities of each agency to the fullest extent available and builds upon our strengths.** No one element of the federal government can alone solve the problem of drug trafficking across the Southwest Border. Only by using the resources of all our agencies in a coordinated fashion can we build a border infrastructure that will defeat the flow of drugs.
- **Organize counter-drug efforts for accountability, responsibility and success.** We need to designate a federal officer who will be responsible for all counter-drug efforts along the border. We must also establish Counter-Drug Operations Coordinators at each POE (e.g., Customs) and for each sector between POEs (e.g., Border Patrol).
- **Harness counter-drug technology.** We must develop and deploy advanced technologies that increase detection rates of drugs and other contraband while facilitating the rapid flow of economic traffic.
- **Work cooperatively with Mexico.** We must work in partnership with Mexico to jointly confront drug-related corruption and violence, while acting in absolute deference to sovereign national responsibilities on both sides of the border.

4. CONCLUSION. The fourth goal of your *1998 National Drug Control Strategy* is to "Shield America's air, land, and sea frontier from the drug threat." Over the past five years, your Administration has invested heavily in anti-drug programs to secure the two-thousand mile border with Mexico. As a result, Customs' budget for Southwest Border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93. The number of assigned DEA special agents has increased 37 percent while the number of assigned INS agents has almost doubled. The enclosed ONDCP White Paper suggests how better coordination can dramatically improve the effectiveness of our collective efforts. We look forward to submitting a detailed proposal for your consideration this fall.

Very respectfully,



Barry P. McCaffrey
Director



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

September 3, 1998

Concept for Analysis

Organizing Counter-Drug Efforts Along the Southwest Border

- I. **Long-standing problem.** Since the 1980s, a number of analyses and reports have identified the need to improve our Southwest Border counter-drug efforts through the following actions:
- Need for an interagency structure which can adequately mobilize and commit the talents and resources of the nation to meet the border-control challenge;
 - Need for closer coordination among Border Patrol, Customs, INS, and other agencies to ensure that the optimum uniformed presence is dedicated to the interdiction effort at and between the Ports of Entry (POEs) along the borders;
 - Need guidelines to ensure a cohesive collection effort;
 - Need for improved human intelligence;
 - Need for interagency cooperation in our embassies;
 - Need to encourage intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state and local levels;
 - Need to combine foreign intelligence with domestic information to target drug trafficking organizations.
- II. **Imperatives for improving counter-drug efforts along the Southwest Border.**
- A. **General Trends.** Three major trends have complicated efforts to stop drug trafficking across the Southwest Border:
1. **Incompatible communications systems.** Operational units must be able to communicate with higher headquarters, with other units and with sources of information. Too many of our systems are either operating in isolation or are dependent upon jerry-rigged solutions.
 2. **Lack of timely intelligence in the right hands.** Separate agencies collecting intelligence often do not share information that may be relevant for another agency. At the same time, agencies are sometimes unable to internally disseminate intelligence within their own organization in time to stop a shipment. Information must be made available to all involved law enforcement agencies in time to stop shipments of drugs.

3. **Lack of efficient non-intrusive inspection technology to screen cross-border traffic and detect drugs.** Currently there are only three truck scanners in place along the border. Traffickers quickly adjust to the construction of such devices, and shift drugs elsewhere. We must develop, test and field technology that can detect drugs while not hindering legitimate commerce.

B. Southwest Border drug interdiction failure. Our efforts to date have not yielded the benefits we had hoped for with the exception of marijuana, though early 1998 seizure data are showing improvements:

- In 1997, we inspected 1.09 million of the 3.54 million commercial trucks and railcars that crossed into the US from Mexico. In just 6 incidents, cocaine was found within the commercial cargo contained by these trucks and railcars.
- Cocaine seizures declined steadily between 1994 and 1997.
- Heroin seizures are down from 1996's record level.
- Methamphetamine seizures in 1997 were 36 percent lower than in 1996.
- Cocaine seizures as a result of investigations in 1997 were about one eighth of what they were in 1994.
- Cocaine seizures between POEs (not including traffic checkpoints) declined by 90 percent between 1995 and 1997.
- Despite resource enhancements at the Southwest border in recent years, approximately 80 percent of the cocaine destined for the United States through Mexico still crosses the border undetected.

These interdiction trends indicate a challenge posed by drug traffickers that is not being adequately met by our drug control system.

III. The Response. For the last three years, the many federal agencies involved in law enforcement, commerce and transportation along our border have been engaged in a process to determine how we can best fulfill these anti-drug imperatives. The Attorney General and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce, Defense, and Transportation, and the leadership of the DEA, the Border Patrol, Customs, and the INS have been integral to this effort. Our common response is to create a Southwest Border Counter-Drug White Paper for approval by the President during the fall of 1998.

A. The Southwest Border counter-drug principles. Three core U.S. principles guide all our efforts:

1. **Maintain deference to the U.S. Constitution.** Maintain the proper balance of federalism. Maintain respect for civil liberties and rights. No U.S. militarization of the border.

2. Respect Mexican sovereignty.

3. Maintain the benefits of NAFTA trade and the enormously increased flow of commerce between our nations.

B. The Southwest Border counter-drug objectives. There are six counter-drug objectives to be achieved:

1. Ensure the rule of law along the entire border. Federal drug control agencies must be prepared to quickly deploy resources to reinforce states and localities threatened by traffickers.

2. Control and interdict drugs along the entire border at all times: We must develop the capacity to control the entire border at all times, preventing traffickers from merely shifting their operations to avoid detection and capture. Build over time a high technology Customs Service and a 20,000+ person Border Patrol, with 500+ miles of fencing, anti-intrusion sensors and supporting infrastructure.

3. Act in a coherent and coordinated manner that uses the counter-drug capabilities of each agency to the fullest extent available and builds on our strengths. No one element of the federal government can alone solve the problem of drug trafficking across the Southwest Border. Only by using the resources of all our agencies, can we build a border infrastructure that will defeat the flow of drugs.

4. Organize counter-drug efforts for accountability, responsibility and success.

a. Establish a Southwest Border Counter-Drug Coordinator.

- One federal officer responsible for all counter-drug efforts along the border.
- Presidential appointee; 4 year term; Senate confirmed.
- Small staff -- Southwest Border Counter-Drug Coordinating Authority (drawn from existing capabilities).
- Located on the Border (El Paso: geographic center; already EPIC hub for intelligence, Operation Alliance and JTF-6 for military support).
- Authority to review and integrate Southwest Border drug policy, procedures, budget and resource levels, construction and control of infrastructure, and intelligence.
- Authority to request redeployment of counter-drug interdiction resources from federal officials.

b. Establish Counter-Drug Operations Coordinators at POEs (leadership- Customs).

- Oversee all counter-drug policy, procedures, and intelligence at their assigned POE.
- Authority for direct coordination of resources and infrastructure.
- Responsible for coordinating with state and local U.S. counter-drug authorities and serving as liaison with counterpart Mexican authorities at their POE.

c. Establish Counter-Drug Operations Coordinators for each sector between POEs (leadership- Border Patrol).

- Oversee all counter-drug policy, procedures and intelligence along their assigned sector.
- Authority for direct coordination of resources and infrastructure.
- Responsible for coordinating with state and local U.S. counter-drug authorities and serving as liaison with counterpart Mexican authorities within their sector.

d. Train border counter-drug law enforcement agents, officers and officials. Joint training will integrate and coordinate counter-drug efforts.

5. Harness counter-drug technology.

- a. Develop and deploy advanced technologies that will increase the probability of detecting drugs and other contraband while facilitating the rapid flow of economic traffic.
- b. Increase the number of counter-drug technology-assisted inspections.
- c. Intercept illegal drug money, weapons, and precursor chemicals.

6. Work cooperatively with Mexico. We are committed to working in partnership with Mexico to jointly confront drug-related corruption and violence, while acting in absolute deference to sovereign national responsibilities on both sides of the border.

*Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along
the United States Southwest Border*



**AN ONDCP
WHITE PAPER**

September 3, 1998



**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY**

Washington, D.C. 20503

**WHITE PAPER
September 3, 1998**

**SUBJECT: Organizing Drug Control Efforts Along the United States
Southwest Border**

1. GENERAL.

a. Purpose. This White Paper is intended to present ideas for improving the coordination of activities of federal drug-control program agencies along the Southwest Border (SWB). It sets the stage for the implementation of follow-on actions that are designed to make it increasingly difficult for illegal drugs to flow through Mexico to the United States. The intent is to decrease the incidence of illegal drug use throughout the United States. Although the Southwest Border is where most of the drugs cross into the United States, their ultimate destination is the heartland of America, the cities, suburbs, and rural communities across the country where the drugs are retailed in local markets. By curtailing the flow across the SWB, we in fact decrease the prevalence of drugs throughout the United States and greatly reduce the corruption and violence that threaten communities on both sides of the border. The purpose of this White Paper is to:

- (1) Outline drug-control problems along the SWB.
- (2) Provide recommended coordinated responses to drug-control problems for interagency approval.
- (3) Propose a time-line for implementation of these drug-control recommendations.

b. Objectives. Drug-control objectives along the Southwest Border include:

(1) Near-Term.

- (a) Develop a recommended Southwest Border drug-control strategy for presentation to the President's Drug Policy Council and POTUS by fall 1998.
- (b) Gain interagency approval for development of an effective, coordinated response to drug-control challenges along the SWB.
- (c) Begin implementation of Counter-drug Intelligence Architecture Review Committee recommendations.

(2) Mid Term.

- (a) Implement 1st generation high-technology non-intrusive inspection mechanisms at all 24 POEs for the U.S. Customs Service.

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- (b) Build a 10,000 person Border Patrol** with 200 miles of Southwest Border fencing and anti-intrusion sensors with supporting infrastructure.
- (c) Reduce the rate at which illegal drugs successfully enter the United States** across the Southwest Border by 10 percent by the year 2002.
- (d) Continue accelerated implementation of Counter-drug Intelligence Architecture Review Committee recommendations.**

(3) Long Term.

- (a) Field multiple system 2nd generation high-technology non-intrusive inspection mechanisms at all 24 POEs.**
 - (b) Complete an integrated C3I structure for the SWB.**
 - (c) Build a 20,000 person Border Patrol** with 500 miles of Southwest Border fencing and anti-intrusion sensors with supporting infrastructure.
 - (d) Complete a maritime surveillance system** for the Gulf and Pacific flank zones.
 - (e) Complete implementation of Counter-drug Intelligence Architecture Review Committee recommendations.**
 - (f) Reduce the rate at which illegal drugs successfully enter the United States** across the Southwest Border by 80 percent by the year 2007.
- c. Efficiency in Southwest Border Federal drug-control efforts.** The Southwest Border concept must eliminate unnecessary duplication and overlap of effort among Federal drug-control program agencies.
 - d. U.S. - Mexico relations.** The Southwest Border concept must improve existing cooperative U.S. - Mexican efforts (such as the High Level Contact Group and the Bi-National Task Force) if we are to improve our bilateral ability to significantly curtail the flow of drugs across the SWB.
 - e. Expanded legal commerce.** The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has created an unprecedented expansion of commerce between the United States and Mexico. Effective use of non-intrusive technologies within the framework of an efficient inspection regime can both stop drugs and facilitate legitimate trade.

2. THE NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE.

a. The Environment:

(1) The Southwest Border is the major entry route for illegal drugs. Approximately 50 percent of the cocaine on our streets and large quantities of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine sold in the United States come across the SWB. These drugs enter by all modes of conveyance for eventual distribution throughout the United States. They come through ports of entry by car, truck, train, and pedestrian border-crossers. They come across the open desert in armed pack trains as well as on the backs of human "mules." They are tossed over border fences from urban locale to urban locale, then speeded away surreptitiously by foot and vehicle. Planes and boats find gaps in U.S./Mexican coverage and position drugs close to the Southwest Border for eventual transfer to the United States. Small boats in the Gulf of Mexico and the eastern Pacific also seek to outflank U.S. interdiction efforts and deliver drugs directly to the United States. Finally, traffickers will seek to exploit incidences of corruption in U.S. local, state and Federal border agencies to route illegal drugs and other contraband between our two nations. However, it is a tribute to the vast majority of U.S. Federal, state, and local officials dedicated to the anti-drug effort that their service is overwhelmingly characterized by dedication, integrity, courage and respect for human rights.

(2) Challenges posed by SWB. Drug traffickers exploit extensive legitimate commerce and traffic at the busiest border in the world. During 1996, 254 million people, seventy-five million cars, and 3.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico through thirty-nine crossings and twenty-four ports of entry (POEs). Indeed, most of the more than one-hundred billion dollars of trade that makes Mexico our 2d-largest trading partner crosses the SWB. Illegal drugs comprise but a tiny fraction of this commerce but cause a disproportionate amount of damage to both countries.

In addition to those people who lawfully cross the border, countless other people cross the border illegally, many carrying unlawful drugs or other contraband. Traffickers exploit the border's length (3,326 kilometers), remoteness, ruggedness, and diversity. The diverse terrain includes: urban sprawl that straddles both sides of the international border; hostile, remote, and vast deserts; easily passable terrain (like the Rio Grande); vulnerable air space; and exploitable maritime. Multiple jurisdictions on both sides of the international border exacerbated by the presence of four major urban complexes further complicate organized, coherent efforts to control the border. The centuries-old tradition of smuggling and illegal migration feeds this region's porosity to illegal drugs.

(3) The Southwest Border is more an area of confluence than a line of demarcation. The political boundary between two sovereign and democratic nations need not be a barrier to open, cooperative, and mutually beneficial relations between two peoples. The Southwest Border holds every opportunity for a rich and prosperous confluence

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of two energetic and symbiotic cultures. Both Mexico and the United States can draw from the other to better both of our ways of life.

The essential principle – which must be shared on both sides -- is the rule of law. Both peoples insist on it; both peoples deserve it. Furthermore, since the majority of law derives from national choice – as opposed to international agreement – we must preserve due respect for the sovereignty of nations. A sovereign nation must determine and control under what conditions people and goods may enter into the territory under its authority.

The border between the United States and Mexico is unique. Our two nations share core values that include love of country, strength of family, respect for the law, and a willingness to work hard in order to procure a decent and dignified livelihood. There is no room within our shared values for the corruption and ruin that comes with the illegal drug trade.

b. Evolution of the Drug Problem. Drug traffickers, along with smugglers in general, have long seen the Southwest Border as a natural entry point to the United States because of the relative ease with which the movement of contraband from nation to nation can occur.

(1) Cocaine. When the cocaine epidemic surged in the 1970s, the preferred route for trafficking cocaine was from Colombia through the western Caribbean. Traffickers used to fly twin-engine civil aviation aircraft from Colombia to small islands in the Bahamas and then airdrop drugs into either Florida or our coastal waters for subsequent pick-up by fast boats. Their success was predicated on the “big sky” or “big ocean” theory and on our inadequate detection and monitoring capabilities. In response to this challenge, United States drug-control program agencies developed extensive detection and monitoring capabilities to sort legitimate air and maritime traffic from illicit drug traffic. As our interdiction organizations and strategies became more effective, drug traffickers changed their routes and modes of transportation in response. Mexico and the Southwest Border became the principal route for cocaine.

Land conveyances, including tractor-trailers, cars, recreation vehicles, and trains, crossing at Southwest Border ports of entry are the primary means used to smuggle cocaine into the United States from Mexico. Cocaine is also carried across the U.S. - Mexican border by foot, by backpackers and by animal caravans. Transnational trafficking organizations employ high-technology equipment including night-vision goggles and radios with scramblers, as well as military hardware such as assault rifles, and bulletproof vests. These criminal groups also use scouts with radios and scanners tuned to police frequencies to monitor drug law enforcement activities along the border.

Cocaine trafficking organizations operating from Colombia employ groups based in Mexico to smuggle a significant proportion of the cocaine supplied by the drug mafias across the SWB. These groups are typically made up of polydrug traffickers

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with extensive experience in smuggling drugs across the SWB. Frequently, the groups receive a percentage (up to 50 percent) of the cocaine shipments in exchange for their services. This has enabled them to become wholesale sources of supply for cocaine available in many western and mid-western U.S. cities such as Chicago, Denver, and Detroit.

- (2) **Heroin.** Since the late 1970s, heroin produced in Mexico has been readily available in the United States, primarily in the West. Heroin trafficking in Mexico is controlled by transnational heroin trafficking groups operating between Mexico and the United States. These organizations control the cultivation, production, smuggling, and distribution of the drug. Heroin produced in Mexico - either in black tar, or brown powder form - is the predominant type of heroin available in the western half of the United States.

Most of the heroin produced in Mexico is destined for the U.S. market. Black tar and brown heroin are produced by traffickers operating from Mexico and sold by transnational networks operating within both nations. These trafficking organizations have been involved in smuggling heroin, cocaine, and marijuana for decades. In addition, these transnational organizations take full advantage of well-established, extended networks to distribute heroin throughout the western United States. These criminal groups also control distribution at the wholesale level. They are not generally involved in street sales that often are managed by local distribution groups.

- (3) **Methamphetamine.** Over the past few years, international organized crime groups have revolutionized the production and distribution of methamphetamine by operating large-scale laboratories in Mexico and the United States capable of producing unprecedented high-purity quantities of the drug. These organizations have saturated the western and mid-west U.S. market with methamphetamine. The amount of methamphetamine seized in transit from Mexico to the United States increased dramatically beginning in 1993. In 1993 and 1994, 306 and 692 kilograms, respectively, were seized in the United States along the border. During 1995, 653 kilograms were seized. By comparison, only 6.5 kilograms were seized in 1992.

The major methamphetamine trafficking organizations operating in Mexico and the United States regularly demonstrate their flexibility and adaptability, modifying smuggling routes and methods as needed to ship drugs into the United States. The primary points of entry into the United States for methamphetamine produced in Mexico are San Ysidro and Otay Mesa, California. The most common method of transporting methamphetamine across the border is via passenger vehicle.

- (4) **Marijuana.** Marijuana from Mexico (either grown in Mexico or transshipped through Mexico from other source countries such as Colombia) accounts for a significant proportion of the marijuana available in the United States. Most of the marijuana smuggled into the United States across the Southwest Border is concealed in vehicles - often in false compartments - or hidden in shipments of legitimate agricultural products. Marijuana is also smuggled across the border by horse, raft,

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backpack, and sporadically by private aircraft. Shipments of 50 kilograms or less are smuggled by pedestrians who enter the United States at border checkpoints, and backpackers alone or in “mule” trains who cross the border at more remote locations. Larger shipments, ranging up to multi-thousand kilogram amounts, usually are smuggled in tractor-trailers or rail cars.

- c. **The evolution of Federal involvement along the Border – The Challenge.** The history of the Southwest Border reflects the history of the United States. At first, undefined and remote, the boundary of the United States gradually took form as our people pushed out, established contact with neighboring cultures, created communities and looked to their government for protection under the law. International competition, conflict, and agreement evolved definitions of sovereign relations. Commercial enterprises sought to leverage their potential by reaching across national divides. Amid this evolution of legitimate international relationships intruded the unsanctioned and corrosive illegal trade in goods and services – contraband, illegal immigrants, guns, and drugs – and the habits of violence and human degradation that come with them.

While the individual policy formulation, resource allocation and operational activities of all federal drug-control program agencies are supportive of the goals and objectives of the President's *National Drug Control Strategy*, there is no central organizing concept for federal interdiction and intelligence efforts along the SWB. For the drug control program in particular, the current, fragmented organizational structure has been debilitating. It underlies the absence of shared accountability for the results of drug control efforts. In fact, the lack of accountability is the key weakness in the overall system. It is clearer at the Southwest Border because of the confluence of illegal drugs, illegal immigration, and trade issues. Nonetheless, the issue of accountability has been of central concern for years to the Congress, executive branch policy makers, and indeed, most of the people involved in the drug law enforcement effort and the general public. Counter-drug activities are rarely coordinated except for the very broad policy guidance of the *National Drug Control Strategy* or the very narrow case-centered criminal investigative activities. There are insufficient coordination mechanisms for translating strategic objectives into integrated, prioritized operational and investigative activities.

Some Observations:

- (1) Over the years, the federal government committed its energies and developed the processes for dealing with the needs and realities of the border region. In keeping with the laws of the United States and the dictates of national sovereignty, these individual agencies – the Border Patrol, the Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and many others – applied their organizational resources to meet their assigned missions at the Southwest Border in particular and throughout the United States. The uniqueness of agency missions and their evolutionary development as new problems emerged and old problems were overcome created separate objectives and traditions among the many agencies. These individual bureaucracies came to be imbued with their own

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sense of purpose. Where missions overlapped among different federal agencies, individual prerogatives and jurisdictions were jealously guarded. Although proximity and necessity drove some degree of cooperation, the more natural inclination for the many federal actors at the Southwest Border was to be wary of others institutions whose evolutionary development, central ethos, and stated purpose was different from one's own.

- (2) It is not surprising that interagency planning, intelligence sharing, budget coordination, and operational integration at the border is less than ideal. Organizations that have evolved in different ways and along separate paths over the decades do not readily come together with their separate organizational imperatives to support each other's specific counter-drug roles. While all of them are committed to slowing the flow of illegal drugs, they are unwilling to yield their own budgetary and manpower prerogatives to the others in order to do so. The result is a mix of redundancy, overlap, competition, and gaps in coverage; leading to needless inefficiency in stopping drugs at the border. This is unacceptable. We must bring together all of the Federal agencies involved in the efforts to counter drugs into a single, committed mission to lessen the flow of illegal drugs across the border.
- (3) The importance of coordinated anti-drug operations has long been recognized at the national level. In just the past thirty years there have been numerous efforts to improve counter-drug coordination and effectiveness and eliminate duplication of effort. In 1968, for example, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) was formed. The BNDD merged the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (under the Department of the Treasury) and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). This action resulted in the Department of Justice gaining primary responsibility for drug investigations. More recent attempts to streamline federal drug-control efforts included: the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (1971), the formation of a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (1971); a Strategy Council on Drug Abuse (1972); establishment of the Drug Enforcement Administration (Reorganization Plan No. 2, 1973); the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (1976), Drug Abuse Policy Office (1977/82); formation of a National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (1983); a National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (1984); and the establishment of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (1988).
- (4) Border control functions have also been subject to attempted reorganization and rationalization. Since 1930, there have been a number of efforts that included broad scale border management reorganization proposals. Improved coordination, however, has proved elusive. Presently, there are five principal departments concerned with drug control-related issues in the Southwest Border region: Treasury (drug interdiction, anti-money laundering and anti-firearms trafficking); Justice (drug and immigration enforcement, prosecutions); Transportation (drug interdiction); State (counter-drug cooperation with Mexico); and Defense (counter-drug support). Drug intelligence is currently provided by individual departments, as well as by organizations such as Director of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics

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Committee (CNC), the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). In addition, ONDCP oversees the Southwest Border HIDTA which encompasses the entire 2,000 mile border one to two counties deep. The HIDTA is divided into five regional counter-drug partnerships of federal, state and local enforcement agencies.

- (5) With the exception of DEA, the counter-drug mission for federal agencies is secondary to other core missions. Coordinating activities among departments and agencies will require overcoming or transcending individual agency line authority requirements and prerogatives. This is always a challenge since no individual bureaucracy willingly or wittingly allows its resources to come under the forced coordination of another organization that is outside that bureaucracy's span of control
- (6) There is much to be proud of. There have been substantial reinforcement of federal drug-control efforts along the SWB. During the past six years, the administration has significantly increased the federal presence along the SWB. For example: Customs' budget for Southwest Border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93; the number of assigned DEA special agents has increased 37 percent since FY90; the number of assigned INS agents has almost doubled since FY90; DOD's drug control budget for the Southwest Border has increased 53 percent since FY91; and the number of U.S. Attorneys handling cases in the Southwest Border region has increased by 80 percent since FY90.
- (7) Federal drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border must be integrated into the five basic border control functions as well as other functions of federal agencies:
 - (a) Inspecting people and goods at ports of entry for illegal drugs and other criminal activity.
 - (b) Patrolling between ports to prevent illegal drug entry and other illegal activity.
 - (c) Collecting and disseminating drug and other criminal information on activities likely to affect the border.
 - (d) Enhancing drug-control partnership between the U.S. and Mexico, and
 - (e) Facilitating commerce and transportation incident to legitimate trade.

The two principal border control and management agencies, Customs (Treasury) and INS (Justice) should undoubtedly remain the principal federal enforcement agencies along the SWB. Any effort to better coordinate Federal drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border must include a shift from a manpower/physical inspection approach to one that is intelligence-driven and that employs emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches. Above all, we need integrated, mutually supporting efforts that create a whole greater than the sum of its parts. The following must be addressed:

d. The Drug-Control Imperatives:

(1) The need for a system to allocate resources against the perceived threat.

Available information about the drug threat is fragmented and incomplete. It is difficult to obtain a succinct, up-to-date assessment of the drug threat either along the entire border or in any specific state or sector. Similarly, there is no readily available integrated overview of Federal efforts to address the drug threat. The end result is that there is often no direct link between current operations and an intelligence analysis of the dynamic threats we face. We need a system that anticipates trends, projects actions by drug-trafficking organizations, and that allocates resources accordingly. This is true not only at the tactical level (i.e., within individual POEs) but also across the entire border.

(2) The need for greater drug-control effectiveness. Although we have been introducing additional inspection resources at the border over the past several years, we have not reliably increased our ability to screen trucks. In 1997, we inspected 1.09 million of the 3.54 million commercial trucks and railcars that crossed into the US from Mexico. In just 6 incidents, cocaine was found within the commercial cargo contained by these trucks and railcars. The challenge is to develop the indicators that will lead to a higher probability of contraband discovery per vehicle checked. The greater the confidence we have in selecting the appropriate vehicles for inspection, the more effective we can be in starving the drug trade, while at the same time speeding legal commerce to market. Our current drug interdiction efforts are relatively ineffective in reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across the border. Recent statistics on the amounts of illegal drugs seized at the border seem to show that we are becoming increasingly ineffective. The inspection process should be less reliant on human resources. Instead, we need to invest in intelligence-driven processes which employ emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches.

(3) The need for better drug-control coordination. Twenty-three separate federal agencies and scores of state and local governments are involved in drug control efforts along the SWB. However, no individual or agency has overall coordination responsibility for drug control operations along the length of the border or even within individual POEs. Regional offices of different federal agencies do not always have matching areas of responsibility. Too often, Federal organizational schema do not take into account state and local jurisdictions. As a stop-gap measure Federal agencies at major POEs are forming quality improvement committees as an *ad hoc* measure to improve coordination. Functional and sectoral accountability must be established.

(4) The need for drug-control synchronization. As Federal drug-control agencies reinforce their efforts, they must consider the effects of their actions on Federal, state, and local agencies. Too much or too little emphasis on any component of the overall drug control effort without corresponding adjustments elsewhere detracts from overall effectiveness. For example, increasing the number of inspectors and agents without a corresponding increase in capabilities within the prosecutorial and detention systems

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can overwhelm the latter.

- (5) **The need for more drug-control inspection capability.** Even as commerce and movement between the United States and Mexico has rapidly expanded in recent years, the Federal ability to properly screen all movement has not increased commensurately. Federal resources do not have to increase in proportion to the number of movements. Federal technical capabilities, however, must stay abreast of the requirement to prevent drugs from being hidden among increasing cross-border traffic.
- (6) **The need to work drug control across federal, state and local lines.** Our constitution and our legal traditions ensure the doctrine of federalism. Both state and local officials have a strong voice in how drug control efforts will be applied within their boundaries. Federal agencies must respect state and local laws and procedures. Federal agencies can also act as a catalyst to promote unity of effort among state and local efforts.
- (7) **The need for good U.S. - Mexico drug-control bilateral relations.** The United States has been blessed with peaceful relations with its two contiguous neighbors throughout the majority of its history. Seldom have nations lived in such harmony along such an expansive border. But the relations between sovereign nations cannot be taken for granted. Only through dignified and proper relations that evince respect for sovereignty can we hope to preserve the beneficial contacts that have long endured. The great common ground we have with Mexico in regard to the illegal drug trade is the recognition that neither country can tolerate wanton violation of the rule of law. Neither society can tolerate the ruin and destruction that the drug trade brings. We must build on this mutual recognition and forge relationships that allow us to develop common purpose in reducing the demand for drugs and foiling criminal traffickers.
- (8) **The need to confront drug corruption.** America is well-served by its dedicated law enforcement officers. Selfless service, physical courage, devotion to duty and integrity mark the record of their service. However, a society that spends more than fifty billion dollars on illegal drugs produces corruption on both sides of the border. Individual corruption is always a possibility. Left unchecked, it can lead to systemic corruption. It is necessary on both sides of the border to create a system of checks and balances to guard against corruption. The men and women of U.S. law enforcement who work so diligently to uphold the law deserve such supporting anti-corruption mechanisms. So do the people they serve.
- (9) **The need to integrate related drug-control issues:**

 - (a) **International Trade.** We are a trading nation. The importance of free trade across our borders cannot be overestimated. We must stop drugs. However, we must continue to facilitate the free exchange of goods which forms the underlying basis of our economy.

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(b) Immigration. Any effort to better coordinate federal counter-drug efforts along the Southwest Border will simultaneously affect federal immigration-control efforts. Presently, the Border Patrol estimates that 18 percent of its activities have a drug nexus. Drug-trafficking organizations capitalize on the illegal flow of people to camouflage and transport drugs. Any effective drug-control regime must also stop the uncontrolled movement of people moving money, drugs and weapons across the Southwest Border in both directions.

(c) Arms trafficking. The illegal drug trade also generates a demand for weapons in both Mexico and the United States. The demand for illegal weapons in Mexico is essentially satisfied through the illegal exportation of weapons from the United States and other nations. Federal drug-control efforts must also address this problem and appropriately support Government of Mexico efforts to stem the illegal flow of weapons from the United States to Mexico.

(d) Money laundering. One of the most pernicious effects of drug trafficking is the way in which money laundering distorts the economy of affected areas. Federal drug control efforts must deny traffickers the profits of their trade to both deter trafficking as well as to safeguard legitimate business.

3. ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES. The growing seriousness of the drug-trafficking problem across the Southwest Border has already elicited a vigorous federal response. In recent years, federal drug interdiction capabilities have improved. U.S.-Mexican cooperation has also increased as both nations have underscored their commitment to the rule of law and the security of our respective citizens. These efforts and improvements, however, have been insufficient. We must do more to stem the flow of illegal drugs. The following drug-control principles, objectives and actions are proposed as a preliminary guide to action:

a. DRUG-CONTROL PRINCIPLES

(1) Sovereignty. We demand respect for our national sovereignty. We will not tolerate transgressions of illegal goods and activities across our borders. We acknowledge that Mexico demands and is entitled to this same respect. We, therefore, must pledge our commitment to the sovereign rights of both of our nations. Both the U.S. and Mexico have the obligation to act unilaterally within their own sovereign air, land, and sea space to protect their citizens from drug-related crime. At the same time, both nations must cooperate closely to ensure that drug trafficking organizations do not exploit sovereignty issues on either side of the border to avoid prosecution. Close coordination between national, regional, and local authorities on both sides of the border can ensure consensual and cooperative anti-drug ventures and allow both Mexican and U.S. officials to effectively target and prosecute drug-trafficking organizations whose activities straddle the SWB.

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(2) Constitutionality. While the illegal drug trade poses a serious threat to our people and our society, we will only respond to it in strict adherence to the principles and values inherent in our constitutional traditions. Four U.S. states comprise our border with Mexico, as do scores of counties and local governments. Each of them is entitled to their rights reserved to them by the constitutions. Our response to the illegal drug trade will always respect:

(a) States' rights. Local law enforcement remains a state and local function. Drug traffickers that violate local laws or commit offenses against communities should be prosecuted visibly so that it is clear that justice has been carried out.

(b) Federal authority. Securing the border and controlling movement of people, goods, and services across it is essentially a federal responsibility. The federal government has an obligation to effectively secure the SWB.

(c) Due process. Every individual must be accorded his or her full constitutional rights. Foreign citizens apprehended in the United States must be treated in accordance with pertinent U.S. migration laws and their government(s) must be promptly notified of the status of their citizens who come into contact with law enforcement agencies.

(d) No U.S. militarization. Militarization of the border is an inappropriate response to the drug trafficking problem at the SWB. Preventing the violation of domestic U.S. laws is a function that must be performed by federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies. The U.S. Armed Forces are already providing invaluable support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the Southwest Border region. This support function is appropriate and should continue. However, the federal government must ensure that its law-enforcement agencies are equal to the task at hand and that the U.S. military is never assigned domestic police functions. Military operations along the border in direct prosecution of law enforcement activities is an inappropriate use of our military forces.

(3) Free trade. The greatest potential for mutually beneficial relations between the United States and Mexico lies in free trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement has brought increased prosperity to peoples of both nations. Whatever steps we take to slow the flow of drugs across the Southwest Border cannot be allowed to slow the flow of legitimate commerce.

b. DRUG-CONTROL OBJECTIVES:

(1) Ensure the rule of law along the entire border. We reject the lawlessness that comes with the illegal drug trade. We have common ground with Mexico to unite our efforts against illegal drug traffickers. No sovereign nation can cede control over any portion of its territory to criminal organizations. Nor can any community be left unprotected and subject to the influence of drug-trafficking organizations. Federal agencies must be prepared to quickly deploy resources to reinforce the drug-control efforts of state and

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local law-enforcement agencies anywhere along the Southwest Border to assure that the rule of law is not compromised.

- (2) Control and interdict drugs along the entire border at all times.** Illegal cross-border traffic inexorably follows the path of least resistance and highest pay-off -- the crossing sites and modes where interdiction is least likely and the highest volume of contraband can get through. Uncontested space along the border is automatically ceded to those who wish to violate our laws and regulations. "Space" must take on a new dimension to involve not only areas of air, land, and sea constituting an international border. The critical area in question also includes interior space created by humans, motor vehicles, aircraft, ships, and containers that cross a border and can be used to carry merchandise and other forms of commerce. No stretch of the Southwest Border can be left uncontested; every dimension must be considered. No cross-border shipment or movement should be immune from scrutiny or inspection. All illegal entries should be subject to detection and interruption. Ports of entry must be made more efficient; intervening spaces must be secured.
- (3) Act in a coherent and coordinated manner that uses the counter-drug capabilities of each agency to the fullest extent available and builds upon our strengths.** No single entity by itself can solve the multi-faceted drug trafficking problem. Solutions can only result from coordinated efforts between Mexican authorities and U.S. Federal, state, and local agencies. Reducing drug trafficking is a sub-set of a larger federal obligation -- the requirement to control our sovereign border. We must ensure that scarce Federal resources are allocated in an efficient and timely manner to ensure a less porous, drug-free border. Each federal agency possesses unique strengths that should be optimized and used in complementary ways. In addition, while we cannot and will not tolerate a militarized border, we must consider the capabilities offered by the U.S. Armed Forces. The U.S. military can aid the federal effort to reduce illegal drug trafficking by: supporting surveillance, intelligence monitoring along remote stretches of the border; providing mobility and quick reaction; providing language interpretation support and intelligence sharing and analysis; providing training to domestic law enforcement agencies. The same is true for state and local agencies. Each must use existing assets in a coordinated and coherent manner.
- (4) Organize counter-drug efforts for accountability, responsibility and success.** Defense of the border cannot begin and end at the border itself. All cross-border movements have three elements: a point of origin, a crossing point, and an intended destination. An effective counter-drug border control regime should be able to influence the movement of contraband drugs, precursor chemicals, illegal weapons, human couriers and illegal funds throughout this "spectrum." Legal movements can be inspected throughout this process rather than solely at the border. Illegal drug movements also should be subject to interdiction in either country before, during, or after transit. Action against drug traffickers should be taken when and where it is most advantageous. Any Southwest Border counter-drug strategy must be executed in concert with a domestic law enforcement threat assessment. As the Department of Justice, for example, progresses with its national plan for disruption and dismantlement of drug distribution organizations,

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we must be careful to integrate their efforts into the overall Southwest Border plan.

- (5) **Harness counter-drug technology.** Technology heightens the probability of successful interdiction of contraband. Integrated with the entire network of systems to secure our citizens from illegal drugs, technology can: improve intelligence and information sharing; lessen the vulnerability of remote areas; penetrate otherwise unobserved space; sense, detect, and track specific substances; and supplement human resources committed to interdiction efforts. In concert with the entire counter-drug strategy, technological investments must be long-term, designed to thwart drug traffickers' efforts to defeat them, and sensitive to new trends in the two-sided struggle to stem the flow of illegal drugs across our border.
- (6) **Work cooperatively with Mexico.** The Governments of the United States and Mexico have recognized that international drug trafficking and related crimes extend beyond national boundaries and exceed the capacity of any nation to face them in isolation. At their meeting in May 1997, the Presidents of the United States and Mexico established a commitment to cooperate more closely to combat the problem of drugs and associated crimes. This commitment was formalized in the Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs signed during the Presidents' meeting. The Declaration established principles under which bilateral cooperation will be carried out, and specific areas in which cooperation will be strengthened. The Declaration includes key areas of collaboration pertaining to the Southwest border drug control efforts. The United States-Mexico High Level Contact Group for Drug Control drafted a binational strategy designed to achieve the objectives identified in the Declaration of Alliance. This strategy will be a key pillar for a coordinated border control strategy.

c. DRUG-CONTROL ACTIONS:

- (1) **Establish a drug-control coordinating authority.** A *U.S. Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinating Authority* will allow us to integrate efforts, complement individual inspection and interdiction operations, focus resources, provide timely and accurate intelligence, and reinforce threatened areas. Such an organization must be vested with appropriate authorities that allow it to coordinate the employment of assets belonging to all federal drug-control program agencies. A Presidentially appointed *Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator* must be the accountable federal official. This coordinating entity would operate from a base in El Paso (the present base of Operation Alliance, the Southwest Border HIDTA, JTF - 6 and EPIC). This Federal coordinator would work with all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and coordinate with appropriate Mexican authorities.
- (2) **Create a shared appreciation of the drug-control challenge.** The many federal, state, and local agencies must have a shared bond among them that transcend their natural inclinations to compete and jealously guard their institutional prerogatives. The commitment against the illegal drug trade is not enough in itself to accomplish that. A key step would be a common educational experience that brings disparate Federal Southwest Border agents together to share techniques and procedures to counter illegal

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drugs. This common training experience would enable them to develop a common culture and appreciate the fact that no one agency can be successful in the struggle against drugs without the integrated efforts of all the others. The success of HIDTA is a good example of a program which capitalizes on a shared appreciation of a common mission. Such an common training experience will also focus all individual law enforcement officers on a single-mission environment that will promote coordination and cooperation.

- (3) Calculate and minimize drug-control risk.** Although we intend to lessen the flow of illegal drugs across our border, we cannot disrupt the enormously beneficial cross border economic trade that generates such wealth in both nations. Risk is inherent in any counter-drug border control regime that does not seek to inspect every movement. Risk can be minimized by focusing resources on movements deemed more likely to be concealing illegal drugs and by developing systems of inspection conducive to moving a high volume of traffic while pinpointing probable illegal drug activity. The risk of drug contraband penetrating our borders will always be present. We need to manage this problem and increase the likelihood that we will intercept enough of it to discourage drug traffickers and force them away from the Southwest Border where drug violence and corruption causes such dismay on both sides of the border.
- (4) Develop a supporting drug control intelligence structure.** Counter-drug intelligence must support border control efforts in both countries by allowing appropriate agencies to identify and track suspect movements. Knowing what to look for as well as where and when can simplify the tasks of those charged with establishing an exclusionary counter-drug regime. Surveillance can offset a lack of physical presence. Sensors can help detect and track the presence of illegal human movement and of contraband. Information and intelligence, properly protected, must be shared in a timely and accurate manner so that those acting against the traffic in illegal drugs can move safely and efficiently.
- (5) Focus on drug criminal organizations.** Much illegal drug trafficking across the Southwest Border is conducted by sophisticated criminal organizations that pose threats to local and state authorities because of their wealth and propensity for violence. These organizations are not constrained by sovereignty considerations as they move illegal drugs, weapons, precursor chemicals and money between Mexico and the United States. In fact, they seek to exploit jurisdictional lines, be they national, state, or local. These drug criminal organizations must be broken up. Our counter-drug organizational efforts must similarly cross national federal, state, and local lines with greater operational flexibility than the criminal organizations we face.
- (6) Facilitate legal traffic; block illegal traffic.** An effective border control policy must facilitate appropriate interaction and constrain illegal drug transactions. Any system designed to stop illegal drug movement across a border, whether consisting of contraband or persons, must be designed so that penalties exacted on legal traffic are minimized. There must be a balance between the imperative of facilitating legal cross-border transactions and the requirement to regulate it in order to stop drugs, raise revenue, protect public health, and uphold laws. There is no reason why stringent drug-control inspection regimes should interfere in any serious way or impede properly cleared

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commercial or private movement or transactions.

(7) **Build on existing drug control initiatives.** Ongoing initiatives such as the Southwest Border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, Operation Alliance, and JTF-6 provide a foundation for the future. These initiatives have evolved over the years from lessons learned from both successes and failures. We need to build on what works and find continued ways to improve our operations against drugs.

(8) **Maintain integrity of law enforcement investigations.** Nothing in this document should be taken to construe any usurpation of delineated Department of Justice or Department of Treasury authority in the conduct of criminal investigations nor should it be taken to amend the discretionary powers of agency supervisors and leadership as they relate to investigations of criminal behavior.

4. PROPOSED DRUG-CONTROL STEPS.

a. **General.** This approach will ensure that our drug-control efforts along the SWB:

(1) **Conform to the *National Drug Control Strategy*.** The *National Drug Control Strategy* summarizes national drug-control goals and objectives. All federal drug-control efforts, to include those along the SWB, must be supportive of Goal 4 of the *Strategy*, “Shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat” and its supporting objectives.

(2) **Integrate drug control efforts.** As we continue to increase federal drug control resources in the Southwest Border area, we must ensure the build-up is feasible to execute and coordinated. In particular, we must ensure that:

(a) Drug control programs are appropriate to the challenge.

(b) Our programs continue to respond to the dynamic nature of the drug threat.

(c) Department and agency build-ups are coordinated.

(3) **Match drug control resources with threats.** We must:

(a) Develop the capability to track the drug threat, drug control assets, and sectoral responsibilities into an automated, digital, grid-based schematic format covering both sides of the border.

(b) Update this information on a real time basis and link it to a centralized Southwest Border intelligence and coordination headquarters.

(c) Create an intelligence system through the five Southwest Border HIDTAs that will allow law enforcement and policy-makers to monitor the changing nature of the trafficking threats and adapt efforts accordingly.

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- (d) Use this carefully protected counter-drug information to prioritize and conduct counter-drug operations and assess new manpower and technology needs.
 - (4) **Drug control efforts are long term.** There is no short-term solution to the drug trafficking problem along the SWB. The federal response must recognize that there must be a permanent capability to deter traffickers from transporting illegal drugs across any portion of the border to include its maritime flanks or air space.
 - (5) **Drug control efforts must be continuously adjusted over time.** The illegal drug threat is a continuously evolving one. Trafficking organizations will respond to federal drug-control efforts by shifting modes and conveyances. The growth of rail traffic, for example, allows traffickers new routes as long as effective screening/inspection techniques are not developed. Federal drug control efforts must anticipate changes in legal commerce as well as those of drug traffickers. Success in one section will cause shifts in trafficking patterns elsewhere. The federal drug control effort must be seen in its entirety in order to make appropriate adjustments over time.
- b. The Southwest Border organizing plan to confront drug smuggling across the border must:**
- (1) **Address drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border in context.** All of the United States' borders, seaports, and airports are vulnerable to the drug threat. Even if we were to be successful in preventing drug trafficking activities along the SWB, trafficking organizations would shift to other entry points as they have in the past. Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, South Florida, major international airports in cities such as Chicago and Orlando, seaports along the Atlantic Seaboard, in the Gulf of Mexico, and on our Pacific coast have experienced problems with drug trafficking. The U.S. - Canadian border is increasingly being targeted by traffickers. Successes in better coordinating the federal response to the drug trafficking threat along the Southwest Border must also be applied to other vulnerable regions within the "arrival zone."
- Federal drug control efforts at the Southwest Border must also consider that U.S., Mexican and other trafficking organizations do not just move drugs across the SWB. They also distribute them throughout the United States, often seeking to hide among migrant populations. Information and intelligence derived by federal drug-control program agencies must be shared promptly with state and local authorities in the heartland of America. If necessary, federal law enforcement agencies must deploy resources to address the activities of transnational trafficking organizations far from our borders.
- (2) **Establish a Southwest Border Counter-drug Coordinating Authority (SWBCCA).** Federal drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border must be properly coordinated. An SWBCCA can fulfill this function and can also coordinate drug control efforts with state and local authorities and Mexican governmental institutions. We must:

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- (a) Assign direct responsibility for coordinating all federal drug control efforts along the Southwest Border to one federal official (a Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator). This individual would:
- (i) Be nominated from a list prepared by the Attorney General, Treasury Secretary, and Director, ONDCP.
 - (ii) Be appointed by the President for a four-year term and confirmed by the Senate.
 - (iii) Be required to submit to the Congress a coordinated annual report on federal drug control efforts along the Southwest Border as an annex to *the National Drug Control Strategy*. This report should address: budget, manpower, technology, construction, intelligence and operations of counter-drug agencies along the SWB.
 - (iv) Have coordinating authority assigned to:
 - Establish in coordination with ONDCP drug-control objectives and priorities for all federal drug-control program agencies along the SWB.
 - In coordination with ONDCP recommend to heads of Southwest Border Federal drug-control program agencies changes to the organization, allocation of personnel, management, and budget of federal departments and agencies engaged in drug enforcement along the SWB.
 - Certify in coordination with ONDCP the adequacy of agency and department drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border and recommend required corrective actions.
- (b) Provide the Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator an organizational capability to assess the effectiveness of federal drug-control program agencies and coordinate promising or successful initiatives
- (c) Designate a Federal Customs official at each Port of Entry and a Border Patrol official along all sectors of the Southwest Border to coordinate all counter-drug interdiction efforts within their areas of responsibility. All federal drug-control program agencies would benefit from the leadership of a single accountable coordinating official in each specific area and across the entire border. This Federal coordinator would have coordinating authority over the drug-control activities of all Federal agencies within his or her area and would also be expected to coordinate with state and local counterparts as well as corresponding Mexican authorities. These Federal coordinating officials will respond to guidance from the Southwest Border Drug-Control Coordinator.

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(3) Incorporate specific recommendations for federal agencies. (Note: To be developed by each federal drug-control program agency with responsibilities along the SWB.)

(a) Department of the Treasury.

(i) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.

(ii) Customs Service

(b) Department of State.

(c) Department of Commerce.

(d) Department of Defense.

(i) The National Guard.

(ii) Active Duty Military Forces.

(e) Department of Transportation.

-Coast Guard.

(f) Department of Justice.

(i) Drug Enforcement Administration.

(ii) Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(iii) Immigration and Naturalization Service.

-The Border Patrol.

(iv) U.S. Attorneys' Offices.

(g) Department of the Interior.

(i) Bureau of Land Management.

(ii) National Park Service.

(iii) Bureau of Indian Affairs.

(h) Department of Agriculture.

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-U.S. Forest Service.

(i) Intelligence Community.

- (i) CNC
- (ii) DIA
- (iii) EPIC
- (iv) NDIC
- (v) NSA

(4) Use existing interagency structures.

(a) **HIDTA.** The five Southwest Border HIDTAs are each substantially improving the ability of law enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking. The effectiveness of HIDTA programs along the border can be improved by:

- (i) Ensuring the five HIDTAs help coordinate all federal, state and local counter-drug activities in their jurisdictions.
- (ii) Increasing coordination among the border HIDTAs (for example, facilitating the flow of intelligence information on a real time basis, creating exchanges about programs that work, and coordinating programs on a regional basis).
- (iii) Improve coordination among HIDTAs, U.S. drug control program agencies, and state and local prevention, treatment, and enforcement agencies.

(b) **Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF).** *Discussion to be developed by DOJ.*

(c) **El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).** *Discussion to be developed by EPIC.*

(d) **Joint Task Force Six.** *Discussion to be developed by JTF-Six.*

(e) **United States Interdiction Coordinator.** *Discussion to be developed by USIC.*

(f) **Joint Interagency Task Forces.** *Discussion to be developed by JIATFs East, South and West.*

(5) **Develop an integrated intelligence structure that supports policy decisions and operations.** Southwest Border operations are hobbled by the existing national counter-drug intelligence architecture which does not effectively and efficiently serve the needs of policy makers or investigators and operators. There is no national

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counter-drug intelligence requirements process that effectively directs law enforcement and foreign intelligence assets against common objectives. Case information at the state and local level is not systematically exploited for its potential usefulness to other investigations and operations. This information is not integrated with Federal information and analyzed to discern possible operational and strategic patterns.

Intelligence must form the basis for an integrated, campaign planning effort as well as support for coordinated, multi-agency investigative and operational activities. An improved organizational structure on the Southwest border must be enabled by a cogent *national counter-drug intelligence system* that meets the needs of (1) federal, state and local officers and (2) policy-makers, planners and resource allocators.

- (6) **Harness technology.** The enormous growing volume and importance of legitimate commercial trade in goods and services between the United States and Mexico is good news for America. However, with this volume of trade, no number of new agents alone can manually prevent the influx of drugs into the United States. Technological advances hold the key to allowing the relatively unfettered flow of legitimate trade, while capturing from this flow illicit traffic in drugs, drug money, weapons and precursor chemicals. The technology currently being deployed is inadequate. Hundreds of Border Patrol agents conduct dangerous night operations without basic equipment, such as night vision optics, border roads and fencing to canalize cross-border illegal drug trafficking. The three operational x-ray machines (two are at fixed sites, one is a mobile prototype) provide inadequate coverage and are easily avoided by traffickers. Another six are scheduled to be operational by mid 1999. We need to ensure that authorities manning this border have access to the most up-to-date counter-drug technologies possible so that:
- (a) Every suspect truck and train that crosses the border into the United States could be subjected to as many as three different non-intrusive inspections that can detect illegal drugs.
 - (b) The physical and or electronic transfer of drug monies and weapons out of the United States can be detected.
 - (c) Fencing, sensors, lighting and remote night vision TV digital devices monitor areas between POEs.
 - (d) Law enforcement officials along the border are equipped with digital communications equipment, observation devices, detection devices, and other technologies necessary to their tasks.
- (7) **Build required infrastructure.** Barriers and surveillance devices work. Along the Imperial Beach, San Diego section of the border for example, there were sixty murders and 10,000 pounds of marijuana seized four years ago. In 1996, after the installation of fences and lights backed up by more Border Patrol Agents, there were

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no murders, and just six pounds of marijuana were seized. Specific suggestions include:

- (a) Develop a strategic five-year Southwest Border plan to build access roads to allow patrolling of the border and to erect fences and lights in high trafficking areas.
 - (b) Assign the U.S. Border Patrol complete responsibility for planning, budgeting, building, and maintaining roads, barriers and sensors along the Southwest Border.
- (8) **Nurture U.S. - Mexico relations.** The United States alone cannot stop drug trafficking across the SWB. Expanded cooperation with Mexico is essential. Ongoing cooperative initiatives at the local, state, and national levels -- such as FBI and DEA training of Mexican law enforcement officials and Bilateral Liaison Mechanisms (BLMs) that link cross-border communities -- should be our building blocks. Specific suggestions might include:
- (a) Encourage BLMs to address drug trafficking and drug-related problems.
 - (b) Establish Mexican law enforcement liaisons with U.S. Southwest Border HIDTAs while maintaining appropriate strict security measures.
- (9) **Involve the private sector.** The scope of this drug-control challenge will require private sector support, particularly from those who hold substantial stakes in the success of U.S.-Mexico relations. The private sector can help by:
- (a) Assisting in the development and deployment of new technologies that can detect drugs without slowing the two-way movement of goods and services.
 - (b) Implementing self-regulatory procedures to prevent drugs from being hidden in legal transactions.

5. MILESTONES.

Aug 98	Further development of Southwest Border concept. IAWG meetings / Office visits SWB Trips (3-5 Aug, 24 - 26 Aug).
Sep 98	Interagency circulation of concept/recommendations.
Nov 98	Submission of SWB concept by PDPC to POTUS/VPOTUS; Interagency development of supporting federal budget.
Dec 98	Begin SWB implementation plan study
Jan 99	State of the Union Address: Announcement of SWB concept/ implementation plan.
Feb 99	Publication of <i>National Drug Control Strategy</i> ;
Jun 99	ONDCP legislative plan implemented.
Oct 99	Begin SWB Concept implementation

6. **CONCLUSION:** The flow of drugs across the Southwest Border has not been significantly curtailed despite tactical success that have caused changes in smuggling routes and techniques. Drug trafficking and violence remain persistent and there are growing threats to border region residents. The obstacles our law enforcement officials face in stemming these threats are significant, but they are not insurmountable. Our substantial investments along the Southwest Border are beginning to pay off. Future success is dependent on adjusting existing drug-control organizations to better support ongoing federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. Harnessing emerging technology is a must.

The Southwest Border is the principal avenue for illegal drug trade into our country. We must anticipate that the greater our success at the Southwest border, the more drug traffickers will attempt to penetrate elsewhere. Therefore, we must see Southwest border organization efforts as but one step in the process to safeguard all our borders from illegal drugs. We should learn from our successes and failures, applying these lessons to future efforts to stem the flow of transnational illegal drugs into our country. Federal, state, and local authorities in the Gulf Coast, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, South Florida, Northeastern and Northwestern United States, and in the Great Lakes region are facing similar organizational and coordination challenges as they seek to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. In the end, we must stop drugs every where they threaten to enter the United States. But since the Southwest border is at the moment the most porous part of the nation's borders, it is there that we must mount an immediate, determined, and coordinated effort to stop the flow of drugs. We can do this. We must do this. And, at the same time, we must anticipate where further efforts will be needed to close the entire border from the destructive flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

The Burkhalter Report of 1988

The Vice President's Task Force on Border Control reported to then Vice President Bush in 1988 the following problems:

- Need for an interagency structure which can adequately mobilize and commit the talents and resources of the nation to meet the border-control challenge.
- Need for closer coordination between the Border Patrol, and Customs to ensure that the optimum uniformed presence is dedicated to the interdiction effort at and between the Ports of Entry along the borders.
- Need guidelines to ensure a cohesive collection effort.
- Need for improved human intelligence.
- Need for interagency cooperation in our embassies
- Need to encourage intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state and local levels.
- Combining foreign intelligence with domestic information to target drug trafficking organizations.

6164

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date

9/4

PLEASE STAFF

From:

Dahm
Bruce Reed
Don Kerrick
The Staff Secretary

Should this have a cover
memo on it before it goes to
POTUS?

Phin

To: KEN
5-7238
P

➤ Robins -
what do we
think about
this initiative?

@

SEP 7 1998

ELANA KAGAN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**DRAFT**INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
CHARLES RUFF
BRUCE REED

SUBJECT: Shaping a Southwest Border Strategy

Barry McCaffrey has sent you the attached memorandum regarding his proposal to organize drug control efforts along the Southwest border. Barry has narrowed his original concept to focus specifically on controlling illegal narcotics that cross the border, rather than casting a wider net covering a broader range of border activities. He calls for greater coordination among Customs, the Border Patrol and other relevant agencies to address the flow of drugs and urges you designate a single federal official responsible for all counterdrug efforts along the border; ~~He also~~ ^{THE} recommends ~~we~~ ^{MENT} develop and deploy ^{MENT OF} advanced technologies to increase detection rates of drug contraband while facilitating legitimate traffic. Barry has gone ahead and announced that he plans to forward these proposals to you in the coming weeks.

We are sympathetic toward the basic thrust of Barry's proposal for strengthened border coordination. Justice and Treasury, however, are not yet on board, and are very unhappy with Barry's method of advancement. Barry will be meeting with Janet Reno and Bob Rubin before October 1 to try to bridge the gap. Barry has agreed to seek Sandy's help in coordinating a decision package to you, following his meeting with Reno and Rubin, addressing all unresolved issues and reflecting all interested agency viewpoints.

Attachment

Tab A McCaffrey Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1006-F
RDS 5/24/10

DRAFT~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 d

Declassify On: 9/17/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

September 3, 1998

Personnel

Sandy -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE SAMUEL R. BERGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM BARRY McCAFFREY

SUBJECT: Organizing Drug Control Efforts along the Southwest Border

1. **PURPOSE.** The purpose of this memorandum is to update you on ONDCP's views of the challenges facing our drug-control efforts along the Southwest Border and our ideas for improving coordination among the twenty-three federal agencies involved in drug-control operations there. The enclosed *White Paper* and *Concept for Analysis* outline the general problem and offer specific suggestions for consideration by the President's Drug Policy Council. We intend to present a coordinated set of recommendations for President Clinton's consideration this fall.

2. **CHALLENGES.** The drug-control challenges we face along the Southwest Border, though severe, are not insurmountable. About 60 percent of the cocaine entering the U.S. does so across this border, yet seizures in the border region are declining. Total 1998 cocaine seizures are projected to be less than half of the annual average seized between 1991 and 1996 and account for just a fifth of the cocaine crossing the border. Heroin seizures have declined by about a third since 1996. Over the past several years, the general trend has been one of fewer seizures of all drugs except marijuana. Our visits last month to San Diego and El Paso reinforced our belief that immediate action must be taken to address the following issues:

- **Drug smugglers coordinate their efforts.** Anecdotal evidence and seizure data in El Paso reveals that when met with resistance smugglers simply shift their methods and routes at the ports of entry (POEs) and between the POEs.
- **One agency's success will inadvertently and directly impact other agencies.** Border officials stated that an increase in inspection efforts at a POE, for example, often resulted in greater challenges for Border Patrol personnel between POEs.
- **The lack of communication and information sharing is a serious problem.** If a Border Patrol officer needs immediate assistance from a member of US Customs, he would have to radio his communications center which would then contact US Customs communications by telephone. US Customs communications would then radio their personnel to assist the Border Patrol officer. This time consuming process puts agents at risk.
- **Border Patrol, Customs, Coast Guard, National Guard, and other government personnel often use outdated technology.** In many instances, line personnel have been using obsolescent equipment for years, one explanation of the insufficient results.

RE: SW BORDER

3. **RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE.** The enclosed ONDCP White Paper contains specific recommendations to attain the following objectives:

STAFF

- **Ensure the rule of law along the entire border.** Federal drug control agencies must be prepared to quickly deploy resources to reinforce states and localities threatened by traffickers.
- **Control and interdict drugs along the entire border at all times.** We must develop the capacity to control the entire border at all times, preventing traffickers from merely shifting their operations to avoid detection and capture
- **Act in a coherent and coordinated manner that uses the counter-drug capabilities of each agency to the fullest extent available and builds upon our strengths.** No one element of the federal government can alone solve the problem of drug trafficking across the Southwest Border. Only by using the resources of all our agencies in a coordinated fashion can we build a border infrastructure that will defeat the flow of drugs.
- **Organize counter-drug efforts for accountability, responsibility and success.** We need to designate a federal officer who will be responsible for all counter-drug efforts along the border. We must also establish Counter-Drug Operations Coordinators at each POE (e.g., Customs) and for each sector between POEs (e.g., Border Patrol).
- **Harness counter-drug technology.** We must develop and deploy advanced technologies that increase detection rates of drugs and other contraband while facilitating the rapid flow of economic traffic.
- **Work cooperatively with Mexico.** We must work in partnership with Mexico to jointly confront drug-related corruption and violence, while acting in absolute deference to sovereign national responsibilities on both sides of the border.

4. **CONCLUSION.** The fourth goal of the President's 1998 *National Drug Control Strategy* is to "Shield America's air, land, and sea frontier from the drug threat." Over the past five years, your Administration has invested heavily in anti-drug programs to secure the two-thousand mile border with Mexico. As a result, Customs' budget for Southwest Border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93. The number of assigned DEA special agents has increased 37 percent while the number of assigned INS agents has almost doubled. The enclosed ONDCP White Paper suggests how better coordination can dramatically improve the effectiveness of our collective efforts. We look forward to submitting a detailed proposal for the President's consideration this fall.

Sincerely,



Barry R. McCaffrey
Director

Would like to personally update you at
your convenience.



**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503**

September 3, 1998

Concept for Analysis

Organizing Counter-Drug Efforts Along the Southwest Border

I. Long-standing problem. Since the 1980s, a number of analyses and reports have identified the need to improve our Southwest Border counter-drug efforts through the following actions:

- Need for an interagency structure which can adequately mobilize and commit the talents and resources of the nation to meet the border-control challenge;
- Need for closer coordination among Border Patrol, Customs, INS, and other agencies to ensure that the optimum uniformed presence is dedicated to the interdiction effort at and between the Ports of Entry (POEs) along the borders;
- Need guidelines to ensure a cohesive collection effort;
- Need for improved human intelligence;
- Need for interagency cooperation in our embassies;
- Need to encourage intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state and local levels;
- Need to combine foreign intelligence with domestic information to target drug trafficking organizations.

II. Imperatives for improving counter-drug efforts along the Southwest Border.

A. General Trends. Three major trends have complicated efforts to stop drug trafficking across the Southwest Border:

- 1. Incompatible communications systems.** Operational units must be able to communicate with higher headquarters, with other units and with sources of information. Too many of our systems are either operating in isolation or are dependent upon jerry-rigged solutions.
- 2. Lack of timely intelligence in the right hands.** Separate agencies collecting intelligence often do not share information that may be relevant for another agency. At the same time, agencies are sometimes unable to internally disseminate intelligence within their own organization in time to stop a shipment. Information must be made available to all involved law enforcement agencies in time to stop shipments of drugs.

3. **Lack of efficient non-intrusive inspection technology to screen cross-border traffic and detect drugs.** Currently there are only three truck scanners in place along the border. Traffickers quickly adjust to the construction of such devices, and shift drugs elsewhere. We must develop, test and field technology that can detect drugs while not hindering legitimate commerce.

B. Southwest Border drug interdiction failure. Our efforts to date have not yielded the benefits we had hoped for with the exception of marijuana, though early 1998 seizure data are showing improvements:

- In 1997, we inspected 1.09 million of the 3.54 million commercial trucks and railcars that crossed into the US from Mexico. In just 6 incidents, cocaine was found within the commercial cargo contained by these trucks and railcars.
- Cocaine seizures declined steadily between 1994 and 1997.
- Heroin seizures are down from 1996's record level.
- Methamphetamine seizures in 1997 were 36 percent lower than in 1996.
- Cocaine seizures as a result of investigations in 1997 were about one eighth of what they were in 1994.
- Cocaine seizures between POEs (not including traffic checkpoints) declined by 90 percent between 1995 and 1997.
- Despite resource enhancements at the Southwest border in recent years, approximately 80 percent of the cocaine destined for the United States through Mexico still crosses the border undetected.

These interdiction trends indicate a challenge posed by drug traffickers that is not being adequately met by our drug control system.

III. The Response. For the last three years, the many federal agencies involved in law enforcement, commerce and transportation along our border have been engaged in a process to determine how we can best fulfill these anti-drug imperatives. The Attorney General and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce, Defense, and Transportation, and the leadership of the DEA, the Border Patrol, Customs, and the INS have been integral to this effort. Our common response is to create a Southwest Border Counter-Drug White Paper for approval by the President during the fall of 1998.

A. The Southwest Border counter-drug principles. Three core U.S. principles guide all our efforts:

1. **Maintain deference to the U.S. Constitution.** Maintain the proper balance of federalism. Maintain respect for civil liberties and rights. No U.S. militarization of the border.

2. Respect Mexican sovereignty.

3. Maintain the benefits of NAFTA trade and the enormously increased flow of commerce between our nations.

B. The Southwest Border counter-drug objectives. There are six counter-drug objectives to be achieved:

- 1. Ensure the rule of law along the entire border. Federal drug control agencies must be prepared to quickly deploy resources to reinforce states and localities threatened by traffickers.**
- 2. Control and interdict drugs along the entire border at all times: We must develop the capacity to control the entire border at all times, preventing traffickers from merely shifting their operations to avoid detection and capture. Build over time a high technology Customs Service and a 20,000+ person Border Patrol, with 500+ miles of fencing, anti-intrusion sensors and supporting infrastructure.**
- 3. Act in a coherent and coordinated manner that uses the counter-drug capabilities of each agency to the fullest extent available and builds on our strengths. No one element of the federal government can alone solve the problem of drug trafficking across the Southwest Border. Only by using the resources of all our agencies, can we build a border infrastructure that will defeat the flow of drugs.**
- 4. Organize counter-drug efforts for accountability, responsibility and success.**
 - a. Establish a Southwest Border Counter-Drug Coordinator.**
 - One federal officer responsible for all counter-drug efforts along the border.
 - Presidential appointee; 4 year term; Senate confirmed.
 - Small staff -- Southwest Border Counter-Drug Coordinating Authority (drawn from existing capabilities).
 - Located on the Border (El Paso: geographic center; already EPIC hub for intelligence, Operation Alliance and JTF-6 for military support).
 - Authority to review and integrate Southwest Border drug policy, procedures, budget and resource levels, construction and control of infrastructure, and intelligence.
 - Authority to request redeployment of counter-drug interdiction resources from federal officials.

b. Establish Counter-Drug Operations Coordinators at POEs (leadership- Customs).

- Oversee all counter-drug policy, procedures, and intelligence at their assigned POE.
- Authority for direct coordination of resources and infrastructure.
- Responsible for coordinating with state and local U.S. counter-drug authorities and serving as liaison with counterpart Mexican authorities at their POE.

c. Establish Counter-Drug Operations Coordinators for each sector between POEs (leadership- Border Patrol).

- Oversee all counter-drug policy, procedures and intelligence along their assigned sector.
- Authority for direct coordination of resources and infrastructure.
- Responsible for coordinating with state and local U.S. counter-drug authorities and serving as liaison with counterpart Mexican authorities within their sector.

d. Train border counter-drug law enforcement agents, officers and officials. Joint training will integrate and coordinate counter-drug efforts.**5. Harness counter-drug technology.**

- a. Develop and deploy advanced technologies that will increase the probability of detecting drugs and other contraband while facilitating the rapid flow of economic traffic.
- b. Increase the number of counter-drug technology-assisted inspections.
- c. Intercept illegal drug money, weapons, and precursor chemicals.

6. Work cooperatively with Mexico. We are committed to working in partnership with Mexico to jointly confront drug-related corruption and violence, while acting in absolute deference to sovereign national responsibilities on both sides of the border.

Date: 12/11/97 Time: 16:07

bTranscript of White House Briefing by Barry McCaffery (2 of 2)

To: National Desk

Contact: White House Press Office, 202-456-2100

WASHINGTON, Dec. 11 /U.S. Newswire/ -- Following is a transcript of a White House press briefing by Gen. Barry McCaffrey (2 of 2):

Q This might be in the handout; I haven't had a chance to read it yet. The President said it's a banner year. What's a banner year? Is it the most drugs ever seized? It's just a lot of drugs?

GENERAL MCCAFFREY: I think it was the best year ever for the Coast Guard, hands down. It's certainly the most organized we've ever been. We finally got a system where we think we're pulling together, so we're pretty optimistic. But there's a lot more to do.

The drug threat can't be solved with interdiction, but -- I just spent two hours yesterday with Erskine Bowles, the White House Chief of Staff; I talked to the President about it again today; my orders are, by the State of the Union speech to have a concept ready to share -- he's already talked to the Speaker of the House about it -- on the southwest border initiative. We're going to try and stop drug smuggling into the United States across the Mexican-U.S. border in the next five years -- substantially stop it -- while still allowing our second biggest trading partner to continue economic cooperation.

And we think that's achievable. But that's what we're working on right now. The Coast Guard, the Caribbean effort, the air bridge from Peru up into Colombia -- we have clamped down on that -- we, meaning Peruvians, Colombians, U.S. Air Force, Navy, CIA is involved in it. We're doing pretty good at some aspects to it.

Q Is that five-year commitment new?

GENERAL MCCAFFREY: It will be when the President announces it.

Q What are your initial thoughts on how that can be accomplished? That's a tremendous feat.

GENERAL MCCAFFREY: Well, what we've been saying is -- you know, you look at this border -- the biggest open border in the world is the U.S. and Mexico, and the numbers are staggering. There's nothing like it anywhere on the face of the Earth. It's 260 million people a year; it's 82 million cars, 3.5 million trucks, 340,000 rail cars. I mean this is big doings. Bigger -- more trade with Mexico than Japan.

And if you got to one of the 39 places on the border where that traffic is coming back and forth, you watch 10 miles of trucks backed up in Mexico. Now, we've got 20,000 men and women in the Customs Service who are trying to stop these drugs with hand-held mirrors and hand-held technology. But we've tested a couple of devices -- one at Ota, Mesa California, the other one at Calexico. We took some X ray machines designed to look through Soviet ICBM shipping containers -- part of the START I regime. We said let's use them on trucks, let's use them on rail cars. They work. They absolutely work.

You can see 20 kilograms of cocaine inside lead in the battery container or in sealed, welded into walls of the truck, or suspended by wires in a load of wet concrete. And so what we said is we've got to proliferate this stuff and we've got to go to the 39 ports of entry, we've got to allow trucks to come across, we've got to improve the intelligence system so it supports Customs and border patrol.

Janet Reno and George Tennant and the CIA Director and I are now finished phase one of our intelligence review, and we're going to

sit down and listen to the results in the next six months. They're going to say, how do we get this sophisticated Intel system to provide usable stuff to Customs officers, border patrol, and DEA. I mean, it's already working, but we need to give them intercept information. My guess is give us five years of hard work, get technology in the hands of the Customs Service, do fencing and censor technology and an adequate border patrol, and we can make it so difficult to smuggle these incredibly lethal cargoes across the border that they'll go to sea. And we want them out at sea, not wrecking the U.S.-Mexican civil population with corruption and violence. And, by the way, we're going to follow them to sea, too.

I better run. Yes, sir?

Q Before you do, General, describe the budget fight. What's happening with that?

GENERAL MCCAFFREY: Scarce dollars. You've got to make a good case for what you're up to. I went down and presented a one hour argument to Congressman Bob Livingston, House Appropriations Chairman, about the '99 budget. And I've been over and I talked to the OMB, Bob Rubin, Frank Raines, Erskine Bowles, to make the case to pay for a national strategy that will drop drug abuse by 50 percent in the next 10 years.

Today the President announced -- we were flat thrilled --announced \$72 million increase in the DOD budget. DOD is only a modest supporting element in the national drug strategy, but I'm enormously grateful for Secretary Cohen's support in increasing his budget, this '99 budget going to OMB.

I think we're on the right track, bottom line. But you've got to make the case for dollars or you can't get them out of --

Q Is that DOD money -- does some of it get to the Coast Guard or is that completely separate?

GENERAL MCCAFFREY: No. The Department of Transportation funds the Coast Guard. That \$72 million increase is going to go to Caribbean interdiction, Mexican's countersmuggling operations in Mexico, the Andean Ridge Strategy -- Peru, Bolivia, Colombia -- and then, finally, the Caribbean initiative. We went down with the President to Barbados and had a Summit of the Caribbean. So now we're going to go back and fund some initiatives to support these 18 binational agreements we've done in the last two years now with Caribbean-based nations. So we're really grateful for Secretary Cohen's support and leadership on this.

But everyone is involved -- \$17.4 billion is what I asked OMB for.

Okay. Thanks very much.

END 2:00 P.M. EST

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/U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/

APNP-12-11-97 1613EST

Date: 12/11/97 Time: 19:08

US to unveil five-year plan to end drug trade along Mexican border

MIAMI, Florida, Dec 11 (AFP) - The US government will unveil a detailed plan next month to drastically curb drug-trafficking along its border with Mexico within the next five years, officials said Thursday.

The initiative will be officially announced on January 27, during President Bill Clinton's State of the Union speech to Congress.

Still, White House officials were willing to share a few early details about the plan.

"We're going to try and stop drug smuggling into the United States across the Mexican-US border in the next five years, substantially stop it, while still allowing our second biggest trading partner to continue economic cooperation," said US drug "czar", retired general Barry McCaffrey.

Each year, millions of people cross the US border with Mexico, which stretches some 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles.)

But the US southern border also has become one of the country's main points of entry for illegal drugs, McCaffrey said, pointing out that it is "the biggest open border in the world."

"There's nothing like it anywhere on the face of the Earth," McCaffrey observed.

McCaffrey said details about the anti-drug program would be made public next month, but said one idea under consideration is to employ new X-ray technology that can peer into the interior of metal, and even concrete receptacles, which might conceal illicit drugs.

"We said, 'let's use them on trucks, let's use them on rail cars.' They work. They absolutely work," McCaffrey said.

chz/sg/pfm



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

December 10, 1997

MEMO FOR THE HONORABLE ERSKINE BOWLES,
WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: BARRY McCaffrey, DIRECTOR ONDCP

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "B. McCaffrey", is written over the word "DIRECTOR" in the "FROM" line.

SUBJECT: THE SOUTHWEST BORDER COUNTER-DRUG CONCEPT

PURPOSE. To outline to the White House Chief of Staff an ONDCP concept to chair an interagency task force to address the drug trafficking problem along the Southwest border.

PROPOSED TASK FORCE OBJECTIVES.

1. Conduct a federal review of the drug trafficking problem along the SWB (report to the President's Drug Policy Council (PDPC) within 90 days).
2. Submit specific recommendations (to the PDPC by 1 June) on:
 - a. Organization of Customs' POEs to confront drug smuggling.
 - b. Augmentation of barriers and surveillance devices along the SWB to counter the drug threat.
 - c. Appropriate roles for Op. Alliance and EPIC to coordinate SWB drug-control efforts.
 - d. Responsibilities of a SWB Coordinator for the counter-drug effort.
 - e. Specific FY2000 - 2004 programmatic plus-ups (i.e. end-state of Border Patrol and other significant agencies) in support of Goal 4 of the President's *National Drug Control Strategy*.

RECOMMENDATION. That you support conclusions of the ONDCP-chaired interagency study to better organize SWB efforts in support of Goal 4 of the President's *National Drug Control Strategy* – "Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat."



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

December 10, 1997

MEMO FOR THE HONORABLE ERSKINE BOWLES,
WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: BARRY McCaffrey, DIRECTOR ONDCP

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "BOM", is written over the word "DIRECTOR" in the "FROM" line.

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RECOMMENDATION. That you support conclusions of the ONDCP-chaired interagency study to better organize SWB efforts in support of Goal 4 of the President's *National Drug Control Strategy* – "Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat."



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Washington, D.C. 20503

December 10, 1997

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Achieving unity of Effort Across the 2000-Mile Southwest Border

Purpose. To describe challenges that must be overcome to achieve greater coherence in the federal response to the drug trafficking challenge along the Southwest Border.

Facts.

- **Seven governmental departments with overlapping responsibilities:** Justice, Treasury, State, Transportation, Defense, Interior, Agriculture.
- **Twenty-two agencies and programs with overlapping responsibilities:** ATF, Border Patrol, Border Research Technology Center (NIJ), Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, EPIC, FBI, FORSCOM, HIDTAs, INS, IRS, INL (State), JIATFs, JTF-Six, Marshals Service, National Guard, ONDCP, OCDETFs, Operation Alliance, USACOM, U.S. Attorneys. More than 11,000 federal agents, inspectors, and officials committed to the SWB.
- Federal departments, agencies, and programs spend approximately \$2B each fiscal year to address the drug problem along the SWB.
- On the U.S. side, four states and twenty-three counties create overlapping jurisdictional challenges.
- Retail value of drugs entering the U.S. across the SWB is approximately \$30B. These drugs kill about 10,000 Americans a year and cause some \$35B in damages to our society.
- Major plus-ups are underway:
 1. Customs' budget for Southwest border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93.
 2. The number of assigned DEA special agents has increased 37 percent since FY90.
 3. The number of assigned INS agents has almost doubled since FY90.
 4. DOD's drug control budget for the Southwest border has increased 53 percent since FY91.
 5. The number of U.S. Attorneys handling cases in the Southwest border region has increased by 80 percent since FY90.

CONCLUSION: We need a better coordinated and coherent response to the problem.


SOUTHWEST BORDER POEs and HIDTAs

12/10/97



Additional Southwest border Coordination Nodes

NDICC
FinCEN
CNC
NSA, Medina
DEA/FBI Coordination Center
Bi-Lateral Task Forces
5 BLMs
JIATF Key West
JIATF Panama
JIATF San Francisco




● POEs HIDTAs

- ① California
SAN DIEGO
- ② Arizona
TUCSON
- ③ New Mexico
LAS CRUCES
- ④ West Texas
EL PASO
- ⑤ South Texas
SAN ANTONIO

Total federal law enforcement personnel on Southwest border approximately 11,000

A Preliminary Organizing Concept



12/10/97

Office of National Drug Control Policy

SWB Coordinator Functions



- **Bring to bear coordinating authority similar to ONDCP's on a national problem.**
- **Senate confirmee status would make him a natural administration spokesperson to the congress and state and local authorities.**
- **Specific actions:**
 1. Submit annual reports.
 2. Set federal priorities.
 3. Provide budgetary guidance to federal agencies.
 4. Establish standards and accountability.



Office of the Deputy Attorney General
United States Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, D. C. 20530

TO: Jose Cerda

FAX: 456-7028

FROM: Eileen C. Mayer
Associate Deputy Attorney General

VOICE: (202) 305-7845
FAX: (202) 514-9368

Total Pages (excluding this cover): 18

Additional Message:

Jose: attached are ① Background + talking points prepared for the AG for her meeting with McCaffrey, et al on 11/12; ② the agenda of the Southern Frontiers meeting she held on 11/19; ③ short minutes of that meeting. Feel free to page me through the Command Center tonight or call me in my office in the am if you want to discuss. Thanks. Eileen

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEETING ON SOUTHWEST BORDER CONCERNS**BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS****BACKGROUND:**

- Coordination of law enforcement:
 - ▶ DEA, FBI and USCS are of the opinion that coordination has never been better in terms of law enforcement, especially as it relates to the Southwest Border and through the Special Operations Division. The federal agencies work on the Southwest Border Initiative OCDETF investigations often in task forces that include state and local law enforcement officers and have thus improved this working relationship.
 - ▶ One Southwest Border law enforcement coordination effort began in 1995, with the "Southwest Border Council," comprised of the six U.S. Attorneys in the region, DEA/FBI/USCS-Headquarters senior personnel, Criminal Division attorneys (DAAG, NDDS Chief, and Public Integrity attorneys). The group was augmented by the regional Special Agents in Charge of the investigative agencies and then by INS/Border Patrol representation.
 - Issues of the need for advanced wiretap training for prosecutors and agents; for better cooperation and more aggressive work on multi-district cases; need for increased resources in some districts; and the like, were addressed and resolved at these sessions
 - Meetings were convened approximately every six weeks with interim conference calls among the participants
 - ▶ The Attorney General's Executive Committee of the Southwest Border Council was later convened here in Washington, with Alan Bersin as chair, and DEA, FBI, USCS, INS/Border Patrol (Operations chiefs), Treasury-Enforcement, and DOJ-CrimDiv as participants along with representatives from DOJ/ODAG and ONDCP-General Counsel. After several meetings -- meetings were characterized by halting progress as the participants tried to ascertain how to prioritize their work, but also by a general willingness to work together to increase cooperation -- the meetings were discontinued.
 - ▶ Border Czar Bersin has offered to draft a proposal for the restructuring of the Executive Committee of the Southwest Border Council and has suggested that

"Operation Alliance" be selected as the on-the-scene staff for the Council. [Note: several participants would disagree with selecting Operation Alliance for anything as this group has been identified as filled with "dead wood" and working to little effect.]

- ▶ Other mechanisms for Southwest Border law enforcement coordination include -- for example,
 - the DEA and INS/Border Patrol have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding that authorizes the Border Patrol seizing drugs at checkpoints to process those drugs and take the cases to the federal and state/local prosecutors as appropriate. The MOU has been implemented and, according to the U.S. Attorneys, is working well within most, but not all, districts;
 - the OCDETF and HIDTA programs;
 - various working relationship between federal and state/local law enforcement agencies and prosecutors' offices.
- Coordination at the Ports of Entry:
 - ▶ USCS and INS/Border Patrol have worked in several POEs to form "Port Councils" that result in better coordination and sharing of the inspection responsibilities.
 - ▶ The Port Council concept is expected to expand across the border in time.
- Coordination between US and Mexican counterparts:
 - ▶ Attorney General to Attorney General contacts and meetings are opportunities for the more candid exchanges on mutual problems.
 - ▶ The US/Mexican Senior Law Enforcement Plenary brings the DEA, FBI, USCS, IRS, CrimDiv as well as representatives from State/INL and ARA, and ONDCP together with their Mexican counterparts and grapples at a more operational level (often effectively through its working groups and Plenary sessions) with issues of the Border Task Forces, stolen vehicles, fugitive and legal issues, prisoner transfers, and the like.
 - ▶ The US/Mexican High Level Contact Group -- with higher level governmental participation -- tends to be a more formal and publicly focused meeting group for US/Mexican drug control coordination.

- ▶ The Border Liaison Mechanism combines US and Mexican border authorities -- federal, state and local -- and is a more local forum for localized problems (violence, security, etc.).
- Director McCaffrey/ONDCP proposals:
 - ▶ In January 1997, ONDCP convened a Southwest Border Conference for federal, state and local law enforcement representatives to discuss, among other topics, coordination of activities along the border
 - In advance of the meeting Treasury and DOJ had learned that ONDCP intended to propose a "Command and Control Center" (using a military model) at the border to direct law enforcement and border control. When challenged on this proposal in advance, ONDCP withdrew the proposal and continued with the conference. At the conference, however, ONDCP sought to reopen this topic of controlling or directing coordination. All attendees -- federal, state and local (with the latter two being the most vocal) -- rejected this idea, commenting that coordination was the best it had ever been and such a command central was not necessary or desirable.
 - ▶ In September 1997, after an end of August trip (including representatives from all affected departments and components) along the border led by General McCaffrey, he was prepared to send his personal trip report and unilateral recommendations to Congress as a chapter in the Report to Congress on US/Mexican cooperation. [See TAB B.] The Attorney General, Treasury Under Secretary, White House Counsel discouraged sending such a report to the Hill without full consultation. ONDCP backed down on sending the report/recommendation and instead agreed to bring together representatives from the departments and components included in the trip to exchange insights and develop recommendations. No such interagency meeting has yet been convened and what might have been a beneficial process has not undertaken. However, on November 5, 1997, Director McCaffrey forwarded the same challenged document in a slightly reworked format to the Congress.
 - Among the novel -- and unvetted -- recommendations were:
 - assign a single federal official [Note: did not say federal "law enforcement" official] to oversee all federal drug control efforts along the border

- strengthen the five Southwest Border HIDTAs and ensure that they coordinate all federal, state and local counterdrug activities within their jurisdictions
- create an intelligence system connecting the five Southwest Border HIDTAs to inform and advise law enforcement and policy makers
[Note: there was no recognition of the planned comprehensive intelligence architecture study that might offer a different assessment or course for intelligence planning]
- In October 1997, General McCaffrey forwarded a Memorandum to the President including these same challenged, unilateral recommendations. [See TAB C -- Close Hold.]
 - most of the same challenged, unvetted proposals were repeated in the Memorandum to the President
- From time to time, General McCaffrey has testified before Congress and has been quoted in the media about his ideas and plans for the Southwest Border (including, for example, the need for cutting edge technology at the border to aid in inspections, and, in the past a call for 20,000 Border Patrol agents). He most certainly has and will continue to be able to offer additional topics and ideas for enhancement of coordination and functioning at the border.

TALKING POINTS:

- Together, Treasury and Justice are seeking to strengthen and enhance our working relationship generally, but also specifically along the Southwest Border
 - ▶ at the Ports and in the cities and towns
 - ▶ among federal law enforcement agencies
 - ▶ with the prosecutors' offices
 - ▶ with our state and local counterparts
 - ▶ with -- as appropriate -- our Mexican counterparts
- With the border efforts of Hardline, Gatekeeper and others and with the investigative ingenuity and effort of the Southwest Border Initiative, together we have had some remarkable successes and, one would, impact for the better in our communities
- The law enforcement challenge is complex,
 - ▶ as we increase our presence and effectiveness at some of the POEs, other sectors along the border become targets for the drug traffickers and alien smugglers
 - ▶ the traffickers that escape detection bring their drugs and often their violence to the border cities and on into the border states and then throughout the U.S.
 - ▶ as we increase the seizure and arrest numbers, we overwhelm the state and local enforcement, prosecution and incarceration capabilities
- Several departments and agencies are working together on the comprehensive intelligence architecture study that may offer recommendations and options for courses of action
- We share the appreciation of the need to make "cutting edge" technology available to our inspectors and enforcement personnel
- We also recognize the need to develop and increase cooperation with those we feel we can trust among our Mexican counterparts and appreciate General McCaffrey's leadership in fostering better bilateral relations in the drug control area
- I thought it might be helpful -- in a very informal, candid fashion -- to discuss any proposals, concerns, future plans, prospects for the border area and how we might together enhance our cooperative efforts

- Perhaps General McCaffrey might offer some of the insights he has gained through his Southwest Border trip in August and his study of our problems in the border area ...
 - ▶ **"Build infrastructure to support the rule of law"**¹
 - develop a strategic 5-year program to build access roads for patrolling, to erect fences and lights in high trafficking areas
 - where are we deficient now? budget consequences?
 - assign one federal agency responsibility for this
 - which federal agency would ONDCP suggest for this?
 - ▶ **"Strengthen the HIDTA program"**
 - ensuring that the five HDTAs (along the SWB) coordinate all federal, state and local counterdrug activities in their jurisdictions
 - how would this be done? is it appropriate? all counterdrug activities is very expansive
 - from those coordinated from federal headquarters to those street crimes covered by the local authorities
 - and with Mexican counterpart authorities
 - why is HIDTA the best and most appropriate mechanism for this? US law enforcement is working well with counterparts in very controlled situations and this course may be the better course until trust/confidence can be more fully established
 - ▶ **"Implement a systems approach to drug control efforts"**
 - our programs need to respond to the dynamic nature of the drug threat and department and agency build-ups need to be coordinated

¹ Bolded topic heads and indented proposals introduced by "--" are taken from the ONDCP Southwest Border trip report/memo; the items that follow introduced by "○" are commentary.

- where are the problems that ONDCP has noticed? agencies/departments out of step? we recognize the need to work with state prosecutors' offices and will be working to find a solution to their overload
- ▶ **"Develop a comprehensive intelligence architecture"**
 - current U.S. intelligence capabilities along the Southwest border are clearly inadequate; need to integrate all efforts in a seamless way along the border
 - shouldn't we wait for the assessment and recommendations of the in-depth intelligence architecture study before taking any action?
 - encourage law enforcement to conduct intelligence-driven information-based operations
 - suggest that this is being done by federal agencies and by federal agencies working with state and local authorities
- ▶ **"Improve accountability"**
 - assign direct responsibility for coordinating all federal drug control efforts along the Southwest border to one federal official
 - who would you envision? federal, state and local law enforcement authorities at ONDCP's January Southwest Border Conference all were of the opinion that coordination was working well
 - designate an "in-charge" federal at each POE
 - aren't the coordination issues being worked through by the Port Councils and agencies among themselves?
- ▶ **"Develop a system that matches resources with threats"**
 - develop a capability to track the drug threat, drug control assets, and sectoral responsibilities into an automated, digital, grid-based schematic format covering both sides of the border
 - await the assessment and recommendations of the intelligence architecture study. also

note that this concern relates to transport across the border, i.e., interdiction, more than investigation of the trafficking organizations

-- create an intelligence system through the five Southwest border HIDTAs

- again, await the study results and recommendations; it may be that the HIDTAs are not the appropriate nodes of communication of intelligence

► "Integrate counter-drug technology"

-- every truck and train that crosses the border into the US can be subjected to at least three different non-intrusive inspections that can detect illegal drugs

- feasibility within trade and commerce concerns?

-- the physical and/or electronic transfer of drug monies out of the US can be detected

- how would this be accomplished?

-- sensors, lighting and remote night vision devices can monitor areas between POEs

- and?

Draft Agenda, revised 11/17/97; 6:00pm

11/19/97 SOUTHERN FRONTIER LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUES MEETING¹

I. OVERVIEW OF THE THREAT

- A. CNC to provide an overview of the threat -- flow/routes of drugs from South America to the U.S.; to be further detailed or otherwise described by DEA, USCS, USCG, others
- B. Where are the gaps; suggestions for new programs/collections/efforts

II. SOUTHWEST BORDER

- A. At the Border (Ports of Entry and Checkpoints)
 - 1. Technology -- coordination of Treasury and DOJ, and assistance from DoD
 - 2. Other infrastructure improvements (fences, lights, etc.) -- DOJ and Treasury to coordinate
 - 3. Coordination in growth of agencies/prosecutors offices strength -- DOJ and Treasury
 - 4. Reduction in level of violence in the border communities -- DOJ and Treasury
- B. Investigations of Major Trafficking Groups
 - 1. Southwest Border Initiative to continue; strategy for takedowns of groups on the US side; advanced technology, means/modes of transport of the traffickers. DEA/FBI/USCS/USAOs/CrimDiv
 - 2. Replicate the "San Diego" project of US/Mexican investigator and prosecutor cooperation; DEA/FBI/USCS/USAOs/CrimDiv
- C. Plans/intentions for military support and assistance in the Southwest Border area
- D. Where/how can we be working more effectively together?

¹ Topic areas should suggest ACTION ITEMS and TIMETABLE for preparation and completion -- some long term, some of shorter duration.

III. MEXICO and CENTRAL AMERICA**A. MEXICO**

1. Need to press for and assist in Mexico's implementing its new organized crime and money laundering legislation Treasury, DOJ, State/INL
2. Other coordinated training proposals -- ICITAP
3. Corruption information/intelligence

B. CENTRAL AMERICA

1. USG intelligence/information and capabilities/gaps to identify trafficking organizations, their transportation means and routes, their financial and money laundering centers, services, means, and their obtaining precursor and essential chemicals; recommendations? CNC, DEA, USCS, USCG, others
2. Which countries are the most vulnerable to the traffickers and what are we or should we be doing, for example in Nicaragua, Belize, Panama (Colon Free Zone), Guatemala, others
3. Where and how should we focus our efforts to the best effect?
 - a. What is the strategy for pressing extradition reform in the region State, CrimDiv
4. Where is maritime cooperation the best and the worst? How can we best support the USCG in these efforts? USCG
5. Operational initiatives planned or underway within the region -- US support and assistance?
6. Training plans, training centers, and coordination of these efforts within the USG? State/INL, ICITAP, FBI, DEA, USCS, others
7. What more can we be doing or how better coordinating in the regional effort?

IV. SOUTH AMERICA

A. Colombia --

1. Situation review: extradition; implementation of money laundering, asset forfeiture, enhanced narcotics penalties; changes in the Fiscalía; presidential elections
2. What should we be doing that we are not doing to support and assist those who are making or could be making progress? Training (money laundering, asset forfeiture, complex narcotics cases), CNP investigations of emerging groups, aircraft denial (forfeiture, etc.) DEA, CrimDiv, OPDAT/ICITAP
3. identifying for USG purposes those in whom we should place our trust

B. Prospects for Peru? Bolivia? Venezuela? Brazil?

1. Peru --

- a. Situation: the "air bridge" has had success leading to some movement to maritime (riverine) and to neighboring country overflights; very little progress on judicial reform
- b. what more can/should USG be doing in denying trafficking transportation means and routes; in aiding in judicial reform? State/INL, DEA, ICITAP/OPDAT

2. Bolivia --

- a. Situation: initial critique of the Banzer Administration CNC, State, DEA
- b. is there more we can/should be doing? recommendations?

3. Venezuela --

- a. Situation: country is struggling to undergo major judicial system overhaul; how can we assist? problem of promises versus performance; past/present corruption and effect on meaningful coordination of US and Venezuelan law enforcement and intelligence gathering efforts State/ARA, INL; DEA; CNC

- b. Recommendations on supporting the reform of the judicial system and other advice, guidance, assistance? State/INL, OPDAT/ICITAP

4. Brazil --

- a. Situation: public statements by Brazilian counterdrug officials suggest a readiness to join regional counterdrug efforts, but what actions have been taken to date; forecast? CNC, DEA, State/ARA, INL
- b. Recommendations on how US can be most effective in its work with Brazil -- State/ARA, INL, DEA, CNC

5. Other countries we need to support/encourage (e.g., Argentina) or engage/confront?

6. Gaps in US intelligence, assistance/support in the region? Recommendations?

7. Where can coordination of our limited law enforcement (and intelligence) efforts be focused to best effect? Recommendations?

V. CARIBBEAN/PUERTO RICO/SOUTH FLORIDA

- A. Overview of the threat -- any change in routes, level of threat detected? Assessment of other islands' trafficking patterns CNC, DEA, USCG

B. Focus on the Dominican Republic

- 1. Extradition -- next steps? DOJ, State
- 2. Money laundering projects -- report of progress, plans Treasury
- 3. Transit of drugs from Haiti then on to U.S. -- need to identify, track, disrupt, arrest and extradite CNC, DEA, CrimDiv

C. Progress on the Justice and Security issues for the Caribbean? Coordination with U.N. and EU? State/INL

D. Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands

1. Situation: remains a primary entry point for drugs coming into the US and for entry of drug proceeds into the US financial system; untoward level of violence; local law enforcement lacks capacity to enforce, investigate, prosecute with sufficient effectiveness; effect of increased federal resources? Recommendations? DEA, FBI, USCS, Treasury

2. Other --

(1) Border search legal analysis document; what additional steps should/can be taken to increase inspections? USCS

(2) Status of secure communication (databases, etc.) from continental U.S. DEA, DoD

(3) Status of the ROTHRR DoD

E. South Florida straits and "mother ships" -- status? What are next steps? USCG, others

Draft, 11/18/97, M.L.Warren

SOUTHERN FRONTIER MEETING, 11/19/97, MINUTES

- I. Memorandum from ONDCP acknowledged and read as lead-off to each segment of the agenda.
- II. CNC "Scene Setter" -- oral presentation to be followed by preparation of written work; overview -- have seen some fundamental shifts in organizations, cultivation, routes/patterns
 - A. Organizations by region:
 1. In Colombia -- Groups are smaller, less powerful, less flamboyant, greater emphasis on security of communications: Henao Montoya (most powerful), "Caracol," and Coneo Rios, plus emerging group in plains east of Andes
 2. In Mexico -- Juarez Cartel still most effective, now with brother Vicente in charge; AFO is most violent; Gulf Cartel in disarray, some subsumed within Juarez; also the Amezcuas for methamphetamine and precursors; gaps in collection are of inner workings of Juarez Cartel and AFO areas
 3. In Caribbean -- Colombian drugs (cocaine and heroin) being moved to U.S. (by Dominicans) and Europe; have greatly increased collection capabilities in area
 4. In Central America -- see Guatemala as increasing target (the Berganza group emerging); gap as to other countries
 - B. Cultivation:
 1. In Peru the "air bridge" denial program accounted for 18% reduction in production last year and may be an additional 25% this year, however, prices have been inching up for leaf and are approaching the break-even point once more for the cocaleros
 2. In Colombia net cultivation increased by 32% last year and is expected to be up again this year; heroin production continues but must be recognized as less than 5% of world's supply [N.B. but a much larger percentage of the US market supply]
 3. In Bolivia the net cultivation is relatively unchanged

C. Consequences in route changes and other trends:

1. Colombia has become increasingly self-reliant on production;
2. other shifts show that the Bolivians are seeking to independently market their product, i.e., not through the Colombians, in Europe and Africa, using the Southern Cone as their staging area;
3. Peru suppliers are shifting westward by boat and road, making Ecuador more and more important, on the way to the Amazon and Brazil; Caribbean routes have not changed;
4. Central America is a secondary route to the U.S., using the Pan American highway as an alternative to the air and sea routes, the seizures of drugs in Central America increased 75% last year over the previous year;
5. Mexicans have sought to buy cocaine supplies outright from Bolivia and Peru to distribute through their networks in the U.S., many of these efforts have been thwarted probably by Colombian tipsters

D. Collection gaps; and importance of timeliness of information --

1. In interior Mexico -- for DEA the vetted units remain the best source of information; USCS information is integrated into DEA intelligence system abroad
2. USCS through ACSI program is working on carrier security by working with business and industry abroad

E. Importance to all of corruption information, aggregated and updated

ACTION ITEM: Focus on official corruption in Mexico: DEA/FBI/USCS, working with CNC, will put together a list of Mexican officials for whom there is some information of corruption; will be updated.

CNC to coordinate effort to fill the "black hole" in collection in Mexico and to decide how far we can go.

III. SOUTHWEST BORDER

- A. Violence issues: FBI reported on New Mexico gang-related violence in Las Cruces and Demming

ACTION ITEMS: ONDCP to circulate "tasking" memo in next few days that assigns topic to DOJ;

Eileen Mayer, ODAG, to report back (working with FBI, others).

- B. Technology: Treasury assessment now underway, will meet with DOJ and then together with DoD; ONDCP also has a Technology Board (but apparently not focused on SWB problem); USCS expects to have 50 POEs fully equipped with non-intrusive technology in 5 years, but focus must also be on the between-the-ports areas

ACTION ITEMS: at POEs -- assessment now being made by Treasury/USCS, will then meet with DOJ/INS-BP, and thereafter together with DoD;

ONDCP to supply advisory identifying which sites or sectors where lights, fences are needed.

- C. Joint proposal (Treasury and DOJ) for funding for the area -- is being worked.

ACTION ITEM: Joint proposal for funding for the border will be prepared.

- D. Major trafficking groups -- problems of encryption and need for technical advice and assistance and of the need to develop a master plan for the takedown of these organizations operating in the U.S.; will also include building replicas of the "San Diego Project" along the border (Juarez/El Paso, Chihuahua/?, Gulf Coast/Brownsville-Houston).

ACTION ITEMS: DEA (and FBI, USCS) need for wiretap encryption technical assistance -- Scott Charney (to be notified by DAAG Warren) to meet with DoD and DEA [along with NDDS-Drug Intelligence Unit representative].

DEA/FBI/USCS/CrimDiv/USAOs to develop a proposal for a "national game plan" for dismantling these major trafficking groups and replicating the "San Diego Project," by the next meeting.

IV. MEXICO

- A. ONDCP requests that law enforcement prioritize law enforcement issues for Mexico

ACTION ITEM: ONDCP to provide paper making this request, by next meeting.

- B. Training, other than specialized training, seems to be stalled on the Mexican side; State/INL reports that the Mexicans ignore the need for the more general training upgrades, have no institutional capacity to move on this, no one is authorized to receive this support; State/INL requested the Attorney General's support on this.

ACTION ITEM: State/INL to press once more, but also to provide talking points on this topic for the Attorney General's visit to Mexico, 11/25-27/97.

V. CENTRAL AMERICA

- A. ILEA-South site in Panama remains uncertain, State/INL advises that an interagency plan for alternative sites must be developed

ACTION ITEM: Alternative sites for ILEA-South: State/INL to convene interagency meeting to draw up options in case Panama does not work out.

- B. Follow up to the Central American Ministers meeting needs to be on the ground and available as liaison and training conduit.

ACTION ITEMS: Explore concept of on-site interagency regional training/liaison capacity in Central America and at some later time in other areas (Southern Cone, Caribbean, elsewhere): report on this at next meeting [who].

DOJ detailee to State/INL: to be provided.

VI. SOUTH AMERICA

- A. Venezuela is an important country in terms of drugs coming to the U.S. (25% approximate of cocaine); questions whether we can rely upon judicial/legal leadership and what action should we be taking (training, prison experts, other)

ACTION ITEM: Venezuelan legal (Badel) and judicial (Sosa) leadership: can they be trusted to be reviewed and reported on by State/ARA and CNC.

- B. Peru -- USG has three accents for Peru, alternative development, riverine project, and judicial reform -- this third area is completely stalled; Brazil and Southern Cone neighbors might benefit from the same regional interagency training/liaison capacity, see above.

VII. CARIBBEAN/PUERTO RICO

- A. In the Caribbean, Treasury notes that the PDD42 process is ongoing and reaching some decision points.
- B. Dominican Republic -- the recent GTO has had some noticeable effect within Dominican Republic demonstrating substantial money laundering problems; extradition has been on hold but State suggests a trip in the near future to cover negotiation of extradition and other topics

ACTION ITEM: State diplomatic trip to Dominican Republic to include extradition negotiations will include DOJ representative.

- C. Haiti report -- that the Colombian traffickers are seeking to gain foothold in Haiti (as a transit point for their drugs, enroute to Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and then into continental U.S.); need to develop an overall plan to thwart this Colombian trafficker effort

ACTION ITEM: US law enforcement foothold in Haiti to deter Colombian encroachment: develop a specific operational proposal for US's deterring Colombians from moving in - Justice and Treasury agencies, by next meeting.

- D. Puerto Rico -- ATF concern that AUSAs with firearms law experience will not be available to prosecute cases in Puerto Rico [N.B. -- Treasury/ATF in last Caribbean Law Enforcement Issues meeting was to develop a plan for firearms enforcement in Puerto Rico]

- RUFF INTRO = Immig. Committee Recs
Also, Customs Border Enf. Issues.
- AG: ALL ISSUES PLEASE. — 9/30th - Set to expire.
 - ↳ POTUS APPOINTS CHAIR, CONGRESS ORDERS
 - ↳ DIFFERENT SETS OF REPORTS.
 - ↳ Final Report to re-state previous recs: and urgent + "Americanization" issues (integrating immigrants).
- Recs on Functions of Immig.

DOJ	-	Enf.
Incl Body	-	Adjudication
State	-	Benefits
Labor	-	Employer piece

- Due at end of month
- Approps. language asks that by April 1, the Admin come to Congress for its response to reorganization.

BMc - no direct long function

CB - Any views from Admin on Border Enf. piece

↳ AM: only informal, interviewing gov. officials + field staff as part of hearings.
↳ no formal cleared positions

ELC: PROCESS

BLC - no one in charge by law of border / hence
→ "one owner" of actual "line"

- don't need to change structure immediately or as first step.
- competing technologies w/ Customs



Quinn: fine + & actually, usually saved

JK: ↓

QB: upcoming hearings/events to force
our hand on this, i.e., drug hearings.

- likely hearings, but only w/ Commission
members.

- DM: continued review should not
include Commission - only executive.

→ also, preparing response + draft
statement.

AG's → Pt of one person being given authority over
border for drugs.

16-September Report on SW
border to Congress

What
better is
this?

- The idea that one federal official should have responsibility for coordinating all federal drug control efforts is simply unworkable. This idea was roundly rejected by federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities at a conference previously held by ONDCP. At a minimum, it is inappropriate to assert this proposition -- and countless others in the report -- without inter-agency discussions and vetting. Indeed, when McCaffrey was persuaded not to send this report to the Hill, he nonetheless agreed to set-up an inter-agency process to discuss and review his findings and proposals. It has been very difficult since that time to get McCaffrey to commit to a principals meeting on the subject.
- The notion that the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) should coordinate "all federal, state and local counter-drug activities in their jurisdictions" is absurd. The federal government cannot dictate the counterdrug efforts of state and local agencies. Moreover, Justice and Treasury would not agree that HIDTAs would be the appropriate mechanism from which to coordinate such counterdrug activities; instead, we would favor beefing up the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program, which has had real successes over the past few years.
- Generalizations that counterdrug officials do not normally receive timely or actionable intelligence seem overly broad and inaccurate. Contrary to McCaffrey's belief, law enforcement is engaged, every day, in "intelligence-driven/information-based operations." Moreover, although McCaffrey claims that we need a new SWB intelligence architecture, he fails to mention that ONDCP, Justice, and CIA are engaged in an large-scale counterdrug intelligence review, covering the SWB along with the rest of the nation, which McCaffrey fought so very hard to lead.
- McCaffrey claims that huge amounts of drugs are getting through the SWB; in his estimation, almost nothing is being stopped. I don't think Justice or Treasury would agree with that typically negative assessment. (He does mention that violent crime is down in California, New Mexico, and Texas, so we must be doing something right).
- How does building a fence across the entire SWB relate to our ongoing efforts to increase legitimate commerce between the US and Mexico?



Office of the Deputy Attorney General
United States Department of Justice

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TO: Jose Cerdá

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FROM:

Jonathan Schwartz

~~Jonathan Schwartz~~
Associate Deputy Attorney General

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Total Pages (excluding this cover): 7

Additional Message: See attached information. Thank you



U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

October 24, 1997

Janet Crist
Chief of Staff
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Ms. Crist:

We thank you for the opportunity to comment on the government-wide Performance Measurement System for the national drug control effort. There are some significant issues that need to be addressed before the Department of Justice can endorse this Blueprint for a Drug Free America.

Process Issue. Almost two years ago, ONDCP began convening interagency working groups to develop a national drug control performance measurement system. At the close of these meetings, ONDCP produced a nearly 100-page draft Blueprint. You asked the Department to clear on the document, which has monumental policy and budget implications, within a few days of its receipt, even though none of the Department's working group members had previously seen many of the objectives and performance targets (and were unaware of their underlying rationale), and even though none of the Department's principals had seen the document at all.

The clearance problems were exacerbated by the fact that ONDCP shared the draft Blueprint with Members of Congress before the Department's senior leadership had received the document, let alone had the opportunity to be briefed on its contents. Several weeks ago, when Department officials were called to testify before the House Judiciary Committee, it was clear that certain Members were familiar with the Blueprint. Subjecting Department officials to the possibility of questioning on an unvetted, unapproved document is unfair, and its premature release impedes thorough discussion and review within the Administration.

To make matters worse, ONDCP subsequently shared the draft Blueprint with state and local officials, as well as private entities, despite an express request by the Department that this not be done and ONDCP's representations that it would not be sent out in the next few weeks. We believe it would have been much more productive, and respectful of your federal partners in the counter-drug effort, to have awaited the completion of the interagency process before sending the document outside of the

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Administration. Giving the document widespread circulation before the interagency process is finished not only guarantees confusion, but also lets ONDCP unfairly dictate the terms of the debate. While the Government Performance and Results Act requires each department or agency to consult with outside stakeholders, that consultation should not, and need not, have occurred before ONDCP received the considered judgment and concurrence of the affected federal agencies.

It is our current understanding that ONDCP formally will submit this system to the Congress by February 1, 1998. In the interim, the Department expects to have the opportunity to review the Blueprint's next iterations, based upon these attached comments as well as the comments from the other National Drug Control Agencies.

Numerical goals. The numerical goals and targets appear to lack any concrete basis or rationale. We need to spell out the rationale for why these goals are feasible. On page 21 the draft Blueprint asks the question whether the goals proposed for 2002 and 2007 are "worthy." We believe the appropriate question is whether the goals are feasible, reasonable, or attainable given current circumstances. Some of the goals go far beyond being optimistic. They likely would create false expectations and would create a significant risk for potential embarrassment to the Administration. The Department will not clear on this document unless the rationale for the specific numerical goals is explicitly articulated.

The Administration's recent Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) on H.R.2610 makes a similar complaint about adopting goals that are likely unattainable. Many of the goals in the Blueprint -- to quote from this recent SAP -- "do not take into consideration budget constraints, the two- to three-year lag between noticeable changes in attitudes toward drugs and noticeable changes in behavior, and the time needed to hire and train law enforcement, drug treatment, and drug prevention personnel."

Furthermore, many goals are internally inconsistent. For example, one proposed goal is to reduce the available supply of drugs by 50% by 2007, but HIDTA, a specific resource-intensive program, is projected only to reduce the illegal drug flow by 25% over the next 10 years. It seems that the HIDTA areas (our highest drug trafficking cities/regions where drug control efforts are most concentrated) would need to achieve a reduction of greater than 50% in order to reach the overall supply reduction goal.

The goals also do not sufficiently take into account uncontrollable outside variables such as demographic factors, economic downturns, political stability in source countries, or international diplomatic relations. But the most serious

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deficiency with respect to the goals is the failure to describe the accompanying resources that could make these goals attainable.

Resources. Adopting the goals has enormous budget implications, both in terms of attempting to reach the designated targets, as well as in attempting to measure the targets. The fact is that these goals represent five- to ten-year projections, but the national drug control agencies have not done budgeting in light of these far-reaching goals and targets. Does ONDCP expect these goals to be attainable with a \$16 billion annual federal drug control budget that only increases by inflationary factors over the next ten years?

The Department of Justice believes that, in order to meet the targets of reducing drug use and drug availability by 50% over the next decade, there would need to be substantial enhancements in many Departments' budgets, including in the areas of enforcement (investigators and prosecutors), prevention, treatment, research, and incarceration. More than any other issue, this is the one that must be resolved by ONDCP, OMB, and the Secretaries and heads of the major national drug control departments and agencies.

There are likely to be future budget implications if the numerically-based measurements are not met by DOJ or other departments. (See pages ii, 21) The proposed measurements state that "Performance data would be a key factor in making the recommendations regarding resource allocations. Performance findings would also assist in reprogramming issues and budget certification procedures. The Annual Reports would assist OMB in assessing the Annual Progress Reports required under GPRA since agency reports on drug control-related performance would be consistent with the findings in the proposed Annual Progress Report." [page 32] If the goals, as set out, are to be achieved, the budgets of the drug control agencies would need to be greatly increased during a period of necessary budgetary restraint. Such a dramatic shift would need to be evaluated in the context of the President's overall budget priorities.

Measuring goals and targets. The Blueprint and the proposed performance measurement systems relate to national drug control efforts, as distinguished from federal drug control efforts. Although federal agencies play a critical role in enforcing our nation's drug laws, the federal government, nevertheless, does not have any direct authority or control over state and local law enforcement agencies. The degree to which the stated goals and performance targets will be achieved are likely to be significantly affected by the performance (and resources) of state and local agencies. Therefore, we must be careful not to hold federal agencies responsible inappropriately for performance over which they have no control. A similar analysis applies in

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the context of the importance of source and transit countries' demonstrations of political will and application of resources in counternarcotics. See page A-12.

DOJ has serious concerns about the responsibility given to its components for reporting outcome or output data -- some of which will have to be obtained from state and local sources -- for some of the most-difficult-to-measure targets. Estimating with any degree of confidence either the amount of drugs entering the country or the number of trafficking organizations responsible for smuggling drugs into the country has been notoriously difficult, and obtaining reliable data from state and local sources usually requires an incentive program. Resources will need to be identified to pay for additional data collection.

Measuring the Government's accomplishments is difficult when there is no current agreement on the baseline figures against which the goals will be compared (such as the current availability of specific drugs). Indeed, even according to the Blueprint, many performance targets do not have currently defined measures, and data systems will have to be created and developed before evaluations can be made.

In addition, the numerical measures often target the wrong objectives. For example:

- The proposed measurements frequently target "arrests," whereas it is more appropriate to target "prosecutions." (Both are output, not outcome measures.) [pages 32; A-41]
- The proposed measurements target asset "seizures," whereas the more appropriate measure is asset "forfeitures." Seizing assets is not sufficient; the assets must be properly forfeited by the court before the Government can sell or share the assets and, thus, achieve the projected goal. [pages 32, A-16, A-17, and A-47]
- The proposed measurements often target "precursor chemicals," whereas the real problem lies in the "illicit diversion of precursor chemicals." [page A-40]

Reporting Agency. In many cases, the wrong government component is assigned to be the "reporting agency" to measure program performance. For example:

- DOD should not be the agency to measure the exchange of information among federal law enforcement agencies. [page A-33]

-5-

- DOJ should be included with State to enhance bilateral and multilateral agreements to establish/facilitate cooperative activities. [Note: Mutual legal assistance treaties are a Justice-to-Justice function.] [pages A-44 - A-46]
- DOJ should be included with USIC/State on cooperative bilateral relations in law enforcement and other justice areas -- particularly with respect to mutual legal assistance. [page A-34]
- Treasury should work with DOJ (DOJ lead) to measure the progress on asset forfeitures. [pages A-16 - A-17]
- DEA should be included with ONDCP as measuring the quantity of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals entering the United States. [page A-31]
- In addition, we believe that DOJ should be the Reporting Agency, or added along with the proposed Reporting Agency, with respect to the following "performance targets." This data collection and reporting would require additional resources.
 - 1. (a) Tracking illegal fund transfers and other money laundering activities; (b) Status of nationwide system for tracking assets forfeited; (c) Number of money laundering organizations disrupted or dismantled. [page A-16]
 - 2. Estimating quantities of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals entering the U.S. [page A-31]
 - 3. Estimating quantities of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals moving through transit zone. [page A-33]
 - 4. Successful negotiations of bilateral and multilateral agreements with transit-zone nations. [page A-34]
 - 5. Evaluating the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions in source countries. [page A-43]
 - 6. Bilateral and multilateral agreements establishing and facilitating cooperative activities. [pages A-44 - A-46]

Enclosed with this letter are line-by-line edits and suggestions compiled from several components within the Department of Justice. We have also included the complete comments of OJP, DEA, and the FBI, although their most serious

-6-


objections have been incorporated in the overview and in the line-by-line comments.

We would be happy to meet with you to discuss any of the concerns outlined in this response.

Sincerely,



Stephen R. Colgate
Assistant Attorney General
Justice Management Division



Mary Lee Warren
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

Enclosures

cc: Office of Management and Budget
Department of the Treasury
Department of Health and Human Services

Copied
Reed
Reiff
VP
COS

IDENT HAS SEEN
11-3-97

Reed / CReiff / ccVP

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM BRUCE REED *BR*
CHUCK RUFF *CR*

RE: Attached ONDCP Memorandum on the Southwest Border Region

I am more sympathetic
to his res. than you are and I
fear too much delay in policy
process - esp on technology prod.
If we are not responsible
enough we can avoid accountability
which is our big problem!

Let's discuss soon

Attached is a memorandum that General McCaffrey sent to you outlining recommendations on how to improve the Administration's drug interdiction efforts along the Southwest border. Although we share the General's concerns, we do not support his recommendations at this time and do not believe this issue should be tasked to the Drug Policy Council for resolution.

First, the Treasury and Justice Departments have strong reservations about ONDCP's recommendations. In fact, less than a month ago, we met with Secretary Rubin, Attorney General Reno, and General McCaffrey to discuss coordination of border-related issues. At that time, General McCaffrey was preparing to send a report to Congress on the Southwest border that made the same recommendations as the attached memorandum. Secretary Rubin and the Attorney General expressed their opposition to sending this report to Congress, and General McCaffrey agreed to hold it. Rubin and Reno -- who oversee the enforcement agencies that carry out the drug, crime, trade and immigration laws along the border -- have concerns that assigning a single, federal official at each point of entry to coordinate drug interdiction will negatively affect or conflict with our immigration and trade policies.

Second, several other border-related issues are currently being discussed in the White House and among the agencies, and will need to be resolved over the next few months. Most notably, the Commission on Immigration Reform recently released its final report recommending that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) be disbanded and its responsibilities -- including border enforcement -- parceled out to various agencies. In the wake of this report, Members of Congress have introduced INS reform plans and included appropriations language requiring the Administration to submit similar plans by early next year.

Because of all the above, we proposed at our recent meeting with Secretary Rubin, the Attorney General, and General McCaffrey that a White House-led working group consider all border-related proposals and the issues of drug and crime enforcement, immigration, and trade that they raise. We have met internally and concluded that the White House group will be led by DPC; include Counsel's Office, OMB, NSC and NPR; and will closely coordinate with all the affected agencies to ensure that their issues are fully considered. Although we recognize ONDCP's specific mandate to oversee the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas and coordinate certain counterdrug technologies and intelligence -- and support these issues being discussed by

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11-3-97

Reed / C. Ruff / cc VP -

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1997

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CHUCK RUFF *CR*

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the Drug Policy Council -- border issues that go beyond the reach of drug policy would be more appropriately handled by the process we have outlined. At OMB's request, we expect to have some initial recommendations before the budget process is concluded. We recommend that you support this process for coordinating border-related issues.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

October 7, 1997

THE PRESIDENT HAS SIGNED
11-3-97

57 OCT 9 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BARRY McCaffrey

SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

1. PURPOSE. The purposes of this memorandum are to: (a) summarize Office of National Drug Control Policy observations made during the recent ONDCP-led trip to the Southwest border; (b) report on the status of counter-drug efforts in this region; and (c) suggest interagency consideration of how federal drug control efforts along the border can be improved.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- a. From August 24, 1997-August 29, 1997, ONDCP led a delegation of federal officials on a fact-finding trip along the U.S. Southwest border. Our purpose was to review federal drug control program agency efforts to stop drug trafficking and stem drug-related violence and corruption. We also met with state and local officials in each of the border states to hear their perspectives of the drug threat. Finally, we discussed cooperative drug control efforts with Mexican officials in four major Mexican border cities (Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Nogales, and Tijuana).
- b. Establishing adequate control of our Southwest border is an increasingly important U.S. national security interest. As U.S.-Mexico trade continues to grow -- it has increased 122 percent since 1990 (going from \$59B to almost \$130B in 1996) -- so do the opportunities for drug trafficking. This 2,000-mile border is one of the most open and busiest in the world. Last year, 254 million people, 75 million cars, and 3.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico through 39 crossings and 24 ports of entries (POEs). We estimate that more than half of the cocaine on our streets, and large quantities of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines also enter the U.S. across this border. The enormous profits associated with this drug trade and the propensity of U.S. and Mexican criminal drug trafficking organizations to use violence and bribes to further their operations foster both corruption and lawlessness. A manifestation of this problem is the wave of murders in the Mexican border town of Ciudad Juarez following the recent death of Mexican trafficker Amado Carrillo Fuentes.
- c. Over the past four years, the administration has significantly increased the federal presence along the Southwest border. Some examples:
 - Customs' budget for Southwest border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93.

October 7, 1997

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✓ DOD's drug control budget for the Southwest border has increased 53 percent since FY91.

✓ The number of U.S. Attorneys handling cases in the Southwest border region has increased by 80 percent since FY90.

* This federal attention is making a difference. For example, violent crime is down in California, New Mexico, and Texas. Federal drug seizures have also increased; USBP FY96 marijuana seizures were up 50 percent over FY94's 50,000 pounds.

* d. Despite these successes, much remains to be done. For example, added inspection resources have not increased our ability to adequately screen trucks. Last year about 900,000 (about a quarter of the total) U.S.-bound trucks were subjected to drug control inspections. Cocaine was found in just sixteen. Our current interdiction efforts almost completely fail to achieve our purpose of reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across the border. We need to shift from a manpower/physical inspection approach to one that is intelligence-driven and that employs emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches. Based on our observations during this trip, ONDCP suggests the following measures will help improve federal drug control capabilities along the Southwest border:

- Improve accountability.
- Expand cooperation with Mexico.
- Develop a comprehensive intelligence architecture.
- Develop a system that matches resources with threats.
- ✓ Integrate technology.
- ✓ Strengthen the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.
- ✓ Build infrastructure to support the rule of law.
- Encourage private sector support of our efforts.
- ✓ Implement a systems approach to drug control efforts.
- Continue DOD's support role.

3. DISCUSSION

- a. **Improve accountability.** At least ten federal agencies and scores of state and local governments are involved in drug control efforts along the Southwest border. However, no individual or agency has overall coordination responsibility for drug control operations along the length of the border or even within individual POEs. That being said, federal

October 7, 1997

SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

agencies at major POEs are forming quality improvement committees as an ad hoc measure to improve coordination. Functional and sectoral accountability must be established. Specific ONDCP suggestions include:

- Assign direct responsibility for coordinating all federal drug control efforts along the Southwest border to one federal official.
- Designate an "in-charge" federal official at each POE.

b. Expand cooperation with Mexico. The United States alone cannot stop drug trafficking across the Southwest border. Expanded cooperation with Mexico is essential. Ongoing cooperative initiatives at the local, state, and national levels -- such as FBI training of Mexican law enforcement officials and Bilateral Liaison Mechanisms (BLMs) that link cross-border communities -- should be our building blocks. Specific suggestions include:

- Encourage BLMs to address drug trafficking and drug-related problems.
- Establish Mexican law enforcement liaisons with U.S. Southwest border HIDTAs while maintaining appropriate strict security measures.

c. Develop a comprehensive intelligence architecture. Current U.S. intelligence capabilities along the Southwest border are clearly inadequate. Federal, state and local law enforcement officials conducting drug control operations do not normally receive timely or actionable intelligence or information. Intelligence is not adequately shared among Federal and state agencies. NDIC and EPIC roles are not supportive of operating elements. Our intelligence and information systems must:

- Bring together all federal, state and local intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination efforts.
- Create a seamless intelligence operation covering the entire 2000-mile border and contiguous waters.
- Encourage law enforcement officials at all levels to conduct intelligence-driven/information-based operations.
- Encourage appropriate, strictly protected sharing of information with vetted counterpart Mexican organizations.

d. Develop a system that matches resources with threats. Available information about the drug threat is fragmented and incomplete. It is difficult to obtain a succinct, up-to-date assessment of the drug threat either along the entire border or in any specific state or sector. Similarly, there is no readily-available integrated overview of federal efforts to address the drug threat. The end result is that there is often no direct link between current operations and an intelligence analysis of the dynamic threats we face. Specific ONDCP suggestions include:

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SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Develop the capability to track the drug threat, drug control assets, and sectoral responsibilities into an automated, digital, grid-based schematic format covering both sides of the border.
- Update this information on a real time basis and link it to a centralized Southwest border intelligence and coordination headquarters.
- Create an intelligence system through the five SW Border HIDTAs that will allow law enforcement and policy-makers to monitor the changing nature of the trafficking threats and adapt efforts accordingly.
- Use this carefully protected counter-drug information to prioritize and conduct counter-drug operations and assess new manpower and technology needs.

e. **Integrate counter-drug technology.** The enormous growing volume and importance of legitimate commercial trade in goods and services between the United States and Mexico is good news for America. However, with this volume of trade, no number of new agents alone can manually prevent the influx of drugs into the United States. Technological advances hold the key to allowing the relatively unfettered flow of legitimate trade, while capturing from this flow illicit traffic in drugs, drug money, and precursor chemicals. The technology currently being deployed is, for the most part, inadequate and/or already outdated. Hundreds of Border Patrol agents conduct dangerous night operations without basic equipment, such as night vision optics. The three operational x-ray machines (two are at fixed sites, one is a mobile prototype) provide inadequate coverage and are easily avoided by traffickers. Another six are scheduled to be operational by mid 1999. We need to ensure that authorities manning this border have access to the most up-to-date counter-drug technologies possible so that:


- Every truck and train that crosses the border into the United States can be subjected to at least three different non-intrusive inspections that can detect illegal drugs.
- The physical and or electronic transfer of drug monies out of the United States can be detected.
- Sensors, lighting and remote night vision devices monitor areas between POEs.
- Law enforcement officials along the border are equipped with digital communications equipment, observation devices, detection devices, and other technologies necessary to their tasks.

f. **Strengthen the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.** Although degrees of success vary, the five Southwest border HIDTAs are each substantially improving the ability of law enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking. The effectiveness of HIDTA programs along the border can be improved by:

- Ensuring the five HIDTAs coordinate all federal, state and local counter-drug activities in their jurisdictions.

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SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Increasing coordination among the border HIDTAs (for example, facilitating the flow of intelligence information on a real time basis, creating exchanges about programs that work, and coordinating programs on a regional basis).
 - Establish strictly-protected coordination between HIDTAs and counterpart Mexican authorities.
 - Improve coordination between HIDTAs, U.S. drug control program agencies, and state and local prevention, treatment, and enforcement agencies.
- g. Build infrastructure to support the rule of law.** In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation establishing federal control of a strip of land sixty feet wide along the entire U.S.-Mexico border. His intent was to assure the federal ability to secure the border. There was no follow-through on his proclamation. We must address serious infrastructure shortfalls in order to prevent the flow of illegal goods and persons -- in particular drugs and drug traffickers -- into the United States. Barriers and surveillance devices work. Along the Imperial Beach, San Diego section of the border for example, there were sixty murders and 10,000 pounds of marijuana seized three years ago. Last year, after the installation of fences and lights backed up by more Border Patrol Agents, there were no murders, and just six pounds of marijuana were seized. Specific suggestions include:
- Develop a strategic five-year plan to build access roads to allow patrolling of the border and to erect fences and lights in high trafficking areas.
 - Assign one federal agency responsibility for planning, building, and maintaining roads and barriers.
- h. Encourage private sector support of our efforts.** The scope of this challenge will require private sector support, particularly from those who hold substantial stakes in the success of U.S.-Mexico relations. The private sector can help by:
- 
- Assisting in the development and deployment of new technologies that can detect drugs without slowing the two-way movement of goods and services.
 - Implementing self-regulatory procedures to prevent drugs from being hidden in legal transactions.
- i. Implement a systems approach to drug control efforts.** Over or under emphasis on any component of the overall drug control effort detracts from overall effectiveness. Increasing, for example, the number of inspectors and agents without a corresponding increase in capabilities within the prosecutorial and detention systems can overwhelm the latter. As we continue to increase federal drug control resources in the Southwest border area, we must ensure the build-up is steady across the board. In particular, we must ensure that:
- Drug control programs are appropriate to the challenge.

October 7, 1997


SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Our programs continue to respond to the dynamic nature of the drug threat
- Department and agency build-ups are coordinated.

✓ j. **Continue DoD's support role.** The U.S. Armed Forces are providing invaluable support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the Southwest border region. This support should continue. However, all Title 10 (active components) and Title 32 (Guard and Reserves) support missions must be carefully scrutinized to ensure assigned missions are compatible with unit and individual capabilities. We should also consider making appropriate investments in those areas where our troops are being employed as a result of federal drug control program agency shortfalls.

4. **CONCLUSIONS.** The flow of drugs across the Southwest border has not been significantly curtailed despite tactical success that have caused changes in smuggling routes and techniques. Drug trafficking and violence remain persistent and growing threats to border region residents. While the obstacles our law enforcement officials face in stemming these threats are significant, they are not insurmountable. Our significant investments along the Southwest border are beginning to pay off. Future success is dependent on adjusting existing organizations to better support ongoing federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. Harnessing emerging technology is a must. The ten initiatives outlined in this report might usefully orient the already extensive federal anti-drug effort in the region. ONDCP will table them with your Drug Policy Council over the coming months. Our intent is to provide you a fully-coordinated and supportable plan of action in the spring.

V/R



Barry R. McCaffrey
Director
Office of National Drug Control Policy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- not sufficient cooperation from Mexico
- no evaluation of USFAS
- Dispute over 600 ft rule
 - ↳ fences? / argument
 - ↳ DOJ argument that border patrol approach different to Mex, 2 sides resources
- Walters respect
- ↳ Custom Communist?
- ↳ Summary - very
- ↳ Imp from MX perspective → increased role

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(616-2987)

Tito Ambr

- Trade Issue
- Custom's Budget
- DOT Budget #s
- shift from manpower,
which completely
funks, to Technology.
+ intelligence
- recs for general
- from agencies perspective
not a drug-control
downer issue
 - Trade
 - immigration
 - crime
- Problem not one drug-control

Teressa

MTG. w/DIM:

- LET ME START w/MY SUGGESTIONS
- HISTORY OF DIFFICULT AGENCY (THINGS HADN'T QUITE EXPLORED)
 - Unharm, asylum, WTC.
- ANSWER WAS HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION + REFORM/RESOURCES
 - RECS already before OMB + supported by Hill (early)

① + RUN SYSTEM BY CONTROLLING LEGAL STATUS

- * Fundamental Issue of Automation
- * Cutting Edge w/Fingerprint Technology

→ Backdrop of
SOS - improvement
→ Enforcement
level

② Concept of border at Airports, Consulate office

→ Enforcement shows we can get things done

→ Service + legal immigration

→ need current & before Hill to improve
Nat - Sec. between Pol. + Juve.

① Don't lose
our success

* SEPARATE ENF. + SEC. FUNCTIONS.

* DIFF. between Enf. + Sec. personnel

→ Hire consultant - do some in Pol. + some
in Sec.

→ pay reform in budget.

* Sil Reyes can be a spokesman for us

Parabair
beverage

① Where are
central
funds?

② What about
dumps + middle
piece

③ OMB, what
on picture

④ existing
SOS
Robert

MEETING WITH INS ON REORGANIZATION
10/30/97

- Thanks for inviting us to come over today to talk about the review process to consider proposals for reorganizing INS. I am sorry we have not been able to sit down sooner to go over these issues. As you know, several pressing immigration issues in particular have taken up a lot of our time -- the Central American legislation and the renewal of 245(I).
- Let me say that we have met once internally to discuss the proposed reorganization of the INS. This meeting included: DPC, OMB, NPR, NSC and White House Counsel. We all agreed that, before the end of the calendar year, we should hold several meetings with you, State and Labor to discuss the CIR's proposed changes, INS suggestions, Rep. Reyes' bill and ONDCP's border concerns. Ideally, by the end of the year -- and before the conclusion of the budget process -- we would have some indication of the types of reforms we would like to consider.
- Also, consistent with our September meeting, we have asked the President to support this process -- and not to let General McCaffrey initiate a separate review of larger border issues. As you know, since his visit to the Southwest Border, the General has gone to Members of Congress and the President and suggested that he and the Drug Policy Council look into improved management of border issues.
- In the meantime, we have also started to collect information for our review. The CIR has shared some of its background information with us from its hearings, site visits, recommendation from the National Academy of Public Administrators, etc. And your policy and planning staff recently shared a draft with us of the management reforms you are considering.
- Since we are just getting ready to embark on this process, what are your recommendations on how best to proceed?

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/9 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10/13SUBJECT: McCallery memo on SW Border efforts

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☒	☐	McCURRY	☐	☐
BOWLES	☒	☐	McGINTY	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	NASH	☐	☐
PODESTA	☒	☐	RADD	☐	☐
MATHEWS	☒	☐	REED	☒	☐
RAINES	☒	☐	RUFF	☐	☐
BLUMENTHAL	☐	☐	SMITH	☐	☐
BERGER	☒	☐	SOSNIK	☐	☐
ECHAVESTE	☐	☐	SPERLING	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☒	☐	STREETT	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	TARULLO	☐	☐
HILLEY	☐	☐	VERVEER	☐	☐
IBARRA	☐	☐	WALDMAN	☐	☐
KLAIN	☐	☐	YELLEN	☐	☐
LEWIS	☐	☐	BEGALA	☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐	<u>Cerda</u> →	☒	☐
MARSHALL	☒	☐		☐	☐
				☐	☐

REMARKS:

Any comment? (Note recommendations in memo)

RESPONSE:



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

October 7, 1997

57 OCT 9 10:40

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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This federal attention is making a difference. For example, violent crime is down in California, New Mexico, and Texas. Federal drug seizures have also increased; USBP FY96 marijuana seizures were up 50 percent over FY94's 50,000 pounds.

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October 7, 1997

SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

agencies at major POEs are forming quality improvement committees as an ad hoc measure to improve coordination. Functional and sectoral accountability must be established. Specific ONDCP suggestions include:

- Assign direct responsibility for coordinating all federal drug control efforts along the Southwest border to one federal official.
 - Designate an "in-charge" federal official at each POE.
- b. Expand cooperation with Mexico.** The United States alone cannot stop drug trafficking across the Southwest border. Expanded cooperation with Mexico is essential. Ongoing cooperative initiatives at the local, state, and national levels -- such as FBI training of Mexican law enforcement officials and Bilateral Liaison Mechanisms (BLMs) that link cross-border communities -- should be our building blocks. Specific suggestions include:
- Encourage BLMs to address drug trafficking and drug-related problems.
 - Establish Mexican law enforcement liaisons with U.S. Southwest border HIDTAs while maintaining appropriate strict security measures.
- c. Develop a comprehensive intelligence architecture.** Current U.S. intelligence capabilities along the Southwest border are clearly inadequate. Federal, state and local law enforcement officials conducting drug control operations do not normally receive timely or actionable intelligence or information. Intelligence is not adequately shared among Federal and state agencies. NDIC and EPIC roles are not supportive of operating elements. Our intelligence and information systems must:
- Bring together all federal, state and local intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination efforts.
 - Create a seamless intelligence operation covering the entire 2000-mile border and contiguous waters.
 - Encourage law enforcement officials at all levels to conduct intelligence-driven/information-based operations.
 - Encourage appropriate, strictly protected sharing of information with vetted counterpart Mexican organizations.
- d. Develop a system that matches resources with threats.** Available information about the drug threat is fragmented and incomplete. It is difficult to obtain a succinct, up-to-date assessment of the drug threat either along the entire border or in any specific state or sector. Similarly, there is no readily-available integrated overview of federal efforts to address the drug threat. The end result is that there is often no direct link between current operations and an intelligence analysis of the dynamic threats we face. Specific ONDCP suggestions include:

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- Develop the capability to track the drug threat, drug control assets, and sectoral responsibilities into an automated, digital, grid-based schematic format covering both sides of the border.
 - Update this information on a real time basis and link it to a centralized Southwest border intelligence and coordination headquarters.
 - Create an intelligence system through the five SW Border HIDTAs that will allow law enforcement and policy-makers to monitor the changing nature of the trafficking threats and adapt efforts accordingly.
 - Use this carefully protected counter-drug information to prioritize and conduct counter-drug operations and assess new manpower and technology needs.
- e. **Integrate counter-drug technology.** The enormous growing volume and importance of legitimate commercial trade in goods and services between the United States and Mexico is good news for America. However, with this volume of trade, no number of new agents alone can manually prevent the influx of drugs into the United States. Technological advances hold the key to allowing the relatively unfettered flow of legitimate trade, while capturing from this flow illicit traffic in drugs, drug money, and precursor chemicals. The technology currently being deployed is, for the most part, inadequate and/or already outdated. Hundreds of Border Patrol agents conduct dangerous night operations without basic equipment, such as night vision optics. The three operational x-ray machines (two are at fixed sites, one is a mobile prototype) provide inadequate coverage and are easily avoided by traffickers. Another six are scheduled to be operational by mid 1999. We need to ensure that authorities manning this border have access to the most up-to-date counter-drug technologies possible so that:
- Every truck and train that crosses the border into the United States can be subjected to at least three different non-intrusive inspections that can detect illegal drugs.
 - The physical and or electronic transfer of drug monies out of the United States can be detected.
 - Sensors, lighting and remote night vision devices monitor areas between POEs.
 - Law enforcement officials along the border are equipped with digital communications equipment, observation devices, detection devices, and other technologies necessary to their tasks.
- f. **Strengthen the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.** Although degrees of success vary, the five Southwest border HIDTAs are each substantially improving the ability of law enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking. The effectiveness of HIDTA programs along the border can be improved by:
- Ensuring the five HIDTAs coordinate all federal, state and local counter-drug activities in their jurisdictions.

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- Increasing coordination among the border HIDTAs (for example, facilitating the flow of intelligence information on a real time basis, creating exchanges about programs that work, and coordinating programs on a regional basis).
 - Establish strictly-protected coordination between HIDTAs and counterpart Mexican authorities.
 - Improve coordination between HIDTAs, U.S. drug control program agencies, and state and local prevention, treatment, and enforcement agencies.
- g. Build infrastructure to support the rule of law.** In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation establishing federal control of a strip of land sixty feet wide along the entire U.S.-Mexico border. His intent was to assure the federal ability to secure the border. There was no follow-through on his proclamation. We must address serious infrastructure shortfalls in order to prevent the flow of illegal goods and persons -- in particular drugs and drug traffickers -- into the United States. Barriers and surveillance devices work. Along the Imperial Beach, San Diego section of the border for example, there were sixty murders and 10,000 pounds of marijuana seized three years ago. Last year, after the installation of fences and lights backed up by more Border Patrol Agents, there were no murders, and just six pounds of marijuana were seized. Specific suggestions include:
- Develop a strategic five-year plan to build access roads to allow patrolling of the border and to erect fences and lights in high trafficking areas.
 - Assign one federal agency responsibility for planning, building, and maintaining roads and barriers.
- h. Encourage private sector support of our efforts.** The scope of this challenge will require private sector support, particularly from those who hold substantial stakes in the success of U.S.-Mexico relations. The private sector can help by:
- Assisting in the development and deployment of new technologies that can detect drugs without slowing the two-way movement of goods and services.
 - Implementing self-regulatory procedures to prevent drugs from being hidden in legal transactions.
- i. Implement a systems approach to drug control efforts.** Over or under emphasis on any component of the overall drug control effort detracts from overall effectiveness. Increasing, for example, the number of inspectors and agents without a corresponding increase in capabilities within the prosecutorial and detention systems can overwhelm the latter. As we continue to increase federal drug control resources in the Southwest border area, we must ensure the build-up is steady across the board. In particular, we must ensure that:
- Drug control programs are appropriate to the challenge.

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
SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Our programs continue to respond to the dynamic nature of the drug threat
- Department and agency build-ups are coordinated.

j. Continue DoD's support role. The U.S. Armed Forces are providing invaluable support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the Southwest border region. This support should continue. However, all Title 10 (active components) and Title 32 (Guard and Reserves) support missions must be carefully scrutinized to ensure assigned missions are compatible with unit and individual capabilities. We should also consider making appropriate investments in those areas where our troops are being employed as a result of federal drug control program agency shortfalls.

4. CONCLUSIONS. The flow of drugs across the Southwest border has not been significantly curtailed despite tactical success that have caused changes in smuggling routes and techniques. Drug trafficking and violence remain persistent and growing threats to border region residents. While the obstacles our law enforcement officials face in stemming these threats are significant, they are not insurmountable. Our significant investments along the Southwest border are beginning to pay off. Future success is dependent on adjusting existing organizations to better support ongoing federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. Harnessing emerging technology is a must. The ten initiatives outlined in this report might usefully orient the already extensive federal anti-drug effort in the region. ONDCP will table them with your Drug Policy Council over the coming months. Our intent is to provide you a fully-coordinated and supportable plan of action in the spring.

V/R



Barry R. McCaffrey
Director
Office of National Drug Control Policy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CC: SHIMA

EK:

HERE'S THE DRAFT
McCAFFREY LETTER
DISCUSSED @ TODAY'S
MTG. W/ THE AG. PAGE
3 OF THE ATTACHED
REPORT (TOP 2 BULLETS)
IS WHAT THE AG WAS
MOST CONCERNED ABOUT -
BUT THE OVERALL TONE
IS A BIT PRESUMPTIOUS
ON THE GENERAL'S PART
(OVER)

ANNA LIKELY TO SET OFF
ALL OR MANY OF THE
INVOLVED DRUG CONTROL
AGENCIES. FINALLY,
FEINSTEIN AND OTHERS
HAVE BROADER ISSUES
IN THIS WHOLE AREA
THAT WE NEED TO BE
CONCERNED ABOUT (NAFTA,
FAST TRACK, APPT. OF NEW
CUSTOMS COMMISSIONER, ETC).

De'

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

September 10, 1997

Dear Senator Feinstein:

Enclosed in three volumes is the Administration's report on key questions related to the entry of illegal drugs into the United States. Volume I is a comprehensive response to your letter of May 2, 1997 regarding progress made by Mexico in its efforts against illegal drug traffickers. That volume also contains a report on Enhanced Multilateral Drug Control Cooperation, which is an assessment of the prospects for multilateral hemispheric cooperation against illegal drugs. The second volume focuses on our Southwest border. It contains the trip report from an ONDCP led August 24-29 interagency review of the situation along the border, as well as a detailed discussion by Customs of enhanced truck inspections along the Southwest border. The last volume is classified and includes material relevant to U.S. and Mexican efforts to eliminate drug trafficking in our two nations.

Mexico has made tremendous strides in preparing the legal and institutional infrastructure to combat drug trafficking in a systematic manner. That approach, and the U.S. policy of cooperation with the government of Mexico as an equal partner in the struggle against illegal drugs, have created a better opportunity than we have heretofore seen to permanently reduce the flow of drugs from Mexico to the United States. Mexico has initiated fundamental reform of the governmental institutions essential to the destruction of major drug trafficking organizations. As a result we are seeing an end to impunity and the best opportunity yet for the destruction of major trafficking organizations.

Reform has been painful, dangerous, and time consuming. Reform has exposed Mexico to detailed scrutiny in the international community, as the extent of drug corruption was made public with each new arrest. Nonetheless, President Zedillo has relentlessly pursued a policy of investigation, arrest, and prosecution of corrupt public officials regardless of their positions in government. In the past six months the United States and Mexico released a U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Drug Threat Assessment, which represents the first time our two nations have jointly defined the drug threat. It will be followed in December by a U.S.- Mexican strategy for mutually reinforcing cooperative action against illegal drugs. Mexico created a Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes Against Health (replacing the National Counter-Drug Institute (INCD) which had been compromised by General Gutierrez Rebollo). They have started a comprehensive vetting program which will ultimately reach all employees of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic (PGR). They have also passed new legislation which provides an arsenal of investigative and prosecutorial tools for use against drug traffickers. Our two governments are now also beginning to work closely within the framework of our legal systems to achieve delivery of our most wanted criminal fugitives. We are beginning to establish

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historically better cooperation and more deliveries of fugitives, including approval of extradition of Mexican citizens on drug charges. The U.S. Government is confident that with the continuing support of Congress over the coming years our two nations can significantly reduce our common drug threat.

The Secretary of State's enclosed report on Enhanced Multilateral Drug Control Cooperation underscores our optimism that a basis for a hemispheric alliance against drugs can be put together. We favor establishment of such an alliance through further development of hemispheric drug control standards and institutions, including better implementation of the follow-on mechanisms to the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami. The Narcotics Action Plan developed at that Summit recognized the need for a broad coordinated hemispheric strategy to reduce drug use and production, including new enforcement methods to disrupt trafficking and money laundering networks. At the 1995 Summit of the Americas Ministerial Conference on Money Laundering, in Buenos Aires, hemispheric leaders developed a plan of action that included legal, regulatory, and enforcement actions, and called for ongoing assessments of progress. In 1996 in Uruguay the nations of this hemisphere endorsed an Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere. In 1997, through the Organization of American States, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) the same nations developed 40 action items for implementation of the strategy. As these international plans are put into effect, and if new elements of an alliance such as measures of effectiveness and institution of an evaluation process are adopted, we expect to substantially increase cooperation and coordinated action against drugs in the hemisphere.

The Secretary of the Treasury's report by the United States Customs Service on the Feasibility of Enhanced Truck Inspections Along the Southwest Border (Vol. II) outlines steps that are being taken to prevent drug trafficking through trucks and trailers. Over the past six years the number of trucks entering the United States has doubled to more than 3.3 million. A truck enters the U.S., on average, every five seconds every day of the year. In 1996, more than 25 percent of trucks entering the U.S. were inspected for drugs. As a result of improved inspection systems, drug seizures in commercial cargo have increased more than 600 percent since 1990. Our continuing capital improvements, infrastructure enhancements, and more comprehensive examination procedures promise more success in the future. The U.S. Customs Service will continue its integrated deployment of personnel and technology to defeat this drug trafficking threat.

Also enclosed are comments and conclusions about federal drug control programs and cooperation with Mexico along the Southwest border. These are based on an ONDCP led, August 24-29 inter-agency review of the situation along the 2,000 mile border. Our principal conclusion is that our ongoing and extensive federal efforts need a new concept for coordination. The border is too vast, too busy, and the gateway for too much legitimate trade, for us to expect

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we can prevent drug smuggling without significant technology and coordination improvements. The Administration has requested approximately \$1.8 billion to support more than 8,300 inspectors and agents along the border in FY 1998. However, in addition to providing adequate resources against the drug threat we must assure that those resources are employed intelligently through advanced technology in support of our Customs inspectors and agents. Our interdiction strategy must be vertically and horizontally integrated at the federal, state, and local levels. This strategy must include cooperation with Mexican law enforcement along the border in a manner that is practical, flexible enough to account for local circumstances, and which provides for the safety of law enforcement officers on both sides of the border. ONDCP will develop, in conjunction with all federal drug control program agencies, an overarching organizing concept for federal drug control programs along the border. In addition, the ONDCP Director, in conjunction with the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence and other Department Secretaries, will review all intelligence collection activities which support our national drug control strategy.

All of us in the Administration appreciate your continued support of our efforts to shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat. We are committed to the development of regional multilateral initiatives to curtail drug production, trafficking, and abuse. We are also confident that the comprehensive, long-range 1997 National Drug Control Strategy which enjoys broad bipartisan support will accomplish its overall goal of significantly reducing both drug use and its consequences over the coming decade.

Very respectfully,

Barry R. McCaffrey
Director

Senator Dianne Feinstein
SH-331 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-1004

OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

**Report to Congress
September 1997**

SOUTHWEST BORDER TRIP REPORT

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(R.Housman/B.Hittle 09/08/97)

Draft**24-29 August 1997 Southwest Border Trip Report**

From August 24-29, 1997, the Office of National Drug Control Policy led a delegation of federal officials on a fact-finding trip along the U.S. Southwest border with Mexico. During this trip the delegates met with state and local officials in each of the border states, as well as with officials from the Mexican government at Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Nogales, and Tijuana. Objectives of the trip were:

- Review the organization of U.S. law enforcement along the border with an eye to producing an overarching organizational concept for drug control programs.
- Consider how best to deploy resources more effectively to stop the flow of drugs across the border.
- Meet with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officers and civic officials on the front lines against drugs
- Gather information about intelligence collection activities in support of our national drug control policy.

The U.S.-Mexico border is vital to both the security and economic well-being of the United States. U.S.-Mexico trade has more than doubled from 1990 through 1996. U.S. exports to Mexico grew by 36.5 percent (\$15.2 billion) from 1993 to a record high in 1996. For the second quarter of 1997, Mexico surpassed Japan as our second largest export market. In 1995, five Southwest border POEs were among the twelve busiest U.S. POE's, and the statistics suggest that this trend continues today. U.S.-Mexico trade supports roughly 600,000 jobs in the United States. NAFTA generated increases in exports to Mexico have created between 92,000 and 160,000 new U.S. jobs. The U.S.-Mexico border is one of the world's the most open borders and both of our nations strongly benefit from that openness.

At the same time, the Southwest border is the primary foreign access point to the United States for cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine. It is also the entry point for significant amounts of heroin. Traffic in illegal drugs makes up an insignificant fraction of the total volume of goods that cross between the U.S. and Mexico. Traffickers take advantage of the openness of our border and the volume of trade with deadly results. Drug-driven violence along the border as reflected in shocking and brazen murders is a new and growing phenomenon that may be related to a power struggle following the death of Amado Carrillo Fuentes. For years, drug monies have contributed to corruption on both sides of the border that has hampered legitimate growth and fostered illegal enterprises.

Despite the relatively recent high-profile drug murders in Mexico, the additional federal

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resources that this administration has devoted to the border are making a difference. From 1993 to 1997, Customs drug control budget for the Southwest border increased by 72 percent; translating into 15 percent more inspectors on the border. The number of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents on the border has increased 37 percent from FY 1990 to FY 1997. During this same period, the number of Border Patrol agents has increased 97 percent. From new agents to new fences, these increased assets are showing results. For example, violent crime in all of the U.S. border states, with the sole exception of Arizona is down. During 1996, the DEA in this region seized 7,711 kilograms of cocaine, 51 kilograms of heroin, 250,433 kilograms of marijuana, and 264 kilograms of methamphetamine. In FY 1996, the Border Patrol seized 75,000 pounds of marijuana at the U.S.-Mexico border; up from 50,000 pounds in FY 1994.

It is imperative that we continue to increase the effectiveness of counter-drug law enforcement efforts along this border. Based upon our observations during the Southwest border trip, we believe that the following initiatives, which are explained in greater detail in the following section, are necessary to meet this goal:

1. Improve accountability;
2. Maintain and improve bilateral cooperation with Mexico;
3. Develop a coordinated intelligence framework for the entire border region;
4. New technologies are the answer to policing the border;
5. Strengthen the HDTAs;
6. Build infrastructure to support the rule of law;
7. The private sector must support these efforts;
8. Put in place a systems approach to counter-drug efforts; and,
9. Continue non-law enforcement military support efforts.

Discussion:**1. Improve accountability.**

At least ten federal agencies and scores of state and local governments play a direct role in anti-drug efforts along the Southwest border. No one person or agency is accountable for operations along the border as a whole, or even at a specific POE. At the flagship POEs, on-site commanders from the various agencies are taking the initiative and forming quality improvement committees to strengthen coordination and command. These initiatives are a step in the right direction. However, they lack overall coordination and do not provide clear lines of authority and responsibility at Ports of Entry or between the ports. In order to maximize the efficient use of federal resources in combating drug

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trafficking, and assist the state and local entities in their similar efforts, the lines of responsibility and oversight must be strengthened. Beginning with:

- One federal official must be given direct responsibility for overseeing all federal counter-drug efforts along the Southwest border; and,
- One federal official must be given direct responsibility for the operations at each POE.

2. Maintain and improve bilateral cooperation with Mexico.

Acting alone, the United States cannot halt drug trafficking along the Southwest border. Cooperation between the United States government and the government of Mexico is vital to the success of anti-drug efforts in the region. Coordination and cooperation at the national capital level has already progressed significantly. Counter-drug policy is being formulated and implemented independently to meet the needs of each nation, but the U.S. and Mexico are also consulting closely to assure that to the extent possible our efforts are complementary and are likely to achieve shared objectives against a common enemy. Efforts at the local, state and national district levels -- such as local police and FBI training of Mexican police officials -- are contributing with little fanfare to common-sense cooperation, case by case problem-solving, and growing trust between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement and government officials. Existing local Border Liaison Mechanisms are extremely effective in this regard. We should build upon this foundation:

- The organizations which make up Border Liaison Mechanisms ought to be strengthened so that people living in the border communities have the wherewithal to operate effectively against the drug threat and can rapidly adjust their actions in response to changing circumstances. Cooperation with Mexican counterpart organizations which is already widespread should be encouraged.
- The Southwest border High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) programs should begin to include Mexican liaison authorities in their operations, while taking due precautions to protect operational security.

3. Develop a coordinated intelligence framework for the entire border region.

Current Southwest border intelligence capabilities are inadequate. The present intelligence architecture fails to provide federal, state and local law enforcement officials

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conducting counter-drug efforts the information they need in a timely manner. This problem is particularly acute with respect to state and local counter-drug efforts, which are now receiving little if any effective federal intelligence support. A new intelligence architecture for this region must be developed with all deliberate speed. This architecture must:

- Encompass federal, state and local intelligence gathering operations;
- Create a seamless intelligence operation running the entire 2000 miles of land border, as well as the airspace and the waters adjacent to these lands;
- Provide law enforcement officials at all levels with operational and strategic intelligence to supplement the current tactical intelligence;
- Provide information that actively supports the planning and implementation of specific law enforcement efforts -- "client-oriented;"
- Provide information in a timely manner to its law enforcement clientele;
- Develop "one stop shopping" intelligence points of contact for law enforcement clients to use; and,
- Include appropriate levels and degrees of information sharing with counterpart Mexican authorities.

4. **New technologies are the answer for countering drug smuggling along the border.** The enormous and growing volume and importance of legitimate commercial trade in goods and services between the United States and Mexico is good news for America. No number of new agents alone can adequately prevent the influx of drugs into the United States. Technological advances hold the key to allowing the relatively unfettered flow of legitimate trade, while capturing from this flow illicit traffic in drugs, drug money, and precursor chemicals. The technology currently being deployed is, for the most part, inadequate and/or already outdated. Hundreds of Border Patrol agents conduct dangerous night operations without basic equipment such as night vision optics. On a border with 39 crossings at 24 POEs, through which 340,000 railcars, 2.8 million trucks, 84 million cars, and 232 million people cross each year, there are only two fixed unit x-ray machines currently in operation. Another three are being installed, and one mobile unit is in use, with another being built. Both are prototypes. We need to ensure that authorities manning this border have access to the most up-to-date counter-drug technologies possible. Areas that are ripe for technological improvement include:

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- Every truck and train that crosses the border into the United States must be subject to inspection by reliable non-intrusive technologies to identify and capture illegal drugs. Multiple competing types of technologies should be considered to increase reliability and chance of drug detection.
- Technical capabilities to detect the physical and electronic transfer of drug monies out of the United States must be developed.
- Sensors and remote night vision optical equipment is necessary to monitor areas between the POEs.
- In general, law enforcement officials along the border must be equipped with digital communications, observation, and other technologies as necessary to their tasks.

5. Strengthen the HIDTAs.

The five High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas must coordinate all federal, state, and local counter-drug activities in their counties. Although the degrees of success vary, the five Southwest border HIDTAs are each substantially improving the ability of law enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking. The success of the HIDTA programs along the border can be improved by:

- Increasing the coordination among the border HIDTAs (for example, facilitating the flow of intelligence information on a real time basis; creating exchanges about programs that work, and coordinating programs on a regional basis);
- Building into the HIDTA programs coordinating efforts with counterpart Mexican authorities; and,
- Building into the HIDTA programs coordination with other agencies and constituencies that play a major role in dealing with the drug threat, most notably the POEs, the treatment community and prison authorities.

6. Build infrastructure to support the rule of law.

At present, we lack the required infrastructure necessary to prevent the flow of illegal goods and persons, in particular drugs and drug traffickers, into the United States. In those few areas along the border where such infrastructure has been constructed within the last five years, the results have been remarkable. Three years ago, there were 60 murders along the Imperial Beach, San Diego section of the border. That same year,

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some 10,000 pounds of marijuana was seized on this same stretch. In response to these threats, fences and lights were installed and the law breakers moved away. Last year, only six pounds of marijuana were seized and there were no murders in this area. Infrastructure improvements ought to include:

- Rapid means of access for law enforcement officials to patrol the border;
- Fences and lights are needed in high trafficking areas; and,

7. The private sector should be asked to support these efforts.

Some members of the private sector, in particular those who hold substantial stakes in the success of U.S.-Mexico relations, are already voluntarily acting to combat the drug threat. We should encourage private sector action, in particular insofar as it can:

- Speed development and deployment of new technologies to both speed up the movement of goods and services across the border and capture illegal traffic in drugs, drug monies and personnel. (For example, at the Otay Mesa POE, importers and the railroad industry are financing improvements to the POE to help with drug detection.)
- Assist law enforcement authorities detect illegal activities, as for example with voluntary carrier inspections, warehouse monitoring actions and similar activities.

8. Put in place a systems management approach to counter-drug efforts.

Over-emphasis on any one aspect of the federal drug effort -- or inadequate attention to any aspect -- undermines the overall success of our efforts. Increases in the number of law enforcement agents without concomitant increases in the number of prosecutors to handle the added cases ultimately unbalances the system. The United States should develop and implement a systems management approach to counter-drug efforts that:

- Ensures the right size and structure of counter-drug efforts;
- Modifies the makeup of these efforts based upon real-time information concerning the dynamic nature of the drug threat (if, for example, hardening the POEs pushes the threat to sea, we must take notice of this, and be ready and able to redeploy our efforts accordingly);
- Meets the emergency needs in the immediate term; and,

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- Develops a five-year plan, with intermediate objectives, to address the longer-term counter-drug needs.

The development of such a systems management technique would be greatly assisted through "program package budgeting" -- budgeting individual programs, such as increases in Border Patrol agents, along with the necessary increases in, for example: POE Inspection Customs staff, detention capacity, prosecution staff, and DEA investigators to ensure balanced and efficient anti-drug program results.

9. Continue non-law enforcement military support efforts

From AWAC planes providing airborne radar surveillance to National Guard engineer units supporting Border Patrol efforts, the U.S. military provides invaluable support to our Southwest border anti-drug efforts. Military units should not conduct civilian law enforcement activities; however, the support active and reserve units provide to law enforcement authorities along the border is vital to halting the flow of drugs across this border and should be continued.

Conclusions:

- The men and women of the Federal Agencies and the U.S. Armed Forces who carry out our Southwest border anti-drug efforts are working hard to stop the flow of illegal drugs, and drug-related crime and corruption, into the United States.
- We have made some dramatic progress, and have substantially increased the costs of doing business for drug traffickers. The risks these criminals face of capture, prosecution, and punishment is significant.
- However, drug trafficking and violence along the Southwest border remains a persistent and growing threat to the citizens of this nation. The obstacles our dedicated law enforcement officials face in stemming this threat are significant, but not insurmountable.
- The future success of their efforts is largely dependent upon providing the technology, doctrine, and human resources necessary for our success.

The nine areas for action we have laid out above would serve as the basis for a plan to reduce the drug flow across our border. ONDCP is committed to translating these objectives into actions in the near term. We will work in a partnership with the members of the Drug Cabinet Council to develop sound concepts for your approval which will achieve these results. The Attorney

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General, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Drug Cabinet Council are central to this planning effort. We will present a preliminary plan before New Year's Day.


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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM BRUCE REED 
CHUCK RUPP 

RE: Attached ONDCP Memorandum on the Southwest Border Region

Attached is a memorandum that General McCaffrey sent to you outlining recommendations on how to improve the Administration's drug interdiction efforts along the Southwest border. Although we share the General's concerns, we do not support his recommendations at this time and do not believe this issue should be tasked to the Drug Policy Council for resolution.

First, the Treasury and Justice Departments have strong reservations about ONDCP's recommendations. In fact, less than a month ago, we met with Secretary Rubin, Attorney General Reno, and General McCaffrey to discuss coordination of border-related issues. At that time, General McCaffrey was preparing to send a report to Congress on the Southwest border that made the same recommendations as the attached memorandum. Secretary Rubin and the Attorney General expressed their opposition to sending this report to Congress, and General McCaffrey agreed to hold it. Rubin and Reno -- who oversee the enforcement agencies that carry out the drug, crime, trade and immigration laws along the border -- have concerns that assigning a single, federal official at each point of entry to coordinate drug interdiction will negatively affect or conflict with our immigration and trade policies.

Second, several other border-related issues are currently being discussed in the White House and among the agencies, and will need to be resolved over the next few months. Most notably, the Commission on Immigration Reform recently released its final report recommending that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) be disbanded and its responsibilities -- including border enforcement -- parceled out to various agencies. In the wake of this report, Members of Congress have introduced INS reform plans and included appropriations language requiring the Administration to submit similar plans by early next year.

Because of all the above, we proposed at our recent meeting with Secretary Rubin, the Attorney General, and General McCaffrey that a White House-led working group consider all border-related proposals and the issues of drug and crime enforcement, immigration, and trade that they raise. We have met internally and concluded that the White House group will be led by DPC; include Counsel's Office, OMB, NSC and NPR; and will closely coordinate with all the affected agencies to ensure that their issues are fully considered. Although we recognize ONDCP's specific mandate to oversee the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas and coordinate certain counterdrug technologies and intelligence -- and support these issues being discussed by

the Drug Policy Council -- border issues that go beyond the reach of drug policy would be more appropriately handled by the process we have outlined. At OMB's request, we expect to have some initial recommendations before the budget process is concluded. We recommend that you support this process for coordinating border-related issues.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

October 7, 1997

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BARRY McCaffrey

SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

1. PURPOSE. The purposes of this memorandum are to: (a) summarize Office of National Drug Control Policy observations made during the recent ONDCP-led trip to the Southwest border; (b) report on the status of counter-drug efforts in this region; and (c) suggest interagency consideration of how federal drug control efforts along the border can be improved.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- a. From August 24, 1997-August 29, 1997, ONDCP led a delegation of federal officials on a fact-finding trip along the U.S. Southwest border. Our purpose was to review federal drug control program agency efforts to stop drug trafficking and stem drug-related violence and corruption. We also met with state and local officials in each of the border states to hear their perspectives of the drug threat. Finally, we discussed cooperative drug control efforts with Mexican officials in four major Mexican border cities (Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Nogales, and Tijuana).
- b. Establishing adequate control of our Southwest border is an increasingly important U.S. national security interest. As U.S.-Mexico trade continues to grow -- it has increased 122 percent since 1990 (going from \$59B to almost \$130B in 1996) -- so do the opportunities for drug trafficking. This 2,000-mile border is one of the most open and busiest in the world. Last year, 254 million people, 75 million cars, and 3.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico through 39 crossings and 24 ports of entries (POEs). We estimate that more than half of the cocaine on our streets, and large quantities of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines also enter the U.S. across this border. The enormous profits associated with this drug trade and the propensity of U.S. and Mexican criminal drug trafficking organizations to use violence and bribes to further their operations foster both corruption and lawlessness. A manifestation of this problem is the wave of murders in the Mexican border town of Ciudad Juarez following the recent death of Mexican trafficker Amado Carrillo Fuentes.
- c. Over the past four years, the administration has significantly increased the federal presence along the Southwest border. Some examples:
 - Customs' budget for Southwest border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93.

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- DOD's drug control budget for the Southwest border has increased 53 percent since FY91.
- The number of U.S. Attorneys handling cases in the Southwest border region has increased by 80 percent since FY90.

This federal attention is making a difference. For example, violent crime is down in California, New Mexico, and Texas. Federal drug seizures have also increased; USBP FY96 marijuana seizures were up 50 percent over FY94's 50,000 pounds.

- d. Despite these successes, much remains to be done. For example, added inspection resources have not increased our ability to adequately screen trucks. Last year about 900,000 (about a quarter of the total) U.S.-bound trucks were subjected to drug control inspections. Cocaine was found in just sixteen. Our current interdiction efforts almost completely fail to achieve our purpose of reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across the border. We need to shift from a manpower/physical inspection approach to one that is intelligence-driven and that employs emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches. Based on our observations during this trip, ONDCP suggests the following measures will help improve federal drug control capabilities along the Southwest border:

- Improve accountability.
- Expand cooperation with Mexico.
- Develop a comprehensive intelligence architecture.
- Develop a system that matches resources with threats.
- Integrate technology.
- Strengthen the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.
- Build infrastructure to support the rule of law.
- Encourage private sector support of our efforts.
- Implement a systems approach to drug control efforts.
- Continue DOD's support role.

3. DISCUSSION

- a. **Improve accountability.** At least ten federal agencies and scores of state and local governments are involved in drug control efforts along the Southwest border. However, no individual or agency has overall coordination responsibility for drug control operations along the length of the border or even within individual POEs. That being said, federal

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agencies at major POEs are forming quality improvement committees as an ad hoc measure to improve coordination. Functional and sectoral accountability must be established. Specific ONDCP suggestions include:

- Assign direct responsibility for coordinating all federal drug control efforts along the Southwest border to one federal official.
 - Designate an "in-charge" federal official at each POE.
- b. Expand cooperation with Mexico.** The United States alone cannot stop drug trafficking across the Southwest border. Expanded cooperation with Mexico is essential. Ongoing cooperative initiatives at the local, state, and national levels -- such as FBI training of Mexican law enforcement officials and Bilateral Liaison Mechanisms (BLMs) that link cross-border communities -- should be our building blocks. Specific suggestions include:
- Encourage BLMs to address drug trafficking and drug-related problems.
 - Establish Mexican law enforcement liaisons with U.S. Southwest border HIDTAs while maintaining appropriate strict security measures.
- c. Develop a comprehensive intelligence architecture.** Current U.S. intelligence capabilities along the Southwest border are clearly inadequate. Federal, state and local law enforcement officials conducting drug control operations do not normally receive timely or actionable intelligence or information. Intelligence is not adequately shared among Federal and state agencies. NDIC and EPIC roles are not supportive of operating elements. Our intelligence and information systems must:
- Bring together all federal, state and local intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination efforts.
 - Create a seamless intelligence operation covering the entire 2000-mile border and contiguous waters.
 - Encourage law enforcement officials at all levels to conduct intelligence-driven/information-based operations.
 - Encourage appropriate, strictly protected sharing of information with vetted counterpart Mexican organizations.
- d. Develop a system that matches resources with threats.** Available information about the drug threat is fragmented and incomplete. It is difficult to obtain a succinct, up-to-date assessment of the drug threat either along the entire border or in any specific state or sector. Similarly, there is no readily-available integrated overview of federal efforts to address the drug threat. The end result is that there is often no direct link between current operations and an intelligence analysis of the dynamic threats we face. Specific ONDCP suggestions include:

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- Develop the capability to track the drug threat, drug control assets, and sectoral responsibilities into an automated, digital, grid-based schematic format covering both sides of the border.
 - Update this information on a real time basis and link it to a centralized Southwest border intelligence and coordination headquarters.
 - Create an intelligence system through the five SW Border HIDTAs that will allow law enforcement and policy-makers to monitor the changing nature of the trafficking threats and adapt efforts accordingly.
 - Use this carefully protected counter-drug information to prioritize and conduct counter-drug operations and assess new manpower and technology needs.
- e. **Integrate counter-drug technology.** The enormous growing volume and importance of legitimate commercial trade in goods and services between the United States and Mexico is good news for America. However, with this volume of trade, no number of new agents alone can manually prevent the influx of drugs into the United States. Technological advances hold the key to allowing the relatively unfettered flow of legitimate trade, while capturing from this flow illicit traffic in drugs, drug money, and precursor chemicals. The technology currently being deployed is, for the most part, inadequate and/or already outdated. Hundreds of Border Patrol agents conduct dangerous night operations without basic equipment, such as night vision optics. The three operational x-ray machines (two are at fixed sites, one is a mobile prototype) provide inadequate coverage and are easily avoided by traffickers. Another six are scheduled to be operational by mid 1999. We need to ensure that authorities manning this border have access to the most up-to-date counter-drug technologies possible so that:
- Every truck and train that crosses the border into the United States can be subjected to at least three different non-intrusive inspections that can detect illegal drugs.
 - The physical and or electronic transfer of drug monies out of the United States can be detected.
 - Sensors, lighting and remote night vision devices monitor areas between POEs.
 - Law enforcement officials along the border are equipped with digital communications equipment, observation devices, detection devices, and other technologies necessary to their tasks.
- f. **Strengthen the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.** Although degrees of success vary, the five Southwest border HIDTAs are each substantially improving the ability of law enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking. The effectiveness of HIDTA programs along the border can be improved by:
- Ensuring the five HIDTAs coordinate all federal, state and local counter-drug activities in their jurisdictions.

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- Increasing coordination among the border HIDTAs (for example, facilitating the flow of intelligence information on a real time basis, creating exchanges about programs that work, and coordinating programs on a regional basis).
 - Establish strictly-protected coordination between HIDTAs and counterpart Mexican authorities.
 - Improve coordination between HIDTAs, U.S. drug control program agencies, and state and local prevention, treatment, and enforcement agencies.
- g. Build infrastructure to support the rule of law.** In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation establishing federal control of a strip of land sixty feet wide along the entire U.S.-Mexico border. His intent was to assure the federal ability to secure the border. There was no follow-through on his proclamation. We must address serious infrastructure shortfalls in order to prevent the flow of illegal goods and persons -- in particular drugs and drug traffickers -- into the United States. Barriers and surveillance devices work. Along the Imperial Beach, San Diego section of the border for example, there were sixty murders and 10,000 pounds of marijuana seized three years ago. Last year, after the installation of fences and lights backed up by more Border Patrol Agents, there were no murders, and just six pounds of marijuana were seized. Specific suggestions include:
- Develop a strategic five-year plan to build access roads to allow patrolling of the border and to erect fences and lights in high trafficking areas.
 - Assign one federal agency responsibility for planning, building, and maintaining roads and barriers.
- h. Encourage private sector support of our efforts.** The scope of this challenge will require private sector support, particularly from those who hold substantial stakes in the success of U.S.-Mexico relations. The private sector can help by:
- Assisting in the development and deployment of new technologies that can detect drugs without slowing the two-way movement of goods and services.
 - Implementing self-regulatory procedures to prevent drugs from being hidden in legal transactions.
- i. Implement a systems approach to drug control efforts.** Over or under emphasis on any component of the overall drug control effort detracts from overall effectiveness. Increasing, for example, the number of inspectors and agents without a corresponding increase in capabilities within the prosecutorial and detention systems can overwhelm the latter. As we continue to increase federal drug control resources in the Southwest border area, we must ensure the build-up is steady across the board. In particular, we must ensure that:
- Drug control programs are appropriate to the challenge.

October 7, 1997


SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Our programs continue to respond to the dynamic nature of the drug threat
- Department and agency build-ups are coordinated.

j. Continue DoD's support role. The U.S. Armed Forces are providing invaluable support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the Southwest border region. This support should continue. However, all Title 10 (active components) and Title 32 (Guard and Reserves) support missions must be carefully scrutinized to ensure assigned missions are compatible with unit and individual capabilities. We should also consider making appropriate investments in those areas where our troops are being employed as a result of federal drug control program agency shortfalls.

4. CONCLUSIONS. The flow of drugs across the Southwest border has not been significantly curtailed despite tactical success that have caused changes in smuggling routes and techniques. Drug trafficking and violence remain persistent and growing threats to border region residents. While the obstacles our law enforcement officials face in stemming these threats are significant, they are not insurmountable. Our significant investments along the Southwest border are beginning to pay off. Future success is dependent on adjusting existing organizations to better support ongoing federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. Harnessing emerging technology is a must. The ten initiatives outlined in this report might usefully orient the already extensive federal anti-drug effort in the region. ONDCP will table them with your Drug Policy Council over the coming months. Our intent is to provide you a fully-coordinated and supportable plan of action in the spring.

V/R



Barry R. McCaffrey
Director
Office of National Drug Control Policy

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

JOSE

DATE: 10/9 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10/13SUBJECT: McCallery memo on SW Border efforts

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☒	☐	McCURRY	☐	☐
BOWLES	☒	☐	McGINTY	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	NASH	☐	☐
PODESTA	☒	☐	RADD	☐	☐
MATHEWS	☒	☐	REED → ☒	☐	☐
RAINES	☒	☐	RUFF	☐	☐
BLUMENTHAL	☐	☐	SMITH	☐	☐
BERGER	☒	☐	SOSNIK	☐	☐
ECHAVESTE	☐	☐	SPERLING	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☒	☐	STREETT	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	TARULLO	☐	☐
HILLEY	☐	☐	VERVEER	☐	☐
IBARRA	☐	☐	WALDMAN	☐	☐
KLAIN	☐	☐	YELLEN	☐	☐
LEWIS	☐	☐	BEGALA	☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐	<u>Cerda</u>	☐	☐
MARSHALL	☒	☐		☐	☐
				☐	☐

REMARKS:

Any comment? (Note recommendations in memo)

RESPONSE:



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

October 7, 1997

57 OCT 9 4:10:40

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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October 7, 1997


SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Our programs continue to respond to the dynamic nature of the drug threat
- Department and agency build-ups are coordinated.

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V/R



Barry R. McCaffrey
Director
Office of National Drug Control Policy

**Questions and Answers on Southwest Border Drug Initiative
December 11, 1997**

Background:

For several months, General McCaffrey has been arguing for a comprehensive effort to stem the flow of drugs coming across the Southwest Border. Based on his site visits to many of the 39 points of entry (POEs) along the Southwest Border, McCaffrey has argued for improved management and increased resources to support the "rule of law" along the border. Yesterday, General McCaffrey announced to the press that the Administration would be releasing a 5-year Southwest Border strategy as part of the State of the Union.

Q: Mr. President, this past week General McCaffrey announced that you would be announcing a new strategy for the Southwest Border in your State of the Union Address. Is this true and, if so, can you tell us a little bit about this proposed strategy?

A: This summer, General McCaffrey and other officials spent a considerable amount of time on a fact-finding tour of the Southwest Border. He has since briefed me and key Members of Congress on his findings. Our Southwest Border is one of the largest and most active borders in the world, and is getting even busier. Tens of millions of cars and trucks cross every year, as so do hundreds of millions of people -- and billions of dollars in two-way trade. And this increased traffic makes our drug control efforts more important than ever.

This Administration has already dramatically increased the federal presence at the border. We have doubled the number of Border Patrol agents from 3,000 to 6,000 and added other law enforcement resources. But even more needs to be done.

Along with the Departments of Justice and the Treasury, General McCaffrey is working on additional ways to improve our efforts to stop the flow of drugs at the border. They are looking at a range of proposals, including some to improve infrastructure and technology at the border and to enhance and better coordinate intelligence efforts. We are considering these issues in the budget process and in the development of our National Drug Control Strategy, and I expect we will come forward with recommendations and improvements throughout the year.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

December 10, 1997

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Achieving unity of Effort Across the 2000-Mile Southwest Border

Purpose. To describe challenges that must be overcome to achieve greater coherence in the federal response to the drug trafficking challenge along the Southwest Border.

Facts.

- **Seven** governmental departments with overlapping responsibilities: Justice, Treasury, State, Transportation, Defense, Interior, Agriculture.
- **Twenty-two** agencies and programs with overlapping responsibilities: ATF, Border Patrol, Border Research Technology Center (NIJ), Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, EPIC, FBI, FORSCOM, HIDTAs, INS, IRS, INL (State), JIATFs, JTF-Six, Marshals Service, National Guard, ONDCP, OCDETFs, Operation Alliance, USACOM, U.S. Attorneys. More than **11,000** federal agents, inspectors, and officials committed to the SWB.
- Federal departments, agencies, and programs spend approximately **\$2B** each fiscal year to address the drug problem along the SWB.
- On the U.S. side, **four states** and **twenty-three counties** create overlapping jurisdictional challenges.
- Retail value of drugs entering the U.S. across the SWB is approximately **\$30B**. These drugs kill about **10,000** Americans a year and cause some **\$35B** in damages to our society.
- **Major plus-ups are underway:**
 1. Customs' budget for Southwest border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93.
 2. The number of assigned DEA special agents has increased 37 percent since FY90.
 3. The number of assigned INS agents has almost doubled since FY90.
 4. DOD's drug control budget for the Southwest border has increased 53 percent since FY91.
 5. The number of U.S. Attorneys handling cases in the Southwest border region has increased by 80 percent since FY90.

CONCLUSION: We need a better coordinated and coherent response to the problem.

SOUTHWEST BORDER POEs and HIDTAs

12/10/97



Additional Southwest border Coordination Nodes

NDICC
FinCEN
CNC
NSA, Medina
DEA/FBI Coordination Center
Bi-Lateral Task Forces
5 BLMs
JIATF Key West
JIATF Panama
JIATF San Francisco

● POEs HIDTAs

- 1 California
SAN DIEGO
- 2 Arizona
TUCSON
- 3 New Mexico
LAS CRUCES
- 4 West Texas
EL PASO
- 5 South Texas
SAN ANTONIO



Total federal law enforcement personnel on Southwest border approximately 11,000

A Preliminary Organizing Concept



ONDCP

**SWB Coordinator
Operation
Alliance**

**Federal
agencies & programs**

JTF-Six

**Integrates all military
support (AC & RC)**

El Paso Intel Center

**Provides directed
intelligence support**

**Customs
24 Ports of Entries**

**Border Patrol
Sectors**

**State & Local
law enforcement agencies**

Explanation of Authorities

- Directive
- . -** Coordinating
- ■ ■ |** Liaison

12/10/97

Office of National Drug Control Policy

SWB Coordinator Functions



- **Bring to bear coordinating authority similar to ONDCP's on a national problem.**
- **Senate confirmee status would make him a natural administration spokesperson to the congress and state and local authorities.**
- **Specific actions:**
 1. Submit annual reports.
 2. Set federal priorities.
 3. Provide budgetary guidance to federal agencies.
 4. Establish standards and accountability.

* PLEASE KEEP VERY CLOSE HOLD * Document No. _____

~~WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM~~

DATE: 10/9 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10/13

SUBJECT: McCallery memo on SUV border stats

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☒	☐	McCURRY	☐	☐
BOWLES	☒	☐	McGINTY	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	NASH	☐	☐
PODESTA	☒	☐	RADD	☐	☐
MATHEWS	☒	☐	REED	☒	☐
RAINES	☒	☐	RUFF	☐	☐
BLUMENTHAL	☐	☐	SMITH	☐	☐
BERGER	☒	☐	SOSNIK	☐	☐
ECHAVESTE	☐	☐	SPERLING	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☒	☐	STREETT	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	TARULLO	☐	☐
HILLEY	☐	☐	VERVEER	☐	☐
IBARRA	☐	☐	WALDMAN	☐	☐
KLAIN	☐	☐	YELLEN	☐	☐
LEWIS	☐	☐	BEGALA	☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐	<u>Cerda</u> →	☒	☐
MARSHALL	☒	☐		☐	☐
				☐	☐

REMARKS:

Any comment? (Note recommendations in memo)

RESPONSE:

* TO: DAVID MEDINA 622-7301 *
JONATHAN SCHWARTZ 616-1239
| RR: JOSE |
* — LET'S DISCUSS! *

Staff Secretary
Ext. 6-2702



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

October 7, 1997

97 OCT 9 10:48

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BARRY McCaffrey

SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

1. PURPOSE. The purposes of this memorandum are to: (a) summarize Office of National Drug Control Policy observations made during the recent ONDCP-led trip to the Southwest border; (b) report on the status of counter-drug efforts in this region; and (c) suggest interagency consideration of how federal drug control efforts along the border can be improved.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- a. From August 24, 1997-August 29, 1997, ONDCP led a delegation of federal officials on a fact-finding trip along the U.S. Southwest border. Our purpose was to review federal drug control program agency efforts to stop drug trafficking and stem drug-related violence and corruption. We also met with state and local officials in each of the border states to hear their perspectives of the drug threat. Finally, we discussed cooperative drug control efforts with Mexican officials in four major Mexican border cities (Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Nogales, and Tijuana).
- b. Establishing adequate control of our Southwest border is an increasingly important U.S. national security interest. As U.S.-Mexico trade continues to grow -- it has increased 122 percent since 1990 (going from \$59B to almost \$130B in 1996) -- so do the opportunities for drug trafficking. This 2,000-mile border is one of the most open and busiest in the world. Last year, 254 million people, 75 million cars, and 3.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico through 39 crossings and 24 ports of entries (POEs). We estimate that more than half of the cocaine on our streets, and large quantities of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines also enter the U.S. across this border. The enormous profits associated with this drug trade and the propensity of U.S. and Mexican criminal drug trafficking organizations to use violence and bribes to further their operations foster both corruption and lawlessness. A manifestation of this problem is the wave of murders in the Mexican border town of Ciudad Juarez following the recent death of Mexican trafficker Amado Carrillo Fuentes.
- c. Over the past four years, the administration has significantly increased the federal presence along the Southwest border. Some examples:
 - Customs' budget for Southwest border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93.

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SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- DOD's drug control budget for the Southwest border has increased 53 percent since FY91.
- The number of U.S. Attorneys handling cases in the Southwest border region has increased by 80 percent since FY90.

This federal attention is making a difference. For example, violent crime is down in California, New Mexico, and Texas. Federal drug seizures have also increased; USBP FY96 marijuana seizures were up 50 percent over FY94's 50,000 pounds.

- d. Despite these successes, much remains to be done. For example, added inspection resources have not increased our ability to adequately screen trucks. Last year about 900,000 (about a quarter of the total) U.S.-bound trucks were subjected to drug control inspections. Cocaine was found in just sixteen. Our current interdiction efforts almost completely fail to achieve our purpose of reducing the flow of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines across the border. We need to shift from a manpower/physical inspection approach to one that is intelligence-driven and that employs emerging technologies to conduct non-intrusive searches. Based on our observations during this trip, ONDCP suggests the following measures will help improve federal drug control capabilities along the Southwest border:

- Improve accountability.
- Expand cooperation with Mexico.
- Develop a comprehensive intelligence architecture.
- Develop a system that matches resources with threats.
- Integrate technology.
- Strengthen the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.
- Build infrastructure to support the rule of law.
- Encourage private sector support of our efforts.
- Implement a systems approach to drug control efforts.
- Continue DOD's support role.

3. DISCUSSION

- a. **Improve accountability.** At least ten federal agencies and scores of state and local governments are involved in drug control efforts along the Southwest border. However, no individual or agency has overall coordination responsibility for drug control operations along the length of the border or even within individual POEs. That being said, federal

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SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

agencies at major POEs are forming quality improvement committees as an ad hoc measure to improve coordination. Functional and sectoral accountability must be established. Specific ONDCP suggestions include:

- Assign direct responsibility for coordinating all federal drug control efforts along the Southwest border to one federal official.
 - Designate an "in-charge" federal official at each POE.
- b. Expand cooperation with Mexico.** The United States alone cannot stop drug trafficking across the Southwest border. Expanded cooperation with Mexico is essential. Ongoing cooperative initiatives at the local, state, and national levels -- such as FBI training of Mexican law enforcement officials and Bilateral Liaison Mechanisms (BLMs) that link cross-border communities -- should be our building blocks. Specific suggestions include:
- Encourage BLMs to address drug trafficking and drug-related problems.
 - Establish Mexican law enforcement liaisons with U.S. Southwest border HIDTAs while maintaining appropriate strict security measures.
- c. Develop a comprehensive intelligence architecture.** Current U.S. intelligence capabilities along the Southwest border are clearly inadequate. Federal, state and local law enforcement officials conducting drug control operations do not normally receive timely or actionable intelligence or information. Intelligence is not adequately shared among Federal and state agencies. NDIC and EPIC roles are not supportive of operating elements. Our intelligence and information systems must:
- Bring together all federal, state and local intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination efforts.
 - Create a seamless intelligence operation covering the entire 2000-mile border and contiguous waters.
 - Encourage law enforcement officials at all levels to conduct intelligence-driven/information-based operations.
 - Encourage appropriate, strictly protected sharing of information with vetted counterpart Mexican organizations.
- d. Develop a system that matches resources with threats.** Available information about the drug threat is fragmented and incomplete. It is difficult to obtain a succinct, up-to-date assessment of the drug threat either along the entire border or in any specific state or sector. Similarly, there is no readily-available integrated overview of federal efforts to address the drug threat. The end result is that there is often no direct link between current operations and an intelligence analysis of the dynamic threats we face. Specific ONDCP suggestions include:

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SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Develop the capability to track the drug threat, drug control assets, and sectoral responsibilities into an automated, digital, grid-based schematic format covering both sides of the border.
 - Update this information on a real time basis and link it to a centralized Southwest border intelligence and coordination headquarters.
 - Create an intelligence system through the five SW Border HIDTAs that will allow law enforcement and policy-makers to monitor the changing nature of the trafficking threats and adapt efforts accordingly.
 - Use this carefully protected counter-drug information to prioritize and conduct counter-drug operations and assess new manpower and technology needs.
- e. **Integrate counter-drug technology.** The enormous growing volume and importance of legitimate commercial trade in goods and services between the United States and Mexico is good news for America. However, with this volume of trade, no number of new agents alone can manually prevent the influx of drugs into the United States. Technological advances hold the key to allowing the relatively unfettered flow of legitimate trade, while capturing from this flow illicit traffic in drugs, drug money, and precursor chemicals. The technology currently being deployed is, for the most part, inadequate and/or already outdated. Hundreds of Border Patrol agents conduct dangerous night operations without basic equipment, such as night vision optics. The three operational x-ray machines (two are at fixed sites, one is a mobile prototype) provide inadequate coverage and are easily avoided by traffickers. Another six are scheduled to be operational by mid 1999. We need to ensure that authorities manning this border have access to the most up-to-date counter-drug technologies possible so that:
- Every truck and train that crosses the border into the United States can be subjected to at least three different non-intrusive inspections that can detect illegal drugs.
 - The physical and or electronic transfer of drug monies out of the United States can be detected.
 - Sensors, lighting and remote night vision devices monitor areas between POEs.
 - Law enforcement officials along the border are equipped with digital communications equipment, observation devices, detection devices, and other technologies necessary to their tasks.
- f. **Strengthen the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.** Although degrees of success vary, the five Southwest border HIDTAs are each substantially improving the ability of law enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking. The effectiveness of HIDTA programs along the border can be improved by:
- Ensuring the five HIDTAs coordinate all federal, state and local counter-drug activities in their jurisdictions.

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SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Increasing coordination among the border HIDTAs (for example, facilitating the flow of intelligence information on a real time basis, creating exchanges about programs that work, and coordinating programs on a regional basis).
 - Establish strictly-protected coordination between HIDTAs and counterpart Mexican authorities.
 - Improve coordination between HIDTAs, U.S. drug control program agencies, and state and local prevention, treatment, and enforcement agencies.
- g. Build infrastructure to support the rule of law.** In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation establishing federal control of a strip of land sixty feet wide along the entire U.S.-Mexico border. His intent was to assure the federal ability to secure the border. There was no follow-through on his proclamation. We must address serious infrastructure shortfalls in order to prevent the flow of illegal goods and persons -- in particular drugs and drug traffickers -- into the United States. Barriers and surveillance devices work. Along the Imperial Beach, San Diego section of the border for example, there were sixty murders and 10,000 pounds of marijuana seized three years ago. Last year, after the installation of fences and lights backed up by more Border Patrol Agents, there were no murders, and just six pounds of marijuana were seized. Specific suggestions include:
- Develop a strategic five-year plan to build access roads to allow patrolling of the border and to erect fences and lights in high trafficking areas.
 - Assign one federal agency responsibility for planning, building, and maintaining roads and barriers.
- h. Encourage private sector support of our efforts.** The scope of this challenge will require private sector support, particularly from those who hold substantial stakes in the success of U.S.-Mexico relations. The private sector can help by:
- Assisting in the development and deployment of new technologies that can detect drugs without slowing the two-way movement of goods and services.
 - Implementing self-regulatory procedures to prevent drugs from being hidden in legal transactions.
- i. Implement a systems approach to drug control efforts.** Over or under emphasis on any component of the overall drug control effort detracts from overall effectiveness. Increasing, for example, the number of inspectors and agents without a corresponding increase in capabilities within the prosecutorial and detention systems can overwhelm the latter. As we continue to increase federal drug control resources in the Southwest border area, we must ensure the build-up is steady across the board. In particular, we must ensure that:
- Drug control programs are appropriate to the challenge.

October 7, 1997


SUBJECT: ONDCP Field Visit to Drug Control Efforts in the Southwest Border Region

- Our programs continue to respond to the dynamic nature of the drug threat
- Department and agency build-ups are coordinated.

j. **Continue DoD's support role.** The U.S. Armed Forces are providing invaluable support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the Southwest border region. This support should continue. However, all Title 10 (active components) and Title 32 (Guard and Reserves) support missions must be carefully scrutinized to ensure assigned missions are compatible with unit and individual capabilities. We should also consider making appropriate investments in those areas where our troops are being employed as a result of federal drug control program agency shortfalls.

4. **CONCLUSIONS.** The flow of drugs across the Southwest border has not been significantly curtailed despite tactical success that have caused changes in smuggling routes and techniques. Drug trafficking and violence remain persistent and growing threats to border region residents. While the obstacles our law enforcement officials face in stemming these threats are significant, they are not insurmountable. Our significant investments along the Southwest border are beginning to pay off. Future success is dependent on adjusting existing organizations to better support ongoing federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. Harnessing emerging technology is a must. The ten initiatives outlined in this report might usefully orient the already extensive federal anti-drug effort in the region. ONDCP will table them with your Drug Policy Council over the coming months. Our intent is to provide you a fully-coordinated and supportable plan of action in the spring.

V/R



Barry R. McCaffrey
Director
Office of National Drug Control Policy



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

December 10, 1997

MEMO FOR THE HONORABLE ERSKINE BOWLES,
WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: BARRY McCaffrey, DIRECTOR ONDCP

SUBJECT: THE SOUTHWEST BORDER COUNTER-DRUG CONCEPT

PURPOSE. To outline to the White House Chief of Staff an ONDCP concept to chair an interagency task force to address the drug trafficking problem along the Southwest border.

PROPOSED TASK FORCE OBJECTIVES.

1. Conduct a federal review of the drug trafficking problem along the SWB (report to the President's Drug Policy Council (PDPC) within 90 days).
2. Submit specific recommendations (to the PDPC by 1 June) on:
 - a. Organization of Customs' POEs to confront drug smuggling.
 - b. Augmentation of barriers and surveillance devices along the SWB to counter the drug threat.
 - c. Appropriate roles for Op. Alliance and EPIC to coordinate SWB drug-control efforts.
 - d. Responsibilities of a SWB Coordinator for the counter-drug effort.
 - e. Specific FY2000 - 2004 programmatic plus-ups (i.e. end-state of Border Patrol and other significant agencies) in support of Goal 4 of the President's *National Drug Control Strategy*.

RECOMMENDATION. That you support conclusions of the ONDCP-chaired interagency study to better organize SWB efforts in support of Goal 4 of the President's *National Drug Control Strategy* – "Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat."



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Washington, D.C. 20503

December 10, 1997

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Achieving unity of Effort Across the 2000-Mile Southwest Border

Purpose. To describe challenges that must be overcome to achieve greater coherence in the federal response to the drug trafficking challenge along the Southwest Border.

Facts.

- **Seven governmental departments with overlapping responsibilities:** Justice, Treasury, State, Transportation, Defense, Interior, Agriculture.
- **Twenty-two agencies and programs with overlapping responsibilities:** ATF, Border Patrol, Border Research Technology Center (NIJ), Coast Guard, Customs, DEA, EPIC, FBI, FORSCOM, HIDTAs, INS, IRS, INL (State), JIATFs, JTF-Six, Marshals Service, National Guard, ONDCP, OCDETFs, Operation Alliance, USACOM, U.S. Attorneys. More than **11,000** federal agents, inspectors, and officials committed to the SWB.
- Federal departments, agencies, and programs spend approximately **\$2B** each fiscal year to address the drug problem along the SWB.
- On the U.S. side, **four states** and **twenty-three counties** create overlapping jurisdictional challenges.
- Retail value of drugs entering the U.S. across the SWB is approximately **\$30B**. These drugs kill about **10,000** Americans a year and cause some **\$35B** in damages to our society.
- Major plus-ups are underway:
 1. Customs' budget for Southwest border programs has increased 72 percent since FY93.
 2. The number of assigned DEA special agents has increased 37 percent since FY90.
 3. The number of assigned INS agents has almost doubled since FY90.
 4. DOD's drug control budget for the Southwest border has increased 53 percent since FY91.
 5. The number of U.S. Attorneys handling cases in the Southwest border region has increased by 80 percent since FY90.

CONCLUSION: We need a better coordinated and coherent response to the problem.

SOUTHWEST BORDER POEs and HIDTAs

12/10/97



Epic
Operation Alliance
JTF-6


**Additional Southwest border
Coordination Nodes**
NDICC
FinCEN
CNC
NSA, Medina
DEA/FBI Coordination Center
Bi-Lateral Task Forces
5 BLMs
JIATF Key West
JIATF Panama
JIATF San Francisco

● POEs HIDTAs

- 1 California
SAN DIEGO
- 2 Arizona
TUCSON
- 3 New Mexico
LAS CRUCES
- 4 West Texas
EL PASO
- 5 South Texas
SAN ANTONIO

Total federal law enforcement personnel on Southwest border approximately 11,000

A Preliminary Organizing Concept



Explanation of Authorities

- — —** Directive
- . -** Coordinating
- ■ ■** Liaison

12/10/97


Office of National Drug Control Policy

SWB Coordinator Functions



- **Bring to bear coordinating authority similar to ONDCP's on a national problem.**
- **Senate confirmee status would make him a natural administration spokesperson to the congress and state and local authorities.**
- **Specific actions:**
 1. Submit annual reports.
 2. Set federal priorities.
 3. Provide budgetary guidance to federal agencies.
 4. Establish standards and accountability.

THE SOUTHWEST BORDER US-MEXICO DRUG INTERDICTION DRAFT ORGANIZING CONCEPT



- POLICY GUIDANCE
- - - - COORDINATION
- LIAISON

- ALL AGENCIES STILL REPORT TO RESPECTIVE DEPARTMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF BUDGETING, OPERATIONS, STAFFING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF RESOURCES.
- ONE US CUSTOMS OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF EACH POE
- USBP SECTOR CHIEFS REMAIN IN CHARGE OF SPACES BETWEEN POEs



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

January 20, 1998

ONDCP
Southwest Border Counter Drug
Concept

Mission Statement

Enhance drug detection capabilities of law enforcement while simultaneously improving the flow of legal commerce. This mission will be achieved by adhering to the following principles: utilizing the latest technology; providing timely intelligence to law enforcement; creating streamlined and accountable management structures; building the necessary infrastructure to support the rule of law; and building upon relationships with the Government of Mexico.

The Threat

- * More than half of the cocaine on our streets, and large quantities of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine also enter the U.S. across this same border. These and other drugs claim 16,000 Americans lives each year and cost America \$67 billion dollars in social, health care, and criminal costs.

Technology

- * We must develop and deploy new technologies along the Southwest border to detect drugs before they enter the United States. Currently, the three operational x-ray machines (two fixed sites, one mobile prototype) provide coverage along the Southwest Border, but are easily avoided by narcotics traffickers. Over the next five years, we will add over 100 high technology detection systems to protect all our Southwest border ports of entry. Our goal is simple, enhance drug detection capabilities of law enforcement while simultaneously improving the flow of legal commerce.

Coordination

- * We must create a management structure that is streamlined and accountable, with one person in charge of coordinating our counter drug efforts at the border and one person in charge of each of our 24 Southwest border ports of entry.

Southwest Border Technology and Infrastructure Funding Proposal FY 1999 - FY 2003*

(\$ millions)

	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Customs Service					
NEXTEA eligible	\$72.219	\$81.286	\$123.350	\$130.656	\$148.277
Expanded NEXTEA required	10.200	11.333	13.565	14.743	12.888
Non-NEXTEA requirements	31.160	37.478	23.010	19.016	15.727
Subtotal, Customs Service	113.579	130.097	159.925	164.416	176.892
Immigration and Naturalization Service					
NEXTEA eligible	3.449	4.748	3.809	2.826	2.888
Expanded NEXTEA required	---	---	---	---	---
Non-NEXTEA requirements	143.676	206.756	211.304	193.424	187.568
Subtotal, INS	147.125	211.503	215.113	196.250	190.456
Coast Guard					
NEXTEA eligible	---	---	---	---	---
Expanded NEXTEA required	---	---	---	---	---
Non-NEXTEA requirements	24.850	61.873	58.142	56.680	15.095
Subtotal, Coast Guard	24.850	61.873	58.142	56.680	15.095
GSA					
NEXTEA eligible	---	---	---	---	---
Expanded NEXTEA required	---	---	---	---	---
Non-NEXTEA requirements	24.000	15.315	6.261	21.328	10.899
Subtotal, GSA	24.000	15.315	6.261	21.328	10.899
All Sources					
NEXTEA eligible	75.668	86.034	127.158	133.482	151.165
Expanded NEXTEA required	10.200	11.333	13.565	14.743	12.888
Non-NEXTEA requirements	223.686	321.421	298.717	290.449	229.289
Subtotal, All Sources	\$309.554	\$418.788	\$439.440	\$438.674	\$393.342

Notes:

* Funding requirements identified in this table include capital costs and follow-on Operations & Maintenance costs only.

ONDCP DRAFT
January 20, 1998

Enhancing Interdiction While Improving Trade
Comments for State of the Union Address, January 27, 1998

- Köester- 1. SW Border initiative (1998)
2. How to provide on new infrastru support?
3. Organiz. chart -
4. Do we have right process (ONDCP-run)?

- Budget includes
1) 1000 new border - doubled since 93
2) New tech
3) 90m for Mexican-side pilot

The dramatically growing volume of legitimate trade between the United States and Mexico is good news for America. In 1997, over 250 million people, 75 million cars, and 3.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico. Our nations share cultural, family, and trade relationships built upon generations of mutual trust and friendship.

Sadly, however, more than half of the cocaine on our streets, and large quantities of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine also enter the U.S. across this same border. These and other drugs claim 16,000 Americans lives each year and cost America \$67 billion dollars in social, health care, and criminal costs. We cannot tolerate this cancer on our people. While progress has been made by the hard working and dedicated men and women of law enforcement along the Southwest border, improvements are still necessary. The committed professionals on the front lines, who tonight in places like Otay Mesa, Nogales, Columbus, El Paso, and Brownsville are risking their lives to stem the flow of this poison into the United States, deserve our full support.

We must do more to both secure our border and encourage commerce. To accomplish this mission we must focus our efforts on three goals: 1) Developing and deploying new technologies along the Southwest border to detect drugs before they enter the United States; 2) Creating a management structure that is streamlined and accountable, with one person in charge of coordinating our efforts at the border; 3) Strengthening our border and at the same time improving the flow of legal commerce into the United States.

This year 1,000 additional officers will be added to further deter those who would harm our children. Since 1993 we have increased the United State Border Patrol from 3,389 agents to 6213 agents. New agents alone, however, cannot prevent the influx of drugs into the United States. Technological advances can open the border to the unfettered flow of legitimate trade, while stopping illicit traffic in drugs, drug money, and chemicals used to make drugs.

Currently, the three operational x-ray machines (two fixed sites, one mobile prototype) provide coverage along the Southwest Border but are easily avoided by narco traffickers. Over the next five years, we will add over 100 high technology detection systems so that all our Southwest border ports of entry are protected.

Coordination and integration of the activities and responsibilities of the Federal drug control program agencies involved in keeping illegal drugs out of the United States must also be improved. A streamlined and accountable management structure along the Southwest border is essential to success, with one person in charge of coordinating our Federal counter drug activities along the Southwest border. Those who push deadly drugs across our Southwest border have the ability to adapt and change their course quickly, it is essential we create the same dynamic on our side of the border.

*** FOR LAWG ONLY**

ONDCP recommends we delay providing the specific technology and infrastructure funding numbers for the State of the Union. However, based on the January 15, 1998 meeting between ONDCP, Department of Transportation, and OMB the total for NEXTEA eligible, expanded NEXTEA eligible, and Non-NEXTEA requirements for FY '99 is \$309.554 million dollars. The average over the next five years is \$399.96 million dollars per year.

Southwest Border Technology and Infrastructure Funding Proposal FY 1999 - FY 2003*

(\$ millions)

	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Customs Service					
NEXTEA eligible					
Fixed X-ray Systems - Truck	\$3.504	\$3.578	\$11.274	\$11.989	\$24.283
Mobile Truck X-ray Systems	16.800	17.118	27.124	38.643	41.298
Relocatable X-ray Systems - Cargo	3.900	8.693	15.800	14.527	6.744
Relocatable X-ray Systems - Containers	---	---	4.070	8.892	10.260
Gamma Imaging Systems - Truck	4.500	7.647	8.615	11.287	12.370
Rail Car Examination Systems	4.400	5.183	15.184	8.297	14.011
Automated Targeting Systems	1.750	1.327	3.339	5.332	4.959
Dedicated Commuter Lanes	6.000	4.697	10.852	7.572	8.174
Infrastructure to Support Technology	3.606	2.655	4.817	6.256	6.525
Infrastructure for Efficient Traffic Man.	5.859	3.537	3.389	3.254	2.651
Roads & Access Infrastructure	7.500	7.658	5.113	5.225	9.809
Outbound Commuter Infrastructure	14.400	19.195	13.774	9.384	7.193
Subtotal, NEXTEA eligible	72.219	81.286	123.350	130.656	148.277
Expanded NEXTEA required					
Mobile X-ray Vans	1.750	0.970	1.096	0.480	1.253
Bulk Marijuana Detection Systems	2.800	4.697	6.156	7.038	7.575
Handheld Drug Detection Devices	3.850	3.165	3.496	3.839	2.997
Anti-spotter Surveillance Systems	1.800	2.501	2.817	3.386	1.063
Subtotal, Expanded NEXTEA required	10.200	11.333	13.565	14.743	12.888
Non-NEXTEA requirements					
Currency Detector Dogs	0.880	1.205	0.991	0.267	0.272
Other Infrastructure: Fences, Lighting, etc.	5.328	5.124	4.970	4.844	3.893
Mobile Support Trucks	2.100	4.605	1.200	1.269	0.883
Investigative Technologies	5.500	5.871	2.755	2.799	3.526
Intelligence Collection & Analysis Systems	0.922	5.595	2.645	0.571	0.583
Voice Privacy Interagency Radio Comm.	12.000	8.168	5.217	5.332	4.360
Drug & Contraband Destruction Systems	2.000	4.429	5.232	3.935	2.210
Laboratory Infrastructure	2.430	2.481	---	---	---
Subtotal, Non-NEXTEA requirements	\$31.160	\$37.478	\$23.010	\$19.016	\$15.727

Notes:

- * Funding requirements identified in this table include capital costs and follow-on Operations & Maintenance costs only.

Southwest Border Technology and Infrastructure Funding Proposal FY 1999 - FY 2003*

(\$ millions)

	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Immigration and Naturalization Service					
NEXTEA eligible					
Integrated Surv Info System (ISIS), ports	\$1.449	\$2.706	\$2.765	\$2.826	\$2.888
Dedicated Commuter Lanes	2.000	2.042	1.043	---	---
Subtotal, Non-NEXTEA requirements	3.449	4.748	3.809	2.826	2.888
Expanded NEXTEA required					
None	---	---	---	---	---
Non-NEXTEA requirements					
Integrated Surv Info Sys (ISIS), non-port	13.038	24.351	24.887	25.434	25.994
Stadium Lighting	---	13.388	13.683	13.984	14.292
Road Construction Improvements	23.720	24.218	24.751	25.295	25.852
Border Barriers	---	34.127	34.878	35.645	36.429
Sterile Train Check Area	---	1.508	1.541	1.575	1.610
Detention Costs--Contract Facilities	87.770	89.613	91.585	74.575	67.762
Detention, Transportation	12.080	12.334	12.605	11.188	10.427
Detention, Removal Costs	7.068	7.216	7.375	5.728	5.203
Subtotal, Non-NEXTEA requirements	\$143.676	\$206.756	\$211.304	\$193.424	\$187.568

Notes:

- * Funding requirements identified in this table include capital costs and follow-on Operations & Maintenance costs only.

Southwest Border Technology and Infrastructure Funding Proposal FY 1999 - FY 2003*

(\$ millions)

	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Coast Guard					
NEXTEA eligible					
None	---	---	---	---	---
Expanded NEXTEA required					
None	---	---	---	---	---
Non-NEXTEA requirements					
WHEC/WMEC Shipboard Sensors	\$12.750	\$12.456	\$12.104	\$1.066	\$1.090
Aircraft Sensors	9.900	49.212	45.829	55.400	13.787
Accoustic Array System	2.200	0.204	0.209	0.213	0.218
Subtotal, Non-NEXTEA requirements	\$24.850	\$61.873	\$58.142	\$56.680	\$15.095

Notes:

* Funding requirements identified in this table include capital costs and follow-on Operations & Maintenance costs only.

Southwest Border Technology and Infrastructure Funding Proposal FY 1999 - FY 2003*

(\$ millions)

	FY 99	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
General Services Administration					
NEXTEA eligible					
None	---	---	---	---	---
Expanded NEXTEA required					
None	---	---	---	---	---
Non-NEXTEA requirements					
Laredo IV	\$24.000	---	---	---	---
Eagle Pass II	---	\$15.315	---	---	---
Colombia BS	---	---	\$2.087	---	---
Pharr	---	---	4.174	---	---
Bridge of the Americas and Paso Del Norte	---	---	---	\$21.328	---
Ft. Hancock	---	---	---	---	\$3.270
Nogales	---	---	---	---	4.360
Nogales/Mariposa	---	---	---	---	3.270
None	\$24.000	\$15.315	\$6.261	\$21.328	\$10.899

Notes:

Funding requirements identified in this table include capital costs and follow-on Operations & Maintenance costs only.