

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. fax	re: Corrections to Milwaukee Case [partial] (1 page)	07/17/1997	b(7)(C), b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Domestic Policy Council
Jose Cerda
OA/Box Number: 17180

FOLDER TITLE:

Gun Tracing Initiative: Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative [folder 1]

2016-0931-S

rc2282

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE
Second Phase Cities

Chicago, Illinois
Los Angeles, California
Detroit, Michigan
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*
New Orleans, Louisiana
Newark, New Jersey*
Houston, Texas
Miami, Florida
Tucson, Arizona*
Gary, Indiana*

*Attorney General's Special Cities

These cities were selected for comprehensive crime gun tracing and trace analysis on one or both of two grounds: (1) cities of over 250,000 with a high number of target violations -- murders with a firearm, robberies with a firearm, aggravated assaults with a firearm and weapons carrying and possessing offenses for youths (18-24) and juveniles (0-17); (2) cities with a population of over 100,000 designated by the Attorney General to be included in the Justice Department's Special Cities Project because violent crime increased annually during the period 1993-1995.

The combination of these two projects was tested in a few additional localities and then greatly expanded last July, when the President announced the YCGII in 17 cities across the country. Through the YCGII, we have learned a great deal more about gun trafficking in just one year.

- Approximately 25% of the crime guns used by juveniles (age 17 and under) and youth (ages 18-24) move rapidly from their point of first retail sale to recovery by law enforcement agencies. Through investigative experience, ATF has learned that recovery of new firearms often signals increased illegal diversion of weapons.
- Illegal handguns recovered from juveniles and youth are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of kinds of firearms. This information is critical. Law enforcement officers have become familiar with these patterns and the guns involved, and assign priorities to investigations of traffickers based on the known popularity of certain weapons among juveniles and youth, as well as adult criminals.
- In most participating cities, the state in which the community is located is the single largest source of recovered firearms successfully traced to retail sale. The identification of the sources of the firearms allows law enforcement more efficiently to investigate the primary sources of illegal firearms (whether operating intrastate or interstate). Collaboration among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies is needed to mount an effective response, and strategies must be designed that take into account different local illegal market conditions.
- Preliminary research of selected communities by the ATF's National Tracing Center indicates that between 9% and 20% of recovered firearms have had their serial numbers obliterated, and were originally purchased as part of a multiple-gun sale and then illegally trafficked. Firearms traffickers remove serial numbers in an attempt to defeat tracing. Crime labs can now often restore these serial numbers, providing us with new and important investigative information.
- Handguns predominate among recovered crime guns. Seven out of ten guns recovered from adults are handguns, while for juveniles and youth the number is eight out of ten. As for the type of handguns, 47% of the firearms recovered from adults are semi-automatic handguns, 58% of those recovered from juveniles are semi-automatic handguns, and 61% of those recovered from youth are semi-automatic handguns.

These are just a few examples of the statistical data that

**THE YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE
PHASE TWO CITIES
JULY 19, 1997**

Chicago, Illinois
Los Angeles, California
Detroit, Michigan
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*
Houston, Texas
Miami, Florida
Tucson, Arizona*
Minneapolis, Minnesota*
Gary, Indiana*
Cincinnati, Ohio

Most cities were selected because of the high number of firearms and violent offenses committed by juveniles and youth. Those cities marked with an asterisk (*) were chosen because, unlike the national trend, they have experienced increases in violent crime.



Office of the Deputy Attorney General
United States Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, D. C. 20530

TO: Jose Cerda

FAX: 456-7028

FROM: Jonathan Schwartz
Associate Deputy Attorney General

VOICE: (202) 514-4375
FAX: (202) 616-1239

Total Pages (excluding this cover): 1

Additional Message:

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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Corrections to Washington, DC Case

1. ~~The prosecution is in MD Tennessee. The USAO is miffed~~ about this being called a Washington DC case.
2. The AUSA's name is spelled Sunny not Suny.
3. The illegal transaction took place in Clarksville, Tenn, not Washington, D.C.
4. Carol admitted to selling 80-110 firearms not 300. Neither the case agent nor the AUSA knows where 300 came from. All written reports say either 50 (which was what he said when he was arrested) or the 80-110 figure which is what he admitted in court.

Corrections to Milwaukee Case

Below is a corrected version of the Milwaukee case. The AUSA made the following corrections: spelling of the ATF agent's name; spelling of the AUSA's name; name that informant had provided police; deletion of quotation "new pistols in the box" (neither case agent nor AUSA knew of any such statement); change of suspect's job to the one he was in during the sale of firearms; deletion of wife as having purchased firearms for sale to bad guys -- she knew nothing about it.

SHIKES, Lawrence - (Milwaukee, WI)

ATF Special Agent: (b)(6) (b)(7)c [001]
Assistant United States Attorney: Michelle Leslie

This investigation began in August 1996, when a confidential informant advised ATF and the Milwaukee Police Department that an individual known as Larry was selling guns to gang members and anyone else who had the money to buy one. Shikes, who was then a security guard at a local grocery store, often sold the handguns (semi-automatic 9 mm and .25 caliber pistols) from the trunk of his car in the parking lot of the store.

A review of trace information on crime guns recovered in Milwaukee showed that Shikes had originally purchased several handguns recovered in connection with youth gang crimes. The crimes with which these guns were associated included homicides, armed robberies, assaults, drive-by shootings, and concealed weapons violations. Undercover handgun and shotgun purchases from Shikes further documented his activities.

Shikes was arrested in April 1997 and subsequently pled guilty to dealing in firearms without a license and providing firearms to convicted felons. Sentencing has been set for August 1997.

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

Tracing

The initiative began on July 8, 1996 when police chiefs, U.S. Attorneys, ATF Special Agents in Charge, and local prosecutors in 17 cities signed an agreement to ensure that all crime gun investigations were traced with ATF's National Tracing Center.

- The voluntary commitment led to a near doubling of the traces from these cities, from 20,000 to more than 37,000 requests. New York's traces jumped to 13,000 from 4,000 during the same period the year before. San Antonio's traces increased 500 percent, to close to 2,000 crime gun traces, from 400 traces during the same period the year before.

Trafficking

- ATF's community crime gun trace analysis reports are the first time that a comprehensive group of crime guns have been analyzed to see patterns on a city by city basis.
- What the reports show is that at least a quarter of the crime guns being recovered by law enforcement from juveniles and youth are moving rapidly from retail sale to the point at which they are recovered by law enforcement. Investigative experience has shown that this rapid "time-to-crime" signals illegal diversion in many cases.
- The most important point is that there are traffickers in new guns that can be identified with the help of crime gun tracing, investigated, arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated.

Previous to this comprehensive look, it was assumed that substantially all guns were sold by individuals for their own use. We have now documented substantial trafficking in guns, which leads to law enforcement from which

Enforcement

- Case experience confirms this. For instance, in Milwaukee a security guard for a grocery store sold guns to young gang members from the trunk of his car in the parking lot. Gun trace information on crime guns recovered in Milwaukee showed that guns he sold were used in crimes ranging from weapons violations to homicides. The trafficker was arrested, pled guilty, and will shortly be sentenced.

In-State Suppliers


- For many cities, the largest single source area for crime guns is the state in which the city is located. Crime gun tracing and stopping traffickers should be a priority for law enforcement in every jurisdiction.

Popular Crime Guns

- Guns used by youth and juveniles are concentrated among a relatively few kinds of guns. In other words, there are popular guns, mostly semi-automatic pistols, that appear in the illegal market more frequently. Law enforcement can devote special attention to finding the illegal sources of popular guns with fast "times-to-crime."

Expansion

- Next year, we will expand comprehensive tracing and analysis to 10 additional cities.
- Crime gun tracing provides more investigative leads to law enforcement from which commitment to making cases against traffickers to youth offenders and juveniles.



The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

The following are consistently the fastest “time-to-crime” guns recovered by law enforcement from juveniles and youth in the 17 Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative sites (by manufacturer, caliber, and type):

- Bryco, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Hi-point, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Lorcin, .380 caliber, semiautomatic pistol
- Glock, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Ruger, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Smith & Wesson, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Mossberg, 12 gauge, shotgun
- Intratec, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Bryco, .380 caliber, semiautomatic pistol
- Lorcin, .25 caliber, semiautomatic pistol

Note: More than 50% of the total number of each of these types of recovered crime guns moved from their first retail sale to their recovery by law enforcement from a juvenile or youth in under three years. The firearms pictured are typical of models falling under the type of firearm listed above. Trafficking investigations aimed at the sources of these firearms have the highest probability of success.

Note: “Time-to-Crime” is that period of time (measured in days) between a firearm’s acquisition from a retail market and law enforcement’s recovery of that firearm during use, or suspected use, in a crime. A short time-to-crime usually means the firearm will be easier to trace, and when several short time-to-crime traces involve the same individual/FFL, this can be an indication of illegal trafficking activity.

**FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ENFORCEMENT)**

Phone: (202) 622-0470

Fax: (202) 622-5040

Date: July 18, 1997

Page 1 of 3

**TO: José Cerda, White House (Fax 202-456-7028)
Jon Schwartz, DOJ, (Fax 202-616-1239)**

**FROM: Elisabeth A. Bresee's office ("Suzy" Ware)
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Law Enforcement)**

**SUBJECT: A copy of Second Phase Cities of Youth Crime Gun
Interdiction Initiative**

Here is the revised list of the 10 additional cities. The ATF SACs are still in the process of notifying Police Chiefs in the ten cities. I'll call you as soon as I receive final word on the notification. Thanks.

E. Bresee

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

Second Phase Cities

Chicago, Illinois
Los Angeles, California
Detroit, Michigan
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*
Houston, Texas
Miami, Florida
Tucson, Arizona*
Minneapolis, Minnesota *
Cincinnati, Ohio
Gary, Indiana*

***Attorney General's Special Cities**

These cities were selected for comprehensive crime gun tracing and trace analysis on one or both of two grounds: (1) cities of over 250,000 with a high number of target violations -- murders with a firearm, robberies with a firearm, aggravated assaults with a firearm and weapons carrying and possessing offenses for youths (18-24) and juveniles (0-17); (2) cities with a population of over 100,000 designated by the Attorney General to be included in the Justice Department's Special Cities Project because violent crime increased annually during the period 1993-1995.

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

July 18, 1997

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Dear Mr. President:

On July 8, 1996, you announced the start of the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII), a collaborative effort among law enforcement officials in 17 cities to reduce youth firearms violence by disrupting the illegal markets that put firearms in the hands of juveniles and youth. The YCGII brought together four significant law enforcement themes of this Administration: first, that we work in a collaborative effort with our state and local law enforcement partners; second, that we make smart and effective use of our limited law enforcement resources; third, that we do everything possible to lower the level of gun violence across the Nation; and fourth, that we make a special effort to reduce youth gun violence.

In the one year since your announcement, we have learned a great deal and have made substantial progress in developing a sophisticated infrastructure to combat illegal gun trafficking. Perhaps most important, we have learned that universal tracing of crime guns in particular communities is achievable. During the past year, gun tracing requests in the 17 pilot cities nearly doubled. Over the coming year, we will strive to increase the number of localities that trace all guns linked to crime.

Through universal tracing, we can greatly improve the quality of crime gun data that is being collected. This will result in law enforcement being better able to identify illegal gun traffickers and develop investigative priorities. For example, we have documented that illegal handguns recovered from juveniles and youth are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of kinds of firearms, particularly semi-automatic weapons. This information is critical, for it permits federal, state, and local enforcement officers to assign priorities to investigations of traffickers based on the known popularity of certain weapons among juveniles and youth, as well as adult criminals.


The Departments of Treasury and Justice are fully committed to this important Initiative. While the initial results are encouraging, we have much more to do. In the next year, we will continue working with state and local officials in the original 17 sites to improve gun tracing and enforcement strategies. We will also be working with additional cities, sharing what we have learned and assisting them in establishing their own gun tracing systems.

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With your leadership and your support, our goal of effective action against illegal firearms markets that supply juveniles and youth will be achieved. By stemming the flow of illegal firearms to juveniles and youth, we expect that the level of violence in our communities will continue to drop.

We are attaching for your information a brief summary of the Initiative, as well as a comprehensive report compiled by the Department of Treasury describing results of ATF's analyses of crime gun trace information in the 17 pilot cities.

Sincerely,



Robert E. Rubin
Secretary of the Treasury



Janet Reno
Attorney General

SUMMARY OF
NATIONAL ILLEGAL FIREARMS TRAFFICKING STRATEGY
&
YOUTH CRIME GUN
INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

Since 1993, this Administration has developed several successful approaches to fighting violent crime and the proliferation of illegal firearms. New laws such as the Brady Act and the Assault Weapons Ban gave us significant tools to prevent criminals from obtaining certain types of firearms.

In 1994, the Departments of Justice and Treasury announced the Administration's Anti-Violent Crime Initiative (AVCI). The AVCI promotes cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in working together to develop coordinated investigative priorities within individual communities. In many communities, gun violence and the proliferation of firearms among juveniles and gang offenders has been identified as the most important violent crime problem. Local task forces in Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) cities, such as Boston, Baltimore, Memphis, and Milwaukee, have been successful in identifying and prosecuting numerous individuals who have brought illegal firearms into our communities.

We have recognized that stopping illegal gun trafficking before it begins has a greater impact and requires fewer resources than pursuing firearms once they have reached the hands of criminals through the illicit trafficking market. Since 1994, the Department of Treasury has pursued an "Anti-Trafficking Strategy," which targets illegal gun trafficking at its source. In addition, we worked to strengthen the licensing of dealers and assure their compliance with applicable laws and regulations, resulting in over a 50% drop in the number of federal firearms licensees.

Reducing the numbers of licensed dealers is not enough, for even with the dramatic reduction, there are still approximately 110,000 licensees. Thus, we have also strived to identify dealers who may be illegally selling firearms, as well as non-licensed individuals who buy and sell firearms that originally were purchased lawfully. Historically, identifying these persons and the resulting trafficking patterns has been difficult. But this is where the YCGII shows great promise.

For the past few years, researchers in Massachusetts had sought to identify the original legitimate source of every gun seized by the Boston Police Department, to determine whether there were any specific patterns that could help law enforcement stem the flow of illegal firearms to criminals. ATF also developed a computer program, Project LEAD, that could take that data, commonly referred to as "trace information," and use it to identify individuals and locations that might be involved in illegal firearms trafficking.

The combination of these two projects was tested in a few additional localities and then greatly expanded last July, when the President announced the YCGII in 17 cities across the country. Through the YCGII, we have learned a great deal more about gun trafficking in just one year.

- Approximately 25% of the crime guns used by juveniles (age 17 and under) and youth (ages 18-24) move rapidly from their point of first retail sale to recovery by law enforcement agencies. Through investigative experience, ATF has learned that recovery of new firearms often signals increased illegal diversion of weapons.
- Illegal handguns recovered from juveniles and youth are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of kinds of firearms. This information is critical. Law enforcement officers have become familiar with these patterns and the guns involved, and assign priorities to investigations of traffickers based on the known popularity of certain weapons among juveniles and youth, as well as adult criminals.
- In most participating cities, the state in which the community is located is the single largest source of recovered firearms successfully traced to retail sale. The identification of the sources of the firearms allows law enforcement more efficiently to investigate the primary sources of illegal firearms (whether operating intrastate or interstate). Collaboration among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies is needed to mount an effective response, and strategies must be designed that take into account different local illegal market conditions.
- Preliminary research of selected communities by the ATF's National Tracing Center indicates that between 9% and 20% of recovered firearms have had their serial numbers obliterated, and were originally purchased as part of a multiple-gun sale and then illegally trafficked. Firearms traffickers remove serial numbers in an attempt to defeat tracing. Crime labs can now often restore these serial numbers, providing us with new and important investigative information.
- Handguns predominate among recovered crime guns. Seven out of ten guns recovered from adults are handguns, while for juveniles and youth the number is eight out of ten. As for the type of handguns, 47% of the firearms recovered from adults are semi-automatic handguns, 58% of those recovered from juveniles are semi-automatic handguns, and 61% of those recovered from youth are semi-automatic handguns.

These are just a few examples of the statistical data that

3

is being provided to each of the participating cities, which will assist local law enforcement officials in setting investigative priorities based on the patterns unique to their community. It is through the expansion of this type of information, which can only be obtained by increased crime gun tracing, that we will be able to more broadly assist individual investigators in their cases across the nation.

The YCGII has developed tools that can be used in cities throughout the country to strengthen enforcement efforts against illegal traffickers to juveniles and youth. By expanding comprehensive crime gun tracing to additional cities, increasing the development of crime gun trace analyses, increasing federal, state, and local training in trafficking investigations, and continuing federal-state-local collaboration in trafficking investigations and local violence reduction initiatives, we will ensure the effectiveness of our nationwide effort to disrupt this lethal trade and reduce juvenile and youth firearms violence.

The Clinton Administration's Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative July 8, 1996

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: What exactly are you announcing today and why?

The Clinton Administration has been strongly committed to reducing firearm violence in this country and reversing an upward trend of firearm violence by juveniles. President Clinton wants to put more police on our streets and take guns and drugs off them.

Today's announcement is another step in that direction. This initiative will bring ATF, U.S. Attorneys, and state and local police chiefs together in 17 cities for a pilot project to disrupt the illegal gun market and make guns less available to kids by helping to identify apprehend, prosecute, and punish illegal gun traffickers.

Through the creation of a federal and state/local partnership, this new initiative ensures that every crime gun in selected cities will be traced using the ATF National Tracing Center and Project LEAD.

Q: How exactly will this program work?

In the 17 pilot cities, the Clinton Administration will establish federal-local partnerships where ATF agents and local police will work together to stem the flow of guns to juveniles.

Through this partnership, all guns used by juveniles in the commission of crimes will be forwarded to the ATF's National Tracing Center (NTC). The NTC will report back to the local police department, informing them as to where the gun was purchased and who was the original owner. Using this information, the local police, working with the ATF, will attempt to track down and prosecute the main suppliers of illegal firearms to youth.

The ATF-local police partnership will also be assisted by Project LEAD, a computer program which aggregates and evaluates information collected by the NTC. Project LEAD compiles information concerning potentially illegal firearms trafficking patterns, illegal purchasers, problem firearms dealers, and geographic sources of supply and sales. Using this information, local and federal officers will attack the illegal firearms market as it pertains to youth.

Q: How did you pick these 17 cities?

The 17 sites were chosen because local law enforcement authorities in each, have

made a significant commitment to the federal government to reduce youth firearms crime. Since the goal is to have an immediate effect, the well-known, pre-existing local commitment was considered a major advantage of the chosen sites. The sites are of various sizes and geographic locations, and all of the sites include the existence of an ATF field office or division, or are sufficiently near to ATF offices to ensure proper federal support.

These pilot sites include 10 Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Youth Firearms Initiative cities. In these ten cities, community policing initiatives have been expanded to specifically address the problem of youth firearm offenses. Of the remaining seven cities, three are National Institute of Justice youth violence research sites, and in the 4 additional cities, U.S. Attorneys and/or police have taken a leadership role in youth crime prevention.

Q: How do you know this will lead to more prosecutions?

The National Tracing Center already receives approximately 80,000 trace requests a year. The information that is collected from the NTC and examined through Project LEAD, identifies the crime-related sources of firearms. Using this data, investigators have an important guide on the illegal firearm market, and an important piece of evidence with which to convict illegal dealers.

Already, the NTC and Project LEAD have enabled the ATF to focus its limited resources and initiate many more criminal and regulatory investigations against illegal firearms traffickers. Since 1993, illegal firearms trafficking criminal cases have risen from 14.4% of ATF's firearms cases in 1993 to 21.5% in 1995. By combining this proven federal system with committed state/local law enforcement, this new initiative will expand the number of traces conducted. The result is better information about the juvenile gun market, and more prosecutions.

Q: Republicans have criticized the Administration for a decline in firearms prosecutions. Why are you doing less cases and how will this new initiative address that problem?

Over the last three years, the Clinton Administration has compiled an impressive record of initiatives that are helping to reduce firearms violence.

Breaking six years of congressional gridlock, President Clinton signed the Brady Bill, which has prevented over 60,000 felons, fugitives, and stalkers from purchasing handguns. The 1994 Clinton Crime Bill banned the manufacture and importation of 19 types of deadly assault weapons and the Gun Free Schools Act is making our schools safer learning environments by providing a "zero tolerance" approach to someone who brings a gun to school.

Since the start of this Administration, the average length of federal sentences for firearm crimes has increased 11 percent and we have had at least an 85 percent conviction rate each year for firearms criminals. In addition, the President's Anti-Violent Crime Initiative has lead to numerous gang prosecutions across the country.

Finally, the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bailey has impeded our ability to prosecute gun cases. The Clinton Administration has submitted legislation to Congress to remedy the problem created by the Court's decision.

Q: Does this initiative focus only on illegal gun trafficking to juveniles?

The primary focus of this new initiative is to prevent the distribution of firearms to young people. By identifying and disrupting the activities of the illegal suppliers of guns to youth, the initiative will put a dent in the illegal firearms market as a whole. Furthermore, while this initiative will target the juvenile gun market, they will not hesitate to investigate and prosecute all suppliers of illegal weapons who are identified through the initiative.

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

Initial Briefing
to the Office of Management and Budget



JUNE 13, 1997

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII)
Expansion to 32 Cities
312 FTE and \$60.25 Million

Executive Summary

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) is a firearms trafficking interdiction project focused on youth and juvenile firearms violence and firearms trafficking to youths. The project relies upon increasing State and local utilization of firearms tracing, using trace data to develop violence reduction strategies and coordinating State, local and Federal efforts to reduce illegal firearms trafficking.

→ computers;
software

YCGII Tactics

In the 32 cities, \$1.88 million in direct and Federal resources will implement the following tactics:

Tactic: Comprehensive Crime Gun Tracing by State and Local Law Enforcement: 0 FTE, \$1.86M Establish the capability to electronically trace all crime guns through the ATF National Tracing Center (NTC.) Required hardware, software and one data entry clerk will be funded for each city.

→ Tracers / Agents
cont & dep
of prop. lead.

Tactic: Rapid High Volume Crime Gun Tracing by the NTC: 52 FTE, \$4.9M

To meet the demands of the YCGII expansion and the rapidly increasing volume of firearms trace requests additional Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) will be necessary at the NTC.

Tactic: NTC Crime Gun Analysis: 0 FTE, \$2.7M

The success of the YCGII is the ability to produce community-specific firearms tracing analyses. Resources are needed to provide three types of trace analysis reports: community specific trace analysis reports, national level trace analysis reports and customized trace analysis reports. These reports provide customized data to those cities with special circumstances or problems. The NTC's Firearms Tracing System and its related field analysis system, Project LEAD, require additional development and enhancement to enable preparation of these reports.

Task Forces
• F. Special
Agents +
S. L.

Tactic: Breaking the Chain of Illegal Supply - Arresting Firearms Traffickers: 230 FTE, \$44.1M

Using the technologies and data from the NTC, 6 special agents and 1 inspector will be assigned to 30 YCGII cities. This cadre, working with 6 local law enforcement officers will utilize both Federal and State laws and capabilities to perfect criminal cases against those individuals and organizations illegally trafficking in firearms to gang offenders, youths and juveniles.

The task forces will target their efforts on interdicting the sources of, and markets for, firearms to youth and juvenile offenders. Federal prosecution will be pursued against the most prolific traffickers, while coordinating with State/local law enforcement to impact on locally active traffickers and/or gang offenders (leaders) where effective State laws are available.

training material
(gunle book, video)
+ sessions for SL.

Tactic: Illegal Firearms Trafficking Investigation Training: 30 FTE, \$6.6M

To ensure the proper tracing of firearms and a clear understanding of the methodologies to be employed, all personnel involved in the YCGII effort in all 30 cities must be fully trained.

Department of the Treasury
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative
32 Cities Cost Estimate
6/13/97

Summary	FTE	\$
Comprehensive Crime Gun Tracing	0	\$1,984,000.00
Rapid High Volume Crime Gun Tracing	52	\$4,904,969.00
NTC Crime Gun Analysis	0	\$2,700,000.00
Breaking the Chain of Illegal Supply	230	\$44,075,410.00
Illegal Firearms Trafficking Training	30	\$6,584,430.00
	312	\$60,248,809.00

Comprehensive Crime Gun Tracing by State and Local Law Enforcement

Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	Total
Batch Download Software			
Installation and Travel	\$17,000.00	32	\$544,000.00
Pentium Laptop	\$5,000.00	32	\$160,000.00
Data Entry Clerk	\$40,000.00	32	\$1,280,000.00
			\$1,984,000.00

Rapid High Volume Crime Gun Tracing

Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	Total
Firearms Tracers	\$84,292.00	45	\$3,793,140.00
Special Agents	\$202,607.00	2	\$405,214.00
Intelligence Analysts	\$105,323.00	5	\$526,615.00
Out Of Business Records Contractors	\$36,000.00	5	\$180,000.00
			\$4,904,969.00

NTC Crime Gun Analysis

Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	Total
Firearms Tracing System			
Mid Range Migration	\$ 2,000,000.00	1	\$2,000,000.00
Project Lead Automation	\$ 700,000.00	1	\$700,000.00
			\$2,700,000.00

Breaking the Chain of Illegal Supply

Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	Total
Special Agents (6 per city)	\$202,607.00	180	\$36,469,260.00
Inspectors (1 per city)	\$105,323.00	30	\$3,159,690.00
Technical Support Personnel	\$105,323.00	20	\$2,106,460.00
State/Local Officer Overtime	\$13,000.00	180	\$2,340,000.00
			\$44,075,410.00

Illegal Firearms Trafficking Training

Item	Unit Cost	Quantity	Total
Firearms Trafficking Investigation Guidebook	\$200,000.00	1	\$200,000.00
Project Lead Tutorial Video	\$30,000.00	1	\$30,000.00
National Tracing Center Services Video	\$30,000.00	1	\$30,000.00
			\$260,000.00

Training Team

Special Agents	\$202,607.00	7	\$1,418,249.00
Inspectors	\$105,323.00	3	\$315,969.00
Program Analyst	\$105,323.00	5	\$526,615.00
Support Personnel	\$105,323.00	15	\$1,579,845.00
Course Development Materials	\$30,000.00	1	\$30,000.00
			\$3,870,678.00

Training Delivery - 32 Cities	\$32,336.00	32	\$1,034,752.00
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New Agent Training	\$75,000.00	8	\$600,000.00
Criminal Investigator Training	\$3,000.00	189	\$567,000.00
Inspector Basic 1	\$72,000.00	2	\$144,000.00
Inspector Basic 2	\$54,000.00	2	\$108,000.00
			\$1,419,000.00

Total Training

\$6,584,430.00

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE
TARGET VIOLATIONS ANALYSIS
 Based On 1995 UCR Data
 ***Revised June 12, 1997

City	POP. DATA	TOTAL YCGII TARGET VIOLATIONS				Total				YCGII Target Violations Per 1000 Residents	Rank Target Violations Per 1000 Residents	Gross Rank Points	Average Rank Points	Composite Rank
	City Population (UCR-T8)	Total Arrest Estimated Juvenile w/ Firearm	Rank Gross Juvenile Target Violations	Total Arrest Estimated Youth w/ Firearm	Rank Gross Youth Target Violations	Total Arrest Estimated YCGII Target Violations	Rank Gross YCGII Target Violations							
Chicago, IL	2,749,881	6,674.41	2	7,963.11	2	14,637.52	2	5.322965	9	15	3.75	1		
Los Angeles, CA	3,466,211	5,936.00	3	7,263.05	3	13,199.05	3	3.807919	19	28	7.00	3		
Detroit, MI	997,297	2,262.41	6	2,769.02	6	5,031.43	6	5.045063	12	30	7.50	4		
Philadelphia, PA	1,529,848	2,501.27	4	2,818.63	4	5,319.90	4	3.477401	22	34	8.50	6		
New Orleans, LA	487,179	1,440.56	11	1,716.59	11	3,157.15	11	6.480469	6	39	9.75	7		
Newark, NJ	260,232	1,318.18	12	1,418.56	15	2,736.74	15	10.51653	1	43	10.75	10		
Houston, TX	1,734,335	2,222.94	7	2,771.69	5	4,994.62	7	2.87985	29	48	12.00	13		
Dallas, TX	1,042,088	1,467.52	9	1,862.30	9	3,329.82	9	3.195336	26	53	13.25	14		
Miami, FL	378,720	994.52	18	1,180.41	21	2,174.93	20	5.742846	8	67	16.75	15		
San Francisco, CA	738,371	1,164.74	16	1,343.92	16	2,508.66	16	3.397564	24	72	18.00	16		
Phoenix, AZ	1,085,706	1,218.99	14	1,660.96	12	2,879.95	13	2.652604	35	74	18.50	17		
Nashville, TN	523,681	947.63	20	1,232.95	19	2,180.57	19	4.163929	17	75	18.75	18		
Kansas City, MO	445,549	933.10	21	1,215.91	20	2,149.01	21	4.823287	14	76	19.00	19		
Las Vegas, NV	793,432	997.19	17	1,246.67	18	2,243.86	17	2.828042	31	83	20.75	20		
Oakland, CA (1993 UCR)	377,037	847.09	24	1,011.20	24	1,858.29	24	4.928676	13	85	21.25	21		
TOTALS	30,857,835	52,574	732	63,232	741	115,807	738	137,718	734	2,945	736	705		
AVERAGES	1,028,595	1,752	24	2,108	25	3,860	25	4.591	24	98	25	24		
DOLLARS PER	1.94					516.76								
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC	544,146	848.91	23	1,103.93	22	1,952.84	22	3.58881	21	88	22.00	22		
San Diego, CA	1,157,771	958.63	19	1,261.05	17	2,219.68	18	1.917202	54	108	27.00	25		
Tampa, FL	289,882	557.09	32	707.10	33	1,264.19	31	4.361054	15	111	27.75	26		
Minneapolis - St. Paul, MN	622,248	680.77	26	848.45	26	1,529.22	26	2.457577	42	120	30.00	28		
Long Beach, CA	436,034	562.12	31	678.77	34	1,240.89	33	2.845854	30	128	32.00	30		
Portland, OR	458,623	534.45	34	724.69	31	1,259.14	32	2.745486	33	130	32.50	31		
Jacksonville, FL	679,148	653.42	28	835.17	28	1,488.59	28	2.191855	47	131	32.75	32		
Columbus, OH	638,729	645.13	29	765.92	29	1,411.05	29	2.20916	46	133	33.25	33		
Tucson, AZ	449,981	501.80	37	712.67	32	1,214.47	34	2.698945	34	137	34.25	34		
Fort Worth, TX	460,321	515.05	36	659.88	35	1,174.93	36	2.552416	41	148	37.00	35		
Fresno, CA	388,495	486.76	39	609.06	39	1,095.82	39	2.820682	32	149	37.25	36		
Buffalo, NY	312,395	427.73	42	509.46	45	937.20	44	3.000032	28	159	39.75	39		
San Jose, CA	822,845	529.51	35	736.28	30	1,265.79	30	1.538309	65	160	40.00	40		
Sacramento, CA	375,845	439.79	40	531.82	43	971.61	42	2.585148	39	164	41.00	41		
Cincinnati, OH	359,749	419.84	43	502.18	46	922.02	45	2.562961	40	174	43.50	42		
Indianapolis, IN	772,292	536.57	33	630.47	37	1,167.04	37	1.511114	67	174	43.50	43		
Oklahoma City, OK	466,232	414.56	44	558.07	41	972.63	41	2.086151	49	175	43.75	45		
El Paso, TX	590,215	436.48	41	601.82	40	1,038.30	40	1.759191	60	181	45.25	46		
Austin, TX	523,691	410.22	45	535.42	42	945.64	43	1.805719	58	188	47.00	47		
Pittsburgh, PA	354,780	387.04	49	436.84	49	823.88	49	2.322224	44	191	47.75	48		
Denver, CO	505,843	389.29	48	530.10	44	919.39	46	1.817531	56	194	48.50	49		
Louisville, KY	272,638	324.77	53	395.45	52	720.22	53	2.641666	36	194	48.50	50		
Santa Ana, CA	292,289	279.98	56	350.02	56	630.00	56	2.15539	48	216	54.00	54		
Albuquerque, NM	419,714	345.97	51	389.27	54	735.24	51	1.751759	61	217	54.25	55		
Mesa, AZ	324,654	268.41	57	385.51	55	653.93	55	2.014228	50	217	54.25	56		
Tulsa, OK	377,152	289.39	54	394.36	53	683.75	54	1.812925	57	218	54.50	57		
Toledo, OH	323,972	285.60	55	342.75	58	628.35	57	1.939523	53	223	55.75	59		
Anaheim, CA	283,552	249.98	59	315.00	59	564.98	59	1.992503	51	228	57.00	61		
Omaha, NE	348,089	255.14	58	345.65	57	600.78	58	1.725948	62	235	58.75	62		
Corpus Christi, TX	280,605	219.97	61	309.51	60	529.49	60	1.886947	55	236	59.00	63		
TOTALS	14,131,930	13,854	1,258	17,707	1,247	31,561	1,248	69	1,374	5,127	1,282	1,289		
AVERAGES	471,064	462	42	590	42	1,052	42	2	46	171	43	43		
Anchorage, AK	253,500	211.41	63	280.42	63	491.83	63	1.940158	52	241	60.25	64		
Arlington, TX	292,324	217.96	62	301.35	61	519.31	62	1.776492	59	244	61.00	65		
Aurora, CO	256,957	176.24	67	243.37	65	419.61	66	1.632983	64	262	65.50	68		
Virginia Beach, VA	435,959	200.44	64	261.36	64	461.80	64	1.05927	71	263	65.75	69		
Honolulu, HI	880,226	167.57	68	234.05	66	401.62	68	0.456272	72	274	68.50	70		
Colorado Springs, CO	324,441	165.72	69	231.06	68	396.78	69	1.222971	70	276	69.00	71		
Freemont, CA	104,499	104.49	72	146.79	72	251.28	72	1.361943	69	285	71.25	72		

**FIGURE 1: YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE
 FAILS MINIMUM POPULATION CRITERIA**

TARGET VIOLATIONS ARE:
 1) MURDER WITH A FIREARM
 2) ROBBERY WITH A FIREARM
 3) AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WITH A FIREARM
 4) WEAPONS CARRYING AND POSSESSION OFFENSES

COMMITTED BY:
 YOUTHS AGES 18 THROUGH 24
 JUVENILES AGES 0 THROUGH 17

PARAMETER REGULATION CRITERIA

06/13/87 08:41 AM 1 YCQH:YK4 U

		Natl % w/ Firearm 68.200% (UCR-T2.11)			Natl % Juvenile 0-17 YOA 15.328% (UCR-T3)			Natl % Youth 18-24 YOA 18.129% (UCR-T3)			Natl % w/ Firearm 41.000% (UCR-T2.22)			Natl % Juvenile 0-17 YOA 32.296% (UCR-T3)			Natl % Youth 18-24 YOA 31.878% (UCR-T3)		
POP. DATA		MURDER DATA			ROBBERY DATA														
City	City Population (UCR-T3)	State Population (UCR-T69)	Percent of State Pop.	Reported City Murders (UCR-T3)	State % w/ Firearm (UCR-T20)	Percent Over/Under Natl Avg	Estimated City Murders w/ Firearm	Arrest Estimated Juvenile w/ Firearm	Arrest Estimated Youth w/ Firearm	Arrest Estimated YOJI Target Murders	Reported City Robberies (UCR-T3)	State % w/ Firearm (UCR-T21)	Percent Over/Under Natl Avg	Estimated Robberies w/ Firearm	Arrest Estimated Juvenile w/ Firearm	Arrest Estimated Youth w/ Firearm	Arrest Estimated YOJI Target Robberies		
Atlanta, GA	420,000	4,040,000	10.4%	1,200	74.19%	5.99%	611.4	93.72	251.46	345.18	30,086	50.247%	9.247%	15,117.19	4882.31	4819.01	9701.32		
Baltimore, MD	725,000	5,950,000	12.1%	850	74.19%	5.99%	611.4	93.72	251.46	345.18	30,086	50.247%	9.247%	15,117.19	4882.31	4819.01	9701.32		
Boston, MA	600,000	6,900,000	10.0%	1,100	74.19%	5.99%	611.4	93.72	251.46	345.18	30,086	50.247%	9.247%	15,117.19	4882.31	4819.01	9701.32		
Buffalo, NY	258,000	2,580,000	10.0%	400	74.19%	5.99%	611.4	93.72	251.46	345.18	30,086	50.247%	9.247%	15,117.19	4882.31	4819.01	9701.32		
Butte, MT	32,000	250,000	12.8%	10	74.19%	5.99%	611.4	93.72	251.46	345.18	30,086	50.247%	9.247%	15,117.19	4882.31	4819.01	9701.32		
Camden, NJ	225,000	1,800,000	12.5%	300	74.19%	5.99%	611.4	93.72	251.46	345.18	30,086	50.247%	9.247%	15,117.19	4882.31	4819.01	9701.32		
Chattanooga, TN	175,000	1,750,000	10.0%	250	74.19%	5.99%	611.4	93.72	251.46	345.18	30,086	50.247%	9.247%	15,117.19	4882.31	4819.01	9701.32		
Chicago, IL	2,749,881	11,000,000	24.99%	824	74.19%	5.99%	611.4	93.72	251.46	345.18	30,086	50.247%	9.247%	15,117.19	4882.31	4819.01	9701.32		
Los Angeles, CA	3,466,211	30,950,000	11.19%	849	73.43%	5.23%	623.5	95.57	256.43	351.99	29,134	40.02%	-0.97%	11,660.79	3766.01	3717.19	7483.21		
Detroit, MI	997,297	8,038,000	12.40%	475	70.67%	2.47%	335.7	51.45	138.06	189.52	10,076	46.29%	5.29%	4666.34	1506.41	1486.88	2993.30		
Philadelphia, PA	1,529,846	8,994,000	17.01%	402	70.31%	2.10%	303.7	46.56	124.93	171.48	13,612	46.60%	5.60%	4344.10	2024.30	2022.35	4071.27		
New Orleans, LA	487,179	2,953,000	16.61%	363	79.41%	11.24%	288.4	44.20	118.60	162.81	5,349	19.97%	1282.72	1055.74	1046.08	2993.82			
Newark, NJ	260,232	1,587,000	13.43%	132	58.45%	-9.76%	59.8	9.14	24.51	33.65	5,480	64.12%	23.92%	3557.16	1143.84	1133.94	2282.78		
Houston, TX	1,734,335	17,993,000	9.43%	316	69.19%	0.99%	218.6	33.51	89.52	123.44	9,222	44.27%	3.27%	4078.58	1317.23	1300.16	2617.39		
Dallas, TX	1,042,088	17,993,000	9.72%	276	69.19%	0.99%	191.0	29.27	78.14	107.81	5,899	44.27%	3.27%	2608.95	842.99	831.67	1674.26		
Miami, FL	378,720	14,142,000	2.67%	110	59.30%	-8.84%	65.2	10.00	26.83	36.83	5,676	38.93%	-2.10%	2207.56	712.96	703.72	1416.68		
San Francisco, CA	738,571	36,950,000	2.38%	99	73.43%	5.23%	72.7	11.14	29.80	41.05	2,469	40.02%	-2.97%	2199.20	836.22	836.22	1661.39		
Phoenix, AZ	1,085,706	3,869,000	28.06%	214	75.75%	7.58%	162.1	24.83	66.68	91.53	3,681	41.81%	0.881%	1546.68	499.52	493.05	992.57		
Nashville, TN	523,681	1,701,000	30.78%	105	68.07%	-0.12%	71.5	10.96	29.40	40.35	2,475	53.99%	14.99%	1481.92	478.61	472.40	951.01		
Kansas City, MO	445,549	3,141,000	14.18%	107	72.51%	4.31%	77.6	11.89	31.91	43.81	3,346	43.69%	2.96%	1471.20	475.14	466.94	984.13		
Las Vegas, NV	793,432	1,406,000	56.432%	118	65.409%	-2.791%	77.2	11.83	31.74	43.58	3,712	44.855%	3.88%	1666.12	536.10	531.21	1069.22		
Oakland, CA (1993 UCR)	377,037	36,950,000	1.218%	154	73.43%	5.23%	113.1	17.33	48.51	63.85	4,558	40.02%	-0.97%	1824.72	589.32	581.68	1171.00		
TOTALS	36,875,831	228,659,000	16.17%	7,876	71.94%	5.55%	5,556	3.22	2,285	3,137	257,045	44.833%	-1.1%	109,893	35,491	35,031	70,523		
AVERAGES	1,028,995	1,944,000	17.55%	263	73.15%		185	28	76	105	8,568	47.75%	0	3,663	1,183	1,168	2,351		
DOLLARS PER	1.94																		
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC	544,146	6,957,000	7.822%	89	66.766%	-1.434%	59.4	9.11	24.44	33.55	2,949	45.539%	4.539%	1342.93	433.72	428.10	861.82		
San Diego, CA	1,157,771	30,950,000	3.741%	91	73.055%	5.235%	66.8	10.24	27.49	37.73	3,244	40.025%	-0.975%	1298.40	419.34	413.90	833.24		
Fort Worth, TX	299,882	14,142,000	2.050%	47	59.306%	-8.894%	27.9	4.27	11.66	15.74	2,626	38.994%	-2.107%	1021.33	329.85	328.58	655.43		
Minneapolis - St. Paul, MN	362,248	4,439,000	14.018%	121	63.536%	-4.664%	76.9	11.48	31.62	44.40	4,480	28.826%	-12.76%	1282.37	414.16	405.79	822.95		
Long Beach, CA	436,034	30,950,000	1.409%	80	73.43%		58.7	9.01	24.16	33.17	2,774	40.025%	-0.975%	1110.28	358.58	353.93	712.52		
Portland, OR	438,623	2,144,000	21.391%	43	58.065%	-10.135%	35.0	3.83	10.27	14.10	2,298	30.472%	-10.528%	705.94	228.15	223.40	445.55		
Jacksonville, FL	679,148	14,142,000	4.802%	86	59.305%	-8.864%	51.6	7.82	8.90	28.93	2,949	38.993%	-2.107%	1135.47	364.32	362.03	728.81		
San Antonio, TX	1,418,728	5,208,000	12.274%	77	63.810%	-4.300%	49.1	7.53	20.21	27.74	3,329	40.227%	-0.773%	1339.14	432.49	426.89	859.38		
Tempe, AZ	449,981	3,869,000	11.630%	63	73.758%	7.558%	49.2	7.55	20.25	27.80	1,192	41.881%	0.881%	499.23	161.23	159.14	320.37		
Fort Worth, TX	460,321	17,993,000	2.558%	108	69.190%	0.999%	74.7	11.45	30.73	42.19	1,965	44.272%	3.272%	869.05	280.67	277.33	557.71		
Freem, CA	388,495	30,950,000	1.255%	71	73.435%	5.235%	52.1	7.99	21.44	29.44	2,166	40.025%	-0.975%	866.93	279.95	276.36	556.25		
Buffalo, NY	312,995	15,810,000	1.976%	62	66.491%	-1.709%	41.6	6.96	6.32	16.96	23.27	24.36	-9.107%	80.99	292.12	288.33	580.45		
San Jose, CA	822,845	30,950,000	2.659%	73	73.435%	5.235%	27.9	2.28	11.48	15.75	1,209	40.025%	-0.975%	483.90	156.28	154.26	310.54		
San Francisco, CA	375,845	30,950,000	1.214%	57	73.435%	5.235%	41.9	6.42	17.22	23.23	6,219	40.025%	-0.975%	851.93	275.21	271.64	564.84		
Cincinnati, OH	359,749	5,204,000	6.913%	50	63.810%	-4.300%	31.9	4.89	13.12	18.01	2,155	40.227%	-0.773%	866.88	279.97	276.34	556.31		
Indianapolis, IN	772,292	3,235,000	23.873%	99	70.857%	2.657%	70.1	10.75	28.85	39.60	2,533	46.099%	5.099%	1164.07	373.71	370.46	745.75		
Oklaheima City, OK	466,323	3,250,000	14.340%	227	35.751%	-32.449%	81.38	12.46	33.38	45.82	1,603	36.424%	-4.576%	581.87	184.57	186.12	374.69		
San Antonio, TX	590,215	17,993,000	3.280%	77	69.190%	0.999%	23.6	3.92	10.53	14.45	1,076	44.272%	3.272%	475.88	153.69	151.70	305.39		
San Antonio, TX	523,691	17,993,000	2.911%	46	69.190%	0.999%	31.8	4.88	17.97	13.36	34.227%	3.272%	590.87	180.83	180.35	379.18			
Pittsburgh, PA	354,780	8,994,000	3.945%	58	70.310%	2.100%	40.8	6.25	16.77	23.02	2,077	46.607%	5.607%	968.02	312.64	308.58	621.22		
Durham, NC	505,843	2,944,000	17.182%	81	58.794%	-9.406%	47.4	7.39	26.89	1,413	32.695%	-4.305%	461.97	149.20	147.27	296.47			
Louisville, KY	272,638	1,298,000	21.168%	50	63.178%	-5.022%	31.6	4.94	8.82	12.99	1,842	38.993%	-2.558%	611.99	197.63	195.79	392.74		
San Jose, CA	292,296	30,950,000	0.944%	52	73.435%	5.235%	52.9	11.00	21.75	29.85	1,234	40.025%	-0.975%	493.90	159.51	157.45	316.94		
Albuquerque, NM	419,714	460,000	91.242%	53	65.131%	-3.062%	34.5	5.29	14.20	19.49	1623	46.764%	7.764%	791.44	235.61	232.29	459.90		
Albuquerque, NM	324,654	3,869,000	8.391%	17	75.758%	7.558%	12.0	1.97	5.30	7.27	507	41.881%	0.881%	212.34	68.58	67.49	136.27		
Tulsa, OK	377,152	3,250,000	11.801%	30	35.751%	-32.449%	10.7	1.64	4.41	6.06	947	36.424%	-4.576%	344.93	111.40	109.66	221.36		
Toledo, OH	333,552	5,204,000	6.225%	35	63.810%	-4.300%	22.3	3.42	9.18	12.61	1,414	40.227%	-0.773%	461.97	181.33	180.02	365.02		
Anaheim, CA	283,552	30,950,000	0.914%	25	73.435%	5.235%	15.1	1.81	7.55	10.36	1,011	40.025%	-0.975%	404.65	130.69	128.99	259.68		
Columbus, OH	348,099	1,470,000	23.680%	27	61.905%	-6.295%	16.7	2.56	6.87	9.44	808	36.426%	-4.578%	310.77	100.37	99.87	199.43		
Corpus Christi, TX	280,405	17,993,000	1.560%	31	69.190%	0.999%	21.4	3.29	8.82	12.11	504	44.272%	3.272%	222.90	71.99	71.06	143.05		
TOTALS	14,131,930	394,497,000	3.58%	1,973	20	(1)	1,252	192	51	70	57,940	12	(0)	22,777	7,356	7,361	14,617		
AVERAGES	471,064	13,149,900	3.58%	66	20	(0)	42	6	17	24	1,931	0	(0)	759	245	242	487		
Anchorage, AK	253,500	495,000	51.212%	29	50.00%	-18.200%	14.5	2.22	5.96	8.19	777	35.920%	-5.080%	279.10	90.14	88.97	179.11		
Arifington, TX	292,324	17,993,000	1.625%	9	69.189%	0.989%	6.2	0.95	2.56	3.52	521	44.227%	3.227%	230.42	74.42	73.73	147.87		
Aurora, CO	256,957	2,944,000	8.728%	18	58.794%	-9.406%	10.6	1.62	4.33	5.97	549	32.695%	-4.305%	179.49	57.97	57.22	115.19		
Virginia Beach, VA	435,959	6,533,000	6.673%	16	70.200%	2.000%	11.2	1.72	4.42	6.34	479	45.870%	4.870%	219.72	70.76	70.04	141.00		
San Jose, CA	880,236	1,187,000	74.156%	38	44.643%	-23.557%	17.0	2.60	6.98	9.58	1,371	9.337%	-31.663%	128.01	41.34	40.81	82.15		
San Jose, CA	324,441	2,944,000	11.020%	18	58.794%</														

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII)

Pilot Cities:

Atlanta, GA
Baltimore, MD
Birmingham, AL
Boston, MA
Bridgeport, CT
Cleveland, OH
Inglewood, CA
Jersey City, NJ
Memphis, TN
Milwaukee, WI
New York, NY
Richmond, VA
St. Louis, MO
Salinas, CA
San Antonio, TX
Seattle, WA
Washington, DC

Recommended Additional Cities

Chicago, IL
Los Angeles, CA
Detroit, MI
Philadelphia, PA
New Orleans, LA
Newark, NJ
Houston, TX
Dallas, TX
Miami, FL
San Francisco, CA
Phoenix, AZ
Nashville, TN
Kansas City, MO
Las Vegas, NV
Oakland, CA

Next 30 Cities (FY99):

Charlotte - Mecklenberg, NC
San Diego, CA
Tampa, FL
Minneapolis - St. Paul
Long Beach, CA
Portland, OR
Jacksonville, FL
Columbus, OH
Tucson, AZ
Fort Worth, TX
Fresno, CA
Buffalo, NY
San Jose, CA
Sacramento, CA
Cincinnati, OH
Indianapolis, IN
Oklahoma City, OK
El Paso, TX
Austin, TX
Pittsburgh, PA
Denver, CO
Louisville, KY
Santa Ana, CA
Albuquerque, NM
Mesa, AZ
Tulsa, OK
Toledo, OH
Anaheim, CA
Omaha, NB
Corpus Christi, TX

 Note: Merge Los Angeles and Inglewood, CA and Newark and Jersey City, NJ

CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF CITIES

Minimum population of 250,000

Youth and Juvenile Crime Rate

Murders with a firearm

Robberies with a firearm

Aggravated Assaults with a firearm

Weapons carrying and possessing offenses

Known Trafficking Source or Market Area

History of Firearms Tracing

Mix of City Size and Demographics

YOUTH AND JUVENILE CRIME RATE

Extrapolated From 1995 UCR Data

Assumptions

City reported offenses follow state level data regarding involvement of a firearm (e.g. if 50% of all murders in state A were committed with a firearm, then 50% of all murders in City B, within state A, were also committed with a firearm.)

The same argument is advanced for Robberies and Aggravated Assaults involving a firearm.

Offense data is broken down by type of weapon involved in the offense at the state level (UCR Tables 20, 21, 22) but not at the city level (UCR Table 8)

Weapons carrying and possessing offenses are reported at the state level (UCR Table 69,) but not the city level. Weapons carrying offenses are attributed to a city based upon their population (UCR Table 8) as percentage of total state population (UCR Table 69.)

Deviation from National averages for murders involving a firearm are calculated from the National average as depicted in UCR Table 2.11 and state data as depicted in UCR Table 69.

Deviation from National averages for robberies involving a firearm are calculated from the national average as depicted in UCR Table 2.22 and state data as depicted in UCR Table 69.

Deviation from National averages for aggravated assaults involving a firearm are calculated from the national average as depicted in UCR Table 2.24 and state data as depicted in UCR Table 69.

Youth involvement for each identified focus area are calculated by adding national level arrest data found in UCR Table 38 for offenders aged 18 through 24 and determining a percentage of youth involvement versus number of nationally reported crimes in the focus area. It is assumed that the utilization of a firearm in the specific crime follows state level patterns as described in UCR Table 69.

Juvenile involvement for each identified focus area are calculated by adding national level arrest data found in UCR Table 38 for offenders aged 0 through 17 and determining a percentage of juvenile involvement versus nationally reported crimes in the focus area. It is assumed that the utilization of a firearm in the specific crime follows state level patterns as described in UCR Table 69.

YCGII Target Violations Data and Ranking

Target violations are murders with a firearm, robberies with a firearm, aggravated assaults with a firearm and weapons carrying and possessing offenses for youths (18-24) and juveniles (0-17)

Target violations are totaled at the youth, juvenile, total (youth + juvenile) and rate per 1000 inhabitants levels.

These levels assign equal priority to highest levels of youth involvement, juvenile involvement, total volume of combined youth and juvenile involvement and normalize for city size.

Rankings are assigned at each level (1=highest incidence and 72 equals lowest incidence)

Gross Rank Points are determined by adding the rankings at the four identified levels.

Composite Rank is a ranking based upon the number of Gross Rank Points determined as above (lowest Gross Rank Points = highest incidence of targeted violations.)

Significant Findings In The Extrapolated Data

56% of all murders in the nation are committed by YCGII age group targeted offenders (9429.) By derivation, 68.2% of those murders (national average committed with a firearm,) or 6430 of those murders, were committed by YCGII targeted offenders. The 32 selected cities target 3137 or 47% of those murders.

64% of all robberies in the nation are committed by YCGII age group targeted offenders (88,439.) By derivation, 41% of those robberies (national average committed with a firearm,) or 36,259 of those robberies were committed by YCGII targeted offenders. The 32 selected cities target 70,523 of youth committed robberies with a firearm.

39% of all aggravated assaults are committed by YCGII age group targeted offenders (173906.) By derivation, 23% of those assaults (national average committed with a firearm,) or 39,998 of those assaults were committed by YCGII targeted offenders. The 32 selected cities target 25,897 or 65% of those assaults.

56% of all weapons carrying and possessing offenses in the nation are committed by YCGII targeted offenders (105,575.) The thirty two selected cities target 16,250 (15%) of those violations (Note: no Chicago data available in this category)

The 32 selected cities target an estimated 115,807 YCGII violations, the full initiative requests 60.25 million in funding; an investment of \$517 per violation targeted.

The 32 targeted cities have a population of 30,857,835 residents. The initiative proposes an investment of \$1.94 per resident to deter the youth violence that is prevalent in the targeted communities.

Highest juvenile, highest youth and highest total YCGII targeted offenses all occur in the City of New York.

Highest incidence of YCGII targeted violations per 1000 residents occurs in Newark, New Jersey (10.5:1000 residents) the smallest of the fifteen proposed additional cities.

What are some of the YCGII accomplishments so far?

- An initial conference took place on July 7 and 8, 1996, in Washington, DC, and was attended by U.S. attorneys, chiefs of police, State or local prosecuting attorneys, and ATF special agents in charge from each of the 17 sites. At this conference all participants signed a memorandum of understanding that formalized commitment to the YCGII.
- An ATF special agent and a local police department representative in each of the 17 sites were designated as YCGII coordinators/points of contact to oversee operational elements of the initiative.
- Specialized training concerning the operational, technological, and research elements of the initiative was provided to all 17 sites by ATF personnel from the Firearms Enforcement Branch and the National Tracing Center (NTC).
- One Pentium laptop computers (120 megahertz, 16 MB RAM) with desk docking stations and preloaded with a multitude of software, to include Project LEAD, was distributed to each of the 17 sites during the training.
- Upgrades to the NTC and Project LEAD have taken place to facilitate easy access, evaluation and manipulation of firearms recovery/trace information from the 17 sites.
- Gang intelligence overview surveys were completed in each of the 17 sites to determine current gang presence and activity.
- A total of more than 36,000 firearms have been traced in the 17 sites since the initiative began.
- As of May 30, 1997, a total of 78 criminal investigations involving individuals illegally trafficking in firearms to youths (and adults) have been initiated in 15 of the 17 YCGII sites. Many of these are multi-defendant investigations and many involve the illegal trafficking of firearms to street gangs. A number of these investigations also involve the theft of firearms from Federally licensed firearms dealers. In these cases a total of 73 defendants have been recommended for prosecution, 43 have already been arrested, 33 have already been indicted, and 13 have already been sentenced.

CASE EXAMPLE: Washington, DC Guns Investigation: Based on information in Project LEAD an investigation was initiated into the source of a number (30 plus) of juvenile and gang related crime guns recovered in Washington, DC, Chicago Illinois and St Louis, Missouri. Many of the firearms were shown to have passed through a former FFL who resided in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. This individual had been licensed as a firearms dealer by ATF from July, 1994, until February, 1996, in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Investigation showed that this individual kept records that indicated he had sold only 194 firearms, however; investigation revealed the former

FFL had received and paid for over 1,800 firearms during the time he was an FFL and had no records for any of the additional or recovered firearms. Further, no more than 6 months had elapsed between the time the firearms were sold and their recovery in crimes. This is an exceptionally short "time-to-crime" rate.

In August, 1996, ATF special agents served a Federal search warrant at the former FFLs residence in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Pursuant to the search warrant, firearms and financial records were seized by ATF, and the former FFL provided a full confession and agreed to cooperate with the investigation.

Based on cooperation from the former FFL two additional search warrants were executed in Tennessee at the homes of individuals whom the former FFL had sold an estimated 1,100 firearms to "off paper" at gun shows in Kentucky. Those two individuals also provided full confessions and admitted to reselling many of the firearms at gun shows; however, they also admitted to selling a number of firearms to a youth from Nashville who regularly placed orders. Further investigation identified these Nashville youths as the individuals who were transporting and selling the firearms to Washington, DC juvenile and youth gang members.

In January 1997, that Nashville youth (Solon Carroll) was arrested after an illegal firearms transaction in Washington, DC, with undercover ATF special agents. After the arrest, Carroll admitted to selling as many as 300 firearms on the streets of Washington, DC. To date more than 30 have been recovered in crimes in the city and 15 of those involved juveniles.

On June 2, 1997 Carroll pled guilty in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to violation of 18 USC Sections 922(a)(1)(A), 922(o), and 922(k). Sentencing has been set for August 1997.

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CASE EXAMPLE: BOGUES, Charles Investigation: This case began as an investigation into firearms and narcotics possession and distribution by youths who are members of the "D" Boys street gang in Boston, Massachusetts. On December 20, 1993 members of the "D" Boys were

involved in a large gang-related shootout during which Louis Brown, an honor student on his way to an antigang rally, was killed when caught in the crossfire. Brown's stepfather, Joseph Cherry, spoke at the White House during the launching of the YCGII in July 1996. In September 1996, a joint ATF/Boston Police Department investigation led to the service of a Federal search warrant at the residence of several "D" Boys that resulted in the seizure of illegal assault weapons, firearms with obliterated serial numbers, and cocaine base from three youths, some of whom had prior felony convictions. Due to the significant Federal charges which were lodged against three "D" boys gang members (youths), the three youths began to cooperate. On January 22, 1997, BOGUES provided a full confession to the murder of Louis Brown. BOGUES was subsequently charged by a Suffolk County Grand Jury for second-degree murder and on February 11, 1997 BOGUES pled guilty to second-degree murder.

CASE EXAMPLE: Salem's Missionary Baptist Church investigation: On May 25, 1996, three individuals fired several rounds into Parker's Chapel Church in Gibson, Tennessee. This predominantly African American Baptist church is located near the Salem's Missionary Baptist Church, which burned on December 30, 1995. Also on May 25, 1996, a local sheriff's deputy removed a firearm from an individual during a domestic dispute. The firearm was sent for ballistic testing at the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and was found to match the projectiles recovered from Parker's Chapel Church. On June 3, 1996, that individual was interviewed and gave a full confession regarding the shooting. During the confession, this individual admitted to giving the firearm to two juveniles who were in his vehicle, and they were the ones who actually shot at the church. The two juveniles were subsequently interviewed and confessed to the shooting. In July 1996, the adult was charged with possession of a stolen firearm and transfer of a firearm to a juvenile (18 U.S.C. § 922(x)) and the juveniles were charged with possession of stolen firearms and juveniles in possession of firearms. All subsequently pled guilty, the adult was sentenced to 5 years in prison, and the juveniles were sentenced to 6 months to 1 year in prison.

CASE EXAMPLE: WHEELER, Rufus investigation: In early 1996, several Memphis area juveniles found in possession of handguns were interviewed and indicated that the source of their firearms was WHEELER. WHEELER is a convicted felon who works at a record store where he makes his illegal firearms sales. Through the undercover purchase of firearms, this investigation was able to prove illegal firearms transfers and illegal firearms possession by WHEELER. WHEELER pled guilty to transfer of a firearm to a juvenile (18 U.S.C. § 922(x)) and was sentenced to 3 years in prison.

CASE EXAMPLE: PARHAM, James L. investigation: On July 13, 1996, a juvenile was arrested in possession of a handgun. The juvenile stated that PARHAM had sold the firearm to him for \$60. PARHAM, who has a lengthy criminal history but no felony convictions, was subsequently interviewed and provided a full confession. PARHAM subsequently pled guilty to transferring a firearm to a juvenile (18 U.S.C. § 922(x)) and was sentenced to 3 years probation.

CASE EXAMPLE: CANNON, Jeremy, et al investigation: On August 18, 1996, a handgun was

turned into the sheriff's department by a parent who found the firearm in the possession of his 15-year-old daughter. The daughter reported receiving the firearm from her 18-year-old boyfriend, CANNON. ATF traced the firearm and found it was 1 of 13 firearms stolen from an FFL on July 15, 1996. Subsequent investigation revealed that CANNON was involved in numerous burglaries and often sold stolen firearms. On August 19, 1996, a search warrant was executed at the residence of CANNON and an 18-year-old associate. Both individuals provided confessions to the FFL burglary and to numerous other burglaries. During the search warrants, 12 stolen firearms from various burglaries were recovered as well as other stolen property and injectable steroids. A third individual was also implicated in the FFL theft by CANNON, and a search of that individual's residence recovered additional stolen property. CANNON has pled guilty to Federal firearms charges in this case and sentencing is pending.

Based on current YCGII investigations, are you seeing any trends, patterns, or other information that is of use to your efforts?

- In keeping with what research has shown, the current YCGII investigations have confirmed that juveniles and youths prefer new firearms. This trend assists law enforcement in identifying the sources of those firearms as once recovered, new firearms have a shorter time to crime (that period of time from retail sale to criminal use and this makes it easier to both trace the firearm and identify the illegal source.
- The comprehensive tracing of all recovered crime-related firearms in an area experiencing high rates of armed crimes is a successful method for identifying those individuals who are illegally trafficking firearms to violent criminals, gang offenders, and in particular juveniles and youths. Further, to effectively analyze the crime-gun data from all of those firearms traces, Project LEAD is a necessary/important investigative tool.
- In most areas of the country, a joint ATF and State/local law enforcement approach to illegal firearms trafficking is vital to a truly effective strategy. State and local law enforcement recover the lions share of crime guns and encounter the lions share of juveniles, violent criminals, and gang offenders in possession of firearms in major cities. It is the information from the debriefing of these defendants and the traces of these firearms that lead to the initiation of illegal firearms trafficking investigations against the sources of those firearms. ATF brings to this partnership the ability to trace these firearms, analyze the data for leads, and use the Federal firearms laws to target the illegal firearms traffickers whose illegal activities often exceed the jurisdictional boundaries of State and local law enforcement and where often times there are no State laws to apply.
- No one type of illegal firearms trafficking type is more prevalent than others in the current open illegal firearms trafficking investigations. In other words, the illegal sources of firearms to juveniles have come from intrastate trafficking, interstate trafficking, stolen

KIDS LIKE
NEW GUNS

COMPREHENSIVE
WHERE THERE
ARE A
GUN CRIMES
RESULTS
IN
CATCHING
TRAFFICKERS

SL-INFO
FEDS -
ANALYSIS
+ CRACK
DOWN ON
TRAFFICKING

firearms trafficking, and FFL thefts. Further, the illegal traffickers supplying the firearms to youths are both adults and other youths and with the exception of firearms traffickers who are a certain gangs supplier, the firearms trafficker who has supplied firearms to youths usually is also dealing to persons of other ages (adults).

- Illegal firearms trafficking investigations are resource and personnel intensive investigations. These investigations often require extensive surveillance and this requires a sufficient number of special agents to conduct these surveillances. Further, to ensure that the most active and prolific illegal firearms traffickers are quickly identified and investigated, appropriate levels of computer and software support are needed to facilitate the comprehensive tracing of all recovered crime guns, the analysis of this information, and the distribution of the investigative leads.

In the near future, interim ATF firearms trace analysis reports for each of the 17 cities, with site specific information detailing trends and patterns in the illegal firearms market, will be released to law enforcement. These reports will portray a more specific picture of the illegal firearms market than is portrayed in the above listed general observations.

ILLEGAL FIREARMS TRAFFICKING CASE EXAMPLES

CASE EXAMPLE: The Bark Investigation. In 1996, firearms trace analysis and Project LEAD alerted ATF special agents in Kansas City, Missouri to potential illegal firearms trafficking activity being conducted by an individual (Bark). Information indicated that a number of firearms recently recovered in crimes, by law enforcement in several States, had all passed through this subject. Investigation revealed that over the course of 3 years the subject, a former Federally licensed firearms dealer, had illegally trafficked over 1300 firearms of which more than 200 of those firearms were recovered by law enforcement from **gang offenders, juveniles and violent criminals** after their use in crimes ranging from illegal possession to homicide. The subject(Bark) was subsequently arrested by ATF, prosecuted in Federal court, and in September 1996, sentenced to 6 years in prison.

EXAMPLE: The Webb Investigation. In 1995, firearms trace analysis alerted ATF special agents in Greensboro, North Carolina to potential illegal firearms trafficking activity being conducted by an individual (Webb). Information indicated that a number of firearms recently recovered in crimes, by law enforcement in several States, had all passed through this subject. Investigation revealed that over the course of 2 years the subject, a former Federally licensed firearms dealer, had illegally trafficked over 3000 firearms of which more than 200 of those firearms were recovered by law enforcement in crimes ranging from illegal possession to homicide committed by **gang offenders, juveniles and violent criminals**. The subject pled guilty to numerous Federal firearms violations and was subsequently sentenced to 34 months in March 1997.

CASE EXAMPLE: The Elite Enterprise Investigation. In 1994, ATF special agents working in a task force with the Los Angeles Police Department recovered two new handguns from local gang members. The special agents traced the guns through the ATF National Tracing Center which revealed that both weapons had been purchased by the same FFL in the Los Angeles area. This trace information also showed that the FFL had purchased both of the guns from the same wholesaler. The special agents contacted the wholesaler and discovered that this FFL had purchased in excess of 600 handguns within the previous 6 months. Through the California Automated Firearm System the special agents learned that more than 450 of these guns were used in crimes by **youthful and juvenile gang members as well as other violent criminals** prior to being recovered by local police. These guns had been purchased from the FFL by local gang members and used in various crimes (murder, assault and battery on a police officer, armed robbery, etc.) throughout the area. The FFL was arrested by ATF and charged with numerous violations of federal firearms laws. The FFL was found guilty and subsequently sentenced to 24 months incarceration.

YCGII ILLEGAL FIREARMS TRAFFICKING CASE EXAMPLES

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CASE EXAMPLE: FOWLER, Michael Investigation: FOWLER, a two-time convicted felon, illegally trafficked handguns with obliterated serial numbers to several youths in Boston, Massachusetts. When apprehended with the firearms, the youths identified FOWLER as their source. Further investigation resulted in the undercover purchase of 12 handguns with obliterated serial numbers from FOWLER. FOWLER has been arrested and indicted for these offenses. It should be noted that one of FOWLER's prior convictions is from an ATF case where FOWLER provided false information to an FFL to illegally obtain firearms.

CASE EXAMPLE: Salem's Missionary Baptist Church investigation: On May 25, 1996, three individuals fired several rounds into Parker's Chapel Church in Gibson, Tennessee. This predominantly African American Baptist church is located near the Salem's Missionary Baptist Church, which burned on December 30, 1995. Also on May 25, 1996, a local sheriff's deputy removed a firearm from an individual during a domestic dispute. The firearm was sent for ballistic testing at the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and was found to match the projectiles recovered from Parker's Chapel Church. On June 3, 1996, that individual was interviewed and gave a full confession regarding the shooting. During the confession, this individual admitted to giving the firearm to two juveniles who were in his vehicle, and they were the ones who actually shot at the church. The two juveniles were subsequently interviewed and confessed to the

shooting. In July 1996, the adult was charged with possession of a stolen firearm and transfer of a firearm to a juvenile (18 U.S.C. § 922(x)) and the juveniles were charged with possession of stolen firearms and juveniles in possession of firearms. All subsequently pled guilty, the adult was sentenced to 5 years in prison, and the juveniles were sentenced to 6 months to 1 year in prison.

CASE EXAMPLE: WHEELER, Rufus investigation: In early 1996, several Memphis area juveniles found in possession of handguns were interviewed and indicated that the source of their firearms was WHEELER. WHEELER is a convicted felon who works at a record store where he makes his illegal firearms sales. Through the undercover purchase of firearms, this investigation was able to prove illegal firearms transfers and illegal firearms possession by WHEELER. WHEELER pled guilty to transfer of a firearm to a juvenile (18 U.S.C. § 922(x)) and was sentenced to 3 years in prison.

CASE EXAMPLE: PARHAM, James L. investigation: On July 13, 1996, a juvenile was arrested in possession of a handgun. The juvenile stated that PARHAM had sold the firearm to him for \$60. PARHAM, who has a lengthy criminal history but no felony convictions, was subsequently interviewed and provided a full confession. PARHAM subsequently pled guilty to transferring a firearm to a juvenile (18 U.S.C. § 922(x)) and was sentenced to 3 years probation.

CASE EXAMPLE: CANNON, Jeremy, et al investigation: On August 18, 1996, a handgun was turned into the sheriff's department by a parent who found the firearm in the possession of his 15-year-old daughter. The daughter reported receiving the firearm from her 18-year-old boyfriend, CANNON. ATF traced the firearm and found it was 1 of 13 firearms stolen from an FFL on July 15, 1996. Subsequent investigation revealed that CANNON was involved in numerous burglaries and often sold stolen firearms. On August 19, 1996, a search warrant was executed at the residence of CANNON and an 18-year-old associate. Both individuals provided confessions to the FFL burglary and to numerous other burglaries. During the search warrants, 12 stolen firearms from various burglaries were recovered as well as other stolen property and injectable steroids. A third individual was also implicated in the FFL theft by CANNON, and a search of that individual's residence recovered additional stolen property. CANNON has pled guilty to Federal firearms charges in this case and sentencing is pending.

TOTAL YCGII OPEN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS: 80

TOTAL YCGII INVESTIGATIVE FUNDS APPROVED/OBLIGATED: \$546,350

TOTAL CASE REPORTS SUBMITTED: 40

TOTAL DEFENDANTS RECOMMENDED FOR PROSECUTION: 73

TOTAL DEFENDANTS ARRESTED: 35 Federal - 7 State

TOTAL DEFENDANTS INDICTED: 33

TOTAL DEFENDANTS SENTENCED: 12

Bureau: Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)

Appropriation: Salaries and Expenses

Initiative: Illegal Firearms Trafficking - Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Program: Illegal Firearms Trafficking (Disarming Violent Criminals, Gang Offenders, and Juveniles)

F. NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION:

1. Explanation of the Base:

o Explanation of existing program and how it supports the mission/objectives of the bureau.

One of the primary missions of ATF is the reduction in violent crime. The Bureau has developed strategies that will provide the greatest impact on violent crime while maximizing its limited resources. The Illegal Firearms Trafficking program is a multilevel effort supported by the National Tracing Center, computer technology for information gathering and analysis, Federal, State and local training, and special agents involved in criminal investigations.

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) is a component of ATF's national illegal firearms trafficking efforts and is designed to focus on: (1) reducing youth firearms violence and illegal firearms trafficking to gang offenders and youth; (2) making ATF's firearms trace capabilities and data more accessible to State and local law enforcement agencies to increase law enforcement's ability to trace all recovered crime guns and use the resulting data to develop local violence reduction strategies; and (3) coordinating State and local law enforcement efforts with ATF's efforts for a comprehensive approach to combating illegal firearms trafficking.

While the YCGII is primarily aimed at reducing the illegal youth firearms market, the lessons learned and practices developed in the project (e.g., comprehensive crime gun tracing, joint ATF/State and local law enforcement training programs, community level trace analysis reports and enabling State and local law enforcement to query Project LEAD through ATF) can be applied to ATF's national efforts to prevent the illegal trafficking of firearms to adult criminals and gang offenders.

- If this is an initiative needed to continue/expand work already underway, explain what has already been done.**

The initiative request draws from the lessons learned through the YCGII pilot conducted in 17 cities across the United States. During 1996 and 1997, ATF worked with authorities in Atlanta, GA, Baltimore, MD, Birmingham, AL, Boston, MA, Bridgeport, CT, Cleveland, OH, Inglewood, CA, Jersey City, NJ, Memphis, TN, Milwaukee, WI, New York, NY, Richmond, VA, St. Louis, MO, Salinas, CA, San Antonio, TX, Seattle, WA and Washington, DC to detail an enforcement effort where ATF and State and local law enforcement could work more closely to impact on the illegal trafficking of firearms to adults, youths, juveniles and gang offenders. The pilot YCGII program focused on the study of firearms trafficking patterns in the 17 selected cities and provided limited resources for the investigation and interdiction of firearms trafficking offenses.

In FY 1998, ATF will expand the YCGII program to a total of 32 cities, (the cities to be added are Chicago, IL, Los Angeles, CA, Detroit, MI, Philadelphia, PA, New Orleans, LA, Newark, NJ, Houston, TX, Dallas, TX, Miami, FL, San Francisco, CA, Phoenix, AZ, Nashville, TN, Kansas City, MO, Las Vegas, NV and Oakland, CA) and will dedicate personnel in 30 cities and at the National Tracing Center to support the YCGII. Efforts initiated during the pilot project in Inglewood, CA will be merged with Los Angeles, CA; likewise, efforts begun in Jersey City, NJ will be merged with Newark, New Jersey.

2. Explanation of the Initiative:

o Describe how the initiative would solve the problem stated above.

ATF has done several analyses to define the best approach to combatting illegal firearms trafficking. The analyses have resulted in a strategy comprised of several interrelated components. The following identifies those components and defines first year requirements.

Comprehensive Crime Gun Tracing by State and Local Law Enforcement:

Funding is necessary to establish the electronic batch downloading of firearms trace requests for all recovered crime guns from 32 major city police departments to the ATF National Tracing Center (NTC). This funding would provide for software and travel expenses (@ \$17,000 per site) associated with the installation of electronic batch downloading. Further, 32 Pentium laptop computers with desk dock, ether net, and fax modem (\$5,000 each) will be needed to provide to the 32 police departments (1 per department) to facilitate batch downloading. Electronic batch downloading reduces data entry needs, thus reducing trace completion times and potential data entry errors. Electronic batch downloading allows for the processing of

more firearms trace requests at a reduced cost. Electronic batch downloading also facilitates comprehensive and thorough crime gun tracing, thus allowing for the efficient exchange of crime gun information between ATF and State and local law enforcement, an effective crime gun market analysis, and the development of criminal investigations through Project LEAD. To ensure that all firearms are traced, one data entry/clerical position is also funded for each participating department.

Rapid High Volume Crime Gun Tracing by the NTC in Support of Law Enforcement:

Research indicates that law enforcement recovers approximately 250,000 crime guns annually. In fiscal year 96 the ATF NTC processed approximately 113,000 trace requests and in the first half of fiscal year 1997 the ATF NTC has processed approximately 90,000 trace requests. Currently, a firearms tracer completes 4,000 traces per year with each trace taking an average of 12 days. To meet the demands of the rapidly increasing rate of firearms trace requests and to reduce the average firearms trace completion time to 5 days (completing trace requests in under 5 days is not possible due to variables within the firearms industry beyond the control of the NTC), additional Full Time Equivalents (FTE's) will be necessary. The number of new FTE's needed to complete up to 250,000 firearms trace requests within 5 days is 3 special agents, 108 tracers and support personnel and 10 inspectors. The initiative phasing includes:

- ◆ 45 Firearms Tracers, bringing current complement of 35 to 80.
- ◆ 2 Special Agent/Project Officer positions to coordinate the NTC's support of law enforcement efforts.
- ◆ Additional contractor support to index out-of-business (OOB) records. (NOTE: More than 50 percent of all firearms traces involve an OOB record. The NTC currently houses the OOB records of over 400,000 former Federal firearms licensees (FFL), which involve more than 2,000,000 individual records. Since September 1994 (Brady Law) over 170,000 FFL's have gone out of business but only 67,000 have turned in their records. Further, it is estimated that an additional 15,000 FFL's will go out of business between now and December 1997. This may result in the NTC receiving the records of 118,000 FFL's. Unless these records are rapidly indexed, as much as 50 percent of all trace requests could be delayed while millions of records in boxes are hand searched for information. The 5 new contract personnel would be employed in the same method that was used to index the current 2,000,000 stored records on microfilm at the NTC, a method that earned the NTC a Vice Presidential Hammer Award in January 1997.)

NTC Crime Gun Analysis:

To further a unified State, local and Federal illegal firearms trafficking effort on a national level, resources are needed to provide three types of valuable trace analysis reports and begin establishment of the National Crime Gun Information Center (NCGIC), which will serve as a repository for all relevant crime gun data. The three types of trace analysis reports are as follows:

- (1) Annual and standardized community level trace analysis reports for those cities experiencing high rates of firearms-related violent crime (based on the Uniform Crime Report) and participating in comprehensive crime gun tracing. Community level trace analysis will permit Federal and State and local law enforcement to work together to formulate strategies that can impact on specific illegal firearms sources and trends identified allowing for maximum local impact and resource targeting. (NOTE: The YCGII Trace Analysis Reports are examples/models.)
- (2) Annual national level trace analysis reports based on the collective crime gun trace data received/developed at the NTC. These reports will be used to identify national illegal firearms trafficking patterns and trends for Federal law enforcement to focus resources as well as facilitate a wider understanding of illegal firearms trafficking among the law enforcement and law maker community. (NOTE: The ATF/Northeastern University studies are examples/models.)
- (3) Customized trace analysis reports to cities with special circumstances or problems (e.g., cities experiencing sudden spikes in armed gang or youth violence or firearms-related homicides such as those involved in the current Attorney General Special Cities Project.) These reports would be used in the same manner as the community level trace analysis reports but may include special/customized data analysis.

The request includes \$2.7 million for NTC automation, hardware, software, and contract support for a decision support system capable of generating the required analyses. In addition, Project LEAD will be placed on a mid-range platform and will incorporate additional indicators developed through Northeastern University thus creating an automated analysis tool. This system would automatically conduct all the information analysis for the investigator.

Personnel resources necessary to produce these valuable services for the 30 target cities include 5 Intelligence Research Specialists (additional analytical staff will be requested in follow-on fiscal years (2 special agent FTE's, 1 inspector, 3 analyst FTE's).

Breaking the Chain of Illegal Supply - Arresting Illegal Firearms Traffickers:

With the technology and information resources in place, special agent FTE's are necessary to perfect criminal cases against those individuals and organizations illegally trafficking in firearms to violent criminals, gang offenders, and juveniles. These special agents will coordinate efforts between firearms source and firearms market areas, pursuing Federal prosecution against the most prolific traffickers while coordinating with State and local law enforcement to impact on locally active traffickers and/or gang offenders (leaders) where effective State laws are available. Staffing levels to adequately conduct interstate surveillance are currently limited.

This initiative proposes the placement of 6 special agents and 1 inspector in 30 target cities. This cadre, together with six State and local law enforcement officers, will utilize both Federal and State laws and capabilities to perfect criminal cases against those individuals and organizations illegally trafficking in firearms to gang offenders, youths and juveniles. Full investigative resources will be provided to each task force city.

The task forces will target their efforts on interdicting the sources of, and markets for, firearms to youth and juvenile offenders. ATF agents will pursue Federal prosecution against the most prolific traffickers, while coordinating with State and local law enforcement to impact on locally active traffickers and/or gang offenders where effective State laws are available.

To fully support the task forces and hiring of additional ATF personnel, a cadre of 20 technical support positions will be dispersed in various areas of the Bureau (e.g. Office of Chief Counsel, Personnel, etc.)

Illegal Firearms Trafficking Investigation Training for ATF and State/Local Law Enforcement:

To ensure the new personnel are properly trained, additional resources are needed. A total of \$200,000 will be needed to mass produce a recently developed, comprehensive Illegal Firearms Trafficking Investigation Guidebook for distribution to the law enforcement community. The guidebook contains detailed instructions on how to identify firearms, trace firearms, conduct trafficking investigations and interdiction efforts, coordinate efforts with ATF, and access ATF's resources. An additional \$60,000 will be needed to produce and distribute a Project LEAD tutorial/operational video, and a National Tracing Center Services video, both of which will also be used as part of a Federal tracing and illegal firearms trafficking investigations course that will be developed and provided to all participating ATF personnel and 224 State/local officers and support personnel (6 officers from each

of the 32 cities to receive batch download firearms tracing capacity). In order to produce and offer this course 2 special agents, 1 program analyst, and 3 support personnel will be needed to produce "Train the Trainer" material that will produce three teams of instructors to teach the 3 - day course. Additionally, 23 FTE are required to provide training to new personnel. A total of 30 FTE will be required to train new ATF personnel and State and local participants.

3. Productivity savings:

- o Describe how any productivity savings would be generated.**

**DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
SALARIES AND EXPENSES**

Object Classification (in millions of dollars)

Identification code 20-1000-0-1-751		Pending Request	Proposed Amendment	Revised Estimate
Direct Obligations				
Personnel compensation:				
11.1	Full-time permanent.....	213	17	230
11.3	Other than full-time permanent.....	1		1
11.5	Other personnel compensation.....	28		28
11.9	Total, personnel compensation.....	242	17	259
12.1	Civilian personnel benefits.....	83	7	90
21	Travel and transportation of persons.....	16	6	22
22	Transportation of things.....	2	1	3
23.1	Rental payment to GSA.....	39	3	42
23.3	Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges.....	22	1	23
24.0	Printing and reproduction.....	2		2
25.2	Other services.....	43	10	53
26.0	Supplies and materials.....	10	2	12
31.0	Equipment.....	38	13	51
99.9	Subtotal direct obligations.....	497	60	557
99.0	Reimbursable obligations.....	17		17
99.9	Total obligations.....	514		574

Personnel Summary

Identification code 20-1000-0-1-751		Pending Request	Proposed Amendment	Revised Estimate
Direct:				
Total compensable workyears:				
1001	Full-time equivalent employment.....	3,911	317	4,228
1005	Full-time equivalent of overtime and holiday hours	22		22
Reimbursable:				
Total compensable workyears:				
2001	Full-time equivalent employment.....	112		112
2005	Full-time equivalent of overtime and holiday hours	2		2

	Agents	Inspectors/ Others	Comp. Crime Gun	Rapid High Vol.	NTC Crim Gun	Breaking Chain	Training	GRAND TOTAL
Staffing	17,687	6,563						24,251
Other Costs (Above Staffing Costs):								
MOC 2100 - Travel	1,972	1,279	544				1,963	5,758
MOC 2200 - Transportation	322	174						496
MOC 2300 - Rent, Comm. & Util.	2,731	1,565						4,296
MOC 2400 - Printing	16	10					200	226
MOC 2500 - Other Services	3,389	983	1,280	180	1,800	2,340	90	10,062
MOC 2600 - Supplies	1,130	475					491	2,096
MOC 3100 - Equipment	11,061	942	160		900			13,063
TOTAL Costs	38,309	11,991	1,984	180	2,700	2,340	2,744	60,248
FTE	189	123						312

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative Expansion - Crime Prevention and Savings/Beneficial Fiscal Impact Statement

- In fiscal year 1996 ATF Field Division had on average 5 special agents dedicated full time to work illegal firearms trafficking. This equates to 105 full time special agents nationwide. These 105 special agents recommended 2,230 illegal firearms traffickers for prosecution. This equates to 21 defendants per special agent on average. (Trafficking cases are often multi-defendant.)
- On average, in the one year period prior to their recommendation for prosecution, these traffickers illegally trafficked 24 crime guns each. The total number of crime guns trafficked into the black market by the 2,230 defendants was 53,520. This equates to approximately 505 firearms per the defendants recommended per special agent. Analysis of current illegal firearms traffickers indicates that left unchecked an illegal firearms trafficker will continue his/her illegal activities for, on average, up to 5 years. Analysis also indicates the average prison sentence served by an illegal firearms trafficker is 3 years.
- By incarcerating for 3 years, 2,230 illegal firearms traffickers who trafficked 53,520 firearms annually, ATF's efforts will prevent these individuals from continuing their activities that would result in the further distribution of 160,560 crime guns over the course of 3 years. This further equates to the prevention of at least 160,560 firearms-related crimes at a cost to the American public of \$116.4 million. The cost figure is based on applying the National Institute of Justice average cost of crime figure of \$2,600 to each crime. This is a highly conservative figure that only accounts for property loss and does not take into consideration medical costs, lost wages, or court/prosecution costs. Further this \$116.4 million savings is after the cost of incarceration is factored out of the total savings. Currently the cost to incarcerate one inmate is \$45,000 per year. Moreover, this savings only assumes one crime per firearm illegally trafficked when in fact many of these firearms will be used in multiple crimes before being recovered by law enforcement.
- Based on the fact that in fiscal year 1996 one special agent dedicated to work illegal firearms trafficking produced 21 defendants, and that each defendant incarcerated prevents at least 72 firearms crimes and saves \$187,200 over three years of incarceration, the average special agent dedicated to work illegal firearms trafficking prevents a total of 1,512 firearms-related crimes and saves the American public \$561,000 in crime related costs per year.
- Based on the foregoing, given 180 new special agents to investigate and incarcerate illegal firearms trafficker, ATF will prevent a minimum of 272,160 firearms-related crimes and save the American public \$197.3 million in crime related costs (even after the cost of incarceration is factored out of the savings). The crimes prevented and costs savings are based on fiscal year 1996 analysis. The crimes prevented and cost savings should further increase with the funding of comprehensive crime gun tracing measures and National Tracing Center measures that will enable special agents to identify and incarcerate the most active illegal firearms traffickers and do so in greater numbers.

For an additional amount of \$60,250,000 for the necessary expenses of The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, including 317 Full Time Equivalent positions, and including, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the purchase of 189 police type sedans, for the investigation of illegal firearms trafficking and Youth Crime Gun Interdiction, of which, not to exceed \$6.0 million shall be available for the equipping and/or leasing of any vessel, vehicle, aircraft or conveyance for official use by a State or local law enforcement agency if the conveyance will be used in joint operations with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; payment of salaries to include overtime and benefits; travel, fuel, training, equipment, supply and other similar costs for any State or local law enforcement agency, to include sworn and support personnel, that are incurred in joint operations with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission
 Cost Model

12-Jun-97
 12:40:11 PM

Occupation: Law Enforcement Officer (Agent)
 Occupational Series: 1811

GRADE: GS-12/01

A GS-12/01 Salary for a Special Agent in FY 1996 is => \$44,458

NUMBER OF NEW POSITIONS:

189

Inflation Rate (Non-Pay): 3.1%

Inflation Rate (Pay): 2.5%

MOC	Category	SOC/BO	Description	FY1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Adjustment	Annual Cost for Current Posn	Total Cost for Current Positions	Current Positions
11	PERSONNEL COMPENSATION								
	11.1	1113	Base Salary & Interim Geo Adj/Locality Pay	47,259	8,931,923	1,181	48,440	9,155,160	9,155,160
		1152	Other Overtime	160	30,240	4	164	30,996	30,996
		1153	Holiday & Sunday Pay	100	18,900	3	103	19,467	19,467
		1154	Cash Awards (Non-PMRS)	500	94,500	13	513	96,957	96,957
		1156	Night Pay Differential	85	16,065	2	87	16,443	16,443
		1159	Availability Pay	11,815	2,233,035	295	12,110	2,288,790	2,288,790
			Subtotal, Other Personnel Compensation	\$59,919	\$11,324,663	1,498	\$61,417	\$11,607,813	11,607,813
								0	0
			TOTAL PERSONNEL COMPENSATION	\$59,919	\$11,324,663	1,498	\$61,417	\$11,607,813	11,607,813
								0	0
12	PERSONNEL BENEFITS								
	12.1		Civilian Personnel Benefits						
		A.	Employee Benefits						
		1212	FEGLI (Life Insurance)	52	9,828	1	53	10,017	10,017
		1213	Health Insurance	2,704	511,056	68	2,772	523,908	523,908
		1214	FICA-OASDI	3,715	702,135	93	3,808	719,712	719,712
		1217	Retirement Contrib - FERS	14,355	2,713,095	359	14,714	2,780,946	2,780,946
		1218	Thrift Savings Plan - TSP	2,726	515,214	68	2,794	528,066	528,066
		1234	FICA-HIT (Medicare)	869	164,241	22	891	168,399	168,399
		1260	OPM per Capita	80	15,120	2	82	15,498	15,498
			Subtotal, Employee Benefits	\$24,501	\$4,630,689	613	\$25,114	\$4,746,546	4,746,546
								0	0
		B.	PCS- Related Benefits 1/						
		1221	PCS/Temporary quarters (1:5 Ratio)	1,073	202,797		1,073	202,797	202,797
		1222	PCS/Real Estate (1:5 Ratio)	1,139	215,271		1,139	215,271	215,271
		1223	PCS/RITA (1:5 Ratio)	1,100	207,900		1,100	207,900	207,900
		1224	PCS/Relocation of Services (1:5 Ratio)	5,852	1,106,028		5,852	1,106,028	1,106,028
			Subtotal, PCS	\$9,164	\$1,731,996	\$0	\$9,164	\$1,731,996	1,731,996
								0	0
			TOTAL PERSONNEL BENEFITS	\$33,665	\$6,362,685	\$613	\$34,278	\$6,478,542	6,478,542
								0	0
			TOTAL, PAY & BENEFITS	\$93,584	\$17,687,348	\$2,111	\$95,695	\$18,086,355	18,086,355

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21	TRAVEL & TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS								0
21									0
		2111	Per Diem/Mision	1,499	283,311	-	1,499	283,311	283,311
		2113	Common Carrier/Mission [2 round trips]	1,186	224,154	-	1,186	224,154	224,154
		2115	GSA Car Rent/Mission	0	0	-	0	0	0
		2116	Other Travel/Mission	317	59,913	-	317	59,913	59,913
			[Taxi fares, tips, tolls, parking, official phone calls, telegrams, mass transpor.]						0
		2121	Per Diem/Training	5,135	970,515	(3,423)	1,712	970,515	323,568
		2122	POV Mileage/Training	85	16,065	(57)	28	16,065	5,292
		2123	Common Carrier/Training	1,407	265,923	(938)	469	265,923	88,641
		2126	Other Travel/Training	285	53,865	(190)	95	53,865	17,955
		213	PCS Travel (1:5 Ratio)	518	97,902	0	518	97,902	97,902
			Subtotal Travel - MOC 21	\$10,432	\$1,971,648	(\$4,608)	\$5,824	\$1,971,648	1,100,736
22	TRANSPORTATION								0
22									0
		2211	Federal Express	27	5,103		27	5,103	5,103
		2231	PCS Transportation of HHGs (1:5 Ratio)	\$1,676	316,764	-	1,676	316,764	316,764
		2200	Subtotal Transportation	\$1,703	\$321,867	\$0	\$1,703	\$321,867	321,867
23	RENT, COMM. & UTILITIES								0
23									0
		2311	RENT *	8,772	1,657,908	-	8,772	1,657,908	1,657,908
		2326	Commercial Parking	396	74,844	-	396	74,844	74,844
		2327	Radio Tower Rental	524	99,036	-	524	99,036	99,036
		2331	Postage	226	42,714	-	226	42,714	42,714
		2332	Local Telephone Service	1,035	195,615	-	1,035	195,615	195,615
		2334	FTS	1,228	232,092	-	1,228	232,092	232,092
		2336	Wireline Services - Government	1,453	274,617	-	1,453	274,617	274,617
		2353	Software Leases	261	49,329	-	261	49,329	49,329
		2362	Office Equipment Rental	437	82,593	-	437	82,593	82,593
		2363	Othe Equipment Rental (pagers)	120	22,680	-	120	22,680	22,680
			Subtotal Rent - MOC 23	\$14,452	\$2,731,428	\$0	\$14,452	\$2,731,428	2,731,428
25	OTHER SERVICES								0
25									0
		2500	Forensic/Technical Support 2/	1,800	340,200	-	1,800	340,200	340,200
		2510	ADP Services Commercial	5,193	981,477	-	5,193	981,477	981,477
		2511	ADP Services Government	368	69,552	-	368	69,552	69,552
		2520	Repair Services	2,025	382,725	-	2,025	382,725	382,725
		2533	Other Comm'l Contracts	1,066	201,474	0	1,066	201,474	201,474
			HIV Testing	834	157,626	-	834	157,626	157,626
			Drug Testing	82	15,498	-	82	15,498	15,498
			Health Impov. Program	150	28,350	-	150	28,350	28,350
		2535	Purchase of Evidence	3,279	619,731	-	3,279	619,731	619,731
		2538	PCS/Storage of HHGs (1:5 Ratio)	873	164,997	-	873	164,997	164,997
		2545	Physical Examinations	328	61,992	(328)	0	61,992	0
		2550	Training	3,000	567,000	-	3,000	567,000	567,000
			Subtotal Other Services - MOC 25	\$17,932	\$3,389,148	(\$328)	\$14,604	\$2,822,148	2,760,156

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
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26	SUPPLIES								0
26									0
									0
		2612	Vehicle Supplies	1,749	330,561	-	1,749	330,561	330,561
		2621	Office and Other Admin Supplies	1,241	234,549	-	1,241	234,549	234,549
		2622	ADP Supplies	820	154,980	-	820	154,980	154,980
		2623	Laboratory Supplies	118	22,302		118	22,302	22,302
		2625	Investigative Supplies	783	147,987	-	783	147,987	147,987
		2626	Training Supplies	480	90,720	(380)	100	90,720	18,900
		2627	Radio & Telephone Supplies	165	31,185		165	31,185	31,185
		2629	Ammunition	623	117,747	-	623	117,747	117,747
			Subtotal Supplies - MOC 26	\$5,979	\$1,130,031	(\$380)	\$5,599	\$1,130,031	1,058,211
31	EQUIPMENT								0
31									0
									0
		3111/2	Office Furniture & Fixtures	1,291	243,999	(1,033)	258	243,999	48,762
			File Cabinet (2 drawer)	85	16,065	(68)	17	16,065	3,213
			Desk	595	112,455	(476)	119	112,455	22,491
			Chair	240	45,360	(192)	48	45,360	9,072
			Floormat	57	10,773	(46)	11	10,773	2,079
			Bookcase	160	30,240	(128)	32	30,240	6,048
			Side Chair	154	29,106	(123)	31	29,106	5,859
		3131	Wireline Equipment	959	181,251	(767)	192	181,251	36,288
		3141/2	Radio Equipment	11,190	2,114,910	(8,952)	2,238	2,114,910	422,982
			Radio	6,250	1,181,250	(5,000)	1,250	1,181,250	236,250
			Handtalkie	4,940	933,660	(3,952)	988	933,660	186,732
			Fixed Station Equipment	500	94,500	(400)	100	94,500	18,900
		3151/2	ADP Hardware (PC) 3/	5,000	945,000	(4,000)	1,000	945,000	189,000
		3161/2	Special Investigative Equipment	21,393	4,043,277	(17,114)	4,279	4,043,277	808,731
		3170	Laboratory Equipment	192	36,288	(154)	38	36,288	7,182
		3182	Automobile (Police-Type)	18,000	3,402,000	(12,000)	6,000	3,402,000	1,134,000
			Subtotal Equipment - MOC 31	\$58,525	\$11,061,225	(\$44,420)	\$14,105	\$11,061,225	2,665,845
									0
									0
			TOTAL PAY & BENEFITS (minus PCS in MOC 12)	\$84,420	\$15,955,352	\$2,111	\$86,531	\$16,354,359	16,354,359
			TOTAL NON-PAY (includes MOC 12 for PCS)	\$118,187	\$22,337,343	(\$49,736)	\$65,451	\$21,770,343	12,370,239
									0
			GRAND TOTAL COST PER NEW AGENT	\$202,607	\$38,292,695	(\$47,625)	\$151,982	\$38,124,702	28,724,598

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission
Cost Model

12-Jun-97
12:40:11 PM

Occupation: Law Enforcement Officer (Agent)
Occupational Series: 1811

GRADE: GS-12/01

A GS-12/01 Salary for a Special Agent in FY 1996 is => \$44,458

NUMBER OF NEW POSITIONS: 189

Inflation Rate (Non-Pay): 3.1%

Inflation Rate (Pay): 2.5%

MOC	Category	SOC/BO	Description	FY1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Adjustment	Annual Cost for Current Posn	Total Cost for Current Positions	XXXXXXXXXX Current Positions
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FOOTNOTES:

1/ The FY 1997 PCS costs were calculated using the PCS report for pay period #07 in FY 1995. Since FY 1995 was used, it has been inflated by 3% (FY 1996 inflation rate) and then again by 3.1% (FY 1997 inflation rate). This ratio was also increased from a 1:6 ratio, to a 1:3 ratio, due to an increase in people moving.

2/ Forensic/Technical Support => 2/3 is for Enforcement for Firearms and Explosives technology.
1/3 is for the Laboratory (FY 1996).

3/ PC's are approximately \$4,200 per computer.

Note: Rent for FY 1997 was calculated only by using the 3.1% inflation factor. Sharon May (Space Management), spoke with GSA and they did not anticipate Rent increasing very much. The Rent report for the 3rd quarter of FY 1995 was very close to applying the 3.1% increase, therefore, the percentage increase was used.

4/ The FY 1997 PCS cost were calculated using the PCS report for pay period #07 in FY 1995. Since FY 1995 was used, it has been inflated by 3% (FY 1996 inflation rate) and then again by 3.1% (FY 1997 inflation rate). The ratio was also increased from a 1:5 ratio to a 1:3 ratio, due to increase costs associated with PCS moves.

NON-RECURRING COSTS:

Note: Travel area was non-recurred at a rate of 50%.
80% of Office Furniture and Fixtures was non-recurred. 4/5 of Radios, Handtalkie, ADP Hardware and 2/3 Automobile purchase were non-recurred.

	3 Agent 1:3 Ratio	6 Inspector 1:6 Ratio
5,054	1,685	842
5,365	1,788	894
5,179	1,726	863
27,552	9,184	4,592
43,150	14,383	7,192
2,440	813	407
7,892	2,631	1,315
4,109	1,370	685
\$57,591	\$19,197	\$9,599

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission
 Cost Model

Today: 13-Jun-97
 10:49:01 AM

Occupation: Regulatory Enforcement (Inspector) & 'Other'
 Occupational Series: 1854

GRADE: GS-11/01

A GS-11 Salary for an Inspector in FY 1996 is

37,094

NUMBER OF NEW POSITIONS:

78

Inflation Rate (Non-Pay):

3.0% 2.7%

Inflation Rate (Pay):

3.5% 3.1%

MOC	Category	BOC/BO	Description	Last year's cost model 97 Estimates	PY FY1997 Estimates	BY FY1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Non-Recur Costs	Annual Cost for Current Pos	Annual Cost For Current Positions
11	PERSONNEL COMPENSATION									
	11.1	1113	Base Salary & Interim Geo Adj/Locality Pay	25,059	28,940	39,394	3,072,732	985	40,379	3,072,732
	11.5	1151	FLSA Overtime	2,022	2,022	2,022	157,716	51	2,073	157,716
		1152	Other Overtime	13	13	150	11,700	4	154	11,700
		1153	Holiday & Sunday Pay		0	50	3,900	1	51	3,900
		1154	Cash Awards (Non-PMRS)		0	400	31,200	10	410	31,200
		1156	Night Pay Differential		0	0	0	0	0	0
		1159	Availability Pay		0	0	0	0	0	0
			Subtotal, Other Personnel Compensation	\$27,094	\$30,975	\$42,016	\$3,277,248	\$1,051	\$43,067	\$3,277,248
	TOTAL PERSONNEL COMPENSATION			\$27,094	\$30,975	\$42,016	\$3,277,248	\$1,051	\$43,067	\$3,277,248
12	PERSONNEL BENEFITS									
	12.1	Civilian Personnel Benefits								
		A.	Employee Benefits							
		1212	FEOI (Life Insurance)	52	99	101	7,915	3	104	7,915
		1213	Health Insurance	2,704	2,704	2,772	216,185	69	2,841	216,185
		1214	FICA-OASDI	1,680	1,720	1,763	137,514	44	1,807	137,514
		1215	COLA				0	0	0	0
		1217	Retirement Contrib - FERS	2,857	2,787	2,857	222,821	71	2,928	222,821
		1218	Thrift Savings Plan - TSP	1,140	1,302	1,335	104,095	33	1,368	104,095
		1232	FICA Temporary		0	0	0	0	0	0
		1234	FICA-HIT (Medicare)	393	400	410	31,980	10	420	31,980
		1241	Overseas Allowance		0	0	0	0	0	0
		1242	Foreign Post (COLA)		0	0	0	0	0	0
		1250	FEPCA Discretionary Pay		0	0	0	0	0	0
		1251	Retention Allowance		0	0	0	0	0	0
		1252	Recruitment Bonus		0	0	0	0	0	0
		1253	Relocation Bonus		0	0	0	0	0	0
		1254	Foreign Language Bonus		0	0	0	0	0	0
		1260	OPM per Capita	80	0	80	6,240	80	160	6,240
		1270	Public Transportation Incentive		0	0	0	0	0	0
			Subtotal, Employee Benefits	\$8,906	\$9,012	\$9,318	\$726,749	\$311	\$9,628	\$726,750
		B.	PCS-Related Benefits 1/							
		1221	PCS/Temporary quarters (1:6 Ratio)	894	0	894	69,732	-	-	69,732
		1222	PCS/Real Estate (1:6 Ratio)	950	0	950	74,100	-	-	74,100
		1223	PCS/RLTA (1:6 Ratio)	917	0	917	71,526	-	-	71,526
		1224	PCS/Relocation of Services (1:6 Ratio)	4,876	0	4,876	380,328	-	-	380,328
			Subtotal, PCS	\$7,637	\$0	\$7,637	\$595,686	\$0	\$0	\$595,686
	TOTAL PERSONNEL BENEFITS			\$16,543	\$9,012	\$16,955	\$1,322,435	\$311	\$9,628	\$1,322,436
	TOTAL PAY & BENEFITS			\$43,637	\$39,987	\$58,971	\$4,599,683	\$1,362	\$52,695	\$4,599,684

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission
 Cost Model

Today: 13-Jun-97
 10:49:01 AM

Occupation: Regulatory Enforcement (Inspector) & 'Other'
 Occupational Series: 1854

GRADE: GS-11/01

A GS-11 Salary for an Inspector in FY 1996 is

37,094

NUMBER OF NEW POSITIONS:

78

Inflation Rate (Non-Pay):

3.0% 2.7%

Inflation Rate (Pay):

2.5% 3.1%

MOC	Category	SOC/BO	Description	Last year's cost model 97 Estimates	FY FY1997 Estimates	BY FY1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Non-Recur Costs	Annual Cost for Current Pos	Annual Cost For Current Positions
21	TRAVEL & TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS									
	21									
		2111	Per Diem/Mission Travel	11,234	0	3,248	253,344		3,248	253,344
		2121	Training Travel/Per Diem	4,393	0	3,456	269,568	(2,302)	1,154	
		213	PCS Travel (1:3 Ratio)	432	432	432	33,696	0	432	33,696
		2141	Conference Travel		0	0	0	0	0	0
		2151	Administrative Travel		0	0	0	0	0	0
			Subtotal Travel - MOC 21	\$14,059	\$432	\$7,136	\$556,608	(\$2,302)	\$4,402	\$253,344
22	TRANSPORTATION									
	22									
		2210	CLB Transportation (FEDEX/UPS)		0	27	2,106	500	527	
		2231	PCS Transportation of HHGs (1:6 Ratio)	1,397	0	1,397	108,966	1,397	2,794	108,966
			Subtotal Transportation - MOC 22	\$1,397	\$0	\$1,424	\$111,072	\$1,897	\$3,321	\$108,966
23	RENT, COMM. & UTILITIES									
	23									
		2311	RENT *	8,491	0	8,772	684,216		8,772	684,216
		2322	Commercial Rent		0	0	0		0	
		2326	Commercial Parking		0	0	0		0	
		2327	Radio Site Rental		0	0	0		0	
		2331	Postage	226	0	226	17,628		226	17,628
		2332	Local Telephone Service	1,035	0	1,035	80,730		1,035	80,730
		2334	FTS	1,128	0	1,228	95,784		1,228	95,784
		2335	Wireline Services/Commercial		0	0	0		0	0
		2336	Wireline Services/Treasury		0	1,453	113,334		1,453	113,334
		2341	Utilities		0	0	0		0	0
		2353	Software Rentals		0	261	20,358		261	20,358
		2362	Office Equipment Rental	437	0	437	34,086		437	34,086
		2363	Office Equipment Rental (papers)		0	120	9,360		120	9,360
			Subtotal Rent - MOC 23	\$11,317	\$0	\$13,532	\$1,055,496	\$0	\$13,532	\$1,055,496
24	PRINTING									
	2400				0	\$345		\$0	345	26,910
			Subtotal Printing - MOC 24		\$0	\$345	\$0	\$0	\$345	\$26,910

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission
 Cost Model

Today: 13-Jan-97
 10:49:01 AM

Occupation: Regulatory Enforcement (Inspector) & 'Other'
 Occupational Series: 1854

GRADE: GS-11/01

A GS-11 Salary for an Inspector in FY 1996 is

37,894

NUMBER OF NEW POSITIONS:

78

Inflation Rate (Non-Pay):

3.0% 1.7%

Inflation Rate (Pay):

2.5% 3.1%

MOC	Category	SOB/BO	Description	Last year's cost model 97 Estimates	FY 1997 Estimates	FY 1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Non-Recur Costs	Annual Cost for Current Pos	Annual Cost For Current Positions
25	OTHER SERVICES									
25										
	2500		Forensic/Technical Support		0	601	46,878		601	46,878
	2510		ADP Services/Commercial		0	5,193	405,054		5,193	405,054
	2511		ADP Services/Treasury Payroll		0	368	28,704		368	28,704
	2520		Repair Services		0	1,200	93,600		1,200	93,600
	2533		Other Commercial Contracts		0	1,066	83,148	0	1,066	83,148
			HIV Testing		0	834	65,052		834	65,052
			Drug Testing		0	82	6,396		82	6,396
			Health Improvement Program		0	150	11,700		150	11,700
	2534		Seizure and Sale Expenses		0	0	0		0	0
	2535		Purchase of Evidence		0	0	0		0	0
	2536		Consultant Contracts		0	0	0		0	0
	2537		Aircraft Rental		0	0	0		0	0
	2538		PCS/Storage of HHGs (1:5 Ratio)	727	0	606	47,268		606	47,268
	2541		GSA Extra Services		0	0	0		0	0
	2543		Health Services		0	0	0		0	0
	2544		Health Club Memberships		0	150	11,700		150	11,700
	2545		Physical Examinations / Other Government Contracts		0	0	0		0	0
	2550		Employee Training		0	3,000	234,000		3,000	234,000
	2560		Representative Fund		0	0	0		0	0
	2570		Interest Payments Fees		0	0	0		0	0
	2575		Lost Payment Discount Fees		0	0	0		0	0
	2597		Diners Club ATM Fees		0	0	0		0	0
	2598		Credit Card Fees		0	0	0		0	0
	2599		Travelers Check Fees		0	0	0		0	0
			Subtotal Other Services - MOC 25	\$727	\$0	\$12,184	\$950,352	\$0	\$12,184	\$950,352

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission

Cost Model

Today: 13-Jun-97
10:49:01 AMOccupation: Regulatory Enforcement (Inspector) & 'Other'
Occupational Series: 1854

GRADE: GS-11/01

A GS-11 Salary for an Inspector in FY 1996 is

37,894

NUMBER OF NEW POSITIONS:

78

Inflation Rate (Non-Pay):

3.0% 2.7%

Inflation Rate (Pay):

2.5% 3.1%

MOC	Category	BOC/BO Description	Last year's cost model 97 Estimates	FY FY1997 Estimates	BY FY1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Non-Recur Costs	Annual Cost for Current Pos	Annual Cost For Current Positions
26	SUPPLIES								
26									
	2611	Aircraft Supplies		0	0	0		0	0
	2612	Vehicle Supplies		0	0	0		0	0
	2621	Office and Other Admin Supplies	2,061	0	2,123	165,581	-	2,123	165,581
	2623	Laboratory Supplies		0	118	9,204	-	118	9,204
	2624	Subscriptions	718	0	740	57,684	-	740	57,684
	2625	Investigative Supplies	312	0	321	25,066	0	321	25,066
		Protective Goggles, Hat, Patch, Duffle Bag	28	0	29	2,250	-	29	2,250
		Protective Clothing	29	0	30	2,330	-	30	2,330
		Rubber Boots	58	0	60	4,660	-	60	4,660
		Tape, Flashlight, Range Finder	197	0	203	15,827	-	203	15,827
	2626	Training Supplies	265	0	273	21,290	0	273	21,290
	2627	Radio Supplies		0	0	0		0	0
	2628	Wireline Supplies		0	0	0		0	0
	2629	Training Supplies (CE) / Ammunition		0	0	0		0	0
	2699	Undistributed Credit Card Charges		0	0	0		0	0
		Subtotal Supplies - MOC 26	\$3,356	\$0	\$3,576	\$178,825	\$0	\$3,576	\$178,826
31	EQUIPMENT								
31									
	3101	Library Books		0	0	0			
	3111/2	Office Furniture & Fixtures	1,321	0	1,361	106,129	(1,089)	272	106,129
		File Cabinet (2 drawer)	85	0	88	6,829	(70)	18	6,829
		Desk	595	0	613	47,802	(490)	123	47,802
		Chair	240	0	247	19,282	(198)	49	19,282
		Floor mat	57	0	59	4,579	(47)	12	4,579
		Bookcase	184	0	190	14,783	(152)	38	14,783
		Side Chair	160	0	165	12,854	(132)	33	12,854
	3113	Office Furniture and Fixtures Leased		0	0	0			
	3121/2	Office Equipment	478	0	492	38,403	(394)	98	38,402
		Tape Recorder	439	0	452	35,269	(362)	90	35,269
		Hand Calculator	39	0	40	3,133	(32)	8	3,133
	3123	Office Equipment Leased		0	0	0			
	3131/2	Wireline Equipment		0	959	74,802			
	3141/2	Radio Equipment		0	0	0	0	0	0
		Radio		0	0	0			
		Handheld		0	0	0			
	3150	ADP Hardware (PC)	5,000	0	5,150	401,700	(3,090)	2,060	401,700
	3161/2	Special Investigative Equipment		0	0	0			
	3163	Special Investigative Equipment Leased		0	0	0			
	3171/2	Laboratory Equipment		0	192	14,976			14,976
	3173	Laboratory Equipment Leased		0	0	0			0
	3182	Automobile (Police-Type) / Motor Vehicle		0	0	0			0
	3191/2	Training Equipment		0	0	0			0
		Subtotal Equipment - MOC 31	\$6,799	\$0	\$8,155	\$636,010	(\$4,572)	\$2,431	\$561,207
		TOTAL PAY & BENEFITS (minus PCS in MOC 12)	\$36,000	\$39,987	\$51,334	\$4,003,997	\$1,362	\$52,695	\$4,003,998
		TOTAL PAY & BENEFITS (includes PCS in MOC 12)	\$43,637	\$39,987	\$58,971	\$4,599,683	\$1,362	\$52,695	\$4,599,684
		TOTAL BENEFITS (minus PCS in MOC 12)	\$8,906	\$9,012	\$9,318	\$726,749	\$311	\$9,628	\$726,750
		TOTAL NON-PAY (includes PCS in MOC 12)	\$47,292	\$432	\$53,989	\$4,184,049	(\$4,977)	\$39,790	\$3,830,787
		GRAND TOTAL COST PER NEW INSPECTOR/OTHER	\$83,292	\$40,419	\$105,323	\$8,188,046	(\$3,615)	\$92,485	\$7,834,785

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission
 Cost Model

Today: 13-Jun-97
 10:49:01 AM

Occupation: Regulatory Enforcement (Inspector) & 'Other'
 Occupational Series: 1854

GRADE: GS-11/01

A GS-11 Salary for an Inspector in FY 1996 is

37,894

NUMBER OF NEW POSITIONS:

78

Inflation Rate (Non-Pay):

3.0%

2.7%

Inflation Rate (Pay):

2.5%

3.1%

MOC	Category	SOC/BO	Description	Last year's cost model 97 Estimates	FY FY1997 Estimates	BY FY1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Non-Recur Costs	Annual Cost for Current Pos	Annual Cost For Current Positions
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FOOTNOTES:

1/ The FY 1997 PCS costs were calculated using the PCS report for pay period #07 in FY 1995. Since FY 1995 was used, it has been inflated by 3% (FY 1996 inflation rate) and then again by 3.1% (FY 1997 inflation rate). This ratio was also increased from a 1:12 ratio, to a 1:6 ratio, due to an increase in people moving.

NON-RECURRING COSTS:

Note: 1/4 of the costs associated with MOC 21 (Travel) was non-recurred.
 100% of Office Furniture and Fixtures was non-recurred.
 1/3 of Tape Recorders, Hand Calculators and ADP Hardware (PC) was non-recurred.
 [This is consistent with the Agent model].

	Current Cost for PCS, per move Ratio of PPW7.9FY 1995	3		6	
		Agent 1:3 Ratio	Inspector 1:6 Ratio	Agent 1:3 Ratio	Inspector 1:6 Ratio
1221	5,054	1,685	842		
1222	5,365	1,788	894		
1223	5,179	1,726	863		
1224	27,552	9,184	4,592		
Subtotal MOC 12	43,150	14,383	7,192		
213	2,440	813	407		
2231	7,892	2,631	1,315		
2538	4,102	1,370	685		
TOTAL:	\$57,591	\$19,197	\$9,599		

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission
 Cost Model

Today: 13-Jun-97
 10:50:00 AM

Occupation: Regulatory Enforcement (Inspector) & 'Other'
 Occupational Series: 1854

GRADE: GS-11/01

A GS-11 Salary for an Inspector in FY 1996 is

\$37,094

NUMBER OF NEW POSITIONS:

45

Inflation Rate (Non-Pay):

3.0% 2.7%

Inflation Rate (Pay):

2.5% 3.1%

MOC	Category	SOC/BO	Description	Last year's cost model 97 Estimates	FY FY1997 Estimates	FY FY1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Non-Recur Costs	Annual Cost for Current Pos	Annual Cost For Current Positions
11	PERSONNEL COMPENSATION									
	11.1	1113	Base Salary & Interim Geo Adj/Locality Pay	25,059	28,940	25,059	1,127,655	626	25,685	1,127,655
	11.5	1151	FLSA Overtime	2,022	2,022	2,022	90,990	51	2,073	90,990
		1152	Other Overtime	13	13	13	585	0	13	585
		1153	Holiday & Sunday Pay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1154	Cash Awards (Non-PHRS)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1156	Night Pay Differential	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1159	Availability Pay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			Subtotal, Other Personnel Compensation	\$27,094	\$30,975	\$27,094	\$1,219,230	\$677	\$27,771	\$1,219,230
	TOTAL PERSONNEL COMPENSATION			\$27,094	\$30,975	\$27,094	\$1,219,230	\$677	\$27,771	\$1,219,230
12	PERSONNEL BENEFITS									
	12.1	Civilian Personnel Benefits								
		A.	Employee Benefits							
		1212	FEOLI (Life Insurance)	52	99	52	2,340	1	53	2,340
		1213	Health Insurance	2,704	2,704	2,704	121,680	68	2,772	121,680
		1214	FICA-OASDI	1,680	1,720	1,680	75,600	42	1,722	75,600
		1215	COLA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1217	Retirement Contrib - FERS	2,857	2,787	2,857	128,565	71	2,928	128,565
		1218	Thrift Savings Plan - TSP	1,140	1,302	1,140	51,300	29	1,169	51,300
		1232	FICA Temporary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1234	FICA-HIT (Medicare)	393	400	393	17,685	10	403	17,685
		1241	Overseas Allowance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1242	Foreign Post (COLA)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1250	FEPCA Discretionary Pay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1251	Retention Allowance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1252	Recruitment Bonus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1253	Relocation Bonus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1254	Foreign Language Bonus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		1260	OPM per Capita	80	0	80	3,600	80	160	3,600
		1270	Public Transportation Incentive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			Subtotal, Employee Benefits	\$8,906	\$9,012	\$8,906	\$400,770	\$301	\$9,207	\$400,770
		B.	PCS-Related Benefits 1/							
		1221	PCS/Temporary quarters (1:6 Ratio)	894	0	894	40,230	-	-	40,230
		1222	PCS/Real Estate (1:6 Ratio)	950	0	950	42,750	-	-	42,750
		1223	PCS/RITA (1:6 Ratio)	917	0	917	41,265	-	-	41,265
		1224	PCS/Relocation of Services (1:6 Ratio)	4,876	0	4,876	219,420	-	-	219,420
			Subtotal, PCS	\$7,637	\$0	\$7,637	\$343,665	\$0	\$0	\$343,665
	TOTAL PERSONNEL BENEFITS			\$16,543	\$9,012	\$16,543	\$744,435	\$301	\$9,207	\$744,435
	TOTAL PAY & BENEFITS			\$43,637	\$39,987	\$43,637	\$1,963,665	\$978	\$36,978	\$1,963,665

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission
Cost Model

Today: 13-Jun-97
 10:50:00 AM

Occupation: Regulatory Enforcement (Inspector) & 'Other'
 Occupational Series: 1854

GRADE: GS-11/01

A GS-11 Salary for an Inspector in FY 1996 is

\$7,094

NUMBER OF NEW POSITIONS:

45

Inflation Rate (Non-Pay):

3.0% 2.7%

Inflation Rate (Pay):

2.5% 3.1%

MOC	Category	SOC/BO	Description	Last year's cost model 97 Estimates	FY FY1997 Estimates	BY FY1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Non-Recur Costs	Annual Cost for Current Pos	Annual Cost For Current Positions
21	TRAVEL & TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS									
21		2111	Per Diem/Vision Travel	11,234	0	11,234	505,530	-	11,234	505,530
		2121	Training Travel/Per Diem	4,393	0	4,393	197,685	(2,926)	1,467	
		213	PCS Travel (1:3 Ratio)	432	432	432	19,440	0	432	19,440
		2141	Conference Travel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		2151	Administrative Travel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			Subtotal Travel - MOC 21	\$16,059	\$432	\$16,059	\$722,655	(\$2,926)	\$12,701	\$505,530
22	TRANSPORTATION									
22		2210	CLB Transportation (FEDEX/UPS)	0	0	0	0	500	500	
		2231	PCS Transportation of HHGs (1:6 Ratio)	1,397	0	1,397	62,865	1,397	2,794	62,865
			Subtotal Transportation - MOC 22	\$1,397	\$0	\$1,397	\$62,865	\$1,897	\$3,294	\$62,865
23	RENT, COMM. & UTILITIES									
23		2311	RENT *	8,491	0	8,491	382,095		8,491	382,095
		2322	Commercial Rent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		2326	Commercial Parking	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		2327	Radio Site Rental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		2331	Postage	226	0	226	10,170		226	10,170
		2332	Local Telephone Service	1,035	0	1,035	46,575		1,035	46,575
		2334	FTS	1,128	0	1,128	50,760		1,128	50,760
		2335	Wireline Services/Commercial	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		2336	Wireline Services/Treasury	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		2341	Utilities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		2353	Software Rentals	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		2362	Office Equipment Rental	437	0	437	19,665		437	19,665
		2363	Office Equipment Rental (pagery)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			Subtotal Rent - MOC 23	\$11,317	\$0	\$11,317	\$509,265	\$0	\$11,317	\$509,265
24	PRINTING									
2400				0	0	0	0	0	0	0
			Subtotal Printing - MOC 24	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission
 Cost Model

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 10:50:00 AM

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GRADE: GS-11/01

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Inflation Rate (Non-Pay):

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MOC	Category	SOC/BO	Description	Last year's cost model 97 Estimates	FY FY1997 Estimates	BY FY1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Non-Recur Costs	Annual Cost for Current Pos	Annual Cost For Current Positions
25	OTHER SERVICES									
	25									
		2500	Forensic/Technical Support		0		0		0	0
		2510	ADP Services/Commercial		0		0		0	0
		2511	ADP Services/Treasury Payroll		0		0		0	0
		2520	Repair Services		0		0		0	0
		2533	Other Commercial Contracts		0		0	0	0	0
			HIV Testing		0		0		0	0
			Drug Testing		0		0		0	0
			Health Improvement Program		0		0		0	0
		2534	Seizure and Sale Expenses		0		0		0	0
		2535	Purchase of Evidence		0		0		0	0
		2536	Consultant Contracts		0		0		0	0
		2537	Aircraft Rental		0		0		0	0
		2538	PCS/Storage of HHGs (1:5 Ratio)	727	0	727	32,715		727	32,715
		2541	GSA Extra Services		0		0		0	0
		2543	Health Services		0		0		0	0
		2544	Health Club Memberships		0		0		0	0
		2545	Physical Examinations / Other Government Contracts		0		0		0	0
		2550	Employee Training		0		0		0	0
		2560	Representative Fund		0		0		0	0
		2570	Interest Payments Fees		0		0		0	0
		2575	Lost Payment Discount Fees		0		0		0	0
		2597	Diners Club ATM Fees		0		0		0	0
		2598	Credit Card Fees		0		0		0	0
		2599	Travelers Check Fees		0		0		0	0
			Subtotal Other Services - MOC 25	727	\$0	727	\$32,715	\$0	727	\$32,715

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission

Cost Model

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26	SUPPLIES	26								
	2611		Aircraft Supplies		0		0		0	0
	2612		Vehicle Supplies		0		0		0	0
	2621		Office and Other Admin Supplies	2,061	0	2,061	92,745	-	2,061	92,745
	2623		Laboratory Supplies		0		0	-	0	0
	2624		Subscriptions	718	0	718	32,310	-	718	32,310
	2625		Investigative Supplies	312	0	312	14,040	0	312	14,040
			Protective Goggles, Hat, Patch, Duffle Bag	28	0	28	1,260	-	28	1,260
			Protective Clothing	29	0	29	1,305	-	29	1,305
			Rubber Boots	58	0	58	2,610	-	58	2,610
			Tape, Flashlight, Range Finder	197	0	197	8,865	-	197	8,865
	2626		Training Supplies	265	0	1,265	56,925	0	1,265	56,925
	2627		Radio Supplies		0		0		0	0
	2628		Wireline Supplies		0		0		0	0
	2629		Training Supplies (CE) / Ammunition		0		0		0	0
	2699		Undistributed Credit Card Charges		0		0		0	0
			Subtotal Supplies - MOC 26	\$3,356	\$0	\$4,356	\$196,020	\$0	\$4,356	\$196,020
31	EQUIPMENT	31								
	3101		Library Books		0		0			
	3111/2		Office Furniture & Fixtures	1,321	0	1,321	59,445	(1,057)	264	59,445
			File Cabinet (2 drawers)	45	0	45	3,825	(68)	17	3,825
			Desk	595	0	595	26,775	(476)	119	26,775
			Chair	240	0	240	10,800	(192)	48	10,800
			Floormat	57	0	57	2,565	(46)	11	2,565
			Bookcase	184	0	184	8,280	(147)	37	8,280
			Side Chair	160	0	160	7,200	(128)	32	7,200
	3113		Office Furniture and Fixtures Leased		0		0			
	3121/2		Office Equipment	478	0	478	21,510	(382)	96	21,510
			Tape Recorder	439	0	439	19,755	(351)	88	19,755
			Hand Calculator	39	0	39	1,755	(31)	8	1,755
	3123		Office Equipment Leased		0		0			
	3131/2		Wireline Equipment		0		0			
	3141/2		Radio Equipment		0		0	0	0	0
			Radio		0		0			
			Handtalkie		0		0			
	3150		ADP Hardware (PC)	5,000	0	5,000	225,000	(3,000)	2,000	225,000
	3161/2		Special Investigative Equipment		0		0			
	3163		Special Investigative Equipment Leased		0		0			
	3171/2		Laboratory Equipment		0		0			
	3173		Laboratory Equipment Leased		0		0			
	3182		Automobile (Police-Type) / Motor Vehicle		0		0			
	3191/2		Training Equipment		0		0			
			Subtotal Equipment - MOC 31	\$6,799	\$0	\$6,799	\$305,955	(\$4,439)	\$2,360	\$305,955
			TOTAL PAY & BENEFITS (minus PCS in MOC 12)	\$36,000	\$39,987	\$36,000	\$1,620,000	\$978	\$36,978	\$1,620,000
			TOTAL PAY & BENEFITS (includes PCS in MOC 12)	\$43,637	\$39,987	\$43,637	\$1,963,665	\$978	\$36,978	\$1,963,665
			TOTAL BENEFITS (minus PCS in MOC 12)	\$8,906	\$9,012	\$8,906	\$400,770	\$301	\$9,207	\$400,770
			TOTAL NON-PAY (includes PCS in MOC 12)	\$47,292	\$432	\$48,292	\$2,173,140	(\$5,468)	\$34,755	\$1,956,015
			GRAND TOTAL COST PER NEW INSPECTOR/OTHER	\$83,292	\$40,419	\$84,292	\$3,793,140	(\$4,490)	\$71,733	\$3,576,015

Revised: August 12, 1996

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
FY 1998 Departmental Budget Submission
 Cost Model

Today: 13-Jun-97
 10:50:00 AM

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 Occupational Series: 1854

GRADE: GS-11/01

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3.0% 2.7%

Inflation Rate (Pay):

2.5% 3.1%

MOC	Category	SOC/BO	Description	Last year's cost model 97 Estimates	PV FY1997 Estimates	BY FY1998 Estimates	Cost for New Positions	Non-Recur Costs	Annual Cost for Current Pos	Annual Cost For Current Positions
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FOOTNOTES:

- 1/ The FY 1997 PCS costs were calculated using the PCS report for pay period #07 in FY 1995. Since FY 1995 was used, it has been inflated by 3% (FY 1996 inflation rate) and then again by 3.1% (FY 1997 inflation rate). This ratio was also increased from a 1:12 ratio, to a 1:6 ratio, due to an increase in people moving.

NON-RECURRING COSTS:

Note: 1/4 of the costs associated with MOC 21 (Travel) was non-recurring.
 100% of Office Furniture and Fixtures was non-recurring.
 1/3 of Tape Recorders, Hand Calculators and ADP Hardware (PC) was non-recurring.
 [This is consistent with the Agent model].

			Current Cost for PCS, per move Ratio of PP#7.9FY 1995		3 Agent 1:3 Ratio		6 Inspector 1:6 Ratio	
	1221	5,054			1,685		842	
	1222	5,365			1,788		894	
	1223	5,179			1,726		863	
	1224	27,552			9,184		4,592	
	Subtotal MOC 12	43,150			14,383		7,192	
	213	2,440			813		407	
	2231	7,892			2,631		1,315	
	2538	4,102			1,370		685	
	TOTAL:	\$57,591			\$19,197		\$9,599	

EXPANSION OF THE YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE JULY 19, 1997

BACKGROUND:

- On July 8, 1996, President Clinton directed the Attorney General and Secretary Rubin to implement a pilot program in 17 cities to trace as many guns as possible, especially those trafficked to kids.
- Under this pilot program, the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII), Federal and local law enforcement in each city worked together to submit all crime guns seized for tracing and use this information to identify and locate illegal gun traffickers.
- Since then, the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) has provided local police departments and ATF special agents with specialized training, computers and software -- and traced as many guns as possible through the National Training Center. Today's report details the findings of this effort.

FINDINGS OF TODAY'S REPORT:

- **Confirms kids and guns is a serious problem in all 17 cities.** Juvenile and youth crime guns account for nearly half (45%) of the firearms recovered from crime scenes and criminals.
- **Reveals that kids use some of the most concealable and dangerous guns.** While 80% of youth and juvenile crime guns are handguns -- and 60% are semiautomatic pistols, only 70% of adult crime guns are handguns -- and less than half, or 47%, are semiautomatics.
- **Crime guns used by kids are concentrated among a relatively small number of makes and models.** The 10 most popular types of crime guns account for 25% of all crime guns. In some cities, this percentage is as high as 50% for youth or juveniles (e.g., Birmingham, Memphis).
- **At least 25% of the crime guns used by kids move rapidly (3 years or less) from first retail sale to crime scenes.** That means that a significant portion of legally purchased guns are quickly and illegally diverted to kids and criminals.
- **The number of trace requests nearly doubled in the 17 pilot cities.** While not all traces submitted could be completed, for a variety of reasons, overall requests submitted to ATF jumped from about 20,000 to 37,000.

HOW TRACING WORKS

- **The Shikes Case.** Shortly after the YCGII was launched, ATF and the Milwaukee Police Department received a tip that an individual named "Larry" was selling guns to gang members. This individual was Larry Shikes, and he was selling guns from the trunk of his car in the parking lot of the grocery store where he worked as a security guard.

A review of trace information on Milwaukee crime guns revealed that Shikes had originally purchased several guns that were recovered in connection with youth gang crimes -- including homicides, assaults and drive-by-shootings. Shikes illegal activity was further documented by undercover purchases of additional shotguns and handguns.

Shikes was arrested in April 1997. He pled guilty to dealing in firearms without a license and providing firearms to convicted felons. He is scheduled to be sentenced next month.

ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES:

- **A new anti-crime tool.** By submitting all crime guns for tracing, the YCGII is showing law enforcement at all levels how young people are getting guns. This is critical information that will allow law enforcement to prioritize the investigation of gun traffickers.
- **Guns are being trafficked to kids.** ATF traces and investigations clearly show that certain corrupt gun dealers are selling guns to large volume traffickers and straw purchasers, who are in turn funneling guns to our youth. With more tracing information and enforcement resources, we can crackdown on these traffickers and break-up the supply of guns to kids and criminals.
- **Brady checks important.** Background checks are needed to help keep guns from being illegally diverted. So it's critical that state and local law enforcement continue their commitment to Brady.

TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT:

- **More Cities, More Resources.** Today, the President will expand the YCGII to 10 more cities. The Treasury Department will commit \$11 million to augment its tracing efforts next year, and the Department of Justice will dedicate funds from the Bureau of Justice Assistance to help provide training to participating state and local law enforcement agencies. Additional funds will also be sought for ATF agents from unobligated funds.

**THE YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE
PHASE TWO CITIES
JULY 19, 1997**

Chicago, Illinois
Los Angeles, California
Detroit, Michigan
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*
Houston, Texas
Miami, Florida
Tucson, Arizona*
Minneapolis, Minnesota*
Gary, Indiana*
Cincinnati, Ohio

Most cities were selected because of the high number of firearms and violent offenses committed by juveniles and youth. Those cities marked with an asterisk (*) were chosen because, unlike the national trend, they have experienced increases in violent crime.

To: Jose

TO: Jose
FROM: Kent & Nick

On page 1 -- "not a single juvenile murder has been committed
with a gun in two years."

On page 3 --

"And we also need a place for young people to go after school.
Over 50% of all ~~juvenile crime~~ serious juvenile crime occurs
in the 3 hours after school closes. It only makes sense to
be sure that there's a place for our young people to go."

NICK

great results. Working together, there's no reason why every community in America can't expect the same success.

TO: KENT / ELIZABETH
FR: GASE

514-1724
602-5040

7/18/97 3:30 pm

**PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON
YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE RADIO ADDRESS
JULY 18, 1997**

Good morning. Today I want to talk about the important progress we are making in our efforts to get guns out of the hands of violent teenagers.

My Administration has put in place a tough, smart anti-crime strategy -- relying on more community police, stricter punishment, and better gang prevention. This strategy is working. For five years in a row, we have seen serious crime drop nationwide. Last year we saw the largest one-year decline in violent crime and murder in 35 years.

Our most recent figures even show a slight decline in juvenile crime. But we know that juvenile crime and violence are still significant problems. We know kids are killing kids -- for shoes, for jackets, for turf. We know that too many of our young people are drawn to guns and violence as a way of life.

One fact stands out and demands our action. Over the past decade, the number of gun murders by juveniles has skyrocketed more than 300%. This is simply unacceptable. And we know we must break this deadly trend.

In Boston, they have. Thanks to a comprehensive effort by prosecutors, police, probation officers, and community leaders, not a single juvenile murder has been committed in the city in two full years. Boston police commissioner Paul Evans, who is here with me today, should be commended for this outstanding record of achievement.

A year ago, I looked at Boston's approach, and it was clear that tracing guns seized from young criminals was a key to the city's success. So I directed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to launch a national initiative in 17 cities to replicate Boston's effort and trace the guns used in crimes.

A year later, the first results are in. Police departments in these 17 cities submitted for tracing nearly twice as many guns used in crimes as they did just a year before. We found that almost half of all guns used in crimes came from young people. More importantly, for the first time, we know where juveniles are getting guns, how they are getting guns, and what kinds of guns they are using.

Half of all guns police seized came from young people. Most disturbing of all, many guns are finding their way quickly from retail stores to black markets through a network of gun traffickers and corrupt gun dealers. Make no mistake: Gun traffickers are funneling guns to lawless youth. We know how they operate. We will shut them down.

TO: KENT / ELIZABETH
FR: GUSE

7/18/97 3:30 pm

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In Milwaukee, thanks to our youth gun tracing initiative, police officers noticed a pattern: Several guns used in drive-by shootings and armed robberies had originally been purchased by one man, a security guard named Larry Shikes. Police investigators quickly discovered that the guard was selling brand new semi-automatic weapons from the trunk of his car. Police swept in and arrested him in April. He pled guilty to trafficking charges and will be sentenced next month.

Our gun-tracing initiative has been so effective that I'm pleased to announce we will expand our efforts to 10 more cities, including Philadelphia and Los Angeles. We will also work with Congress to hire more ATF agents to work with local police officers and prosecutors to pursue traffickers based on the leads we are generating every day.

We have a chance to build on our progress by passing a smart, tough juvenile justice bill that cracks down on guns and gangs. We need to provide for more prosecutors, tougher penalties, and better gang prevention programs. We should require that every new gun has a child-safety lock. And we should prohibit violent teenagers from buying guns once they become adults.

Last week, I was disappointed that a Senate committee considering a juvenile crime bill voted against child-safety locks. I urge the full Senate to reconsider this action. A juvenile crime bill must be comprehensive. Of course it must get tough on violent juvenile offenders, but it also must cut off their access to guns. That's why Boston's program works.

To keep guns away from crime-committing youth, we also must continue to perform background checks on gun-buying adults. The Brady law has already stopped more than 250,000 fugitives, felons, and stalkers from buying handguns. The Supreme Court recently struck down a portion of the Brady law. But in a meeting this week with law enforcement officials from around the country Attorney General Reno and Treasury Secretary Rubin confirmed that the overwhelming majority of police departments are continuing to perform background checks voluntarily -- because they work.

Now that we're making every effort to keep criminals from getting guns through the front door of a gun shop, we are turning our attention to locking the back door, too. We have started to crack the code of the black market in illegal weapons. We are tracing the guns, targeting the traffickers, and taking more of our children out of harm's way. Cities like Boston have shown us great results. Working together, there's no reason why every community in America can't expect the same success.

**FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ENFORCEMENT)**

Phone: (202) 622-0470

Fax: (202) 622-5040

Date: July 18, 1997

Page 1 of 3

TO: Lowell Weiss, White House, (Fax--202-456-5709)
José Cerda, White House, (Fax--202-456-7028)

FROM: Elisabeth A. Bresee's office ("Suzy" Ware)
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Law Enforcement)

SUBJECT: Treasury's comments on the President's Radio Address.

TO: ELIZABETH
 RE: JOSE

622-5040

7/18/97 12:30 pm

STILL BEING RE-WORDED!

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 YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE RADIO ADDRESS
 JULY 18, 1997

Good morning. Today I want to talk about the important progress we are making in our efforts to get guns out of the hands of violent teenagers.

My Administration has put in place a tough, smart anti-crime strategy -- relying on more *community* police, stricter punishment, and better gang prevention. This strategy is working. For five years in a row, we have seen serious crime drop nationwide. Last year we saw the largest one-year decline in violent crime and murder in 35 years.

Our most recent figures even show ^{an} ~~some~~ decline in juvenile crime. But we know that juvenile crime and violence are still huge problems. We know kids are killing kids -- for shoes, for jackets, for turf. We know that too many young people are drawn to guns and violence as a way of life.

The facts are plain. Although the ~~number~~ ^{of} of murders juveniles commit without guns has remained the same during the past decade, the number of murders juveniles commit with guns has skyrocketed more than 300%. This is simply unacceptable.

In Boston, there has been a remarkable effort to crack down on illegal guns and juvenile crimes. Not a single juvenile murder has been committed in Boston in two years. I am pleased to be joined today by Boston police commissioner Paul Evans, ~~who~~ ^{all} deserves great credit for ~~this~~ ^{their} outstanding ~~achievement~~ ^{work}.

A year ago, I looked at Boston's approach, and it was clear that ~~tracing~~ ^{used in crime} guns seized from young criminals was a key to the city's success. So I directed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to launch a national initiative in 17 cities to trace the guns used in crimes. We needed to find out where these guns are coming from and how they are getting into the hands of violent youth.

A year later, the first results are in. Police departments in these 17 cities submitted nearly twice as many guns for tracing as they did just a year before. And now, for the first time, we know where juveniles are getting guns, how they getting guns, and what kinds of guns they are using.

One crucial fact our tracing initiative makes clear is that many guns are finding their way quickly from retail stores to ~~black~~ ^{illegal} markets through a network of gun traffickers and corrupt gun dealers. Make no mistake: Gun traffickers are fueling the surge in deadly youth violence. We will shut them down.

and Treasury Under Secretary for Enforcement
 Raymond Kelly, both of whom

were able to document

In Milwaukee, thanks to our tracing initiative, police officers ~~noticed~~ a pattern: Several guns used in drive-by shootings and armed robberies had originally been purchased by one man, a security guard named Larry Shikes. Police investigators quickly discovered that the guard was selling brand new semi-automatic weapons from the trunk of his car. Police swept in arrested him in April. He pled guilty to trafficking charges and will be sentenced next month.

Our gun-tracing initiative has been so effective that I'm pleased to announce we will expand our efforts to 10 more cities, including Philadelphia and Los Angeles. We will also work with Congress to hire more ATF agents to work with local police officers and prosecutors to nail traffickers based on the leads we are generating every day.

We have a chance to build on our progress by passing a smart, ~~balanced~~ ^{tough} juvenile justice bill that does more than just talk tough. We need to provide for more prosecutors, tougher penalties, and better gang prevention programs. We should require that every new gun has a child-safety lock. And we should prohibit violent teenagers from buying guns once they become adults.

Last week, I was disappointed that a Senate committee considering a juvenile crime bill voted against child-safety locks. I urge the full Senate to reconsider this action. A juvenile crime bill must be comprehensive -- not just increase penalties but also get tough on guns. Anything less will be a juvenile crime bill in name only.

To keep guns away from crime-committing youth, we also must continue to perform background checks on gun-buying adults. The Brady law has already stopped more than 250,000 fugitives, felons, and stalkers from buying handguns. The Supreme Court recently struck down a portion of the Brady law. But in a meeting this week with law enforcement officials from around the country Attorney General Reno and Treasury Secretary Rubin confirmed that the overwhelming majority of police departments are continuing to perform background checks voluntarily -- because they work.

Now that we're making every effort to keep criminals from getting guns through the front door of a gun shop, we are turning our attention to locking the back door, too. We have started to crack the code of the black market in illegal weapons. We are tracing the guns, targeting the traffickers, and taking more of our children out of harm's way. Cities like Boston have shown us great results. Working together, there's no reason why every community in America can't expect the same success.

**YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
JULY 19, 1997**

Q: What exactly has the Administration learned from this report -- and how will it be used to reduce juvenile gun crime?

First, we have learned that comprehensive, community-based tracing of crime guns is doable -- as well as a worthwhile endeavor. The voluntary commitment of each of these cities to submit as many crime guns as possible for tracing resulted in a near doubling in the overall number of trace requests -- from about 20,000 to 37,000. In New York, for example, trace requests jumped from 4,000 to 13,000; in San Antonio, trace requests increased from a mere 500 to about 2,000.

Second, we have learned that substantial number of guns -- nearly half of those recovered from crime scenes or criminals -- are being trafficked to our kids in a variety of ways and shortly after they were legally purchased. We have learned that kids are more likely than adults to commit a crime with a new handgun -- especially with certain types of semiautomatic pistols. And we have learned that most crime guns generally originate from in-state sources.

And thirdly, each of the 17 cities involved -- and Federal law enforcement -- have learned more about the make-up and trafficking patterns of crime guns in their community. These community specific reports are a valuable enforcement tool that can be used to crackdown on local traffickers and break-up the supply of guns to our kids. This is how Boston has used its trace information, and -- as I understand it -- July 10th Boston hit the two-year mark with no juvenile gun homicides.

Q: Can you please clarify today's announcement?

A: Based on our experience with the first 17 cities, we are going to expand the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) to an additional 10 cities. There was considerable interest from other cities when we initiated the pilot program last year, so we are pleased to expand the YCGII today. (See attached list of cities).

To pay for this -- and to increase ATF's overall ability to do more traces and trace analysis -- Treasury will dedicate about \$11 million from its forfeiture fund next year. That's about 10 times what we've spent during this first year, so that's a significant enhancement.

Also, the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance has set aside some funds to help train participating state and local law enforcement agencies in the new cities.

Q: How were both the new cities for this initiative picked?

A: As I understand it, most of the cities were selected based on the number of firearms and violent offenses committed by youths and juveniles. However, four of the cities -- Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Tucson and Gary -- were picked because, unlike the national crime trend for most cities, they have been experiencing increases in violent crime over the past few years.

Q: If tracing and trace analysis lead to cracking down on gun traffickers, how many have you prosecuted as a result of this effort?

A: Well, first let me make clear that we are only one-year into this initiative, and that establishing the tracing infrastructure (i.e., trained officers, computers, software, etc.) and producing the national and local reports was our initial goal.


Also, the YCGII is a special component of ATF's overall firearms trafficking strategy that has generated thousands of investigations over the past year -- involving tens of thousands of illegally trafficked firearms. And over time, we expect the YCGII to contribute many important cases to this workload.

Having said that, to date, ATF estimates that the YCGII has helped initiate some 75 pending trafficking investigations.

Q: How come ATF only traced an average of 37% of the guns submitted to the National Tracing Center?

A: There are several reasons why complete traces were not conducted for all crime guns. In some cases, because of different tracing guidelines and practices, not all of the required information was submitted. In other cases, firearms were either too old or serial numbers obliterated. While traces can be completed in these instances, they are much more resource intensive. Many of these issues can now be addressed.

It is important to note that not all trace analyses depend on successfully-completed trace requests. Much of the information submitted can still be analyzed and used by law enforcement.



The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

The following are consistently the fastest “time-to-crime” guns recovered by law enforcement from juveniles and youth in the 17 Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative sites (by manufacturer, caliber, and type):


- Bryco, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- High Standard, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Lorcin, .380 caliber, semiautomatic pistol
- Glock, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Ruger, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Smith & Wesson, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Mossberg, 12 gauge, shotgun
- Intratec, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Bryco, .380 caliber, semiautomatic pistol
- Lorcin, .25 caliber, semiautomatic pistol

Note: More than 50% of the total number of each of these types of recovered crime guns moved from their first retail sale to their recovery by law enforcement from a juvenile or youth in under three years. The firearms pictured are typical of models falling under the type of firearm listed above. Trafficking investigations aimed at the sources of these firearms have the highest probability of success.

Note: “Time-to-Crime” is that period of time (measured in days) between a firearm’s acquisition from a retail market and law enforcement’s recovery of that firearm during use, or suspected use, in a crime. A short time-to-crime usually means the firearm will be easier to trace, and when several short time-to-crime traces involve the same individual/FFL, this can be an indication of illegal trafficking activity.


Firearm and Non-Firearm Juvenile Homicides

Juvenile Offenders (ages 10-17)




Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Crime Gun Recoveries by Age Group



Based on recoveries in 13 of 17 communities. The following sites were excluded: Atlanta, Inglewood, Jersey City, and St. Louis. These sites include too few cases in one or more age categories to be used in an age-based comparison.

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative
Crime Guns Recovered in 17 Communities
**Semi-automatic Handguns as a
Percentage of All Crime Gun Recoveries**



**YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
JULY 19, 1997**

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EXPANSION OF THE YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

JULY 19, 1997

P - Summary: I entered a curriculum

BACKGROUND:

I am why it matters

I am what we're doing today

- On July 8, 1996, President Clinton directed the Attorney General and Secretary Rubin to implement a pilot program in 17 cities to trace as many guns as possible, especially those trafficked to kids.
- Under this pilot program, the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII), Federal and local law enforcement in each city worked together to submit all crime guns seized for tracing and use this information to identify and locate illegal gun traffickers.
- Since then, the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) has provided local police departments and ATF special agents with specialized training, computers and software -- and traced as many guns as possible through the National Training Center. Today's report details the findings of this effort.

FINDINGS OF TODAY'S REPORT:

- **Confirms kids and guns is a serious problem in all 17 cities.** Juvenile and youth crime guns account for nearly half (45%) of the firearms recovered from crime scenes and criminals.
- **Reveals that kids use some of the most concealable and dangerous guns.** While 80% of youth and juvenile crime guns are handguns -- and 60% are semiautomatic pistols, only 70% of adult crime guns are handguns -- and less than half, or 47%, are semiautomatics.
- **Crime guns used by kids are concentrated among a relatively small number of makes and models.** The 10 most popular types of crime guns account for 25% of all crime guns. In some cities, this percentage is as high as 50% for youth or juveniles (e.g., Birmingham, Memphis).
- **At least 25% of the crime guns used by kids move rapidly (3 years or less) from first retail sale to crime scenes.** That means that a significant portion of legally purchased guns are quickly and illegally diverted to kids and criminals.
- **The number of trace requests nearly doubled in the 17 pilot cities.** While not all traces submitted could be completed, for a variety of reasons, overall requests submitted to ATF jumped from about 20,000 to 37,000.

HOW TRACING WORKS

- **The Shikes Case.** Shortly after the YCGII was launched, ATF and the Milwaukee Police Department received a tip that an individual named "Larry" was selling guns to gang members. This individual was Larry Shikes, and he was selling guns from the trunk of his car in the parking lot of the grocery store where he worked as a security guard.

A review of trace information on Milwaukee crime guns revealed that Shikes had originally purchased several guns that were recovered in connection with youth gang crimes -- including homicides, assaults and drive-by-shootings. Shikes illegal activity was further documented by undercover purchases of additional shotguns and handguns.

Shikes was arrested in April 1997. He pled guilty to dealing in firearms without a license and providing firearms to convicted felons. He is scheduled to be sentenced next month.

ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES:

- **A new anti-crime tool.** By submitting all crime guns for tracing, the YCGII is showing law enforcement at all levels how young people are getting guns. This is critical information that will allow law enforcement to prioritize the investigation of gun traffickers.
- **Guns are being trafficked to kids.** ATF traces and investigations clearly show that certain corrupt gun dealers are selling guns to large volume traffickers and straw purchasers, who are in turn funneling guns to our youth. With more tracing information and enforcement resources, we can crackdown on these traffickers and break-up the supply of guns to kids and criminals.
- **Brady checks important.** Background checks are needed to help keep guns from being illegally diverted. So it's critical that state and local law enforcement continue their commitment to Brady.

TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT:

- **More Cities, More Resources.** Today, the President will expand the YCGII to 10 more cities. The Treasury Department will commit \$11 million to augment its tracing efforts next year, and the Department of Justice will dedicate funds from the Bureau of Justice Assistance to help provide training to participating state and local law enforcement agencies. Additional funds will also be sought for ATF agents from unobligated funds.



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

July 18, 1997

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Dear Mr. President:

On July 8, 1996, you announced the start of the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII), a collaborative effort among law enforcement officials in 17 cities to reduce youth firearms violence by disrupting the illegal markets that put firearms in the hands of juveniles and youth. The YCGII brought together four significant law enforcement themes of this Administration: first, that we work in a collaborative effort with our state and local law enforcement partners; second, that we make smart and effective use of our limited law enforcement resources; third, that we do everything possible to lower the level of gun violence across the Nation; and fourth, that we make a special effort to reduce youth gun violence.

In the one year since your announcement, we have learned a great deal and have made substantial progress in developing a sophisticated infrastructure to combat illegal gun trafficking. Perhaps most important, we have learned that universal tracing of crime guns in particular communities is achievable. During the past year, gun tracing requests in the 17 pilot cities nearly doubled. Over the coming year, we will strive to increase the number of localities that trace all guns linked to crime.


Through universal tracing, we can greatly improve the quality of crime gun data that is being collected. This will result in law enforcement being better able to identify illegal gun traffickers and develop investigative priorities. For example, we have documented that illegal handguns recovered from juveniles and youth are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of kinds of firearms, particularly semi-automatic weapons. This information is critical, for it permits federal, state, and local enforcement officers to assign priorities to investigations of traffickers based on the known popularity of certain weapons among juveniles and youth, as well as adult criminals.

The Departments of Treasury and Justice are fully committed to this important Initiative. While the initial results are encouraging, we have much more to do. In the next year, we will continue working with state and local officials in the original 17 sites to improve gun tracing and enforcement strategies. We will also be working with additional cities, sharing what we have learned and assisting them in establishing their own gun tracing systems.

With your leadership and your support, our goal of effective action against illegal firearms markets that supply juveniles and youth will be achieved. By stemming the flow of illegal firearms to juveniles and youth, we expect that the level of violence in our communities will continue to drop.

We are attaching for your information a brief summary of the Initiative, as well as a comprehensive report compiled by the Department of Treasury describing results of ATF's analyses of crime gun trace information in the 17 pilot cities.

Sincerely,



Robert E. Rubin
Secretary of the Treasury



Janet Reno
Attorney General

07/18/97 14:47 2010 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

SUMMARY OF
NATIONAL ILLEGAL FIREARMS TRAFFICKING STRATEGY
&
YOUTH CRIME GUN
INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

Since 1993, this Administration has developed several successful approaches to fighting violent crime and the proliferation of illegal firearms. New laws such as the Brady Act and the Assault Weapons Ban gave us significant tools to prevent criminals from obtaining certain types of firearms.

In 1994, the Departments of Justice and Treasury announced the Administration's Anti-Violent Crime Initiative (AVCI). The AVCI promotes cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in working together to develop coordinated investigative priorities within individual communities. In many communities, gun violence and the proliferation of firearms among juveniles and gang offenders has been identified as the most important violent crime problem. Local task forces in Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) cities, such as Boston, Baltimore, Memphis, and Milwaukee, have been successful in identifying and prosecuting numerous individuals who have brought illegal firearms into our communities.

We have recognized that stopping illegal gun trafficking before it begins has a greater impact and requires fewer resources than pursuing firearms once they have reached the hands of criminals through the illicit trafficking market. Since 1994, the Department of Treasury has pursued an "Anti-Trafficking Strategy," which targets illegal gun trafficking at its source. In addition, we worked to strengthen the licensing of dealers and assure their compliance with applicable laws and regulations, resulting in over a 50% drop in the number of federal firearms licensees.

Reducing the numbers of licensed dealers is not enough, for even with the dramatic reduction, there are still approximately 110,000 licensees. Thus, we have also strived to identify dealers who may be illegally selling firearms, as well as non-licensed individuals who buy and sell firearms that originally were purchased lawfully. Historically, identifying these persons and the resulting trafficking patterns has been difficult. But this is where the YCGII shows great promise.

For the past few years, researchers in Massachusetts had sought to identify the original legitimate source of every gun seized by the Boston Police Department, to determine whether there were any specific patterns that could help law enforcement stem the flow of illegal firearms to criminals. ATF also developed a computer program, Project LEAD, that could take that data, commonly referred to as "trace information," and use it to identify individuals and locations that might be involved in illegal firearms trafficking.

The combination of these two projects was tested in a few additional localities and then greatly expanded last July, when the President announced the YCGII in 17 cities across the country. Through the YCGII, we have learned a great deal more about gun trafficking in just one year.

- Approximately 25% of the crime guns used by juveniles (age 17 and under) and youth (ages 18-24) move rapidly from their point of first retail sale to recovery by law enforcement agencies. Through investigative experience, ATF has learned that recovery of new firearms often signals increased illegal diversion of weapons.
- Illegal handguns recovered from juveniles and youth are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of kinds of firearms. This information is critical. Law enforcement officers have become familiar with these patterns and the guns involved, and assign priorities to investigations of traffickers based on the known popularity of certain weapons among juveniles and youth, as well as adult criminals.
- In most participating cities, the state in which the community is located is the single largest source of recovered firearms successfully traced to retail sale. The identification of the sources of the firearms allows law enforcement more efficiently to investigate the primary sources of illegal firearms (whether operating intrastate or interstate). Collaboration among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies is needed to mount an effective response, and strategies must be designed that take into account different local illegal market conditions.
- Preliminary research of selected communities by the ATF's National Tracing Center indicates that between 9% and 20% of recovered firearms have had their serial numbers obliterated, and were originally purchased as part of a multiple-gun sale and then illegally trafficked. Firearms traffickers remove serial numbers in an attempt to defeat tracing. Crime labs can now often restore these serial numbers, providing us with new and important investigative information.
- Handguns predominate among recovered crime guns. Seven out of ten guns recovered from adults are handguns, while for juveniles and youth the number is eight out of ten. As for the type of handguns, 47% of the firearms recovered from adults are semi-automatic handguns, 58% of those recovered from juveniles are semi-automatic handguns, and 61% of those recovered from youth are semi-automatic handguns.

These are just a few examples of the statistical data that

is being provided to each of the participating cities, which will assist local law enforcement officials in setting investigative priorities based on the patterns unique to their community. It is through the expansion of this type of information, which can only be obtained by increased crime gun tracing, that we will be able to more broadly assist individual investigators in their cases across the nation.


The YCGII has developed tools that can be used in cities throughout the country to strengthen enforcement efforts against illegal traffickers to juveniles and youth. By expanding comprehensive crime gun tracing to additional cities, increasing the development of crime gun trace analyses, increasing federal, state, and local training in trafficking investigations, and continuing federal-state-local collaboration in trafficking investigations and local violence reduction initiatives, we will ensure the effectiveness of our nationwide effort to disrupt this lethal trade and reduce juvenile and youth firearms violence.



The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Crime Gun Trace Analysis Reports: The Illegal Youth Firearms Markets in 17 Communities

Department of the Treasury
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms





DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, DC 20226

UNDER SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUBIN

FROM: Raymond W. Kelly
Under Secretary (Enforcement)

SUBJECT: Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Attached are reports prepared by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) for the 17 communities participating in the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative. They fulfill three goals by:

- (1) Documenting how juveniles and youth illegally obtain firearms;
- (2) Enabling Federal and local enforcement agencies to assess the illegal firearms problem in their communities and develop strategies to combat it;
- (3) Reporting on greatly increased ATF tracing of firearms recovered by enforcement agencies.

The following are among the reports' findings about firearms recovered by enforcement agencies:

- Firearms rapidly diverted from first retail sales at federally licensed gun dealers to an illegal market account for at least a quarter of the firearms that police recover from juveniles and youth.
- One out of ten firearms recovered by police is from a juvenile (17 and under). When youth (ages 18-24) are included, the number changes to four out of 10.
- In 15 of the 17 sites, the majority or the single largest supply of the crime guns successfully traced comes from retail sources *within* the State. Jersey City and Washington, DC, are the only sites where the largest single source of successfully traced crime guns is outside of their State or borders.
- Seven out of ten crime guns recovered from adults are handguns. For juveniles and youth, the number is eight out of 10.
- Half of all crime guns recovered by police are semiautomatic pistols, which are also the preferred weapons for juvenile and youthful offenders (60 percent).
- While thousands of different kinds of firearms are available, crime guns are concentrated among a relatively small number of makes and calibers in each city.
- Preliminary research shows that a high percentage of crime guns with obliterated serial numbers were originally purchased as part of a multiple sale by a federally licensed gun dealer and then illegally trafficked.

During the course of the initiative, trace requests from the 17 sites nearly doubled over the same period the previous year, from 20,000 to more than 37,000 requests. Trace information is stored in the National Tracing Center's illegal firearms trafficking information system, Project LEAD, which enforcement officials use in the identification of illegal traffickers. By expanding the volume of tracing, participants in the initiative not only provided data needed to identify community patterns, but have added significantly to the investigative information available to make cases against illegal traffickers.

We are confident that these reports will enable local enforcement officials, working with State and Federal authorities, to better protect our young and the public by preventing the illegal trafficking of firearms to those who would use them to commit violent crime.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Introduction

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative is a 17-city demonstration project aimed at reducing youth firearms violence. Officials from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), police chiefs, local prosecutors, and U.S. attorneys are developing information about illegal trafficking of firearms to young people and new methods of reducing the illegal supply of firearms to them. The initiative was developed by ATF and its National Tracing Center, funded by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Enforcement and the National Institute of Justice, and announced by President Clinton on July 8, 1996.

Purposes of This Report

Since July 1996, participants have tested a new method of developing and providing information about the illegal sources of firearms to youth. Federal and local enforcement officials in each jurisdiction voluntarily agreed to submit information on all recovered crime guns to ATF's National Tracing Center. ATF developed the tools to analyze the information. ATF is publishing this report of its analyses for the following purposes:

To provide new information about illegal firearms activity by community. These reports provide an overall view of firearms associated with illegal possession or activity in a jurisdiction. They identify the types of firearms that enforcement agencies most frequently recover, the types of crimes with which these weapons are associated, the time it takes for firearms to move from a federally licensed firearms dealer to recovery by enforcement officials, and the source States of these firearms. This is the first time ATF has developed and published standardized reports on recovered crime guns.

To identify differences in adult, juvenile, and youth illegal firearms activity. These reports analyze firearms recoveries by age group, with a focus on young people. The information establishes whether patterns of crime gun acquisition differ by age group. While ATF has previously collected information from enforcement agencies on firearms recovered from juveniles from across the country, this is the first time ATF has been able to provide age-based analysis by local jurisdiction. This analysis provides enforcement officials with a new and important tool for reducing illegal juvenile and youth access to firearms.

To expand access to firearms-related enforcement information. These reports share ATF firearms-related enforcement information with other enforcement agencies. The reports thereby provide a new, common foundation for collaboration among ATF, the offices of the U.S. attorney, and local police and prosecutors, as well as other agencies concerned with youth violence. Using this information, police departments and local prosecutors may choose to modify resources devoted to firearms trafficking interdiction, and local task forces may choose to pursue firearms trafficking cases in Federal or State courts.

To initiate community, State, and national reporting on firearms trafficking. These reports provide a model for standardized, annual ATF reports on firearms recoveries at the city, State, and national level. State and national reports using firearms recovery information provided by every jurisdiction allow regional and national patterns to be identified.

To enable enforcement officials to focus their resources where they are likely to have the greatest impact on illegal trafficking to juveniles and violent youth gang members, as well as adult criminals. Specific investigative information about the illegal sources of crime guns can be obtained by a variety of

methods, including Project LEAD, ATF's computerized illegal firearms information trafficking system, debriefing armed arrestees, and other street sources. These reports do not provide additional investigative information (such as the identities of federally licensed gun dealers or retail purchasers repeatedly associated with new crime guns). Rather, they provide analyses that can be useful in deciding how best to focus investigative resources to reduce the illegal firearms supply used in violent crime.

Strategic targeting of illegal sources of juvenile and youth crime guns. Information about the percentages of a jurisdiction's crime guns recovered from juveniles, youth, and adults allows investigative priorities to be established and assessed. For instance, enforcement officials may choose to use Project LEAD to look for federally licensed gun dealers and first purchasers linked with crime gun traces associated with juveniles and youth.

Strategic targeting of illegal sources of certain crime guns. Enforcement officials also can draw on the reports to develop other enforce-

ment strategies. Federal investigators already look for high volume traffickers operating across jurisdictional lines, whether interstate or intrastate, and use Project LEAD to investigate the illegal sources of guns used in violent crimes. Drawing on these reports, Federal and local officials can jointly decide to use Project LEAD and other investigative tools to target the illegal sources of various groups of crime guns: firearms with obliterated serial numbers; firearms most often used by juveniles and youth in violent crimes; illegally trafficked firearms most popular among juveniles, violent youth, and violent gangs; firearms with short "time-to-crime" rates, which are likely to have been deliberately trafficked; and firearms originating in-State or firearms originating out of State.

Optimum, balanced local enforcement strategy. By combining a focus on high volume traffickers with targeted trafficking enforcement efforts using trace analyses and information about local conditions, enforcement officials can work toward the optimum strategy for reducing local illegal access to firearms, especially by juveniles and violent gang members.

What This Report Contains

Information about *crime guns*. A *crime gun* is defined, for purpose of firearms tracing, as any firearm that is illegally possessed, used in a crime, or suspected by enforcement officials of being used in a crime. Report E shows the crime types most frequently associated with crime gun trace requests.

Comprehensive crime gun trace data by community. The report presents information about how many crime guns were submitted for tracing. Participants in the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative voluntarily agreed to trace *all* crime guns recovered in their jurisdiction. Police departments are not required by Federal law to maintain or supply crime gun recovery information and have not historically submitted all crime guns for tracing. Lack of comprehensive tracing has precluded certain kinds of crime gun analyses since there may not have been enough crime gun trace requests from particular jurisdictions to identify community-wide patterns. The voluntary tracing agreement under this initiative was intended to overcome this problem.

Information from *National Tracing Center traces*. The information in this report is derived from data contained in requests for crime gun traces that enforcement agencies submitted to ATF's National Tracing Center (NTC) and from the results of traces that the NTC conducts. An *NTC trace* uses records maintained and made available by the firearms industry to identify the history of a firearm's ownership. A *successful NTC trace* describes firearm ownership from the manufacturer or importer through the wholesaler to the first known retail dealer. Depending on the investigative circumstances, the NTC trace may also identify the first retail purchaser, and sometimes even subsequent purchasers. Because of the structure of Federal firearms regulation and recordkeeping requirements, however, it is generally not possible for the NTC to trace a crime gun beyond its first retail sale using firearms industry records. To further trace a crime gun's path, ATF must conduct an *investigative trace*, in which special agents investigate

the subsequent chain of possession. Investigative traces are extremely resource intensive and are generally conducted only where there is a specific investigative need.

Analyses of *requests* for crime gun traces. The report contains certain analyses that are based on the information contained in *requests* for crime gun traces. These analyses do not depend on the NTC successfully completing the traces. Information available for all crime guns submitted for tracing, whether or not the crime gun is successfully traced by the NTC, includes the number of recovered crime guns in a community, the type of firearm (e.g., revolver, rifle), and its manufacturer and caliber.

Analyses of *successful NTC traces*. The report also contains certain analyses that are based on the results of *successful NTC traces*. Information available only for crime guns successfully traced by the NTC includes the time it takes for a crime gun to move from its last known retail sale to recovery by enforcement officials, and the State in which the crime gun was sold.

Analysis of *incomplete traces*. The report shows the number of successful NTC traces and explains why the NTC closed the remaining traces without a successful NTC trace. This information is intended to assist in increasing the number of successful NTC traces.

Analyses by *adult, youth, and juvenile age categories*. The report generally presents information in four age categories: adults (25 and over); youth (ages 18 through 24); juvenile (17 and under); and all age categories combined.

Crime gun trace information for a *10-month period*. The patterns depicted in this report are based on crime guns for which trace requests were submitted to the NTC during the period of July 1, 1996, through April 30, 1997. The NTC provided project training in August and September 1996; project tracing then began in all sites. Early trace requests may not include as complete information as later traces.

General Findings From the Participating Communities

This section presents general findings based on experience in all 17 participating communities. These 17 communities may not comprise a valid sample for purposes of national analysis. However, this is the largest collection of community-based information yet available on recovered crime guns.

List of Participating Communities

The communities participating in this initiative, and on which the findings are based, are:

Atlanta, Georgia
Baltimore, Maryland
Birmingham, Alabama
Boston, Massachusetts
Bridgeport, Connecticut
Cleveland, Ohio
Inglewood, California
Jersey City, New Jersey
Memphis, Tennessee
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
New York, New York
Richmond, Virginia
St. Louis, Missouri
Salinas, California
San Antonio, Texas
Seattle, Washington
Washington, DC

This section is divided into two parts: (1) comprehensive community-based crime gun tracing and (2) local illegal firearms markets. These findings are intended to give enforcement officials in each community a wider perspective on its use of crime gun tracing and on its violent firearms crime and trafficking problems, particularly as they involve juveniles and youth.

General Findings:

Comprehensive, Community-Based Crime Gun Tracing

The 17 participating sites jointly tested the feasibility and utility of an enforcement policy of submitting all recovered crime guns in a community to the National Tracing Center (NTC) for tracing. Based on this experience, ATF reaches the following conclusions:

Comprehensive, community-based crime gun tracing is achievable. Trace requests from the 17 sites during the 10-month period nearly doubled over the same period the previous year, from approximately 20,000 trace requests to more than 37,000 trace requests. Tracing volume in all of the sites increased. Police departments in all of the sites had official policies requiring tracing of all recovered crime guns for all or part of the project period. Eight of the communities reported that they had a general tracing policy before the initiative began. One site, Jersey City, was part of a state-wide agreement by enforcement officials and prosecutors to trace all crime guns. One State, Virginia, mandates tracing of all firearms recovered by State and local enforcement agencies. Sixteen of the seventeen participating police departments continue to have a written or stated policy of tracing all recovered firearms.

Technical improvements in local and State tracing capability increase crime gun tracing levels, efficiency, and accuracy. Working with local and State enforcement officials, ATF has tested three methods of facilitating comprehensive crime gun tracing. The methods vary according to the jurisdiction's volume of recovered firearms, recordkeeping procedures, and level of computerization. Costs of such technical assistance are low and the benefits high, both for the police departments and ATF. Because of technical improvements, for instance, New York City's requests for traces jumped to close to 13,000 crime guns during the 10-month project period, from fewer than 4,000 crime guns during the same time period the previous year. San Antonio's tracing rate increased 500 percent, to close to 2,000 crime gun traces during the project period from fewer than 400 traces during the same period the previous year.

Comprehensive crime gun tracing achieves its primary purpose: to increase the number of investigative leads to illegal traffickers derived from NTC tracing. The *primary* purposes of NTC crime gun tracing are to assist in solving individual gun crimes and to increase the amount of investigative information about illegal gun trafficking available to enforcement agencies. Crime gun trace information is added to the NTC's Project LEAD. This information system aggregates crime gun trace information from enforcement agencies throughout the Nation, and identifies links among those traces. For instance, Project LEAD could link a crime gun that enforcement officials in Inglewood, California, submit for tracing with a crime gun that enforcement officials in Jersey City, New Jersey, submit for tracing by showing that both were sold by the same Federal firearms licensee or purchased by the same individual. By nearly doubling the volume of trace requests from the 17 communities, ATF and local and State enforcement agencies have significantly increased the amount of trace information in Project LEAD and the number of investigative leads available to enforcement agencies throughout the country.

As demonstrated by these reports, comprehensive crime gun tracing can also be used to assist enforcement agencies by identifying major crime gun patterns in a community. By simply submitting trace requests on all recovered firearms, enforcement officials can check for patterns and trends on crime guns in their community. When the NTC can successfully trace these crime guns, additional strategic and investigative information is available.

Refinement of tracing guidelines and practices will result in greater consistency in trace analysis reporting. While participants have followed or are following comprehensive tracing policies, tracing procedures vary. For instance, practices may differ for tracing firearms that have obliterated serial numbers, are recovered by school authorities, are found without identified possessors or are known to be stolen, or are antique. In addition, there are variations in how the exact location of where the firearm was recovered is reported. For this reason, a few crime guns recovered in nearby jurisdictions may have been included in reports from some of the 17 sites. Finally, during this special initiative, enforcement agencies may have submitted all available firearms rather than only firearms recovered after the initiative began. Trace levels can be expected to stabilize if technical improvements are made and as the NTC refines tracing guidelines.

Faster NTC trace completion time benefits enforcement agencies. The faster a crime gun trace can be completed, the sooner the trace information can be entered into the Project LEAD illegal trafficking information system and the sooner it can be used by enforcement officials in investigations of illegal traffickers. The NTC presently completes trace requests in an average of 9 days. Crime gun-related investigations would benefit from faster completion times. Two factors affect completion time: NTC resources and the speed with which Federal firearms licensees make records available. The firearms industry has recently pledged to assist the NTC in speeding up crime gun tracing by making more records accessible electronically.

Increasing the number and percentage of successful NTC traces benefits enforcement agencies. The NTC successfully completed approximately 37 percent of the traces requested during this project. Reasons for lack of successful NTC tracing include lack of needed information about the firearm in trace requests (23 percent), lack of Federal firearms licensee records (7 percent), and legal and resource limitations on tracing older firearms (33 percent). Not all trace analyses depend on successfully completing trace requests. However, the benefits of crime gun tracing for enforcement agencies are maximized if traces are successfully completed. Many of the reasons preventing successful NTC tracing can and should be addressed.

Training in crime gun tracing benefits enforcement agencies. Working together, police departments and ATF fulfilled their goal of tracing all recovered crime guns, with a minimum of training. However, some sites were more successful than others in submitting the full amount of crime gun-related data that can be used in Project LEAD and in trace analyses. In particular, a few sites provided insufficient possessor date of birth information to provide reliable analysis by age category. Most importantly, 23 percent of the trace requests overall were submitted with insufficient firearms information to successfully complete the traces. This reflects several factors, including that some police departments' internal firearms-related procedures are more conducive than others to comprehensive crime gun tracing. Training in crime gun tracing and a collaborative effort between the NTC and State and local enforcement agencies are needed to improve the level of information provided in trace requests.

General Findings: Local Illegal Firearms Markets

This section summarizes enforcement findings and conclusions based on crime gun trace information from the 17 participating communities. The category "adult" includes ages 25 and over, "youth" includes ages 18 to 24, and "juvenile" includes ages 17 and under.*

Adult crime guns predominate. Most crime guns are recovered from adults. While youth firearms crime remains a special priority because of high rates of youth violence, adult firearms crime still predominates. In the largest city among the participants, New York, where almost 13,000 crime guns were submitted for tracing, juveniles under age 18 account for 11 percent of the crime guns, youth ages 18 to 24 account for 34 percent, and adults age 25 and over account for 55 percent. Only in Bridgeport does the adult crime gun category not constitute a plurality.

Juvenile crime guns are a significant percentage of the total. One out of ten crime guns is recovered from a juvenile. Juvenile crime gun trace requests accounted for at least 10 percent of the total traces requested, with three exceptions, Cleveland (6 percent), Milwaukee (8 percent), and Richmond (9 percent). The percentage of juvenile crime guns submitted for tracing was over 20 percent in two cities: Seattle and Memphis.

Juvenile and youth crime guns comprise almost half of the total. Juvenile and youth crime guns combined account for 45 percent of the crime guns requested for tracing, while adult crime guns account for 55 percent of the total.

Handguns predominate. Eight out of ten crime guns traced are handguns. Handguns include semiautomatic pistols, revolvers, and derringers. In all sites, handguns are the largest category of firearms recovered by enforcement agencies. The percentage of crime guns accounted for by handguns recovered from all age groups ranged from 63 percent in Salinas, to 98 percent in Atlanta.

A disproportionate number of juvenile and youth crime guns are handguns. Juvenile and youth crime guns are more likely than adult crime guns to be handguns. Eight out of ten

juvenile and youth crime guns traced are handguns, whereas seven out of 10 adult crime guns are handguns. Of the crime guns recovered from *juveniles*, the percentage that are handguns ranges from 73 percent in Salinas to more than 90 percent in five cities: Cleveland, New York City, Seattle, Richmond, and Boston. Of the crime guns recovered from *youth*, the percentage that are handguns ranges from 67 percent in San Antonio to more than 90 percent in three cities: Washington, DC, Memphis, and New York City. Of the crime guns recovered from *adults*, the lowest percentage of handguns is in Seattle and Memphis, 56 percent. Handguns account for between 80 and 90 percent of the adult crime guns in four cities.

Semiautomatic handguns predominate. Semiautomatic handguns are more common crime guns than revolvers. Semiautomatic handguns range from a high of 67 percent of crime guns in Atlanta, to a low of 39 percent in St. Louis. Revolvers supplied no more than 41 percent of crime guns in any site. Half of all the crime guns recovered are semiautomatics.

A disproportionate number of juvenile and youth crime guns are semiautomatic handguns. In each site, juveniles and youth are more likely to be associated with semiautomatic handguns than are adults. Semiautomatic handguns accounted for a high of 66 percent of the *juvenile* crime guns in Boston, to a low of 47 percent of the *juvenile* crime guns in Baltimore and Birmingham. Semiautomatic handguns accounted for a high of 71 percent of the *youth* crime guns in Memphis, to a low of 46 percent of the *youth* crime guns in Salinas. Semiautomatic handguns accounted for a high of 54 percent of the *adult* crime guns in New York City and Washington, D.C. to a low of 35 percent of the *adult* crime guns in Birmingham and Milwaukee. Overall, 47 percent of the adult crime guns are semiautomatics. Semiautomatics constitute 61 percent of the youth crime guns and 58 percent of the juvenile crime guns.

* Not all sites were considered for each of the findings below. Where the number of cases was insufficient for the particular finding, the site was excluded. A technical note with further explanation is available from ATF.

In each site crime guns are concentrated among a relatively few kinds of firearms by manufacturer and caliber. The top 10 types of crime guns, by manufacturer and caliber, represent a disproportionately large share of the total number of recovered firearms. The greatest concentration is in Inglewood, where the top 10 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber account for 48 percent of the total; 58 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber account for the remaining 52 percent. Even in Milwaukee, where the concentration is the least, the top 10 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber still account for 21 percent of the total; 567 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber account for the remaining 79 percent. Overall, the top 10 types of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for more than 9,000 crime guns, or 24 percent, while 1,207 kinds of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for the over 28,000 crime guns remaining, or 76 percent.

Crime gun concentration by kind of firearm, by manufacturer and caliber, is relatively greater among juveniles and youth than among adults. The highest concentration among *juvenile* crime guns is in Birmingham where the top 10 types of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for 52 percent of recovered juvenile firearms. The highest concentration among *youth* crime guns is in Memphis where the top 10 kinds of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for 46 percent of recovered youth firearms. By comparison, the highest concentration among *adult* crime guns is in Bridgeport, where the top 10 types of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for 36 percent of the recovered adult firearms.

In general, the State in which the community is located is the largest single source of its successfully traced crime guns. In 12 of the 17 sites, the State itself supplies a *majority* of the successfully traced crime guns. This majority ranged from a high of 77 percent in San Antonio to a low of 54 percent in Seattle. In three of the 17 sites, the State itself supplies more crime guns than any other single source State, while the combination of all other States

supplies more than half of the successfully traced crime guns. This plurality ranges from a high of 47 percent in St. Louis to a low of 13 percent in New York City. There are two exceptions: for Jersey City, the top two source States are Virginia and Florida, each supplying 14 percent of the successfully traced crime guns, while New Jersey supplies 10 percent. No crime guns were traced to first retail sales in Washington, DC.

Many recovered firearms are rapidly diverted from first retail sales at federally licensed gun dealers to a black market that supplies juveniles and youth. This is shown by the proportion of guns recovered by law enforcement officials that are new, that is, bought less than three years before recovery by enforcement officials. New guns in young hands signal direct diversion — by illegal firearms trafficking, including straw purchases, theft from federally licensed gun dealers, or a combination of all of these. Enforcement officials can often identify the illegal sources of new firearms by following up on trace information. By contrast, older crime guns are more likely to have passed through numerous hands before entering illegal commerce, requiring other methods, such as debriefing criminal offenders, to identify their illegal sources. Based on crime guns recovered and submitted for tracing during the initiative, ATF estimates that new crime guns comprise between 22 percent and 43 percent of the firearms recovered from *juveniles*, between 30 percent and 54 percent of the firearms recovered from *youth*, and between 25 percent and 46 percent of the firearms recovered from *adults*.^{*} This finding leads to our conclusion that an effort to identify, prosecute, and incarcerate illegal firearms traffickers can reduce the illegal firearms supply that supports criminal activity by young people.

Crime guns with obliterated serial numbers are likely to have been illegally trafficked. Local tracing practices with respect to firearms with obliterated serial numbers varied too much during this initiative to provide consistent community-based analyses of crime guns with obliterated serial numbers. Therefore, reports on crime guns with obliterated serial numbers are not

^{*} A technical note explaining how these ranges were calculated is available from ATF upon request.

provided for the participating sites. However, preliminary research by the NTC in selected communities indicates that between 9 percent and 20 percent of recovered firearms have their serial numbers obliterated. NTC analysis indicates that *a very high percentage of firearms with obliterated serial numbers were originally purchased as part of a multiple sale and then illegally trafficked*. Restoration of obliterated serial numbers is often possible by either ATF or police department laboratories. Restoration of these serial numbers and tracing of the firearm should be given high priority.

Preventing trafficking in new firearms to youths and juveniles. Crime gun tracing is identifying many investigative opportunities for enforcement officials. The fact that many young people are using relatively new firearms, purchased from Federal firearms licensees that are maintaining records, provides significant opportunities for

enforcement agencies to identify illegal traffickers. Project LEAD and trace analyses can facilitate the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of illegal suppliers of these crime guns.

Preventing trafficking of older firearms. Preventing the trafficking of older firearms requires a different approach. Older firearms enter the illegal market through several routes: they are sold by federally licensed gun dealers as used firearms, they are sold as used firearms on the legal secondary market (i.e., private sales exempt from federal regulation), they are stolen and resold through gun traffickers, or they are stolen personally by the crime gun possessor. Finding the source of older guns requires, in addition to crime gun tracing, debriefing of arrestees associated with crime guns and investigation into the chain of transfers of the crime gun beyond the first retail purchaser.

Future Crime Gun Trace Analysis Techniques

The ATF National Tracing Center is continuing to develop new techniques to analyze crime gun traces. These will further increase the ability of enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute illegal traffickers. Future developments will include the following:

Reporting on crime guns with obliterated serial numbers that cannot be restored. The NTC has established a data base for crime guns for which serial numbers have been obliterated and cannot be restored. Collection of this information is critical to the NTC's efforts to report on crime gun trafficking.

Improvements in Project LEAD. Project LEAD, ATF's illegal firearms trafficking information system, is being improved to add indicators that will suggest new types of leads to trafficking investigators. In addition, special agents will be able to access Project LEAD in real time.

Reports on multiple purchases of crime guns by a single purchaser. When a Federal firearms licensee sells two or more handguns in five business days to a single purchaser, the licensee must notify ATF of these sales in writing. ATF provides a multiple sales form to simplify this notification. Information supplied by Federal firearms licensees on multiple sales forms is integrated into Project LEAD for use in

illegal firearms trafficking investigations. In the future, information on crime gun traces associated with multiple purchases can be included in crime gun trace analysis reports.

Reports on crime guns that possessors report to be stolen. The submission of trace requests for firearms known by enforcement officials to have been stolen was inconsistent among participating sites. NTC procedures will be altered to permit accurate reporting of this information. Currently, less than 1 percent of all crime guns submitted for tracing to the NTC are reported to have been stolen.

Use of a ballistics identification system to help identify firearms traffickers. ATF has pioneered ballistics technology that allows enforcement agencies to link recovered bullets and cartridge cases with recovered crime guns. To facilitate identification of traffickers and other criminals, the ballistics data base and the NTC crime gun data base can be linked, and ballistics-related information can be captured in crime gun trace analyses.

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative and Related Local Initiatives

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative builds on leadership and innovations in a number of jurisdictions where enforcement agencies have been focusing on reducing illegal access to firearms. Three important examples follow:

Project LISA: New Jersey's statewide crime gun tracing system. Locally developed crime gun information systems, such as Project LISA in New Jersey, have served as local models for Project LEAD, ATF's national crime gun information system. Information on all recovered crime guns statewide is entered into the LISA system, enabling enforcement officials to identify juvenile and adult offenders. U.S. Attorney Faith Hochberg organized this statewide system through a memorandum of understanding among all enforcement officials in the State.


The Boston Gun Project/Ceasefire. The Boston Gun Project/Ceasefire is a joint Federal and local effort to reduce youth firearms violence in Boston under the leadership of Commissioner Paul Evans, U.S. Attorney Don Stern, and ATF Special Agent in Charge Jeff Roehm. David Kennedy, a senior researcher at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, developed the project under a grant from the National Institute of Justice. Participants also include the Department of Probation, youth outreach workers, the Department of Parole, the Department of Youth Services, and school police. The strategy combines: (1) a local, State, and Federal effort to crack down on the illegal gun supply and (2) a local, State, and Federal strategy to deter violence by youth gangs.

The Boston Gun Project: crime gun supply reduction. This project developed comprehensive tracing and trace analysis and instituted the debriefing of arrestees especially gang members arrested for weapons, drug, and violent offenses, for information leading to local gun traffickers. ATF agents, police, and prosecutors are using traditional criminal investigative techniques to identify and prosecute specific traffickers.

Participants are also developing an enforcement strategy based on trace analysis to disrupt Boston's illegal youth gun market. This focuses on guns recovered less than two years from first retail sale, guns with two or more crime gun traces, guns recovered from members of violent gangs, and guns identified as particularly popular with gang members. ATF and police are restoring obliterated serial numbers, tracing those firearms, and focusing on FFL's and gun purchasers associated with those weapons.

The Boston Gun Project: deterring violent gang crime. Participants in the Gun Project researched the Boston youth homicide problem and determined it to be largely gang related. Participating officials agreed to deliver and act on a new enforcement message to these gangs: *violence will not be tolerated in Boston; it will be met with a strong and coordinated interagency response.* Officials delivered this message through formal meetings with gang members, individual police and probation contacts with gang members, meeting with all inmates of secure juvenile facilities in the city, and gang outreach workers. Where violence occurs, it is met with a coordinated interagency response, using all possible enforcement tools, from probation supervision to Federal investigation and prosecution.

Memphis U.S. Attorney's Anti-Violent Crime Task Force. This task force is a joint Federal and local effort to reduce youth firearms violence in Memphis, spearheaded by U.S. Attorney Veronica Coleman. The group developed comprehensive crime gun tracing and trace analysis and instituted the debriefing of all arrestees, especially gang members and juveniles arrested with firearms or for violent offenses. This task force is currently working with ATF to expand local capacity to restore obliterated serial numbers on crime guns.



The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Crime Gun Trace Analysis Report: The Illegal Youth Firearms Market in Milwaukee^{WI}

**Department of the Treasury
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms**



ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT A: Number of Crime Gun Trace Requests

This report contains the number of crime gun trace requests to the National Tracing Center from this community. It also indicates the completeness of certain trace data submitted for analysis. Lack of data may reflect unavailability or an issue that remains to be addressed by the police department and ATF.

REPORT PERIOD: July 1, 1996 - April 30, 1997

	Number	Percentage
Total trace requests:	4,011	100.00
For all trace requests, number with:		
Possessor identified:	2,762	68.86
Possessor's date of birth identified:	2,694	67.17
Recovery date identified:	3,886	96.88

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT B: Crime Gun Trace Requests by Age of Possessor

This report provides information concerning the age of the possessors of the crime guns for which trace requests were submitted from this community to the National Tracing Center. Not all crime guns can be associated with a possessor when a trace request is made since not all recovered firearms are found in an individual's possession. Therefore, the breakdown by age group is not expected to be based on all recovered crime guns.

REPORT PERIOD: July 1, 1996 - April 30, 1997

	Number	Percentage of Total
Total number of requests:	4,011	100.00
Total number of requests for which the possessor's age can be determined:	2,702	67.36
Adult crime gun trace requests:	1,817	67.25*
Youth crime gun trace requests:	656	24.28*
Juvenile crime gun trace requests:	229	8.48*

* Based on the trace requests for which the possessor's age can be determined.

NOTE: For purposes of this report:

Adult is defined as 25 years of age and over.

Youth is defined as 18 years of age through 24 years of age.

Juvenile is defined as 17 years of age and under.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT C: Crime Gun Trace Requests by Type of Firearm

This report depicts the number of crime gun trace requests from this community by firearm type. Recoveries are identified as having been from adults, youth, juveniles, and all age categories combined. This information can be useful in developing an enforcement strategy that focuses on the kinds of crime guns used by particular age groups.

REPORT PERIOD: July 1, 1996 - April 30, 1997

Adult (ages 25 and over):

Type of Firearm	Number	Percentage of Adults*
Semiautomatic Pistol	642	35.33
Revolver	482	26.53
Rifle	410	22.56
Shotgun	246	13.54
Derringer	32	1.76
Machine Gun	2	0.11
Combination**	2	0.11

Youth (ages 18-24):

Type of Firearm	Number	Percentage of Youth*
Semiautomatic Pistol	370	55.40
Revolver	163	24.85
Shotgun	59	8.99
Rifle	57	8.69
Derringer	7	1.07
Machine Gun	0	0.00
Combination**	0	0.00

Juvenile (ages 17 and under):

Type of Firearm	Number	Percentage of Juveniles*
Semiautomatic Pistol	119	51.97
Revolver	66	28.82
Shotgun	20	8.73
Rifle	20	8.73
Derringer	4	1.75
Machine Gun	0	0.00
Combination**	0	0.00

* Based on the trace requests for which the possessor's age can be determined.

** A combination firearm is a multi-barreled firearm containing two or more different caliber barrels.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT C: Crime Gun Trace Requests by Type of Firearm (continued)

All Ages:

	Number	Percentage of Total
Semiautomatic Pistol	1649	41.11
Revolver	1020	25.43
Rifle	688	17.15
Shotgun	589	14.68
Derringer	58	1.45
Combination*	4	0.10
Machine Gun	2	0.05

*A combination firearm is a multi-barreled firearm containing two or more different caliber barrels.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT D: Top 10 Crime Guns Requested for Tracing by Type, Manufacturer, and Caliber

This report depicts the most frequently recovered and traced crime guns by firearm type, manufacturer, and caliber, in this community. It does not distinguish among models of firearms of the same caliber. For instance, all Smith & Wesson .38 revolvers are considered as one group. Recovered crime guns are often concentrated among a relatively few kinds of firearms.

REPORT PERIOD: July 1, 1996 - April 30, 1997

Adult (ages 25 and over):

Type of Firearm	Manufacturer	Caliber	Number of Kinds of Firearms	Number of Crime Guns	Percentage of Crime Guns Requested for Tracing*
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.38		59	3.25
Shotgun	Remington	12 GA		38	2.09
Rifle	Marlin	.22		37	2.04
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.357		37	2.04
Shotgun	Mossberg	12 GA		35	1.93
Semiautomatic Pistol	Raven	.25		34	1.87
Semiautomatic Pistol	Colt	.45		33	1.82
Rifle	North China Industries	.30		27	1.49
Revolver	Unknown Manufacturer**	.44		25	1.38
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.44		25	1.38
Summary for top kinds of crime guns			10	350	19.26
All other crime gun kinds			429	1,467	80.74

Youth (ages 18 through 24):

Type of Firearm	Manufacturer	Caliber	Number of Kinds of Firearms	Number of Crime Guns	Percentage of Crime Guns Requested for Tracing*
Semiautomatic Pistol	Lorcin	.380		23	3.51
Semiautomatic Pistol	Raven	.25		21	3.20
Semiautomatic Pistol	Ruger	9mm		20	3.05
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.38		19	2.90
Semiautomatic Pistol	Smith & Wesson	9mm		16	2.44
Rifle	North China Industries	.30		14	2.13
Revolver	Taurus	.38		12	1.83
Semiautomatic Pistol	Bryco	9mm		12	1.83
Revolver	High Standard	.22		11	1.68
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.357		11	1.68
Summary for top kinds of crime guns			10	159	24.24
All other crime gun kinds			204	497	75.76

Juvenile (ages 17 and under):

Type of Firearm	Manufacturer	Caliber	Number of Kinds of Firearms	Number of Crime Guns	Percentage of Crime Guns Requested for Tracing*
Semiautomatic Pistol	Raven	.25		12	5.24
Semiautomatic Pistol	Harrington & Richardson	.32		6	2.62
Semiautomatic Pistol	Rohm	.22		6	2.62
Revolver	Ruger	.357		6	2.62
Semiautomatic Pistol	Davis	.380		6	2.62
Semiautomatic Pistol	Lorcin	.380		4	1.75
Rifle	Marlin	.22		4	1.75
Semiautomatic Pistol	ACCU-TEK	.380		4	1.75
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.38		4	1.75
Semiautomatic Pistol	Ruger	9mm		4	1.75
Summary for top kinds of crime guns			10	56	24.45
All other crime gun kinds			119	173	75.55

* Based on the trace requests for which the possessor's age can be determined.

** These revolvers are cap and ball weapons, which do not meet the definition of firearm under Federal law. There are therefore no Federal regulations governing the sale of these weapons.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT D: Top 10 Crime Guns Requested for Tracing by Type, Manufacturer, and Caliber (continued)

All Ages:

Type of Firearm	Manufacturer	Caliber	Number of Kinds of Firearms	Number of Crime Guns	Percentage of Crime Guns Requested for Tracing
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.38		121	3.02
Semiautomatic Pistol	Raven	.25		115	2.87
Shotgun	Mossberg	12GA		97	2.42
Shotgun	Remington	12GA		86	2.14
Rifle	North China Industries	.30		83	2.07
Rifle	Marlin	.22		79	1.97
Semiautomatic Pistol	Ruger	9mm		72	1.80
Semiautomatic Pistol	Lorcin	.380		72	1.80
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.357		67	1.67
Semiautomatic Pistol	Davis	.380		61	1.52
Summary for top kinds of crime guns			10	853	21.27
All other crime gun kinds			567	3,158	78.73

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT E: Crime Types Most Frequently Associated with Crime Gun Trace Requests

This report depicts the crimes most frequently associated with firearms recovered and traced from this jurisdiction. This information can be useful in developing an enforcement or intervention strategy that focuses on preventing or solving those crimes involving armed youth gang members and juveniles.

REPORT PERIOD: July 1, 1996 - April 30, 1997

Adult (ages 25 and over):

Crime Type	Number	Percentage*
Firearms Offenses	670	36.87
Vice Crimes	565	31.10
Assaults/Threats	285	15.69
Narcotics Crimes	163	8.97
Arson/Explosives/Fraud	67	3.69
Homicide	31	1.71
Robbery	16	0.88
Burglary/Theft/Fraud	16	0.88
Kidnapping	4	0.22

Youth (ages 18 through 24):

Crime Type	Number	Percentage*
Firearms Offenses	352	53.66
Narcotics Crimes	128	19.51
Assaults/Threats	63	9.60
Vice Crimes	41	6.25
Homicide	35	5.34
Robbery	27	4.12
Burglary/Theft/Fraud	10	1.52

Juvenile (ages 17 and under):

Crime Type	Number	Percentage*
Firearms Offenses	155	67.69
Assaults/Threats	23	10.04
Narcotics Crimes	18	7.86
Robbery	10	4.37
Vice Crimes	9	3.93
Burglary/Theft/Fraud	9	3.93
Homicide	5	2.18

* Based on the trace requests for which the possessor's age can be determined.

NOTE: The offense categories listed above and the frequency with which they appear are generated by information provided by the firearms trace requester. The category "firearms offenses" can include any offense/crime in which a firearm was involved.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT E: Crime Types Most Frequently Associated with Crime Gun Trace Requests (continued)

All Ages:

Crime Type	Number	Percentage
Firearms Offenses	1,448	36.10
Vice Crimes	1,285	32.04
Narcotics Crimes	540	13.46
Assaults/Threats	438	10.92
Homicide	107	2.67
Robbery	68	1.70
Arson/Explosive Crimes	68	1.70
Burglary/Theft/Fraud	52	1.30
Kidnapping	4	0.10
Sex Crimes	1	0.02

NOTE: The offense categories listed above and the frequency with which they appear are generated by information provided by the firearms trace requester. The category "firearms offenses" can include any offense/crime in which a firearm was involved.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT F: Number of Crime Guns Successfully Traced by the National Tracing Center

This report shows the number and percentage of crime guns successfully traced by the National Tracing Center and explains why the NTC closed the remaining traces without a successful NTC trace. A successful NTC trace identifies the history of a firearm's ownership from the manufacturer or importer through the wholesaler to at least the first known retail dealer. Depending on the investigative circumstances, the trace also may include the first retail purchaser of the firearm and sometimes subsequent purchasers as well. A successful trace is required to determine the time it takes for crime guns to move from first retail sale to recovery by enforcement officials and the source states for crime guns.

REPORT PERIOD: July 1, 1996 - April 30, 1997

Adult (ages 25 and over):

Trace Requests:	Number	Percentage†
Successfully completed:	1129	62.14
Insufficient information in trace request:*	241	13.26
Federal firearms licensee records unavailable:**	104	5.72
Firearm determined to be too old to trace:***	343	18.88

Youth (ages 18 through 24):

Trace Requests:	Number	Percentage†
Successfully completed:	350	53.35
Insufficient information in trace request:*	92	14.02
Federal firearms licensee records unavailable:**	58	8.84
Firearm determined to be too old to trace:***	156	23.78

Juvenile (ages 17 and under):

Trace Requests:	Number	Percentage†
Successfully completed:	110	48.03
Insufficient information in trace request:*	48	20.96
Federal firearms licensee records unavailable:**	18	7.86
Firearm determined to be too old to trace:***	53	23.14

All Ages:

Trace Requests:	Number	Percentage
Successfully completed:	2178	54.30
Insufficient information in trace request:*	613	15.28
Federal firearms licensee records unavailable:**	279	6.96
Firearm determined to be too old to trace:***	941	23.46

† Based on the trace requests for which the possessor's age can be determined.

* The NTC received incorrect information or insufficient information to complete a firearm trace request, such as the proper nomenclature of a firearm or the firearm's importer.

** Manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer records were incomplete, destroyed, missing, not properly maintained, illegible, or seized by law enforcement or regulatory entities.

*** Firearms predated the enactment of the 1968 Gun Control Act or traces were closed under NTC guidelines relating to age determination in special projects.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT G: Time-to-Crime Rates on Top 10 Crime Guns Requested for Tracing by Type, Manufacturer, and Caliber

This report depicts "time-to-crime" rates for those crime guns most frequently requested for tracing as depicted in Report E. Time-to-crime is the period of time between the first retail sale of a firearm by a Federal firearms licensee and the time the firearm is recovered by enforcement officials or requested for tracing. A short time-to-crime rate can be an indicator of illegal trafficking. In the tables below, the proportion of traceable firearms showing a time-to-crime rate of less than and more than three years is shown; experienced trafficking investigators view a time-to-crime rate of less than three years as an especially useful trafficking indicator. Time-to-crime information can be useful in developing an enforcement strategy that identifies and investigates the specific sources of these firearms.

REPORT PERIOD: July 1, 1996 - April 30, 1997

Adult (ages 25 and over):

Type of Firearm	Manufacturer	Caliber	Number *	Number Successfully Traced	Less than 3 Years Time-to-Crime		More than 3 Years Time-to-Crime		Fastest Time-to-Crime (days)
					Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.38	59	6	2	33.33	4	66.67	61
Shotgun	Remington	12 GA	38	8	1	12.50	7	87.50	130
Rifle	Marlin	.22	37	14	3	21.43	11	78.57	280
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.357	37	12	3	25.00	9	75.00	87
Shotgun	Mossberg	12 GA	35	23	13	56.52	10	43.48	4
Semiautomatic Pistol	Raven	.25	34	16	0	0.00	16	100.00	1,688
Semiautomatic Pistol	Colt	.45	33	1	0	0.00	1	100.00	1,730
Rifle	North China Industries	.30	27	4	2	50.00	2	50.00	457
Revolver	Unknown Manufacturer**	.44	25	0	0	—	0	—	—
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.44	25	2	1	50.00	1	50.00	385

Youth (ages 18 through 24):

Type of Firearm	Manufacturer	Caliber	Number *	Number Successfully Traced	Less than 3 Years Time-to-Crime		More than 3 Years Time-to-Crime		Fastest Time-to-Crime (days)
					Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Semiautomatic Pistol	Lorcin	.380	23	20	15	75.00	5	25.00	16
Semiautomatic Pistol	Raven	.25	21	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	1,546
Semiautomatic Pistol	Ruger	9mm	20	17	13	76.47	4	23.53	8
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.38	19	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	2,858
Semiautomatic Pistol	Smith & Wesson	9mm	16	10	9	90.00	1	10.00	19
Rifle	North China Industries	.30	14	3	3	100.00	0	0.00	121
Revolver	Taurus	.38	12	6	1	16.67	5	83.33	216
Semiautomatic Pistol	Bryco	9mm	12	10	10	100.00	0	0.00	1
Revolver	High Standard	.22	11	0	0	—	0	—	—
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.357	11	5	1	20.00	4	80.00	565

Juvenile (ages 17 and under):

Type of Firearm	Manufacturer	Caliber	Number *	Number Successfully Traced	Less than 3 Years Time-to-Crime		More than 3 Years Time-to-Crime		Fastest Time-to-Crime (days)
					Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Semiautomatic Pistol	Raven	.25	12	9	0	0.00	9	100.00	1,815
Semiautomatic Pistol	Harrington & Richardson	.32	6	3	0	0.00	3	100.00	3,695
Semiautomatic Pistol	Rohm	.22	6	0	0	—	0	—	—
Revolver	Ruger	.357	6	1	1	100.00	0	0.00	995
Semiautomatic Pistol	Davis	.380	6	6	1	16.67	5	83.33	346
Semiautomatic Pistol	Lorcin	.380	4	3	2	66.67	1	33.33	224
Rifle	Marlin	.22	4	4	0	0.00	4	100.00	1,512
Semiautomatic Pistol	ACCU-TEK	.380	4	3	1	33.33	2	66.67	301
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.38	4	2	0	0.00	2	100.00	5,541
Semiautomatic Pistol	Ruger	9mm	4	4	3	75.00	1	25.00	88

* Trace requests for which the possessor's age can be determined.

** These revolvers are cap and ball weapons, which do not meet the definition of firearm under Federal law. There are therefore no Federal regulations governing the sale of these weapons.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT G: Time-to-Crime Rates on Top 10 Crime Guns Requested for Tracing by Type, Manufacturer, and Caliber (continued)

All Ages:

Type of Firearm	Manufacturer	Caliber	Number	Number Successfully Traced	Less than 3 Years Time-to-Crime		More than 3 Years Time-to-Crime		Fastest Time-to-Crime (days)
					Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.38	121	14	2	14.29	12	85.71	61
Semiautomatic Pistol	Raven	.25	115	63	1	1.59	62	98.41	64
Shotgun	Mossberg	12 GA	97	60	33	55.00	27	45.00	0
Shotgun	Remington	12 GA	86	26	10	38.46	16	61.54	44
Rifle	North China Industries	.30	83	20	12	60.00	8	40.00	121
Rifle	Marlin	.22	79	29	5	17.24	24	82.76	280
Semiautomatic Pistol	Ruger	9mm	72	57	36	63.16	21	36.84	3
Semiautomatic Pistol	Lorcin	.380	72	61	33	54.10	28	45.90	1
Revolver	Smith & Wesson	.357	67	24	6	25.00	18	75.00	87
Semiautomatic Pistol	Davis	.380	61	53	16	30.19	37	69.81	215

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT H: Most Frequent Source States for Successfully Traced Crime Guns

This report depicts the most frequent source States for successfully traced crime guns in this city. This information can be useful in developing an enforcement strategy that identifies and investigates the specific illegal sources of crime guns from those areas.

REPORT PERIOD: July 1, 1996 - April 30, 1997

Adult (ages 25 and over):

Source State	Number	Percentage*
Wisconsin	467	65.87
Florida	22	3.10
Illinois	19	2.68
Indiana	18	2.54
California	17	2.40
Mississippi	16	2.26
Georgia	15	2.12
Utah	15	2.12
Ohio	11	1.55
Arizona	10	1.41
Total for top 10 source States	610	86.04
Total for all other source States	99	13.96

Youth (ages 18-24):

Source State	Number	Percentage*
Wisconsin	291	68.31
Mississippi	19	4.46
Florida	14	3.29
Illinois	12	2.82
California	12	2.82
Indiana	10	2.35
Arkansas	7	1.64
Georgia	5	1.17
Arizona	5	1.17
Michigan	5	1.17
Total for top 10 source States	380	89.20
Total for all other source States	46	10.80

Juvenile (ages 17 and under):

Source State	Number	Percentage*
Wisconsin	93	66.91
Illinois	7	5.04
Florida	4	2.88
Indiana	4	2.88
Mississippi	4	2.88
New Jersey	3	2.16
Georgia	2	1.44
Tennessee	2	1.44
Missouri	2	1.44
Kentucky	2	1.44
Total for top 10 source States	123	88.49
Total for all other source States	16	11.51

*Based on the trace requests for which the possessor's age and the source State can be determined.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

REPORT H: Most Frequent Source States for Successfully Traced Crime Guns (continued)

All Ages:

Source State	Number	Percentage*
Wisconsin	1,284	65.14
Mississippi	75	3.81
Florida	60	3.04
Illinois	58	2.94
Indiana	54	2.74
California	46	2.33
Georgia	32	1.62
Texas	24	1.22
Michigan	24	1.22
Virginia	22	1.12
Total for top 10 source States	1,679	85.19
Total for all other source States	292	14.81

*Based on the trace requests for which the source State can be determined.

**YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE
TABLE OF CONTENTS**

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***ALL INFORMATION EMBARGOED UNTIL
SATURDAY, JULY 19, 10:06AM***

514-1724

ATTACHMENT

1

EXPANSION OF THE YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE JULY 19, 1997

BACKGROUND:

- On July 8, 1996, President Clinton directed the Attorney General and Secretary Rubin to implement a pilot program in 17 cities to trace as many guns as possible, especially those trafficked to kids.
- Under this pilot program, the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII), Federal and local law enforcement in each city worked together to submit all crime guns seized for tracing and use this information to identify and locate illegal gun traffickers.
- Since then, the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) has provided local police departments and ATF special agents with specialized training, computers and software -- and traced as many guns as possible through the National Training Center. Today's report details the findings of this effort.

FINDINGS OF TODAY'S REPORT:

- **Confirms kids and guns is a serious problem in all 17 cities.** Juvenile and youth crime guns account for nearly half (45%) of the firearms recovered from crime scenes and criminals.
- **Reveals that kids use some of the most concealable and dangerous guns.** While 80% of youth and juvenile crime guns are handguns -- and 60% are semiautomatic pistols, only 70% of adult crime guns are handguns -- and less than half, or 47%, are semiautomatics.
- **Crime guns used by kids are concentrated among a relatively small number of makes and models.** The 10 most popular types of crime guns account for 25% of all crime guns. In some cities, this percentage is as high as 50% for youth or juveniles (e.g., Birmingham, Memphis).
- **At least 25% of the crime guns used by kids move rapidly (3 years or less) from first retail sale to crime scenes.** That means that a significant portion of legally purchased guns are quickly and illegally diverted to kids and criminals.
- **The number of trace requests nearly doubled in the 17 pilot cities.** While not all traces submitted could be completed, for a variety of reasons, overall requests submitted to ATF jumped from about 20,000 to 37,000.

HOW TRACING WORKS

- **The Shikes Case.** Shortly after the YCGII was launched, ATF and the Milwaukee Police Department received a tip that an individual named "Larry" was selling guns to gang members. This individual was Larry Shikes, and he was selling guns from the trunk of his car in the parking lot of the grocery store where he worked as a security guard.

A review of trace information on Milwaukee crime guns revealed that Shikes had originally purchased several guns that were recovered in connection with youth gang crimes -- including homicides, assaults and drive-by-shootings. Shikes illegal activity was further documented by undercover purchases of additional shotguns and handguns.

Shikes was arrested in April 1997. He pled guilty to dealing in firearms without a license and providing firearms to convicted felons. He is scheduled to be sentenced next month.

ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES:

- **A new anti-crime tool.** By submitting all crime guns for tracing, the YCGII is showing law enforcement at all levels how young people are getting guns. This is critical information that will allow law enforcement to prioritize the investigation of gun traffickers.
- **Guns are being trafficked to kids.** ATF traces and investigations clearly show that certain corrupt gun dealers are selling guns to large volume traffickers and straw purchasers, who are in turn funneling guns to our youth. With more tracing information and enforcement resources, we can crackdown on these traffickers and break-up the supply of guns to kids and criminals.
- **Brady checks important.** Background checks are needed to help keep guns from being illegally diverted. So it's critical that state and local law enforcement continue their commitment to Brady.

TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT:

- **More Cities, More Resources.** Today, the President will expand the YCGII to 10 more cities. The Treasury Department will commit \$11 million to augment its tracing efforts next year, and the Department of Justice will dedicate funds from the Bureau of Justice Assistance to help provide training to participating state and local law enforcement agencies. Additional funds will also be sought for ATF agents from unobligated funds.

ATTACHMENT

2

**THE YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE
PHASE TWO CITIES
JULY 19, 1997**

Chicago, Illinois
Los Angeles, California
Detroit, Michigan
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*
Houston, Texas
Miami, Florida
Tucson, Arizona*
Minneapolis, Minnesota*
Gary, Indiana*
Cincinnati, Ohio

Most cities were selected because of the high number of firearms and violent offenses committed by juveniles and youth. Those cities marked with an asterisk (*) were chosen because, unlike the national trend, they have experienced increases in violent crime.

ATTACHMENT

3



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

July 18, 1997

Dear Mr. President:

On July 8, 1996, you announced the start of the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII), a collaborative effort among law enforcement officials in 17 cities to reduce youth firearms violence by disrupting the illegal markets that put firearms in the hands of juveniles and youth. The YCGII brought together four significant law enforcement themes of this Administration: first, that we work in a collaborative effort with our state and local law enforcement partners; second, that we make smart and effective use of our limited law enforcement resources; third, that we do everything possible to lower the level of gun violence across the Nation; and fourth, that we make a special effort to reduce youth gun violence.

In the one year since your announcement, we have learned a great deal and have made substantial progress in developing a sophisticated infrastructure to combat illegal gun trafficking. Perhaps most important, we have learned that universal tracing of crime guns in particular communities is achievable. During the past year, gun tracing requests in the 17 pilot cities nearly doubled. Over the coming year, we will strive to increase the number of localities that trace all guns linked to crime.

Through universal tracing, we can greatly improve the quality of crime gun data that is being collected. This will result in law enforcement being better able to identify illegal gun traffickers and develop investigative priorities. For example, we have documented that illegal handguns recovered from juveniles and youth are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of kinds of firearms, particularly semi-automatic weapons. This information is critical, for it permits federal, state, and local enforcement officers to assign priorities to investigations of traffickers based on the known popularity of certain weapons among juveniles and youth, as well as adult criminals.


The Departments of Treasury and Justice are fully committed to this important Initiative. While the initial results are encouraging, we have much more to do. In the next year, we will continue working with state and local officials in the original 17 sites to improve gun tracing and enforcement strategies. We will also be working with additional cities, sharing what we have learned and assisting them in establishing their own gun tracing systems.

2


With your leadership and your support, our goal of effective action against illegal firearms markets that supply juveniles and youth will be achieved. By stemming the flow of illegal firearms to juveniles and youth, we expect that the level of violence in our communities will continue to drop.

We are attaching for your information a brief summary of the Initiative, as well as a comprehensive report compiled by the Department of Treasury describing results of ATF's analyses of crime gun trace information in the 17 pilot cities.

Sincerely,



Robert E. Rubin
Secretary of the Treasury



Janet Reno
Attorney General

SUMMARY OF
NATIONAL ILLEGAL FIREARMS TRAFFICKING STRATEGY
&
YOUTH CRIME GUN
INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

Since 1993, this Administration has developed several successful approaches to fighting violent crime and the proliferation of illegal firearms. New laws such as the Brady Act and the Assault Weapons Ban gave us significant tools to prevent criminals from obtaining certain types of firearms.

In 1994, the Departments of Justice and Treasury announced the Administration's Anti-Violent Crime Initiative (AVCI). The AVCI promotes cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in working together to develop coordinated investigative priorities within individual communities. In many communities, gun violence and the proliferation of firearms among juveniles and gang offenders has been identified as the most important violent crime problem. Local task forces in Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) cities, such as Boston, Baltimore, Memphis, and Milwaukee, have been successful in identifying and prosecuting numerous individuals who have brought illegal firearms into our communities.

We have recognized that stopping illegal gun trafficking before it begins has a greater impact and requires fewer resources than pursuing firearms once they have reached the hands of criminals through the illicit trafficking market. Since 1994, the Department of Treasury has pursued an "Anti-Trafficking Strategy," which targets illegal gun trafficking at its source. In addition, we worked to strengthen the licensing of dealers and assure their compliance with applicable laws and regulations, resulting in over a 50% drop in the number of federal firearms licensees.

Reducing the numbers of licensed dealers is not enough, for even with the dramatic reduction, there are still approximately 110,000 licensees. Thus, we have also strived to identify dealers who may be illegally selling firearms, as well as non-licensed individuals who buy and sell firearms that originally were purchased lawfully. Historically, identifying these persons and the resulting trafficking patterns has been difficult. But this is where the YCGII shows great promise.

For the past few years, researchers in Massachusetts had sought to identify the original legitimate source of every gun seized by the Boston Police Department, to determine whether there were any specific patterns that could help law enforcement stem the flow of illegal firearms to criminals. ATF also developed a computer program, Project LEAD, that could take that data, commonly referred to as "trace information," and use it to identify individuals and locations that might be involved in illegal firearms trafficking.

The combination of these two projects was tested in a few additional localities and then greatly expanded last July, when the President announced the YCGII in 17 cities across the country. Through the YCGII, we have learned a great deal more about gun trafficking in just one year.

- Approximately 25% of the crime guns used by juveniles (age 17 and under) and youth (ages 18-24) move rapidly from their point of first retail sale to recovery by law enforcement agencies. Through investigative experience, ATF has learned that recovery of new firearms often signals increased illegal diversion of weapons.
- Illegal handguns recovered from juveniles and youth are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of kinds of firearms. This information is critical. Law enforcement officers have become familiar with these patterns and the guns involved, and assign priorities to investigations of traffickers based on the known popularity of certain weapons among juveniles and youth, as well as adult criminals.
- In most participating cities, the state in which the community is located is the single largest source of recovered firearms successfully traced to retail sale. The identification of the sources of the firearms allows law enforcement more efficiently to investigate the primary sources of illegal firearms (whether operating intrastate or interstate). Collaboration among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies is needed to mount an effective response, and strategies must be designed that take into account different local illegal market conditions.
- Preliminary research of selected communities by the ATF's National Tracing Center indicates that between 9% and 20% of recovered firearms have had their serial numbers obliterated, and were originally purchased as part of a multiple-gun sale and then illegally trafficked. Firearms traffickers remove serial numbers in an attempt to defeat tracing. Crime labs can now often restore these serial numbers, providing us with new and important investigative information.
- Handguns predominate among recovered crime guns. Seven out of ten guns recovered from adults are handguns, while for juveniles and youth the number is eight out of ten. As for the type of handguns, 47% of the firearms recovered from adults are semi-automatic handguns, 58% of those recovered from juveniles are semi-automatic handguns, and 61% of those recovered from youth are semi-automatic handguns.


These are just a few examples of the statistical data that

is being provided to each of the participating cities, which will assist local law enforcement officials in setting investigative priorities based on the patterns unique to their community. It is through the expansion of this type of information, which can only be obtained by increased crime gun tracing, that we will be able to more broadly assist individual investigators in their cases across the nation.

The YCGII has developed tools that can be used in cities throughout the country to strengthen enforcement efforts against illegal traffickers to juveniles and youth. By expanding comprehensive crime gun tracing to additional cities, increasing the development of crime gun trace analyses, increasing federal, state, and local training in trafficking investigations, and continuing federal-state-local collaboration in trafficking investigations and local violence reduction initiatives, we will ensure the effectiveness of our nationwide effort to disrupt this lethal trade and reduce juvenile and youth firearms violence.

ATTACHMENT


4



The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Crime Gun Trace Analysis Reports: The Illegal Youth Firearms Markets in 17 Communities

**Department of the Treasury
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms**





DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, DC 20226

UNDER SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUBIN

FROM: Raymond W. Kelly
Under Secretary (Enforcement)

SUBJECT: Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Attached are reports prepared by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) for the 17 communities participating in the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative. They fulfill three goals by:

- (1) Documenting how juveniles and youth illegally obtain firearms;
- (2) Enabling Federal and local enforcement agencies to assess the illegal firearms problem in their communities and develop strategies to combat it;
- (3) Reporting on greatly increased ATF tracing of firearms recovered by enforcement agencies.

The following are among the reports' findings about firearms recovered by enforcement agencies:

- Firearms rapidly diverted from first retail sales at federally licensed gun dealers to an illegal market account for at least a quarter of the firearms that police recover from juveniles and youth.
- One out of ten firearms recovered by police is from a juvenile (17 and under). When youth (ages 18-24) are included, the number changes to four out of 10.
- In 15 of the 17 sites, the majority or the single largest supply of the crime guns successfully traced comes from retail sources *within* the State. Jersey City and Washington, DC, are the only sites where the largest single source of successfully traced crime guns is outside of their State or borders.
- Seven out of ten crime guns recovered from adults are handguns. For juveniles and youth, the number is eight out of 10.
- Half of all crime guns recovered by police are semiautomatic pistols, which are also the preferred weapons for juvenile and youthful offenders (60 percent).
- While thousands of different kinds of firearms are available, crime guns are concentrated among a relatively small number of makes and calibers in each city.
- Preliminary research shows that a high percentage of crime guns with obliterated serial numbers were originally purchased as part of a multiple sale by a federally licensed gun dealer and then illegally trafficked.

During the course of the initiative, trace requests from the 17 sites nearly doubled over the same period the previous year, from 20,000 to more than 37,000 requests. Trace information is stored in the National Tracing Center's illegal firearms trafficking information system, Project LEAD, which enforcement officials use in the identification of illegal traffickers. By expanding the volume of tracing, participants in the initiative not only provided data needed to identify community patterns, but have added significantly to the investigative information available to make cases against illegal traffickers.

We are confident that these reports will enable local enforcement officials, working with State and Federal authorities, to better protect our young and the public by preventing the illegal trafficking of firearms to those who would use them to commit violent crime.

ATF CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORT

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Introduction

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative is a 17-city demonstration project aimed at reducing youth firearms violence. Officials from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), police chiefs, local prosecutors, and U.S. attorneys are developing information about illegal trafficking of firearms to young people and new methods of reducing the illegal supply of firearms to them. The initiative was developed by ATF and its National Tracing Center, funded by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Enforcement and the National Institute of Justice, and announced by President Clinton on July 8, 1996.

Purposes of This Report

Since July 1996, participants have tested a new method of developing and providing information about the illegal sources of firearms to youth. Federal and local enforcement officials in each jurisdiction voluntarily agreed to submit information on all recovered crime guns to ATF's National Tracing Center. ATF developed the tools to analyze the information. ATF is publishing this report of its analyses for the following purposes:

To provide new information about illegal firearms activity by community. These reports provide an overall view of firearms associated with illegal possession or activity in a jurisdiction. They identify the types of firearms that enforcement agencies most frequently recover, the types of crimes with which these weapons are associated, the time it takes for firearms to move from a federally licensed firearms dealer to recovery by enforcement officials, and the source States of these firearms. This is the first time ATF has developed and published standardized reports on recovered crime guns.

To identify differences in adult, juvenile, and youth illegal firearms activity. These reports analyze firearms recoveries by age group, with a focus on young people. The information establishes whether patterns of crime gun acquisition differ by age group. While ATF has previously collected information from enforcement agencies on firearms recovered from juveniles from across the country, this is the first time ATF has been able to provide age-based analysis by local jurisdiction. This analysis provides enforcement officials with a new and important tool for reducing illegal juvenile and youth access to firearms.

To expand access to firearms-related enforcement information. These reports share ATF firearms-related enforcement information with other enforcement agencies. The reports thereby provide a new, common foundation for collaboration among ATF, the offices of the U.S. attorney, and local police and prosecutors, as well as other agencies concerned with youth violence. Using this information, police departments and local prosecutors may choose to modify resources devoted to firearms trafficking interdiction, and local task forces may choose to pursue firearms trafficking cases in Federal or State courts.

To initiate community, State, and national reporting on firearms trafficking. These reports provide a model for standardized, annual ATF reports on firearms recoveries at the city, State, and national level. State and national reports using firearms recovery information provided by every jurisdiction allow regional and national patterns to be identified.

To enable enforcement officials to focus their resources where they are likely to have the greatest impact on illegal trafficking to juveniles and violent youth gang members, as well as adult criminals. Specific investigative information about the illegal sources of crime guns can be obtained by a variety of

methods, including Project LEAD, ATF's computerized illegal firearms information trafficking system, debriefing armed arrestees, and other street sources. These reports do not provide additional investigative information (such as the identities of federally licensed gun dealers or retail purchasers repeatedly associated with new crime guns). Rather, they provide analyses that can be useful in deciding how best to focus investigative resources to reduce the illegal firearms supply used in violent crime.

Strategic targeting of illegal sources of juvenile and youth crime guns. Information about the percentages of a jurisdiction's crime guns recovered from juveniles, youth, and adults allows investigative priorities to be established and assessed. For instance, enforcement officials may choose to use Project LEAD to look for federally licensed gun dealers and first purchasers linked with crime gun traces associated with juveniles and youth.

Strategic targeting of illegal sources of certain crime guns. Enforcement officials also can draw on the reports to develop other enforce-

ment strategies. Federal investigators already look for high volume traffickers operating across jurisdictional lines, whether interstate or intrastate, and use Project LEAD to investigate the illegal sources of guns used in violent crimes. Drawing on these reports, Federal and local officials can jointly decide to use Project LEAD and other investigative tools to target the illegal sources of various groups of crime guns: firearms with obliterated serial numbers; firearms most often used by juveniles and youth in violent crimes; illegally trafficked firearms most popular among juveniles, violent youth, and violent gangs; firearms with short "time-to-crime" rates, which are likely to have been deliberately trafficked; and firearms originating in-State or firearms originating out of State.

Optimum, balanced local enforcement strategy. By combining a focus on high volume traffickers with targeted trafficking enforcement efforts using trace analyses and information about local conditions, enforcement officials can work toward the optimum strategy for reducing local illegal access to firearms, especially by juveniles and violent gang members.

What This Report Contains

Information about *crime guns*. A *crime gun* is defined, for purpose of firearms tracing, as any firearm that is illegally possessed, used in a crime, or suspected by enforcement officials of being used in a crime. Report E shows the crime types most frequently associated with crime gun trace requests.

Comprehensive crime gun trace data by community. The report presents information about how many crime guns were submitted for tracing. Participants in the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative voluntarily agreed to trace *all* crime guns recovered in their jurisdiction. Police departments are not required by Federal law to maintain or supply crime gun recovery information and have not historically submitted all crime guns for tracing. Lack of comprehensive tracing has precluded certain kinds of crime gun analyses since there may not have been enough crime gun trace requests from particular jurisdictions to identify community-wide patterns. The voluntary tracing agreement under this initiative was intended to overcome this problem.

Information from *National Tracing Center traces*. The information in this report is derived from data contained in requests for crime gun traces that enforcement agencies submitted to ATF's National Tracing Center (NTC) and from the results of traces that the NTC conducts. An *NTC trace* uses records maintained and made available by the firearms industry to identify the history of a firearm's ownership. A *successful NTC trace* describes firearm ownership from the manufacturer or importer through the wholesaler to the first known retail dealer. Depending on the investigative circumstances, the NTC trace may also identify the first retail purchaser, and sometimes even subsequent purchasers. Because of the structure of Federal firearms regulation and recordkeeping requirements, however, it is generally not possible for the NTC to trace a crime gun beyond its first retail sale using firearms industry records. To further trace a crime gun's path, ATF must conduct an *investigative trace*, in which special agents investigate

the subsequent chain of possession. Investigative traces are extremely resource intensive and are generally conducted only where there is a specific investigative need.

Analyses of *requests* for crime gun traces. The report contains certain analyses that are based on the information contained in *requests* for crime gun traces. These analyses do not depend on the NTC successfully completing the traces. Information available for all crime guns submitted for tracing, whether or not the crime gun is successfully traced by the NTC, includes the number of recovered crime guns in a community, the type of firearm (e.g., revolver, rifle), and its manufacturer and caliber.

Analyses of *successful NTC traces*. The report also contains certain analyses that are based on the results of *successful NTC traces*. Information available only for crime guns successfully traced by the NTC includes the time it takes for a crime gun to move from its last known retail sale to recovery by enforcement officials, and the State in which the crime gun was sold.

Analysis of *incomplete traces*. The report shows the number of successful NTC traces and explains why the NTC closed the remaining traces without a successful NTC trace. This information is intended to assist in increasing the number of successful NTC traces.

Analyses by *adult, youth, and juvenile age categories*. The report generally presents information in four age categories: adults (25 and over); youth (ages 18 through 24); juvenile (17 and under); and all age categories combined.

Crime gun trace information for a *10-month period*. The patterns depicted in this report are based on crime guns for which trace requests were submitted to the NTC during the period of July 1, 1996, through April 30, 1997. The NTC provided project training in August and September 1996; project tracing then began in all sites. Early trace requests may not include as complete information as later traces.

General Findings From the Participating Communities

This section presents general findings based on experience in all 17 participating communities. These 17 communities may not comprise a valid sample for purposes of national analysis. However, this is the largest collection of community-based information yet available on recovered crime guns.

List of Participating Communities

The communities participating in this initiative, and on which the findings are based, are:

Atlanta, Georgia
Baltimore, Maryland
Birmingham, Alabama
Boston, Massachusetts
Bridgeport, Connecticut
Cleveland, Ohio
Inglewood, California
Jersey City, New Jersey
Memphis, Tennessee
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
New York, New York
Richmond, Virginia
St. Louis, Missouri
Salinas, California
San Antonio, Texas
Seattle, Washington
Washington, DC

This section is divided into two parts: (1) comprehensive community-based crime gun tracing and (2) local illegal firearms markets. These findings are intended to give enforcement officials in each community a wider perspective on its use of crime gun tracing and on its violent firearms crime and trafficking problems, particularly as they involve juveniles and youth.

General Findings:

Comprehensive, Community-Based Crime Gun Tracing

The 17 participating sites jointly tested the feasibility and utility of an enforcement policy of submitting all recovered crime guns in a community to the National Tracing Center (NTC) for tracing. Based on this experience, ATF reaches the following conclusions:

Comprehensive, community-based crime gun tracing is achievable. Trace requests from the 17 sites during the 10-month period nearly doubled over the same period the previous year, from approximately 20,000 trace requests to more than 37,000 trace requests. Tracing volume in all of the sites increased. Police departments in all of the sites had official policies requiring tracing of all recovered crime guns for all or part of the project period. Eight of the communities reported that they had a general tracing policy before the initiative began. One site, Jersey City, was part of a state-wide agreement by enforcement officials and prosecutors to trace all crime guns. One State, Virginia, mandates tracing of all firearms recovered by State and local enforcement agencies. Sixteen of the seventeen participating police departments continue to have a written or stated policy of tracing all recovered firearms.

Technical improvements in local and State tracing capability increase crime gun tracing levels, efficiency, and accuracy. Working with local and State enforcement officials, ATF has tested three methods of facilitating comprehensive crime gun tracing. The methods vary according to the jurisdiction's volume of recovered firearms, recordkeeping procedures, and level of computerization. Costs of such technical assistance are low and the benefits high, both for the police departments and ATF. Because of technical improvements, for instance, New York City's requests for traces jumped to close to 13,000 crime guns during the 10-month project period, from fewer than 4,000 crime guns during the same time period the previous year. San Antonio's tracing rate increased 500 percent, to close to 2,000 crime gun traces during the project period from fewer than 400 traces during the same period the previous year.

Comprehensive crime gun tracing achieves its primary purpose: to increase the number of investigative leads to illegal traffickers derived from NTC tracing. The primary purposes of NTC crime gun tracing are to assist in solving individual gun crimes and to increase the amount of investigative information about illegal gun trafficking available to enforcement agencies. Crime gun trace information is added to the NTC's Project LEAD. This information system aggregates crime gun trace information from enforcement agencies throughout the Nation, and identifies links among those traces. For instance, Project LEAD could link a crime gun that enforcement officials in Inglewood, California, submit for tracing with a crime gun that enforcement officials in Jersey City, New Jersey, submit for tracing by showing that both were sold by the same Federal firearms licensee or purchased by the same individual. By nearly doubling the volume of trace requests from the 17 communities, ATF and local and State enforcement agencies have significantly increased the amount of trace information in Project LEAD and the number of investigative leads available to enforcement agencies throughout the country.

As demonstrated by these reports, comprehensive crime gun tracing can also be used to assist enforcement agencies by identifying major crime gun patterns in a community. By simply submitting trace requests on all recovered firearms, enforcement officials can check for patterns and trends on crime guns in their community. When the NTC can successfully trace these crime guns, additional strategic and investigative information is available.

Refinement of tracing guidelines and practices will result in greater consistency in trace analysis reporting. While participants have followed or are following comprehensive tracing policies, tracing procedures vary. For instance, practices may differ for tracing firearms that have obliterated serial numbers, are recovered by school authorities, are found without identified possessors or are known to be stolen, or are antique. In addition, there are variations in how the exact location of where the firearm was recovered is reported. For this reason, a few crime guns recovered in nearby jurisdictions may have been included in reports from some of the 17 sites. Finally, during this special initiative, enforcement agencies may have submitted all available firearms rather than only firearms recovered after the initiative began. Trace levels can be expected to stabilize if technical improvements are made and as the NTC refines tracing guidelines.

Faster NTC trace completion time benefits enforcement agencies. The faster a crime gun trace can be completed, the sooner the trace information can be entered into the Project LEAD illegal trafficking information system and the sooner it can be used by enforcement officials in investigations of illegal traffickers. The NTC presently completes trace requests in an average of 9 days. Crime gun-related investigations would benefit from faster completion times. Two factors affect completion time: NTC resources and the speed with which Federal firearms licensees make records available. The firearms industry has recently pledged to assist the NTC in speeding up crime gun tracing by making more records accessible electronically.

Increasing the number and percentage of successful NTC traces benefits enforcement agencies. The NTC successfully completed approximately 37 percent of the traces requested during this project. Reasons for lack of successful NTC tracing include lack of needed information about the firearm in trace requests (23 percent), lack of Federal firearms licensee records (7 percent), and legal and resource limitations on tracing older firearms (33 percent). Not all trace analyses depend on successfully completing trace requests. However, the benefits of crime gun tracing for enforcement agencies are maximized if traces are successfully completed. Many of the reasons preventing successful NTC tracing can and should be addressed.

Training in crime gun tracing benefits enforcement agencies. Working together, police departments and ATF fulfilled their goal of tracing all recovered crime guns, with a minimum of training. However, some sites were more successful than others in submitting the full amount of crime gun-related data that can be used in Project LEAD and in trace analyses. In particular, a few sites provided insufficient possessor date of birth information to provide reliable analysis by age category. Most importantly, 23 percent of the trace requests overall were submitted with insufficient firearms information to successfully complete the traces. This reflects several factors, including that some police departments' internal firearms-related procedures are more conducive than others to comprehensive crime gun tracing. Training in crime gun tracing and a collaborative effort between the NTC and State and local enforcement agencies are needed to improve the level of information provided in trace requests.

General Findings: Local Illegal Firearms Markets

This section summarizes enforcement findings and conclusions based on crime gun trace information from the 17 participating communities. The category "adult" includes ages 25 and over, "youth" includes ages 18 to 24, and "juvenile" includes ages 17 and under.*

Adult crime guns predominate. Most crime guns are recovered from adults. While youth firearms crime remains a special priority because of high rates of youth violence, adult firearms crime still predominates. In the largest city among the participants, New York, where almost 13,000 crime guns were submitted for tracing, juveniles under age 18 account for 11 percent of the crime guns, youth ages 18 to 24 account for 34 percent, and adults age 25 and over account for 55 percent. Only in Bridgeport does the adult crime gun category not constitute a plurality.

Juvenile crime guns are a significant percentage of the total. One out of ten crime guns is recovered from a juvenile. Juvenile crime gun trace requests accounted for at least 10 percent of the total traces requested, with three exceptions, Cleveland (6 percent), Milwaukee (8 percent), and Richmond (9 percent). The percentage of juvenile crime guns submitted for tracing was over 20 percent in two cities: Seattle and Memphis.

Juvenile and youth crime guns comprise almost half of the total. Juvenile and youth crime guns combined account for 45 percent of the crime guns requested for tracing, while adult crime guns account for 55 percent of the total.

Handguns predominate. Eight out of ten crime guns traced are handguns. Handguns include semiautomatic pistols, revolvers, and derringers. In all sites, handguns are the largest category of firearms recovered by enforcement agencies. The percentage of crime guns accounted for by handguns recovered from all age groups ranged from 63 percent in Salinas, to 98 percent in Atlanta.

A disproportionate number of juvenile and youth crime guns are handguns. Juvenile and youth crime guns are more likely than adult crime guns to be handguns. Eight out of ten

juvenile and youth crime guns traced are handguns, whereas seven out of 10 adult crime guns are handguns. Of the crime guns recovered from *juveniles*, the percentage that are handguns ranges from 73 percent in Salinas to more than 90 percent in five cities: Cleveland, New York City, Seattle, Richmond, and Boston. Of the crime guns recovered from *youth*, the percentage that are handguns ranges from 67 percent in San Antonio to more than 90 percent in three cities: Washington, DC, Memphis, and New York City. Of the crime guns recovered from *adults*, the lowest percentage of handguns is in Seattle and Memphis, 56 percent. Handguns account for between 80 and 90 percent of the adult crime guns in four cities.

Semiautomatic handguns predominate. Semiautomatic handguns are more common crime guns than revolvers. Semiautomatic handguns range from a high of 67 percent of crime guns in Atlanta, to a low of 39 percent in St. Louis. Revolvers supplied no more than 41 percent of crime guns in any site. Half of all the crime guns recovered are semiautomatics.

A disproportionate number of juvenile and youth crime guns are semiautomatic handguns. In each site, juveniles and youth are more likely to be associated with semiautomatic handguns than are adults. Semiautomatic handguns accounted for a high of 66 percent of the *juvenile* crime guns in Boston, to a low of 47 percent of the juvenile crime guns in Baltimore and Birmingham. Semiautomatic handguns accounted for a high of 71 percent of the *youth* crime guns in Memphis, to a low of 46 percent of the youth crime guns in Salinas. Semiautomatic handguns accounted for a high of 54 percent of the *adult* crime guns in New York City and Washington, D.C. to a low of 35 percent of the adult crime guns in Birmingham and Milwaukee. Overall, 47 percent of the adult crime guns are semiautomatics. Semiautomatics constitute 61 percent of the youth crime guns and 58 percent of the juvenile crime guns.

* Not all sites were considered for each of the findings below. Where the number of cases was insufficient for the particular finding, the site was excluded. A technical note with further explanation is available from ATF.

In each site crime guns are concentrated among a relatively few kinds of firearms by manufacturer and caliber. The top 10 types of crime guns, by manufacturer and caliber, represent a disproportionately large share of the total number of recovered firearms. The greatest concentration is in Inglewood, where the top 10 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber account for 48 percent of the total; 58 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber account for the remaining 52 percent. Even in Milwaukee, where the concentration is the least, the top 10 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber still account for 21 percent of the total; 567 types of crime guns by manufacturer and caliber account for the remaining 79 percent. Overall, the top 10 types of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for more than 9,000 crime guns, or 24 percent, while 1,207 kinds of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for the over 28,000 crime guns remaining, or 76 percent.

Crime gun concentration by kind of firearm, by manufacturer and caliber, is relatively greater among juveniles and youth than among adults. The highest concentration among *juvenile* crime guns is in Birmingham where the top 10 types of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for 52 percent of recovered juvenile firearms. The highest concentration among *youth* crime guns is in Memphis where the top 10 kinds of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for 46 percent of recovered youth firearms. By comparison, the highest concentration among *adult* crime guns is in Bridgeport, where the top 10 types of firearms by manufacturer and caliber account for 36 percent of the recovered adult firearms.

In general, the State in which the community is located is the largest single source of its successfully traced crime guns. In 12 of the 17 sites, the State itself supplies a *majority* of the successfully traced crime guns. This majority ranged from a high of 77 percent in San Antonio to a low of 54 percent in Seattle. In three of the 17 sites, the State itself supplies more crime guns than any other single source State, while the combination of all other States

supplies more than half of the successfully traced crime guns. This plurality ranges from a high of 47 percent in St. Louis to a low of 13 percent in New York City. There are two exceptions: for Jersey City, the top two source States are Virginia and Florida, each supplying 14 percent of the successfully traced crime guns, while New Jersey supplies 10 percent. No crime guns were traced to first retail sales in Washington, DC.

Many recovered firearms are rapidly diverted from first retail sales at federally licensed gun dealers to a black market that supplies juveniles and youth. This is shown by the proportion of guns recovered by law enforcement officials that are new, that is, bought less than three years before recovery by enforcement officials. New guns in young hands signal direct diversion — by illegal firearms trafficking, including straw purchases, theft from federally licensed gun dealers, or a combination of all of these. Enforcement officials can often identify the illegal sources of new firearms by following up on trace information. By contrast, older crime guns are more likely to have passed through numerous hands before entering illegal commerce, requiring other methods, such as debriefing criminal offenders, to identify their illegal sources. Based on crime guns recovered and submitted for tracing during the initiative, ATF estimates that new crime guns comprise between 22 percent and 43 percent of the firearms recovered from *juveniles*, between 30 percent and 54 percent of the firearms recovered from *youth*, and between 25 percent and 46 percent of the firearms recovered from *adults*.^{*} This finding leads to our conclusion that an effort to identify, prosecute, and incarcerate illegal firearms traffickers can reduce the illegal firearms supply that supports criminal activity by young people.

Crime guns with obliterated serial numbers are likely to have been illegally trafficked. Local tracing practices with respect to firearms with obliterated serial numbers varied too much during this initiative to provide consistent community-based analyses of crime guns with obliterated serial numbers. Therefore, reports on crime guns with obliterated serial numbers are not

^{*} A technical note explaining how these ranges were calculated is available from ATF upon request.

provided for the participating sites. However, preliminary research by the NTC in selected communities indicates that between 9 percent and 20 percent of recovered firearms have their serial numbers obliterated. NTC analysis indicates that *a very high percentage of firearms with obliterated serial numbers were originally purchased as part of a multiple sale and then illegally trafficked*. Restoration of obliterated serial numbers is often possible by either ATF or police department laboratories. Restoration of these serial numbers and tracing of the firearm should be given high priority.

Preventing trafficking in new firearms to youths and juveniles. Crime gun tracing is identifying many investigative opportunities for enforcement officials. The fact that many young people are using relatively new firearms, purchased from Federal firearms licensees that are maintaining records, provides significant opportunities for

enforcement agencies to identify illegal traffickers. Project LEAD and trace analyses can facilitate the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of illegal suppliers of these crime guns.

Preventing trafficking of older firearms. Preventing the trafficking of older firearms requires a different approach. Older firearms enter the illegal market through several routes: they are sold by federally licensed gun dealers as used firearms, they are sold as used firearms on the legal secondary market (i.e., private sales exempt from federal regulation), they are stolen and resold through gun traffickers, or they are stolen personally by the crime gun possessor. Finding the source of older guns requires, in addition to crime gun tracing, debriefing of arrestees associated with crime guns and investigation into the chain of transfers of the crime gun beyond the first retail purchaser.

Future Crime Gun Trace Analysis Techniques

The ATF National Tracing Center is continuing to develop new techniques to analyze crime gun traces. These will further increase the ability of enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute illegal traffickers. Future developments will include the following:

Reporting on crime guns with obliterated serial numbers that cannot be restored. The NTC has established a data base for crime guns for which serial numbers have been obliterated and cannot be restored. Collection of this information is critical to the NTC's efforts to report on crime gun trafficking.

Improvements in Project LEAD. Project LEAD, ATF's illegal firearms trafficking information system, is being improved to add indicators that will suggest new types of leads to trafficking investigators. In addition, special agents will be able to access Project LEAD in real time.

Reports on multiple purchases of crime guns by a single purchaser. When a Federal firearms licensee sells two or more handguns in five business days to a single purchaser, the licensee must notify ATF of these sales in writing. ATF provides a multiple sales form to simplify this notification. Information supplied by Federal firearms licensees on multiple sales forms is integrated into Project LEAD for use in

illegal firearms trafficking investigations. In the future, information on crime gun traces associated with multiple purchases can be included in crime gun trace analysis reports.

Reports on crime guns that possessors report to be stolen. The submission of trace requests for firearms known by enforcement officials to have been stolen was inconsistent among participating sites. NTC procedures will be altered to permit accurate reporting of this information. Currently, less than 1 percent of all crime guns submitted for tracing to the NTC are reported to have been stolen.

Use of a ballistics identification system to help identify firearms traffickers. ATF has pioneered ballistics technology that allows enforcement agencies to link recovered bullets and cartridge cases with recovered crime guns. To facilitate identification of traffickers and other criminals, the ballistics data base and the NTC crime gun data base can be linked, and ballistics-related information can be captured in crime gun trace analyses.

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative and Related Local Initiatives

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative builds on leadership and innovations in a number of jurisdictions where enforcement agencies have been focusing on reducing illegal access to firearms. Three important examples follow:

Project LISA: New Jersey's statewide crime gun tracing system. Locally developed crime gun information systems, such as Project LISA in New Jersey, have served as local models for Project LEAD, ATF's national crime gun information system. Information on all recovered crime guns statewide is entered into the LISA system, enabling enforcement officials to identify juvenile and adult offenders. U.S. Attorney Faith Hochberg organized this statewide system through a memorandum of understanding among all enforcement officials in the State.

The Boston Gun Project/Ceasefire. The Boston Gun Project/Ceasefire is a joint Federal and local effort to reduce youth firearms violence in Boston under the leadership of Commissioner Paul Evans, U.S. Attorney Don Stern, and ATF Special Agent in Charge Jeff Roehm. David Kennedy, a senior researcher at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, developed the project under a grant from the National Institute of Justice. Participants also include the Department of Probation, youth outreach workers, the Department of Parole, the Department of Youth Services, and school police. The strategy combines: (1) a local, State, and Federal effort to crack down on the illegal gun supply and (2) a local, State, and Federal strategy to deter violence by youth gangs.

The Boston Gun Project: crime gun supply reduction. This project developed comprehensive tracing and trace analysis and instituted the debriefing of arrestees especially gang members arrested for weapons, drug, and violent offenses, for information leading to local gun traffickers. ATF agents, police, and prosecutors are using traditional criminal investigative techniques to identify and prosecute specific traffickers.


Participants are also developing an enforcement strategy based on trace analysis to disrupt Boston's illegal youth gun market. This focuses on guns recovered less than two years from first retail sale, guns with two or more crime gun traces, guns recovered from members of violent gangs, and guns identified as particularly popular with gang members. ATF and police are restoring obliterated serial numbers, tracing those firearms, and focusing on FFL's and gun purchasers associated with those weapons.

The Boston Gun Project: deterring violent gang crime. Participants in the Gun Project researched the Boston youth homicide problem and determined it to be largely gang related. Participating officials agreed to deliver and act on a new enforcement message to these gangs: *violence will not be tolerated in Boston; it will be met with a strong and coordinated interagency response.* Officials delivered this message through formal meetings with gang members, individual police and probation contacts with gang members, meeting with all inmates of secure juvenile facilities in the city, and gang outreach workers. Where violence occurs, it is met with a coordinated interagency response, using all possible enforcement tools, from probation supervision to Federal investigation and prosecution.

Memphis U.S. Attorney's Anti-Violent Crime Task Force. This task force is a joint Federal and local effort to reduce youth firearms violence in Memphis, spearheaded by U.S. Attorney Veronica Coleman. The group developed comprehensive crime gun tracing and trace analysis and instituted the debriefing of all arrestees, especially gang members and juveniles arrested with firearms or for violent offenses. This task force is currently working with ATF to expand local capacity to restore obliterated serial numbers on crime guns.

ATTACHMENT

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The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

The following are consistently the fastest “time-to-crime” guns recovered by law enforcement from juveniles and youth in the 17 Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative sites (by manufacturer, caliber, and type):


- Bryco, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- High Standard, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Lorcin, .380 caliber, semiautomatic pistol
- Glock, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Ruger, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Smith & Wesson, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Mossberg, 12 gauge, shotgun
- Intratec, 9mm, semiautomatic pistol
- Bryco, .380 caliber, semiautomatic pistol
- Lorcin, .25 caliber, semiautomatic pistol

Note: More than 50% of the total number of each of these types of recovered crime guns moved from their first retail sale to their recovery by law enforcement from a juvenile or youth in under three years. The firearms pictured are typical of models falling under the type of firearm listed above. Trafficking investigations aimed at the sources of these firearms have the highest probability of success.

Note: “Time-to-Crime” is that period of time (measured in days) between a firearm’s acquisition from a retail market and law enforcement’s recovery of that firearm during use, or suspected use, in a crime. A short time-to-crime usually means the firearm will be easier to trace, and when several short time-to-crime traces involve the same individual/FFL, this can be an indication of illegal trafficking activity.


Firearm and Non-Firearm Juvenile Homicides

Juvenile Offenders (ages 10-17)




Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

Crime Gun Recoveries by Age Group



Based on recoveries in 13 of 17 communities. The following sites were excluded: Atlanta, Inglewood, Jersey City, and St. Louis. These sites include too few cases in one or more age categories to be used in an age-based comparison.

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative
Crime Guns Recovered in 17 Communities
**Semi-automatic Handguns as a
Percentage of All Crime Gun Recoveries**



The President's Youth Gun Initiative Extension

\$8.2M --	Redirected Resources for Enforcement/Tracing Center Staffing (Treasury)
\$2.7M --	Tracing System Upgrades Already in the FY 1998 Budget (Treasury)
\$3.0M --	State and Local Training and Equipment (Justice)
\$13.9M	Total (Treasury and Justice)

1) Redirected Treasury Resources for Enforcement/Tracing Center Staffing = \$8.2M

The \$8.2M is a balanced package of additional enforcement resources that will be used to follow up and investigate gun trace leads already being generated in the 17 original pilot cities coupled with additional investment in gun tracing capability at ATF's Tracing Center. The package includes:

\$7.1M - Put More Enforcement in 17 Original Pilot Cities: Hires 51 entry level (GS-9) agents, or 3 per city, to conduct investigations and build cases, based on gun tracing activity already taking place. (Assumes ½ year FTE utilization; full year cost is \$8.7M.)

- ATF has 368 agents deployed among the existing pilot cities, for an average of 22 agents per city (although the actuals vary per city). An addition of 51 agents is a healthy increase in enforcement resources that will enable ATF to conduct additional investigations and surveillances, and build cases for the U.S. Attorneys.

\$1.1M - Expand Tracing Pilot to 10 More Cities/Augment Tracing Center: Make modest investment in new Tracing Center staffing (funds 13 firearms tracing staff).

- This package does not aim to cure all of the woes of the current gun tracing system. However, this package proceeds from the assumption that gun tracing is useful and that providing Treasury with some resources now to perform more gun traces (even if at a continuing high workload) is a valuable investment that will yield positive law enforcement results.
- A liberal assumption is that a 10 city tracing pilot expansion will generate 60,000 new traces. (The 1-year 17 city tracing pilot generated 17,000 new traces.) 13 additional firearms examiners could handle 60,000 additional traces at the same level of productivity the Tracing Center is currently operating under.

2) Tracing System Upgrades Already in the FY 1998 Budget = \$2.7M

The President's FY 1998 Budget already includes \$2.7M in resources for software improvements and computer migration for the National Tracing Center, as well as electronic data exchange to provide investigative leads for ATF field agents. While not proposing to redirect this funding, it could be claimed as part of the ATF Youth Gun initiative.

3) State and Local Training and Equipment = \$3M

The Department of Justice will identify \$3 million to provide Federal assistance to State and local jurisdictions. The Federal support may include computer hardware, software and technical assistance; overtime pay for State and local officers; and funding to support the development and cost associated with course material, instructors and attendees at training sessions. Funding would support extension of the tracing pilot to 10 additional cities and also assist local law enforcement in the 17 original pilot cities to work with ATF to perform gun tracing and participate in firearms trafficking investigations.

In addition, the Administration supports a provision in pending juvenile justice legislation giving special priority in the Byrne discretionary grant program to those jurisdictions that include in their application a description of strategies to disrupt the illegal sale or transfer of firearms to or between juveniles through tracing the sources of crime guns provided to juveniles.

**Sources of Redirected Funding for Treasury Enforcement/Tracing Center Staffing
-- \$8.2M Needed**

- 1) \$1.5M - Treasury Forfeiture Fund Super Surplus or Secretary's Enforcement Fund Resources (no year):** Treasury is making \$1.5M available from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in support of the ATF Youth Gun initiative. The funds can be spent now, without any legislation, except that they must be swapped with other ATF Salaries and Expenses funds in order to be used to fund FTE.
- 2) \$0.7M - Unobligated 50% Carryover Balances (FY 1997 only):** Of the \$1M in unobligated 50% carryover balances from FY 1996 that ATF can spend in FY 1997, Treasury can commit \$0.7M for the ATF Youth Gun initiative. These funds can be used to fund FTE, but only during FY 1997. However, the funds could be effectively swapped with FY 1998 funds by having ATF buy equipment now that was planned for purchase in the FY 1998 budget and paying for the initiative FTE from FY 1998 funds.

3) \$6.0M - Options for Funding the Remainder (of the \$8.2M total)

a. Seek Authority to for 100% Carryover Balances (FY 1998)

Treasury finishes each fiscal year with \$20-40M in unobligated balances from its Salaries and Expenses accounts. Currently, Treasury is limited to carrying over 50 percent of such balances for spending in the next fiscal year, although some other agencies (Justice and GSA) are permitted to carry over 100 percent of such balances. Treasury has not been willing to plan in advance for uses for this funding, since the amounts are not entirely predictable and since it doesn't want to have *to plan* to have unspent balances. If authority were sought for 100 percent carryover authority (CBO may not score it), an additional \$10-20M would be available for spending each year. With such amounts available, Treasury could easily find \$6M for support of the initiative.

b. Use Unexpended Customs Forfeiture Fund Resources (no year)

Treasury currently has \$11M in unexpended Customs Forfeiture Fund resources that could be made available for extension of the ATF Youth Gun pilot, with passage of appropriate legislation that would authorize such a use. (Senate Finance and House Ways & Means would need to agree with the legislation.) However, availability of the \$11M is not a "sure thing," since the authorizers would need to be willing to OK legislation approving use of the funds for ATF.

c. Redirect FY 1998 Initiatives in the President's FY 1998 Budget

Although each of the following options raises concerns, redirecting some of one or more of the following ATF initiatives to support the Youth Gun initiative extension could meet the initiative's funding requirements:

- **\$4.0M -- Canine Explosives Detection Program**

Defer expansion of the canine explosives detection program for only one year, recognizing the special expertise that ATF has in canine explosives detection training.

- **\$8.0M -- Vehicle Purchases**

Deferring vehicle purchases for one year increases ATF's vehicle fleet mileage to an average of 80,000 miles per vehicle, an increase over the current 67,000 miles per vehicle (initiative includes 51 vehicles for new agents).

- **\$26.0M -- HQ New Site Selection Expenses**

The SE Federal Center site is available now for the construction of a new, secure facility for ATF HQ employees. Recognizing the importance of a new HQ site for ATF, as well as the fact the SE Federal Center site would eliminate land purchase costs, a portion of this funding could be made available for the Youth Gun initiative.