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Rethinking the Strong Arm of the Law

By FOX BUTTERFIELD

WITH the shooting death of an unarmed African immigrant by four police officers, New York City has grimly discovered there is a price for the tough law enforcement tactics that have led to its steep drop in crime: estrangement between police and citizens, something that many cities successfully combating crime have managed to avoid.

This estrangement erupted in weeks of protests since Amadou Diallo, a street vendor from Guinea, was shot 19 times at his Bronx home Feb. 4, and has also given rise to widespread complaints that police officers mistreat residents of minority neighborhoods. A question many law enforcement officials around the country are asking is how much of this was self-inflicted after Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani and Police Commissioner Howard Safir abandoned efforts by their predecessors to establish community policing, scorning it as social work.

But community policing, which makes citizens allies of the police, is thriving in many cities, from Chicago to San Diego and from Fort Wayne, Ind., to Fort Worth, Tex. Based on statistics alone, several of these cities have surpassed New York City in reducing crime. Where homicides in New York City have dropped by two-thirds from a record high in 1990, in San Diego they have dropped by three-fourths from their peak in 1991. Where New York City has seen a 41 percent decline in overall violent crime in the past decade, Fort Worth has recorded a 56 percent drop, according to a new study by the Justice Department.

These cities have achieved their gains without the confrontations seen in New York City. Jerry Sanders, the police chief of San Diego, which has a population of 1.2 million, measures progress as much by an annual survey of public satisfaction with the police as by the actual reduction in the crime rate. The most recent survey, conducted by an outside



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consultant, showed approval at 89 percent, he said. In a New York Times poll conducted March 8 through 14, 43 percent of New Yorkers thought the police were doing an excellent or good job.

In Fort Wayne, a city of 200,000, neighborhood leaders help evaluate prospective police candidates and sit in on com-

puter-generated crime statistics sessions similar to those in New York City in which local police commanders are held accountable for crime reduction in their districts. "When you isolate yourself and don't let people know what you are doing, they become suspicious," said Nancy Becher, Fort Wayne's deputy police chief.

"We learned long ago that we can't do it all ourselves."

Whether police officers can do it all by themselves is at the center of the debate between New York City's approach — which relies on the massive use of offi-

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cers to suppress crime — and the strategy of community policing and a related approach called problem-solving policing.

"Our basic premise is, we don't have enough police officers to do it all, so we need community participation," said Mr. Sanders. San Diego has only 1.7 officers per 1,000 residents, compared with 5 per 1,000 in New York City. The reliance on community participation has another benefit, Mr. Sanders said: It avoids "the long-term perils of zero tolerance." Mr. Giuliani's policy of arresting minor lawbreakers like jaywalkers, graffiti artists and others as a way to avert more serious crimes.

San Diego has, of course, far fewer people than New York City, but unlike New York City, it borders Mexico, which is a major corridor for drug smuggling and illegal immigration. Its community policing begins with a practical consideration: "listening to the community," Mr. Sanders says, "and letting them tell us what their priorities are."

BASED on the ideas of residents themselves, the police divided the city into 99 neighborhoods, with a police team assigned to each. These areas are on the department's Web site, and anyone can look up a specific neighborhood and see what the police are doing about crime.

"The things people wanted us to work on," Mr. Sanders said, "were not serious crimes, but mostly abandoned cars, or abandoned houses, that attracted other problems to the neighborhoods, and in some of the worst areas, drug houses." Once residents came to know their officers and met regularly with them, they began providing a constant flow of tips.

Another component in community policing is 1,200 volunteers, many of them retired people who receive police training, wear police-like uniforms and drive around in official vehicles. They help watch their neighborhood or work on police department computers so officers can patrol.

Problem-solving is also emphasized instead of simply making arrests. This style of policing analyzes why certain locations attract more crime or why particular people are repeatedly victimized. In one case, Agnes Brookes, a 68-year-old civilian volunteer, was assigned to figure out why a self-storage warehouse had been burglarized 150 times in six months. After studying other warehouses, she decided the problem lay with a sloppy manager, who was re-moved, and then she had the owner install better lighting, fencing and an electronic lock. The burglaries stopped.

Community policing began in the aftermath of the urban riots of the late 1960's when the Kerner Commission, appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, concluded that part of the problem lay with the failure

of the police to involve local residents.

Herman Goldstein, a professor emeritus at the University of Wisconsin Law School who is regarded as the originator of problem-solving policing, said the first step was "to get the police to recognize that they cannot combat crime by themselves." The next step, he said, was "to get people to like us, and then to have the community help set police policy."

In the 1980's Mayor David N. Dinkins and Police Commissioner Lee Brown inaugurated some early and successful experiments with community policing, including the removal of abandoned cars. But after defeating Mr. Dinkins, Mr. Giuliani and his first Police Commissioner, William J. Bratton, eliminated community policing and invested heavily in police operations. "This was almost coming full cycle back to the 1960's, to the idea that the police alone can fight crime," Professor Goldstein said.

That philosophy is implicit in the motto of the Street Crime Unit, whose members included the four officers indicted last week in Mr. Diallo's death: "We own the street," members boast.

Last December, Commissioner Safir scoffed at community policing. "If you think back to 1990, '91, the total focus of this department was community policing, and we had the highest crime rate in the history of the city," he said.

"I'm not going to be bullied by the community activists who say we want leagood cops," Mr. Safir said in another interview. Fort Wayne has tried to carry community policing a step further than San Diego, Ms. Becher said, moving toward a concept of community government. The city is divided into 227 neighborhoods, each with an assigned police officer who has the authority to call on city agencies like the parks department or the housing code department to deal with problems like loud music or abandoned homes.

THE city has also created a higher-level body where neighborhood representatives can meet with senior police and city officials.

Fort Wayne's homicides have been cut in half since 1994. No one disputes that New York has achieved stunning reductions in crime. But Rana Sampson, a former police sergeant in the city, who is director of public safety for the University of San Diego, said, "What N.Y.P.D. did was throw people at the problems. You can't put a cop on every corner, and do you really want to live in a society with a cop on every corner?"

"Keeping peace by peaceful means" was the credo of Sir Robert Peel, who created the first modern police department in London in the 1820's. "The degree," he said, "of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately, the necessity for the use of physical force."

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Robert Burroughs for The New York Times

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You Talkin' to Me?

**Rudy Giuliani Battles
His Enemies—
and Himself**

BY FRED SIEGEL

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**David Grann
Penetrates the
Last Commie Spy Ring**

**Richard A. Posner
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and have had more contacts with [the PLA] than at any other time," boasts a senior administration official.

Unfortunately, though, these contacts and visits are usually not nearly as extensive as the ones the Chinese get in America: there is no real reciprocity. While the Americans are anxious to show the Chinese the crown jewels of our military to demonstrate American superiority, the Chinese, operating from a position of military weakness, are reluctant to show the Americans much of anything. Moreover, the Communist-run PLA is inherently secretive and insular—even when it comes to dealing with Chinese civilian leaders. Transparency runs counter to the ancient teachings of Sun Tzu, who famously advised in *The Art of War*, "The formation and procedure [of] the military should not be divulged."

Not surprisingly, then, when then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili visited a Chinese military installation in 1997, he was shown a routine marksmanship demonstration—at a distance, through binoculars—and given a tour of empty barracks and mess halls. Similar things have happened to other visiting American officers. "We see the same tired old factories, the same 196th Division we've seen before," gripes a former Pentagon official. "We don't get into their crack divisions, their 'fist' troops, their rapid reaction forces, their power projection. The question has to be, 'What's the quid pro quo?'"

Another question has to be whether the United States should be playing host to some of the PLA's more odious officers—particularly those who had a direct role in

the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Clearly a key benefit of the exchanges for the PLA is the credibility and legitimacy its officers gain when they are treated as equals by the American military establishment. Administration officials concede that the Chinese push for such recognition when they visit, and PLA General Zhang Wannian admitted as much when he recently wrote that military exchanges abroad have "established and preserved our army's excellent image in the world." That the United States is helping the PLA enhance its image is perhaps the biggest problem with the exchanges.

Consider Chinese Defense Minister General Chi Haotian's December 1996 visit. Chi was chief of staff of the PLA during the Tiananmen crackdown. But this didn't prevent him from receiving a 19-gun salute when he visited the Pentagon. It also didn't get in the way of Chi's photo-op with President Clinton. Chi's visit went off without a hitch. He toured West Point, Gettysburg, four military bases, and the Sandia National Laboratory.

The only discordant moment came during a lecture Chi gave at the National Defense University, when a Navy captain asked him if the PLA regretted the loss of life during the Tiananmen uprising. No, Chi explained, because there was no loss of life, only "some pushing." "At that time, I was the chief of the general staff," he said. "Here I can tell you in a responsible and serious manner that at that time not a single person lost his life in Tiananmen Square." And what was the American reaction to this barefaced lie? A few days later, the U.S. military took Chi to Disneyland. •

Giuliani fights his enemies—and himself.

RUDY AWAKENING

By Fred Siegel

It's 11:30 in the morning in New York—time for the daily demo at One Police Plaza. It goes off like clockwork. Michael Hardy, the lawyer who defended the Reverend Al Sharpton when he was sued along with Alton Maddox and C. Vernon Mason in the recent Tawana Brawley defamation case, hands the police the list of those asking to be arrested. The demonstrators, there to protest the killing of Amadou

Diallo, an unarmed African immigrant, by four policemen, chant Sharpton's trademark slogan "no justice, no peace" or sing "We Shall Overcome." The initial arrestees were an honor roll of failed urban politicians. They include former Mayor David Dinkins, Harlem Congressman Charles Rangel, and Kweisi Mfume, who, as a congressman, once agreed to a "sacred covenant" with Louis Farrakhan.

The leader of the protests, Sharpton, looks on, joking that it "looks like my shadow Cabinet just got bigger." Sharpton has reason to smile. For him and the rest of New York's Rudolph Giuliani-haters, the Diallo tragedy is a political godsend—the first big break since Giuliani was elected mayor more than six years ago. Even former

FRED SIEGEL is a professor of history at The Cooper Union, a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, and author of *The Future Once Happened Here: New York, D.C., Los Angeles, and the Fate of America's Big Cities* (Free Press).

Mayor Ed Koch and Giuliani's Republican rival Governor George Pataki—hardly Sharpton acolytes—have been piling on the mayor. The New York police are now the subject of three major investigations, one state and two federal. The Sharpton-Dinkins crowd has never forgiven Giuliani for ousting Dinkins, who was not just a black mayor but the city's first black mayor. Yet, until now, Giuliani has been invincible, thanks to the simple fact that New York has thrived during his mayoralty.

Consider: Last year, for the first time in a decade, the city's economy grew faster than the national economy. Giuliani has lowered the city's welfare rolls by more than the population of Buffalo, which, in the mayor's words, means "this city has really caught up with the rest of America." It's helped that private sector jobs have been growing at a record pace. And, now that the city has finally recovered all the jobs it lost under Dinkins, lower-skilled workers are being drawn back into the economy so that 54 percent of adults are employed—a new city record.

Harlem, undergoing a "second renaissance," is bustling with new developments, including "HarlemUSA"—a \$65 million, 275,000-square-foot retail and entertainment complex on 125th Street. The South Bronx is enjoying a similar revival. A major reason for all the good news is that the crime rate has hit a 30-year low. Last year, New York actually had fewer murders than Chicago, a city that is three times smaller in population. The sharpest drops have come in minority areas like central Harlem, where overall crime has dropped 61 percent since 1994, and East New York, which went from 110 murders in 1993 (Dinkins's last year as mayor) to 37 in 1998 and had none through the first three months of this year.

Now, the shooting of Diallo and Giuliani's politically tone-deaf response to it have pierced the mayor's political invincibility. At a time when mayors like Chicago's Richard Daley Jr. and Philadelphia's Ed Rendell are basking in unprecedented African American support and overall popularity, Giuliani, who has done much more than either of those two mayors to tackle crime, finds himself under siege. Clearly, a lot of this has to do with the willingness of Giuliani's political enemies to exploit the Diallo killing, and the timely availability of Hillary Clinton as a possible Senate candidate, for their own ends. But much of Giuliani's problem is of his own making—a result both of his personality and of his misreading of the past few years as a vindication of the way he leads rather than the policies he's championed.

Flash back to the 1993 election contest between Dinkins and Giuliani. It would be difficult to exaggerate what was at stake. Although the Dow was at a then-record high, the city was losing 7,000 jobs per month—all told, 330,000 during the Dinkins years. The country was just coming out of a recession at the time. But Dinkins had made matters worse with billion-dollar tax increases. These kept his core constituencies in the social services industries funded but also sent business—already reeling from crime—fleeing.

The murder rate was at a record high, and there was a

widespread sense that the rule of law was collapsing. "Homeless activists," explained Democratic Councilman John Sabini, "treated the city like it was an urban theme park—experience a man pissing near you." When city council candidate Andrew Eristoff asked a man not to ride his bicycle on a crowded sidewalk, the cyclist shouted, "I could hit you, and that would be illegal, too, and nobody would do anything about that, either." He then punched the candidate, which produced a pool of blood and resulted in 22 stitches.

When convicted kidnapper and self-confessed "anti-white" activist Sonny Carson led a group of thugs to protest alleged racism at a Flatbush grocery, shouting "slant eyes" at the Korean owner and threatening would-be customers, the Dinkins administration stood by and did nothing for six months. When a wrestling match between a cop and a drug dealer named Kiko Garcia, who had proclaimed Washington Heights "a liberated zone," led to the latter's death, Dinkins sided with Garcia. Then there were the three days of anti-Jewish rioting in Crown Heights, where a young scholar was killed. The Dinkins administration lay back and let things vent.

Not surprisingly, the Dinkins-Giuliani race was particularly nasty. Giuliani's worst moment came at an over-the-top, obscenity-laced speech before a rally of out-of-control cops. The Dinkins campaign enlisted black nationalists and celebrities alike to warn of Giuliani's alleged "racism" and "fascism." President Clinton lent a hand, saying that only racial prejudice could explain a vote against Dinkins. All along, the Dinkins camp warned that a Giuliani election would set off riots. It didn't.

The success story that followed is well known. Giuliani and then-Police Chief Bill Bratton applied George Kelling's "broken windows" theory of policing, which had already succeed in the subways, to the city as a whole. The distinction between broken-windows policing and community policing is often blurred, but the former was one of the keys to both Giuliani's early successes and later difficulties. Community policing takes cops out of patrol cars and places them on foot patrol in neighborhoods. It reduces public hostility to the police, but not crime. Broken-windows policing—the name refers to the idea that permitting one broken window to remain unmended invites vandals to break more—concentrates on preventing small problems from turning into big ones by, for example, quickly targeting open-air drug markets before they invite even more criminal activity. Broken-windows policing is the single most important urban public policy success of the past 30 years, but its forcefulness carries the danger of increasing police-community tensions.

The success of Giuliani's first term did not satisfy everyone, of course. When Giuliani reduced the increases in the school budget and drove the popular and personable but ineffective schools chancellor, Raymond Cortines, out of town, his support plunged. But even then Giuliani's adversaries were unable to take advantage. Smarting from Giuliani's refusal to deal with them, Reverends Sharpton and Jesse

Jackson marched on Albany in 1995 to protest newly elected Republican Governor Pataki's budget cuts. But the episode produced only yawns. Sharpton's organization, the National Action Network, was treading water, despite some successful shakedowns of "bloodsucking" Korean businessmen.

But, eight months later, Sharpton, one of whose businesses is to keep business or, as he put it, "white interloper[s]," out of Harlem, showed he was still a force. Picketers from the National Action Network, led by an escaped mental patient and part-time street vendor, Morris Powell, turned a landlord-tenant dispute into a deadly incident. Egged on by the daily racial rantings about "Jew bastards," one of Powell's picketers, Abugunde Mulocko, né Roland Smith, walked into Freddy's Fashion Mart, having previously promised to "burn down the Jew store." Armed with a .38, he shot three whites and a Pakistani in cold blood. Then he set the fire that killed five Hispanics, one Guyanese, and one black—the security guard whom the protesters had taunted as a "cracker lover."

Remarkably, the 125th Street massacre only strengthened Sharpton, who by then had much of the black political class thoroughly intimidated. When the 1997 mayoral campaign began, Sharpton, a perennial candidate, taunted the press, daring them to bring up the Freddy's fire murders. When they declined, he blamed the incident on Giuliani, to the silence of his fellow candidates in the Democratic primary. His immunity from accountability intact, Sharpton went on to very nearly force Ruth Messinger, Dinkins's designated heir at the time, into a runoff.

By the time of the general election, Giuliani was so strong that not even the notorious police torture of Haitian immigrant Abner Louima could derail the outcome. Giuliani handled the incident so deftly in expressing his clear and immediate outrage that the ACLU's Norman Siegel, usually a full-time Giuliani critic, declared that "he's had his best forty-eight hours as mayor of this city." African American Congressman Floyd Flake summed up the situation: "I would say that the level of racial tension is the lowest now that it's been in the twenty-one years that I've lived in the city."

In January 1998, Giuliani, who could increasingly see a national role for himself in the Republican Party, exuded both confidence and conservatism in a colloquially delivered "state of the city" speech. Not only did he describe fathers who don't support their kids as "bums"; he called for an end to open admissions at the City University of New York and an experiment in vouchers for the public schools. He called, in effect, for a repeal of much of the 1960s.

Giuliani's speech was a full-scale assault on the city's sclerotic bureaucracy—the vast public sector workforce in the schools and welfare organizations that lived off their own failures. (The remedial programs at CUNY, for instance, designed to make up for the city's failing high schools, are a profit center for the community colleges that hire inexpensive adjuncts to teach courses.) Yet, if

the speech quite literally left many of his critics speechless, it also betrayed an overconfidence that led Giuliani to push his agenda beyond what the public consensus would bear.

Institutional change in the mayor's office was partly responsible for this. Giuliani was the first mayor to take full advantage of a new city charter foisted on the city by civil rights advocates in 1989. The old city government included a Board of Estimate, in which the borough presidents had a voice along with the mayor and other citywide officials in approving major capital projects. With the board eliminated on the grounds that it violated the Voting Rights Act because the smallest and whitest borough, Staten Island, had equal representation with the others, the only thing left to check the mayor's power was a fractious city council.

Giuliani, in other words, had a rather free hand. And he used it, first, to push for an ill-considered plan by Yankees owner George Steinbrenner to build a new stadium in midtown Manhattan. The very idea of moving what amounts to a city shrine and economic anchor for the Bronx dismayed even Giuliani's strongest supporters.

On crime, the mayor's second-term agenda angered New Yorkers who have a strong sense of their God-given right not to obey the laws too thoroughly. His cops moved from drug dealers to jaywalkers and other assorted "miscreants," including street vendors, zigzagging cab drivers, and unleashed dogs. All the initiatives had some merit (pedestrian deaths, for instance, have gone down sharply). But each one peeled off some of his political support.

At the same time, the mayor raised eyebrows by further expanding the role of the 40,000-member NYPD. It was given responsibility for school safety, traffic enforcement, and the Taxi and Limousine Commission. Again, some of these ideas made sense. But, by turning the cops into his primary instrument of public policy, Giuliani increasingly inserted the cops into minor, but unpleasant, encounters with ordinary citizens. This, in turn, eroded goodwill toward the mayor—particularly across racial lines.

Increasingly, the mayor's outsized political personality seemed to dwarf the issues on his second-term agenda. The mayor's relentless energy was out of sync with the new mood he had helped create. New Yorkers wanted to relax a bit and enjoy the good times. The mayor, like a good prosecutor, wanted to press ahead, with or without allies.

Even before the Diallo tragedy, Giuliani's Margaret Thatcher-like political personality separated him from the others. The same convictions that allowed both politicians to take on entrenched social democratic hacks also insured that they'd largely fight alone. Giuliani even has a tough time recognizing that other officials, such as city council Speaker Peter Vallone, who agrees with him on most issues, can represent legitimate interests when they differ. When the mayor and the city council were locked in a fight over Yankee Stadium, Deputy Mayor Randy Mastro told Bruce Bender, a cen-

trist representing Vallone, "We will bring you to your knees." One moderate Democrat on the council who's sympathetic to Giuliani's policies complains that "the mayor won't let me be his ally." In part, that's because Giuliani really doesn't like other politicians. Daley and Rendell were prosecutors on their way up the career ladder, but Giuliani is a prosecutor to the bone, a guy who often sees his rivals as little better than the corrupt Bronx boss Stanley Friedman, whom he sent to jail.

Black Democrats complain that he treats them badly. That's true, but he treats all pols badly. Probably his nastiest feud has come with councilman and fellow Italian-American Stephen DiBrienza. Rather than govern through alliances with other politicians, Giuliani, a Republican in an overwhelmingly Democratic New York, runs the entire city out of the mayor's office.

For all this, the mayor might have cruised along on his way to the U.S. Senate in 2000—if not for Hillary Clinton's incipient campaign for the Senate and the police killing of Diallo. Together, these have exposed the Achilles' heel of the Giuliani mayoralty, the hyper-centralization of power in city hall. The sure touch the mayor had exhibited in the Louima affair has deserted him in the Diallo case. Rather than expressing horror at how the police could have pumped 41 bullets into an innocent man, Giuliani, perhaps looking beyond city hall to a statewide run, responded with inappropriate equanimity, saying that he wouldn't prejudge the case. Two of the four cops involved from the special Street Crime Unit, however, had already made it clear by crying after Diallo's death that they had made a hideous mistake. No matter; the damage was done, and it was pay-back time.

When the Louima affair broke; there were claims that the cops involved shouted out, "It's Giuliani time." That proved a hoax, and the brutality could be written off to rogue cops in a bad precinct. But the Diallo case seemed to implicate the broken-windows policing Giuliani has used to build his reputation. This was the opportunity

Giuliani's enemies, deserved and undeserved, had been waiting for. And none exploited the situation more effectively than the city's leading racial demagogue, Al Sharpton. Sharpton emerged from a guilty verdict in the defamation case stemming from the Tawana Brawley hoax stronger than ever and became the primary spokesman for the Diallo family. Walking hand in hand with a city press that saw the enemy of its enemy as its friend, Sharpton announced, "Amadou Diallo will be the end of Giuliani's burgeoning political career."


In the month that followed the killing, Giuliani's approval rating in the city dropped by 20 points as the

local papers ran more than 600 stories on the shooting, all based on the same paltry set of facts. The cops thought they were pursuing a serial-rape suspect who resembled Diallo; they fired all 41 bullets in just seven seconds. It seems likely that after the first shots were fired the cops kept firing at flashes reflected on a glass pane and their own ricochets, but it's hard to know, since the four cops, who have reportedly been indicted for second-degree murder, refused to testify before the grand jury. Nonetheless, a contest quickly emerged to express the greatest outrage with the fewest facts.

Time and again, accusations of racism have been hurled at Giuliani on the grounds that racist intent could be inferred

from the outcome of the incident. The left-wing civil libertarians who had been terribly unhappy about the simultaneous decline in crime and social spending, since it undermined their argument that social conditions such as poverty are the "root causes" of crime, are glowing with vindication. Sharpton's flacks in the press, like Jim Dwyer of the *Daily News*, insisted that the cops had set out to "prey" on black people—no evidence required—while Art Spiegelman did a *New Yorker* cover in which a smiling cop takes target practice at cutouts of civilians.

Giuliani responded with evidence showing that, while the Street Crime Unit of 400 men makes up one percent of the police force, it was responsible for seizing 40 percent of the guns pulled off the streets and saving



RUDOLPH GIULIANI BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

countless lives, and that the unit had a slightly lower level of civilian complaints than the NYPD as a whole to boot. He further noted that New York's crime reduction has been accompanied by a nearly 50 percent reduction in police use of deadly force since the Dinkins years.

The numbers were all but ignored as the Dinkins Democrats looked to define the New York party's post-Giuliani future. More recently, their allies from out of state have gotten into the game. John Conyers, the Democratic congressman from Detroit, has been bashing Giuliani for some time. Last year, for example, Conyers convened an informal anti-Giuliani hearing, in which one "witness" was a man who went on an anti-Semitic rant; Conyers claimed he didn't hear it. Another witness was none other than Sonny Carson, of Korean-grocery-boycott fame. Conyers said he was "privileged" to call Carson to testify. Carson, for his part, went on to explain of the police, "Once a pig, always a pig."

After the Diallo killing, Conyers implied to a New York cable news station that Giuliani is a racist—and called New York cops the most brutal in the country. This from a man who represents a city with much higher rates of both crime and police brutality and who serves in Washington, D.C., a city where the largely resident black police department is four times more likely to use deadly force than in New York.

But the protests, particularly from individuals, go far beyond the politicians. For many they are a genuine expression of outrage on the part of innocent African Americans humiliated by the expansion of police stop-and-frisk efforts. Filmmaker Majora Carter, a resident of the South Bronx, explained that, while she liked "the message the cops were sending to criminals," she "disliked some of the messengers," particularly the special unit cops unfamiliar with her neighborhood, who had hassled her.

There is a problem with New York policing—a reason for concern—but it's a matter of policy, not racism. "There is no racism or tolerance of brutality in the NYPD," argues former Police Chief Bratton. "The racism comes from Sharpton." Bratton, author of the administration's early anti-crimes successes, was forced out of the Giuliani administration in 1996 not only because there was a clash of egos but also because the mayor's desire to run the entire show from city hall was incompatible with Bratton's plans for the police department. Bratton argued that, after street crime had been reduced through broken-windows policing, community policing should be given a bigger role.

The problem, Bratton realized, is that you can't drive crime below the level a community has set for itself without incurring considerable resentment. The only way to keep pushing it down is to establish a better rapport between police and the citizens in order to minimize understandable black ambivalence about anti-crime efforts. Most African Americans are conservative on crime until their 15-year-old nephew gets unfairly arrested. The dilemma is that, while 15- to 25-year-old minority toughs live in fear of the police, much

of the rest of the city lives in fear of those same toughs.

The key to black middle-class anger about New York policing is found in what sociologist Jan Rosenberg describes as "the failure of success model." The more the objective conditions for African Americans improve as they move up the social ladder into integrated situations, she notes, the more opportunities there are for slights, real and perceived. A similar situation is set in motion when broken-windows policing radically cuts crime. The more Giuliani's police department tried to reduce crime, the more cops came into contact with innocent people. So, as crime goes down, fruitless frisks go up and resentments multiply. Or, as Bill Stephney, a hip-hop record producer put it, "As fear from knuckleheads declines, fear from police pursuing knuckleheads has been rising."

A less isolated administration, one with a wider range of allies and more willing to listen to friendly dissent, might have picked up on the complaints and modified its tactics. But, when Bratton left, so did the primary channel for such feedback. Giuliani and his top staff are far more energetic and talented than the usual city-hall hacks. But it's impossible to run a city of 7.4 million with a small cadre of reformers operating out of the mayor's executive offices.

To be sure, Giuliani labors under a great burden. In other cities, the black politicians of the civil rights era such as Coleman Young in Detroit and Marion Barry in D.C. have given way to a new generation of black leaders, like Dennis Archer and Anthony Williams, who have replaced racial symbolism with a concern for concrete achievement. There is no such second generation in New York. One aim of the celebrity acts of scripted "civil disobedience" outside One Police Plaza is to reenact the old struggles while preserving the power of patronage politicians like Harlem's Charles Rangel.

It's not too late for Giuliani to save himself and his program for the city. He's belatedly begun to meet with black leaders, and he seems now to recognize that even good policies can be taken too far. Similarly, under the pressure of the protests, anti-crime policy seems to be moving toward Bratton's vision of community policing.

In 1989, Sharpton helped convert a genuine grievance, the killing of young black teen Yusef Hawkins by a group of white thugs, into a mayoral victory for Dinkins. Sharpton now hopes that a similar campaign of polarization can define the city's post-Giuliani future. And he may succeed. Sharpton has become the instrument of revenge for all the public sector pols and interest-group activists, who are angered as much by Giuliani's achievements as by his failings.

For all its flaws, Rudy Giuliani's crusade to make New York more like the rest of America, by reducing crime and welfare while giving the private sector economy the opportunity to do its work, has been an enormous success. The tragedy of Amadou Diallo's death would be compounded only if the racial hysteria produced by the ongoing war between Giuliani and a Sharptonized Democratic Party unraveled those accomplishments. •

August 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO

FROM: RANA SAMPSON, WHITE HOUSE FELLOW

SUBJECT: COMMUNITY POLICING

This brief memoranda provides a follow-up to your August 23rd conversation with the Chiefs of Police from St. Louis, Ft. Pierce, Austin, Prince George's County, and Greensboro at NIJ's community policing conference. It is intended to fill in some of the gaps that are inevitable in such a short discussion about a topic as complex as community policing. For years now, I have provided technical assistance and training in community policing to police and city officials throughout the country, including three of the above-mentioned chiefs, and I would be remiss if I did not follow-up with you to underscore community policing's essential elements. In addition, with community, government, and political expectations raised concerning community policing, it is important to have a full picture about the level of progress the police profession has made thus far.

- Community policing is best understood through its component parts -- community engagement and problem solving. These two are integrally linked and must exist in tandem in a department doing community policing. Community engagement just for the sake of improving the police relationship to the community is community relations, not much more. And a problem-oriented approach that does not focus on the crime and disorder problems that communities care about misdirects scarce police resources and undermines police accountability to the public. Many police departments only rely on community engagement limiting their effectiveness in tackling crime and disorder problems.

- Community policing is not a return to a style of policing done in earlier times. Although some in the profession make this claim, it is generally because they were not around 30 or 40 years ago in policing or are truly unfamiliar with those times in our policing history. Not all communities had officers assigned to their areas who were helpful to its residents. Communities of color often do not have as fond memories of policing in their neighborhoods. In addition, the working environment in police departments was paramilitary (in many, it still is), and departments placed a high value on conformity -- both of which are characteristics that do not lend themselves to community policing. Officers were seen as crime fighters, nothing more, and had few skills to help them do anything but criminal apprehension.

- Most police departments that claim to have implemented community policing are only in the beginning stages of their efforts -- even those who have been at it for a few years. The chiefs that you met the other day represent some of the better community policing

departments, yet only a handful of the officers in each of those departments is actually engaged in community policing. Most police officers, even in the better departments, remain unengaged from community policing efforts. This is true, in part, because many chiefs have opted for a split-force concept of community policing where only a small group of officers engage in community policing while the majority go about business as usual engaged in traditional reactive, incident-driven policing. In addition, for those few departments that have opted to implement community policing department-wide, a long-term (probably 10 years), transformational change will be required, offering little in terms of quick successes.

- Community policing is not a series of programs (block watch and mentoring) nor a series of tactics (foot patrol and bike patrol). It is a philosophy that requires the transformation of the way we deliver police service. It requires police to change their organizations internally -- how they recruit, train, deploy, supervise, evaluate, transfer and promote personnel. It requires police to change the way they provide service. Under community policing, officers will be analyzing crime and disorder problems, working with the community on a search for alternative solutions, implementing solutions, and evaluating their effectiveness in between responding to calls for police service. It requires police to change the way they interact with the public -- engaging the public in the responsibility or co-production of public safety. It requires police to change the way they interact with the criminal justice system, reserving for the system only the most serious, deserving or problematic of offenders. It requires police agencies to change the working environment internally, the way first line supervisors and management interact with officers. And it requires police agencies to look to new training and technologies to better understand neighborhood crime and disorder problems. Community policing is all about tailoring solutions, based on thoughtful, in-depth analysis, to unique neighborhood crime and disorder problems, not applying generic models from other communities and overlaying them to the problems of another community.

- Community policing is probably most effective in a community which believes in community-oriented government -- where services are shared, customer-driven, integrated, and turf battles kept to a minimum. Yet we are only just learning about the effectiveness of community policing. In many places, boasts of reducing crime is unsubstantiated when put to greater scrutiny. This is not to say community policing doesn't reduce crime. Rather it must be done right and done well, and efforts must be focused on manageable problems, preferably in a defined geographic area, but most police departments are not doing this.

- Most police departments fail to measure the effectiveness of their community policing projects, (i.e. did moving the bus stop away from the vacant lot really reduce purse snatchings?) Unless the profession is encouraged to document its efforts, it is unclear how assessments can be made.

- Finally, community policing departments are going to have to focus on their

primary business -- crime control and prevention. To some extent, it is easier, as many police do, to focus less on this primary function and concentrate time and limited resources on projects that, while related, are the work of other government agencies (inspecting housing violations, clearing unkempt lots and parks, removing graffiti, establishing park basketball leagues). Police should only provide referrals and work with government officials to make sure the referrals actually work. Otherwise, these new tasks are extremely time consuming and labor intensive, and the hazard is that they distract police from their focus on crime control and prevention. In the long run, community policing will be judged, not on its ability to be a more efficient provider of other government services, but in its ability to prevent and control crime.



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Communities:
Mobilizing Against Crime
Making Partnerships Work

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Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime

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POLICE HIRING TO ESTIMATE THE
EFFECT OF POLICE ON CRIME

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FINAL REPORT

POLICING IN BUFFALO:
The Community's
Attitudes, Opinions, and Preferences

by

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and

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FEBRUARY 1995

**Policing in Buffalo:
The Community's Attitudes, Opinions, and Preferences**

by

Profs. Carl B. Backman and Ron Stewart, Ph.D.

Department of Sociology
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February 1995

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In August and September 1994 four hundred ninety seven (497) interviews were conducted with Buffalo adults concerning attitudes toward the services provided by the Buffalo Police Department. Respondents also provided information pertaining to problems that exist in their neighborhoods. The interviews were conducted under the direction of Drs. Ron Stewart and Carl Backman of Buffalo State College on behalf of the Buffalo Police Department. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time the Buffalo Police Department has used a city-wide probability sample to obtain such detailed, citizen-level information on perceptions of its services.

PRÉCIS OF FINDINGS

Slightly over half of Buffalo adults are satisfied, though not enthusiastic, with the Buffalo Police Department. These generally positive attitudes correspond with people's generally positive evaluations of their actual contacts with the police.

People feel the department already works with the community to solve problems, but would like to see it do so even more. Neighborhood block clubs are overwhelmingly seen as good ideas to get the police help in fighting crime, though less than half the people live in a neighborhood with a block club.

Fear of crime is a problem in Buffalo; about half of the city's adults have altered their activities due to fear of crime. About 60 percent of adults think crime in their neighborhood is getting worse.

The most serious neighborhood problem is drug selling and use, followed by harassment by hangers out and residential burglary. Serious neighborhood problems are concentrated in the mideast. Serious neighborhood problems are also commonly reported in the midwest and northeast. Problems in the neighborhoods of the south are markedly less serious than those elsewhere.

Far and away the most important service of the Buffalo Police, according to respondents, is responding to 911 calls. Calls to 911 were the most common way of initiating contact between citizens and the police. The second most important service is narcotics investigations. Both services received roughly C+ grades for satisfaction. Three prevention-related programs -- general crime prevention programs, D.A.R.E., and youth work to prevent crime -- are the next most important services. Women are particularly likely to value prevention-related programs. Services with highest satisfaction scores (still less than B grades, on average) are D.A.R.E., traffic control, and Neighborhood Block Clubs.

Minorities are less satisfied with the police than are others. Just under half report general satisfaction with the police. The reservoir of good will reflected in the positive evaluations by the community at large of the Buffalo Police Department's professionalism, fairness, and concern for the community is present among minority adults in Buffalo, but it is measurably smaller.

Though minority adults see some of the problems in their neighborhoods as more serious than those problems are seen by non-minorities, minority and non-minorities tend to agree on which neighborhood problems are more serious than which other problems. The two groups also express similar preferences for, and evaluations of, police services. This suggests the existence of an underlying city-wide consensus concerning law enforcement-related problems and preferred solutions rather than some pervasive racial/ethnic bifurcation.

On virtually every measure of satisfaction, residents in the northeast part of the city are the least satisfied with the services of the department. Residents in the south are the most satisfied. Residents of the northwest tend to have favorable attitudes similar to those in the south, while residents in the mideast and midwest sections of the city tend more toward the attitudes of the northeast.

Compared with the demographic profile of Buffalo provided by the 1990 Census, the sample of respondents in this survey is representative of the age and sex structure of the city and of home ownership. The sample underrepresents the less educated, unmarried people, and residents of one person households. It also slightly underrepresents minorities.

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REPORT DETAILS

In August and September 1994 four hundred ninety seven (497) interviews were conducted with a probability sample of Buffalo adults concerning attitudes toward the services of the Buffalo Police and evaluations of neighborhood problems. The interviews were conducted under the direction of Drs. Ron Stewart and Carl Backman of Buffalo State College on behalf of the Buffalo Police Department.

THE SURVEY

Instrument. The survey instrument was a 79 item questionnaire developed by Captain Crystalea Pelletier of the Police Commissioner's office and Drs. Stewart and Backman. Many of the items were adapted from earlier surveys conducted in other communities. A copy of the questionnaire is included as Appendix A of this report. It is the final authority concerning what the respondents were really asked.

Sample design. The sample was drawn in two stages. The first stage drew telephone numbers, effectively yielding a sample of households. A modification of the "plus one" method of obtaining phone numbers was employed to ensure that households with unlisted numbers were included and to ensure respondent confidentiality (Frey 1989). The second stage was to select a respondent from each sampled household. Respondents were limited to residents of the City of Buffalo who were 18 or older. One adult within the household was randomly selected to respond (the interviewer asked to speak to the adult in the household with the last birthday). Since the objective of the survey was to make assertions about Buffalo adults, not households, responses had to be weighted in analysis to adjust for the fact that the initial stage in this sample selection process drew households, not individuals. This sample design excluded individuals not living in households served by a telephone. The target of the design was 500 completed interviews. After final editing, 497 interviews remained for analysis.

Sampling error. Sampling error for a survey of 497 respondents is plus or minus 4.4 percentage points (Kalton 1983). This means that in 95 percent of all possible samples of size 497 the percentage of all adults in the City of Buffalo who would answer a question a certain way would be within plus or minus 4.4 percentage points of the percentage in the sample who answer it that way. (This estimate makes the usual simplifying assumptions that the true percentage is 50 percent and that the sample is a simple random sample). It is important to remember that not all error in surveys comes from sampling: non-response, bad questions, interviewer errors, and respondent errors also contribute to total survey error. Sampling error is usually reported because it is the only source of error that we can numerically estimate.

Interviewers. Interviewers were students or former students at Buffalo State College selected, trained, and supervised by Dr. Stewart.

Subpopulations. This report focuses on four sets of subpopulation pairs: minority versus non-Hispanic white respondents, elderly versus less than 65 year old respondents, homeowners versus renters, and males versus females.

A fifth set of subpopulations was defined geographically. As the only geographic information gathered in the survey was ZIP code, ZIP code boundaries were used to define geographic regions. It would have been useful to report results at the level of the police precinct. Unfortunately, attempts to match precincts with ZIP codes were not very satisfactory. For instance, Main Street, the boundary between precincts 13 and 16, runs right through the center of ZIP code 14214. Similarly, William Street both bisects ZIP 14206 and forms the boundary between the South District and Precinct 11. For this report it was thus necessary to define regions that are unique to this report. To avoid associations with other non-ZIP defined regions (e.g., "the upper west side"), we have given the regions the rather bland titles Northeast (ZIP code 14215), Mideast (14208, 14212, 14211), South (14206, 14210, 14220), Midwest (14201, 14202, 14203, 14204, 14209, 14213), and Northwest (14207, 14214, 14216, 14222). The northeast region is a rough quadrilateral whose vertices are Winspear and Eggert, Winspear and Parkridge, Grider and East Ferry, and Lang and the city line. The northwest region has two connected parts. The larger is a wide rectangle bordered on the north by the city line (mostly Kenmore Avenue to UB's South Campus), on the east by the northeast region down to East Delevan and Chelsea, on the south by the Scajaquada Expressway to Delevan, and on the west by the Niagara River. The second part runs from the Scajaquada south down Elmwood between Richmond and Delaware to North Street. The mideast region is a rough rectangle whose northern edge is East Ferry and Lang, whose eastern edge is the city line, whose southern edge runs a block or two to the south of Broadway, and whose western edge is Masten and, south of North Street, Jefferson. The midwest region shares its northern border with the northwest region, its eastern border with the mideast region plus an extension that essentially projects Jefferson to the Lackawana line, and its southern border with Lackawana. Its western border is Lake Erie and the Niagara River. The south region is south of the mideast region and south and east of the midwest region.

Unless otherwise specified, all differences between subpopulations that are discussed in this report are statistically significant. "Statistically significant" is a technical term that means in this case that differences as large as those we found between two groups in our sample would be found in less than five percent of samples drawn from a population in which there were no differences between the subgroups. Put another way, these tests adjust for the fact that instead of contacting all 250,000 adults in Buffalo, we contacted only a few hundred. At least ninety five percent of the time when we use these tests, along with our careful sampling technique, we will be correct in concluding on the basis of the sample that a difference exists between two groups in the entire adult population of Buffalo. All tests are two-tailed, or non-directional, which means that we made no assumptions ahead of time about which group would be higher in any given comparison. Most of the tests were t-tests, which test whether two groups

gave the same mean response to a question. Since t-tests are used to compare two groups, not five, another technique had to be used to test whether there were statistically significant differences among the five regions in their mean responses to each question. The technique was one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). When the ANOVA results indicated that the means were not all the same, the least significant difference method was used to make comparisons between each possible pair of regions.

The estimated sampling error for percentages based on the full complement of 135 minority respondents in our sample is 8.5 percentage points. Thus, when we report that 35 percent of our minority respondents feel that the quality of the service provided by the Buffalo Police is excellent or good, we are fairly certain that the percent of all Buffalo minority adults who feel that way is somewhere between 26.5 percent and 43.5 percent. For the full complement of 73 elderly respondents, sampling error is 11.5 percentage points. Sampling errors are 6.5 percentage points for owners (n=230), 6.2 for renters (n=249), 5.8 for females (n=282), and 6.9 for males (n=200). For regions, sampling errors are 10.3 percentage points for the south (n=92), 8.8 for the midwest (n=125), 9.4 for the northwest (n=109), 14.0 for the northeast (n=50), and 11.6 for the mideast (n=72).

Sample representativeness. Demographic characteristics of the sample of respondents are reasonably though not perfectly similar to the characteristics of the population over 18 years of age in the City of Buffalo in 1990, as reported by the Census Bureau (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, 1993) (see Table 1). Though the city has no doubt changed in the four years between the taking of the census and the collection of data for this survey, 1990 Census data are probably still the best available benchmark. Sample proportions are within plus or minus 4.4 percentage points for gender and home ownership and for all age categories except 35-44, which is slightly oversampled. Minorities are slightly underrepresented (4.7 percentage points). Larger discrepancies between the sample and 1990 Census data occur in education, where those of less than a high school diploma are strikingly underrepresented (23 percentage points) and those with graduate degrees and college less than a bachelors degree are overrepresented (10 and 7 percentage points, respectively); in household size, where one person households are underrepresented (by 16 percentage points) and three person households are somewhat overrepresented (by 9 percentage points); and in marital status, where married people are overrepresented (by 13 percentage points) and those never married (8 percentage points) and or widowed are somewhat underrepresented (5 percentage points). Thus the sample is more educated, married, and slightly more white than the city at large and has a larger household size. It is not clear what the consequences of these differences are.

Table 1. Selected Characteristics of the Sample and of the City of Buffalo

	Sample		1990 Census City of Buffalo	
	N	Pct	N	Pct
Sex ¹				
Male	200	41.5	112,372	45.2
Female	282	58.5	136,214	54.8
Total	482	100.0	248,586	100.0
Race & Ethnicity ¹				
Nonhispanic White	347	71.8	166,779	67.1
Other	136	28.2	81,807	32.9
Total	483	100.0	248,586	100.0
Age				
18-19	9	1.9	10,764	4.3
20-24	52	10.9	30,907	12.4
25-34	127	26.6	60,279	24.2
35-44	104	21.8	42,700	17.2
45-54	73	15.3	26,997	10.9
55-64	38	8.0	28,236	11.4
65-74	50	10.5	27,463	11.0
75 and over	24	5.0	21,240	8.5
Total	477	100.0	248,586	99.9
Years of Education ²				
Less than 12	37	9.3	67,846	32.7
High school	132	33.0	60,535	29.2
Less than bachelors	129	32.3	45,737	22.1
Bachelors	48	12.0	19,664	9.5
Graduate studies	54	13.5	13,615	6.6
Total	400	100.1	207,397	100.1
Marital Status ³				
Married	244	51.5	96,803	38.9
Widowed	30	6.3	27,207	10.9
Divorced	46	9.7	22,707	9.1
Separated	18	3.8	11,034	4.4
Never married	136	28.7	90,835	36.5
Total	474	100.0	248,586	99.8
Home Ownership (unweighted)				
Homeowner	213	44.5	58,909	43.2
Renter	266	55.5	77,527	56.8
Total	479	100.0	136,436	100.0
Persons in Household (unweighted)				
1	96	20.0	48,610	35.6
2	128	26.6	39,096	28.7
3	119	24.7	21,841	16.0
4	73	15.2	15,380	11.3
5	38	7.9	7,172	5.3
6 and up	27	5.6	4,337	3.2
Total	481	100.0	136,436	100.1

NOTE: percents may not total to 100.0 due to rounding

¹ Persons 18 and over² Persons 25 and over³ Persons 18 and over. Census lists marital status for those 15 and over. Those under 18 have been assumed to be never married.

FINDINGS

OVERALL EVALUATIONS

The majority of respondents were satisfied with the Buffalo Police Department and the level, quality, and professionalism/ responsiveness of the services it provides. A majority were confident the Buffalo Police can handle crime. About two thirds of those who reported having contact with the police felt positively about the quality of their most recent contact.

Though there is substantial satisfaction with the Buffalo Police, there remains substantial room for improvement. The majorities were thin, ranging from 65 percent whose overall satisfaction with the department was positive down to 53 percent who rated the level of service from the department as better than fair. Even those who were positive about the department tended not to give it the highest possible marks. For example, only 11 percent of respondents responded "Very satisfied" to the item about their overall satisfaction with the department. Minorities had more negative attitudes than the respondents as a whole. Perhaps reflecting the racial and ethnic distribution of the city's population, respondents in the northeast and mideast regions were less satisfied than respondents elsewhere, especially than those in the south and northwest. It is also possible that the lower satisfaction reported by minorities reflects characteristics of policing in the northeast and mideast that have little or nothing to do with race and ethnicity.

Minorities. The majority of minority respondents were neutral or dissatisfied with the department and the level, quality, and professionalism/responsiveness of the services it provides. On all these items minority respondents gave statistically significantly more negative responses than non-Hispanic white respondents. There were no significant differences between minorities and others in confidence that the Buffalo Police can handle crime and in the proportion who reported that their most recent contact with the police was better than fair.

Elderly. The elderly were somewhat more positive toward the police than was the rest of the population, though the only significant differences were their greater levels of overall satisfaction with the department and with the department's level of service.

Owners and renters. Homeowners have more favorable attitudes toward the Buffalo Police than do renters. Only on the questions concerning the quality of the most recent contact with the police and confidence in the ability of the police to handle crime are the differences between the two groups not statistically significant.

Gender. There were no male/female differences in overall evaluations of the department.

Regions. There were strong differences in overall evaluations of the department by region. Respondents in the northeast were the most dissatisfied, consistently evaluating the department's services more negatively than positively. Next most dissatisfied were respondents in the mideast. Though still generally not positive, ratings from the mideast were significantly higher than those from the northeast concerning confidence in the department's ability to handle crime, the responsiveness and professionalism of the department's services, and overall satisfaction with the department. Respondents in the south were the most satisfied, closely followed by those in the northwest. The only significant difference between the south and northwest is that respondents in the south have greater confidence in the department's ability to handle crime. Respondents in the midwest fell in the middle between the extremes of the northeast and the south. The midwest gave significantly lower ratings than the south and significantly higher ratings than the northeast to the level, quality, and responsiveness and professionalism of the department's services, to their confidence in the department's ability to handle crime, and to their overall satisfaction with the department.

COMMUNITY POLICING

Several questions probed attitudes that could affect the potential for effective partnership between the community and the police department. About half of the respondents feel that the police department and citizens currently work together to solve problems. Three quarters feel the department should spend even more time working with groups and individuals to solve problems. Two thirds feel that more time should be spent informing people about available services.

Three quarters of respondents agree that the Buffalo Police Department is concerned with the safety and security of the community. Such trust is no doubt essential for effective community policing. Two thirds feel that the department offers responsive and professional police services to the community. In both cases, though, substantially more just "agree" with the statement than "strongly agree," suggesting somewhat lukewarm trust.

Department Presence in the Community. About 60 percent of respondents consider the department to be usually fair, though even more (67 percent) believe the department is stricter in some neighborhoods than others. Only 37 percent agree that the department is usually intimidating.

Officers and Citizens. Nearly three quarters of respondents feel that most citizens are really interested in the problems faced by Buffalo police officers. Half feel friendships between citizens and the Buffalo Police are easy to develop. On the other hand, 60 percent feel officers seem content staying in their patrol cars rather than interacting with the citizens.

Minorities and Community Policing. The foundation of trust in the police is weaker among minorities than among the population as a whole, though there is still substantial trust. Minority respondents were significantly less likely than non-Hispanic whites to feel that the Buffalo Police Department is concerned with the safety and security of the community (67 percent versus 80 percent), though still two thirds did feel that the department was so concerned. Only about half of minority respondents believe the department provides responsive, professional service, compared to 70 percent of others. Minorities are significantly less likely to find the department usually fair (only 47 percent), significantly more likely to find it intimidating (47 percent), and significantly more likely to find it stricter in some areas than others (77 percent). Minority respondents significantly more often think officers are content to stay in their patrol cars (67 percent), and significantly less often feel it is easy to develop friendships with Buffalo Police officers (46 percent). They are significantly less likely to believe that the police and citizens currently work together to solve problems (46 percent).

The Elderly and Community Policing. The elderly tend to be somewhat more positive toward the current situation than are those under 65. They are significantly more likely to feel that citizens and the Buffalo Police work together to solve problems (72 percent versus 49 percent). They are also significantly more likely to think that citizens really care about the problems officers face and to believe that friendships with officers are easy to develop.

Home Owners, Renters, and Community Policing. Like the elderly, home owners are more likely than renters to feel friendship is easy to develop with the Buffalo Police (58 percent versus 49 percent for renters) and to feel that citizens and police work together to solve problems (59 percent vs 45). Owners are also more likely to rate the department's services as responsive and professional (68 percent vs 61).

Gender and Community Policing. There were no statistically significant differences between men and women on community policing questions.

Region and Community Policing. The most striking findings concerning region and community policing are the low levels of trust in the police in the northeast relative to other parts of the city and the relatively high levels of trust in the south.

Respondents from the south were significantly more likely to feel the department is usually fair than were respondents in the northeast and midwest, though even in the latter two regions respondents lean toward agreeing that the department is fair. Northeast respondents were also significantly less likely to agree that the department is fair than respondents from the midwest or northwest. The only significant differences between regions concerning perceptions of differential police strictness were between respondents in the midwest and respondents in the south and midwest, though respondents in all regions tend to agree that the police are stricter in some areas than in others. There were no regional differences in evaluations of whether the department is usually intimidating.

In contrast with the frequent attitudinal similarity between respondents from the northeast and mideast, respondents from these two regions differ significantly concerning whether citizens are interested in the problems of the police. Though they tend to agree that citizens are interested, respondents from the mideast are in greater agreement than are respondents from the northeast. Respondents from the midwest, too, agree significantly more than northeast respondents that citizens are interested in the problems of the police. Respondents from the northeast and northwest are significantly less likely than those from the south to feel friendships are easy to make with the police. Respondents from the south also significantly differ from those in the northeast (and from those in the mideast) in being less likely to feel that Buffalo police officers seem content staying in their police cars.

Respondents in the northeast are least likely to agree that citizens and the Buffalo Police Department work together to solve problems, though they are significantly different only from respondents from the south and midwest. Most strongly in agreement with the statement that the department should spend more time informing people about available services were respondents in the mideast. They were significantly more likely to agree than were respondents in the northeast, midwest, and south. There were no significant regional variations in agreement with the widely approved sentiment that the department should spend more time with individuals and groups to solve problems.

Respondents in the northeast and mideast are significantly less likely than respondents from the south to feel that the department is concerned with the community's safety and security, though a majority in all regions do agree the department is concerned with the community's safety and security. As noted earlier, northeastern respondents are significantly less likely than respondents in all other regions to agree that the department provides responsive and professional police services. Mideast respondents are significantly less likely to feel that the department provides responsive and professional services than are those in the south and northwest, while midwest respondents are less likely to than those in the south.

RESPONSE TO CRIME

Half of respondents report having limited or changed their activities due to fear of crime. This is especially true for minorities (59 percent), home owners (58 percent), and women (57 percent). The elderly were no different than the population as a whole. "Only" 43 percent of men report altering their patterns of activity due to fear of crime.

About three in five respondents feel crime has increased in their neighborhood, while one in two feels that the police can handle crime. Men and women, the elderly and those under 65, and owners and renters do not differ significantly in their perceptions of changing rates of crime in their districts nor in their confidence that the police can handle crime. Minorities, however, are significantly more likely than non-Hispanic whites to

feel that crime has increased (68 percent versus 58 percent) and are significantly less likely to feel confident that the police can handle crime (49 percent vs 58 percent).

Only half the respondents report talking to their neighbors about crime prevention. While there were no significant differences by race, elderly status, or gender in the likelihood of talking to neighbors about crime prevention, there was a large difference between home owners (62 percent) and renters (36 percent).

Neighborhood Block Clubs were strongly endorsed. About 90 percent of respondents agree that they are good ideas for citizens to adopt in their neighborhoods so that police can get help fighting crime. Even among minorities and the elderly, who are statistically significantly less enthusiastic, 85 percent or more think they are a good idea. A quarter of respondents do not know whether there is currently a block club in operation in their neighborhood. Of those who know, about half report that there are neighborhood block clubs in operation in their neighborhood.

Regions. Respondents in the south, the majority of whom have not changed their activities due to fear of crime, were significantly more likely to report no change in activities than were respondents in all other areas of the city. The majority of respondents outside the south have changed activities due to fear of crime. Though respondents in all areas tend to feel crime in their neighborhood has increased in recent years, respondents in the south are significantly less likely to feel this way than are respondents in all areas except the mideast. Respondents in the mideast are less likely to feel crime has increased than are respondents in the northeast. Three quarters of respondents in the south are confident in the ability of the police department to handle crime, significantly more than in any other part of the city.

There were no significant geographic differences in whether respondents discuss crime with their neighbors or in whether they think block clubs are good ideas. The only significant differences concerning whether there is a block club in the respondent's neighborhood are between the mideast and both the south and the northwest. Respondents in the mideast were more likely to have a block club.

NEIGHBORHOOD PROBLEMS

Respondents evaluated some 15 possible neighborhood problems, indicating for each whether it was a serious problem, a problem, or no problem in their neighborhood.

A mix of felony crimes and quality of public life problems constituted the problems most commonly rated as serious. Nearly a third of respondents (31 percent) indicated that people selling and using illegal drugs is a serious problem in their neighborhood. Groups of teenagers or others hanging out and harassing people was the problem next most commonly rated as a serious problem (by 28 percent of respondents). Back to felonies, the third most common serious problem was residential burglary (25

percent). (If we combine the problem and serious problem categories, residential burglary was the most commonly mentioned problem, by over 60 percent of respondents, surpassing even drug sale and use.)

Vandalism was a serious problem for just over 20 percent of respondents and physical decay in the neighborhood for just under. Trailing in mentions as serious problems were muggings, illegal gun possession and use (both over 16 percent), child abuse/neglect, noise, graffiti, victimization of the elderly, and traffic violations (all over 10 percent). Rarely mentioned as serious problems were prostitution or traffic congestion/parking problems.

Asked a yes-no question whether their neighborhood problems call for concentrated and/or repeated police action, 62 percent said yes.

Minorities. Minority rankings of problems were similar to the rankings by the respondents as a whole. Over 40 percent of minority respondents rated people selling and using illegal drugs as a serious problem in their neighborhood, and nearly 40 percent rated groups of teenagers hanging out and harassing people as a serious problem. Minority respondents gave significantly higher seriousness ratings than non-Hispanic whites to the problems of drug sale and use, physical decay in the neighborhood, and illegal gun possession and use.

Elderly. The elderly see neighborhood problems much like the sample as a whole. They differ significantly from those under 65 in being more likely to see noise as a problem. They are significantly less likely to feel problems need heavy policing. Though the elderly are slightly more likely than those under 65 to see victimization of the elderly as a problem, the difference is not statistically significant.

Owners. The only statistically significant difference between owners and renters is that renters are more likely to see prostitution as a problem. Neither group, though, tends to see it as much of a problem.

Gender. There were no statistically significant differences between men and women in the evaluation of neighborhood problems.

Regions. The region with the most serious problems was the mideast, where on average respondents indicated that 3.6 of the possible problems were "serious problems" in their neighborhood. Respondents from the south were least likely to identify serious problems in their neighborhoods, averaging only 1.5 mentions per respondent, less than half that of the mideast. The average for the south was significantly lower than the average for the mideast, the midwest (2.9), and the northwest (2.5). (The average for the northeast, 2.7, was presumably not significantly different from the south because of its smaller number of respondents or its greater variance.) The distribution of serious problems by region is illustrated in Table 2, which extracts from the region-specific ratings of all fifteen problems the 21 that were rated as serious problems by 25 percent or more of the region's respondents.

Table 2 Most Serious Neighborhood Problems, Ranked by Percent in Each Region Calling the Problem Serious¹

Problem	Percent in Region Rating Problem Serious	Mean Rating ²	Region ³
Illegal drug sales and use	54.0	1.63	Mideast
Illegal drug sales and use	43.9	1.84	Midwest
Teens or others hanging out and harassing people	39.7	1.74	Northeast
Teens or others hanging out and harassing people	39.2	2.04	Mideast
Illegal drug sales and use	39.1	2.08	Northwest
Illegal drug sales and use	35.7	1.99	Northeast
Teens or others hanging out and harassing people	35.3	1.97	Midwest
Illegal gun possession and use	34.7	2.04	Mideast
Residential burglary	34.0	1.84	Northeast
Vandalism	33.8	1.98	Northeast
Residential burglary	33.2	1.89	Northwest
Residential burglary	33.1	2.03	Mideast
Physical decay	29.4	2.09	Mideast
Physical decay	27.7	2.15	Midwest
Domestic violence	27.0	2.21	Northeast
Vandalism	26.6	2.14	Mideast
Noise	26.4	2.08	Northeast
Illegal gun possession and use	25.7	2.39	Northwest
Muggings	25.4	2.21	Mideast
Residential burglary	24.9	1.99	Midwest
Illegal drug sales and use	24.9	2.27	South

¹ Tabulated are all 21 problems/region combinations in which one fourth or more of respondents in the region of the city reported that the problem was a serious problem in their neighborhood

² 1=serious problem, 2=problem, 3=no problem

³ Based on ZIP codes. Mideast includes ZIP codes 14212, 14208, and 14211. Northeast includes 14215. Midwest includes 14201, 14202, 14203, 14204, 14209, and 14213. Northwest includes 14207, 14214, 14216, and 14222. South includes 14210 and 14220.

The problem of drug sales and use is, according to respondents, significantly more serious in neighborhoods in the mideast than in all other regions except the midwest. Respondents in the midwest rate the problem as significantly more serious than do those in the south. Harassment from teenagers and others hanging out is reported to be a significantly bigger problem in the northeast than in the south or northwest, and a significantly bigger problem in the midwest and mideast than in the northwest. Residential burglary was rated a significantly smaller problem in the south than in any other region except the mideast.

There were no regional differences in ratings of vandalism as a problem. Respondents in the mideast, midwest, and northeast all were significantly more likely than those in the south and northwest to cite physical decay as a problem in their neighborhood. Respondents from all regions outside the south rated both muggings and illegal gun possession and use significantly bigger problems than did those in the south. Respondents in the mideast also rated gun possession and use a significantly more serious problem than did respondents in the midwest and northwest. Noise was a significantly bigger problem in the northeast, mideast, and midwest than in the south or northwest. Graffiti is a significantly bigger problem in the midwest and mideast than in either the south or northwest. Victimization of the elderly was rated significantly less a problem in the south than anywhere else. There were no regional differences concerning traffic violations, though respondents in the mideast rated traffic congestion/parking a more serious problem than did respondents in all other regions except the northwest. Prostitution was rated less a problem in the south than in all other regions except the northeast.

Respondents in the northeast were significantly more likely than those in any other region except the mideast to feel their neighborhood problems need heavy policing.

PROGRAMS AND SERVICES

Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of 12 programs and services of the department. They further rated their satisfaction with each of the programs they considered important.

Program/service importance. The most important service was responding to 911 calls. Three quarters of respondents rated this a very important service.

The next most important service was narcotics investigation, rated very important by 64 percent. Rated very important by about 50 percent of respondents were crime prevention programs, D.A.R.E., and work with youth to prevent crime.

Over 40 percent rated Neighborhood Block Clubs and foot patrol as very important, while over 30 percent gave that rating to accident investigation and A.I.M. An unusually high fraction of respondents did not know about A.I.M. A.I.M.'s importance rating

from those willing to give the program some evaluation was similar to the overall ratings for D.A.R.E. and the crime prevention programs. Bringing up the rear among programs were traffic control, K-9 patrol, and parking enforcement.

Program/service satisfaction. Programs and services received somewhat better than mediocre satisfaction ratings. For all programs and services except foot patrol, the average satisfaction with a program or service reported by those who felt it was important or very important lay between somewhat satisfied and undecided. Foot patrol was between undecided and somewhat dissatisfied.

The most important service, responding to 911, ranked next to last in satisfaction. Its rating was closer to "undecided" than to "somewhat satisfied." Narcotics investigation, the second most important service, was rated only slightly better, midway between "undecided" and "somewhat satisfied."

The three highest rated programs and services were D.A.R.E., traffic control, and Neighborhood Block Clubs.

Minorities. Statistically significant differences between minority and non-Hispanic white respondents were minimal. Minorities were less satisfied with the narcotics investigation service and much less satisfied with current foot patrol services. They gave greater importance to Neighborhood Block Clubs.

Elderly, Owner/renter. There were no significant differences between elderly respondents and those under 65 in evaluations of the importance of programs and services and in ratings of satisfaction with programs and services. Similarly, there were no differences between owners and renters.

Gender. In general women see prevention-related activities as more important than do men. They gave significantly higher importance ratings than did men to crime prevention programs, D.A.R.E., working with community youths to prevent crime, and Neighborhood Block Clubs, as well as to investigating accidents and traffic control. They were more satisfied with 911 service and with K-9 patrol.

Region. There were few differences by region in evaluations of the importance of programs and services. On the other hand, there were some notable differences in satisfaction with programs the respondent considered important. Where there were differences, there was a strong tendency for northeast respondents to be less satisfied than respondents elsewhere in the community.

Among the nine services rated most important by all respondents, only for the importance of responding to 911 calls was there a significant regional difference, with northeast respondents rating it less important than northwest respondents. Though their difference with northwest respondents was statistically significant, well over half the

respondents from the northeast rated this service as very important. Other significant differences concerned traffic control, which northeast respondents rated as less important than did all other regions, and K-9 patrol, which was seen as more important in the midwest than in the south or mideast.

Satisfaction with the service rated overall most important, responding to 911, was lowest in the northeast, which differed significantly from all other regions, and in the midwest, which differed significantly from the northwest. There were no regional differences in satisfaction with narcotics investigations, crime prevention programs, work with youth to prevent crime, neighborhood block clubs, or parking enforcement. The only significant differences associated with the highly rated D.A.R.E. program involved respondents in the northeast. These respondents were significantly less satisfied than respondents in every other region. Concerning foot patrol, respondents in the south were significantly more satisfied than respondents in all other regions except the northwest. Concerning A.I.M., respondents in the northeast were less satisfied than respondents everywhere else except the northwest. Respondents in the northeast were significantly less satisfied than those elsewhere with accident investigations and were less satisfied than those in the midwest with the K-9 patrol.

CONTACTS WITH POLICE

Most respondents reported relatively little contact with the services of the Buffalo Police (84 percent have contact "not too often" or less frequently). A third reported never having contact. A little over half of those who reported having contact rated the quality of their most recent contact as good or excellent. Seventeen percent of respondents (one in six) felt the quality of their most recent contact was poor. This seems a rather high negative rating.

The reason for 40 percent of respondents' most recent contacts was to report an incident or complaint. Another 18 percent were due to the respondent being a crime victim. The third most common reason (9 percent) was a parking ticket. (It is likely that many respondents do not distinguish between parking tickets issued by the Parking Violations Bureau and by the Buffalo Police.) Most contacts were initiated by the respondent. About half of contacts (52 percent) began with calls to 911, and another quarter (23 percent) with calls to the Buffalo Police. Over half of respondents (57 percent) rated the handling of their phone call as good or excellent; 16 percent rated it poor. About 40 percent rated the response time to their call as quick or better, 60 percent as adequate or better, and 20 percent as very slow.

Respondents who reported calling the Buffalo Police Department directly reported receiving significantly quicker response to their call than those calling 911. On the other hand, there were no significant differences between those calling the department and those calling 911 in terms of evaluations of the handling of the phone call or of the quality of their most recent contact.

Subgroup Differences. There were few statistically significant differences between subgroups in their experiences of contact with the police. Men were somewhat more often in contact with the police than were women. Home owners and the elderly reported quicker response times to phone calls than did others. The elderly were also more satisfied with how their phone call was handled.

Region. Though respondents in all regions tended not to have much contact with the police, this was especially true of respondents from the south. Respondents from the south, 70 percent of whom report never or hardly ever having contact with police, reported significantly lower rates of contact than did respondents in the northeast, mideast, and midwest, 49, 51, and 55 percent of whom, respectively, reported never or hardly ever having contact with the police. There were no significant differences by region in the reasons for contact or in how the contact was initiated. Response to phone calls was significantly quicker in the northwest than in all other parts of the city and in the midwest than in the mideast. Evaluations of how well phone calls were handled and of the quality of the most recent contact differed significantly only between the northeast and northwest. Respondents in the northeast were least satisfied with the handling of their phone calls and with the quality of their most recent contact with the police.

OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS

Respondents were given two open ended opportunities to volunteer suggestions for, or evaluations of, the department. In both cases only about a quarter of respondents made suggestions or evaluations. These responses were then coded into general categories.

Suggestions for Services or Programs. The first question asked if there were programs or services which should be developed to serve the policing needs of Buffalo. Eighteen respondents suggested more community programs. Thirteen suggested developing a Police Athletic League. Twelve suggested more foot patrols, while 11 suggested working more with youth.

Additional Comments Regarding the Buffalo Police. The second open ended item, the last in the interview, asked if the respondent had any additional comments regarding the Buffalo Police Department. Twenty-five volunteered that the Buffalo Police Department does a good job. Sixteen suggested that more police were needed on the street.

SUMMARY

On the whole, the adults of Buffalo are satisfied though not enthusiastic with the services of the Buffalo Police Department. They have generally positive feelings about Buffalo's police officers. They feel the department currently works with the community and would like it to do so even more. Responding to 911 calls is the most important service of the department; the department's performance of this service receives only fair to middling evaluations. Over half of respondents have altered their behavior due to crime. Most feel block clubs are valuable aids in fighting crime. The most serious neighborhood problem is drug selling and use, followed by harassment from teens and others hanging out. Minorities are neutral to dissatisfied with the services of the Buffalo Police Department. Residents in the south of the city are the most satisfied with the department, while those in the northeast are the least satisfied. There were few differences between minorities and others and among the regions of the city in evaluations of which were the most serious neighborhood problems, which were the most important police services and programs, and which services were being handled best.

THE STUDY DIRECTORS

Prof. Carl B. Backman is Associate Professor of Sociology at Buffalo State College. He received his BA from Yale University in 1973, an MA from Cornell in 1976, and his PhD from Cornell in 1983. All his degrees are in sociology. He honed his survey skills with four years at the Survey and Statistical Analysis unit of the United States Senate Computer Center. Before coming to the Department of Sociology at Buffalo State in 1985, he taught at the Georgia Institute of Technology and at Auburn University. Among his areas of expertise are demography and computer methods in sociology.

Prof. Ron Stewart is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Buffalo State College. He received an A.A. from Bishop State Community College in Mobile, Alabama, his BA in sociology from Tuskegee University in 1979, MAs in both sociology and black studies from Ohio State University in 1982 and 1983, respectively, and his PhD in sociology from Howard University in 1990. He sharpened his survey skills working on several surveys for the Washington Urban League and other urban clients in Washington, DC. He joined the Buffalo State Department of Sociology in 1990, with previous teaching experience at Alabama State University. Among his areas of expertise are research methods, the African American male, and the African American family.

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Appendix A The survey instrument

Appendix B Frequencies on all questions: the entire sample

Appendix C Means on all questions: the entire sample

Appendix D Crosstabulations with minority status

Appendix E Crosstabulations with elderly status

Appendix F Crosstabulations with home ownership

Appendix G Crosstabulations with gender

Appendix H Crosstabulations with region

APPENDIX A

The Survey Instrument

Included in this Appendix is the survey instrument interviewers used in conducting the telephone interviews. Items in brackets are prompts interviewers were to use in response to respondent requests for clarification. DK is an abbreviation for "Don't know."

COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT SURVEY QUEST ID# _____
A Survey Conducted for the INTERVID# _____
BUFFALO POLICE DEPARTMENT STUDY# 0794

Hello! My name is _____ from Buffalo State College. We are conducting a community-wide survey on behalf of the Buffalo Police Department and we need your help. Is this house in Buffalo? [If not, thank respondent and end interview.] The Buffalo Police Department is changing and is interested in your views about the police department and the services it provides. Your views will help the department in its efforts to meet the needs of the community, especially in making changes that will please citizens such as yourself. Your participation in the survey is voluntary and is absolutely confidential. Neither your name nor any other identifying information will be asked for or recorded. The interview will only take a few minutes of your time. To ensure that the survey represents the adult population, may I speak to the adult who had the last birthday? [I work for Buffalo State College, not the Buffalo Police Department. The police department doesn't really care which individuals we talk to, and if it did, there is no way it could ever find out that we talked to you. They are interested in the feelings of the community, not any one individual.]

I PROGRAMS AND SERVICES

To begin, some people think only of a patrol officer in a car when they think of police, and yet there are many other things involved in policing. This section asks your opinion of the services provided by the Buffalo Police Department. The questions ask about the **quality and level** of service provided.

Q1 Overall, how would you describe the level of service provided by the Buffalo Police Department? (FOR EXAMPLE: THE AMOUNT AND/OR FREQUENCY OF SERVICE PROVIDED)

Excellent.....	1
Good.....	2
Fair.....	3
Poor	4
DK	8

Q2 Please indicate your opinion of the quality of service provided by the Buffalo Police Department (FOR EXAMPLE: HOW GOOD ARE THE SERVICES PROVIDED? HOW COURTEOUS, PROFESSIONAL AND EFFECTIVE ARE POLICE OFFICERS IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE PUBLIC?)

Excellent	1
Good	2
Fair	3
Poor	4
DK	8

The following is a list of some of the programs and services that the Buffalo Police Department provides. Please tell me if you know about the service. If you do know about it, tell me if you feel the program(s) and service(s) are Very Important [VI], Important [I], Undecided [U], Unimportant [UI], or Very Unimportant [VU]. For those that are important or very important to you, please tell me how satisfied you are with the current program or service. Tell me if you are Very Satisfied [VS], Somewhat Satisfied [SWS], Undecided [U], Somewhat Dissatisfied [SWD], or Very Dissatisfied [VD].

	VI	I	U	UI	VU	DK	
Q3 A.I.M. (School attendance program).....	1	2	3	4	5	8	
Q4 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied							
are you with the program?	1VS	2SWS	3U	4SD	5VD	8DK	9N/A
Q5 D.A.R.E. (Drug prevention program).....	1	2	3	4	5	8	
Q6 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied							
are you with the program?	1VS	2SWS	3U	4SD	5VD	8DK	9N/A

		VI	I	U	UI	VU	DK
Q7	Neighborhood Block Clubs	1	2	3	4	5	8
	Q8 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied are you with the program?	1VS	2SWS	3U	4SD	5VD	8DK 9N/A
Q9	Working with Community Youths to Prevent Crime	1	2	3	4	5	8
	Q10 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied are you with the program?	1VS	2SWS	3U	4SD	5VD	8DK 9N/A
Q11	Crime Prevention Programs	1	2	3	4	5	8
	Q12 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied are you with the programs?	1VS	2SWS	3U	4SD	5VD	8DK 9N/A
Q13	Investigating Accidents	1	2	3	4	5	8
	Q14 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied are you with the service?	1VS	2SWS	3U	4SD	5VD	8DK 9N/A
Q15	Responding to 911 Calls (Calls for Service)	1	2	3	4	5	8
	Q16 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied are you with the program?	1VS	2SWS	3U	4SD	5VD	8DK 9N/A
Q17	Traffic Control.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
	Q18 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied are you with the service?	1VS	2SWS	3U	4SD	5VD	8DK 9N/A
Q19	Parking Enforcement.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
	Q20 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied are you with the service?	1VS	2SWS	3U	4SD	5VD	8DK 9N/A
Q21	K-9 Patrol	1	2	3	4	5	8
	Q22 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied are you with the program?	1VS	2SWS	3U	4SD	5VD	8DK 9N/A
Q23	Foot Patrol	1	2	3	4	5	8
	Q24 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied are you with the service?	1VS	2SWS	3S	4SD	5VD	8DK 9N/A
Q25	Narcotic Investigations.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
	Q26 [If 1 or 2] How satisfied are you with the service?	1VS	2SWS	3S	4SD	5VD	8DK 9N/A
Q27	Please identify any other programs or services which you feel should be developed to serve the policing needs of Buffalo.						

II RECENT CONTACTS WITH POLICE, NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY

This section asks about your contacts with the Buffalo Police Department, and your perceptions of safety in your neighborhood.

- Q28 How frequently do you come into contact with the services provided by the Buffalo Police Department?
- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| Very often..... | 1 |
| Fairly often..... | 2 |
| Not too often..... | 3 |
| Hardly ever..... | 4 |
| Never(GO TO SEC.III) | 5 |
- Q29 Please indicate the reason for the most recent contact.
- | | |
|-----------------------------------|----|
| Report an incident/complain..... | 01 |
| Victim of a crime..... | 02 |
| Witness to a crime..... | 03 |
| Request information/service..... | 04 |
| Involved in traffic accident..... | 05 |
| Community/school program..... | 06 |
| Questioning/detention/arrest..... | 07 |
| Parking ticket | 08 |
| Other | 97 |
| Not appropriate | 99 |
- Q30 How was this most recent contact initiated?
- | | |
|------------------------------------|----|
| 911-Emergency operations center .. | 01 |
| Called BPD..... | 02 |
| Scheduled contact..... | 03 |
| Stopped Officer on street..... | 04 |
| Officer initiated..... | 05 |
| Left Ticket on window | 06 |
| Other (.....) | 97 |
| DK..... | 98 |
| Not Appropriate..... | 99 |
- Q31 If you have ever initiated a call by telephone, what is your opinion of the way your call was handled? (FOR EXAMPLE: WAS THE PERSON YOU TALKED TO HELPFUL, COURTEOUS, CONCERNED?)
- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Excellent..... | 1 |
| Good..... | 2 |
| Needs improvement.... | 3 |
| Poor..... | 4 |
| DK..... | 8 |
| Inappropriate | 9 |
- Q32 If you have ever initiated contact with the Police Department by phone, please indicate your feelings about the amount of time it took the police to respond to your call.
- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| Very Quick..... | 1 |
| Quick..... | 2 |
| Adequate..... | 3 |
| Slow | 4 |
| Very Slow | 5 |
| DK | 8 |
| Inappropriate | 9 |
- Q33 The quality of the most recent contact with the Police Department was: (FOR EXAMPLE: WERE THE OFFICERS WHO RESPONDED HELPFUL, COURTEOUS, CONCERNED)
- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| Excellent | 1 |
| Good | 2 |
| Fair | 3 |
| Poor | 4 |
| DK | 8 |
| Inappropriate | 9 |

III NEIGHBORHOOD PROBLEMS

Next I would like to ask about specific problems that may exist in your neighborhood. Using the following scale, please indicate which most accurately describes the extent of these problems. The scale is as follows: A Serious Problem [SP], A Problem [P], No Problem [NP], Uncertain [U].

		SP	P	NP	U
Q34	People's homes being broken into (Residential burglaries).....	1	2	3	8
Q35	People having their purses/wallets or other personal property forcibly taken.....	1	2	3	8
Q36	Physical violence among people living in the same household (Domestic violence).....	1	2	3	8
Q37	Traffic Violations.....	1	2	3	8
Q38	Groups of teenagers or others hanging out and harassing people.....	1	2	3	8
Q39	People selling and using illegal drugs.....	1	2	3	8
Q40	Child abuse/neglect.....	1	2	3	8
Q41	Vandalism -- that is, kids or others breaking windows, or damaging property	1	2	3	8
Q42	Prostitution	1	2	3	8
Q43	Physical decay -- such as abandoned cars, run down buildings, houses in disrepair, etc.....	1	2	3	8
Q44	Victimization of the elderly.....	1	2	3	8
Q45	Noise-such as loud parties.....	1	2	3	8
Q46	Illegal gun possession and use	1	2	3	8
Q47	Traffic congestion/parking problems.....	1	2	3	8
Q48	Teenagers or others writing things on walls/property (Graffiti).....	1	2	3	8
Q49	Of the problems you identified as definitely being a problem, do they call for concentrated and/or repeated police action?				
		YES	1		
		NO	2		
		DK	8		
		INAPPROPRIATE ..	9		

IV EFFECTS OF CRIME ON BEHAVIOR

Now I'm interested in the effects of crime on your behavior. Please indicate your feelings about the following statements.

Q50	Do you think crime in your neighborhood has, in the past few years, has ...	INCREASED	1
		REMAINED THE SAME	2
		DECREASED	3
		DK	8
Q51	Have you limited or changed your activity in the past few years due to fear of crime?	YES	1
		NO	2
		DK	8

- Q52 Are you confident in the ability of the police department to prevent crime and apprehend criminals?
- YES 1
NO 2
DK 8
- Q53 Do you talk to your neighbors about crime prevention?
- YES..... 1
NO..... 2
DK..... 8
- Q54 Do you think Neighborhood Block Clubs are good ideas for citizens to adopt in their neighborhoods, so that police can get help fighting crime?
- YES..... 1
NO..... 2
DK..... 8
- Q55 Does your neighborhood have a Neighborhood Block Club in operation at this time?
- YES..... 1
NO..... 2
DK..... 8

V COMMUNITY POLICING

This next section is about community centered policing. Community Policing in its simplest terms consists of building and maintaining **partnerships** between the community and the police. To assess the potential success of the community policing initiative, the following statements relate to many of the attitudes and opinions citizens have about police in general. After I read each statement, tell me whether you strongly agree [SA], somewhat agree [SWA], are undecided [U], somewhat disagree [SD], or strongly disagree [SWD] with the statement.

- | | SA | SWA | U | SWD | D |
|--|----|-----|---|-----|---|
| Q56 Most citizens are really interested in the problems faced by Buffalo police officers..... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Q57 Friendships between the citizens and the Buffalo Police are easy to develop..... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Q58 Buffalo police officers seem content staying in their patrol cars rather than interacting with the citizens..... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Q59 Citizens and the Buffalo Police Department work together in solving problems..... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Q60 The Buffalo Police Department is usually fair..... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Q61 The Buffalo Police Department is usually intimidating..... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Q62 The Buffalo Police Department is more strict in some neighborhoods than in others..... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Q63 The Buffalo Police Department should spend more time informing people about available services..... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Q64 The Buffalo Police Department should spend more time working with individuals and groups to solve problems..... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

- Q65 The Buffalo Police Department is concerned with the safety and security of the community..... 1 2 3 4 5
- Q66 The Buffalo Police Department provides responsive and professional police services to the community..... 1 2 3 4 5
- Q67 My overall satisfaction with the Buffalo Police Department is
- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| Very satisfied | 1 |
| Satisfied | 2 |
| Undecided | 3 |
| Dissatisfied | 4 |
| Very Dissatisfied .. | 5 |

VI BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The final set of questions deals with aspects of your personal background. This information is needed in order to make sure that people from all walks of life are represented in the survey.

- Q68 How old were you on your last birthday? **(RECORD VERBATIM)** _____
- Q69 Of which group do you consider yourself a member?
- | | |
|------------------------------|---|
| CAUCASIAN/WHITE | 1 |
| AFRICAN AMERICAN/BLACK | 2 |
| HISPANIC | 3 |
| AMERICAN INDIAN | 4 |
| ASIAN | 5 |
| OTHER (_____) | 7 |
- PLEASE SPECIFY**
- Q70 What is your sex?
- | | |
|------------|---|
| Male | 1 |
| Female.... | 2 |
- Q71 What is the highest grade of school you completed?
- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|--------------|----|----|-------------|----|----|---------|----|----|----|----|
| 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 |
| | | | | | | | | | | GRADE SCHOOL | | | HIGH SCHOOL | | | COLLEGE | | | | |
- Q72 Are you:
- | | |
|-----------------|---|
| Employed..... | 1 |
| Unemployed..... | 2 |
| Retired..... | 3 |
| Disabled..... | 4 |
| Other | 7 |
| DK..... | 8 |
- Q73 Are you a homeowner or renter?
- | | |
|-----------------|---|
| Homeowner | 1 |
| Renter | 2 |
- Q74 Please indicate your type of residence (Check One).
- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| Apartment | 1 |
| Single Family Home | 2 |
| Duplex | 3 |
| Condominium..... | 4 |
| Other | 7 |
- (Specify)
- Q75 What is the total number of persons in you household? _____
- Q75a What is the total number of people 18 and over in your household? _____

Q76 Are you currently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?

married	1
widowed	2
divorced	3
separated	4
never married ..	5
other _____	7

Q77 What is your Zip Code? (Record Verbatim)

1 4 _ _ _

That completes the interview. Thank you very much for your cooperation. We would appreciate any additional comments you may have regarding the Buffalo Police Department (INTERVIEWER RECORD VERBATIM)

INTERVIEWER OBSERVATION:

Please record your perception of the Respondent's attitude towards the interview.


Positive	1
Neutral	2
Negative	3
DK	8

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Bureau of Justice Assistance

Understanding Community Policing

A Framework for Action

MONOGRAPH

A Neighborhood Gives Peace a Wary Look

By DAVID M. HALBFINGER

In Washington Heights, until recently one of New York's most murderous communities, a disturbing truth reveals itself in the empty stoops on West 162d Street in late afternoon, in the thinly peopled parks overlooking the Harlem River, in the greetings not exchanged by lifelong neighbors on Audubon Avenue:

The gunfire may recede into memory, but the fear hangs on.

In 1991, there were 119 killings north of 155th Street in Manhattan. So far this year, the body count stands at just five. Yet while people in Times Square and other far less violent neighborhoods have greeted far less dramatic drops in crime with responses bordering on euphoria, hardly anybody is ready to celebrate here in Washington Heights.

Slowly, haltingly, after a decade and a half in a war zone, the survivors are beginning to emerge from their bunkers into the plain light of day.

New stores are opening, and without shields of bulletproof glass over the counters.

Police officers, once feared almost as much as the drug dealers themselves, have actually started hearing quiet thanks for their crime-fighting help.

And finally, at the relatively advanced age of 9, Roselia Montalvo has learned to ride a bike.

But at every step toward normal life, the memories, and the mis-



Angel Franco/The New York Times

Neighbors talk in safer times for Washington Heights in Manhattan.

WHERE FEAR LINGERS

A special report.

trust, seem to get in the way.

Hundreds of people are still recovering from some trauma of war — the state assemblyman who saw a man shot in the back of the head and still hears the screams of the victim's wife; the eighth grader who remembers running for cover

as a friend was gunned down by rival drug dealers, the woman whose 12-year-old son was killed because he had witnessed his father's murder.

Some simply discount the Police Department's murder statistics. They point out the apartments in their buildings where drugs are sold and used, or the shadows under parked cars where they see

Continued on Page A19

PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION

In Washington Heights, Drug War Survivors Cast A Wary Look at Peace

Continued From Page A1

people stash guns, as signs that the supposedly safe streets are just so much hype.

Many more remain invisible, for want of a better word. Confined behind triple-locked doors, these battle-weary bystanders — often single mothers, the elderly or immigrant couples with young children — have yet to venture out and sense the difference for themselves.

They know that things are somehow better, but real safety still feels out of reach.

"Safe is when you could walk from the train station home, or from your corner to your building, or from the street downstairs to your apartment door, without nobody trying to bother you or follow you," said 15-year-old Rantlin Estrella. "They got a long way to go."

The shooting started in the mid-1980's, when crack cocaine took hold in Washington Heights and gangs of recent Dominican immigrants established the area as the nation's largest wholesale drug market. Other neighborhoods, especially in Brooklyn and the Bronx, also had a strong local customer base for drugs, but Washington Heights was special.

Fed by six bridges and three major highways, Washington Heights was accessible from New Jersey, Westchester and Connecticut, as well as from the rest of the city. It had one of New York's largest and most thinly stretched police precincts, the 34th. And it had an economically desperate population of Dominicans, many of whom, law enforcement officials said, applied their rich tradition of entrepreneurship and their common language with Colombian cocaine suppliers to become the perfect middlemen for crack.

Soon, the neighborhood was to drug dealers: throughout the Northeast what the Hunts Point market in the Bronx is to the region's grocery stores, but with sedans instead of semitrailers, and tenement doors in place of loading docks. Operating independently, four or five drug crews might share a single block, their street peddlers swarming over cars with out-of-state plates, vying for market share literally side by side.

A Drug Capital Where Gunmen Ruled

That free-for-all competition often turned deadly. Isaac Sanchez, who is 15, remembers seeing one business dispute resolve itself in typical fashion several years ago.

"You see that white church?" he said, pointing to the corner of 166th Street and Amsterdam Avenue. "This guy who was a friend of mine used to own a drug spot there. He was going to sell it to someone, and they started arguing over the money; and the guy shot him. I had to run inside the cigar store across the street."

Today, Washington Heights remains the region's largest distribution center for narcotics, Police Commissioner Howard Safir said. Drug arrests there — now occurring an average of once every hour and a half — have yet to peak and, he said, are not likely to do so for some time. But the drug trade has been greatly diminished and, for the most part, forced indoors. The streets, he said, once again belong to the police.

The change took the better part of a decade, a series of prosecutions of violent drug gangs, aggressive police tactics, money and manpower. The District Attorney's office convinced the owners of hundreds of apartment buildings to allow police officers to patrol inside, resulting in thousands of arrests a year. A new police precinct, the 33d, with 200 more officers, was carved out of the southern half of the 34th in 1994, after a long community campaign. And in 1996, Mr. Safir organized a city-state-Federal task force that pools intelligence data and responds to every reported drug incident in Washington Heights.

Gun arrests are already down, said Deputy Inspector John Romero, commander of the 34th Precinct, which until April 28 had enjoyed more than five months without a murder.

"People now aren't going to take a chance at carrying a gun, because we're stopping people for quality-of-life crimes all the time," he said. "And if they're not going out

with guns, they don't have them when their tempers flare up."

Other signs of change bear out the statistics.

Edward Rivera, manager of the Rivera Funeral Home on St. Nicholas Avenue, remembers when occupied coffins would be left in the hall because the private viewing rooms were busy. "Out of every five calls we'd get, maybe three were gunshot victims," he said. "Mondays were really bad, after the weekend. And the days after holidays. In the early 90's, we could've had 10 or 15 homicides a month."

Business is slow now, he said, adding, "I don't remember the last homicide we had."

At Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, the area's only hospital, gunshot victims once rolled in on gurneys almost nightly. But surgeons removed only four bullets last year. Today, kitchen accidents and sprained ankles receive the staff's full attention, said Dr. James F. Giglio, director of emergency medicine. The trauma surgery room is dark most of the time, its swinging door locked.

Showing Symptoms Of War Survivors

Bodily trauma may be on the wane, but psychic trauma is another story.

Marta Pepin recalls sitting in her rocker and watching TV one afternoon in 1988, when she heard five loud bangs through her first-floor window. She turned and saw a neighbor, Ricky Santiago, fall down dead a few feet outside on Audubon Avenue.

Mrs. Pepin responded to the constant gunfire not by shrinking in fear but by organizing her fellow tenants to buy their building, in which drug dealers controlled five apartments. Four have since been evicted. But Mrs. Pepin is still afraid. Last year, the building hired a guard to keep out unwanted night visitors. The extra \$16,000 a year is threatening to drive the building into bankruptcy, but Mrs. Pepin says she is loath to leave its security up to her neighbors and the police.

"You can't trust anyone," she said, sitting on a plastic slipcover in her modest but immaculate living room. "You don't know who people are. We've got nice people, but sometimes you think someone's nice, then you hear they're drug dealers. You just can't tell."

Such doubts are all too common, said Dr. Randall D. Marshall, director of trauma research at Columbia-Presbyterian.

"Once somebody's view of the world is that it's dangerous and threatening, it's difficult to change," said Dr. Marshall, whose clinic treats hundreds of residents, many with symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, an illness common among Vietnam veterans.

In wartime, at least, he said, "it's very clear who your enemy is, who your comrade is."

"The trouble here is that a lot of the threats are living within the community," he said. "People have learned that they can be exploited or harmed by anybody they come into contact with, and have to watch out."

In Washington Heights, even the most upstanding extended families lost relatives to the lure of drugs or drug money, making it impossible to see one's neighbors as simply good or bad. Savvy drug dealers carried bags of groceries for the elderly, delivered toys and meals at Christmas, held block parties in warm weather and generally cultivated their neighbors' goodwill — and their silence.

Wary of one another, people hardly put their faith in the police. Tensions between the two have been worse in Washington Heights than anywhere else in the city, from the full-fledged riots that followed a police officer's fatal shooting of an unarmed man in 1992, to the April 1997 death of Kevin Cedeño, shot in the back by an officer who was named "cop of the month" by his colleagues soon after.

"At least the drug dealers are not here to hurt you — they're here to make a profit," said Yvonne Stennett, who heads the Community League of West 159th Street.

Old complaints about do-nothing attitudes and slow response times only gave way to more suspicion after the new 33d Precinct brought in several officers transferred from the corruption-plagued 30th in Harlem.

**PHOTOCOPY
PRESERVATION**




Ramon Sanchez standing guard outside the two adjoining buildings he manages, 520 and 524 West 162d Street. The police have cleared out the drug dealers who overran one of the buildings. "Out of 24 apartments, 16 had drugs," he said.

STATUS REPORT

Murders Decline

The number of murders in New York City and Washington Heights, a neighborhood in northern Manhattan.



Since then, increasingly aggressive police tactics have convinced many law-abiding residents that officers see them as criminal suspects first.

"Nobody's really ready to let their guard down too far," said the Rev. Earl Koopkamp, pastor of the Church of the Intercession on West 155th Street.

Lessons learned painfully, after all, are not quickly forgotten.

There are about 250 city blocks in Washington Heights and Inwood to the north. But aside from four "model blocks," where officers patrol 24 hours a day, there are few places where people seem to have relaxed. Parents still make their children carry beepers, or check in by phone every time they go from one friend's home to another. Teen-age boys stay away from parks that have supposedly been cleaned up. More and more stores are staying open in the evenings, but few women shop alone after dark.

The local Assemblyman, Adriano Espaillat, thinks a bicycle race might help. Mr. Espaillat, who like so many of his constituents once witnessed a murder in daylight, wants to hold the race this summer, to show outsiders that the neighborhood is safe to visit, but more important, he says, to prove to residents that it is safe to go outside — a

first step toward a more normal way of life.

Some people think those first steps have already been taken, that the old twisted alliances and enmities are beginning to straighten out. Deputy Inspector Garry F. McCarthy, commander of the 33d Precinct, recounted how two men he had stopped and frisked had actually thanked him afterward, once he showed them how closely they matched the description of two crime suspects. And when the police shut down five businesses on Broadway a few weeks ago for harboring drug activity, several passers-by quietly expressed their gratitude, he said.

Even young people are reexamining their past loyalties.

"The fun we had then — now, I regret it," said Isaac Sanchez, talking about the days when his block was an open-air crack market. "Before, in the summer, the drug dealers used to do barbecues. Now, they're gone, and we can't do it any more. Nobody's got the money. But I feel guilty now. Because I used to take whatever anybody gave me. I never asked where they got it. I enjoyed it."

Others are taking risks to insure that the cease-fire holds.

Ramon Sanchez, who manages two adjoining buildings on West 162d Street, stands guard outside, making sure that the front doors lock and that no one gets inside who does not belong. He points out a "crack-head" across the street, gestures at several men, loitering near a garage, who he says are dope peddlers, and fingers a hole in the masonry that was blown out by a .357 Magnum shell.

One of the two buildings used to be overrun with dealers, said Mr. Sanchez, 58, who is not related to Isaac Sanchez.

"Out of 24 apartments, 16 had drugs," he said. "Once I caught my super selling drugs. You couldn't walk into this building. You might get held up, or you might not come back."

But he worked with the police, turning in the superintendent, turning over a batch of cocaine that a postman found in a mailbox, keeping track of who was doing what where. A year ago, largely on the strength of his information, the police hauled off 20 people living inside. Last month, again relying on Mr. Sanchez for intelligence, officers swept through the entire block and arrested 10 people on drug charges.

Mr. Sanchez is tougher than most in Washington Heights. In 1990, his daughter was attacked by a New Jersey drug dealer after she informed against him. Mr. Sanchez, then a tradesman at Columbia University, drove to the dealer's home and shot him to death. He spent four years in prison on a reduced count of manslaughter.

"I am afraid of nobody," Mr. Sanchez said. "But I was scared for my family. I was afraid to even send them to the store."

Neighbors Emerge To Meet as Strangers

The other afternoon, Alexandra Peña watched as her four children played outside their apartment building on West 163d Street, between Amsterdam and Broadway. Michael, 13, rode back and forth on his bicycle. Roselia, 9, danced around with a

friend, announcing that she had just learned how to ride a bike herself. Justine, 7, tagged along with her sister. James, 6, scared his mother as he hung from a loose iron rail over a basement stairwell. An unremarkable after-school scene in most places. But until a few months ago, Ms. Peña and her family were prisoners of the violent drug trade in Washington Heights.

"When Michael was 9 or 10 months old," Ms. Peña said, "we were looking out the window one day — I was holding him — and we saw a guy get shot in the head right here on the corner. That was Michael's first experience."

There were plenty of others; their street was one of the most dangerous in the 33d Precinct. Last August, Inspector McCarthy declared it the first of the "model blocks." After an all-out drug sweep, the police created checkpoints at both ends of the street, posted officers there around the clock, painted over graffiti and helped residents organize tenant groups and a block association. The barricades have since come down, but an officer patrols the block at all times.

And slowly, the fear has begun to lift on 163d Street. People who for years would only leave their apartments in a hurry have begun to step outside merely to be outside — first by peering out of a doorway, then by taking a seat on a stoop, then finally taking the plunge by striking up a conversation with a stranger next door.

"We found people who lived across the street from each other for 25 years and had never seen each other," Inspector McCarthy said.

Ms. Peña said, "We were hibernating like the bears."

In safer parts of the world, her daughter Roselia might have started on a tricycle at 3, and moved up to training wheels at 5 or 6. But on 163d Street, she and her siblings could not play on the sidewalk. They could not even play in the lobby of their apartment building, where no fewer than four drug dealers would meet customers.

"I used to take them to school in the morning, pick them up in the afternoon, then take them to 101st and West End Avenue to play," said Ms. Peña, referring to her childhood home on the Upper West Side. "We lived here, but we didn't stay here. We'd come home at 8 or 9 at night. If we came too late, we'd be in danger. If we came home too early, we'd be bored, because we'd be locked up inside."

For fun, Roselia and Justine played with Barbie dolls or took rare turns at the Nintendo set that Michael monopolized. These days, Michael rides his bike, Justine has learned hide-and-seek and tag, and Roselia has discovered the other children on the block. "I've made five new friends," she said, pointing to their windows in three different buildings.

Ms. Peña says her children, born into the violence, have already lost their fear. "They don't even remember most of this," she said. "The great thing is, they're getting a chance for a better life."

She envies them. "I've got to get over my fear, too," she said. "It controls you. It does not allow you to be. It makes you feel like a prisoner when you have not committed a crime."

MAYOR RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI

TESTIMONY BEFORE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

Wednesday, March 3rd, 1999

Check Against Delivery

CC: Cynthia
Jose
Tanya
from: Andrea

- Thank You, Chairman Burton (**R-Ind**). I am honored to be able to address the committee today on the reforms and initiatives we've put in place in New York City, which have brought about a renaissance in New Yorkers' quality of life.
- New York City is the nation's largest and most diverse city. And with over 34 million visitors a year, we tend to symbolize the state of urban America to the world. In the early **1990s**, our city was suffering over 2,000 murders a year. We had lost 320,000 jobs between 1990 and 1993 and more than one seventh of the City's population - 1.16 million people - was on the welfare rolls. We were facing a \$2 billion budget gap and the City's only plan to respond to this crisis was to raise taxes and ask the federal government for more money.
- Twenty years of poor management and one-sided political debate in urban America had come to this: Cities had ceased to be the most innovative laboratories for change and innovation in government.
- But every challenge represents an opportunity. And throughout the mid **1990s**, a new breed of independent-minded Mayors spurred crime reduction, job growth and economic development in cities like Los Angeles, Indianapolis, Philadelphia and many others. We've learned from each other's successes. The result has been that urban America is again one of the country's most vibrant sources for solutions and innovations in government.
- I'm here to talk to you today about the ways in which we've improved the quality of life in our city. Our significant successes in crime reduction have provided a foundation on which we've been able to build substantial improvements in every area of city life. While I understand that the focus of today's hearing is on crime reduction, future hearings by this committee will deal with welfare reform, education and taxes. And so, while I will devote the majority of my testimony today to crime reduction, I'll also touch on those other areas that have played an instrumental part transforming the philosophy, spirit and quality of life in our city.

CRIME REDUCTION

WHAT WE'VE ACHIEVED

- Crime in New York City is now at its lowest level in three decades. Where once we were considered the crime capital of the nation, New York is now the safest large city in the nation, according to FBI statistics.
- **Over the last five years**, overall crime in New York City has declined by 50 percent. Our progress in reducing murder has been even more dramatic. Over the past five years, we've seen a 70 percent decrease in murders, to the lowest annual total since 1963.
- And I'm particularly proud that it is some of our City's least affluent neighborhoods that have seen the most' dramatic decreases in crime. For instance, Crown Heights, in Brooklyn, has seen an 89 percent reduction in homicides over the past five years.
- These dramatic results have brought police departments from around the country and around the world to New York City to study the changes in philosophy and strategy that have accompanied our historic reduction in crime.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SHIFT

- In the early 1990s, as murders exceeded 2,000 a year and crime, drugs and gangs became a fact of daily life for many New Yorkers, a sense of deep pessimism set in. The City's politicians seemed to prefer rationalizing the city's crime, rather than addressing it directly. In turn, many citizens felt a sense of helplessness and frustration as they were denied the ability to live in freedom because of pervasive crime, drugs and gangs.
- When my administration took office in **January** of 1994, we realized that we would have to address both the reality of crime and people's fear of crime in order to significantly improve New Yorkers' quality of life. Application of the Broken Windows theory in our basic policing strategies helped us do both.
- As many of you know, the **Broken Windows theory** states that when a window in a neighborhood building is broken and no one repairs it, that sends a subtle message that it is acceptable to destroy property. In time, all the windows of that building are knocked out. Residents and passersby notice this and begin to feel that vandals are more in **control** of the streets than law-abiding citizens. Criminals notice this as well and they start to move in as businesses and families move out. This is a dramatic illustration of a phenomenon that has affected urban centers across **our** country over the last 30 years. The Broken Windows theory essentially says that the small things matter. Respect breeds respect – for the law and one another.

SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES

- Our **CompStat** system – which utilizes computer statistics and pin mapping to analyze crime trends and allocate police resources – is the centerpiece of our efforts to increase accountability for and responsiveness to crime reduction in New York City. Each week, the Police Department collects crime statistics from every precinct, which are then loaded into a comprehensive data base that the police commissioner can examine instantaneously, as well in the semi-weekly meetings that he holds with precinct commanders. This system works in sharp contrast to previous years, when crime data was unavailable until months after the crime trends it detailed had occurred.
- Since CompStat ensures accurate and timely intelligence, it gives us the information to rapidly deploy personnel and resources around the city. For example, if there is an increase in auto-thefts in a certain neighborhood, **we're** able to send in an anti-auto theft squad the next day. We're able to stop a crime trend before it becomes a crime wave. Consequently, we no longer have a reactive, but a pro-active Police Department in the City of New York.
- CompStat also helps us answer the important question of how we measure our successes in fighting crime. It used to be that the Police Department measured its success by the number of arrests it made. But the public's reasonable expectation of the police force wasn't just that it make arrests, but that it make people feel safer. Therefore the proper measure of success for the Police Department should have been total crime reduction. CompStat helps us measure crime reduction in quantifiable terms at the same time that it allows us to hold precinct commanders accountable for the crime in their neighborhoods.
- Over the past two years, under Police Commissioner Howard Safir's guidance, we've also used **CompStat's** resources to follow through on civilian complaints. In the semi-weekly CompStat meetings precinct commanders are asked to account for the civilian complaints directed toward their command. The accountability is yielding results: civilian complaints have fallen across the city. To date we've conducted 7,000 field tests of officers' courtesy and professionalism. This is a further indication that the **NYPD's** Courtesy, Respect and Professionalism training has moved from an instructional to a practical program whose effectiveness can be measured. In addition to these efforts, the Department has conducted **800** integrity tests, which serve to root out corruption and dishonesty within the NYPD.

- **CompStat** has given us the information to successfully implement specific targeted crime control strategies including:
 - One of our earliest focuses, **taking guns off the streets and out of the hands of criminals**: Every time an arrest is made involving a gun, the department investigates how the suspect acquired the illegal weapon. Through tracking down ~~the~~ weapon's history, we're able to remove additional guns from the streets. **Our efforts** to reduce the number of guns on the street has led to a reduction in **handgun**-related homicides from 1500 in 1992 to 363 in 1998.
 - **Aggressive and innovative anti-drug strategies**: I gave extensive testimony last Wednesday to the Sub-Committee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources on our efforts to combat drug use in our City. We use a combined approach of law-enforcement, treatment and education. The centerpieces of the law-enforcement component are our **Anti-Drug Enforcement Initiatives**. To date we've put 13 of these initiative zones in effect throughout the five boroughs of the City, including four - in South Brooklyn, Northern Queens, Central Bronx and East Harlem - that began in February. We've used CompStat data to establish which neighborhoods would benefit the most from expanded anti-drug efforts. And in the areas where our anti-drug initiative zones have been in effect, we've seen the crime-declines **outpace** citywide decline. Over the past year, precincts with new anti-drug enforcement initiatives saw crime drop over 16 percent, with a 22 percent decline in shooting incidents. Compare those declines to the substantial, but lower, citywide drops of 10.5 percent in overall crime and 8.2 percent in shooting incidents.
 - **Enforcing Quality of Life Crimes**: In **accordance** with the "Broken Windows" theory, we've worked to help communities to reduce the number of quality of life violations, including graffiti, illegal sex shops, aggressive panhandling, public drinking and unreasonable noise. As a result, civic pride is thriving in our City, along with the local economy. Crime reduction has proven to be the most effective economic development initiative the city could hope for.
 - **Police Restraint**: As the NYPD has reduced crime it has actually become even more restrained in its use of firearms, in every way that can be measured. **In 1993 there were 212 intentional shooting incidents involving officers; in 1998 there were 111. That translates to a decrease of 47.6 percent over a period of time in**

which the number of sworn officers increased by 35.7 percent. That results in a 67.2 percent decrease per officer.

- And while the number of arrests between 1995 and 1998 increased from 309,587 in 1995 to 403,659 in 1998, the number of shots fired by police officers in that time decreased from 1,728 in 1995 to 856 in 1998. To put that another way, while citywide arrests have increased by 30.4 percent over the past four years – meaning that the NYPD's activity has increased significantly – the number of shots fired by police officers decreased by 50.5 percent.
- The facts bear witness that the NYPD is one of the most restrained big city police departments in the United States. A 1998 article in the New York Times reiterates this point, saying, "Despite a Hollywood-inspired perception that the New York City Police are quick to use gunfire to fight crime, FBI statistics show that city officers actually shoot civilians far less frequently than their counterparts in other major cities." This includes Miami, Dallas, Philadelphia and here in Washington D.C., where officers are six times more likely to be involved in a fatal shooting than members of the NYPD.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE

- The most significant federal contribution to our fight to remove crime from our streets was the **Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994**. I was a strong advocate for the passage of that bill because I was confident that it would give local governments new tools in the fight for public safety.
- Adding 100,000 new police officers around the country obviously has contributed directly to the nationwide crime drop. But it is **important** to emphasize that simply hiring new police officers does not by itself effect a turnaround in crime. What matters is how the new officers are deployed. Results are seen when resources are used in a specific, strategic manner.
- As we look ahead, the federal government should recognize that localities like New York City have been very successful in reducing crime and that it is usually innovative local solutions that have proven most effective in affecting crime reduction. Therefore the federal government should expand its efforts to institute flexible funding that is unattached to federally mandated programs – such as is provided by the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program. Instead of mandating payments to localities tied to specific programs, the federal government should be looking to fund results. The Clinton **Administration's "21st Century Policing Initiative,**" which extends and builds upon the effects of the landmark 1994

Crime Bill, is an additional step in the right direction, and the City of New York strongly supports it.

WELFARE REFORM

WHAT WE'VE ACHIEVED

- Over the past five years, we've reduced the welfare rolls by more than 450,000 - that's more than the entire population of Charlotte, North Carolina. Our welfare to work program is the largest and most successful in the nation, and we're returning the work ethic to the center of city life.

THE SHIFT IN PHILOSOPHY

- Throughout the **1960s**, **70s** and **80s**, the Human Resources Administration, which manages public assistance in New York City, seemed to gauge its success by the size of the welfare rolls. That was a reflection of a political philosophy that saw welfare as a way of life, rather than a way to a better life. The welfare rolls in New York City went above 800,000 in 1968 and stayed above that level every day, month and year until February of last year. Clearly, rewarding the Human Resources Administration for maximizing the number of people on welfare was not **the** right measure of success. Just as the public reasonably expects the police department to reduce crime, not just respond to it, the right measure of success for the agency in charge of public assistance shouldn't be how many people are dependent on welfare, but how many people that agency moves off welfare towards work and self-sufficiency.

SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES

- When I first took office there were 1.16 million people on **the** welfare rolls in New York City. When we began our welfare reforms in 1994 and 1995, we knew that we had to restore integrity and accountability to the system. We instituted an **eligibility verification review**, consisting of finger-imaging, home visits and financial background checks - to make sure that only the people eligible for public assistance were receiving it. Before we began **these** reviews 80% of the people who applied for public assistance received it; now that number is under 50%.
- Our **workfare** program is designed to reinforce the social contract, the value which says that for every right there is an obligation, for every benefit, a duty. We've changed our welfare offices to **job centers** and seek to place every applicant for public assistance in a private sector job. Each job center has extensive resources designed to help applicants find employment, such as constantly updated job listings and resume workshops. If no private sector job is available, applicants participate in the city's **Work Experience Program**, working to improve the quality of life in our city.

TAX REDUCTION AND JOB GROWTH

WHAT WE'VE ACHIEVED

- For decades, New York City government cultivated an anti-business philosophy that attempted to manage the City's economy rather than allowing it to flourish on its own strength. Political leaders rationalized the City's burdensome tax policies and continued to raise taxes every time the government needed a surge in revenue – which it frequently did, because of chronic fiscal mismanagement and unchecked growth in City government – often driving businesses and residents away in the process.
- Between 1990 and 1993, City government imposed repeated record tax increases on New Yorkers, and not coincidentally the City suffered the loss of 320,000 private sector jobs. In 1993, faced with a \$2.3 billion deficit and a private sector deeply in need of relief, City government proposed further tax increases.
- Since 1994 we have worked to bring our fiscal house in order through consistent efforts to make City government more efficient and accountable. Targeted tax reductions have been a central part of our strategy. Over the last five years, we have cut taxes by more than \$2 billion – far more than any other administration in the history of the City, and our economy is much stronger as a result. Within five years of inheriting a \$2.3 billion deficit, the City had accumulated a \$2.2 billion surplus, and to date we have recovered nearly 300,000 of the jobs we lost in the early 1990s, marking the City's strongest five year private sector job gain on record.

THE SHIFT IN PHILOSOPHY

- New York City has returned to its proud heritage of being a pro-business city that understands that when businesses thrive, people thrive, and vice-versa.
- We've changed the terms of the debate surrounding taxes in New York City. Now, instead of the Mayor and the City Council discussing which taxes to raise and how much to raise them, the Council and I discuss which ones to reduce and by how much.
- Our successes have repudiated the old philosophy that government should raise taxes in order to generate revenue, by proving that tax reductions spur private sector growth, and can even result in more revenue for government.

SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES

- When I came into office, New York City had one of the highest hotel occupancy rates in the nation. We were losing convention business and damaging the tourism industry, which is a fundamentally important part of our economy. At the same time many people were saying that New York City had too many hotel rooms to support its tourist base. When we suggested reducing the tax, people argued that at a time when our City was faced with a crippling budget deficit, taxes should be raised to

increase revenue, not decreased. But I never believed that a City could tax its way to prosperity.

- In late 1994, in cooperation with New York State, we reduced the Hotel Occupancy Tax by 31 percent, and from this smaller tax the City now sees nearly \$60 million in additional revenue annually. Today conventions and tour groups come in much greater numbers to New York. And New York City has had four consecutive years of record tourism, with over 34 million people visiting the City last year. In fact, now there is widespread agreement that New York City has too few hotels, which led to the recent opening of the first new hotel in Brooklyn in 50 years.
- We've extended this philosophy by reducing or eliminating 10 separate taxes in order to give businesses a clearer and more transparent tax system. For example, in fiscal year 1993, 81,400 businesses paid the commercial rent tax; in fiscal year 1998, after we raised the threshold of the tax and eliminated it completely in parts of Manhattan, as well as in the other four boroughs of our City entirely, that number dropped to 12,300.
- The result is a private sector that is free to surge forward on the strength of its potential. In fact, last year's job creation total of 84,000 is the highest the City has experienced since we began keeping such records in 1951.
- As a city that is constantly looking for improvements and innovation, we're not finished with our targeted tax reductions. That's why in January, I announced the formation of a Task Force on Tax Reform, which will further restructure our city's tax system with an eye toward not only reducing taxes, but cutting the sheer number of taxes as well. We are confident that these actions will make New York City's tax system as streamlined, transparent and competitive as possible.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE

- Our experience in New York has shown that you can reduce taxes and spur job growth. I encourage the Congress to study at our successes and apply them, when appropriate, to their efforts to reduce taxes responsibly, while keeping the nation's economic house in order.

EDUCATION

WHAT WE'VE ACHIEVED

- Under the leadership of New York City Schools Chancellor Rudy Crew, our ongoing efforts to bring accountability and high standards of performance to the nation's largest school district have borne results. Reading and math scores are up citywide. Morale is higher than it has been in a generation. Strategic instructional initiatives are providing new opportunities for our children. We've finally achieved

a **school safety** plan that will protect all the children in our schools by training and recruiting our school safety officers through the NYPD. For the first time in a decade, the number of new school seats added has **outpaced** the number of new students. On the state level, the passage of charter school enabling legislation will further our goals of more options, increased opportunity and greater accountability in New York City's school system. And in the same spirit, the Chancellor is moving to establish a pilot parental-choice program in one New York City school district. But much more still needs to be done.

THE SHIFT IN PHILOSOPHY

- Public schools exist to educate our children. But for too many years, layers of bureaucracy and middle management diverted funding and attention from this basic and essential mission. In New York City, we are engaged in a struggle that is being replicated all across the nation. It is a fight to reassert that the primary purpose of our schools is the education of our children, not job protection.

SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES

- **Ultimately, the best way to permanently improve the quality of New York City's education system** would be to dissolve our central board and 32 community school boards and to put in their place a commissioner of education – appointed by the Mayor with the advice and consent of the City Council – with a minimum of middle management and a value-added board modeled after corporate boards. The system would be modeled on Chicago's, where greater accountability has yielded real results.
- But while the opportunity for such a complete reinvention of the New York City school system has not yet occurred, given the current obstacles – including the terrible system of principal tenure – we have made great strides in increasing the opportunities for our students by working to streamline the bureaucracy that surrounds public school education. One way we've done this is by funding specific, targeted educational initiatives like Project Read, Project Arts and Project Smart Schools whose progress and effectiveness we can constantly measure, rather than simply providing more and more money to the Board of Education without strategic performance criteria in mind.
- **Project Read** is a literacy program that reaches more than 130,000 students citywide in after-school and intensive school day programs. Students in the program boosted their reading scores on our citywide reading test by 3.9 percentage points last year – an improvement 60 percent greater than the average reading improvements that have occurred citywide.
- Project Arts has brought arts education back into New York City's **public** schools. We've hired 750 new arts teachers over the past two years and by the end of next year arts education will be implemented in every school in the City.

- **Project Smart Schools** has equipped over 4,500 middle school classrooms and 182 middle school libraries with approximately 17,000 computers. By August of this year we will have installed an additional 13,000 computers, giving computer access to all 6th, 7th and 8th grade classes in the City.
- New York City has also instituted **school-based budgeting**, which allows parents and all taxpayers to see where their tax dollars are going. It's a strong step in the right direction towards bringing fiscal accountability to our more than \$9 billion school system.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE

- Our success in establishing measurable initiatives that improve our children's education - like Project Read, Project Arts and Project Smart Schools - has proven the effectiveness of flexibility in federal funding for education. And I'm encouraged by the Congress' movement toward increasing the flexibility given to state and local governments in spending federal education funds.

CONCLUSION

- Ultimately, local governments can be responsive to the particular needs and challenges of their communities in ways that the federal government cannot. There are no "one size fits all" solutions to the problems that are facing America. But there are specific initiatives and philosophical approaches that have proven their effectiveness in cities around the country. More flexible funding from the federal government - especially in the form of block grants - can be very helpful in making sure that these solutions reach the maximum number of Americans. Local innovation should be encouraged by legislation and studied as part of the national discussion on how to best meet the challenges that we face. That is the admirable goal of these hearings and I thank the committee for giving me this opportunity to share with you some of our successes in New York City.

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Pulling Levers:

Getting Deterrence Right

*by David Kennedy**

August 29, 1996, Boston, Massachusetts.

More than 20 members of the Intervale Posse, a street gang in Boston's Roxbury neighborhood, are arrested in an early-morning sweep after a nearly 9-month investigation. Fifteen of the arrestees face Federal drug charges and 10-year minimum mandatory sentences; many face even stiffer sanctions. In the weeks after the arrests, Boston's Ceasefire Working Group—composed of front-line members of the Boston Police Department's gang unit, the departments of probation and parole, the U.S. Attorney's and county prosecutor's offices, the Office of the State Attorney General, school police, youth corrections, social services, and others—meets with gangs around the city, goes to youth detention facilities to talk with inmates, and speaks to assemblies

in Roxbury public schools. The message Ceasefire members deliver is simple and direct:

The city is not going to put up with violence any longer. We know who's behind the gang violence. We're warning gangs to stop; if they don't, there are going to be consequences. There are people here who want to help you—we can offer services, job training, protection from your enemies, whatever you need—but the violence is going to stop. The Intervale Posse was warned, they didn't listen, and they're gone. This doesn't have to happen to you. Just put your guns down.

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Getting deterrence right

Can we make deterrence work? Criminal justice agencies have always tried, but the results—whether of preventive patrol or the death penalty—have always been dubious. The three vignettes on Boston, Lowell, and Minneapolis highlight a new approach to crafting deterrence strategies, and in the larger tales that lie behind them there is reason to be optimistic. In Boston, youth homicide fell by two-thirds after the Ceasefire strategy was put in place in 1996. In Lowell, youth assaults declined; according to Lowell High School headmaster William Samaras, who had been dealing with gang conflicts among students, there was “an immediate quieting effect on the school.”² In Minneapolis—one of several Midwestern cities that had experienced an increasing homicide rate—homicide fell by 45 percent citywide in the months after the city kicked off its homicide prevention strategy with the Bogus Boyz’ arrests. None of these operations were controlled experiments, and a detailed evaluation of the Boston intervention is still under way. But the experiences to date are interesting enough to support an exploration of the basic crime-control logic that was applied to the work in Boston, Lowell, and Minneapolis and that is currently being explored in a number of other jurisdictions.

The basic approach was developed in Boston as part of the National Institute of Justice-supported Boston Gun Project, an attempt to bring problem-solving policing to bear on the city’s youth homicide problem. A two-part intervention—the Ceasefire strategy—emerged from the Gun Project’s research and planning phase. One part mounted a direct law enforcement attack on the illicit market that was supplying youths with firearms. The other part was what the Gun Project’s inter-agency working group eventually came to call a “pulling levers” strategy:

May 1997, Lowell, Massachusetts.

One by one, 20 of Lowell’s worst young troublemakers are brought into a meeting with 14 representatives of 7 city and State agencies. In 2 additional meetings, the authorities meet with a group of 35 less chronic offenders and 16 members of a city street gang. The message basically is the same as Boston’s. “We just wanted to tell you that we know who you are,” says assistant district attorney Michael Ortiz. “If you continue to get into trouble, you’re going to end up in jail, or hurt, or even dead. But if you want to get out of a gang or back into school, or you want a job or counseling, we’re here to help.”¹

detering violent behavior by chronic gang offenders by reaching out directly to gangs, setting clear standards for their behavior, and backing up that message by “pulling every lever” legally available when those standards were violated. The deceptively simple operation that resulted made use of a wide variety of traditional criminal justice tools but assembled them in fundamentally new and different ways. (See “What It Isn’t, and What It Is.”) It may be that the basic “pulling levers” logic can be applied in a variety of settings and against a range of different

crime and public safety problems. And it may be that “pulling levers” can, where applicable, substantially alter the balance of power between the authorities and offenders.

The traditional approach: deterrence through case processing

Criminal justice has sought to generate deterrence in a variety of ways: police agencies through patrol and rapid response, probation and parole agencies

June 1997, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

A dozen members of the Bogus Boyz, a street gang composed of members ejected from other gangs and notorious for street violence, are arrested on Federal weapons charges after a short, intensive investigation spearheaded by the Minneapolis Police Department’s gang unit, in cooperation with Federal authorities. At the same time, teams of police and probation officers hit the streets to visit some 250 individuals identified by the gang unit as the city’s most chronic gang offenders. The teams tell the gang members:

The Bogus Boyz’ arrests were no accident. The Bogus Boyz were violent, and their violence won them this treatment. This is how the city is doing things from now on. We’ve got a dozen agencies, from probation to the Feds, meeting regularly and focusing on gang violence. Where we find it, we’re going to act.

Gang officers visit injured gang members—victims of assaults by other gangs—in the hospital and say to them:

This is a terrible thing that’s happened to you. But understand, we’re going to deal with it. Retaliation will not be tolerated. Remember the Bogus Boyz.

WHAT IT ISN'T, AND WHAT IT IS

It is worth noting that while a "pulling levers" strategy like Ceasefire may seem to be like certain existing criminal justice approaches, they are different in important ways. Ceasefire was not, for instance, a targeted prosecution strategy: No attempt was made to systematically take chronic offenders off the street. It was not a strategy for use against gang crime as such. It was not an antigang strategy to disrupt or dismantle Boston's gangs. Rather, it was an attempt to deter and control the particular problem of gang-related violence. If gangs refrained from violence but continued to commit other crimes, the normal workings of police, prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal justice community attended to them. But if they hurt people, Ceasefire members came calling.

It is possible to sketch the essence of what "pulling levers" encompasses. What follows is the basic structure, along with the key differences from more traditional deterrence approaches.

(1) Select a "target category" of behavior to be addressed, such as gang violence. (Traditional deterrence approaches have much broader targets, such as "offending" or "gang offending.")

(2) Assemble an array of agency capacities that can be deployed in the service of the strategy. In Boston, for example, the Ceasefire Working Group included police; probation; parole; Federal and local prosecutors; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; school police; youth corrections; and gang outreach workers. Other agencies and groups that became deeply involved included clergy, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Immigration

and Naturalization Service, and neighborhood groups. (Traditional deterrence approaches tend to rely primarily on the routine workings of the police, prosecutors, and corrections.)

(3) Deliver a direct and explicit "retail deterrence" message to a relatively small target audience regarding what kind of behavior will provoke a special response and what that response will be. (Traditional deterrence approaches vaguely "send signals" to a large and indeterminate population, generally promise only arrest and prosecution as a response, and do not focus services and other opportunities on the same population in a complementary fashion.)

(4) Follow through. In Boston, the Ceasefire Working Group met roughly every 2 weeks, in addition to constant informal communication, to assess the violence problem in the city and craft necessary responses. (Traditional deterrence approaches are generally unable to deliver a sustained and focused response.)

(5) Continue to communicate with the target audience as the strategy unfolds. (Traditional deterrence approaches rely on the routine workings of criminal justice agencies to send signals to offenders and do not draw explicit cause-and-effect connections between the behavior of the target population and the behavior of the authorities.)

(6) Select, if desired, a new category of target behavior. If the original target behavior is controlled, a new one—overt drug trafficking, domestic violence—may be selected. (Traditional deterrence approaches do not take a strategic approach to winning selected battles in a manner of the public's choosing.)

through supervision, prosecutors and judges by focusing attention and sanctions on repeat and violent offenders, and the like. The main engine for creating deterrence, however, has been the basic case-processing mechanisms of the criminal justice process: the apprehension, prosecution, and sanctioning of offenders. In this model, deterrence is generated by the threat that an offender will face a formal penalty for the crime he has committed. We calculate—and presume that offenders calculate—this threat on the basis of the expected costs, imposed by the criminal justice process, on offenders for the crimes that they commit.

Unfortunately, both scholarship and everyday experience suggest that the deterrent power of this strategy has not been great. It is not hard to see why. Most crimes are neither reported to nor observed by the police; in many types of crimes, such as drug dealing and prostitution, both parties to the transaction actively strive for concealment. And the majority of crimes that are reported do not result in an arrest. In 1994, 12,586,227 offenses were known to the police; only 21.4 percent were cleared by arrest.³ When police make an arrest, it generally takes some time for the case to make its way through to a disposition. In 1992, the

average number of days between arrest and conviction for felony cases disposed by State courts was 173.⁴ Finally, most of the resulting sentences are not terribly severe; it is estimated that 52 percent of all *felony* convictions result in probation.⁵ Traditional probation is the most extensively used sanction in the correctional system. About 60 percent of offenders under correctional supervision are on probation.⁶ And while research has repeatedly suggested that the certainty and swiftness of sanctions matters more than their severity, most of the political and policy debate has centered on increasing sanctions. Debates center on the

death penalty and three-strikes laws, not on clearance rates for violent crimes or the workloads of prosecutors and judges.

The resulting weakness of deterrence is perhaps particularly vexing where chronic offenders are concerned. It has long been known that a relatively small number of criminals offend at very high rates, are repeatedly arrested and sanctioned, and—if only by virtue of their continued offending—demonstrate a particular resistance to both deterrence and rehabilitation. This is a particular problem where violent offending is concerned. Not all chronic offenders are violent offenders, but a large proportion of violent crimes are committed by chronic offenders, who commit not only crimes of violence but also property crimes, drug crimes, disorder offenses, and the like. Such offenders are themselves victimized at very high rates. Boston Gun Project research, for example, showed that youth homicide was concentrated among a small number of serially offending gang-involved youths. Only about 1,300 gang members—less than 1 percent of their age group citywide—in some 61 gangs were responsible for at least 60 percent, and probably more, of all the youth homicide in the city. These gang members were well known to authorities and tended to have extensive criminal records. (See “Boston’s Victims and Offenders.”)

Pulling levers in Boston

Detering violence by this group of chronic offenders became a central Gun Project goal. The “pulling levers” strategy the Gun Project Working Group designed was built on a simple but crucially important realization: Chronic offending made these youths, and the gangs they formed, extremely vulnerable. Authorities had a large and varied menu of ways—“levers to pull,”

as the Working Group came to call them—they could impose costs on these gangs. They could disrupt street drug activity, focus police attention on low-level street crimes such as trespassing and public drinking, serve outstanding warrants, cultivate confidential informants for medium- and long-term investigations of gang activities, deliver strict probation and parole enforcement, seize drug proceeds and other assets, ensure stiffer plea bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention, request stronger bail terms (and enforce them), and even focus potentially severe Federal investigative and prosecutorial attention on, for example, gang-related drug activity.

This was, of course, not news to the authorities. There were two problems: It was impossible to give all the gangs this kind of heightened attention all

the time, and occasional crackdowns, while useful in the short term, had little long-term impact. The ability to deliver overwhelming crackdowns, however, was not in doubt. The Working Group’s innovation—again, simple but important—was to make it clear to gangs that *violence* would draw such crackdowns and then *continue to communicate* with gangs as the resulting strategy unfolded.

This changed the game rather dramatically. From a world in which the cost to a gang of committing a homicide was, perhaps, that a gang member would be caught and prosecuted (while “street” benefits such as a reputation for toughness accrued to the gang as a whole), the cost soared. Added to the original risk would be everything else the authorities could bring to bear: cash-flow problems caused by street

BOSTON’S VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS


The Boston Gun Project examined records on 155 youths age 21 and under who had been killed by a gun or a knife over a 5-year period. Prior to their murders, 75 percent had been arraigned for at least one offense in Massachusetts courts, 19 percent had been committed to an adult or youth correctional facility, 42 percent had been on probation at some time before their murder, and 14 percent were on probation at the time of their murder. Of the 125 youthful offenders known to be associated with those homicides, 77 percent had been arraigned for at least one offense in Massachusetts courts, 26 percent had been committed to a facility, 54 percent had been on probation, and 26 percent were on probation at the time they committed the homicide. For the 117 homicide victims with at least 1 arraignment, the average

number of arraignments was 9.5, and 44 percent had 10 or more arraignments. For the 96 offenders with at least 1 arraignment, the average number of arraignments was 9.7, and 41 percent had 10 or more arraignments. For both victims and offenders, arraignments for property offenses, armed violent offenses, and disorder offenses outnumbered drug offenses. For offenders, unarmed violent offenses also outnumbered drug offenses. Even within this population, the rate of offending was skewed, with the worst 5 percent and worst 10 percent of the 125 offenders responsible for 20 percent and 36 percent of 1,009 total arraignments, respectively. The worst 5 percent and worst 10 percent of the 155 victims were responsible for 17 percent and 33 percent of 1,277 total arraignments, respectively.

PULLING LEVERS

drug market disruption, arrests for outstanding warrants, the humiliation of strict probation enforcement, even the possibility of severe sanctions brought by Federal involvement. Those costs were borne by the whole gang, not just the shooter. As long as the authorities were confident that they knew what gangs were involved in a particular act of violence, as they usually were, these penalties were certain; the Working Group could always figure out ways to reach out and touch particular gangs. They were also swift: Drug market disruption, increased disorder enforcement, warrant service, probation attention, and the like could be deployed within days of a violent event. Rather than an uncertain, slow, and often nonsevere response to violence, the response with the Ceasefire strategy became certain, rapid, and of whatever range of severity the Working Group felt appropriate.

Talking regularly to the gangs served a number of purposes. Originally, the Working Group wanted to make sure that gangs knew about this new policy—so they could comply if they wished—and to tell other gangs when a gang was being punished for violence. The Working Group also wanted to make clear to gangs that while violence would bring strong attention, refraining from violence would not win them a “pass” to deal drugs or do other crimes: This was, in language the Working Group used explicitly in the gang meetings,



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Presumably at least one or two of these hypothetical markets are violent, and they receive crackdowns lasting 6 weeks. On July 15, new messages

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This cycle is repeated until drug market-related violence is controlled.

At this point, the authorities change their message to the following:

The old rules still apply. Violence will bring consequences. But now that the violence is nearly gone, we're also going to insist on order. In 2 weeks, we're launching new crackdowns. We're going to assign them based on what is bothering the community the most: unruly buyers, late-night traffic, public drinking and urination, street-corner sales, and the like. (And, by the way, pick up your trash.)

Once again, the authorities repeat the cycle of communicating, responding, and communicating again until order is established.

The authorities then send a final message:

The old rules still apply. Violence and disorder bring attention. (And, by the way, congratulations on behaving. We knew you were rational people.) We have one new rule. Don't use juveniles in your trade any more; the kids are off limits. And since those of you using juveniles are usually one or two steps removed from the streets, we're going to have to resort to serious investigations, in concert with DEA, to reach you. You don't want that. We don't want to have to do it. So pay attention.


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Or how about domestic violence? Unlike gang violence and street drug markets, domestic violence is not generally public and overt. It is, however, often associated with chronic offenders, in the sense both that abusers also commit other crimes and that domestic abuse tends to be part of a pattern of misbehavior by the offender over time, within a particular relationship and serially across relationships. We could begin by creating a special, strict surveillance and supervision regime for a limited number of offenders: 100, for sake of illustration. Using appropriate means, the authorities select 75 of a jurisdiction's worst domestic violence offenders and place them on this regime. Some will be subject to restraining orders; some will be put on probation for domestic offenses; some will be identified by police officers, probation officers, and victim advocates as particularly dangerous but not currently on restraining orders or

probation (or, perhaps, they will be on probation but for other offenses). The authorities will then brief them:

You have made the "A team" by virtue of your intransigent behavior or the fact that you are clearly a threat at the moment. We are watching you carefully. If you are on probation for a domestic violence offense, we will be asking the judge to attach onerous conditions of probation, which will include frequent drug

and alcohol testing, mandatory counseling, restriction, frequent and unannounced curfew checks, and supplying district police officers who cover your "partner's" home and work areas with your name and picture. [Technological possibilities like "reverse house arrest"—an electronic bracelet that sounds an alarm when the wearer goes near the victim—might have a role to play here.] If you are on probation, but not for a domestic violence offense, you will get very strict probation supervision, and we will be working to the extent possible with your "partner" and advocates, patrol officers, and prosecutors to bring a case that will result in a domestic violence charge and, if not incarceration, domestic violence probation status. If you are not under supervision but are arrested for a crime of any kind, we will consider taking a very tough line in the disposition of that case as part of our recently announced "repeat domestic offender enforcement policy." For any violation of probation or any new domestic violence charge, we will do everything we can to take you off the street. And



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PULLING LEVERS

remember, you can earn your way off this list: Go a year without a probation violation, a new arrest, or some other sign that you remain a threat, and we'll happily give your slot to somebody else.

The authorities now go to the much larger group of somewhat less serious domestic offenders and say:

You are the "B team." Here's how you win a seat on the "A team." We have 25 slots just waiting for you.

And they back up the entire scheme by regularly communicating to both groups what happens to people on the "A team:" how they misbehave and are predictably sanctioned, how they behave well and are rewarded, how members of the "A team" are "graduated" to the "B team," and vice versa.

Can this work? It would certainly have to be implemented in a way that minimizes the threat domestic violence victims face from abusers angered by official attention; takes advantage of all that domestic violence specialists have learned in recent years about victim safety plans, when and why offenders are most dangerous, and patterns of offending by chronic abusers; and integrates the strategy into the robust steps many jurisdictions now take in an attempt to control domestic violence offenders. Quite possibly the scale of the example is wrong; we might need 500 slots, or 5 levels of

supervision. But it seems worth exploring such a scheme: creating a tight web for a small but meaningful number of offenders; creating clear rules for admission and exclusion from that select group; and informing the larger universe of offenders of the progress, both good and bad, of those who are subject to such strict attention.

Conclusion

Community policing and problem-solving policing can be viewed as attempts to escape what have become the routine, and often extremely unsatisfactory, choices posed by traditional thinking about crime control. Deterrence, or, failing that, incapacitation, was the business of criminal justice, yet the ordinary case-processing business of criminal justice agencies often manifestly failed to deliver sufficient crime control. The other alternatives were root-cause strategies that prevent crime by making fundamental improvements in communities and the lives of the people and families that constitute them. Yet these too were uncertain, hard to carry out in the midst of high levels of local crime and fear, and offered little help to communities needing immediate help with serious public safety problems. Community policing and problem-solving policing have tried to escape that bind by borrowing from the repertoire of both enforcement and prevention, crafting strategic interventions for particular problems in concert with a

wide variety of new partners. It may be that the "pulling levers" framework offers some useful guidance to shaping some of those interventions. Deterrence may not be so hard to come by after all. And, remarkably, it may be that a key aspect of getting the deterrence equation right is simply communicating directly with the last group that is usually considered for inclusion in crime control strategies: offenders themselves. It would be nice if this were so. Talk, after all, is cheap.

Notes

1. Berard, Darrin, "Turning Bad Apples Around," *Lowell Sun*, November 16, 1997.
2. Ibid.
3. Maguire, Kathleen, and Ann Pastore, eds., *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1995*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996: 425, NCJ 158900 [hereinafter 1995 *Sourcebook*].
4. Maguire, Kathleen, and Ann Pastore, eds., 1995 *Sourcebook*: 509.
5. See Cuniff, Mark, *Sentencing Outcomes in 28 Felony Courts, 1985*, Washington, DC: [U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1987: 1, NCJ 107760.
6. Maguire, Kathleen, and Ann Pastore, eds., 1995 *Sourcebook*: 540.

Pulling Levers:

Getting Deterrence Right

*by David Kennedy**

August 29, 1996, Boston, Massachusetts.

More than 20 members of the Intervale Posse, a street gang in Boston's Roxbury neighborhood, are arrested in an early-morning sweep after a nearly 9-month investigation. Fifteen of the arrestees face Federal drug charges and 10-year minimum mandatory sentences; many face even stiffer sanctions. In the weeks after the arrests, Boston's Ceasefire Working Group—composed of front-line members of the Boston Police Department's gang unit, the departments of probation and parole, the U.S. Attorney's and county prosecutor's offices, the Office of the State Attorney General, school police, youth corrections, social services, and others—meets with gangs around the city, goes to youth detention facilities to talk with inmates, and speaks to assemblies

in Roxbury public schools. The message Ceasefire members deliver is simple and direct:

The city is not going to put up with violence any longer. We know who's behind the gang violence. We're warning gangs to stop; if they don't, there are going to be consequences. There are people here who want to help you—we can offer services, job training, protection from your enemies, whatever you need—but the violence is going to stop. The Intervale Posse was warned, they didn't listen, and they're gone. This doesn't have to happen to you. Just put your guns down.

**David Kennedy is a senior researcher in the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and director of the Boston Gun Project.*

Getting deterrence right

Can we make deterrence work? Criminal justice agencies have always tried, but the results—whether of preventive patrol or the death penalty—have always been dubious. The three vignettes on Boston, Lowell, and Minneapolis highlight a new approach to crafting deterrence strategies, and in the larger tales that lie behind them there is reason to be optimistic. In Boston, youth homicide fell by two-thirds after the Ceasefire strategy was put in place in 1996. In Lowell, youth assaults declined; according to Lowell High School headmaster William Samaras, who had been dealing with gang conflicts among students, there was “an immediate quieting effect on the school.”² In Minneapolis—one of several Midwestern cities that had experienced an increasing homicide rate—homicide fell by 45 percent citywide in the months after the city kicked off its homicide prevention strategy with the Bogus Boyz’ arrests. None of these operations were controlled experiments, and a detailed evaluation of the Boston intervention is still under way. But the experiences to date are interesting enough to support an exploration of the basic crime-control logic that was applied to the work in Boston, Lowell, and Minneapolis and that is currently being explored in a number of other jurisdictions.

The basic approach was developed in Boston as part of the National Institute of Justice-supported Boston Gun Project, an attempt to bring problem-solving policing to bear on the city’s youth homicide problem. A two-part intervention—the Ceasefire strategy—emerged from the Gun Project’s research and planning phase. One part mounted a direct law enforcement attack on the illicit market that was supplying youths with firearms. The other part was what the Gun Project’s inter-agency working group eventually came to call a “pulling levers” strategy:

May 1997, Lowell, Massachusetts.

One by one, 20 of Lowell’s worst young troublemakers are brought into a meeting with 14 representatives of 7 city and State agencies. In 2 additional meetings, the authorities meet with a group of 35 less chronic offenders and 16 members of a city street gang. The message basically is the same as Boston’s. “We just wanted to tell you that we know who you are,” says assistant district attorney Michael Ortiz. “If you continue to get into trouble, you’re going to end up in jail, or hurt, or even dead. But if you want to get out of a gang or back into school, or you want a job or counseling, we’re here to help.”¹

deterring violent behavior by chronic gang offenders by reaching out directly to gangs, setting clear standards for their behavior, and backing up that message by “pulling every lever” legally available when those standards were violated. The deceptively simple operation that resulted made use of a wide variety of traditional criminal justice tools but assembled them in fundamentally new and different ways. (See “What It Isn’t, and What It Is.”) It may be that the basic “pulling levers” logic can be applied in a variety of settings and against a range of different

crime and public safety problems. And it may be that “pulling levers” can, where applicable, substantially alter the balance of power between the authorities and offenders.

The traditional approach: deterrence through case processing

Criminal justice has sought to generate deterrence in a variety of ways: police agencies through patrol and rapid response, probation and parole agencies

June 1997, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

A dozen members of the Bogus Boyz, a street gang composed of members ejected from other gangs and notorious for street violence, are arrested on Federal weapons charges after a short, intensive investigation spearheaded by the Minneapolis Police Department’s gang unit, in cooperation with Federal authorities. At the same time, teams of police and probation officers hit the streets to visit some 250 individuals identified by the gang unit as the city’s most chronic gang offenders. The teams tell the gang members:

The Bogus Boyz’ arrests were no accident. The Bogus Boyz were violent, and their violence won them this treatment. This is how the city is doing things from now on. We’ve got a dozen agencies, from probation to the Feds, meeting regularly and focusing on gang violence. Where we find it, we’re going to act.

Gang officers visit injured gang members—victims of assaults by other gangs—in the hospital and say to them:

This is a terrible thing that’s happened to you. But understand, we’re going to deal with it. Retaliation will not be tolerated. Remember the Bogus Boyz.

WHAT IT ISN'T, AND WHAT IT IS

It is worth noting that while a "pulling levers" strategy like Ceasefire may seem to be like certain existing criminal justice approaches, they are different in important ways. Ceasefire was not, for instance, a targeted prosecution strategy: No attempt was made to systematically take chronic offenders off the street. It was not a strategy for use against gang crime as such. It was not an antigang strategy to disrupt or dismantle Boston's gangs. Rather, it was an attempt to deter and control the particular problem of gang-related violence. If gangs refrained from violence but continued to commit other crimes, the normal workings of police, prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal justice community attended to them. But if they hurt people, Ceasefire members came calling.

It is possible to sketch the essence of what "pulling levers" encompasses. What follows is the basic structure, along with the key differences from more traditional deterrence approaches.

- (1) Select a "target category" of behavior to be addressed, such as gang violence. (Traditional deterrence approaches have much broader targets, such as "offending" or "gang offending.")
- (2) Assemble an array of agency capacities that can be deployed in the service of the strategy. In Boston, for example, the Ceasefire Working Group included police, probation, parole, Federal and local prosecutors, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, school police, youth corrections, and gang outreach workers. Other agencies and groups that became deeply involved included clergy, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Immigration

and Naturalization Service, and neighborhood groups. (Traditional deterrence approaches tend to rely primarily on the routine workings of the police, prosecutors, and corrections.)

- (3) Deliver a direct and explicit "retail deterrence" message to a relatively small target audience regarding what kind of behavior will provoke a special response and what that response will be. (Traditional deterrence approaches vaguely "send signals" to a large and indeterminate population; generally promise only arrest and prosecution as a response, and do not focus services and other opportunities on the same population in a complementary fashion.)

- (4) Follow through. In Boston, the Ceasefire Working Group met roughly every 2 weeks, in addition to constant informal communication, to assess the violence problem in the city and craft necessary responses. (Traditional deterrence approaches are generally unable to deliver a sustained and focused response.)

- (5) Continue to communicate with the target audience as the strategy unfolds. (Traditional deterrence approaches rely on the routine workings of criminal justice agencies to send signals to offenders and do not draw explicit cause-and-effect connections between the behavior of the target population and the behavior of the authorities.)

- (6) Select, if desired, a new category of target behavior. If the original target behavior is controlled, a new one—overt drug trafficking, domestic violence—may be selected. (Traditional deterrence approaches do not take a strategic approach to winning selected battles in a manner of the public's choosing.)

through supervision, prosecutors and judges by focusing attention and sanctions on repeat and violent offenders, and the like. The main engine for creating deterrence, however, has been the basic case-processing mechanisms of the criminal justice process: the apprehension, prosecution, and sanctioning of offenders. In this model, deterrence is generated by the threat that an offender will face a formal penalty for the crime he has committed. We calculate—and presume that offenders calculate—this threat on the basis of the expected costs, imposed by the criminal justice process, on offenders for the crimes that they commit.

Unfortunately, both scholarship and everyday experience suggest that the deterrent power of this strategy has not been great. It is not hard to see why. Most crimes are neither reported to nor observed by the police; in many types of crimes, such as drug dealing and prostitution, both parties to the transaction actively strive for concealment. And the majority of crimes that are reported do not result in an arrest. In 1994, 12,586,227 offenses were known to the police; only 21.4 percent were cleared by arrest.³ When police make an arrest, it generally takes some time for the case to make its way through to a disposition. In 1992, the

average number of days between arrest and conviction for felony cases disposed by State courts was 173.⁴ Finally, most of the resulting sentences are not terribly severe; it is estimated that 52 percent of all *felony* convictions result in probation.⁵ Traditional probation is the most extensively used sanction in the correctional system. About 60 percent of offenders under correctional supervision are on probation.⁶ And while research has repeatedly suggested that the certainty and swiftness of sanctions matters more than their severity, most of the political and policy debate has centered on increasing sanctions. Debates center on the

death penalty and three-strikes laws, not on clearance rates for violent crimes or the workloads of prosecutors and judges.

The resulting weakness of deterrence is perhaps particularly vexing where chronic offenders are concerned. It has long been known that a relatively small number of criminals offend at very high rates, are repeatedly arrested and sanctioned, and—if only by virtue of their continued offending—demonstrate a particular resistance to both deterrence and rehabilitation. This is a particular problem where violent offending is concerned. Not all chronic offenders are violent offenders, but a large proportion of violent crimes are committed by chronic offenders, who commit not only crimes of violence—but also property crimes, drug crimes, disorder offenses, and the like. Such offenders are themselves victimized at very high rates. Boston Gun Project research, for example, showed that youth homicide was concentrated among a small number of serially offending gang-involved youths. Only about 1,300 gang members—less than 1 percent of their age group citywide—in some 61 gangs were responsible for at least 60 percent, and probably more, of all the youth homicide in the city. These gang members were well known to authorities and tended to have extensive criminal records. (See “Boston’s Victims and Offenders.”)

Pulling levers in Boston

Deterring violence by this group of chronic offenders became a central Gun Project goal. The “pulling levers” strategy the Gun Project Working Group designed was built on a simple but crucially important realization: Chronic offending made these youths, and the gangs they formed, extremely vulnerable. Authorities had a large and varied menu of ways—“levers to pull,”

as the Working Group came to call them—they could impose costs on these gangs. They could disrupt street drug activity, focus police attention on low-level street crimes such as trespassing and public drinking, serve outstanding warrants, cultivate confidential informants for medium- and long-term investigations of gang activities, deliver strict probation and parole enforcement, seize drug proceeds and other assets, ensure stiffer plea bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention, request stronger bail terms (and enforce them), and even focus potentially severe Federal investigative and prosecutorial attention on, for example, gang-related drug activity.

This was, of course, not news to the authorities. There were two problems: It was impossible to give all the gangs this kind of heightened attention all

the time, and occasional crackdowns, while useful in the short term, had little long-term impact. The ability to deliver overwhelming crackdowns, however, was not in doubt. The Working Group’s innovation—again, simple but important—was to make it clear to gangs that *violence* would draw such crackdowns and then *continue to communicate* with gangs as the resulting strategy unfolded.

This changed the game rather dramatically. From a world in which the cost to a gang of committing a homicide was, perhaps, that a gang member would be caught and prosecuted (while “street” benefits such as a reputation for toughness accrued to the gang as a whole), the cost soared. Added to the original risk would be everything else the authorities could bring to bear: cash-flow problems caused by street

BOSTON’S VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS


The Boston Gun Project examined records on 155 youths age 21 and under who had been killed by a gun or a knife over a 5-year period. Prior to their murders, 75 percent had been arraigned for at least one offense in Massachusetts courts, 19 percent had been committed to an adult or youth correctional facility, 42 percent had been on probation at some time before their murder, and 14 percent were on probation at the time of their murder. Of the 125 youthful offenders known to be associated with those homicides, 77 percent had been arraigned for at least one offense in Massachusetts courts, 26 percent had been committed to a facility, 54 percent had been on probation, and 26 percent were on probation at the time they committed the homicide. For the 117 homicide victims with at least 1 arraignment, the average

number of arraignments was 9.5, and 44 percent had 10 or more arraignments. For the 96 offenders with at least 1 arraignment, the average number of arraignments was 9.7, and 41 percent had 10 or more arraignments. For both victims and offenders, arraignments for property offenses, armed violent offenses, and disorder offenses outnumbered drug offenses. For offenders, unnamed violent offenses also outnumbered drug offenses. Even within this population, the role of offending was skewed, with the worst 5 percent and worst 10 percent of the 125 offenders responsible for 20 percent and 36 percent of 1,009 total arraignments, respectively. The worst 5 percent and worst 10 percent of the 155 victims were responsible for 17 percent and 33 percent of 1,277 total arraignments, respectively.

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
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probation (or, perhaps, they will be on probation but for other offenses). The authorities will then brief them:

You have made the "A team" by virtue of your intransigent behavior or the fact that you are clearly a threat at the moment. We are watching you carefully. If you are on probation for a domestic violence offense, we will be asking the judge to attach onerous conditions of probation,

which will include frequent drug and alcohol testing, mandatory counseling, restriction, frequent and unannounced curfew checks, and supplying district police officers who cover your "partner's" home and work areas with your name and picture. [Technological possibilities like "reverse house arrest"—an electronic bracelet that sounds an alarm when the wearer goes near the victim—might have a role to play here.] If you are on probation, but not for a domestic violence offense, you will get very strict probation supervision, and we will be working to the extent possible with your "partner" and advocates, patrol officers, and prosecutors to bring a case that will result in a domestic violence charge and, if not incarceration, domestic violence probation status. If you are not under supervision but are arrested for a crime of any kind, we will consider taking a very tough line in the disposition of that case as part of our recently announced "repeat domestic offender enforcement policy." For any violation of probation or any new domestic violence charge, we will do everything we can to take you off the street. And



remember, you can earn your way off this list: Go a year without a probation violation, a new arrest, or some other sign that you remain a threat, and we'll happily give your slot to somebody else.

The authorities now go to the much larger group of somewhat less serious domestic offenders and say:

You are the "B team." Here's how you win a seat on the "A team." We have 25 slots just waiting for you.

And they back up the entire scheme by regularly communicating to both groups what happens to people on the "A team:" how they misbehave and are predictably sanctioned, how they behave well and are rewarded, how members of the "A team" are "graduated" to the "B team," and vice versa.

Can this work? It would certainly have to be implemented in a way that minimizes the threat domestic violence victims face from abusers angered by official attention; takes advantage of all that domestic violence specialists have learned in recent years about victim safety plans, when and why offenders are most dangerous, and patterns of offending by chronic abusers; and integrates the strategy into the robust steps many jurisdictions now take in an attempt to control domestic violence offenders. Quite possibly the scale of the example is wrong; we might need 500 slots, or 5 levels of

supervision. But it seems worth exploring such a scheme: creating a tight web for a small but meaningful number of offenders; creating clear rules for admission and exclusion from that select group; and informing the larger universe of offenders of the progress, both good and bad, of those who are subject to such strict attention.

Conclusion

Community policing and problem-solving policing can be viewed as attempts to escape what have become the routine, and often extremely unsatisfactory, choices posed by traditional thinking about crime control. Deterrence, or, failing that, incapacitation, was the business of criminal justice, yet the ordinary case-processing business of criminal justice agencies often manifestly failed to deliver sufficient crime control. The other alternatives were root-cause strategies that prevent crime by making fundamental improvements in communities and the lives of the people and families that constitute them. Yet these too were uncertain, hard to carry out in the midst of high levels of local crime and fear, and offered little help to communities needing immediate help with serious public safety problems. Community policing and problem-solving policing have tried to escape that bind by borrowing from the repertoire of both enforcement and prevention, crafting strategic interventions for particular problems in concert with a

wide variety of new partners. It may be that the "pulling levers" framework offers some useful guidance to shaping some of those interventions. Deterrence may not be so hard to come by after all. And, remarkably, it may be that a key aspect of getting the deterrence equation right is simply communicating directly with the last group that is usually considered for inclusion in crime control strategies: offenders themselves. It would be nice if this were so. Talk, after all, is cheap.

Notes

1. Berard, Darrin, "Turning Bad Apples Around," *Lowell Sun*, November 16, 1997.
2. Ibid.
3. Maguire, Kathleen, and Ann Pastore, eds., *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1995*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996: 425, NCJ 158900 [hereinafter 1995 *Sourcebook*].
4. Maguire, Kathleen, and Ann Pastore, eds., 1995 *Sourcebook*: 509.
5. See Cuniff, Mark, *Sentencing Outcomes in 28 Felony Courts, 1985*, Washington, DC: [U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1987: 1, NCJ 107760.
6. Maguire, Kathleen, and Ann Pastore, eds., 1995 *Sourcebook*: 540.