



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

BACKGROUND

TREASURY, ATF, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

The ATF Juvenile Tracing Initiative.

Over two years ago, in November 1993, Under Secretary Noble directed ATF Director Magaw to address the issue of juvenile gun crime. Director Magaw began the Juvenile Tracing Initiative in which ATF announced to all local police departments that it would provide trace information on any gun seized from a juvenile. Since the project started, over 5,000 juvenile guns have been reported to and traced by ATF. ATF has also compiled and analyzed the trace data to develop preliminary information about the sources of juvenile crime guns, the types of crime guns used by juveniles, and the crimes in which they are used. *ATF's analysis, combined with confirming analysis from other published and academic research, has provided information used in developing the proposed initiative, which combines further tracing and information analysis with law enforcement operations.*

Treasury Enforcement's Strategic Plan: Juvenile Homicide and Illicit Gun Markets.

Following the Waco Review, it was decided to focus ATF's resources more in the direction of trafficking cases, and away from involvement in law enforcement operations that could be conducted under local authority. Treasury Enforcement in fall 1994 adopted a strategic plan that identifies juvenile homicide as the single most important problem to address in the area of violent crime. The plan states:

Homicides committed by juveniles (often while they are under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol) using firearms have increased significantly while violent crime in general continues at unacceptably high levels throughout the nation. . . We will . . . [e]nsure the integrity of the market in firearms and destructive devices by ensuring that businesses holding Federal firearms licenses are run responsibly, and by preventing the illegal acquisition, possession and trade of firearms by illegal gun traffickers, criminals and juveniles through a combination of regulatory and enforcement actions.

The initiative fulfills Enforcement's commitment to address juvenile firearms homicides, by preventing the illegal acquisition, possession and trade of firearms by illegal gun traffickers and juveniles.



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ATF's Strategic Plan: The Trafficking Strategy.

In FY 1995, ATF proposed, Treasury supported, and OMB approved a restructuring of ATF field offices. The plan, called the Integrated Violence Impact Strategy ("IVIS"), establishes new Violence Reduction Alliances ("VRAs") and new Firearms Trafficking Task Forces ("FTTFs"). When the VRAs are fully funded, they will be developed to include ATF personnel and representatives of the U.S. Attorney, state prosecutors, and local law enforcement. By creating the VRAs, ATF is able to direct some armed career criminal and armed narcotics trafficker cases to local law enforcement when appropriate, while reserving for federal law enforcement those cases deemed appropriate for federal courts. At the same time, ATF field personnel when funded will form the new firearms trafficking groups, bringing ATF's unique expertise to bear on the illicit firearms markets. These firearms trafficking groups will be full-fledged task forces in some locations, in others, they will be groups, and in others there will be dedicated agents. As with the VRAs, ATF will seek participation by U.S. Attorneys, state and local prosecutors, and local police departments. *The firearms trafficking groups in approximately 16 of ATF's 200 field locations will participate in the juvenile initiative.*

Project LEAD.

In late 1995, ATF introduced Project LEAD to its 24 field division offices. Project LEAD is a computer software program that enables law enforcement to manage crime gun information in the database of the National Tracing Center. (By statute, out of business records of federal firearms licensees cannot be computerized.) Project LEAD software compiles data by linkanalysis, providing ATF regulatory inspectors and law enforcement investigators with information concerning potentially illegal firearms trafficking patterns, illegal purchasers, problem firearms dealers, and geographic sources of supply and sales. Project LEAD is enabling ATF to focus its resources and initiate many more regulatory and criminal investigations against illegal traffickers and their sources of supply. Since 1993, trafficking cases have risen from comprising 14.4% of ATF's firearms cases, to 21.5% in 1995. Further increases are projected. Piloted in 8 cities, including New York city, Project LEAD recently resulted in its first major case, the Traders Two case, in which the Birmingham U.S. Attorney indicted several traffickers trafficking firearms from a FFL in Birmingham, Alabama to New York. U.S. Attorneys have been receptive to ATF's cases, and several U.S. Attorneys are leaders in focusing on ATF's trace information, including Faith Hochberg (New Jersey), Eric Holder (D.C.), and Don Stern (Boston). *The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative will tailor Project LEAD software to produce information specifically about traffickers to juveniles and juvenile firearms crimes in the participating jurisdictions, and place computers to run this software in cities participating in the initiative.*



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Department of Justice COPS Youth Firearms Initiatives.

The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office of the Department of Justice has granted \$1 million to 10 communities to establish innovative programs to increase and enhance proactive crime control and prevention programs in which juveniles, law enforcement, and others participate. For instance, in Birmingham, Alabama, police will work with school officials to conduct searches of lockers, vehicles, and students for illegal firearms. Birmingham police will also enforce curfews and step up their presence in high illicit activity sites in the city. Similarly, in Baltimore, Maryland, the police department is adding 24 officers to curfew teams and juvenile violent crime teams. *The COPS Youth Firearms Initiative communities will participate in the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative, which will provide a federally backed firearms enforcement program to the participating police department, that includes gun traces, illicit market information, and law enforcement support.*

Department of Justice NIJ Juvenile Gun Crime Research.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has been sponsoring research on juvenile gun crime for several years, and is the source of most published research on juvenile firearms use. At present, NIJ research focuses on programs in four cities: Atlanta (cooperative community efforts, including public health resources); Boston (juvenile illicit firearms market research); Detroit (gun court); St. Louis (mentoring and consensual home searches). *The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction initiative builds on previously published NIJ research, current NIJ research, especially in Boston, as well as on ATF analysis, and sponsors a study to better map illicit gun markets in the participating locations and, through aggregation of data, nationwide.*

Department of Justice Policy Priority.

The Attorney General has repeatedly said that the reduction of youth firearms violence is a priority for her. *The Justice Department's draft Juvenile Justice Action Plan includes as Objective 3 reducing youth involvement with guns, drugs, and gangs.*

Local Police Department Initiatives and Successes.

Individual communities and police departments, sometimes working with U.S. Attorneys, have made firearms violence a priority. Gun buyback programs are one example of local initiatives. There is promising evidence, though not evidence dealing particularly with juveniles, from both New York City and Kansas City that measures aimed at detering gun carrying can result in significant decreases in violent crime. *The Youth Gun Crimes Interdiction Initiative provides a federal strategy and federal support aimed primarily at reducing the illegal supply of juvenile firearms, and generally disrupting local firearms markets, to complement and expand on local initiatives in the pilot cities.*



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PURPOSES AND ASSUMPTIONS

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative is a pilot program relying on ATF's investigative resources. Its purposes are to:

Create a community oriented law enforcement structure for mobilizing local police departments, with federal backing, to disrupt the illegal firearms market, especially the juvenile illegal firearms market and its adult suppliers.

Implement an ATF-state-local strategy to interdict illegally supplied firearms, particularly to juveniles by adults, thereby reducing illegal juvenile access to firearms, and reducing juvenile firearms violence, death, and injury.

Investigate and prosecute scofflaw federally licensed firearms dealers and illegal firearms traffickers and pushers to juveniles.

Provide results that will permit development of a nationwide federal-state-local partnership to disrupt illegal firearms markets, especially juvenile illegal firearms markets.

The basic facts and ideas behind the pilot program are:

Because most guns used by juveniles in crimes are obtained illegally, disrupting the illicit gun market will result in less juvenile violence;

Because juvenile gun acquisition also may be particularly tied to illicit drug market and gang activity, it is necessary to develop community oriented policing partnerships that can jointly address all aspects of the juvenile firearms violence, including fear, illicit drugs, and gangs.

Because surveys have consistently revealed that kids acquire weapons mostly out of fear and for self-defense, primarily fear of other kids with guns, making it harder to get guns will break the current cycle of fear leading to gun acquisition leading to more fear and more gun acquisition;

The pilot program is intended to be flexible, permitting the dropping or adding of sites, with the expectation that there will be a variation in the levels of enforcement activity and research occurring in the different sites. The pilot is expected to produce information about enforcement strategies and the illicit gun market that will benefit local jurisdictions specifically and law enforcement and policy makers generally.



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YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

PROGRAM

SUMMARY

Federal-local Partnership. The pilot project creates a federal-state structure to attack illicit firearms markets. *At least one crime analyst from each participating police departments will join an ATF firearms trafficking group.*

Partnership Mission. The mission of the partnerships is to disrupt the juvenile illicit firearms market.

Partnership Strategy. The initial strategy will be to identify and build cases against illegal adult gun traffickers to juveniles, straw purchasers, and street level sellers to juveniles.

Partnership Roles. The partnership provides benefits to both sides.

The federal government will supply (1) equipment, (2) training, (3) operational information, and (4) law enforcement support, as well as (5) make federal trafficking cases against locally active adult traffickers to juveniles, (6) conduct a study of the local and national juvenile illicit gun markets, and (7) enter into a dialogues with local police departments about appropriate federal and state and local law enforcement strategies to attack the illicit gun market as it affects juveniles.

The local police department will (1) supply a local partner for the ATF firearms trafficking group, who will (2) ensure that all crime guns seized in the jurisdiction are traced, (3) refer non-federal trafficking cases derived from ATF's Project LEAD to state and local prosecutors, (4) assist in joint federal-state-local trafficking cases, (5) facilitate the federal study of the juvenile illicit gun markets, (6) continue to work with ATF in developing new law enforcement strategies against the illicit gun markets.



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PROGRAM

ATF's Overall Trafficking Strategy. *The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative builds on and is a component of ATF's overall trafficking strategy, which seeks to cut off the illicit supply of firearms by building cases against the sources of crime guns. The trafficking strategy has the following elements:*

NTC traces. ATF traces any crime gun submitted by any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency at its National Tracing Center. The agency submits basic information about the crime gun to the NTC through a computer phone line or by fax. NTC responded to 89,726 trace requests in FY '95.

Traces that solve firearms crimes. *The NTC trace identifies the federal firearms licensee (FFL) that sold the crime weapon and the initial purchaser of that weapon. NTC returns this information to the submitting agency within approximately 11 days for routine traces and within a day for urgent traces. Trace information can be useful in any case involving a firearm, by providing leads to, or evidence of, the link between the perpetrator and the weapon. Though prosecutors may successfully make cases without this information, an NTC trace can only serve to strengthen the evidence against a defendant.*

Traces that identify illegal traffickers. *NTC trace information can lead to the building of an additional case, against a gun dealer, trafficker or street level pusher that illegally sold, transported and/or transferred the crime gun. Arresting a scofflaw FFL or illicit trafficker disrupts the illegal supply of firearms to felons, juveniles, and other prohibited persons.*

Supply disruption that aims at preventing firearms crime. *The systematic use of trace information by ATF to attack illegal firearms dealers supplying prohibited persons with weapons represents an entirely new, violence prevention law enforcement strategy for ATF and all of federal law enforcement. ATF and state law enforcement agencies, using a variety of "three strikes" type statutes, will continue to arrest the most violent criminals who use firearms, but will now also take action against illegal firearms suppliers, with the goal of depriving prohibited persons of illegal firearms, thus reducing overall levels of violence.*



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Use of Project LEAD at the NTC to support the strategy. *When a number of traces of crime guns are aggregated and analyzed, the trace information supplies information concerning patterns of illegal trafficking. The more guns traced, the more patterns are visible. ATF has developed the Project LEAD computer software, an automated link analysis information system that aggregates and analyzes trace data. Project LEAD identifies firearms purchasers and FFLs who repeatedly have crime-related firearms traced back to them. The information is contained in a Windows environment, easily usable by law enforcement investigators. The identifications provide leads that ATF may follow up in regulatory inspections or criminal investigations.*

Limited local use of Project LEAD. Individual NTC traces are provided directly to the submitting law enforcement entity. Project LEAD software is provided to ATF's 26 field divisions. While the Firearms Trafficking Task Forces will invite local police department participation, *ATF's overall firearms trafficking strategy is primarily federally focused, using Project LEAD data to build multi-defendant, interstate gun trafficking cases.*

Pilot success with Project LEAD. An early example of success with Project LEAD is from New York City, where the software has been piloted. Crime guns seized in NYC were traced to a former Birmingham, Alabama FFL called Traders Two. The Birmingham U.S. Attorney on December 29 announced the indictments of a firearms dealer and six other persons on charges including conspiracy, illegal possession of firearms, and making false statements on firearms records.

Increasing crime gun tracing. The more guns that are traced, the more data there is for Project LEAD to analyze, and the more information will be available to all of law enforcement about illegal gun pushers. At the federal level, law enforcement agencies are only now committing to gun tracing; U.S. Attorneys are not all familiar with the NTC's capabilities. At the local level, police departments, with a few notable exceptions, are unfamiliar with the benefits of tracing and with the concept of disrupting firearms markets through a trafficking strategy. *Few of the nation's 17,000 police departments trace crime guns. For there to be successful nationwide disruption of the illicit firearms markets, all crime guns must be traced.*



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The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative. *The Youth Crime Gun initiative both extends and develops ATF's trafficking strategy, gun tracing, and Project LEAD infrastructure, while specially targeting adult gun pushers who supply juveniles. The initiative will work as follows:*

Local partners. In approximately 16 pilot jurisdictions, local police chiefs will designate a staff person to join ATF's firearms trafficking groups and be the local partner for federal law enforcement. The local partner will concentrate on trafficking cases involving youth crime guns.

Crime gun tracing. Upon joining the initiative, the local police department will commit to submitting all crime guns seized in the jurisdiction for NTC tracing. NTC trace information will be provided to the jurisdiction through the local partner. The tracing and LEAD analysis of all crime guns, and not only all juvenile crime guns, is a benefit of this project, that will both assist local law enforcement in criminal investigations, and provide the firearms trafficking groups with a broader picture of the local illicit gun market. *In sites where record keeping and resources permit, traces will be conducted on a sample of or all juvenile crime guns for the preceding five years, and a sample of adult crime guns for comparison purposes.*

Site and juvenile specific Project LEAD analysis. *NTC will upgrade Project LEAD software (1) to create a geographic information system that provides trace analysis and investigative leads specific to the 16 jurisdictions, and (2) to provide information that further describes the illicit juvenile market, for instance whether the crime gun was seized at school.* Project LEAD updates will be provided at least every 30 days to the Task Forces, permitting the continuous evaluation of new investigative leads. This Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative will be ATF's first use of a local (as opposed to regional) and group specific application for Project LEAD.

Project LEAD computers and training. The initiative includes computers for the specially designed software. The Justice Department's COPS Office will provide computers for local law enforcement to use at the Project LEAD participating sites. These computers will belong to the local police departments. Treasury will fund 16 computers for the participating ATF field offices. ATF field agents will train the local partners in the use of Project LEAD data.

Trafficking inspections and investigations. *Using Project LEAD information developed from local crime gun traces, ATF may conduct FFL inspections and ATF and local police departments will conduct criminal investigations and develop trafficking cases against scofflaw FFLs, gun traffickers, straw purchasers, distributors, and pushers supplying local juveniles.*



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Limitations of Project LEAD. *Because Project LEAD cases will only reach a segment of the illicit firearms market affecting juveniles, the initiative takes additional steps to attempt to address the entire illicit firearms market.*

The problem. NTC tracing identifies only the FFL seller and the first purchaser; it does not provide information about subsequent purchasers or transferrers of the crime gun to the person from whom the weapon has been confiscated. When the time elapsed from purchase to confiscation by law enforcement (for criminal possession or activity) is short -- under two years -- Project LEAD is most effective in linking crime guns with illicit traffickers. (Guns may be called "crime guns" both if they are illegally possessed or because they have been used in another crime.) The longer a crime gun has been in circulation before its confiscation and submission for tracing, the more likely it is to have had multiple owners, and to require active investigation by ATF in order to determine its chain of transfer from the legal to the illegal market. *So-called short time-to-crime guns constitute only a part of the supply of guns illicitly available to juveniles. Interdicting them and arresting their traffickers is therefore only a partial strategy to reduce the illicit availability of guns to juveniles.*

The additional steps: targeting the entire illicit youth firearms market. Very little is known about the characteristics of the illicit juvenile market not supplied by easily traceable, short time-to-crime guns. Yet ATF and researchers believe this may be as much as half or more of the illegal firearms supply. For instance, in Boston 70% of the juvenile crime guns are more than two years old, and only 50% of the guns are semi-automatic pistols, which are generally new guns, while revolvers (30%) and long guns (20%) are generally older. *In order to target the entire illicit juvenile firearms market about which little is known, Treasury and NIJ will jointly sponsor a study to provide ATF and local police departments more information about the local patterns of illicit gun supply. The new information will be used to develop additional law enforcement strategies.*

Differences between the youth and adult illicit markets. Little is known about the differences between how kids and adults obtain firearms illegally. Existing indications are that juveniles may: use straw purchasers to obtain guns from firearms dealers, since FFLs cannot sell to juveniles; prefer new, semi-automatic pistols to older guns; use fewer guns obtained in burglaries. This data is from limited research and may not be representative of the picture nationwide. The lack of illicit market information useful to law enforcement is the principal reason for the study. ATF's Juvenile Tracing Initiative, for example, compiles data from trace requests from any police department that submits them; ATF's compiled analysis is therefore suggestive but not a valid national sample. *Existing survey research on both juveniles and adult felons is that roughly 1/3 say they can obtain a gun with difficulty, and 1/3 not at all, suggesting that tightening the market is a reasonable approach to decreasing firearms violence.*



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JOINT NIJ-TREASURY-ATF STUDY

Treasury/NIJ Funded Joint Study. Researchers will:

Report on analysis of LEAD data -- analyze LEAD data, by site, aggregated and cross-site, and report any useful findings to ATF and the local partner.

Collect additional available data -- with local partner assistance, collect additional available data associated with the juvenile traces and a comparison sample of adult felon traces, such as crime report information, firearm value information, and criminal history and associations of the juvenile; analyze this data by site, aggregated and cross-site, and report any useful findings to ATF to be shared with the local partner.

Conduct selected interviews -- where possible, conduct selected interviews to obtain qualitative information that will verify and supplement information derived from available data -- with special agents, gang officers, probation officers, juveniles, and others.

Design protocols for sample investigative traces -- with ATF, design protocols and samples to support limited investigative or end-to-end traces by ATF of youth crime guns, and a comparison sample of crime guns used by felons -- investigative traces follow crime guns through the complex channels that deliver them from the point of sale to the street.

Report on city specific and cross-site analysis of all data -- available data, interview reports, and investigative trace results -- to provide such information as: what type of firearms are preferred by type of juvenile and type of crime, source of firearms by nature of offense, firearms acquisition by gang affiliation, time-to-crime for particular group of offenders, concentration of FFL and straw purchasers for particular groups of offenders, and the structure of illicit firearms markets.

Report regularly to ATF. The NIJ researchers will provide analysis and information to ATF on a periodic basis as it is developed, so that to the extent permitted by law it is immediately available for law enforcement purpose, as well as formal final reports.

Improvements in Law Enforcement Information Collection. Researchers and ATF will determine what information ought to be collected on a long term basis and/or added to the LEAD system, based on the pilot project information's utility to law enforcement at each site. The initiative's upgrades of Project LEAD will be evaluated, as well as the use of available data, interviews, and investigative traces. *Tailoring federal law enforcement data for local application and making it available to local law enforcement is a major benefit of the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative.*



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PILOT CITIES

16 police departments of various sizes and geographic locations were chosen for the pilot program. All of ATF's field locations are included in the trafficking strategy and the development of firearms trafficking groups, therefore, all locations sufficiently near to ATF offices were possible sites. The 16 sites were chosen because in each, local law enforcement authorities have made a significant commitment to working with the federal government to reduce youth firearms crime. Because the goal was to begin the pilot project as quickly as possible, the well-known, pre-existing local commitment was considered a major advantage to the initiative. *Initial contact has been made with the police chiefs and others in these sites, however, no final commitments have been sought or given. Sites subject to modification.*

Local Police Department

ATF Support Office

(1)Atlanta,GA**^	Atlanta Field Division
(2)Baltimore,MD*^	Baltimore Field Division
(3)Birmingham,AL*	Birmingham Field Division
(4)Boston,MA**^	Boston Field Division
(5)Bridgeport,CT*	Hartford Field Office
(6)Cleveland,OH*^	Cleveland Field Division
(7)Inglewood,CA*	Los Angeles^ Field Division
(8)Jersey City,NJ***	New York Field Division/Newark Field Office
(9)Milwaukee,WI*	Milwaukee Field Office
(10)New York City,NY***^	New York Field Division
(11)Richmond,VA*	Washington Field Division/Richmond Field Office
(12)St. Louis,MO**	St. Louis Field Division
(13)Salinas,CA*	San Francisco Field Division/San Jose Field Office
(14)San Antonio,TX*	Houston Field Division/San Antonio Field Office
(15)Seattle,WA*	Seattle Field Division
(16)Washington,DC***	Washington Field Division

*COPS Office Youth Firearms Initiative grant site.

**NIJ juvenile firearms research site.

***Additional sites where U.S. Attorneys and chiefs of police have made firearms trafficking and/or juvenile firearms crime a major priority.

^ Enterprise Community/Empowerment Zone

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"Pride and Commitment"

Civic-minded teen caught in crossfire

By JASON E. JOHNSON

Louis Brown feared the gangs and random violence that stalked the streets of his Dorchester neighborhood so much that the shy 16-year-old seldom ventured outside his home, and recently joined an anti-violence youth group.

It was on his way to a meeting of that group that Brown was fatally shot when caught in the crossfire of an apparent gang-related shooting, police and relatives said.

"This was the first organization that he really enjoyed. He didn't want to be late," recalled Brown's mother, Clementine, who often broke into tears talking about her son. "It's not fair for innocent kids to die like this."

Brown, of 8 Dahlgren St., was shot once in the head shortly after 3 p.m. Monday at Geneva Avenue and Tongwanda Street. Police found him lying at the entrance to an alley at 221 Geneva Ave. He was rushed to Boston City Hospital and pronounced dead at 5 a.m. yesterday.

Two other men, Carlton Phillips, 19, of 38 Topawanda St., and Anthony Turner, 20, of 14 Magnolia Square, Roxbury, were also wounded in the shooting, and may

have been the intended targets, police said.

Several shots were fired and three different weapons were used in the incident. Police, who recovered a .380 Colt at the scene, have made no arrests in the case. Investigators are searching for two or three men who fled on foot.

"It was just raining," said one police source. "Turner



LOUIS BROWN
Died early yesterday

has been in jail for awhile. He just got out about six weeks ago. While he was in jail he was telling people he was going to take back the street."

Both Turner and Phillips have criminal backgrounds, but have not been charged in the incident. It was unknown yesterday if the gun recovered at the scene belonged to any of the victims.

At a press conference yes-

terday, Superintendent Joseph V. Sala and homicide Capt. Detective Edward McNeilly said such violence would not be tolerated, a pledge echoed by those in the community.

"This is just devastating," said Kathy Gannett of the Lindsay Street Association. "This corner has been an accident waiting to happen."

In 1980, Dorchester High School student Junior Fernandez was gunned down in the same neighborhood. The death sparked community action and residents took back their neighborhood.

A sophomore at West Roxbury High School, Brown joined the Gang Drug Prevention Program about a month ago and couldn't stop talking about it.

Surrounded by family and friends in the living room of their colorfully decorated home, Brown's parents also called for increased involvement from the people of Dorchester.

"We, as parents, have to monitor our kids," said the boy's father, Joseph M. Chery said.

"They talk about programs, they talk about jail time. I think the problems are deeper than that," said Chery. "I think the whole moral fiber of the community has broken down. We have to recover that."

Seeking an end to violence, honor pupil becomes victim

By Howard Marly
GLOBE STAFF

Louis Brown, 15, wanted to be early for his Christmas party. Eager to exchange gifts with other teen-agers involved in the antigang and violence prevention council, Brown left home shortly after 3 p.m. Monday, gift in hand, and promised his mother he would call home as soon as he arrived.

He never called.

At 8:18 p.m., he was caught in the middle of gunfire not far from the corner of Geneva Avenue and Townsend Street near Fields Corner in Dorchester. An errant bullet hit him in the head, rendering him brain-dead almost instantly. A second bullet struck him in the side.

His mother, Cleopatra Chery, sensed something was terribly wrong when her son did not call home.

"I just knew something was wrong," she said yesterday, her trembling voice becoming weaker. "He would always call. Even if he was sidetracked somewhere, he would always call."

Brown died yesterday morning at Boston City Hospital, just four days before Christmas, leaving behind his mother and father, a 4-year-old sister and a year-old brother.

Like thousands of young men in Boston and across the country, he walked almost daily through a gauntlet of urban horrors and tried to do the right thing, balancing his appetite for knowledge with a desire to survive on the streets.

"As parents, we all say our kids are wonderful,"

said his mother. "But Louis was an exceptional kid. Ask anyone who knew him. For this to happen to him is unfair. We can't go on living like this. As parents, we can't continue to close our eyes to what is happening on the streets."

Louis' trepidation of the streets was palpable, his father, Joseph M. Chery, said yesterday from the family's Dahlgren Street home in Dorchester.

Louis, a straight-A student at West Roxbury High School, seldom went outside, choosing instead to lie on a couch watching television or playing video games — pastimes interrupted only by frequent trips to the refrigerator.

Reading became his means to reach his goal of becoming the nation's first black president. "On Sundays, he would be real quiet in his room," Joseph Chery said yesterday. "And I'd walk up there and find him reading several volumes of the encyclopedia."

Louis, a high school sophomore, earned honors status in geometry. He had the universal teen-age problems of refusing to clean his room or wash dishes. "But other than that, he was a model son," said his father, an accountant for the Boston public schools.

His parents wanted him to become more involved in extracurricular activities, but Louis did not participate in many.

A karate class, for instance, lasted only for a few weeks. He recently told his parents that he was going to try out for the football team, even asking them to buy a pair of prescription goggles. "He didn't like hanging out," his father recalled. "He would rather stay home."

But that was before a cousin told Louis about a youth group called Turn Against Gang Violence, sponsored by the city Department of Health and Hospitals.

Brown joined the group about four weeks ago, and for the first time, he became excited, talking about meetings and issues nonstop. He tacked the meeting schedule on the

family's refrigerator.

"He set out to make a difference," his father said. "And he was amazed that a group of teen-agers could talk with each other about their similar fears."

But on one night, the sheer magnitude of gang violence struck him as odd. "He told me that he learned that there were three ways you could die," his mother recalled. "You could either kill yourself, or somebody else could kill you, or somebody could hire someone to kill you. He was very troubled by that."

Most troublesome to Brown was the epidemic of black-on-black crime.

"Louis was a very sensitive, very genuine young man," Ulrich Johnson, the antigang group's program director, said yesterday.

Louis' parents are still trying to piece together what happened Monday afternoon, when their oldest child became this year's 55th homicide victim in Boston.

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18 THE BOSTON HERALD, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1994

Boston Police establish tip line in bid to crack unsolved cases

By SEAN FLYNN

Louis Brown was just 18 years old when he was cut down by the violence he wanted so badly to end.

He was walking to the Fields Corner MBTA stop Dec. 20, planning to hop a train to a Christmas party hosted by Youth Against Gang Violence, when the shooting started.

Louis Brown was caught in the middle of the cross fire — right at the corner of Geneva Avenue and Tapscott Street.

A bullet pierced his head.

"He fell to the ground," Boston Police Department homicide detective Richard Ross said, "clutching a small gift



that he had taken with him for the Christmas party."

Nine months later, Ross and the department's Crime Stoppers program are asking any witnesses — moments who saw the shooting, heard the gun or

knows anything at all — to help solve Brown's murder.

"It's our belief," said Sgt. Detective Thomas O'Leary, "that due to the pre-Christmas rush and school getting out of session, there were several potential witnesses on Geneva Avenue during this incident."

Those witnesses, O'Leary continued, are urged to call the Crime Stoppers hot line, a new tip line launched today that guarantees callers anonymity and promises up to a \$1,000 reward for information leading to an arrest and indictment.

Crime Stoppers — 1-800-331-TIPS — is sponsored by the Boston Police Foundation and the Boston Police Department.

SWO-



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS



YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE
PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND DETAILS

ATF's Overall Illegal Firearms Trafficking Strategy. *The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative builds on, and is a component of, ATF's overall trafficking strategy which seeks to cut off the illicit supply of firearms by building cases against the sources of crime guns. The trafficking strategy has the following elements:*

NTC traces. ATF traces any crime gun voluntarily submitted by any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency to its National Tracing Center. Agencies may submit basic information about the crime gun to the NTC through NLETS, a computer phone line, telephone, or by fax. NTC responded to 89,726 federal, state, and local trace requests in Fiscal Year 1995.

Traces that solve firearms crimes. *The NTC trace identifies the federal firearms licensee (FFL) that sold the crime weapon and the initial purchaser of that weapon. NTC returns this information to the submitting agency within approximately 11 days for routine traces and within a day for urgent traces. Trace information can be useful in any case involving a firearm, by providing leads to, or evidence of, the link between the perpetrator of the crime and the weapon. Though prosecutors may successfully make cases without this information, an NTC trace can only serve to strengthen the evidence against a defendant and in some instances may prove crucially important to developing a prosecutable case.*

Traces that identify illegal traffickers. *NTC trace information can lead to the building of an additional case against a licensed firearms dealer, straw purchases of illegal firearms trafficker that illegally sold, transported and/or transferred the crime gun to the criminal. Arresting a scofflaw FFL or illicit trafficker disrupts the illegal supply of firearms to felons, juveniles, and other persons prohibited by law from possessing a firearm.*

Supply disruption that aims at preventing firearms crime. *The systematic use of trace information by ATF to attack illegal firearms traffickers supplying prohibited persons with weapons represents an entirely new, violence prevention law enforcement strategy for ATF and all of federal law enforcement. ATF and state law enforcement agencies, using a variety of "three strikes" type statutes, will continue to arrest the most violent criminals who use firearms, but will now also take action against illegal firearms suppliers, with the goal of depriving prohibited persons their illicit source of firearms, thus reducing overall levels of violence.*

Reducing Youth Gun Violence: **The Clinton Administration's Kids & Guns Initiative**

Questions and Answers

Q. What exactly are you announcing and why?

The Clinton Administration has been strongly committed to reducing firearm violence in this country and reversing an upward trend of firearm violence by juveniles. President Clinton wants to put more police on our streets and take kids, guns, and drugs off them.

Today's announcement is another step in that direction. This initiative will bring ATF, U.S. Attorneys, and state and local police chiefs together in 17 cities for a pilot project to disrupt the illegal gun market and make guns less available to kids by helping to identify apprehend, prosecute, and punish illegal gun dealers and traffickers.

Through the creation of a federal and state/local partnership, this new initiative ensures that every crime gun used by a juvenile will be traced using the ATF's National Tracing Center and Project LEAD.

Q. How exactly will this program work?

In the 17 pilot cities, the Clinton Administration will establish federal-local partnerships where ATF agents and local police will work together to stem the flow of guns to juveniles.

Through this partnership, all guns used by juveniles in the commission of crimes will be forwarded to the ATF's National Tracing Center (NTC). Within two weeks, the NTC will report back to the local police department, informing them as to where the gun was purchased and who was the original owner. Using this information, the local police, working with the ATF, will attempt to track down and prosecute the main suppliers of illegal firearms to youth.

The ATF-local police partnership will also be assisted by Project LEAD, a computer program which aggregates and evaluates information collected by the NTC. Project LEAD compiles information concerning potentially illegal firearms trafficking patterns, illegal purchasers, problem firearms dealers, and geographic sources of supply and sales. Using this information, local and federal officers will attack the illegal firearms market as it pertains to youth.

Q. How did you pick these 17 cities?

The 17 sites were chosen because local law enforcement authorities in each, have made a significant commitment to the federal government to reduce youth firearms crime. Since the goal is to have an immediate impact, the well-known, pre-existing local

commitment was considered a major advantage of the chosen sites. The sites are of various sizes and geographic locations, and all of the sites include the existence of an ATF field office or division, or are sufficiently near to ATF offices to ensure proper federal support.

These pilot sites include 10 Office of Community Oriented Policy Services (COPS) Youth Firearms Initiative cities. In these ten cities, community policing initiatives have been expanded to specifically address the problem of youth firearm offenses. Of the remaining seven cities, three are National Institute of Justice youth violence research sites, and in the 4 additional cities, U.S. Attorneys and/or police have taken a leadership role in youth crime prevention.

Q How do you know this will lead to more prosecutions?

The National Tracing Center already receives over 80,000 trace requests a year. The information that is collected from the NTC and examined through Project LEAD, identifies firearms purchasers and Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs) who repeatedly have crime-related firearms traced back to them. Using this data, investigators have an important clue on where to look for illegal firearm dealers, and an important piece of evidence with which to convict illegal dealers.

Already, the NTC and Project LEAD has enabled the ATF to focus its limited resources and initiate many more criminal and regulatory investigations against illegal firearms traffickers. Since 1993, illegal firearms trafficking criminal cases have risen from 14.4% of ATF's firearms cases in 1993 to 21.5% in 1995. By combining this proven federal system with committed state/local law enforcement, this new initiative will expand the number of traces conducted. The result is better information about the juvenile gun market, and more prosecutions.

Q Republicans have criticized the Administration for a decline in firearms prosecutions. Why are you doing less cases and how will this new initiative address that problem?

Over the last three years, the Clinton Administration has compiled an impressive record of initiatives that are helping to reduce firearms violence.

Breaking six years of congressional gridlock, President Clinton signed the Brady Bill, which has prevented over 60,000 felons, fugitives, and stalkers from purchasing handguns. The 1994 Clinton Crime Bill banned the manufacture and importation of 19 types of deadly assault weapons.

This new initiative will build upon the Clinton Administration's Youth Handgun Safety Act and the Gun Free Schools Act.

(so why are we doing less cases?)

Q Does this initiative focus only on illegal gun trafficking to juveniles?

The primary focus of this new initiative is to prevent the distribution of firearms to young people. By identifying and disrupting the activities of the illegal suppliers of guns to youth, the initiative will put a dent in the illegal firearms market as a whole. Furthermore, while *Reducing Youth Gun Violence* will target the juvenile gun market, they will not hesitate to investigate and prosecute all suppliers of illegal weapons who are identified through the initiative.

Q. How will U.S. Attorneys work with local prosecutors? Who will bring cases generated from this project?

Firearms trafficking cases derived from Project LEAD and other elements of this new initiative will be referred to U.S. Attorneys. U.S. attorneys will then be responsible for referring non-federal cases to state and local prosecutors. In cases of federal firearms trafficking the U.S. Attorneys will be responsible for handling the prosecution themselves. State and local prosecutors will assist in joint federal-state-local firearms distribution cases. Working together, the initial strategy of federal, state, and local prosecutors will be to identify and build cases against illegal adult gun traffickers to juveniles, straw purchasers, and street level sellers to juveniles.

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**REMARKS OF UNDER SECRETARY RAYMOND W. KELLY
UNDER SECRETARY FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
JULY 8, 1996
AT THE WHITE HOUSE**

Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, Secretary Rubin, Attorney General Reno, we are here today to focus on what our government can do to prevent young people from gaining illegal access to firearms.

An illegal market exists, fed by a number of channels. There are criminal chains of gun transfer, which can include illegal sales and re-sales, illegal purchase, and theft, and these weapons pass along the links of the chain, until they land in the hands of adolescents. We must and we will break that chain.

We have all witnessed the violence that too often mars the lives of those who live in the high risk neighborhoods of our cities.

Today, as Under Secretary for Enforcement at the Treasury Department, overseeing the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, one of my greatest responsibilities is to ensure that the firearms laws of this country are enforced as effectively as possible.

Every murder is a tragedy, but the killing of a young person is a special horror. Homicide is the worst, but not the only problem associated with young people's illegal access to guns. For every homicide, there are more wounded victims. For every injury, there are even more shots fired and guns brandished. This unchecked use of weapons by young people brings fear to the community even when it does not bring death.

Firearms are deeply implicated in the threat to our children. From 1980 to 1994, homicides of juveniles in which a firearm was involved nearly tripled. This increase started when crack cocaine hit the streets of our cities in the mid-1980's. Over a decade later, gun use is still associated with drug activity, but gun violence has spread from the drug trade to neighborhoods and to schools.

And of course, much of the gun violence among young people happens in and around gangs, whether or not the gang is involved in drug activity.

Mr. President, the Brady Law and other reforms you have spearheaded in our system of licensing firearms dealers are making it more and more difficult for criminals to buy guns from legitimate gun dealers. But criminals always have and always will try to get guns illegally.

To try to stop these sorts of crimes, ATF has developed a new enforcement strategy, focusing on identifying illegal gun markets and traffickers. Once they are identified, prosecutors can build cases against them, on a variety of charges.

Any arrest of a gun trafficker will make it harder for kids to get guns. But this initiative will place a special focus on trafficking to young people -- by improvements to ATF's information gathering specifically relating to young people, added computer resources, extra funds for intensified law enforcement operations specifically against traffickers to young people, and additional research.

With the information ATF provides, local police departments can develop community policing strategies that make it even less likely that gang members and other young people will carry guns. Over time, these strategies will slow the supply of guns to kids, and make it harder for them to obtain weapons.

There are a growing number of cases that demonstrate how a youth crime gun strategy can be effective. In St. Louis, two juveniles used a TEC-9 to fire on St. Louis patrol officers. The officers apprehended one of the juveniles, traced the recovered firearm, and identified the licensed dealer who had received the firearm for retail sale. Through first a civil inspection, then a criminal investigation, ATF learned that the dealer had bought and illegally disposed of about 450 weapons. Law enforcement authorities have recovered 96 of them. These weapons have turned up in investigations of murders, robberies, assaults, and narcotics violations. The weapons were routinely supplied to St. Louis street gangs. The dealer was convicted and sentenced to seven years imprisonment for violation of federal firearms and narcotics laws. We hope to make many more cases like this one.

We know that the illegal chain of weapons transfer can be broken. This Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative will build on successful cases like this one; first in seventeen cities and, if it succeeds as we believe it will, nationwide.

Mr. President, Attorney General Reno, Mr. Secretary, all the law enforcement officials here today are striving to develop new ways of reducing youth firearms violence. We are now working together to combine our ideas and energies to solve this problem. Together, we will make a difference.

It is now my pleasure to introduce the Secretary of the Treasury, Robert E. Rubin.

SIGNIFICANT ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS OF GUN TRAFFICKERS DEALING TO JUVENILES

Virginia

In June 1994, an adult in Danville, Virginia made a straw purchase of a firearm from an FFL on behalf of a juvenile. Two hours later, the juvenile robbed a grocery store and murdered the manager of the store. The juvenile then travelled to Washington DC and sold the murder weapon on the streets. In January 1995, ATF positively linked the gun to the murder. The juvenile pled guilty to first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The adult who purchased the gun for the juvenile was charged with making false statements relating to the purchase of a firearm from an FFL.

Missouri

In November 1991, three young males with a TEC-9 fired upon two St. Louis police officers. The officers returned fire and were able to apprehend one of the juveniles and recover a firearm. Ballistics evidence revealed that the firearm had been utilized in two separate homicides. The juvenile was later charged with both murders. ATF and the St. Louis Police initiated a joint investigation of the FFL from whom the firearm had been purchased. An undercover officer met with the FFL, purchased 11 handguns, ammunition and in excess of 1 ounce of cocaine. It was learned that the FFL had purchased approximately 450 firearms and sold them illegally. Many of these firearms were illegally sold to St. Louis street gangs, which include many juveniles. Ninety-six of these firearms have been recovered after being used in murders, robberies, assaults, and narcotics violations. The FFL was convicted and sentenced to seven years imprisonment for violations of the Federal firearms and narcotics laws.

North Carolina

In January 1995, ten members of a violent street gang were arrested as a result of an eighteen month investigation. Nine narcotics-related shootings were attributed to this gang. Additionally, members of the gang distributed over twenty-five kilograms of crack cocaine in the Reidsville-Rockingham County area. It was learned that numerous firearms had been sold to juveniles who provided "protection" for the gang's operations. Nine of the ten gang members were found guilty and received sentences of from three years to life imprisonment.

South Carolina

In July 1993, an ATF led task force dubbed "Operation Gunshot" discovered that a felon acted as a straw purchaser of a firearm for a juvenile. The juvenile was later arrested along with 9 other teenagers for their involvement in a shooting spree at the Haywood Mall in Greenville, South Carolina. The felon pled guilty to making false statements to obtain a firearm and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.

California

A mother and daughter who were licensed as at-home gun dealers acquired over 90 inexpensive handguns and sold the guns, with the assistance of a juvenile son, directly to gang members. Forty of these guns have been recovered, and approximately half are known to have been involved in crimes such as driveby shootings and bank robberies. The mother and son have pled guilty to making false statements and the daughter pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge. They are awaiting sentencing.

Texas

A juvenile shot and killed a man during a carjacking using a gun which the juvenile's aunt had purchased for him. The juvenile accompanied his aunt to the firearms dealer, picked out the gun, and the juvenile returned alone after the 5 day waiting period to pick up the firearm. The firearm dealer gave the gun to the juvenile. In August 1994, the father and son firearms dealers pled guilty to firearms violations and each were sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO &
FIREARMS

45e-7028



OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT
OFFICE OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT

FIREARMS ENFORCEMENT DIVISION

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TO: Kelly Crawford

FROM: Joe Vince

DATE: 7-5-96

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER): 20

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY





National Institute of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

*Research
in Brief*

Michael J. Russell, NIJ Acting Director; John J. Wilson, OJJDP Acting Administrator

December 1993

Gun Acquisition and Possession in Selected Juvenile Samples

by Joseph F. Sheley, Ph.D., and James D. Wright, Ph.D.

Violence committed by and against juveniles has come increasingly to define the public's image of the crime problem and the larger political debate over anticrime policy. While evidence documenting the growth of youth violence is abundant, systematic research on the *means* and *methods* of this violence is scarce.

This Research in Brief summarizes the results of a study concerning the number

and types of firearms juveniles possess as well as where, how, and why juveniles acquire and carry firearms. The findings derive from responses to surveys completed by *selected* samples of male inmates (mostly from urban areas) in juvenile correctional facilities in California, New Jersey, Louisiana, and Illinois and male students in 10 inner-city public high schools near the correctional institutions surveyed.

The research focused on serious juvenile offenders and on inner-city students because these groups are popularly thought to engage in and experience violence at rates exceeding those of most other groups.¹ The sites chosen reflect the few instances in which the researchers gained dual entry into both a State's juvenile correction system and at least one adjacent, urban, local school district within a reasonably parallel time period.

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Research in Brief:

Results of a study of juvenile possession of firearms drawn from voluntary questionnaires anonymously completed by:

- 835 male serious offenders incarcerated in 6 juvenile correctional facilities in 4 States;

- 758 male students in 10 inner-city high schools near the facilities.

Both students and inmates came from environments marked by crime and violence.

Key Issues: Researchers sought to find out the number and types of arms owned and where, how, and why they were obtained. Because the study focused on serious juvenile offenders and students from schools in high-risk areas, the results are not generalizable to the entire U.S. population.

Key Findings: The study found that:

- 83 percent of inmates and 72 percent of the students possessed guns.

- 55 percent of inmates carried guns all or most of the time in the year or two before being incarcerated; 12 percent of the students did so, with another 23 percent carrying guns now and then.

- The firearms of choice were high-quality, powerful revolvers, closely followed by automatic and semiautomatic handguns and then shotguns.

- Most of those surveyed thought it would be easy to acquire a gun. Only 13 percent of inmates and 35 percent of students said it would be a lot of trouble or nearly impossible.

- When asked how they would get a gun, 45 percent of the inmates and 53 percent of the students would "borrow" one from family or friends; 54 percent of the inmates and 37 percent of the

students said they would get one "off the street."

- Fewer inmates and students said they used hard drugs than expected (43 percent of inmates and 5 to 6 percent of students). Drug use was moderately related to gun activity.

- More inmates than students reported selling drugs (72 percent of inmates and 18 percent of students). Those who were involved in selling drugs had higher levels of gun ownership and use than those who were not.

- The main reason given for owning or carrying a gun was self-protection.

The researchers conclude that the fundamental policy problem involves convincing youths they can survive in their neighborhoods without being armed.

Target audience: Law enforcement administrators, school officials, juvenile justice practitioners, researchers, and community groups who work with youth.

A number of schools and neighborhoods can be dangerous places for many young people in America. knives, revolvers, and even shotguns regularly turn up in searches of school lockers. News reports describe incidents of children being shot on playgrounds or of youths firing rifles as they cruise the streets in cars. The use of weapons in schools and neighborhoods has increased fear among citizens of all ages.

In looking for solutions, school administrators and local criminal and juvenile justice officials seek more information about juvenile use of firearms. To that end, the National Institute of Justice, with joint funding from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention—two bureaus within the Justice Department's Office of Juvenile Programs—commissioned a study to learn more about the level and nature of juvenile gun possession in high-risk neighborhoods. The researchers interviewed students in high schools that had experienced a large number of violent incidents as well as male juveniles involved in serious offenses, about the weapons they carried, why they carried them, and how they acquired them.

The reader should note, however, that the study focused on high-risk areas and an at-risk population. Therefore, the findings are not generalizable, but the data shed new light on a complex problem.

The findings discussed in this report are sobering. For example, many students surveyed in the study claimed they carried firearms to protect themselves from fellow students and had little trouble obtaining the weapons. This report raises serious issues for concern all who are working to diminish violence and crime in our neighborhoods. It should be helpful to those developing policies and strategies to combat the threats to public safety posed by juveniles who illegally carry guns.

Michael J. Russell
Acting Director
National Institute of Justice

John J. Wilcox
Acting Administrator
Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention

Method

A total of 835 inmates in 6 of the respective States' major correctional facilities (3 in California, 1 each in the remaining States) completed self-administered questionnaires in the spring of 1991. Each site was a standard State facility to which seriously troublesome youth were remanded. The offenses characterizing the inmates in these sites ranged from drug-related crimes (generally trafficking in drugs) to homicide. All but the New Jersey site, whose inmates had profiles like those of inmates in the other institutions, were maximum security facilities (completely enclosed, guarded, razorwired). The institutions' populations ranged from 172 to 850. The percentage of inmates surveyed per institution ranged from 22 to 62 (primarily a function of size of institution), with a mean of 41 percent.

The survey was introduced to the inmates as a national study of firearms and violence among youth. Participation in the study was voluntary and anonymous, and respondents were given \$5 to participate in the project. In all of the correctional facilities in question, administrators announced the study to inmates in all of the smaller facilities' dormitories and to those in about half of the dormitories in the larger facilities. The researchers then discussed the project with them. An average of 95 percent of the inmates addressed by the researchers agreed to participate in the study. At each site, groups of 10 to 20 inmates at a time completed the questionnaire.

In all cases, local high school administrators viewed the topic of guns and violence among students as politically charged. They consented to the research only on the guarantee that their districts and schools would not be identified in the publication of the research results. Responses were obtained from schools in large prominent cities near the correctional facilities serving as research sites. Enrollments in these schools ranged from 900 to 2,100.

Schools selected for study were identified by local school board officials as inner-city schools that had experienced firearms incidents in the recent past and whose

students likely encountered gun-related violence (as victims, perpetrators, or bystanders) out of school. No formal evidence is available by which to document these claims. However, interviews with the faculty and students of these schools during the administration of the survey confirmed the administrators' assessments. In one school, surveyors observed a student taking a gun from his jacket to examine it before responding to a questionnaire item about caliber. Moreover, in the time since administration of the survey, four of the schools have experienced violent episodes sufficient to gain national media attention.

The survey was introduced to students as it was to the inmates—as a voluntary and anonymous national study of firearms and violence among youth. Spanish versions of the survey were offered to students who desired them. Principals were asked to grant the researchers access to 150 to 200 students in each of the schools entered and, within the practical constraints faced by principals and teachers, to make the sample—students in grades 9 through 12—as representative of their pupils as possible.

In six instances, principals arranged for the survey to take place during homeroom periods. These periods were uniform for the student body; thus, theoretically, the study had access to the entire student population. In two schools, the survey was given during the physical education hours, and in two schools, access was given to all students enrolled in social studies courses. In the former two sites, physical education was mandatory and its hours were uniform for all students; thus, here too, the study theoretically had access to all students. In the latter two sites access to the entire student body was more limited. Approximately 95 percent of students addressed by the researchers participated in the study.

The number of students surveyed was 758, an average of 165 per school (within a range of 109 to 229). The percentage of student populations surveyed across schools ranged from 7 to 21 (with a mean of 10 percent; lower percentages were a function of larger schools). In some

schools, the survey was administered to groups of 20 to 30 students at a time. In others, it was given to larger assemblies of 100 to 200 students. In 4 of the 10 schools sampled, students were offered \$5 to participate in the survey. Neither financial inducement nor method of distribution more generally was tied to the percentage of the student body participating in the survey or to response variation across questionnaire items.

Validity, completeness, and consistency issues

With respect to sites more generally, responses to the questionnaire items displayed some variation across correctional facilities, as expected, but reflected no systematic site-to-site patterns. Site differences that did occur could most often be reduced to a single site at variance with the others concerning a given item; no one site appeared conspicuously at odds across all items.

Missing data were expected given that the survey was long, that time limits were imposed on some respondents by their institutions, and that respondents had been told that answering any given item in the survey was discretionary. Despite this, the average percentage of inmate respondents who failed to complete both items in any set of randomly cross-tabulated items was only 1.41 percent (literally, one case) within a range of 0.11 to 4.1 percent; for students the corresponding figure was 3.1 percent within a range of 0.7 to 3.9 percent. Additionally, missing cases on the items used in the present analysis were contrasted with responding cases controlling for research site, race/ethnicity, and age. Missing and responding cases differed little. As a further check, all analyses reported below were rerun substituting predicted values for all missing cases.² The results were substantively unchanged.

Finally, though self-report data are absolutely necessary to studies such as this one, they inevitably raise issues of reliability and validity. Attempts to establish level of reliability in the present study centered on pairs of items, the responses to which were checked for logical consistency. For ex-

ample, respondents who claimed never to have owned a military-style weapon at any time in their lives should not have responded affirmatively to a later item regarding ownership of such a weapon just prior to incarceration. Fourteen such items were examined for the inmate sample, and 11 were examined for the student sample. Inconsistent responses averaged only 2.4 percent within a range of 1.2 to 3.4 percent among the inmate respondents. For the students, they averaged 1.5 percent within a range of 0.7 to 3.1 percent.

To determine how systematic were the inconsistencies, each respondent was scored on the number of inconsistent answers. Inmate respondents received scores between 0 and 14; student respondents received scores between 0 and 11. Only 4 percent of the inmates scored above 2; no inmate scored above 6, and only one scored 6. Only 1 percent of the students scored above 2; no student score exceeded 4.

Validity was more difficult to assess, since there were no official records against which to compare the self-report data. However, indicative of construct validation, respondents who attributed respect from peers to ownership of a gun also felt that friends would look down on them if they did not carry a gun ($r = 0.638$ for inmates; 0.587 for students). The level of use of heroin, crack, and regular cocaine was associated with the extent of commission of property crimes to gain drug money (r ranges between 0.245 and 0.384 for inmates; between 0.395 and 0.453 for students)—a finding consistent with those of previous researchers.³

As has been reported previously,⁴ marijuana seems to have served as a gateway drug to heroin, cocaine, and crack use for the respondents. Among the inmate users of heroin, cocaine, and crack, 79, 80, and 76 percent, respectively, had also used marijuana. Among the student users of heroin, cocaine, and crack, 76, 86, and 88 percent, respectively, had also used marijuana.

In sum, reliability levels seem far above what might be expected for respondents of the type surveyed in the present study and

for the subject matter of interest here. Validity levels clearly fall within an acceptable range, but see "Caveat."

Characteristics of respondents

The average inmate respondent's age was 17, and 84 percent of inmates were non-white. The modal educational attainment level was 10th grade. More than half of the inmates were from cities of at least 250,000 residents. Half had committed robbery; two-thirds had committed burglary. Among the students, 97 percent

Caveat

It should be stressed that these findings are technically not generalizable to other settings and populations. The four States serving as research sites for this study were not a probability sample of States. Moreover, to maximize percentages of respondents involved in the behaviors of interest, the study purposely focused on serious juvenile offenders and on students from especially problematic inner-city schools. Therefore, the 6 correctional facilities and 10 high schools (and by virtue of the voluntary nature of participation in the study, the respondents in those institutions) serving as research sites were not probability samples of their respective universes.

Nonetheless, comparison of inmate respondents' profiles with those known through studies of youth in similar institutions indicates that the present sample was not dissimilar to samples of State maximum-security wards serving as subjects of other studies.⁵ Moreover, a 1984 study of inner-city high school students' criminal activity employed data collected from randomly selected high school students from inner-city, high-crime neighborhoods in four cities⁶ and indicated age and race breakdowns very similar to those found among the student respondents.

were nonwhite, and the mean age was 16. The modal educational attainment level also was 10th grade. All of the student respondents were from cities with populations exceeding 250,000. As expected, the student sample was far less involved in criminal activities. Still, 42 percent of the students reported having been arrested or picked up by the police at least once; 22 percent had been arrested or picked up "many" times; 23 percent reported having stolen something worth at least \$50. Nine percent reported using a weapon to commit a crime.

Exposure to guns and violence

Prior to examining the gun-related behaviors of the respondents, one had to place those behaviors in a larger social context. Inmates and students alike inhabited social worlds characterized by crime and violence. Four in 10 inmates had siblings who had also been incarcerated, and 47 percent had siblings who owned guns legally or illegally. More generally, 79 percent of the inmates came from families in which at least some of the males owned guns; 62 percent had male family members who routinely carried guns outside the home. The pattern was even sharper with respect to the peers of the incarcerated juveniles. Nine out of 10 inmates had at least some friends and associates who owned and carried guns routinely.

Thus, in the street environment inhabited by these juvenile offenders, owning and carrying guns were virtually universal behaviors. Further, in this same environment, the inmate respondents regularly experienced threats of violence and violence itself. A total of 84 percent reported that they had been threatened with a gun or shot at during their lives. Half had been stabbed with a knife.

If the social world of the student sample was less dangerous or hostile, it was only by comparison to that of the inmates. A total of 69 percent of the students had males in their families who owned guns. Two out of five reported that males in their families routinely carried guns outside the home. Gun owning and carrying were also

common among the friends of the student respondents. More than half (57 percent) of the respondents had friends who owned guns; 42 percent had friends who routinely carried guns outside the home.

Like members of the inmate sample, the student respondents were also frequently threatened and victimized by violence. Forty-five percent had been threatened with a gun or shot at on the way to or from school in the previous few years. One in 10 had been stabbed, and 1 in 3 had been beaten up in or on the way to school. Nearly a fifth (17 percent) had been wounded with some form of weapon other than a knife or a gun in or near the school.

Victimization aside, the study data also permit some comment concerning violence in the inner-city schools in which the students were surveyed. Nearly a quarter (22 percent) of the surveyed students reported that carrying weapons to school was common. Nearly half (47 percent) personally knew schoolmates at whom shots had been fired in the previous few years. Fifteen percent personally knew someone who had carried a weapon to school; 8 percent personally knew someone who had brought a gun to school.

The reality of violence in the respondents' worlds shaped or was shaped by their

attitudes about violence. Both samples were asked a series of questions about when they felt it was acceptable ("okay") to shoot someone. Response possibilities were "strongly disagree," "disagree," "agree," and "strongly agree." A total of 35 percent of the inmates and 10 percent of the students agreed or strongly agreed that "it is okay to shoot a person if that is what it takes to get something you want." Was it "okay to shoot some guy who doesn't belong in your neighborhood?" Twenty-nine percent of the inmates and 10 percent of the students agreed or strongly agreed that it was. Elements of insult and injury inevitably increased the perceived acceptance of violent responses. It was considered "okay [agree or strongly agree] to shoot someone who hurts or insults you" by 61 percent of the inmates and 28 percent of the students.

Gun possession

The media depiction of the firearms environment for juveniles is one in which guns of all types, even sophisticated military-style weapons, are widely and easily available. The average inner-city youth seemingly needs only to approach a street source, pay but a few dollars, and depart with a firearm. However, no one has systematically documented any of these per-

Table 1. Inmate and Student Gun Possession (numbers in parentheses)

	Percent of Inmates Who Owned Just Prior to Confinement	Percent of Students Who Owned at Time of Survey
Any type of gun	83 (815)	22 (741)
Target or hunting rifle	22 (823)	8 (728)
Military-style automatic or semiautomatic rifle	35 (823)	6 (728)
Regular shotgun	39 (823)	10 (728)
Sawed-off shotgun	51 (823)	9 (728)
Revolver	58 (823)	15 (728)
Automatic or semiautomatic handgun	55 (823)	18 (728)
Derringer or single-shot handgun	19 (822)	4 (727)
Homemade (zip) handgun	6 (823)	4 (727)
Three or more guns	65 (815)	15 (741)

ceptions, especially with respect to the types of guns youth are obtaining. Table 1 presents findings concerning gun possession among members of both samples; at least with respect to the inmate group, the media depiction is largely accurate. A total of 83 percent of the inmates owned at least one firearm just prior to their confinement (67 percent acquired their first gun by age 14). Two-thirds (65 percent) owned at least three firearms just before being jailed. Nearly a quarter of the students (22 percent) possessed a gun at the time the survey was completed. Six percent reported owning three or more guns at the time of the survey.

Carrying guns

Obviously, one need not actually own a gun in order to carry one. Since most of the incarcerated juveniles in the sample (83 percent) owned a gun of their own at the time of their arrest, the distinction may be relatively meaningless for them. But it is easy to imagine high school students who carry guns they do not own (for example, guns that have been borrowed from or otherwise made available by friends and family members, possibly guns that are jointly owned by multiple students). It is possible, in other words, that focusing on ownership results in an *underestimation* of the number of guns in the hands of the students in the study.

In fact, among the inmate sample, carrying a firearm was about as common as owning one; 55 percent carried a gun "all" or "most of the time" in the year or two before being incarcerated, and 84 percent carried a gun at least "now and then," with the latter figure nearly identical to the percentage who owned a gun. Among the student sample, carrying a gun at least occasionally was *more common* than gun ownership. A total of 22 percent of the students owned a gun at the time of the survey; 12 percent of them reported currently carrying a gun "all" or "most of the time," and another 23 percent did so at least "now and then," for a combined percentage of 35 percent who carried firearms regularly or occasionally. Thus, by this more liberal measure, guns were in the hands of one out of three male central-

city high school students surveyed. Beyond this, 3 percent of the students reported carrying a gun *to school* "all" or "most of the time"; an additional 6 percent did so "now and then."

Firearms of choice

Considerable media attention has been given recently to automatic and military-style weapons in the hands of youth. The findings presented in table 1 permit assessment of this problem. In that table, automatic and semiautomatic weapons (rifles and handguns that automatically place a new round into the firing chamber) are treated in combination because the study's aim was simply to distinguish rapid-fire arms from traditional arms.

Among the inmate respondents, the revolver was the most commonly owned firearm; 58 percent owned a revolver at the time of their present incarceration. These were not small handguns. The most common calibers among the most recently owned handguns of this sample were the 0.38 and the 0.357. Closely following the revolver in popularity were automatic and semiautomatic handguns, typically chambered for 9mm or 0.45 caliber rounds; 55 percent owned one at the time of their incarceration.

The shotgun, whether sawed-off or unaltered, also represented a major weapon of choice. More than half the sample (51 percent) had possessed such a weapon; 39 percent had owned a regular shotgun. (A bit fewer than half the inmates, 47 percent, reported that they personally had cut down a shotgun or rifle to make it easier to carry or conceal at some point in their lives.) Next in popularity were the military-style automatic and semiautomatic rifles that have figured so prominently in recent media accounts. More than a third of the inmates (35 percent) owned one at the time they went to prison. Other types of guns—regular hunting rifles, derringers, zip guns, etc.—found little favor; fewer than a quarter said they owned this type of firearm when they were incarcerated.

Table 1 shows similar patterns of ownership, although on a considerably diminished scale, for the high school students.

The most commonly owned weapon was the automatic or semiautomatic handgun (18 percent), followed by the revolver (15 percent). Shoulder weapons of all sorts were less likely to be owned by the students than were handguns; still, 9 percent owned a sawed-off shotgun, 10 percent an unmodified shotgun, and 6 percent a military-style rifle.

Absent additional data, it is hard to be certain which aspects of the pattern of ownership reflected preferences and which aspects reflected availability. Considering the ease with which the juveniles obtained firearms and the number and variety of guns apparently in circulation in their communities (see below), it is a reasonable assumption that they carried what they preferred to carry and that differential availability had little or nothing to do with it. There was an evident preference for concealable firearms (handguns and sawed-off shotguns), but hard-to-conceal shoulder weapons, whether military-style or not, were also quite common.

To gain some sense of what juveniles seek in a weapon, the study asked respondents (both samples) what features they considered "very important" in a handgun. The profile of desirable features was remarkably similar in both groups. Among inmates, the three highest rated traits were firepower, quality of construction, and untraceability, followed by ease of firing and accuracy. Among the students, quality of construction was the highest rated trait, followed by being easy to shoot, accurate, and untraceable. Neither inmates nor students indicated much preference for small, cheap guns, nor were they attracted to such ephemeral characteristics of weapons as "scary looking" or "good looking." The preference, clearly, was for hand weapons that were well-made, accurate, easy to shoot, and not easily traced.

Obtaining a gun

Media accounts suggest that most types of guns are relatively abundant and readily accessible to juveniles. In fact, 70 percent of the inmates felt that upon release they could get a gun with "no trouble at all," a sentiment expressed by 41 percent of the

students as well. An additional 17 percent of the inmates and 24 percent of the male students said it would be "only a little trouble." Only 13 percent of the inmates and 35 percent of the students perceived access to guns as a "lot of trouble" or "nearly impossible."

We also asked both groups of respondents how they would go about getting a gun if they desired one. Most felt there were numerous ways but that family, friends, and street sources were the main sources (see table 2). Forty-five percent of the inmates and 53 percent of the students would "borrow" a gun from a family member or friend. Thirty-six percent and 35 percent of the inmates and students, respectively, would "buy" one from family or friends. Half of the inmates (54 percent) and a third of the students (37 percent) would "get one off the street."

Drug dealers and addicts were the major suppliers after family, friends, and other street sources, this for both inmates (35 percent) and students (22 percent). Purchasing a gun at a gunshop (or asking someone else to do so (see below) was perceived by 28 percent of the students as a reliable method; only 12 percent of the inmates considered it so (or viewed it as necessary). Theft was twice as likely to be mentioned by the inmates as by the students although, relative to other sources, it was prominent for neither group.

By way of partial confirmation of these findings (also see table 2), when asked where they *actually had obtained* (bought, borrowed, or stolen) the most recent handgun they had ever possessed, more than half of the inmates who had possessed handguns checked a friend (30 percent) or street source (22 percent). Only 6 percent

listed family member as the source. Drug dealers and drug addicts were the sources of 21 percent of the guns. The picture differed somewhat for the students. Friends (38 percent) and street sources (14 percent) were important, but family members (23 percent) were also primary sources. Drug dealers and addicts were rarer sources (8 percent).

The two sets of findings in table 2, then, point to illegal and fairly close sources of guns; if family or friends could not supply a gun, an apparently abundant blackmarket network could be found on the street.

While relatively few inmates mentioned theft as a means to obtain a gun upon release, far more had actually stolen guns, usually from homes or cars. More than half had stolen a gun at least once in their lives. In contrast, only 8 percent of the students had ever stolen a gun. Most of the thefts involved revolvers (50 percent of the inmates), but substantial numbers of inmates reported stealing other types of guns: shotguns (41 percent), automatic or semi-automatic handguns (44 percent), and military-style rifles (30 percent). When the inmates sold or traded the guns they had stolen, they generally did so to friends or other trusted persons.

Thus, these juveniles both supplied guns to and obtained guns from an informal network of family, friends, and street sources. It seems likely, then, that theft and burglary were the ultimate source of many of the guns acquired by the juveniles surveyed, but only occasionally the proximate source. Buttressing this point, it was found that although half of the inmates had stolen guns at some time, only 24 percent had stolen their most recently obtained handgun.

Though by no means the preferred method of acquisition, purchasing a gun through legitimate channels was fairly common among respondents. Federal law bars juveniles from purchasing firearms through normal retail outlets, but the law is readily circumvented by persuading someone who is of legal age to make the purchase in one's behalf. A total of 32 percent of the inmates and 18 percent of the students had asked someone to purchase a gun for them in a gun shop, pawnshop, or other retail

Table 2. Means of Obtaining Guns

	Percent of Inmates	Percent of Students
Likely Source If Desired*	(N = 738)	(N = 623)
Steal from a person or car	14	7
Steal from a house or apartment	17	8
Steal from a store or pawnshop	8	4
Borrow from family member or friend	45	53
Buy from family member or friend	36	35
Get off the street	54	37
Get from a drug dealer	36	22
Get from an addict	35	22
Buy from gun shop	12	28
Source of Most Recent Handgun**	(N = 640)	(N = 211)
A friend	30	38
Family member	6	23
Gun shop/pawnshop	7	11
The street	22	14
Drug dealer	9	2
Drug addict	12	6
"Taken" from someone's house or car	12	2
Other	2	4

* Item: "How would you go about getting a gun if you decided you wanted one?" (Multiple responses permitted.)

** Item: "Where did you get your most recent handgun?" Respondents who owned handguns only.

outlet; 49 percent of the inmates and 52 percent of the students mentioned a friend as the person requested to buy a gun; and 14 percent of the inmates and 18 percent of the students had turned to family members. Only 7 percent and 6 percent of the inmates and students, respectively, had sought help from strangers.

It seems, then, that the inmates had access to an informal network that made gun acquisition cheaper and easier, turning to retail channels was possible but generally not necessary. Less streetwise and less hardened, perhaps, the students saw themselves as more dependent on the retail shop if they needed a gun, although only 18 percent had ever used that source.

Cost of a gun

Aside from convenience, there is another good reason why juveniles prefer informal and street sources over normal retail outlets. Guns obtained from informal and street sources are considerably less expensive. The substantial majority of handguns and conventional shoulder weapons obtained by juveniles in a cash transaction with an informal source were purchased for \$100 or less; most of the military-style rifles obtained from such sources were purchased for \$300 or less (table 3). Considering the general quality of the firearms in question (see above), the cash prices paid on the street were clearly much less than the normal cost paid by the relatively few respondents who obtained the guns through regular retail outlets.

The decision to carry a gun

The popular fear is that juveniles carry guns to prey on the rest of society. For the inmate sample, this fear is well-founded; 63 percent had committed crimes with guns. Forty percent had obtained a gun specifically for use in crime. Of those who reported committing "serious" crimes, 43 percent were "usually" or "always" armed with a gun during the process.

Use in crime, however, was not the most important factor in the decision to own or carry guns, either for inmates or students. Nor was the gun principally a totem whose primary function was to impress one's

Table 3. Cost of Most Recent Firearm (for respondents who purchased gun for cash)*

Gun Type	Inmates			Students		
	Total	Retail	Informal	Total	Retail	Informal
Handguns						
Less than \$50	41%	17%	21%	21%	0%	25%
\$50-\$100	24%	22%	48%	53%	27%	58%
More than \$100	35%	61%	31%	26%	73%	17%
Number	235	23	201	64	11	48
Military-Style Rifles						
Less than \$100	22%	28%	21%	28%	0%	29%
\$100-\$300	48%	7%	50%	21%	40%	45%
More than \$300	30%	65%	29%	51%	60%	35%
Number	165	14	151	38	5	31
Rifles or Shotguns						
Less than \$100	54%	32%	51%	47%	25%	52%
\$100-\$150	13%	14%	20%	29%	25%	28%
More than \$150	33%	54%	29%	24%	50%	20%
Number	153	19	134	30	4	25%

*By way of interpretation of the results, of 235 inmates whose most recently acquired gun was a handgun paid for in cash, 41 percent paid \$50 or less and 35 percent paid \$100 or more; likewise, among 38 students whose most recently acquired gun was a military rifle that had been purchased for cash, 51 percent paid \$300 or more for it. "Retail" means a gun shop, pawn shop, or other retail outlet; "informal" is a cash purchase from any other source.

peers. Impressing peers or others was among the least important reasons for purchasing a gun, regardless of weapon type and for students and inmates equally.

Instead, reasons for carrying a gun were dominated by themes of self-protection and self-preservation. The most frequent circumstances in which inmates carried guns were when they were in a strange area (66 percent), when they were out at night (58 percent), and whenever they thought they might need self-protection (69 percent). Likewise, for any of the types of guns acquired by either inmates or students, the desire for protection and the need to arm oneself against enemies were the primary reasons to obtain a gun.

As the findings displayed in table 4 indicate, for example, 74 percent of the inmates who had obtained a handgun cited protection as a primary reason for their most recent purchase, and 52 percent cited armed enemies as a major factor. Use in

crime (36 percent) and to "get someone" (37 percent) were relatively, though obviously not wholly, unimportant. The theme of self-protection was also evident in the circumstances in which the inmate respondents had actually fired their guns. Three-quarters had fired a gun at a person at least once. Sixty-nine percent had fired in what they considered self-defense. More than half had also fired shots during crimes and drug deals. Better than 6 in 10 had fired their weapons in fights and to scare someone.

Dealing guns

Given the means and sources of firearms acquisition for both inmates and high school students, it is obvious that there is a large, informal street market in guns, one in which the inmate respondents were regular suppliers as well as frequent consumers. Forty-five percent could be described as gun dealers in that they had

Table 4. "Very Important" Reasons for Most Recent Gun Acquisition

Gun Type	Percent Stating That Each Reason Was "Very Important"	
	Inmates	Students
Military-Style Guns	(N = 365)	(N = 108)
Protection	73	75
Enemies had guns	60	42
Use in crimes	40	(item not asked)
To get someone	43	25
Friends had one	20	16
To impress people	10	9
To sell	11	6
Handguns	(N = 611)	(N = 210)
Protection	74	70
Enemies had guns	52	28
Use in crimes	36	(item not asked)
To get someone	37	13
Friends had one	16	7
To impress people	10	10
To sell	10	4
Rifles or Shotguns	(N = 523)	(N = 121)
Protection	64	59
Enemies had guns	47	29
Use in crimes	35	(item not asked)
To get someone	37	20
Friends had one	16	5
To impress people	10	7
To sell	10	8

bought, sold, or traded a lot of guns. Of those who described themselves as dealers, the majority reported their most common source as theft from homes or cars and acquisitions from drug addicts. Sixteen percent had bought guns out-of-State for purposes of gun dealing; another 7 percent had done so in-State; and nearly 1 in 10 had stolen guns in quantity from stores or off trucks during shipment.

There were two very different types of "gun dealers" in the sample. One group (77 percent) comprised juveniles who occasionally came into possession of surplus firearms and then sold or traded them to street sources. They may have come across firearms in the course of burglaries or break-ins, or taken firearms from drug addicts in exchange for drugs, but they

were not systematically in the business of gun dealing. The other group (23 percent) was more systematic in its gun-dealing activities and looked on gun deals as a business, seeking (if need be) to purchase guns both in- and out-of-State to supply their consumers. This group would include (one assumes) the one inmate in five who had gone (a few times or many times) to places with "very easy gun laws" to buy up guns for resale in his own neighborhoods. Those who had dealt guns, whether systematically or not, were more involved in gun use and criminal activity than those who had not dealt guns. They were more likely to carry a gun generally, more likely to own all types of weapons, more involved in shooting incidents, and more accepting of shooting someone to get something they wanted.

Drug use and gun activity

Much of the recent attention given to drugs and violence has centered on the use and sale of so-called hard drugs, specifically heroin, cocaine, and crack. Such drug use was not pervasive among the student respondents. Any use of hard drugs was reported by only 5 or 6 percent. Even among the inmates, percentages of users were moderate to low; only 43 percent had used cocaine, 25 percent crack, and 21 percent heroin. Combining results across types of drugs, complete abstinence from hard drugs was found to be characteristic of 93 percent of the high school students and 47 percent of the inmates. Further, the vast majority of users reported only occasional use.

With respect to the drugs-guns nexus, two important findings should be noted. First, substantial numbers of nonusers engaged in all the gun-related behaviors reported by respondents. For example, 72 percent of the inmates who had never used heroin had fired a gun at someone. A second and related finding is that inmate heroin users were generally more likely than nonusers to have been involved in most aspects of gun ownership and use, though the level of use among users was unrelated to the level of firearm activity. However, users of cocaine and crack were generally no more likely to have engaged in gun activity than nonusers. While the number of drug users among the students was too small to permit reliable analyses, the link between drugs and gun activity seemed more pronounced among members of this group.

Drug dealing and gun activity

The majority of inmates (72 percent) and a surprising percentage of high school students (18 percent) had either themselves dealt drugs or worked for someone who did. Firearms were a common element in the drug business. Among those who had dealt drugs or had worked for dealers, 89 percent of the inmates and 75 percent of the students had carried guns generally. Of the inmate dealers, 60 percent were very likely to carry guns during drug transactions, and 63 percent had fired guns during

those transactions. Moreover, 43 percent of the inmates reported that all or most of the drug dealers they knew also dealt in guns. Nearly half of the inmates who had ever stolen guns had also sold at least some of them to drug dealers. Six percent of those who had dealt guns had bought guns from drug dealers.

For inmate respondents, whether or not drug users, involvement in drug sales was associated with higher levels of every type of gun activity examined in this study. Student drug sellers reported higher levels of firearm activity than nonsellers who were not also users. However, differences between those who combined use and sales and those who only sold were not great; to the extent differences existed, they favored those who were involved in both use and sales. Taking the findings regarding drug use, drug sales, and gun activity together, it seems that dealers, addicts, and drugs were common and, in many instances, highly influential pieces in the illicit firearms market of the respondents. Judged by the findings from the study's selected samples, the street economy is not made up of specialists so much as of a generalized commerce in illegal goods wherein guns, drugs, and other illicit commodities are bought, sold, and traded.

Gangs and guns

The notion of a link between gangs and gun-related violence is common in most discussions of crime in the Nation's urban centers. Part of the problem with assessing the accuracy of this perception is the difficulty encountered in classifying the many forms that gangs take. Since the present study was not directed specifically at this issue, it is not possible to resolve the problem fully here. However, it was possible to classify gangs broadly through use of variables central to most discussions of gang typology and actual research on gangs.

Typologies aside, it must be stressed that the gang members mentioned in this report derive from selected samples of juvenile gang members who are also sufficiently serious offenders to merit confinement in maximum security facilities as well as

gang members who are also students in inner-city high schools with established problems of violence.

For the present study gangs are classified into three general types:

- Quasi-gang—a group with whom the respondent identifies but does not define as an organized gang.

- Unstructured gang—a group that is considered an organized gang by the respondent but that has fewer than 10 members or has few of the trappings normally associated with gangs (e.g., an "official" name, an "official" leader, regular meetings, designated clothing, and a specified turf).

- Structured gang—a group that is considered an organized gang by the respondent, has at least 10 members, and has at least 4 of the trappings normally associated with gangs. A total of 68 percent of the inmates and 22 percent of the students were affiliated with a gang or quasi-gang.

As with the relation between drugs and guns, it is important to note that substantial portions of the samples who were not affiliated with gangs were heavily involved in gun-related activity. However, for the inmates and to a lesser extent the students as well, movement from nongang member to member of a gang was associated with increases in possessing and carrying guns. Overall, structured and unstructured gang members differed little in relation to these variables. Both exceeded quasi-gang members in gun possession and carrying. Among inmates, for example, 81 percent of both types reported ownership of a revolver; 75 percent of structured gang members and 72 percent of unstructured gang members reported owning an automatic or semiautomatic handgun. Corresponding figures for quasi-gang members were slightly lower—70 percent and 65 percent, respectively.

Of some special interest, findings from both samples indicate that members of structured gangs were less likely than members of unstructured gangs (for students, even less than those of quasi-gangs) to possess military-style rifles. The preferred (or, at least, most commonly owned) weapon for respondents of both samples

was the revolver, although ownership of military-style weapons among gang-affiliated inmates was quite widespread, averaging 53 percent across gang types.

Implications

- *Owning and carrying guns are fairly common behaviors among segments of the juvenile population—in the present study, among youth with records of serious crime and among students in troubled inner-city schools.* Fifty-five percent of the inmate respondents carried a gun routinely before being incarcerated. Twelve percent of the students carried a gun routinely. Thus, while these behaviors were by no means universal, least of all among the students surveyed, neither were they rare.

- *Perhaps the most striking finding is the quality of firearms these youth possessed.* They were well-made, easy to shoot, accurate, reliable firearms. Whether a matter of accessibility or preference, the most likely owned gun of either sample was a hand weapon (automatic or not) of large caliber. At the time of their incarceration, 55 percent of the inmate respondents owned automatic or semiautomatic handguns; 35 percent owned military-style automatic rifles. Comparable figures for the student sample were 18 and 6 percent, respectively.

- *For the majority of respondents, self-protection in a hostile and violent world was the chief reason to own and carry a gun.* Drug use and sales are seriously implicated in the youth-gun problem, but, at least with respect to the respondents in this study, to characterize either as directly causal is likely incorrect. The same may be said of the association between gangs and guns. While the link is apparent, it is not at all clear whether gangs cause gun use or whether they simply offer safety and a sense of belonging to youth who are already well acquainted with guns and perceive the need for them.

To the extent a violent social world prevails for people like those in the selected samples, the preference for high-quality, powerful firearms should not be surprising. Given the evidently heavy flow of firearms of all sorts through the respondents'

commercial guns of this type will ultimately find favor among both perpetrators and their possible victims. To the extent that anti-violence policy departs from changing the general social conditions that make arms-possession seem necessary and even desirable to juveniles, policy by necessity leans toward dissuading youth from pursuing so many and such lethal weapons. In this vein, the study findings shed some light on the potential for curbing youth violence through controlling gun distribution at the point of retail sale.

- *The handgun (and, secondarily, the shotgun) was the most commonly owned firearm among the respondents.* Much of the recent policy debate over firearms has concerned the wisdom of banning sales (and ownership) of military-style combat rifles to the general public. More than a third of the inmate respondents (though only 1 in 21 students) claimed to have possessed such a weapon at the time they were incarcerated. Yet it would seem highly specialized assault rifles are generally ill-suited for the day-to-day business of self-protection and crime. Outfitted with high-capacity magazines or clips, these weapons are bulky, relatively hard to handle, and very difficult to conceal on the street. Further, the firepower such weapons represent would rarely be in demand. For most offensive and defensive purposes, handgun weapons are better suited.

- *Controls imposed at the point of retail sale likely would be ineffective, at least by themselves, in preventing the acquisition of guns by juveniles studied here because they rarely obtain their guns through such customary outlets.* Indeed, most of the methods of obtaining guns reported by the juveniles are already against the law. Informal commerce in small arms involving purchases and trades among private parties (most likely family members and friends) is difficult to regulate, is exploited by juveniles as well as adults to obtain guns, and successfully subverts legal measures designed to prevent guns from falling into the wrong hands. In the final analysis, the problem may not be that the appropriate laws do not exist but that the laws that do exist, apparently are not or cannot be enforced and that persons involved in financial transactions with juveniles are

not concerned with the legality of the transaction.

- *Judging by the present findings, handguns of all types, and even military-style rifles, are readily available through theft from legitimate sources and can be had at relatively little cost.* Again judging by the present findings, theft seems a major avenue by which guns enter the black market. Most of the inmate respondents, for example, had stolen guns themselves, though most had purchased or traded for the gun they owned at the time they were incarcerated. If theft is indeed such an important piece of the gun-supply puzzle, the approximately 72 million handguns currently possessed by legitimate private owners represent a potentially rich source for criminal handgun acquisition.

- *Therefore, an effective gun ownership policy, of necessity, must confront the issue of firearms theft.* At a minimum, there should be programs to educate the gun-owning public concerning the importance of securing their firearms.

Ultimately, from the viewpoint of policy, it may matter less where juveniles get their guns than where they get the idea that it is acceptable to use them. The problem is less one of getting guns out of the hands of juveniles and more one of reducing motivations (for the sample, primarily self-preservation) for youth to arm themselves in the first place. Convincing juveniles not to own, carry, and use guns will therefore require convincing them that they can survive in their neighborhoods without being armed.

Notes

1. Altschuler, D., and P. Brounstein. 1991. "Patterns of Drug Use, Drug Trafficking and Other Delinquency Among Inner City Adolescent Males in Washington, DC." *Criminology* 29:589-621. See also Cernkovich, S., P. Giordano, and M. Pugh. 1985. "Chronic Offenders: The Missing Cases in Self-Report Delinquency Research." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 76:705-32.
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6. See Beck, A., S. Kline, and L. Greenfeld. 1988. *Survey of Youth in Custody, 1987*. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Fagan, J., E. Piper, and M. Moore. 1986. "Violent Delinquents and Urban Youths." *Criminology* 24:439-71. Fagan, J., E. Piper, and Y. Cheng. 1987. "Contributions of Victimization to Delinquency in Inner Cities." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 78:586-613. Wright, J.D., and P. Rossi. 1986. *Armed and Considered Dangerous*. Hawthorne, New York: Aldine. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1988. *Profile of State Prison Inmates, 1986*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
7. See Fagan, J., E. Piper, and M. Moore. 1986. "Violent Delinquents and Urban Youths." *Criminology* 24:439-71. Fagan, J., E. Piper, and Y. Cheng. 1987. "Contributions of Victimization to Delinquency in Inner Cities." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 78:586-613.

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- Anderson, A.B., A. Basilevsky, and D. Hum. 1983. "Missing Data: A Review of the Literature." In *Handbook of Survey Research*, P. Rossi, J. Wright, and A. Anderson, eds. New York: Academic Press. 415-94.
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Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1988. *Profile of State Prison Inmates, 1986*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Wright, J.D., and P. Rossi. 1986. *Armed and Considered Dangerous*. Hawthorne, New York: Aldine.

Joseph F. Sheley is Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, at Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, and James D. Wright is Favrot Professor of Human Relations, Department of Sociology, Tulane University.

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention are components of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Office for Victims of Crime.

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Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice

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Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

The ATF's Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII), is a pilot program aimed at intervening in the illicit gun market to reduce the illegal supply of firearms to young people.

1) Establishes ATF-state/local law enforcement partnerships in approximately 17 pilot cities to target the illicit youth firearms market.

The YCGII creates a federal-state law enforcement structure to attack illicit firearms markets. At least one crime analyst from each participating police department will join ATF illegal firearms trafficking efforts and participate in relevant federal-state-local task forces.

The federal government will supply equipment, provide training, provide information, provide law enforcement support, make federal firearms trafficking cases against traffickers to youth, conduct a study of local and national firearms markets, and work with state/local authorities to develop a joint strategy to attack the firearms market as it affects juveniles.

The local police department will ensure that all crime guns recovered are traced through ATF's National Tracing Center (NTC), refer non-federal cases derived from ATF's Project LEAD to state and local prosecutors, assist in joint federal/state/local cases, facilitate the study of the illicit gun markets, help develop a joint federal/state/local strategy.

2) Uses the ATF National Tracing Center (NTC) and Project LEAD, to provide the ATF/state/local partnerships with investigative leads to develop federal, state, and local cases against scofflaw firearms dealers and illicit firearms traffickers selling to young people.

The National Tracing Center will trace any crime gun voluntarily submitted by any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency to its NTC. NTC responded to 89,726 trace requests in Fiscal Year 1995. The NTC trace identifies the federal firearms licensee that sold the crime weapon and the initial purchaser of that weapon. NTC returns this information within 11 days for routine traces and within a day for urgent traces.

ATF has developed Project LEAD, a computer based automatic link analysis information system that aggregates and analyzes trace data. Project LEAD identifies firearms purchasers and federal firearm licensee (FFL) who repeatedly have crime-related firearms traced back to them. The information is contained in a Windows environment easily usable by law enforcement investigators.

The systematic use of trace information by ATF to attack illegal firearm traffickers supplying prohibited persons with weapons represents an entirely new, violence prevention law enforcement strategy for ATF and all of federal law enforcement. Few of the nation's 17,000 police departments trace crime guns. For there to be successful nationwide disruption of the illicit firearms markets, all crime-related firearms must be traced.

3) Co-sponsors with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) a study that will provide the AFT-local law enforcement partnerships with operationally relevant information about the illegal juvenile gun market not available through Project LEAD.

In order to target the entire illicit juvenile firearms market about which little is known, Treasury and NIJ will jointly sponsor a study to provide ATF and local police departments more information about the local patterns of illicit gun supply. The new information will be used to develop additional law enforcement strategies.

Researchers will;

- * Report on analysis of LEAD data
- * Collect additional available data
- * Conduct selected interviews
- * Design protocols for sample investigative traces
- * Report on city specific and cross-site analysis of all data
- * Report regularly to ATF

4) Includes as its pilot sites 10 COPS Youth Firearms Initiative cities, 3 NIJ youth violence research sites, and 4 additional cities where the U.S. Attorneys and/or police chiefs have taken a leadership role in youth violence or crime gun interdiction.

COPS Office Youth Firearms Initiative grant sites:

Local Police Department	ATF Support Office
1. Baltimore, MD	Baltimore Field Division
2. Birmingham, AL	Birmingham Field Division
3. Bridgeport, CT	Boston Field Division
4. Cleveland, OH	Cleveland Field Division
5. Inglewood, CA	Los Angeles Field Division
6. Milwaukee, WI	St. Paul Field Division / Milwaukee Office
7. Richmond, VA	Washington Field Division/Richmond Office
8. Salinas, CA	San Fran Field Division / San Jose Office
9. San Antonio, TX	Houston Field Division / San Antonio Office
10. Seattle, WA	Seattle Field Division

NIJ Juvenile Firearms research sites:

1. Atlanta, GA	Atlanta Field Division
2. Boston, MA	Boston Field Division
3. St. Louis, MO	St. Louis Field Division

Additional Cities

1. Jersey City, NJ	New York Field Division / Newark Office
2. Memphis, TN	Nashville Field Division / Memphis Office
3. New York City, NY	New York Field Division
4. Washington, DC	Washington Field Division

5) By creating a partnership between federal and local law enforcement, provides a structure for continued development by law enforcement of federally backed local strategies to attack the illicit gun market as it affects young people.

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YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearm's (ATF) Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) is a pilot program aimed at intervening in the illicit gun market to reduce the illegal supply of firearms to young people and criminals, by tracing crime guns and developing investigative leads. The YCGII:

- (1) Establishes a federal-local law enforcement focus in 17 pilot cities on the illicit youth firearms market. Police departments of various sizes and geographic locations have joined the pilot program. Each will be supported by an ATF office. U.S. Attorneys and state and local prosecutors will provide leadership and prosecutorial support.
- (2) Includes a commitment by the chiefs of police in each city to submit information regarding all crime guns seized locally to ATF's National Tracing Center (NTC) for tracing. A NTC trace identifies the first seller and purchaser of the crime gun, providing an investigative lead for determining how the gun ultimately ended up in the hands of criminals.
- (3) Uses the NTC's Project LEAD, a computer information system that aggregates information derived from individual crime gun traces, to provide law enforcement with additional investigative leads. These leads will be used to develop federal, state, and local cases against illegal firearms traffickers, straw purchasers and others illegally transferring guns to criminals and young people.
- (4) Focuses on investigating and prosecuting scofflaw federally licensed firearms dealers and illegal firearms traffickers and pushers, with emphasis on those who illegally supply firearms to young people and criminals.
- (5) Sponsors a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) study that will analyze the tracing data and provide to law enforcement additional information about illegal gun markets.

The YCGII is supported by a working conference, computers using Project LEAD, and funds to upgrade Project LEAD. Funds are also being provided for training and to support law enforcement operations aimed at traffickers to youth.





These sites were chosen because law enforcement officials at each have made a significant commitment to working with the federal government to reduce youth firearms crime. It is expected that the levels of federal, state, and local law enforcement activity and research occurring in the different sites will vary. This is a pilot program that is intended to produce information about enforcement strategies and the illicit gun market that will benefit local jurisdictions specifically and law enforcement and policy makers generally.

date:

7-3-96

NAME: DENNIS BURKEDEPT: JUSTICEPHONE: 202-456-5568FAX: 202-456-7028FAX
6-7431from: THE LOUIS D. BROWN
PEACE CURRICULUMNUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER
SHEET 4SUBJECT: *Here is the information
about Boston Against Drugs.**Happy Fourth of July.**Joseph M. Chery*

reply: 617-825-1917 PHONE/FAX



Boston Against Drugs

PRESSURE TO USE ILLEGAL SUBSTANCES BEGINS IN THE FOURTH GRADE.

BY AGE 13, 20% OF ALL BOYS AND 22% OF ALL GIRLS HAVE BEGUN TO DRINK ALCOHOL.

WHAT CAN YOU DO ABOUT IT?

TEAM UP WITH B.A.D. Boston Against Drugs B.A.D. Helps Boston Fight Substance Abuse

Boston Against Drugs (B.A.D.) is an active coalition of concerned neighborhood residents, local government, and the business community. Simply put, B.A.D. promotes community health by working to prevent alcohol, tobacco, and other drug abuse.

Since 1985, B.A.D. has been bringing this vital message to Boston through its unique TEAM approach. TEAM stands for "Through Empowerment and Mobilization" and means that only by involving residents, business, and government can Boston work to solve the problem of substance abuse on our streets and in our neighborhoods.

The TEAM approach enables neighborhood teams to design alcohol, tobacco, and other drug prevention programs that are targeted to the specific needs of their neighborhood. Family members, police, clergy, health care providers, and teachers work together to help their community combat substance abuse.

"B.A.D. is based on the notion of partnership. Alcohol, tobacco, and other drug abuse affects individuals, families, and entire communities. Our best hope for fighting this problem is to work together." Tom Menino, Mayor, City of Boston, and Honorary Chair, Boston Against Drugs

HOW B.A.D. TEAMs WORK IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD

All across Boston, members from 16 B.A.D. neighborhood TEAMs are working to develop short-and long-term strategies to address their communities' specific prevention needs. They develop the plan and put it to work.

Each TEAM is free to come up with its own creative approaches to reducing substance abuse in its neighborhood. Some examples of B.A.D. TEAMs at work include:

Boston Against Drugs**Page 2**

- * Sponsoring alcohol, tobacco, and other drug prevention courses at a neighborhood branch library for parents and youth.
- * Training youth sports league coaches who, in turn, educate their teams about substance abuse prevention.
- * Exposing teens firsthand to the harmful consequences and risk factors associated with substance abuse by having them attend a drug court trial.
- * Working with senior outreach organization to identify and help isolated senior citizens avoid substance abuse and over-medication problems.

"Alcohol, tobacco, and other drug abuse is as much a public health problem as it is a safety problem. As with any illness, it's better to prevent it than to treat it. That's why B.A.D. is all about." Bill Van Faasen, President and CEO, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, and Chair, Boston Against Drugs.

B.A.D. at Work With the City of Boston

The City of Boston has been a critical partner in the success of the B.A.D. program. In 1990, the City secured a federal grant from the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) to fund prevention activities and services for Boston's neighborhoods TEAMS by providing expertise, guidance, and invaluable support and services.

"I want my children to have the drug awareness education they need to avoid alcohol and drug abuse. I want them to grow up in a neighborhood that's free from drugs and violence. I am willing to do my part to make sure that happens."

Katie Walsh, Boston Public School Student and Dorchester TEAM participant.

B.A.D. AND BUSINESS PARTNERS: TEAMing UP

Each B.A.D. neighborhood TEAM is paired with one of Boston's sixteen largest and most active businesses. It's just one of the unique elements of the B.A.D. program, and it's proven successful enough to be replicated throughout the country. B.A.D. Business Partners, with their neighborhood TEAMS, create and implement innovative education and prevention initiatives. B.A.D. Business Partners include:

BUSINESS NEIGHBORHOOD

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of MA Citywide Chair

Bank of Boston Hyde Park * Readville

Boston Edison North End

Boston Gas Jamaica Plain

Bull Worldwide Information Systems Allston * Brighton

Brigham & Women's Hospital Mission Hill

Faulkner Hospital West Roxbury

Fleet Bank Roxbury

Gillette South Boston

John Hancock Insurance Company South End

IBM Mattapan

MBTA Roslindale

Massport East Boston

NYNEX Dorchester (2 TEAMS)

The Raymond Group Charlestown

Tufts University Chinatown

B.A.D. PARTNERSHIPS ARE GOOD BUSINESS

B.A.D. Business Partners are taking an active stand. They're helping Boston's neighborhoods reduce substance abuse, and they're helping their own companies create meaningful volunteer opportunities for their employees. B.A.D. Business Partners provide support through a variety of financial and in-kind services.

* A teen business bureau was set up by one B.A.D. Business Partner to train teens in marketable skills as an alternative to becoming involved in the drug economy.

* One Business Partner included educational materials designed by its TEAM in a mailing to 10,000 of its Boston clients.

* Each year, one Business Partner hosts a gala to honor the positive work being done by B.A.D. team members.

And while Boston businesses are working hard for B.A.D., B.A.D. can give back by working with these businesses to educate their employees and combat workplace alcohol, tobacco, and other drug abuse. B.A.D.'s "Focus on the Workplace" program helps businesses develop ways to identify substance abuse problems and cut down on accidents, absenteeism, and other problems associated with workplace substance abuse.

HOW CAN YOU GET INVOLVED?

Whether you're a concerned individual wanting to make a difference or you represent a small business, a large business, or a community group, B.A.D. needs you. The best way to get involved is to join your neighborhood TEAM. No matter how much or how little time you can commit to our mission--there's a way for you to help.

* There are short-term volunteer opportunities at B.A.D. community events.

* If you've got more time, explore becoming an active member of your local B.A.D. TEAM.

* And if you can make a long-term commitment, B.A.D.'s coordinated citywide effort needs your help.


Call today at (617) 635-3283, or stop by our offices in Room 708 at Boston City Hall. We need you to help make a better Boston.

"I value my mental and physical health. Through alcohol and drug abuse prevention training B.A.D. has given me a head start on a drug-free life." Erasto Mercado, Jamaica Plain Against Drugs Youth Peer Leader

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date:

7-3-96



NAME: DENNIS BURKE
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PHONE: 202 - 456 - 5568
FAX: 202 - 456 - 7028

from: THE LOUIS D. BROWN
→ → → PEACE CURRICULUM

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER
SHEET 6

SUBJECT:

Once again, thank you for

*this great honor. I am sending you information
about the Peace Curriculum and my Resume.*

I will fax you information about (BAD)

Later.

Joseph M. Chéry

reply: 617-825-1917 PHONE/FAX

Joseph M. Chéry

5 Dahlgren Street
Dorchester, MA 02124-1011
(617) 825-1917

Education:

<i>Boston University</i> , Boston, Massachusetts; - M.S.W. candidate	Present
<i>College Les Umanites</i> , Port-au-Prince, Haiti; B.S.	1977

Work Experience

Executive Director 1994 - present
Mayor's Office of Boston Against Drugs (BAD), Boston City Hall

Accounts Coordinator 1989 - present
Boston Public Schools Food Services, 26 Court Street, Boston MA 02108

Transportation Audit Specialist 1987 -1989
Boston Public Schools Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Operations

Grants Manager 1986 - 1987
Boston Community Schools

Publications

Weekly column in daily "Le Nouveau Monde", Port-au-Prince, Haiti -1975-1976
Mattapan Against Drugs Spring 1992 Retreat Hand Book - 1992
Mattapan Against Drugs "Mattapan Resource Manual" - 1992

Skills

Personal computer/Multi Media
- Operating Systems: DOS, Microsoft, Geoworks Pro.
- Desk top Publishings: Publish It, DPaint II Plus, Geodraw, First Publisher, Harvard Graphics.
- Word Processors: Word Perfect, Multimate, Geowrite.
- Spread Sheets: Excell, Lotus, Quatro-Pro.
- Data Base: DBase III Plus

Languages: French, Creole , English, Spanish (fair)

Interests

Visual Arts, Reading, Jazz & Classical Music

Affiliation

The Louis D. Brown Social Development Corporation
Founding member, President/Clerk, 1993 - present
The Dorchester House
Vice Chairman, present

Board Member, 1990 - present

Massachusetts Haitian American Cultural Center

Founding member, Board Member, 1990 - present

Haitian Cultural Committee

Founding member, Treasurer, 1989-1991

Boston Afro-American Artists, Inc.

President, 1989

Tele Kreyol Family Television

Chairman of the Board, 1993-present

Awards

Community Contribution Award

The Massachusetts Victim and Witness Assistance Board 1996

Special Recognition Award

Teens Against Gang Violence 1996

Community Health Award

The Medical Foundation 1995

Irv Zola Award

Community Works 1995

Special Citation

Boston Police Department 1994

Outstanding Community Service Award

Boston Plan For Excellence 1994

Certificate of Parent Against Gang/Drug Violence

Teens Against Gang Violence, Boston Health & Hospital 1994

Outstanding Community Program staff

Mass. Immigrant and Refugee Advocacy Coalition, 1994

Speaking Engagements

Violence at our doorstep, what can parents do?

Temple Salem, 222 Woodrow Ave, Mattapan MA January 22, 1994

The responsibilities of future leaders

Teens Against Gang Violence, River Street, Mattapan January 22, 1994

Violence at our doorstep, what must politicians do?

Elliot Church, Inauguration of Councilor G. Saunders February 5, 1994

Community against violence

Boston City Hall, Gun Buy Back Exhibit March 7, 1994

Responsibilities of future leaders

Brighton High School Talent Show for Non Violence March 16, 1994

Peer leading workshop

Woodrow Wilson Middle School, Violence prevention forum March 24, 1994

Family Community & Violence

Startsharp (Parent Workshop) Holland Middle School, Dorchester April 12, 1994

Coalition Building

Holland Middle School, Dorchester Basket Ball Janboree April 23, 1994

Family Values

Unity Sports Club, Celebration of Family & Peace April 24, 1994

Young leaders against violence

Unity Sports Club, TAGV's open house May 16, 1994

Commencement Speech

Martin Luther King, Jr. Middle School June 21, 1994

The Louis D. Brown Peace Curriculum

GOALS

The long term purpose of The Louis D. Brown Peace Curriculum is to help change the city's violent environment to one in which all young people will be safe. The program seeks to cultivate peace among young people and adults by using literature to teach high school sophomores about the value of peace and the constant practice of peaceful ways, and through inter-generational service to foster peace in the community

BACKGROUND

Louis David Brown dreamed of getting *"a Masters 1, 2 and a Ph. D. in Aerodynamic Engineering and to become the first black US President."* As a teenager, he was already working towards the goals he set for himself, earning good grades in school and beginning to investigate the problem of crime, violence, and racism that he could see in Dorchester, Massachusetts, where he lived his whole life.

As a member of Teen Against Gang Violence, he wanted to help his peers change their violent ways because he worried that *"if things don't change, I will be by myself in the White House because by the time I become president my peers will either be all in jail, doped up or dead."*

Louis was 15 years old when he was killed by a stray bullet on his way to a meeting of the Teens Against Gang Violence. The Louis D. Brown Peace Curriculum was developed in his memory by his parents Joseph and Clementina Chery to continue Louis' legacy by teaching the value of peace. The curriculum is offered through the Boston Public Schools because the Cherys believe that a key element to the successful reform of our schools is the active participation of parents in the school lives of their children.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The program is offered primarily to sophomore English classes. The Louis D. Brown Peace Curriculum 50-member Advisory Committee selects a book each year that mirrors the violent reality confronting urban students and embodies the peaceful values it wishes to foster in the students. This book is the core of the curriculum. A teaching guide is developed for each book selected.

A three hour curriculum conference is offered each year to orient teachers to the purpose of the program, motivate them to place high priority on the program in their curriculum, and prepare them to teach about peace and its practice using the book selected for the year.

Teachers read Louis's story to the class, show the biographical video, lead students in the reading and discussion of the selected book, and elicit from students essays about an aspect of peace in the community. The teaching objective is to increase the knowledge and understanding of peaceful behavior and improve reading and writing skills. Each year, the time devoted to the program increases as the curriculum expands by one book a year.

The Louis D. Brown Peace Curriculum Advisory Committee works on the development of the Peace Curriculum, and participates in its implementation. They act as public relations agents and raise funds for the program. Each year, members of the Advisory Committee visit classrooms on the first day of the program to read Louis's story and introduce the theme of Peace. They recruit parents and other adults in the community to work alongside the students and provide services that will produce peace in the community. The common link in the service activities is their inter-generational nature. They provide opportunities for youth and adults to work and play together, demonstrating involved and peaceful behavior.

Students demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of peace through participation in classroom discussions, writing essays or personal stories on the subject of peace, working with adults in service projects, and striving to behave peacefully at all times despite provocation. Students are encouraged to complete ten hour of community service. Essays are collected and judged by the Advisory Committee. Every student who participates in the curriculum receives a Louis D. Brown Certificate of Recognition. The students whose essays are selected are recognized at an awards ceremony. They are awarded Louis D. Brown Fellows and their essays are published in The Book of Peace. The book is distributed to Boston's civic and business organizations and agencies, schools and libraries.

Now in its second year, the Louis D. Brown Peace Curriculum is taught in 16 Boston Public High Schools, three middle schools, one catholic high school, and is used by the United Church in Walpole, Massachusetts as part of their confirmation curriculum.

RESPONSES

Students relate easily to the curriculum because it is based on the story of a peer. Michael Lewis, a 1996 Fellow says that *"My way of keeping Louis Brown's vision alive is to keep my hopes high, and keep on doing well in school"*. They find inspiration in his dreams and his efforts to make a difference. *"If our youth today had dreams like you [Louis], you wouldn't be where you are today"*, says Karla Vasquez a 1996 Fellow from John D. O'Bryant high school. Naomie Pierre, a SOPHOMORE at Hyde Park high school agrees that *"this program can make teenagers think twice"*. What is evident is that Louis' life has become an inspiration for others to think about violence and ways to prevent it. Glenice, a tenth grader at Dorchester high, believes that coming in contact with the Cherys and the Peace Curriculum *"have changed my life and the way I live it every day"*.

Teachers find that *"The Peace Curriculum is more relevant to the lives of the students ..."*. Daniel Jordan, English teacher, West Roxbury High School. The students in Mrs. Ruth Ann Weinstein class at Brighton high school *"were highly honored to participate in the program"*.

Patricia Smith, in the Boston Globe issue of May 3, 1996 prescribes *"the next time you're convinced that the city is going to hell in a hand basket, curl up with this compact little volume [the Book of Peace] and get a hefty dose of hope. Then, just like these kids have done, get up your duff and do something"...* because, as the Honorable Thomas M. Menino, Mayor of Boston declared, *"All 2,000 graduates of The Louis D. Brown Peace Curriculum are the heroes of our campaign for peace"*.

ANNUAL BUDGET SUMMARY

Book Selection and Purchase	9,000.00
Teaching Guide development & printing	5,000.00
Class Visits	0.00
Essays Review	500.00
Teachers Conference	1,500.00
Fellows Award	10,000.00
Book of Peace design & printing	19,000.00
Coordination	25,000.00
Sub Total	70,000.00

FUTURE GOALS

1. The Louis D. Brown Peace Curriculum is taught in all Boston public high schools and three middle schools, and once catholic high school. Our goal for the academic year 1996-97 is to **teach the curriculum in all the catholic high schools in the metropolitan Boston area.**
2. While students are encourages to perform a 10-hour community service, no support services are being offered to them. For the academic year 1996-97, we intend to link with the Boston Public Schools Vecinos Program to **help link students to community service sites in their area of interest and in accessible locations.**
3. To keep students connected to the Peace Curriculum, and to continue to foster the pursuit of a peaceful life, the **Louis D. Brown Fellows will be linked with the Street Smarts Initiative.** The initiative will provide them with training, technical assistance and resources to enable to fellows to work together and develop and implement a peace project of their own. **Interested Fellows will also be enrolled in the 96 Inc. Literary Art Program.**
4. Peacemaking is a life long journey. The lessons learned in class through the peace curriculum need constant reinforcement in the community and at home, in order to continue to be meaningful to the fellow. That is why we want to provide some training to parents, to help bring the peace message in the home. We want to **provide 4 training sessions per year to parent:**
 - **How to connect your children to positive programs**
 - **How to be supportive of your children's dreams**
 - **How to create a home atmosphere of peace**
 - **How to make peace a part of the home/growing up education**
5. Academic year 1996-97 will mark the third year of the Louis D. Brown Peace Curriculum. With help from the Educators for Social Responsibility and Zamor Associates, we will **develop and evaluation tool to assess the effectiveness of the program.**

SIGNIFICANT ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS OF GUN TRAFFICKERS DEALING TO JUVENILES

Virginia

In June 1994, an adult in Danville, Virginia made a straw purchase of a firearm from an FFL on behalf of a juvenile. Two hours later, the juvenile robbed a grocery store and murdered the manager of the store. The juvenile then travelled to Washington DC and sold the murder weapon on the streets. In January 1995, ATF positively linked the gun to the murder. The juvenile pled guilty to first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The adult who purchased the gun for the juvenile was charged with making false statements relating to the purchase of a firearm from an FFL.

Missouri

In November 1991, three young males with a TEC-9 fired upon two St. Louis police officers. The officers returned fire and were able to apprehend one of the juveniles and recover a firearm. Ballistics evidence revealed that the firearm had been utilized in two separate homicides. The juvenile was later charged with both murders. ATF and the St. Louis Police initiated a joint investigation of the FFL from whom the firearm had been purchased. An undercover officer met with the FFL, purchased 11 handguns, ammunition and in excess of 1 ounce of cocaine. It was learned that the FFL had purchased approximately 450 firearms and sold them illegally. Many of these firearms were illegally sold to St. Louis street gangs, which include many juveniles. Ninety-six of these firearms have been recovered after being used in murders, robberies, assaults, and narcotics violations. The FFL was convicted and sentenced to seven years imprisonment for violations of the Federal firearms and narcotics laws.

North Carolina

In January 1995, ten members of a violent street gang were arrested as a result of an eighteen month investigation. Nine narcotics-related shootings were attributed to this gang. Additionally, members of the gang distributed over twenty-five kilograms of crack cocaine in the Reidsville-Rockingham County area. It was learned that numerous firearms had been sold to juveniles who provided "protection" for the gang's operations. Nine of the ten gang members were found guilty and received sentences of from three years to life imprisonment.

South Carolina

In July 1993, an ATF led task force dubbed "Operation Gunshot" discovered that a felon acted as a straw purchaser of a firearm for a juvenile. The juvenile was later arrested along with 9 other teenagers for their involvement in a shooting spree at the Haywood Mall in Greenville, South Carolina. The felon pled guilty to making false statements to obtain a firearm and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.

California

A mother and daughter who were licensed as at-home gun dealers acquired over 90 inexpensive handguns and sold the guns, with the assistance of a juvenile son, directly to gang members. Forty of these guns have been recovered, and approximately half are known to have been involved in crimes such as driveby shootings and bank robberies. The mother and son have pled guilty to making false statements and the daughter pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge. They are awaiting sentencing.

Texas

A juvenile shot and killed a man during a carjacking using a gun which the juvenile's aunt had purchased for him. The juvenile accompanied his aunt to the firearms dealer, picked out the gun, and the juvenile returned alone after the 5 day waiting period to pick up the firearm. The firearm dealer gave the gun to the juvenile. In August 1994, the father and son firearms dealers pled guilty to firearms violations and each were sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative - Statement of Participants

The undersigned federal and local law enforcement officials concur in the statements below and commit to work cooperatively to further the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII):

1) While it has become increasingly difficult for prohibited purchasers, such as convicted felons, those under age 18, and those subject to protective orders, to obtain firearms through licensed firearms dealers, criminals continue to obtain guns from straw purchasers and from illegal black market traffickers.

2) The original source of crime guns seized by law enforcement officers usually can be established through the use of firearms tracing by the National Tracing Center of the Department of Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. With information about the origin of crime guns, law enforcement officials can begin to trace the chain of ownership of those guns and to detect patterns of illegal gun trafficking. This information, in turn, can be the basis for discovering the identities of those involved in this illegal gun trafficking.

3) The YCGII is a valuable pilot program. It will evaluate the extent to which the dedication of resources to an intense gun tracing approach will yield increased prosecutions for illegal gun trafficking and disrupt the illegal flow of guns to America's young people. The YCGII will utilize Project LEAD, a computer software system that examines crime gun trace information and provides law enforcement officers with crucial investigative leads about the sources of these guns.

4) Through existing partnership programs with local law enforcement officials, such as the Anti-Violent Crime Initiative, the YCGII is entitled to the cooperative attention of all law enforcement officers in a range of pilot cities, who can test its effectiveness and provide the basis for a determination of whether it should be expanded nationwide.

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Chief of Police

Prosecuting Attorney

ATF Special Agent in Charge

United States Attorney

Baltimore, MD:

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United States Attorney**Salinas, CA:**

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YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearm's (ATF) Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII), is a pilot program aimed at intervening in the illicit gun market to reduce the illegal supply of firearms to young people.

The initiative:

- (1) Establishes ATF-state/local law enforcement partnerships in approximately 17 pilot cities to target the illicit youth firearms market;
- (2) Uses the ATF National Tracing Center (NTC) and Project LEAD, a NTC computer information system, to provide the ATF/state/local partnerships with investigative leads to develop federal, state, and local cases against scofflaw firearms dealers and illicit firearms traffickers selling to young people;
- (3) Co-sponsors with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) a study that will provide the ATF-local law enforcement partnership with operationally relevant information about the illegal juvenile gun market not available through Project LEAD; ?
- (4) Includes as its pilot sites 10 Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Youth Firearms Initiative cities, 3 NIJ youth violence research sites, and 4 additional cities where the U.S. Attorneys and/or police chiefs have taken a leadership role in youth violence or crime gun interdiction;
- (5) By creating a partnership between federal and local law enforcement, provides a structure for the continued development by law enforcement of federally backed local strategies to attack the illicit gun market as it affects young people.

The YCGII is supported by one working conference, computers, training, administrative, and operational funds, and is jointly funded by the Department of the Treasury through ATF, and the Department of Justice through NIJ, with participation from U.S. Attorneys.

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

PURPOSES AND ASSUMPTIONS

The purpose of ATF's Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative is to reduce youth access to firearms, and reduce youth firearms violence, death, and injury by:

Creating a community oriented law enforcement structure for mobilizing local police departments, with federal backing, to disrupt the illegal firearms market, especially the illegal youth firearms market and its adult suppliers;

Developing and implementing a federal-state-local law enforcement strategy to interdict illegal sources of firearms, particularly to youth;

Investigating and prosecuting scofflaw federally licensed firearms dealers and illegal firearms traffickers and pushers, with emphasis on those who supply firearms to young people.

The basic facts and ideas behind the YCGII are:

Because most guns used by young people in crimes are obtained illegally, disrupting the illicit gun market and reducing the availability of illegal guns will result in less youth violence;

Existing survey research on both juveniles and adult felons indicates that roughly 1/3 say they can obtain a gun with difficulty, and 1/3 not at all, suggesting that tightening the market is a reasonable approach to decreasing firearms violence.

Because youth gun acquisition may be particularly tied to illicit drug market and gang activity, it is necessary to develop community oriented policing partnerships that can jointly address all aspects of the juvenile firearms violence, including fear, illicit drugs, and gangs;

Because surveys have consistently revealed that kids acquire weapons mostly out of fear and for self-defense, primarily fear of other kids with guns, making it harder to get guns will break the current cycle of fear leading to gun acquisition leading to more fear and more gun acquisition.

It is expected that there will be a variation in the levels of federal, state, and local enforcement activity and research occurring in the different sites. This is a pilot program that is intended to produce information about enforcement strategies and the illicit gun market that will benefit local jurisdictions specifically and law enforcement and policy makers generally.

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

PROGRAM SUMMARY

Federal-local Partnership. The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative creates a federal-state law enforcement structure to attack illicit firearms markets. *At least one crime analyst from each participating police department will join ATF illegal firearms trafficking efforts and participate in relevant federal-state-local task forces.*

Partnership Mission. The mission of the partnerships is to disrupt the illicit youth firearms market.

Partnership Strategy. The initial strategy will be to use ATF crime gun tracing information to identify and build federal, state, and local cases against scofflaw federal firearms licensees, straw purchasers, and illegal traffickers of firearms to young people.

Partnership Roles. The partnership provides benefits to both sides.

The federal government will:

- (1) supply equipment,
- (2) provide training,
- (3) provide operational information to federal, state, and local authorities,
- (4) provide law enforcement support to state and local law enforcement,
- (5) make federal firearms trafficking cases against locally active illegal firearms traffickers to youth,
- (6) conduct a study of the local and national illicit youth firearms markets,
- (7) join with local police departments to develop appropriate federal, state and local law enforcement strategies to attack the illicit firearms market as it affects juveniles.

The local police department will supply a local partner for the to join ATF illegal firearms trafficking enforcement efforts, who will:

- (1) ensure that all crime guns recovered in the jurisdiction are traced through ATF's National Tracing Center (NTC),
- (2) refer non-federal trafficking cases derived from ATF's Project LEAD to state and local prosecutors,
- (3) assist in joint federal-state-local firearms trafficking cases,
- (4) facilitate the study of the illicit gun markets,
- (5) continue to work with ATF in developing new law enforcement strategies to address illicit firearms markets.

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND DETAILS

ATF's Overall Illegal Firearms Trafficking Strategy. *The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative builds on, and is a component of, ATF's overall trafficking strategy which seeks to cut off the illicit supply of firearms by building cases against the sources of crime guns. The trafficking strategy has the following elements:*

NTC traces. ATF traces any crime gun voluntarily submitted by any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency to its National Tracing Center. Agencies may submit basic information about the crime gun to the NTC through NLETS, a computer phone line, telephone, or by fax. NTC responded to 89,726 federal, state, and local trace requests in Fiscal Year 1995.

Traces that solve firearms crimes. *The NTC trace identifies the federal firearms licensee (FFL) that sold the crime weapon and the initial purchaser of that weapon. NTC returns this information to the submitting agency within approximately 11 days for routine traces and within a day for urgent traces. Trace information can be useful in any case involving a firearm, by providing leads to, or evidence of, the link between the perpetrator of the crime and the weapon. Though prosecutors may successfully make cases without this information, an NTC trace can only serve to strengthen the evidence against a defendant and in some instances may prove crucially important to developing a prosecutable case.*

Traces that identify illegal traffickers. *NTC trace information can lead to the building of an additional case against a licensed firearms dealer, straw purchases of illegal firearms trafficker that illegally sold, transported and/or transferred the crime gun to the criminal. Arresting a scofflaw FFL or illicit trafficker disrupts the illegal supply of firearms to felons, juveniles, and other persons prohibited by law from possessing a firearm.*

Supply disruption that aims at preventing firearms crime. *The systematic use of trace information by ATF to attack illegal firearms traffickers supplying prohibited persons with weapons represents an entirely new, violence prevention law enforcement strategy for ATF and all of federal law enforcement. ATF and state law enforcement agencies, using a variety of "three strikes" type statutes, will continue to arrest the most violent criminals who use firearms, but will now also take action against illegal firearms suppliers, with the goal of depriving prohibited persons their illicit source of firearms, thus reducing overall levels of violence.*

Use of Project LEAD at the NTC to support the strategy. *When a number of crime gun traces are aggregated and analyzed, the trace data supplies information concerning patterns of illegal trafficking. The more firearms traced, the more patterns are visible. ATF has developed Project LEAD, a computer based automated link analysis information system that aggregates and analyzes trace data. Project LEAD identifies firearms purchasers and FFLs who repeatedly have crime-related firearms traced back to them. The information is contained in a Windows environment easily usable by law enforcement investigators. The identifications provide leads that ATF may follow up in criminal investigations or regulatory inspections.*

Limited local use of Project LEAD. Individual NTC traces are provided directly to the submitting law enforcement entity. Project LEAD software is provided to ATF's 24 field divisions. While ATF's firearms trafficking task forces will invite local police department participation, *ATF's overall firearms trafficking strategy is primarily federally focused, using Project LEAD data to build multi-defendant, interstate gun trafficking cases.*

Pilot success with Project LEAD. An early example of success with Project LEAD is from New York City, one of the eight sites where the software has been piloted. Crime guns seized in NYC were traced to a former Birmingham, Alabama FFL called Traders Two. On December 29, 1995, the Birmingham U.S. Attorney announced the indictments of a federally licensed firearms dealer and six other persons on charges including conspiracy, illegal possession of firearms, and making false statements on firearms records.

Increasing crime gun tracing. The more firearms traced, the more data there is for Project LEAD to analyze, and the more information will be available to all of law enforcement about illegal firearms traffickers. At the federal level, law enforcement agencies are now committing to gun tracing. At the local level many police departments, with a few notable exceptions, are unfamiliar with the benefits of tracing recovered crime guns and the concept of disrupting illicit firearms markets through a trafficking strategy. *Few of the nation's 17,000 police departments trace crime guns. For there to be successful nationwide disruption of the illicit firearms markets, all crime-related firearms must be traced.*

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative. *The Youth Crime Gun initiative both extends and develops ATF's illegal firearms trafficking strategy, firearms tracing, and Project LEAD infrastructure, while placing emphasis on illegal firearms traffickers who supply young people. The initiative will work as follows:*

Local partners. In approximately 17 pilot jurisdictions, local police chiefs will designate a staff person to join ATF's illegal firearms trafficking efforts and be the local partner with federal law enforcement. The local partner will concentrate on firearms trafficking cases involving youth crime guns.

Crime gun tracing. Upon joining the initiative, the local police department will commit to submitting all crime guns recovered in the jurisdiction for NTC tracing. NTC trace results information will be provided to the jurisdiction through the local partner. The tracing and LEAD analysis of all crime guns, and not only all juvenile crime guns, is a benefit of this project that will both assist local law enforcement in criminal investigations and provide the firearms trafficking groups with a broader picture of the local illicit gun market. *In sites where record keeping and resources permit, traces will be conducted on a sample of or all juvenile crime guns for the preceding five years, and a sample of adult crime guns for comparison purposes.*

Site and juvenile specific Project LEAD analysis. *The NTC will upgrade Project LEAD software (1) to create a geographic information system that provides trace analysis and investigative leads specific to the 17 jurisdictions, and (2) to provide information that further describes the illicit youth market, for instance whether the crime gun was recovered at a school. Project LEAD updates will be provided at least every 30 days to the the firearms trafficking groups, permitting the continuous evaluation of new investigative leads. This YCGII will be ATF's first use of a local (as opposed to regional) and group specific application for Project LEAD.*

Project LEAD computers and training. The initiative includes computers for use in operating the specially designed software. These computers will belong to the local police departments. The Treasury Department will fund 17 computers for the participating ATF field offices. ATF field agents will train the local partners in the use of Project LEAD data.

Firearms Trafficking investigations and inspections. *Using Project LEAD information developed from local crime gun traces, ATF and local police departments will conduct criminal investigations and attempt to develop firearms trafficking cases against scofflaw FFLs, straw purchasers, and illegal firearms traffickers supplying local juveniles. In addition, ATF will conduct inspections at FFLs identified by Project LEAD as a source of crime-related firearms.*

Limitations of Project LEAD. *Because cases generated by Project LEAD will only reach a segment of the illicit firearms market affecting young people, the YCGII takes additional steps to attempt to address the entire illicit firearms market.*

The problem. NTC tracing identifies only the FFL seller and the first purchaser; it does not provide information about subsequent purchasers or transferrers of the crime gun to the person from whom the weapon has been confiscated. When the time elapsed from purchase to confiscation by law enforcement (for criminal possession or activity) is short - under two years -- Project LEAD is most effective in linking crime guns with illicit traffickers. (Guns may be called "crime guns" both if they are illegally possessed or because they have been used in another crime.) The longer a crime gun has been in circulation before its confiscation and submission for tracing, the more likely it is to have had multiple owners, and to require additional investigation by ATF in order to determine its chain of transfer from the legal to the illegal market. *So-called short time-to-crime guns constitute only a part of the supply of guns illicitly available to young people. Interdicting them and arresting their traffickers is therefore only a partial strategy to reduce the illicit availability of guns to juveniles.*

The additional steps: targeting the entire illicit youth firearms market. Very little is known about the characteristics of the illicit juvenile firearms market not supplied by easily traceable, short time-to-crime firearms. Yet ATF and researchers believe this may be as much as half or more of the illegal firearms supply. For instance, in Boston 70% of the juvenile crime guns are more than two years old, and only 50% of the guns are semi-automatic pistols, which are generally new guns, while revolvers (30%) and long guns (20%) are generally older. *In order to target the entire illicit juvenile firearms market about which little is known, Treasury and NIJ will jointly sponsor a study to provide ATF and local police departments more information about the local patterns of illicit gun supply. The new information will be used to develop additional law enforcement strategies.*

Differences between the youth and adult illicit markets. Little is known about the differences between how kids and adults obtain firearms illegally. Existing indications are that juveniles: use straw purchasers to obtain guns from firearms dealers, since FFLs cannot sell to juveniles; prefer new, semi-automatic pistols to older guns; and use fewer guns obtained in burglaries. This data is from limited research and may not be representative of the picture nationwide. The lack of illicit firearms market information useful to law enforcement is the principal reason for the study.

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE JOINT NIJ-TREASURY-ATF STUDY

Treasury/NIJ Funded Joint Study. Researchers will:

Report on analysis of LEAD data -- analyze LEAD data, by site, aggregated and cross-site, and report any useful findings to ATF and the local partner.

Collect additional available data -- with local partner assistance, collect additional available data associated with the juvenile traces and a comparison sample of adult felon traces, such as crime report information, firearm value information, and criminal history and associations of the juvenile; analyze this data by site, aggregated and cross-site, and report any useful findings to ATF to be shared with the local partner.

Conduct selected interviews -- where possible, conduct selected interviews to obtain qualitative information that will verify and supplement information derived from available data -- with special agents, gang officers, probation officers, juveniles, and others.

Design protocols for sample investigative traces -- with ATF, design protocols and samples to support limited investigative or end-to-end traces by ATF of youth crime guns, and a comparison sample of crime guns used by felons -- investigative traces follow crime guns through the complex channels that deliver them from the point of sale to the street.

Report on city specific and cross-site analysis of all data -- using available data, interview reports, and investigative trace results -- to provide such information as: what type of firearms are preferred by type of juvenile and type of crime, source of firearms by nature of offense, firearms acquisition by gang affiliation, time-to-crime for particular groups of offenders, concentration of FFLs and straw purchasers for particular groups of offenders, and the structure of illicit firearms markets.

Report regularly to ATF. The NIJ researchers will provide analysis and information to ATF on a periodic basis as it is developed, so that to the extent permitted by law it is immediately available for law enforcement purpose, as well as formal final reports.

Improvements in Law Enforcement Information Collection. Researchers and ATF will determine what information ought to be collected on a long term basis and/or added to the LEAD system, based on the pilot project's information utility to law enforcement at each site. The initiative's upgrades of Project LEAD will be evaluated, as well as the use of available data, interviews, and investigative traces. *Tailoring federal law enforcement data for local application and making it available to local law enforcement is a major benefit of the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative.*

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE BACKGROUND

The ATF Juvenile Tracing Initiative.

Over two years ago, in November 1993, Under Secretary (Enforcement) Ronald K. Noble directed ATF Director Magaw to address the issue of juvenile gun crime. Director Magaw began the Juvenile Tracing Initiative in which ATF announced to all local police departments that it would provide trace information on any illegally possessed firearm recovered from a juvenile. Since the project started, over 5,000 juvenile guns have been reported to and traced by ATF. ATF has also compiled and analyzed the trace data to develop preliminary information about the sources of juvenile crime guns, the types of crime guns used by juveniles, and the crimes in which they are used. *ATF's analysis, combined with confirming analysis from other published and academic research, has provided information used in developing this proposed initiative, which combines further tracing and information analysis with law enforcement operations.*

Treasury Enforcement's Strategic Plan: Juvenile Homicide and Illicit Gun Markets.

Treasury Enforcement, in fall 1994, adopted a strategic plan that identifies juvenile homicide as the single most important problem to address in the area of violent crime. The plan states:

Homicides committed by juveniles (often while they are under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol) using firearms have increased significantly while violent crime in general continues at unacceptably high levels throughout the nation. . . We will . . . [e]nsure the integrity of the market in firearms and destructive devices by ensuring that businesses holding Federal firearms licenses are run responsibly, and by preventing the illegal acquisition, possession and trade of firearms by illegal gun traffickers, criminals and juveniles through a combination of regulatory and enforcement actions.

This initiative fulfills Enforcement's commitment to address youth firearms homicides, by preventing the illegal acquisition, possession and trade of firearms by illegal gun traffickers and young people.

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE BACKGROUND

ATF's Strategic Plan: The Illegal Firearms Trafficking Strategy (Disarming the Criminal). In FY 1995, ATF proposed, Treasury supported, and OMB approved a restructuring of ATF field offices. The plan, called the Integrated Violence Impact Strategy (IVIS), establishes new Firearms Crime Coordination Groups (FCCGs) and Violent Crime Coordinators (VCCs) along with new Firearms Trafficking Task Forces (FTTFs). When the FCCGs are fully funded, they will be developed to include ATF personnel (VCCs) and representatives of the U.S. Attorney, state prosecutors, and local law enforcement. With the FCCGs and VCCs, ATF is able to streamline the process by which it handles some armed violent criminal and armed narcotics trafficker cases by ensuring that only those cases meritorious of federal attention are brought into the federal courts system. At the same time, crime-related firearms trace information gathered by the FCCGs and VCCs is fed into Project LEAD and utilized by increased numbers of ATF field personnel who have been redirected to investigate illegal firearms trafficking. This strategy brings ATF's full unique expertise, information, and statutory jurisdiction to bear on the illicit firearms markets. ATF's illegal firearms trafficking efforts consist of formal/full-fledged task forces in some locations, informal firearms trafficking groups in other locations, and in still other locations the efforts may consist of a few special agents dedicated to firearms trafficking. As with the FCCGs, ATF will seek participation by U.S. Attorneys, state and local prosecutors, and local police departments. *Firearms trafficking groups existing in any of the 17 sites will participate in the juvenile initiative.*

Project LEAD.

In late 1995, ATF introduced Project LEAD to its 24 field division offices. Project LEAD is a computer software program that enables law enforcement to manage crime gun trace information in the database of the National Tracing Center. (By statute, the out of business records of federal firearms licensees which are maintained at the NTC cannot be computerized.) Project LEAD software as an automated link analysis information system which organizes the trace data, providing ATF special agents and regulatory inspectors with information concerning potential illegal firearms trafficking patterns, illegal purchasers, problem firearms dealers, and geographic sources of crime gun supply. Project LEAD is enabling ATF to focus its limited resources and initiate many more criminal and regulatory investigations against illegal firearms traffickers. Since 1993, illegal firearms trafficking criminal cases have risen from comprising 14.4% of all ATF's firearms cases, to 21.5% in 1995. Further increases are projected. Piloted in 8 cities, including New York city, Project LEAD recently resulted in its first major case, the Traders Two case, in which the Birmingham U.S. Attorney indicted several individuals illegally trafficking firearms from an FFL in Birmingham, Alabama to New York. U.S. Attorneys have been receptive to ATF's cases, and several U.S. Attorneys are leaders in focusing on ATF's trace information, including Faith Hochberg (New Jersey), Eric Holder (D.C.), Don Stern (Boston), and Veronica Coleman (Memphis). *The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative will tailor Project LEAD software to produce information specifically about traffickers of firearms to youth and youth firearms crimes in the participating jurisdictions, and place computers to run this software in participating sites.*

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE BACKGROUND

Department of Justice Policy Priority.

Attorney General Janet Reno has issued a comprehensive plan for reducing youth violence. *The Justice Department's Juvenile Justice Action Plan includes as Objective 3 - reducing youth involvement with guns, drugs, and gangs.*

Department of Justice COPS Youth Firearms Initiatives.

The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office of the Department of Justice has granted \$1 million to 10 communities to establish innovative programs to increase and enhance proactive crime control and prevention programs in which juveniles, law enforcement, and others participate. For instance, in Birmingham, Alabama, police will work with school officials to conduct searches of lockers, vehicles, and students for illegally possessed firearms. Birmingham police will also enforce curfews and step up their presence in high illicit activity sites in the city. Similarly, in Baltimore, Maryland, the police department is adding 24 officers to curfew teams and juvenile violent crime teams. *Without receiving additional funding from COPS, the COPS Youth Firearms Initiative communities will participate in the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative, which will provide a federally backed firearms enforcement program to the participating police department that includes gun traces, illicit market information, and law enforcement support.*

Department of Justice NIJ Juvenile Gun Crime Research.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has been sponsoring research on youth gun crime for several years, and is the source of most published research on youth firearms use. At present, related NIJ research focuses on programs in four cities: Atlanta (cooperative community efforts, including public health resources); Boston (juvenile illicit firearms market research); Detroit (gun court); St. Louis (mentoring and consensual home weapons searches). *The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative builds on previously published NIJ research, current NIJ research, especially in Boston, as well as on ATF analysis, and sponsors a study to better map illicit gun markets in the participating locations and, through aggregation of data, nationwide.*

Local Police Department Initiatives and Successes.

Individual communities and police departments, sometimes working with U.S. Attorneys, have made firearms violence a priority. There is promising evidence, though not evidence dealing particularly with juveniles, from both New York City and Kansas City that measures aimed at detering gun carrying can result in significant decreases in violent crime. *The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative provides a federal strategy and federal support aimed primarily at reducing the illegal supply of juvenile firearms, and generally disrupting local firearms markets to complement and expand on local initiatives in the pilot cities.*

YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION INITIATIVE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

(1) By intensifying ATF's investigative efforts, do you expect significant numbers of new prosecutions under the Youth Hand Gun Safety Act (sec. 922(x)(1)) or other related laws?

ATF is not predicting the number of prosecutions that will result from its intensified focus, nor the time frame in which they might occur. ATF is also not placing special emphasis on particular charges or statutes. ATF is launching a pilot program, rather than a nationwide program, to determine whether the type of resources being provided will lead to useful results in three areas: prosecutions of illegal firearms traffickers; the use of intelligence and research in mapping illicit firearm market patterns; and improved state and local law enforcement efforts.

(2) Is the YCGII focused on illegal firearms trafficking to "juveniles" or to "youth?"

ATF and Treasury designed this program in response to the fact that youth gun homicides have nearly tripled since 1985, while non-gun violence, and the rate of violence for older age groups have not changed. While the gun homicide victimization rates are comparable in the 15-19 year old and 20-24 year old age groups, the increase in offending/arrest rates are much higher in the 15-19 year old age group than in the 20-24 year old age group. Between 1985 and 1992, the biggest increase in murder arrest rates (all the increase is in gun homicides) was for 18 year olds, about 2 ½ times, and it is practically the same for the whole . For 21 year olds, it was about a 1 ½ times. There has been little or no increase in older age groups since 1985. 86 J. Crim. Law and Criminology 10, 17, 21 (1995).

Our primary concern is the age group that is experiencing this upward spiral in gun homicides -- this upward spiral of youth on youth gun homicide is what we are trying to reduce or stop through intervention in illicit gun markets. However, the YCGII is not strictly limited to focusing on those illegally trafficking firearms to the federally defined "juvenile." Rather, participating ATF field offices will focus on illegal traffickers of firearms to youth, understood as including the federally defined under 18, with flexibility to focus on illegal traffickers of firearms to young people up to 21 years of age or older if circumstances warrant.

Implicit in this question is a concern over the difficulties in using juveniles as witnesses. This is addressed in the next question.

(3) Will the YCGII overwhelm ATF's investigative resources, especially in southern states which are frequently the sources of firearms illegally trafficked to northern states?

The YCGII will be supported by ATF's current level of resources, and the initiative -- including operations, intelligence and research, and assistance to state and local law enforcement - will be given priority attention. If the pilot program can demonstrate that more investigative resources would be useful, this will be taken into account during the next budget cycle.

Notwithstanding the current need for additional agents, ATF expects to be able to support operations under this initiative. In early 1996, ATF's field divisions received Project LEAD software, a linkanalysis system that aggregates crime-related firearms trace data. Project LEAD provides ATF's field enforcement efforts with information concerning those individuals who continually show up as a purchaser or transferor of firearms which are later recovered in crimes. This provides investigative leads to special agents, especially for crime-related firearms for which the time span from purchase to crime is short, without depending on resource intensive end to end tracing. With the NTC and Project LEAD, it is also not always necessary to have an illegal youthful firearm possessor's cooperation in determining the source or method of firearm acquisition. And, since present information suggests that youthful crime gun users, at least in some cities, favor new semi-automatic pistols, Project LEAD can be expected to have a disproportionate impact on illegal firearms trafficking cases involving youth crime guns.

An example of the use of the NTC and Project LEAD in cases of firearms trafficking to young people is a case out of the Washington Field Division in which a firearm, recovered from a juvenile pursuant to an investigation of assault with a deadly weapon in the District of Columbia, was traced to a straw purchaser and linked with a robbery/murder in Virginia; the purchaser admitted the straw purchase for a juvenile and has been charged under 18 U.S.C. section 922(a)(6).

(4) How is the YCGII distinguished from ATF's overall illegal firearms trafficking strategy and what number of U.S. Attorneys are already working with ATF and Project LEAD to perfect illegal firearms trafficking cases?

Project LEAD was piloted in 8 cities, and therefore some U.S. Attorneys and police chiefs are familiar with it. The YCGII is a component of ATF's overall illegal firearms trafficking strategy, which was launched in late 1995 with a reorganization of field offices to streamline the processing of referred cases in order to free up resources for redirection to trafficking cases. The YCGII has a specific youth focus in several ways, for instance, it: gives extra operational support funds to participating sites for developing cases aimed at traffickers to young people; provides over \$200,000 for Project LEAD software upgrades to serve the sites and include new information relating to youth crime guns; requires local police departments to trace all crime guns in return for analysis relating to youth crime gun trafficking patterns; supports a major study of illegal firearms trafficking patterns by NIJ, with special analysis of the illicit youth firearms market; funds an initial meeting among participants to exchange ideas; establishes a structure for ATF-local cooperation on intervention in local illicit youth firearms markets, not limited to the development of federal prosecutions. In a few cities, where U.S. Attorneys and/or state and local law enforcement have taken a leadership role in either firearms tracing or other youth gun violence strategies, the YCGII will provide additional information, analysis and resources, and establish a framework for sharing their experience with the other sites. In most of the sites, an intensified youth crime gun law enforcement focus will be new.

(5) How will the YCGII be coordinated with other anti-violent crime law enforcement programs?

Where federally coordinated task forces relating to youth violence or illegal firearms trafficking exist, ATF expects the YCGII to become a part of the ongoing discussion. Funding for YCGII investigative operations is being provided by the Department of the Treasury.

The 17 initial sites were chosen because law enforcement officials in these locations have manifested a commitment to addressing youth violence, through participation in Department of Justice grant or research projects, or through the leadership role of certain U.S. Attorneys and police chiefs. This decision was a pragmatic one, in the hopes that the pilot could be launched most rapidly in these locations.

(6) Is there any indication that the illicit youth firearms market is different from the rest of the illicit firearms market?

Lack of sufficient information about how the illegal firearms market works has made it difficult to construct an effective strategy against illegal traffickers, and is the reason for including a study in the YCGII. However, *information we already have from past research concerning juvenile firearms preferences suggest that federal and state law enforcement working together can have a more effective impact on illegal firearms trafficking to young people than with cases involving the illegal trafficking of firearms to adult criminals, due in part because those juvenile firearms preferences lend themselves to easy identification of the illicit source.* Because of that expectation, resources are being focused on the illegal traffickers of firearms to young people and a specific effort will be made to work with local law enforcement to seek out crime guns from particularly violent locations.

Firearm tracing has demonstrated that the patterns of illicit acquisition of firearms are different for juveniles and adult criminals, at least in some cities. It is unlawful for anyone to sell, deliver or transfer a handgun to a juvenile. Since handguns are by far the preferred weapon of choice for criminal usage, juveniles must rely on black marketeers to supply their needs.

ATF's Juvenile Tracing Program, begun two years ago, as well as other research on the types of guns associated with the decade old rise in juvenile gun violence, demonstrate that *juveniles, in contrast to adult felons, are associated with semi-automatic pistols.* In Boston, where NIJ (Kennedy) has sponsored gun market research for the past two years, more than half of all guns recovered from juveniles by the police are semiautomatic pistols. *Semiautomatic pistols entered the civilian stockpile only in the mid-eighties, and are thus less easily available through theft.* Juveniles, and those supplying firearms to young people illegally, thus appear to be relying on diversions of newly purchased guns rather than on gun theft, or at least in greater proportion. Such guns are far more readily investigable by following up on trace analysis.

An important difference between the juvenile and adult gun markets is the "time to crime" associated with illicit guns, that is, the time between a gun's first sale at retail and the time it is recovered from a crime by police. For semi-automatic pistols recovered from juveniles in Boston, 41% have a time to crime of less than two years. Certain makes of semiautomatic pistols popular with juveniles show from 50% to, for one brand, 90% with time to crime of under two years. Adults show very different patterns. In Boston, of the guns taken away from those age 30 or older, only 17% have a time to crime of less than two years. These guns are of more traditional styles, are older, and are less likely to have been purchased and more likely to have been stolen. Again, guns with quick time to crime are more readily investigable.

Also related, is that the geographic source of crime guns is different for adults and juveniles. Only 34% of all guns seized from juveniles in Massachusetts were first sold at retail in Massachusetts; fully 31% came from southern states (Georgia, Florida, Virginia, Alabama, North Carolina, Mississippi, South Carolina), giving a clear Federal prosecutorial interest. Of guns seized from adults age 30 or older, 51% were first sold in Massachusetts.

The chance of making an impact on illegal firearms trafficking to juveniles is therefore much better, because the newer a gun is, and the fewer hands it has passed through, the easier it is to investigate its diversion and its diverters -- to identify scofflaw FFLs, straw purchasers, trace its path to the street, and build prosecutions. A ten year old .38 caliber revolver may be an investigative dead end. A six-month old semi-automatic pistol is promising. To the extent that there are larger illegal gun running operations, they are more likely to be dealing in the new guns, more likely to be dealing to juveniles, and more likely to be found by analyzing and tracing local crime guns, especially guns supplied by certain geographic locations.

Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative

WASHINGTON, DC

Sunday, July 7, 1996 - Hotel Washington, Washington Room
615 15th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20004

6:30 p.m. - 7:30 p.m. Reception

Monday, July 8, 1996 - Old Executive Office Building
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

8:30 a.m. Continued Breakfast

9:00 a.m. Introduction and Welcome

9:10 a.m. Director John W. Magaw

9:20 a.m. Treasury Department Remarks,
Under Secretary for Enforcement Raymond Kelly

9:20 a.m. Initiative -

How to use it/How it will work

Chief Joseph J. Vince, Program Manager Dale

Armstrong, ATF Firearms Enforcement Division

10:00 a.m. Break

10:15 a.m. National Tracing Center -

Special Agent in Charge Jerry Nunziato

10:30 a.m. National Institute of Justice -

Lois F. Mock, Program Manager, Firearms and

Violence, Colin Lofton, Professor, University of
Maryland

11:00 a.m. Leave for White House

11:45 a.m. Meeting with President

1:00 p.m. Lunch

2:00 p.m. Project LEAD -

3:00 p.m. Break

3:15 p.m. Remarks -

Honorable Veronica Coleman, U.S. Attorney,
Western Judicial District of Tennessee

3:30 p.m. Local Perspective Remarks -

Chief Paul Evans, Boston, Police Department

3:45 p.m. Closing Remarks -

Andrew L. Vita, Associate Director (Enforcement)

4:00 p.m. Adjourn



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

JUL 3 1996

Honorable Mary Jo White
U.S. Attorney
One Saint Andrews Plaza
New York, New York 10007

Dear Ms. White:

On July 8, 1996, the Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) will host a conference in Washington, DC, to kick off the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII). This conference will be attended by U.S. attorneys, district attorneys, police chiefs, and ATF special agents in charge from 17 cities across the Nation, as well as other representatives from the Department of Treasury, Department of Justice, and the law enforcement community. The YCGII is aimed at stopping the illegal flow of firearms into the hands of juveniles and criminals.

Arrangements have been made for out-of-town participants to stay at the Hotel Washington, 515 15th Street, NW., Washington, DC (202-638-5900). On Sunday, July 7, 1996, ATF will host a casual reception at the rooftop of the Hotel Washington, from 5:30 to 7:30 p.m.

The working conference is scheduled for Monday, July 8, 1996. The conference will be held at the Old Executive Office Building (OEOB), 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC. It will commence in the Indian Treaty Room, Room 474, with registration and a continental breakfast at 8:30 a.m. At 9 a.m., the conference will begin in room 450 of the OEOB. At 11 a.m., the conference will break to allow participants to report to a ceremony with President Clinton at the East Room of the White House. The ceremony with the President is scheduled for 11:45 a.m. Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Attorney General Janet Reno, and Treasury Under Secretary Raymond W. Kelly will attend that ceremony. After the ceremony, lunch will be served, and the conference will resume. The conference is expected to conclude at 4 p.m. on July 8, 1996. A more detailed agenda for the conference will be provided at registration.

If you have any questions about the White House ceremony, please contact the White House Social Office (202-456-7136). For any other questions, please contact Chris Sullivan, Department of Justice, Office of Public Liaison and Intergovernmental Affairs (202-541-9967); Charysse Alexander, Department of Justice,

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Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (202-514-5326); Susan Ginsburg, Department of Treasury, Office of Enforcement (202-622-1496 (voice mail) or 202-622-1260 (Treasury Operator)); or ATF's Firearms Enforcement Division (202-927-7770).

We look forward to seeing you at the conference.