

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. agenda	Agenda and Summary for PRD-47 meeting (4 pages)	04/00/1995	P1/b(1)
002. report	re: PRD/NSC-47 (100 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Tim Atkin to Paul Coffey et al re: PRD-47 (1 page)	04/30/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Domestic Policy Council
Jose Cerda
OA/Box Number: 5318

FOLDER TITLE:

PRD [Presidential Review Directive] - 47/NSC [National Security Council]

2016-0931-S

rc2334

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Interagency Transnational Crime Initiatives
April 1995

I. Infrastructure, Resources and Legislation

A. Strengthened Authority for State Department Special Agents

The Department currently has some 250 Diplomatic Security special agents stationed at over 130 posts overseas. Many of these posts are not covered by resident representatives of other federal law enforcement agencies. Department personnel have assisted other law enforcement agencies in the past, relying on the general statutory authority granted to Foreign Service officers acting at the request of other government agencies. This authority may limit, however, the extent to which State Department special agents can assist other law enforcement agencies in overseas investigations. These investigative efforts would be improved substantially if the authority of Diplomatic Security special agents was more clearly defined.

Direct Diplomatic Security and relevant federal law enforcement agencies to develop memoranda of understanding regarding DS authority to act at the behest of law enforcement agencies. These agreements should address the authority of DS special agents in particular types of investigations, their ability to respond to requests from federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, and the procedures for handling investigative leads from other DS sources. These MOUs would greatly enhance U.S. investigative efforts overseas.

B. Expanded State TIPOFF Initiative

Direct State, Justice, Treasury and other relevant law enforcement and intelligence agencies to determine whether the State's TIPOFF database on international terrorism, currently coordinated with the intelligence community, should be expanded to include information on other international criminals and crime organizations. If feasible, declassified biographic information could be entered into CLASS and INS/Customs systems which are used at visa-issuing posts and/or ports of entry. A Memorandum of Understanding could be concluded between State and the proprietors of information regarding procedures for sharing or citing this information in the event of a "hit."

C. Financial Crime Advisory Panel

Form an advisory panel, subject to any applicable requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, made up of representatives of

businesses with interests overseas, especially international banking, brokerage and other financial services firms. The panel would identify for the U.S. Government significant issues with respect to financial crimes presently inhibiting U.S. business activity overseas and recommend measures to resolve those issues. This panel could be established within the structure of an existing advisory panel at either State or Treasury where numerous financial services firms and institutions are already members. Doing so may require amendments to existing charters, however.

D. International Crime Forfeiture Initiative

To successfully combat international crime, the U.S. and other countries must improve their ability to target and seize the proceeds of criminal activity. The Cali Cartel and other criminal organizations have become such formidable foes largely because they have been able to use the substantial revenues of crime to further their activities, corrupt government institutions and counter law enforcement initiatives. All nations must, therefore, be far more aggressive in attacking the financial underpinnings of criminal activity. There is no method more effective for accomplishing this goal than the adoption and implementation of asset forfeiture laws -- laws that respect due process rights, but give governments the authority to seize and dispose of the proceeds of criminal activity.

At the diplomatic level, the development of forfeiture laws and more vigorous enforcement of existing laws must be seen as a vital component of U.S. foreign policy. A foreign country's performance in this area should be part of the U.S. Government's assessment of its law enforcement cooperation generally. With literally billions of dollars being laundered through the world financial system annually, it should be incumbent upon those countries serious about combating international crime to show some tangible results from doing so.

To help foster international cooperation and to the extent permissible, broaden applicable U.S. laws to include a wider variety of foreign offenses giving rise to forfeiture. For example, while it would benefit the U.S. if more countries were willing to seize and forfeit the proceeds of fraudulent activity here, U.S. law does not provide for seizure and forfeiture of proceeds of non-bank frauds perpetrated in other countries.

- Expand money laundering laws to include a wider array of foreign offenses. This would effectively allow the proceeds of these crimes to be seized and forfeited, as property involved in money laundering offenses is forfeitable under current law.

The forfeiture statutes themselves could also be broadened to address more foreign crimes directly.

- Have State, DOJ and Treasury develop an international strategy to improve forfeiture cooperation among nations. The strategy would include measures to allow for the forfeiture of a broader array of criminal proceeds, including money laundering and other financial crimes, and streamline the process for identifying and seizing potentially forfeitable assets. The strategy would also seek greater international sharing of forfeited assets.

E. Asset Forfeiture Fund Enhancements

To finance and enhance U.S. law enforcement efforts overseas, make legislative and regulatory changes to allow DOJ and Treasury to award State a proportionate share of internationally forfeited property where State personnel have assisted law enforcement activities at the request of DOJ or Treasury in the investigation or proceedings giving rise to the forfeiture. Like most other governmental applicants for sharing, State would agree that any funds provided to it could only be used to support U.S. law enforcement efforts abroad.

F. Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program

State and local law enforcement agencies are increasingly called upon to investigate cases that have international aspects. These cases can pose significant difficulties for state and local agencies, who often lack the expertise and resources available to federal authorities. It is therefore necessary for these agencies to address transnational criminal cases that cannot be pursued by federal agencies. It is important, however, that any overseas investigations or initiatives engaged in by state or local law enforcement officials be coordinated with the federal government. The failure to do so can waste precious resources, impede investigations and interfere with U.S. foreign policy and law enforcement interests. Although federal agencies such as the FBI and the N.C.B. INTERPOL will provide international investigative assistance to local law enforcement agencies, if requested, these agencies do not adequately utilize these services.

To help foster much needed coordination:

- Establish a grant program to be administered by DOJ, in conjunction with State, to assist state and local agencies in specific investigations having international aspects. The grants would encourage these agencies to develop and submit proposals to address these issues, (e.g., improving computer

databases, developing foreign language capabilities, obtaining specialized training and the like). Effective programs could then be replicated across the country. As a condition for receiving these grants, however, state and local agencies would be required to adhere to the standard practice of pursuing any overseas investigative or prosecutorial matters through DOJ, State and any other appropriate federal agency.

- Form an interagency group (State, DOJ and Treasury) to study additional methods to improve coordination of overseas investigations with state and local law enforcement agencies. The group would propose a process for ensuring that international investigatory activities by state and local agencies are coordinated through DOJ, State, and Treasury as appropriate.

G. International Crime Advisory Team

Propose, at the upcoming G-7 Summit, the formation of an International Crime Advisory Team (ICAT), drawing on the successful model provided by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). ICAT would focus on developing common legislative and regulatory approaches among nations to counter international organized crime. Governments would designate representatives from their judicial, financial, and enforcement ministries, as well as foreign policy experts, to comprise delegations to the ICAT.

Like FATF, the first task of the ICAT would be to develop a series of policy recommendations which members would agree to raise and consider for adoption at the national level and agree to be evaluated on their progress. ICAT membership should ensure that other major regions of the world are represented. Therefore, in addition to the G-7 members, membership could include: Mexico (Central America); Brazil (South America); The Bahamas (Caribbean); Thailand (Southeast Asia); Australia (Pacific); China and Korea (East Asia); India (South Asia); Egypt (Middle East); Russia (Eastern Europe); and Kenya (Africa). This would result in 17 members. Membership could be expanded to include South Africa, Switzerland, Ukraine and the Netherlands. Broad participation in the ICAT would ensure that nations suffering from a wide array of crimes, with all their geographic, cultural, legal and financial diversity, would have their needs as well as their opinions reflected in the ICAT body of work.

Beyond policy, the critical function of ICAT would be to assemble teams of national experts to assist ICAT and non-ICAT member governments in developing, adopting and implementing new or revised legislation and policies, consistent with the ICAT recommendations. The ICAT would provide such assistance in

harmony with the United Nations and other programs. ICAT would also coordinate law enforcement assistance and training programs offered by its member governments in an effort to improve targeting and eliminate waste.

The United States could offer to chair the first round of ICAT, with the chair passing to other governments among the G-7 on an annual basis. The ICAT should have an initial budget of \$700,000, shared equally by the G-7, and subject to revision when an operational plan of assistance has been devised.

H. Fugitives and Extradition Initiative

Though we have an ever increasing volume of success with extraditing international fugitives, significant problems remain in bringing to justice defendants located overseas. The greatest obstacles are often found in the countries that refuse as a matter of law or policy to extradite their citizens. In many of these countries, the option of domestic prosecution is, in fact, no option at all. A number of measures would further U.S. interests in bringing fugitives to justice:

- 1) On the diplomatic level, announce that the U.S. will make it a highest priority that other nations either extradite or, upon request, prosecute international fugitives, including their own nationals. Further, where prosecution is the chosen alternative, the U.S. will make a highest priority that such cases be pursued aggressively and that convicted felons receive meaningful sentences.
- 2) Have Justice and State explore with selected countries a third alternative to "extradite or prosecute": i.e., such countries would, where appropriate, provide for the extradition of their nationals to the U.S. with the agreement that the U.S. would return these citizens to serve any sentence imposed.
- 3) Have Justice and State representatives study methods for expediting the extradition process with respect to defendants who are not citizens or permanent residents of the U.S. For example, this group would study the feasibility of obtaining a prospective waiver of extradition as a condition for obtaining a non-immigrant visa. It would also study other statutory or regulatory proposals to expedite this process. The group would then present its recommendations to the Secretary of State and Attorney General for consideration.

II. Trafficking Crimes

A. Alien Smuggling and Illegal Immigration Initiative

Introduce a series of measures to combat alien smuggling and illegal immigration and to strengthen the U.S. passport and visa system. (A number of these proposals are in the President's illegal immigration initiative announced in February 1995.)

- Introduce immigration reform legislation that: 1) increases penalties for alien smuggling, passport and visa fraud, and supplying other fraudulent immigration and admission documents; 2) adds alien smuggling and passport and visa fraud to the list of predicate RICO offenses; 3) authorizes use of wiretaps in alien smuggling and passport/visa fraud investigations; 4) provides for the expedited exclusion of illegal aliens smuggled into the United States; and, 5) expedites the process for deporting criminal aliens. The Sentencing Guidelines would also have to be amended to reflect the higher criminal penalties for immigration offenses in this legislation, as well as those provided in the 1994 Crime Bill.
- Introduce legislation enhancing the penalties for alien smuggling or false documentation knowingly used to further some other crime, such as narcotics trafficking, should also be introduced.
- Implement cooperative initiatives with those nations adversely affected by alien smuggling or those used as transshipment points. To implement these initiatives, as well as determine what additional measures and/or agreements are necessary, designate a liaison officer from INS to work with State personnel.

Finally, develop measures to protect the visa system from international criminals. Narcotics traffickers, organized crime figures, money launderers and other criminals often make use of immigrant and non-immigrant visas to support their activities in the United States. Our ability to disrupt their U.S. operations could be improved in two ways.

- Amend current immigration law to provide for the exclusion of any individual whom a consular or immigration official has reason to believe has or is engaged in any of the predicate RICO offenses, or any criminal activity in a foreign country that would constitute a predicate RICO offense if committed in the U.S. While current law could arguably justify exclusion of

many of these individuals, U.S. efforts to identify and exclude international criminals would benefit greatly from a clearly stated statutory exclusion.

- Review the procedures of U.S. law enforcement agencies to ensure timely provision of appropriate and relevant information on excludable aliens and their organizations to State and INS. The existing Visas Viper Committees at each U.S. embassy, which have been very active in gathering and disseminating information on potential or known terrorists, could be expanded for the purpose of gathering similar information on other serious criminals. Waivers of ineligibility could be utilized when issuance of a visa would further some U.S. foreign policy and law enforcement interest such as an ongoing investigation or cooperation.

This series of measures will significantly enhance our ability to combat illegal immigration and help ensure the security of America's borders.

B. Nuclear Material Trafficking Initiative

The ability of organized criminals to gain access to and traffic in nuclear materials poses a direct threat to U.S. national security. A series of measures designed to equip law enforcement agencies with the investigative tools necessary to counter this growing threat could be introduced:

- Amend 18 U.S.C. Section 831 to better address today's trafficking in nuclear materials. In addition, provide wiretap authority for Section 831 investigations and add these offenses to the list of predicate RICO offenses.

Whether they are trafficking in nuclear materials or engaged in other serious criminal activity, it is clear that international criminal organizations respect no national boundaries. Therefore, to the extent legally permissible, amend the RICO statute to include racketeering activities that occur overseas (whether or not these activities have resulted in a foreign criminal conviction). The ability to use the RICO statute to target and dismantle multinational criminal organizations would be enhanced if foreign crimes could be used to help law enforcement authorities establish a pattern of racketeering activity. Under current law, foreign criminal activity could only qualify as a predicate RICO offense to the extent that it was otherwise chargeable under one of the specified federal criminal statutes or constituted one of the specified state felony offenses. Broadening the RICO statute to include foreign crimes in appropriate cases could provide an important tool for

U.S. law enforcement's efforts to disrupt transnational criminal organizations.

C. Narcotics Initiatives

There is arguably no criminal activity that takes a higher annual toll on the collective well-being of America than narcotics trafficking. The impact of illicit drugs is evident in hospital emergency rooms, workplaces and schools across the country. The Administration has developed a long-term strategic plan to combat international narcotics trafficking. That plan is designed to attack all phases of the traffickers' operations, from the harvesting of crops to importation, including targeting the leadership of these criminal organizations themselves. The plan helps develop democratic institutions in key regions that will resist the corrupting influence of narcotics trafficking. It also helps integrate our anti-drug efforts with sustainable development programs intended to promote legitimate economic growth and alternatives to drug crops. Our drug strategy emphasizes, as it must, international cooperation and the development of the requisite political will in source and transit countries.

Several other specific counternarcotics programs:

- 1) Develop a comprehensive international heroin strategy designed to combat the growing heroin problem in this country.
- 2) Publicize the certification process as a stringent diplomatic tool under this Administration. This year's certification decisions could be used to make this point. Most of the public does not understand the certification process or the ramifications of decertification. Presently, when countries are denied certification, there is some foreign policy price to be paid but very little domestic credit given for the decision. This could change if the process were better understood and publicized.
- 3) Among the principal impediments to our international anti-narcotics efforts, and indeed anti-crime efforts generally, are the inadequate laws and procedures, archaic judicial systems, and poorly trained and equipped police forces that still burden many countries around the world. Narcotics traffickers and money launderers recognize the opportunities these deficiencies create and have demonstrated the ability to capitalize quickly. The ability of U.S. law enforcement agencies to counter these efforts is limited by both jurisdiction and resources. DEA, for example, has only 500 special agents stationed overseas. As

good as these agents are, even where the U.S. has jurisdiction, they cannot substitute for effective, trained law enforcement agencies in key countries.

Congress recognized the danger posed by this disparity of capabilities between organized criminal groups and governmental institutions in the case of the former Soviet Union. It has provided significant funds for the development of the appropriate legal infrastructure and law enforcement training in the NIS. But the same problems now plaguing the NIS can be seen in the Caribbean, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere.

To address these problems, establish a new International Crime and Law Enforcement Fund. The fund would provide law enforcement training in key countries to ensure that newly developed legal tools are utilized effectively. State would administer the program, in close coordination with DOJ and Treasury, and would rely on these and other government agencies to provide training and support where practicable.

This program would complement present institution building initiatives. In the past, some have supported law enforcement training efforts, but opposed institutional development programs. This would be a serious mistake. Training a law enforcement officer, for example, to conduct sophisticated investigations of organized crime activity is futile in a country that does not have a conspiracy law or RICO statute, or cannot prosecute offenders in a just and timely fashion in an independent court system. Training and development efforts must coexist for an effective anti-crime program.

4) Improve computerized information exchange programs like some already established in many Western Hemisphere locations. Drug databases run by the governments of the countries or dependent territories in which they are located could draw together all the relevant narcotics control agencies in a country to cooperate and coordinate their efforts. These databases could also feed their information to DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center for comparison with U.S. data bases. Such programs would greatly enhance regional cooperation and law enforcement efforts.

D. Arms Trafficking Initiatives

The nations of the world must do more to limit the flow of weapons available to criminal organizations, terrorists and other illegitimate users. The United States must ensure that its small arms import and export policies support its anti-crime efforts

internationally. Three specific initiatives would help address this concern:

- Form an interagency team to review existing small arms import policies to ensure they do not contribute to transnational crime. The team would determine whether arms imports from some countries should be restricted because policies or companies in those countries contribute to the flow of arms to illicit users internationally or in the United States. The White House has already initiated an interagency dialogue on arms import issues and this issue could be included in those discussions.
- Have an interagency team from the Department of State and Customs examine U.S. export policies and institute procedures to limit the unlawful diversion to criminals abroad of munitions controlled under the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. This team would also provide and/or coordinate training support to those governments that identify U.S.-made weapons as a crime problem in their respective countries.
- To support the above mentioned State/Customs interagency team, have the intelligence and law enforcement communities identify the sources and flow of weapons to international criminals and terrorists.

III. Financial and Business Crimes

A. Money Laundering Initiative

Though narcotics trafficking continues to be the leading source of illegal proceeds laundered through the world's financial systems, non-drug proceeds are increasingly moved through the same channels and are frequently commingled. Professional money launderers have emerged willing and able to conceal the proceeds of all forms of criminal activity. Money laundering increasingly threatens the economic and social stability of many nations around the world. Published reports have suggested control of certain Russian financial institutions by organized crime, for example. And emerging alternative currency technologies will challenge the capabilities of governments everywhere.

Money laundering initiatives to introduce:

- 1) Raise the issue of money laundering at each available opportunity on the diplomatic level, in bilateral and multilateral contexts. These efforts would include providing support for and urging greater activity on the part of the relevant multilateral organizations, such as the

Financial Action Task Force and its subsidiary bodies, and asserting, at international meetings, the need for greater anti-money laundering efforts. The goals of these diplomatic contacts would be to:

- encourage ratification of the 1988 UN Convention and the criminalization of money laundering, where such actions have not been taken, and encourage the effective implementation and enforcement of anti-money laundering legislation particularly in key nations;
- encourage enactment, and effective implementation and enforcement, of legislation allowing for the seizure, forfeiture, and international sharing of money laundering proceeds;
- encourage the development and implementation of regulations requiring the reporting of suspicious financial transactions;
- develop joint strategies to address the problem of the international transportation of illegal source currency and monetary instruments; and
- otherwise seek adoption and implementation of the relevant Financial Action Task Force recommendations, as appropriate.

2) To help develop a comprehensive and coordinated U.S. policy on global money laundering and other financial crimes, form a policy planning group with representatives from the relevant State, DOJ and Treasury bureaus and agencies, and the Federal Reserve. This group would ensure that U.S. policy statements, diplomatic contacts and other initiatives are consistent with each other and support U.S. foreign policy, law enforcement and regulatory interests.

3) Make available the expertise of U.S. law enforcement and regulatory agencies to any nation willing to adopt stronger anti-money laundering legislation and policies. FinCen, FBI and the FBI Academy, DEA, Customs, IRS and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) have all provided excellent money laundering training to foreign law enforcement officers and government officials. These efforts would be expanded in a coordinated and efficient manner.

4) To help counter money laundering activities in the U.S. that help criminals export illegal proceeds abroad, introduce a series of legislative measures that: authorize the IRS to disclose Form 8300 (Reports of certain

transactions over \$10,000) to other federal, state, local and international law enforcement officers in the same manner in which Currency Transaction Reports (CTRS) may now be shared; authorize Customs to search outbound mail in the same manner in which it can now search mail coming into the U.S.; and, amend the Bank Secrecy Act to provide criminal penalties for willfully causing a violation of the wire transfer recordkeeping requirements.

5) Finally, to deter the laundering of the proceeds of foreign crimes in the U.S., as well as to offer an incentive for foreign governments to reciprocate, expand U.S. money laundering laws to the extent permissible to include a wider array of foreign crimes. Under current law, only a limited number of foreign crimes are covered by the U.S. money laundering statutes (i.e., narcotics trafficking, certain violent crimes and foreign bank frauds). This effectively allows the perpetrators of certain crimes abroad (e.g., arms trafficking, fraud and other non-bank financial crimes) to launder proceeds in the U.S. with virtual impunity. Seizure and forfeiture of such assets would be difficult, if not impossible, in most cases.

Expanding the scope of foreign crimes covered by U.S. money laundering laws would aid enforcement activities in this country as well as encourage foreign governments to do the same. The laws could be amended to address a wide array of international crimes. Broadening the scope of our own statutes would be an important first step to expansion of the definition of criminal proceeds worldwide.

B. Commercial Crime Initiatives

One of the principal goals of U.S. foreign policy is to foster free trade and market economies around the world. The success of this policy continues to manifest itself, as trade and border restrictions fall and international business opportunities abound. This emerging global trading system is not without its costs, however. International criminals have profited handsomely from the opportunities it presents. Indeed, criminal organizations have often been better positioned than law enforcement agencies to capitalize on the global marketplace. Criminals are not burdened by the jurisdictional limits and sovereignty concerns that often restrain international law enforcement activity. In some nations, organized crime actually undermines and threatens economic reform and advancement. Therefore, as we seek to expand free trade and develop market economies, we should also face the challenges they present for law enforcement and limit the opportunity for criminal

organizations to profit. A series of measures would help meet these goals:

- As the U.S. extends trade benefits and enters into free trade agreements with other nations, seek opportunities to strengthen law enforcement cooperation as well. While law enforcement issues cannot and should not be the primary consideration in structuring our economic relationships with other countries, the U.S. may in some instances be able to encourage needed reform in law enforcement matters in the same way it encourages commercial, financial or political reform in prospective trading partners.
- Have State, Justice and Treasury expand efforts to negotiate agreements with foreign governments to identify and repatriate vehicles stolen and exported from the U.S. Stolen cars account for over \$7 billion in losses imposed on U.S. consumers each year. A substantial number of cars stolen in the U.S. are smuggled out of this country and many car theft rings have direct ties to organized crime groups. These international agreements will help protect U.S. interests.
- Offer legislation to combat trade-related crime -- criminal activity that will no doubt expand as the U.S. successfully eliminates barriers to trade and reduces border restrictions. The legislation should: create a criminal penalty and enhanced civil penalties for port running; amend the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to cover attempts to make exports in violation of an embargo; create a consolidated criminal export smuggling statute under Title 18 of the U.S. Code; provide for the automatic suspension of a broker's license following a felony conviction; create felony penalties for illegal marking, and the commission of certain customs offenses against foreign governments; and, prohibit, except to bona fide government end users, export from the U.S. of those weapons enumerated in the 1994 Crime Control Bill (i.e., designated assault weapons). In addition, offer legislation criminalizing the falsification of certain documents required under NAFTA.

C. Counterfeit Currency Initiative

The production and distribution of counterfeit U.S. currency overseas is a growing problem. Approximately 65% of the counterfeit currency passed within the U.S. is produced outside this country. In 1994, over \$137 million in counterfeit currency appeared overseas. Organized crime groups around the world have become involved in producing and distributing counterfeit U.S. currency. Counterfeit currency undermines confidence in the U.S. dollar. Indeed, merchants in some countries will no longer accept \$100 bills because of widespread counterfeiting. It also

fuels other criminal ventures by allowing criminal organizations to sell counterfeit currency at less than face value in exchange for authentic currency.

It is critical that the U.S. respond to the growing counterfeiting problem. Current plans to introduce re-designed U.S. currency could tempt counterfeiters to flood the market in the hope of exchanging phony bills for new currency. The U.S. could also:

- Develop programs with law enforcement agencies overseas to aid enforcement of the 1994 Crime Bill provision criminalizing counterfeiting activities outside the U.S.

Expand the presence and coordination of the Secret Service, Federal Reserve, Department of State and other relevant law enforcement and intelligence agencies in their efforts to control counterfeiting. These efforts would include expansion of the current Secret Service and Federal Reserve efforts to train foreign law enforcement officers and central banks to identify counterfeit U.S. currency and investigate its sources.

IV. Training

A. Ambassadorial Training

Make narcotics and crime matters part of the Department of State orientation and training process for all U.S. ambassadors and other critical Foreign Service officials. These subjects are not currently addressed even though they are important to American foreign policy interests. DOJ and Treasury would participate in this training effort as appropriate.

B. NIS Law Enforcement Training Program

State has already announced implementation of the \$20 million law enforcement training program for the NIS and Central Europe. Stressing the importance of this program in combating the problems of organized crime, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, money laundering and financial crime, make a multi-year commitment to this program and to the existing legal reform and rule of law programs that are also essential. Experience in the U.S. has shown that it takes several years for training and education to have a measurable effect on law enforcement in the field, especially where training focuses on new legal or investigative techniques. Given the magnitude of the problems in the NIS and Central Europe, it is unlikely a one-year training program would sufficiently equip law enforcement agencies to address these difficult issues effectively.

C. Law Enforcement Language Center

The increasing number of international investigations and prosecutions has sorely taxed the ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to obtain quality translation and interpretation services. Translation services in complex extradition or wiretap cases by themselves can be a monumental burden on these agencies. The individual law enforcement agencies' language capabilities are not sufficient to meet this growing need, and the lack of a common pool of language resources affects the quality of translations and the availability of linguists who are proficient in the less commonly spoken languages.

Justice and Treasury, in consultation with State, could fund the creation of a Law Enforcement Language Center. The Center would provide translation and interpretation support for ongoing investigations and prosecutions. If feasible, it could also provide support for international conferences and meetings. Justice and Treasury, in consultation with State, would determine whether the center established by expanding existing language services components or creating a new facility and identify possible funding sources. Given the importance of quality language services to U.S. law enforcement interests, complete a feasibility study of the proposed center at the earliest possible date.

V. Public Affairs and Outreach

A. Transnational Organized Crime Conference

Hold a Transnational Crime Conference in the United States in the fall of 1995. The purpose of the conference would be to improve cooperation between nations on important transnational crime issues such as narcotics trafficking, money laundering, the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime. The conference would be designed to achieve specific goals, i.e., formation of specific working groups, and the like. The conference can be billed as building on the groundwork of previous gatherings (e.g., the UN ministerial conference in Naples and the UN Crime Congress in 1995). Holding a conference in the U.S. would help emphasize U.S. leadership in this vital area and help the U.S. focus the agenda to ensure concrete results.

The conference could be chaired by the Vice President in order to demonstrate the high level of commitment in the U.S. to fighting international crime. DOJ, State and Treasury would jointly develop the conference's agenda and scope.

B. Public Diplomacy Initiative

Because international cooperation is vital in the area of transnational crime, it is important that the U.S. help shape public attitudes overseas in a way that supports our foreign policy objectives. To accomplish this, State would lead an interagency effort to strengthen the USG's public diplomacy in the areas of narcotics and crime. USIA would also add international crime as a priority initiative to its international program and media operations, with special focus on key countries, and would promote our crime initiatives through Worldnets and all other available media assets.

There can be little doubt that a strong public diplomacy effort is vital. Concerns about perceived infringements of sovereignty on the part of other nations have inhibited and will continue to inhibit effective law enforcement cooperation in many instances. Colombia's decision to ban extradition is one example of this problem. By successfully characterizing the extradition issue in terms of sovereignty, the drug cartels in several Latin American countries can now conduct their operations with little fear of U.S. law enforcement or punishment. To avoid this problem elsewhere on such issues as legalization, eradication, law enforcement cooperation and money laundering (the last of which is not considered to be a criminal concern in many nations), the public diplomacy project will attempt to formulate and project a consistent message to the public, both overseas and in the United States.

C. Ambassadorial Summit

To emphasize the importance of transnational crime in the American foreign policy agenda and to encourage the active support of U.S. embassy personnel, call selected U.S. ambassadors to Washington for a joint meeting with the President to announce the adopted crime initiatives. The President would address this meeting with appropriate follow-up briefings by senior U.S. Government officials. Specific crime initiative proposals would be discussed, with special emphasis on those proposals requiring active embassy engagement.

VI. ONGOING INITIATIVES

A. Border Security

Continue border security activities already underway at the Department of State. These activities are funded through the machine readable visa (MRV) fee. They are based on Vice President Gore's initiative in this area beginning in 1993. Bringing these efforts to fruition will require that the MRV fee

be extended beyond September 30, 1995. With these funds, we will continue to upgrade and expand the existing lookout systems, bring more overseas posts on line, and directly integrate the State lookout system with those of other agencies. Other initiatives, such as efforts to produce tamper-resistant passports and visas, and increasing anti-fraud/investigative positions relating to passport and visa fraud in key overseas posts, may require additional resources.

B. Anti-drug Program Funding

Implementing the President's strategic plan will require a long-term, bipartisan commitment. Press Congress to fully fund our international drug control efforts by adopting the Administration's FY 1996 budget request.

C. International Institution Building

Reemphasize Administration support of full funding for existing programs designed to help key nations develop laws and judicial procedures consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests. These administration of justice programs have helped many countries toughen penalties for narcotics trafficking, develop conspiracy laws and the like, and undertake needed judicial reform. These are all critical components of this country's counternarcotics strategy. To ensure that these programs continue to support U.S. law enforcement interests, as well as our international development concerns, State/AID together with DOJ, Treasury and the law enforcement community should continue and strengthen their consultations concerning administration of justice programs.

D. Financial Crime Intelligence

- Continue work with key governments to establish an international network of "Financial Intelligence Centers." These centers, subject to appropriate agreements, facilitate the more rapid exchange of financial information among law enforcement and regulatory agencies, enhancing the world's ability to control global money laundering. It is clear that without the proper infrastructure and access to information, even trained law enforcement officers will have tremendous difficulty battling sophisticated money launderers. Indeed, in today's global financial system, unless national governments improve their abilities to collect, analyze and share financial information more rapidly, launderers will always have an advantage.

- The best available intelligence information should also be provided to those U.S. policy makers developing our money laundering strategies. Continue law enforcement and intelligence community efforts, consistent with their authorities, to improve and coordinate intelligence collection and analysis in this important area.

E. Budapest International Law Enforcement Academy

Continue State, Justice and Treasury efforts to solicit participation by other nations in the Budapest International Law Enforcement Academy, announced by President Clinton on December 2, 1994, and to develop its curriculum and faculty. The goal of this initiative is to make this center a truly international facility designed to train law enforcement officials from Central Europe and the NIS, utilizing the resources, specialized skills, and training capabilities of a number of nations. Participation is being sought of the European Union members, Canada and Norway.

F. Agent Efforts Against Counterfeiting

Continue to support the current program to increase the presence of Secret Service and other trained Treasury agents overseas to combat counterfeiting.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. report	re: PRD/NSC-47 (100 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Domestic Policy Council
Jose Cerda
OA/Box Number: 5318

FOLDER TITLE:

PRD [Presidential Review Directive] - 47/NSC [National Security Council]

2016-0931-S
rc2334

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	Tim Atkin to Paul Coffey et al re: PRD-47 (1 page)	04/30/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Domestic Policy Council
Jose Cerda
OA/Box Number: 5318

FOLDER TITLE:

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