

The debate over deterrence

THINKING ABOUT CRIME

BY JAMES Q. WILSON

THE AVERAGE CITIZEN HARDLY NEEDS TO BE PERSUADED that crimes will be committed more frequently if, other things being equal, crime becomes more profitable than other ways of spending one's time. Accordingly, the average citizen thinks it obvious that one major reason why crime has increased is that people have discovered they can get away with it. By the same token, a good way to reduce crime is to make its consequences to the would-be offender more costly (by making penalties swifter, more certain, or more severe), or to make alternatives to crime more attractive (by increasing the availability and pay of legitimate jobs), or both.

These citizens may be surprised to learn that social scientists who study crime are deeply divided over the correctness of such views. While some scholars, especially economists, believe that the decision to become a criminal can be explained in much the same way as we explain the decision to become a carpenter or to buy a car, other scholars, especially sociologists, contend that the popular view is wrong—crime rates do not go up because would-be criminals have little fear of arrest, and will not come down just because society decides to get tough on criminals.

This debate over the way the costs and benefits of crime affect crime rates is usually called a debate over deterrence—a debate, that is, over the efficacy (and perhaps even the propriety) of trying to prevent crime by making would-be offenders fearful of punishment. But the theory of human nature that supports the idea of deterrence—the theory that people respond to the penalties associated with crime—also assumes that people will take jobs in preference to crime if the jobs are more attractive. In both cases, we are saying that would-be offenders are rational and that they respond to their perception of the costs and benefits attached to alternative courses of action. When we use the word “deterrence,” we are calling attention to only the cost side of the equation. No word in common scientific usage calls attention to the benefit side of the equation, though perhaps “inducement” might serve.

The reason scholars disagree about deterrence is that

the consequences of committing a crime, unlike the consequences of shopping around for the best price on a given automobile, are complicated by delay, uncertainty, and ignorance. In addition, some scholars contend that many crimes are committed by persons who are so impulsive, irrational, or abnormal that even if delay, uncertainty, or ignorance were not attached to the consequences of criminality, we would still have a lot of crime.

Imagine a young man walking down the street at night with nothing on his mind but a desire for good times and high living. Suddenly he sees a little old lady standing alone on a dark corner, stuffing the proceeds of her recently cashed Social Security check into her purse. Nobody else is in view. If the young man steals the purse, he gets the money immediately. The costs of taking it are uncertain—the odds are at least ten to one that the police will not catch a robber, and even if he is caught, the odds are very good that he will not go to prison, unless he has a long record. On the average, no more than three felonies out of a hundred result in the imprisonment of the offender. In addition, whatever penalty may come his way will come only after a long delay—in some jurisdictions, a year or more might be needed to complete the court disposition of the offender, assuming he is caught in the first place. Moreover, this young man might, in his ignorance of how the world works, think the odds against being caught are even greater than they are, or that delays in the court proceedings might result in a reduction or avoidance of punishment.

Compounding the problem of delay and uncertainty is the fact that society cannot feasibly increase by more than a modest amount the likelihood of arrest, and though it can to some degree increase the probability and severity of prison sentences for those who are caught, it cannot do so drastically, by, for example, summarily executing all convicted robbers, or even by sentencing all robbers to twenty-year prison terms. Some scholars note a further complication: the young man may be incapable of assessing the risks of crime. How, they ask, is he to know his chances of being caught and punished? And even if he does know, perhaps he is driven by uncontrollable impulses to snatch purses whatever the risks.

As if all this were not bad enough, the principal method by which scholars have attempted to measure the effect of

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deterrence on crime has involved using data about aggregates of people (entire cities, counties, states, and even nations) rather than about individuals. In a typical study, the rate at which, say, robbery is committed in each state is "explained" by means of a statistical procedure in which the analyst takes into account both the socio-economic features of each state that might affect the supply of robbers (for example, the percentage of persons with low incomes, the unemployment rate, the population density of the big cities, the proportion of the population made up of young males) and the operation of the criminal-justice system of each state as it attempts to cope with robbery (for example, the probability of being caught and imprisoned for a given robbery, and the length of the average prison term for robbery).

Isaac Ehrlich, an economist, produced the best-known of such analyses, using data on crime in the United States in 1940, 1950, and 1960. He found, after controlling for such things as the income level and the age distribution of the population, that the higher the probability of imprisonment for those convicted of robbery, the lower the robbery rate. At the same time, he did not find that the severity of punishment (the average time served in prison for robbery) had, independent of its certainty, an effect on robbery rates in two of the three time periods (1940 and 1960).

But some grave problems are associated with using aggregate data of this sort in studies of the effect of sanctions on crime rates. One is that many of the most important factors are not known with any accuracy. For example, we are dependent on police reports for our measure of the robbery rate, and these undoubtedly vary in accuracy from place to place. If all police departments were inaccurate to the same degree, this would not be important; unfortunately, some departments are probably much less accurate than others, and this variable error can introduce a serious bias into the statistical estimates of the effect of the criminal-justice system.

Even if we manage to overcome this problem, a further difficulty lies in wait. States in which the probability of going to prison for robbery is low are also states that have high rates of robbery (other things being equal). This fact can be interpreted in at least two ways. It can mean that the higher robbery rates are the results of the lower imprisonment rates (and would thus be evidence that deterrence works), but it might also mean that the lower imprisonment rates are caused by the higher robbery rates. To see how the latter might be true, imagine a state that is experiencing, for some reason, a rapidly rising robbery rate. It arrests, convicts, and imprisons more and more robbers as more and more robberies are committed, but it cannot quite keep up. The robberies are increasing so fast that they swamp the criminal-justice system; prosecutors and judges respond by letting more robbers off without a prison sentence, or perhaps even without a trial, in order to keep the system from becoming hopelessly clogged. As a result, the proportion of arrested robbers who go to pris-

on goes down while the robbery rate goes up. In this case, we ought to conclude not that prison deters robbers but that high robbery rates "deter" prosecutors and judges.

The best analysis of these problems in statistical studies of deterrence is to be found in a 1978 report of the Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, which was set up by the National Research Council (an arm of the National Academy of Sciences). That panel, chaired by Alfred Blumstein, of Carnegie-Mellon University, concluded that the available statistical evidence (as of 1978) did not warrant any strong conclusions about the extent to which differences among states or cities in the probability of punishment might alter deterrent effect. The panel (of which I was a member) noted that "the evidence certainly favors a proposition supporting deterrence more than it favors one asserting that deterrence is absent," but urged "scientific caution" in interpreting this evidence.

Other criticisms of deterrence research, generally along the same lines as those of the panel, have led some commentators to declare that "deterrence doesn't work," and that we may now get on with the task of investing in those programs, such as job-creation and income maintenance, that will have an effect on crime. Such a conclusion is, to put it mildly, premature.

ONE WAY TO COMPENSATE FOR ERRORS IN OFFICIAL statistics relating to crime rates is to consider other measures of crime, in particular reports gathered by Bureau of the Census interviewers from citizens who have been victims of crime. While these victim surveys have problems of their own (such as the forgetfulness of citizens), they are not the same problems as those that affect police reports of crime. Thus, if we obtain essentially the same findings about the effect of sanctions on crime from studies that use victim data as we do from studies that use police data, our confidence in these findings is strengthened. Studies of this sort have been done by Itzhak Goldberg, at Stanford, and by Barbara Boland and myself, and the results are quite consistent with those from research based on police reports. As sanctions become more likely, both sets of data suggest, crime becomes less common.

It is possible, as some critics of deterrence say, that rising crime rates swamp the criminal-justice system, so that a negative statistical association between, say, rates of theft and the chances of going to prison for theft may mean not that a decline in imprisonment is causing theft to increase but rather that a rise in theft is causing imprisonment to become less likely. This might occur particularly with respect to less serious crimes, such as shoplifting or petty larceny; indeed, the proportion of prisoners who are shoplifters or petty thieves has gone down over the past two decades. But it is hard to imagine that the criminal-justice system would respond to an increase in murder or armed robbery by letting some murderers or armed rob-

bers off with no punishment. Convicted murderers are as likely to go to prison today as they were twenty years ago. Moreover, the deterrent effect of prison on serious crimes like murder and robbery was apparently as great in 1940 or 1950, when these crimes were much less common, as it is today, suggesting that swamping has not occurred.

Still more support for the proposition that variations in sanctions affect crime can be found in the very best studies of deterrence—those that manage to avoid the statistical errors described above. In 1977, Alfred Blumstein and Daniel Nagin published a study of the relationship between draft evasion and the penalties imposed for draft evasion in each of the states. After controlling for the socio-economic characteristics of the states, they found that the higher the probability of conviction for draft evasion, the lower the evasion rates. This is an especially strong finding, because the study is largely immune to the problems associated with other analyses of deterrence. Draft evasion is more accurately measured than street crimes, and draft-evasion cases could not have swamped the federal courts in which they were tried, in part because such cases made up only a small fraction (about 7 percent) of the workload of these courts, and in part because federal authorities had instructed the prosecutors to give high priority to these cases. For all these reasons, Blumstein and Nagin felt they could safely conclude that draft evasion is deterrable.

White-collar crime can also be deterred. In the late 1970s, Michael Block, Fred Nold, and J. G. Sidak, then at Stanford, investigated the effect of enforcing the anti-trust laws on the price of bread in the bakery business. When the government filed a price-fixing complaint against colluding bakery firms, and when those firms also faced the possibility of private suits claiming treble damages for this price-fixing, the collusion ended and the price of bread fell.

Another way of testing whether deterrence works is to look not at differences among states or firms at one point in time but at changes in the nation as a whole over a long period of time. Historical data on the criminal-justice system in America are so spotty that such research is difficult to do here, but it is not at all difficult in England, where the data are excellent. Kenneth I. Wolpin, of Yale, analyzed changes in crime rates and in various parts of the criminal-justice system (the chances of being arrested, convicted, and punished) for the period 1894 to 1967, and concluded that changes in the probability of being punished seemed to cause changes in the crime rate. He offered reasons for believing that this causal connection could not be explained away by the argument that the criminal-justice system was being swamped.)

Given what we are trying to measure—changes in the behavior of a small number of hard-to-observe persons who are responding to delayed and uncertain penalties—we will never be entirely sure that our statistical manipulations have proved that deterrence works. What is im-

pressive is that so many (but not all) studies using such different methods come to similar conclusions. More such evidence can be found in studies of the death penalty. Though the evidence as to whether capital punishment deters crime is quite ambiguous, most of the studies find that the chances of being imprisoned for murder do seem to affect the murder rate. Even after wading through all this, the skeptical reader may remain unconvinced. Considering the difficulties of any aggregate statistical analysis, that is understandable. But, as we shall shortly see, the evidence from certain social experiments reinforces the statistical studies.

WHENEVER WE TRY TO DISCOVER A RELATIONSHIP between hard-to-measure factors that operate deep inside a complex social structure, we are well advised not to rely on any single method of analysis, and we are particularly well advised not to rely on statistical studies using aggregate data. We should attack the problem from a number of angles, using different kinds of data and various methodologies. Above all, we should look at what happens to individuals (rather than to cities or states) and at what happens when a new program is tried.

Ideally, we would like to know how the probability or severity of a possible punishment will affect the behavior of persons who *might* commit a serious crime. Such persons probably constitute only a small fraction of the total population, but they are the important fraction. Most of us would not commit a serious crime because of the bite of conscience, reinforced by the fear of embarrassment should our misconduct be detected. A few of us may commit serious crimes with only small regard to the risks, unless those risks can be made great and immediate. What we would like to know is how changes in the prospective costs of crime, and in the prospective benefits of pursuing legitimate alternatives to crime, affect the behavior of those individuals who are "at risk"—that is, persons who lack strong, internalized inhibitions against misconduct, who value highly the excitement of breaking the law, who have a weak stake in conformity, who are willing to take greater chances than the rest of us, and who greatly value quick access to ready cash. Such persons tend, disproportionately, to be young males. As Philip J. Cook, at Duke University, has argued, would-be offenders don't have to be entirely rational or fully informed for the criminal-justice system (or the legitimate labor market) to have an effect on them. They need only attach some value to the consequences of their actions. We already know they value one consequence—the money or pleasure produced by crime. There is no reason to believe they are indifferent to all other consequences, including the risks of being caught.

Most of us are probably not very well informed about the true costs of crime: being law-abiding, we probably imagine that the chances of being caught are higher than in fact they are, and that the severity of the sentence (mea-



sured in years in prison) is greater than it really is. But most of us depend for our information on newspaper stories, on detective programs on television, and on our own deep fear of being exposed as a disreputable person. Persons at risk—young men hanging around on street corners, and thieves who associate with other thieves—tend to depend for their information on the accounts of other young men or other thieves who have had a run-in with the police or the courts and who therefore can supply a crudely accurate estimate of the current risks of arrest, prosecution, and sentencing.

The behavior of these persons, thus informed, is what we wish to observe. Only a few careful efforts have been made to measure the deterrent effect of the sanctions of the criminal-justice system on individuals, as opposed to cities or states. One such effort was carried out in Cook County, Illinois, and aimed at the young offender. Charles A. Murray and Louis A. Cox, Jr., in their book, *Beyond Probation*, measured the number of arrests per month of 317 Chicago boys who had been incarcerated for the first time by the Illinois Department of Corrections. Though young (their average age was sixteen), they were scarcely novices at crime: they had been arrested an average of thirteen times each before receiving their first prison sentences. Nor were their offenses trivial: as a group, they had been charged with fourteen homicides, twenty-three rapes, more than 300 assaults and a like number of auto thefts, nearly 200 armed robberies, and more than 700 burglaries. The patience of the court exhausted, these youthful offenders were eventually sent off to a correctional institution, where they served an average sentence of

ten months. Murray and Cox followed them for (on the average) seventeen months after their release. During this period, the frequency with which they were arrested (i.e., arrests per month per 100 boys) declined by about two thirds. To be exact, the members of this group of hard-core delinquents were arrested an average of 6.3 times each during the year before being sent away but only 2.9 times each during the seventeen months on the street after release.

The Murray and Cox study, one of the few of its kind, adds some support to the deterrence theory. But it, like others, focuses on persons who have already committed crimes; we remain uncertain about the effect of changes in the criminal-justice system on those who have not yet committed any crime. To study behavior that does not occur is all but impossible, though we may ask, as some scholars have, various persons—often students—whether they would commit or have committed a crime when they perceived the penalties to be of a given severity and a given probability. One such study was done among students at an eastern college, another among high school students in Arizona, and a third among adult Americans generally. The authors of all three studies found that the persons who believed they were likely to be punished for a particular criminal act were less likely to report (anonymously) having committed the act than were persons who thought they probably wouldn't be punished. The studies were broadly consistent with the view that deterrence works, but all are difficult to interpret. No one can be confident that the number of offenses the persons reported bears any relationship to the number they actually committed. More im-

portant, the studies raise the possibility that what actually deters these persons (very few of whom commit any serious acts with any frequency) is not what they guess to be the chances of being caught but the moral opprobrium with which such acts are viewed. For most people in most circumstances, the moral quality of their actions, and the internalized inhibitions against misconduct arising out of that moral code, are probably the major deterrents to crime. Interviewing people may highlight that fact, but it cannot tell us what happens at the margin, when society alters the certainty or severity of punishment for a given offense. And for purposes of public policy, that is exactly what we want to know. The best way to find out is to conduct an experiment.

MOST EXPERIMENTS IN DETERRENCE HAVE INVOLVED changes in police behavior rather than changes in the behavior of judges and prosecutors. The results of those changes seem to indicate that the more focused and aggressive the police effort, the greater the chance it will make a difference. Changes in the level of routine preventive patrol in marked cars seemed to make little difference in crime rates in Kansas City, but changes in the number of officers riding New York subway cars and changes in the aggressiveness with which San Diego policemen stopped and interrogated persons on the streets did seem to make a difference. Comparable results come from a study of drunk driving in Great Britain, where the police began to use a breathalyzer to catch inebriated motorists, in hopes of reducing traffic accidents, especially fatal ones. A careful study by H. Laurence Ross, a sociologist, clearly indicates that these hopes were borne out: "the Road Safety Act caused a reduction in casualties" by as much as two thirds during weekend evenings, when drunk driving is likely to be most common. Unhappily, the police did not like to enforce this law, which could lead to the mandatory revocation of the driving license of a motorist whose blood alcohol level exceeded .08 percent. In time, the chief constable of the county of Cheshire made a highly publicized effort to get the police to administer breathalyzer tests to every driver stopped for a moving violation or because of a traffic accident, and once again accidents declined.

Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the operation of deterrence—dramatic because it involved a true experiment on individuals engaging in what some believe is a wholly emotional crime—comes from an effort in Minneapolis to find out how the police can best handle incidents of spouse assault. The conventional wisdom had been that if one or both parties to such an assault were handled by the officer informally—by mediation or referral to a social-work agency—the parties would be better off than if the assaulter were arrested. And the police themselves often preferred not to make an arrest, because it took time and effort and often led to no prosecution when the victim re-

fused to press charges. With the advice of the Police Foundation, a group of Minneapolis officers began handling their misdemeanor spouse-assault cases by randomly assigning the assaulter to one of three dispositions: arresting him, counseling him, or sending him out of the house to cool off. Over 250 cases were treated in this experimental fashion and followed up for six months. The assaulters who were arrested were less likely to be reported to the police for a subsequent assault than were those advised, and much less likely than those sent out of the house. And this was true even though, in the vast majority of cases, the arrested person spent no more than a week in jail.

A tougher and, for policy purposes, more useful test of deterrence would be to alter the sentence a person gets without altering police conduct. We have surprisingly few careful studies of the results of doing that, even though it is regularly done. Many states have passed mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses, and some have tried to eliminate plea bargaining, or at least to ensure that serious offenders cannot have the charges against them reduced simply in order to induce a guilty plea. Unfortunately, most of these changes were made under circumstances that rendered any serious evaluation of their effect difficult, if not impossible.

TWO WELL-KNOWN CHANGES IN SENTENCING PRACTICES are the so-called Rockefeller drug laws in New York and the Bartley-Fox gun law in Massachusetts. In 1973, New York State revised its criminal statutes relating to drug trafficking in an attempt to make more severe and more certain the penalties for the sale and possession of heroin (the law affecting other drugs was changed as well, but the focus of the effort—and the most severe penalties—were reserved for heroin). The major pushers—those who sold an ounce or more of heroin—would be liable for a minimum prison term of fifteen years and the possibility of life imprisonment. But the law had some loopholes. Someone who had sold an ounce could plea bargain the charges against him down, but no lower than to a charge that would entail a mandatory one-year minimum prison sentence. Police informants could get probation instead of prison, and persons under the age of sixteen were exempt from the mandatory sentences. A provision that was made part of some amendments passed in 1975 exempted from the law persons aged sixteen to eighteen. A group was formed to evaluate the effect of this law. The authors of its report, issued in 1977, found no evidence that the law had reduced the availability of heroin on the streets of New York City or reduced the kinds of property crime often committed by drug users. Of course, it is almost impossible to measure directly the amount of an illegal drug in circulation, or to observe the illicit transactions between dealers and users, but a good deal of circumstantial evidence, gathered by the study group, suggests that no large changes occurred. The number of

deaths from narcotics overdoses did not change markedly, nor did admissions to drug-treatment programs or the price and purity of heroin available for sale on the street (as inferred from buys of heroin made by undercover narcotics agents).

The explanation for this disappointing experience, in the opinion of the study group, was that difficulties in administering the law weakened its deterrent power, with the result that most offenders and would-be offenders did not experience any significantly higher risk of apprehension and punishment. There was no increase in the number of arrests, and a slight decline in the proportion of arrests leading to indictments as well as in the proportion of indictments resulting in conviction. Offsetting this was a higher probability that a person convicted would go to prison. The net effect was that the probability of imprisonment for arrested drug dealers did not change as a result of the law—it was about one imprisonment per nine arrests both before and after passage of the law. On the other hand, the sentences received by those who did go to prison were more severe. Before the law was passed, only 3 percent of persons imprisoned for selling an ounce or more of heroin received a sentence of three years or more. After the law went into effect, 22 percent received such sentences. Perhaps because sentences became more severe, more accused persons demanded trials instead of pleading guilty; as a result, the time needed to dispose of the average drug case nearly doubled.

Does the experience under the Rockefeller law disprove the claim that deterrence works? The answer is no, but that is chiefly because deterrence theory wasn't satisfactorily tested. If "deterrence" means changing behavior by increasing either the certainty or the swiftness of punishment, then the Rockefeller law, as it was administered, could not have deterred behavior, because it made no change in the certainty of punishment and actually reduced its swiftness. If, on the other hand, "deterrence" means changing behavior by increasing the severity of punishment, then deterrence did not work in this case. What we mainly want to know, however, is whether heroin trafficking could have been reduced if the penalties associated with it had been imposed more quickly and in a higher proportion of cases.

Severity may prove to be the enemy of certainty and speed. As penalties get tougher, defendants and their lawyers have a greater incentive to slow down the process, and those judges who, for private reasons, resist heavy sentences for drug dealing may use their discretionary powers to decline indictment, accept plea bargains, grant continuances, and modify penalties in ways that reduce the certainty and the celerity of punishment. The group that evaluated the Rockefeller law suggested that reducing severity in favor of certainty might create the only real possibility for testing the deterrent effect of changes in sentences.

The Bartley-Fox gun law in Massachusetts was adminis-

tered and evaluated in ways that avoided some of the problems of the Rockefeller drug laws. In 1974, the Massachusetts legislature amended the law that had long required a license for a person carrying a handgun, by stipulating that a violation of this law would entail a mandatory penalty of one year in prison, which sentence could not be reduced by probation or parole or by judicial finagling. When the law went into effect, in April of 1975, various efforts were made to evaluate both the compliance of the criminal-justice system with it and the law's impact on crimes involving handguns. James A. Beha, II, then at the Harvard Law School, traced the application of the law for eighteen months, and concluded that, despite widespread predictions to the contrary, the police, prosecutors, and judges were not evading the law. As in New York, more persons asked for trials, and delays in disposition apparently increased, but in Massachusetts, by contrast with the experience in New York, the probability of punishment increased for those arrested. Beha estimated in 1977 (at a time when not all the early arrests had yet worked their way through the system) that prison sentences were being imposed five times more frequently on persons arrested for illegally carrying firearms than had been true before the law was passed. Owing to some combination of the heavy publicity given to the Bartley-Fox law and the real increase in the risk of imprisonment facing persons arrested while carrying a firearm without a license, the casual carrying of firearms seems to have decreased. This was the view expressed to interviewers by participants in the system, including persons being held in jail, and it was buttressed by a sharp drop in the proportion of drug dealers arrested by the Boston police who, at the time of their arrest, were found to be carrying firearms.

Three studies were made of the impact of the Bartley-Fox law on serious crime. The authors of those studies used slightly different methods, but came in general to the same conclusion—namely, that a measurable decline had occurred in some crimes that involve the casual use of firearms. Moreover, the proportion of crimes in which guns were used did not go down in other large cities during this time. In sum, the Bartley-Fox law seems, at least during the years in which its effect was studied, to have increased the risk associated with carrying a gun, to have reduced the frequency with which guns were casually carried, and thereby to have reduced the rate at which certain gun-related crimes were committed.

An effort to achieve the same results in Michigan did not work out as well, in large measure because the judges there—and in particular the judges in Wayne County, which includes Detroit—did not apply the law as expected. The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, which went into effect in 1977, required the imposition of a two-year prison sentence for possessing a firearm while committing a felony, and the two-year firearm sentence was to be added on to whatever sentence was imposed for the other felony. But no real change occurred in either the certainty or the



severity of sentences issued to gun-carrying felons. Many judges would reduce the sentence given for the original felony (say, assault or robbery) in order to compensate for the add-on. In other cases, the judge would dismiss the gun count. Given this evasion, it is not surprising that the law had little effect on the rate at which gun-related crimes were committed.

Several states have recently altered the legal minimum drinking age; because of the effect of teenage drinking on highway fatalities, these changes have been closely studied. Between 1970 and 1973, twenty-four states lowered their legal drinking ages. Shortly thereafter, Allan F. Williams and his associates at the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety examined the effect of these reductions on highway accidents, and concluded that the changes in the laws had contributed to an increase in fatal motor-vehicle accidents. Reacting to the implications of such findings, at least fourteen states, beginning in 1976, raised their minimum drinking ages from eighteen or nineteen to twenty or twenty-one. Williams and his colleagues studied these changes in nine states and concluded that when young persons could not legally buy alcoholic beverages, fewer fatal auto accidents occurred at night (when most drink-related accidents take place). Alexander C. Wagenaar, at the University of Michigan, looked closely at the Michigan experience, and came to the same conclusion. When the legal drinking age there was lowered to eighteen, the number of persons aged eighteen to twenty who were involved in accidents and reportedly had been drinking began to rise; when the drinking age was raised to twenty-one, the number of such persons in crashes began to fall. Comparable

conclusions were reached in a study of the consequences of altering the legal drinking age in Maine.

In sum, the evidence from these experiences is that changes in the probability of being punished can lead to changes in behavior, though this may not happen when the new laws exist on paper and not in practice, or when the benefits to be had from violating the law are so great as to make would-be perpetrators indifferent to the slight alteration in the risks facing them. For example, when the prospective gains from heroin trafficking or obtaining (and supplying) illegal abortions are very large, these gains can nullify the effect of modest changes in the costs of these actions, especially when (as with the New York drug law and the Michigan firearms law) the criminal-justice system does not in practice impose greater risks. When the system in fact makes the behavior much more costly, as it did with the 317 juveniles in Chicago, we observe a reduction in crime. And when the prospective benefits from violating the law are small (as with teenage drinking, or perhaps with carrying an unlicensed gun), even small changes in the risks can have significant effects on behavior.

All this means that it is difficult but not impossible to achieve increased deterrent effects through changes in the law. To obtain these effects, society must walk a narrow line—the penalties must be sufficiently great to offset, at the margin, the benefits of the illegal act, but not so great as to generate in the criminal-justice system resistance to their prompt imposition. If social experiments show that under some circumstances crime rates go down when penalties go up, can other experiments show that crime rates go down when jobs are easier to find?

DETERRENCE AND JOB-CREATION ARE NOT DIFFERENT anti-crime strategies; they are two sides of the same strategy. The former increases the costs of crime; the latter enhances the benefits of alternatives to criminal behavior. The usefulness of each depends on the assumption that we are dealing with a reasonably rational potential offender.

Let us return to our original example. The young man is still yearning for the money necessary to enjoy some high living. Let us assume that he considers finding a job. He knows he will have to look for one; this will take time. As-

suming he gets one, he will have to wait even longer to obtain his first paycheck. But he knows that young men have difficulty finding their first jobs, especially in inner-city neighborhoods such as his. Moreover, he cannot be certain that the job he might get would provide benefits that exceed the costs. Working forty hours a week as a messenger, a dishwasher, or a busboy might not seem worth the sacrifice in time, effort, and reputation on the street corner that it entails. The young man may be wrong about all this, but if he is ignorant of the true risks of crime, he is probably just as ignorant of the true benefits of alternatives to crime.

Compounding the problems of delay, uncertainty, and ignorance is the fact that society cannot feasibly make more than modest changes in the employment prospects of young men. Job-creation takes a long time, when it can be done at all, and many of the jobs created will go to the "wrong" (i.e., not criminally inclined) persons; thus, unemployment rates among the young will not vary greatly among states and will change only slowly over time. And if we wish to see differences in unemployment rates (or income levels) affect crime, we must estimate those effects by exactly the same statistical techniques we use to estimate the effect of criminal-justice sanctions.

The problem of measurement error arises because we do not know with much accuracy the unemployment rate among youths by city or state. Much depends on who is looking for work and how hard, how we count students who are looking only for part-time jobs, and whether we can distinguish between people out of work for a long period and those who happen to be between jobs at the moment. Again, since inaccuracies in these data vary from place to place, we will obtain biased results.

The problem of omitted factors is also real, as is evident in a frequently cited study done in 1976 by Harvey Brenner, of Johns Hopkins University. He suggested that between 1940 and 1973, increases in the unemployment rate led to increases in the homicide rate. But he omitted from his analysis any measure of changes in the certainty or the severity of sentences for murder, factors that other scholars have found to have a strong effect on homicide.

Finally, the relationship between crime and unemployment (or poverty) is probably complex, not simple. For example, in a statistical study that manages to overcome the problems already mentioned, we might discover that as unemployment rates go up, crime rates go up. One's natural instinct would be to interpret this as meaning that rising unemployment causes rising crime. But rising crime might as easily cause rising unemployment. If young men examining the world about them conclude that crime pays more than work—that, for instance, stealing cars is more profitable than washing them—they may then leave their jobs in favor of crime. Some young men find dealing in drugs more attractive than nine-to-five jobs, but, technically, they are "unemployed."

Perhaps both crime and unemployment are the results of



MONEY

We need more money.
There isn't enough, and life
Is too short to waste
On being poor.

Money in all its beautiful forms:
The pale wampum, the bright doubloon
Cowries blinking on the dawn shore
The tawny oxen, the rupees;
With its ten colors

We need to give each other money
Till we are rich beyond our wildest dreams
Until the banks of the world can't hold it
Until we have to melt it down into spoons.

There should be money on every tree
Nestled in the buds for safe keeping
Or in summer hanging heavy from the branches.
The leaves should clink as they fall
And the squirrels hoard nuggets of gold.

We could buy everything
If we had the money:
We could buy each other's freedom.
It would mean the end of rock and roll.
It would give us time to walk hand in hand
Through the forest with our lovers.
The way rich people do in a time of peace,
Naming the animals.

—Mary B. Campbell

some common underlying cause. In 1964, the unemployment rate for black men aged twenty to twenty-four was 12.6 percent; by 1978, it was 20 percent. During the same period, crime rates, in particular those involving young black men, went up. Among the several possible explanations are the changes that have occurred where so many young blacks live, in the inner parts of large cities. One such change is the movement out of the inner cities of both jobs and the social infrastructure that is manned by adult members of the middle class. The departure of jobs led to increased unemployment; the departure of the middle class led to lessened social control and hence to more crime. If we knew more than we now know, we would probably discover that all three relationships are working simultaneously: for some persons, unemployment leads to crime; for others, crime leads to unemployment; and for still others, social disintegration or personal inadequacy leads to both crime and unemployment.

That several of these relationships are in fact at work is suggested by Brenner's study, which noted that the murder rate went up with increases in per capita income and inflation as well as with a rise in joblessness. But if the stress of joblessness leads to more murders, what is it about increases in average income (or in inflation) that also leads to more murders? And if society attempts to reduce the murder rate by reducing unemployment, how can it do this without at the same time increasing the murder rate, because, as a result of increased employment, it has managed to increase per capita incomes or stimulate inflation?

I do not say this to explain away the studies purporting to show that unemployment or poverty causes crime, for in fact—contrary to what many people assert—very little research shows a relationship between economic factors and crime. Robert W. Gillespie, of the University of Illinois, reviewed studies available as of 1975 and found that out of ten looking for evidence of the existence of a significant relationship between unemployment and crime, only three were successful. In 1981, Thomas Orsagh and Ann Dryden Witte, both of the University of North Carolina, reviewed the studies that had appeared since 1975 and found very little statistically strong or consistent evidence to support the existence of such a connection. The evidence linking income (or poverty) and crime is similarly inconclusive, and probably for the same reasons: grave methodological problems confront anyone trying to find the relationship, and the relationship, to the extent that it exists, is probably quite complex (some people may turn to crime because they are poor, some people may be poor because they have turned to crime but are not very good at it, and still others may have been made both poor and criminal because of some common underlying factor). To quote Orsagh and Witte: "Research using aggregate data provides only weak support for the simple proposition that unemployment causes crime. . . [and] does not provide convincing tests of the relationship between low income and crime."

THE HOPE, WIDESPREAD IN THE 1960S, THAT job-creation and job-training programs would solve many social problems, including crime, led to countless efforts both to prevent crime by supplying jobs to crime-prone youths and to reduce crime among convicted offenders by supplying them with better job opportunities after their release from prison. One preventive program was the Neighborhood Youth Corps, which gave to poor young persons jobs during the afternoons and evenings and all day during the summer. An evaluation of the results of such programs among poor blacks in Cincinnati and Detroit found no evidence that participation in the Youth Corps had any effect on the proportion of enrollees who came into contact with the police. Essentially the same gloomy conclusion was reached by the authors of a survey of a large number of delinquency-prevention programs, though they reported a few glimmers of hope that certain programs might provide some benefits to some persons. For example, persons who had gone through a Job Corps program that featured intensive remedial education and job training in a residential camp were apparently less likely to be arrested six months after finishing their training than a control group.

Though preventing crime and delinquency through job programs of the sort developed by the Great Society seemed a lost hope, somewhat more success was reported from efforts to reduce crime among ex-offenders. Philip Cook followed 325 men who had been released from Massachusetts prisons in 1969 and found that parolees who were able to find "satisfactory" jobs (not just any job) were less likely than other parolees to have their parole revoked because they committed a new crime during an eighteen-month follow-up period. This was true even after controlling for the personal attributes of the parolees, such as race, intelligence, marital status, education, prior occupation, and military service.

Findings such as Cook's may have reinforced the belief of policy-makers that if only we would re-integrate the ex-offender into the labor market, we could cut crime and at the same time save money through reduced prison populations. By the early 1970s, forty-two states had adopted some variety of "work-release" program for prisoners, in which convicts nearing the end of their prison terms were released into the community in order to work at various jobs during the day, returning to prison at night or on weekends. Gordon P. Waldo and Theodore G. Chiricos, of Florida State University, evaluated the results of work-release in Florida, and did so on the basis of a particularly sophisticated research design. Eligible inmates were randomly assigned to either a work-release or a non-release group. And many different measures of recidivism were calculated—not just whether the offender was later arrested but also the rate of arrests per month. Waldo and Chiricos found no differences whatsoever in the re-arrest rate (or in any measure of recidivism) between persons in and out of work-release. An equally unpromising result was



found by Ann Dryden Witte in North Carolina, though there work-release may have led offenders to commit somewhat less serious crimes.

If work-release seems not to reduce crime rates, perhaps it is because it focuses on work rather than on wealth. Perhaps if ex-offenders had more money, especially during the crucial few months after their release, they would not need to steal in order to support themselves. Some preliminary evidence gave credence to this view. In Baltimore, about 400 ex-convicts were randomly assigned to one of four groups—those receiving nothing, those receiving employment assistance, those receiving financial aid, and those receiving both job-placement services and financial aid. After two years, it was clear that getting employment counseling did not affect the chances of being re-arrested, but getting financial aid (\$60 a week for thirteen weeks) did make a small difference (about 8 percent). This finding, however, brought with it a host of problems. For one thing, recidivism was defined as re-arrest, not the rate of re-arrest (thus possibly obscuring changes in the frequency with which persons committed crimes). Moreover, the study excluded first offenders, alcoholics, heroin users, and persons who had not committed property offenses.

A fuller test of the combined effects of employment and wealth on criminal behavior was made in Georgia and Texas. Called TARP (Transitional Aid Research Project), it involved randomly assigning about 2,000 ex-convicts in each state to groups that, on release from prison, received financial aid, job-placement services, or nothing. This experiment was not only much larger than the one in Balti-

more but also included all available categories of offenders, and it used the *number* of arrests of an individual (and not simply the *fact* of arrest) as the measure of the outcome. It also arranged that the financial aid that ex-convicts received would be reduced by any income they received from jobs—a more realistic arrangement than that used in Baltimore, where the ex-convicts could keep their financial aid whether or not they worked.

The ex-convicts who received financial aid and/or employment counseling had about the same arrest rate after release as the group that received no aid or counseling. Moreover, individuals who received TARP financial aid worked less than those who did not, so the money could be said to have discouraged, rather than encouraged, employment. The authors of the evaluation, however, were not discouraged by these findings. A complex statistical analysis led them to suggest that if the financial assistance could have been administered so as not to cause unemployment, then the payments might have prevented some crime. That speculation has been challenged by critics. What is not in dispute is that, as administered, the TARP payments did not reduce crime.

THE BEST AND MOST RECENT EFFORT TO IDENTIFY the link between employment and crime was the "supported-work" program of the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC). In ten locations around the country, MDRC randomly assigned four kinds of people with employment problems to special workshops or to control groups. The four categories were long-term

welfare (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) recipients, school dropouts, former drug addicts, and ex-convicts. The workshops provided employment in unskilled jobs supplemented by training in job-related personal skills. The unique feature of the program was that all the participants in a given work setting were people with problems; thus the difficulties experienced by persons with chronic unemployment problems when they find themselves competing with persons who are successful job-seekers and job-holders were minimized. Moreover, the workshops were led by sympathetic supervisors (often themselves ex-addicts or ex-convicts), who gradually increased the level of expected performance until, after a year or so, the trainees were able to go out into the regular job market on their own. This government-subsidized work in a supportive environment, coupled with training in personal skills, was the most ambitious effort of all we have examined to get persons with chronic problems into the labor force. Unlike vocational training in prison, supported work provided real jobs in the civilian world, and training directly related to what one was paid to do. Unlike work-release programs, supported work did not immediately place the ex-convict in the civilian job market to sink or swim on his own.

Welfare recipients and ex-addicts benefited from supported work, but ex-convicts and youthful school dropouts did not. Over a twenty-seven-month observation period, the school dropouts in the project were arrested as frequently as the school dropouts in the control group, and the ex-offenders in the project were arrested *more* frequently (seventeen more arrests per 100 persons) than ex-offenders in the control group.

The clear implication, I think, of the supported-work project—and of all the studies to which I have referred—is that unemployment and other economic factors may well be connected with criminality, but the connection is not a simple one. If, as some people assume, “unemployment causes crime,” then simply providing jobs to would-be criminals or to convicted criminals would reduce their propensity to commit crimes. We have very little evidence that this is true, at least for the kinds of persons helped by MDRC. Whether crime rates would go down if dropouts and ex-convicts held on to their jobs we cannot say, because, as the supported-work project clearly showed, within a year and a half after entering the program, the dropouts and ex-convicts were no more likely to be employed than those who had never entered the program at all—despite the great and compassionate efforts made on their behalf. Help, training, and jobs may make a difference for some persons—the young and criminally inexperienced dropout; the older, “burned-out” ex-addict; the more mature (over age thirty-five) ex-convict. But ex-addicts, middle-aged ex-cons, and inexperienced youths do not commit most of the crimes that worry us. These are committed by the young chronic offender.

Marvin E. Wolfgang and his colleagues at the University

of Pennsylvania, following the criminal careers of about 10,000 boys born in 1945 who lived in Philadelphia from their tenth to their eighteenth birthdays, found that about one third of the boys were arrested. For about half of these, their criminal “careers” stopped there. However, once a juvenile had been arrested three times, the chances that he would be arrested again were greater than 70 percent. These findings are consistent with the view that for novice offenders (to say nothing of non-offenders), some combination of informal social control, the deterrent effect of punishment, and the desire for normal entry into the world of work serves to restrain the growth of criminality. This is the group to whom we should look for evidence of the effects of changes in the probability and severity of punishment and of changes in job availability. At the other end of the scale, 6 percent of the Philadelphia boys committed five or more crimes before they were eighteen, accounting for more than half of all the recorded delinquencies of the 10,000 boys and most of the violent crimes committed by the entire cohort. The evidence from MDRC is consistent with the view that job programs are not likely to be effective with these offenders. Since we have only a few studies of the effect of deterrence on individuals (as opposed to large aggregates of people), we cannot be confident that increasing the certainty or severity of punishment would affect this group of hard-core, high-rate offenders, but evidence in the Murray and Cox study suggests that it might.

I BELIEVE THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE—Aggregate statistical analyses, evaluations of experiments and quasi-experiments, and studies of individual behavior—supports the view that the rate of crime is influenced by its costs. This influence is greater—or easier to observe—for some crimes and persons than for others. The crime rate can be lowered by increasing the certainty of sanctions, but inducing the criminal-justice system to make those changes is difficult, especially if apprehending and punishing the offender is not intrinsically rewarding to members of the criminal-justice system, or if the crime itself lacks the strong moral condemnation of society. In theory, the rate of crime should also be sensitive to the benefits of non-crime—for example, the value and availability of jobs—but thus far efforts to show that relationship have led to inconclusive results. Moreover, the nature of the connection between crime and legitimate opportunities is complex: unemployment (and prosperity!) can cause crime, crime can cause unemployment (but probably not prosperity), and both crime and unemployment may be caused by still other factors. Economic factors probably have the greatest influence on the behavior of infrequent, novice offenders and the least on frequent, experienced ones. Despite the uncertainty that attaches to the connection between the economy and crime, I believe that the wisest course of action for society is to try to increase the

benefits of non-criminal behavior and the costs of crime simultaneously, all the while bearing in mind that no feasible change in either part of the equation is likely to produce big changes in crime rates.

Some may agree with me but still feel that we should spend more heavily on one side or the other of the cost-benefit equation. At countless scholarly gatherings, I have heard learned persons examine closely any evidence purporting to show the deterrent effect of sanctions, but accept with scarcely a blink the theory that crime is caused by a "lack of opportunities." Perhaps they feel that since the evidence on both propositions is equivocal, it does less harm to believe in—and invest in—the "benign" (i.e., job-creation) program. That is surely wrong. If we try to make the penalties for crime swifter and more certain, and it should turn out that deterrence does not work, then we have merely increased the risks facing persons who are guilty of crimes in any event. If we fail to increase the certainty and swiftness of penalties, and it should turn out that deterrence *does* work, then we have needlessly increased the risk of being victimized for many innocent persons.

We can alter the crime rate in ways other than by manipulating the incentives confronting a would-be offender. Even if no criminal paid any heed to the risks he ran—an unlikely state of affairs—we could still reduce the crime rate by separating offenders (in prisons or on desert islands) from the rest of us. We call this "incapacitation." Almost no one doubts that incapacitation works: a man in prison cannot harm persons outside of prison, though scholars do disagree as to how large a reduction in crime we will obtain for a given cost (in money for prisons and in the freedom lost by the inmates).

Many people doubt that manipulating incentives works. Settling that issue is important, because, in theory, changing the penalties and opportunities operating in society would be a more powerful crime-control technique than simply incapacitating known criminals. To the extent that behavior is affected by rewards, would-be criminals can be induced not to become criminals at all and existing criminals can be persuaded to reduce the rate at which they offend. Were sanctions sufficiently swift and certain (and were alternatives to crime sufficiently attractive), the long prison terms required by the incapacitation strategy might not be necessary.

BUT WE CANNOT ACHIEVE LARGE REDUCTIONS IN crime rates by making sanctions very swift or very certain or by making jobs very abundant, because things other than the fear of punishment or the desire for jobs affect the minds of offenders, and because while we say we want a speedy, fair, and efficient criminal-justice system, we want other things more.

The behavior of most of us is affected by even small (and possibly illusory) changes in the costs attached to it. We

are easily deterred by a crackdown on drunk driving, especially if it is highly publicized, and our willingness to take chances when filling out our tax returns is influenced by how likely we think an audit may be. Why, then, should we not see big changes in the crime rates when we make our laws tougher?

The answer is not that, unlike the rest of us, burglars, muggers, and assaulters are irrational. I am struck by the account given in Sally Engle Merry's book, *Urban Danger*, of her extended interviews with youthful offenders in a big-city neighborhood she observed for a year and a half. She found that these young men had a sophisticated, pragmatic view of their criminal enterprises, even though they were neither "white-collar" criminals nor highly professional burglars. They distinguished carefully between affluent and less-affluent targets, spoke knowledgeably about the chances of being caught in one part of the district as opposed to another, understood that some citizens were less likely to call the police than others, knew which offenses were most and which were least likely to lead to arrest and prosecution, and had formed a judgment about what kinds of stories the judges would or would not believe. Though many committed crimes opportunistically, or in retaliation for what they took to be the hostile attitudes of certain neighbors, they were neither so impulsive nor so emotional as to be unaware of, or indifferent to, the consequences of their actions.

The chronic offenders who cause us all so much misery are probably especially aware of the risks they run. When Jan and Marcia Chaiken, of the Rand Corporation, analyzed the data gathered from more than 2,000 inmates of jails and prisons in California, Michigan, and Texas, they found that the chances of going to prison for a crime were higher in Texas than in California, and that the inmates sensed it. The California inmates were twice as likely as the ones in Texas to say that they thought they could commit the same crime again without getting caught. The Chaikens found, in short, what appeared to be some connection among what criminals think will happen, what in fact does happen, and how criminals behave.

Why, then, do crime rates seem so hard to change? The answer is not that criminals are irrational. It is rather that they evaluate their risks and opportunities by standards somewhat different from those of the rest of us, and society cannot easily change those risks and opportunities in ways that will have a noticeable effect on criminal behavior.

Chronic offenders may attach little or no importance to the loss of reputation that comes from being arrested; in certain circles, they may feel that an arrest has enhanced their reputation. They may attach a low value to the alleged benefits of a legitimate job, because it requires punctuality, deferential behavior, and a forty-hour week, all in exchange for no more money than they can earn in three or four burglaries carried out at their leisure. These values are not acquired merely by trying crime and comparing its

benefits with those of non-criminal behavior; if that were all that was involved, far more of us would be criminals. These preferences are shaped by personal temperament, early familial experiences, and contacts with street-corner peers—by character-forming processes that occur in intimate settings, produce lasting effects, and are hard to change.

Whereas the drinking driver, the casual tax cheat, or the would-be draft evader, having conventional preferences, responds quickly to small changes in socially determined risks, the chronic offender seems to respond only to changes in risks that are sufficiently great to offset the large benefits he associates with crime and the low value he assigns to having a decent reputation. Changing risks to that degree is not impossible, but changing those risks permanently and for large numbers of persons is neither easy nor inexpensive, especially since (as we saw in Wayne County, with the felony firearm statute, and in New York, with the Rockefeller drug law) some members of the criminal-justice system resist programs of this kind.

One third of all robberies committed in the United States are committed in the six largest cities, even though they contain only 8 percent of the nation's population. The conditions of the criminal-justice system in those cities range from poor to disastrous. *The New York Times* recently described one day in New York City's criminal courts. Nearly 4,000 cases came up on that day; each received, on the average, a three-minute hearing from one of seventy overworked judges. Fewer than one case in two hundred resulted in a trial. Three quarters of the summonses issued in the city are ignored; 3.7 million unanswered summonses now fill the courts' files. It is possible that some measure of rough justice results from all this—that the most serious offenders are dealt with adequately, and that the trivial or nonexistent penalties (other than inconvenience) imposed upon minor offenders do not contribute to the production of more chronic offenders. In short, these chaotic courts may not, as the *Times* described them, constitute a "system in collapse." But could such a system reduce the production of chronic offenders by increasing the swiftness, certainty, or severity of penalties for minor offenders? Could it take more seriously spouse assaults where the victim is reluctant to testify? Or monitor more closely the behavior of persons placed on probation on the condition that they perform community service or make restitution to their victims? Or weigh more carefully the sentences given to serious offenders, so as to maximize the crime-reduction potential of those sentences? It seems most unlikely. And yet, doing some or all of these things is exactly what is required by any plan to reduce crime by improving deterrence. For reasons best known to state legislators who talk tough about crime but appropriate too little money for a big-city court system to cope properly with lawbreakers, the struggle against street crime that has supposedly been going on for the last decade or so is in large measure a symbolic crusade.

I HAVE WRITTEN AT LENGTH ELSEWHERE ABOUT THE obstacles that prevent more than small, planned changes in the criminal-justice system. Given the modest effect that changes will have on the observable behavior of chronic offenders, we may want to supplement improvements in the criminal-justice system with programs that would reduce the causes of crime. When I published the first edition of *Thinking About Crime*, in 1975, I argued that a free society lacked the capacity to alter the root causes of crime, since they were almost surely to be found in the character-forming processes that go on in the family. The principal rejoinder to that argument was that these root causes could be found instead in the objective economic conditions confronting the offender. Labor-market or community conditions may indeed have some effect on the crime rate, but since I first wrote, the evidence has mounted that this effect is modest and hard to measure and that devising programs—even such extraordinary programs as supported work—that will have much impact on repeat offenders or school dropouts is exceptionally difficult.

By contrast, a steadily growing body of evidence suggests that the family affects criminality and that its effect, at least for serious offenders, is lasting. Beginning with the research of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck in Boston during the 1930s and 1940s, and continuing with the work of Lee Robins, William and Joan McCord, and Travis Hirschi in this country, Donald West and David Farrington in England, Lea Pulkinnen in Finland, Dan Olweus in Norway, and many others, we now have available an impressive number of studies that, taken together, support the following view: Some combination of constitutional traits and early family experiences accounts for more of the variation among young persons in their serious criminality than any other factors, and serious misconduct that appears relatively early in life tends to persist into adulthood. What happens on the street corner, in the school, or in the job market can still make a difference, but it will not be as influential as what has gone before.

If criminals are rational persons with values different from those of the rest of us, then it stands to reason that temperament and family experiences, which most shape values, will have the greatest effect on crime, and that perceived costs and benefits will have a lesser impact. For example, in a society where people cannot be under continuous official surveillance, the pleasure I take in hitting people is likely to have a greater effect on my behavior than the occasional intervention of some person in a blue uniform who objects to my hitting others and sets in motion a lengthy and uncertain process that may or may not result in my being punished for doing the hitting.

In a sense, the radical critics of America are correct. If you wish to make a big difference in crime rates, you must make a fundamental change in society. But what they propose to put in place of existing institutions, to the extent that they propose anything at all except angry rhetoric,

would leave us yearning for the good old days when our crime rate may have been higher but our freedom was intact.

There are, of course, ways of re-organizing a society other than along the authoritarian lines of radical Marxism. One can imagine living in a society in which the shared values of the people, reinforced by the operation of religious, educational, and communal organizations concerned with character formation, would produce a citizenry less criminal than ours is now without diminishing to any significant degree the political liberties we cherish. Indeed, we can do more than imagine it; we can recall it. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, we managed in this country to keep our crime rate lower than it might have been in the face of extensive urbanization, rapid industrialization, large-scale immigration, and the widening of class differences. We did this, as I have argued elsewhere ("Crime and American Culture," *The Public Interest*, Winter, 1982), by investing heavily in various systems of impulse control through revival movements, temperance societies, uplift organizations, and moral education—investments that were based on and gave effect to a widespread view that self-restraint was a fundamental element of character.

These efforts were designed to protect (and, where necessary, to replace) the family, by institutionalizing familial virtues in society at large. The efforts weakened as the moral consensus on which they were based decayed: self-expression began to rival self-control as a core human value, at first among young, well-educated persons, and eventually among persons of every station. Child-rearing methods, school curricula, social fashions, and intellectual tendencies began to exalt rights over duties, spontaneity over loyalty, tolerance over conformity, and authenticity over convention.

The criminal-justice system of the nineteenth century was probably no swifter or more certain in its operations than the system of today, at least in the large cities, and the economy was even more subject to booms and busts than anything we have known since the 1930s. The police were primitively organized and slow to respond, plea bargaining was then, as now, rife in the criminal courts; prisons were overcrowded and nontherapeutic, and protection against the vicissitudes of the labor market was haphazard or nonexistent. Yet these larger social processes may have had a greater effect on crime rates then than they do today, because then, unlike now, they were working in concert with social sentiments: society condemned those whom the police arrested, the judge convicted, or the labor market

ignored. Shame magnified the effect of punishment, and perhaps was its most important part.

Today, we are forced to act as if the degree of crime control that was once obtained by the joint effect of intimate social processes and larger social institutions can be achieved by the latter alone. It is as if we hope to find in some combination of swift and certain penalties and abundant economic opportunities a substitute for discordant homes, secularized churches, intimidated schools, and an ethos of individual self-expression. We are not likely to succeed.

Nor are we likely to reproduce, by plan, an older ethos or its accompanying array of voluntary associations and social movements. And, since we should not abandon essential political liberties, our crime-control efforts for the most part will have to proceed on the assumption—shaky as it is—that the things we can change; at least marginally, will make a significant difference. We must act as if swifter and more certain sanctions and better opportunities will improve matters. Up to a point, I think, they will, but in reaching for that point we must be prepared for modest gains uncertainly measured and expensively priced.

Brighter prospects may lie ahead. By 1990, about half a million fewer eighteen-year-old males will be living in this country than were living here in 1979. As everyone knows, young males commit proportionately more crimes than older ones. Since it is the case in general that about 6 percent of young males become chronic offenders, we will in 1990 have 30,000 fewer eighteen-year-old chronic offenders; if each chronic offender commits ten offenses (a conservative estimate) per year, we will have a third of a million fewer crimes from this age group alone. But other things may happen as well as the change in numbers. A lasting drop in the birthrate will mean that the number of children per family will remain low, easing the parental problem of supervision. A less youthful society may be less likely to celebrate a "youth culture," with its attendant emphasis on unfettered self-expression. A society less attuned to youth may find it can more easily re-assert traditional values and may be more influenced by the otherwise marginal effects of improvements in the efficiency of the criminal-justice system and the operation of the labor market. Natural and powerful demographic forces, rather than the deliberate re-establishment of an older culture, may increase the values of those few policy tools with which a free society can protect itself. In the meantime, justice requires that we use those tools, because penalizing wrong conduct and rewarding good conduct are right policies in themselves, whatever effect they may have. □

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
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The February Almanac was compiled with the assistance of Gail Cleere and the staff of the U.S. Naval Observatory; the Environmental Protection Agency; the AIDS Policy Center at the George Washington University, in Washington, D.C.; Rhona S. Applebaum, of the Chocolate Manufacturers Association; and Dr. Robert Johnson, of University Orthopedics, in Burlington, Vermont.

FEBRUARY 1989



*Sometimes "fixing broken windows" does more
to reduce crime than conventional "incident-oriented" policing*

MAKING NEIGHBORHOODS SAFE



BY JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L. KELLING


NEW BRIARFIELD APARTMENTS IS AN OLD, RUN-down collection of wooden buildings constructed in 1942 as temporary housing for shipyard workers in Newport News, Virginia. By the mid-1980s it was widely regarded as the worst housing project in the city. Many of its vacant units provided hiding places for drug users. It had the highest burglary rate in Newport News; nearly a quarter of its apartments were broken into at least once a year.

For decades the police had wearily answered calls for assistance and had investigated crimes in New Briarfield. Not much came of this police attentiveness—the buildings went on deteriorating, the burglaries went on occurring, the residents went on living in terror. Then, in 1984, Detective Tony Duke, assigned to a newly created police task force, decided to interview the residents of New

Briarfield about their problems. Not surprisingly, he found that they were worried about the burglaries—but they were just as concerned about the physical deterioration of the project. Rather than investigating only the burglaries, Duke spent some of his time investigating the *buildings*. Soon he learned that many city agencies—the fire department, the public-works department, the housing department—regarded New Briarfield as a major headache. He also discovered that its owners were in default on a federal loan and that foreclosure was imminent.

The report he wrote to Darrel Stephens, then the police chief, led Stephens to recommend to the city manager that New Briarfield be demolished and its tenants relocated. The city manager agreed. Meanwhile, Barry Haddix, the patrol officer assigned to the area, began working with members of other city agencies to fix up the project, pend-






ing its eventual replacement. Trash was carted away, abandoned cars were removed, potholes were filled in, the streets were swept. According to a study recently done by John E. Eck and William Spelman, of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the burglary rate dropped by 35 percent after Duke and Haddix began their work.

Stephens, now the executive director of PERF, tells the story of the New Briarfield project as an example of "problem-oriented policing," a concept developed by Professor Herman Goldstein, of the University of Wisconsin Law School, and sometimes also called community-oriented policing. The conventional police strategy is "incident-oriented"—a citizen calls to report an incident, such as a burglary, and the police respond by recording information relevant to the crime and then trying to solve it. Obviously, when a crime occurs, the victim is entitled to a rapid, effective police response. But if responding to incidents is all that the police do, the community problems that cause or explain many of these incidents will never be addressed, and so the incidents will continue and their number will perhaps increase.

This will happen for two reasons. One is that a lot of serious crime is adventitious, not the result of inexorable social forces or personal failings. A rash of burglaries may occur because drug users have found a back alley or an abandoned building in which to hang out. In their spare time, and in order to get money to buy drugs, they steal

from their neighbors. If the back alleys are cleaned up and the abandoned buildings torn down, the drug users will go away. They may even use fewer drugs, because they will have difficulty finding convenient dealers and soft burglary targets. By the same token, a neglected neighborhood may become the turf of a youth gang, whose members commit more crimes together in a group than they would if they were acting alone. If the gang is broken up, former members will still commit some crimes but probably not as many as before.

Most crime in most neighborhoods is local: the offenders live near their victims. Because of this, one should not assume that changing the environmental conditions conducive to crime in one area will displace the crime to other areas. For example, when the New York City police commissioner, Ben Ward, ordered Operation Pressure Point, a crackdown on drug dealing on the Lower East Side, dealing and the criminality associated with it were reduced in that neighborhood and apparently did not immediately reappear in other, contiguous neighborhoods. Suburban customers of the local drug dealers were frightened away by the sight of dozens of police officers on the streets where these customers had once shopped openly for drugs. They could not—at least not right away—find another neighborhood in which to buy drugs as easily as they once had on the Lower East Side. At the same time, the local population included some people who were willing to



aid and abet the drug dealers. When the police presence made drug dealing unattractive, the dealers could not—again, at least not for the time being—find another neighborhood that provided an equivalent social infrastructure.

The second reason that incident-oriented police work fails to discourage neighborhood crime is that law-abiding citizens who are afraid to go out onto streets filled with graffiti, winos, and loitering youths yield control of these streets to people who are not frightened by these signs of urban decay. Those not frightened turn out to be the same people who created the problem in the first place. Law-abiding citizens, already fearful, see things occurring that make them even more fearful. A vicious cycle begins of fear-induced behavior increasing the sources of that fear.

A Los Angeles police sergeant put it this way: "When people in this district see that a gang has spray-painted its initials on all the stop signs, they decide that the gang, not the people or the police, controls the streets. When they discover that the Department of Transportation needs three months to replace the stop signs, they decide that the city isn't as powerful as the gang. These people want us to help them take back the streets." Painting gang symbols on a stop sign or a storefront is not, by itself, a serious crime. As an incident, it is trivial. But as the symptom of a problem, it is very serious.



IN AN EARLIER ARTICLE IN *THE ATLANTIC* (MARCH, 1982) we called this the problem of "broken windows": If the first broken window in a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that no one cares about the building and more windows will be broken. Soon the building will have no windows. Likewise, when disorderly behavior—say, rude remarks by loitering youths—is left unchallenged, the signal given is that no one cares. The disorder escalates, possibly to serious crime.

The sort of police work practiced in Newport News is an effort to fix the broken windows. Similar projects are under way in cities all over America. This pattern constitutes the beginnings of the most significant redefinition of police work in the past half century. For example:

- When a gunfight occurred at Garden Village, a low-income housing project near Baltimore, the Baltimore County police responded by investigating both the shooting and the housing project. Chief Cornelius Behan directed the officers in his Community Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) unit to find out what could be done to

alleviate the fears of the project residents and the gang tensions that led to the shooting. COPE officers worked with members of other agencies to upgrade street lighting in the area, trim shrubbery, install door locks, repair the roads and alleys, and get money to build a playground. With police guidance, the tenants organized. At the same time, high-visibility patrols were started and gang members were questioned. When both a suspect in the shooting and a particularly troublesome parole violator were arrested, gang tensions eased. Crime rates dropped. In bringing about this change, the police dealt with eleven different public agencies.

- When local merchants in a New York City neighborhood complained to the police about homeless persons who created a mess on the streets and whose presence frightened away customers, the officer who responded did not roust the vagrants but instead suggested that the merchants hire them to clean the streets in front of their stores every morning. The merchants agreed, and now the streets are clean all day and the customers find the stores more attractive.

- When people in a Los Angeles neighborhood complained to the police about graffiti on walls and gang symbols on stop signs, officers assigned to the Community Mobilization Project in the Wilshire station did more than just try to catch the gang youths who were wielding the spray cans; they also organized citizens' groups and Boy Scouts to paint over the graffiti as fast as they were put up.

- When residents of a Houston neighborhood became fearful about crime in their area, the police not only redoubled their efforts to solve the burglaries and thefts but also assigned some officers to talk with the citizens in their homes. During a nine-month period the officers visited more than a third of all the dwelling units in the area, introduced themselves, asked about any neighborhood problems, and left their business cards. When Antony Pate and Mary Ann Wycoff, researchers at the Police Foundation, evaluated the project, they found that the people in this area, unlike others living in a similar area where no citizen-contact project occurred, felt that social disorder had decreased and that the neighborhood had become a better place to live. Moreover, and quite unexpectedly, the amount of property crime was noticeably reduced.

These are all examples of community-oriented policing, whose current popularity among police chiefs is as great as the ambiguity of the idea. In a sense, the police have always been community-oriented. Every police officer knows that most crimes don't get solved if victims and witnesses do not cooperate. One way to encourage that cooperation is to cultivate the good will of both victims and witnesses. Similarly, police-citizen tensions, over racial incidents or allegations of brutality or hostility, can often be allayed, and sometimes prevented, if police officers stay in close touch with community groups. Accordingly, most departments have at least one community-relations officer.

who arranges meetings between officers and citizens' groups in church basements and other neutral locales.

But these commonplace features of police work are additions, and rarely alter the traditional work of most patrol officers and detectives: responding to radio calls about specific incidents. The focus on incidents works against a focus on problems. If Detective Tony Duke had focused only on incidents in New Briarfield, he would still be investigating burglaries in that housing project; meanwhile, the community-relations officer would be telling outraged residents that the police were doing all they could and urging people to call in any useful leads. If a tenant at one of those meetings had complained about stopped-up drains, rotting floorboards, and abandoned refrigerators, the community-relations officer would have patiently explained that these were not "police matters."

And of course, they are not. They are the responsibility of the landlord, the tenants themselves, and city agencies other than the police. But landlords are sometimes indifferent, tenants rarely have the resources to make needed repairs, and other city agencies do not have a twenty-four-hour emergency service. Like it or not, the police are about the only city agency that makes house calls around the clock. And like it or not, the public defines broadly what it thinks of as public order, and holds the police responsible for maintaining order.

Community-oriented policing means changing the daily work of the police to include investigating problems as well as incidents. It means defining as a problem whatever a significant body of public opinion regards as a threat to community order. It means working with the good guys, and not just against the bad guys.

The link between incidents and problems can sometimes be measured. The police know from experience what research by Glenn Pierce, in Boston, and Lawrence Sherman, in Minneapolis, has established: fewer than 10 percent of the addresses from which the police receive calls account for more than 60 percent of those calls. Many of the calls involve domestic disputes. If each call is treated as a separate incident with neither a history nor a future, then each dispute will be handled by police officers anxious to pacify the complainants and get back on patrol as quickly as possible. All too often, however, the disputants move beyond shouting insults or throwing crockery at each other. A knife or a gun may be produced, and somebody may die.

A very large proportion of all killings occur in these domestic settings. A study of domestic homicides in Kansas City showed that in eight out of ten cases the police had been called to the incident address at least once before; in half the cases they had been called *five times* or more. The police are familiar with this pattern, and they have learned how best to respond to it. An experiment in Minneapolis, conducted by the Police Foundation, showed that men who were arrested after assaulting their spouses were much less likely to commit new assaults than those who were merely pacified or asked to leave the house for a few

hours. Research is now under way in other cities to test this finding. Arrest may prove always to be the best disposition, or we may learn that some kind of intervention by a social agency also helps. What is indisputable is that a domestic fight—like many other events to which the police respond—is less an "incident" than a problem likely to have serious, long-term consequences.

Another such problem, familiar to New Yorkers, is graffiti on subway cars. What to some aesthetes is folk art is to most people a sign that an important public place is no longer under public control. If graffiti painters can attack cars with impunity, then muggers may feel they can attack the people in those cars with equal impunity. When we first wrote in these pages about the problem of broken windows, we dwelt on the graffiti problem as an example of a minor crime creating a major crisis.

The police seemed powerless to do much about it. They could arrest youths with cans of spray paint, but for every one arrested ten more went undetected, and of those arrested, few were punished. The New York Transit Authority, led by its chairman, Robert Kiley, and its president, David Gunn, decided that graffiti-free cars were a major management goal. New, easier-to-clean cars were bought. More important, key people in the Authority were held accountable for cleaning the cars and keeping them clean. Whereas in the early 1980s two out of every three cars were covered with graffiti, today fewer than one in six is. The Transit Police have played their part by arresting those who paint the cars, but they have been more successful at keeping cars from being defaced in the first place than they were at chasing people who were spraying already defaced ones.



WHILE THE PHRASE "COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING" comes easily to the lips of police administrators, redefining the police mission is more difficult. To help the police become accustomed to fixing broken windows as well as arresting window-breakers requires doing things that are very hard for many administrators to do.

Authority over at least some patrol officers must be decentralized, so that they have a good deal of freedom to manage their time (including their paid overtime). This implies freeing them at least partly from the tyranny of the radio call. It means giving them a broad range of responsibilities: to find and understand the problems that create disorder and crime, and to deal with other public and private agencies that can help cope with these problems. It

means assigning them to a neighborhood and leaving them there for an extended period of time. It means backing them up with department support and resources.

The reason these are not easy things for police chiefs to do is not simply that chiefs are slaves to tradition, though some impatient advocates of community-oriented policing like to say so. Consider for a moment how all these changes might sound to an experienced and intelligent police executive who must defend his department against media criticisms of officer misconduct, political pressure to cut budgets, and interest-group demands for more police protection everywhere. With decentralized authority, no one will know precisely how patrol officers spend their time. Moreover, decentralized authority means that patrol officers will spend time on things like schmoozing with citizens, instead of on quantifiable tasks like issuing tickets, making arrests, and clearing cases.

Making the community-oriented officers generalists means letting them deal with other city agencies, a responsibility for which few officers are well trained and which cuts across sensitive questions of turf and public expectations.

If officers are left in a neighborhood, some of them may start taking money from the dope dealers and after-hours joints. To prevent that, officers are frequently moved

around. Moreover, the best people are usually kept in the detective squad that handles the really big cases. Few police executives want their best people settling into a neighborhood, walking around the bus stops and shopping malls.

The enthusiasts for community-oriented policing have answers for all these concerns, but sometimes in their zeal they forget that they are contending with more than mere bureaucratic foot-dragging—that the problems are real and require thoughtful solutions. Many police executives get in trouble not because the crime rate goes up but because cops are accused of graft, brutality, laziness, incivility, or indifference.

In short, police management is driven more by the constraints on the job than by the goals of the job. You cannot cope with those constraints without understanding them. This may be why some of the biggest changes toward community-oriented policing have occurred in cities where a new chief has come in from the outside with a mandate to shake up a moribund department. Lee Brown brought a community orientation to the Houston Police Department under precisely those circumstances—the reputation of the department was so bad that almost any change would have been regarded as an improvement.

What can we say to the worried police chief who is al-

SAVING MEMORY

Summer nights we put pennies on the track.
Even the station was quiet enough for crickets.
Mountains surrounded us, middling high and purple.
No matter where we stood they protected us
with perspective. People call them gentle mountains
but you can die in there; they're thick
with creeper and laurel. Like voodoo,
I drew pictures with a sparkler. A curved line
arced across the night. Rooted in its slope,
one laurel tree big as the mountain holding it.

You can hear the train in the rails.
They're round, not flat, as you'd expect,
and slick. We'd walk the sound, one step, two,
slip, on purpose, in the ballast, hopscotch
and waltz on the ties, watching the big round eye
enter the curve and grow like God out of the purple,
the tracks turning mean, molten silver blazing
dead at us. We'd hula. Tango. And the first
white plume would shoot up screaming long, lonely,
vain as Mamma shooting starlings from her latticed pies.

Sing Mickey Mouse, the second scream rising long, again,
up and up. Stick our right hip out, the third
wailing. Give it a hot-cha wiggle, the fourth
surrounding us. And bidding each other fond adieux,
we'd count to three, turn our backs, flash it a moon,
and materialize, fantastic, run over with light,
the train shrieking to pieces, scared, meaning it,
short, short, short, short, pushing a noise
bigger than the valley. It sent us flying,
flattened, light as ideas, back on the platform,
the Y6B Mallet compound rolling through
southbound, steamborne, out of Roanoke.

It wasn't to make the train jump the track
but to hold the breath-edged piece of copper
grown hot with dying, thin with birth,
wiped smooth of origin and homilies.
To hold such power. As big as the eye
of the train, as big as the moon burning
like the sun. All the perspective
curved and gone.

—Mary Stewart Hammond

THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY

ready running a pretty good department? Start with corruption: For decades police executives and reformers have believed that in order to prevent corruption, you have to centralize control over personnel and discourage intimacy between police officers and citizens. Maybe. But the price one pays for this is very high. For example, many neighborhoods are being destroyed by drug dealers, who hang out on every street corner. The best way to sweep them off the streets is to have patrol officers arrest them for selling drugs and intimidate their customers by parking police cars right next to suspected drug outlets. But some police chiefs forbid their patrol officers to work drug cases, for fear they will be corrupted. When the citizens in these cities see police cars drive past scenes of open drug dealing, they assume the police have been paid off. Efforts to prevent corruption have produced the appearance of corruption.

Police Commissioner Ben Ward, in New York, decided that the price of this kind of anti-corruption strategy was too high. His Operation Pressure Point put scores of police officers on the streets to break up the drug-dealing bazaar. Police corruption is no laughing matter, especially in New York, but some chiefs now believe that it will have to be fought in ways that do not require police officers to avoid contact with people.

Consider the problem of getting police resources and managing political pressures: resources can be justified with statistics, but statistics often become ends in themselves. One police captain we interviewed said that his department was preoccupied with "stacking widgets and counting beans." He asked his superior for permission to take officers out of radio cars and have them work on community problems. The superior agreed but warned that he would be watching to see what happened to "the stats." In the short run the stats—for example, calls answered, average response time—were likely to get worse, but if community problems were solved, they would get better as citizens had fewer incidents to report. The captain worried, however, that he would not be given enough time to achieve this and that the bean counters would cut off his program.

A better way to justify getting resources from the city is to stimulate popular demand for resources devoted to problem-solving. Properly handled, community-oriented policing does generate support for the department. When Newark police officers, under orders from Hubert Williams, then the police director, began stopping city buses and boarding them to enforce city ordinances against smoking, drinking, gambling, and playing loud music, the bus patrons often applauded. When Los Angeles police officers supervised the hauling away of abandoned cars, onlookers applauded. Later, when some of the officers had their time available for problem-solving work cut back, several hundred citizens attended a meeting to complain.

In Flint, Michigan, patrol officers were taken out of their cars and assigned to foot beats. Robert Trojanowicz,

a professor at Michigan State University, analyzed the results and found big increases in citizen satisfaction and officer morale, and even a significant drop in crime (an earlier foot-patrol project in Newark had produced equivalent reductions in fear but no reductions in crime). Citizen support was not confined to statements made to pollsters, however. Voters in referenda twice approved tax increases to maintain the foot-patrol system, the second time by a two-to-one margin. New Briarfield tenants unquestionably found satisfaction in the role the police played in getting temporary improvements made on their housing project and getting a commitment for its ultimate replacement. Indeed, when a department experiments with a community-oriented project in one precinct, people in other precincts usually want one too.



POLITICIANS, LIKE POLICE CHIEFS, HEAR THESE VIEWS and respond. But they hear other views as well. One widespread political mandate is to keep the tax rate down. Many police departments are already stretched thin by sharp reductions in spending that occurred in the lean years of the 1970s. Putting *one* additional patrol car on the streets around the clock can cost a quarter of a million dollars or more a year.

Change may seem easier when resources are abundant. Ben Ward could start Operation Pressure Point because he had at his disposal a large number of new officers who could be thrown into a crackdown on street-level drug dealing. Things look a bit different in Los Angeles, where no big increases in personnel are on the horizon. As a result, only eight officers are assigned to the problem-solving Community Mobilization Project in the Wilshire district—an economically and ethnically diverse area of nearly 300,000 residents.

But change does not necessarily require more resources, and the availability of new resources is no guarantee that change will be attempted. One temptation is to try to sell the public on the need for more policemen and decide later how to use them. Usually when that script is followed, either the public turns down the spending increase or the extra personnel are dumped into what one LAPD captain calls the "black hole" of existing commitments, leaving no trace and producing no effects.

What may have an effect is how the police are deployed and managed. An experiment jointly conducted by the Washington, D.C., Police Department and the Police Foundation showed that if a few experienced officers con-

THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY

concentrate on known repeat offenders, the number of serious offenders taken off the streets grows substantially. The Flint and Newark experiences suggest that foot patrols in certain kinds of communities (but not all) can reduce fear. In Houston problem-oriented tactics seem clearly to have heightened a sense of citizen security.

The problem of interagency cooperation may, in the long run, be the most difficult of all. The police can bring problems to the attention of other city agencies, but the system is not always organized to respond. In his book *Neighborhood Services*, John Mudd calls it the "rat problem": "If a rat is found in an apartment, it is a housing inspection responsibility; if it runs into a restaurant, the health department has jurisdiction; if it goes outside and dies in an alley, public works takes over." A police officer who takes public complaints about rats seriously will go crazy trying to figure out what agency in the city has responsibility for rat control and then inducing it to kill the rats.

Matters are almost as bad if the public is complaining about abandoned houses or school-age children who are not in school. The housing department may prefer to concentrate on enforcing the housing code rather than go through the costly and time-consuming process of getting an abandoned house torn down. The school department may have expelled the truant children for making life miserable for the teachers and the other students; the last thing it wants is for the police to tell the school to take the kids back.

All city and county agencies have their own priorities and face their own pressures. Forcing them to cooperate by knocking heads together at the top rarely works; what department heads promise the mayor they will do may bear little relationship to what their rank-and-file employees actually do. From his experiences in New York City government Mudd discovered that if you want agencies to cooperate in solving neighborhood problems, you have to get the neighborhood-level supervisors from each agency together in a "district cabinet" that meets regularly and addresses common concerns. This is not an easy task (for one thing, police district lines often do not match the district boundaries of the school, housing, traffic, and public-works departments), but where it has been tried it has made solving the "rat problem" a lot easier. For example, Mudd reports, such interagency issues as park safety and refuse-laden vacant lots got handled more effectively when the field supervisors met to talk about them than when memos went up the chain of command of one agency and then down the chain of command of another.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF Neighborhood Watch programs may help reduce crime, but we cannot be certain. In particular, we do not know what kinds of communities are most likely to benefit from such programs. A Police Foundation study in Minneapolis found that getting effective community orga-

nizations started in the most troubled neighborhoods was very difficult. The costs and benefits of having patrol officers and sergeants influence the delivery of services from other city agencies has never been fully assessed. No way of wresting control of a neighborhood from a street gang has yet been proved effective.

And even if these questions are answered, a police department may still have difficulty accommodating two very different working cultures: the patrol officers and detectives who handle major crimes (murders, rapes, and robberies) and the cops who work on community problems and the seemingly minor incidents they generate. In every department we visited, some of the incident-oriented officers spoke disparagingly of the problem-oriented officers as "social workers," and some of the latter responded by calling the former "ghetto blasters." If a community-service officer seems to get too close to the community, he or she may be accused of "going native." The tension between the two cultures is heightened by the fact that in many departments becoming a detective is regarded as a major promotion, and detectives are often selected from among those officers who have the best record in making major arrests—in other words, from the ranks of the incident-oriented. But this pattern need not be permanent. Promotion tracks can be changed so that a patrol officer, especially one working on community problems, is no longer regarded as somebody who "hasn't made detective." Moreover, some police executives now believe that splitting the patrol force into two units—one oriented to incidents, the other to problems—is unwise. They are searching for ways to give all patrol officers the time and resources for problem-solving activities.

Because of the gaps in our knowledge about both the results and the difficulties of community-oriented policing, no chief should be urged to accept, uncritically, the community-oriented model. But the traditional model of police professionalism—devoting resources to quick radio-car response to calls about specific crime incidents—makes little sense at a time when the principal threats to public order and safety come from *collective*, not individual, sources, and from *problems*, not incidents: from well-organized gangs and drug traffickers, from uncared-for legions of the homeless, from boisterous teenagers taking advantage of their newfound freedom and affluence in congested urban settings.

Even if community-oriented policing does not produce the dramatic gains that some of its more ardent advocates expect, it has indisputably produced one that the officers who have been involved in it immediately acknowledge: It has changed their perceptions of the community. Officer Robin Kirk, of the Houston Police Department, had to be talked into becoming part of a neighborhood fear-reduction project. Once in it, he was converted. In his words, "Traditionally, police officers after about three years get to thinking that everybody's a loser. That's the only people you're dealing with. In community policing you're dealing with the good citizens, helping them solve problems." □

Vital Speeches of the Day

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VOL. LX

MARCH 15, 1994

NO. 11

Combating Violence In America

CRIME AFFECTS ALL OF US

By JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., *United States Senator from Delaware, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee*

Delivered before the Wilmington Rotary Club, Wilmington, Delaware, December 16, 1993

I have long believed that the single most important issue facing America, notwithstanding the economy, notwithstanding foreign policy, notwithstanding unemployment, notwithstanding NAFTA, is violence.

Violence in our nation has reached epidemic proportions, requiring all of us to fundamentally change the way we run our lives, because we now feel insecure about our physical safety and the well-being of our families. Fifteen years ago, there weren't many places I feared to go; today, I doubt whether any one of you in this room would be willing to go to half a dozen places I could name in our own community.

Violence today has had a leveling effect — those of us who used to think we could take care of ourselves know we are defenseless when faced with a nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol loaded with 22 rounds. Those of us who live in suburban neighborhoods used to feel we were immune from crime. Today, there is no immunity; shopping centers from Greenville to Concord Pike are now robbed in broad daylight. Violence exacts a terrible price — on individual victims who suffer physical wounds and bear long-term emotional scars; and on our communities and society at large who suffer a loss of security and peace of mind.

The facts bear out our fears — the United States of America is the most dangerous country in the world. No country in the world has a higher per capita murder rate than the United States of America — there were 23,760 murders in 1992. No country in the world matches the rate at which women in the United States are raped — here, a

woman is raped every 47 seconds. That is nearly four times higher than in Germany, 13 times higher than in Great Britain, and more than 20 times higher than in Japan. These rates have risen dramatically over the last several decades. In the last 10 years alone, the murder rate has increased 23 percent and the rate of violent crimes has increased 41 percent. More than five and a half million felonies were committed in 1992.

Even more troubling is that the character of the violence is changing — first, younger and younger kids are committing violent crimes. Over the last 10 years, the number of juveniles arrested for murder increased 142 percent! Last year, in the United States of America, more than 4,500 murders were attributed to killers under the age of twenty. Second, teen-age criminals commit crimes that are more impulsive and irrational. The randomness of crime — the chance of being victimized for being in “the wrong place at the wrong time” — have increased. Finally, the wide and easy availability of guns with frightening firepower multiplies the destruction caused by each act of violence.

More than 15 thousand of the nearly 24 thousand murders last year resulted from gun wounds. Guns are the preferred weapon of those intent on violence. And, as doctors across the country have told me, the kind of guns preferred today wreak unparalleled havoc with the human body. One doctor explained how advances in emergency medicine mean trauma units can save almost everyone with a single .22-caliber wound — even to the head or the chest. But today the victims of violence come to hospitals not with

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Subscription Rates September 1, 1992: \$37.50 a year. Foreign one year: \$42.00. Single copies \$2.25. Back issues, if available, within two years \$3.25 a copy. Microfilm and microfiche editions \$27.50 per volume plus postage, subscribers only. On order under \$22.50, remittance must accompany order. Claims for nondelivery of issues must be made within two months of the date of the issue.

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Second Class postage paid at Mount Pleasant, S.C. and additional mailing offices.

Printed in the U.S.A.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to: 389 Johnnie Dodd Blvd., Box 1247, Mount Pleasant, S.C. 29465.

single wounds, but with multiple gunshot wounds from the head to the neck; not with a .22-caliber bullet lodged in the chest, but with the lungs literally blown out of the body by a .45-caliber slug.

We have all read the stories and seen the news coverage of stories illustrating each of these characteristics: kids as young as 13 stalking and shooting tourists on the highways of Florida; the robber in Washington, D.C., who turned around on his way out of a jewelry store, and went back to lean over the counter and gratuitously shoot the owner with his semi-automatic pistol!

This is a society out of sync; this is a society in trouble. The problem of violence is so big and so multifaceted that it can seem intractable. For years, we have debated the "conservative" and "liberal" answers to crime and violence — painting tougher punishment or educational and social programs as stark "either/or" choices — and then concluding that nothing has worked. But is this criticism fair? I think not. Have we really made sure violent criminals know that punishment will be severe and certain? No — in states across the nation violent offenders serve on average only 40 percent of their sentences. Have we really succeeded in providing at-risk youths with the education and job opportunities necessary to offset the lure of crime? No. Student drop-out rates and teen unemployment — particularly for minorities — remain high, the minimum wage continues to lag behind inflation. When I look at our response to violence, I am reminded of what G. K. Chesterton said about Christianity: it is not that it has been tried and found wanting, but, rather, that it has been found difficult and left untried.

As we pursue solutions, we must re-frame the debate not in terms of what sounds tough, but in terms of what works; we must face the fact that answers to the problems of violence and crime are not easy — they will take our most determined commitment of energy and time. We must begin to isolate the factors we know are contributing to the violence; we must be willing to confront the causes of violence no matter how difficult or unpopular.

Let me just mention four such factors — factors which often work in conjunction with each other: first, much has been written about the fact that violent adults were often the victims of abuse as children. Violence is learned behavior. The "cycle of violence" begins as children suffer violence at home themselves or see their mothers or other family members suffer abuse.

Second, we know that the lack of a male role model in the home is related to criminal behavior. More than 40 percent of the state prison population nationwide grew up without fathers in their homes. More than 70 percent of all juveniles in long-term state correctional institutions come from homes without a father present. Even after controlling the income, boys from fatherless homes are significantly more likely to commit crimes and to wind up in the criminal justice system. This effect is exacerbated by the fact that children in single-parent homes are six times as likely to be poor, and are at greater risk for abuse, as compared to children from intact families.

Third, the link between violent crime and illegal drugs is unquestioned. Drug related murders have risen 118 percent since 1985 alone. The violent competition among traffickers for markets has turned some of our neighborhoods into war zones. Criminals and innocent bystanders alike are

killed at ever increasing rates. Don't forget, though, that most drug-related crime is committed by drug buyers, not sellers. Addicts who have no jobs or whose jobs can not support a drug habit snatch purses, mug pedestrians, and rob cars and houses to support their habits.

Fourth, the availability of guns means that crime is increasingly lethal. Yet we continue to permit the legal purchase of weapons of such ferocity that our police forces are routinely out-gunned, that our citizens can be mowed down by those with guns that fire 15 or more rounds in mere seconds.

What can we do to combat these factors? One thing we must not do is throw up our hands and declare defeat. Instead, we must commit ourselves to finding solutions, and I believe we must do so through a two-step strategy.

First, we must take immediate steps to address those who are now in the crime stream, committing violent acts and menacing others. The crime bill just passed by the Senate contains provisions that will help with the first level of response. In particular, we must ensure tough, cost-effective punishment for all; offenders; we must put more police on our streets; we must permit fewer guns in the hands of criminals; and we must begin intensive efforts to reach those who are at risk and deter them from crime.

Let me take these one at a time.

First, our ability to reduce crime in a cost-effective manner depends directly on our ability to target offenders with the appropriate type of sentence. This means, first and foremost, that we must identify violent offenders and make sure they go to prison. By the end of 1992, state prisons were housing 840,000 inmates — and local jails held an additional 450,000 persons. The price tag for this incarceration is steep: state spending on prisons doubled between 1986 and 1992, and there is no end in sight unless we become smarter in using our resources. We must have adequate prison space to get violent people off the streets. The Senate's crime bill contains \$3 billion in grants to states for building and/or operating prisons for violent offenders.

In addition, to encourage states to identify nonviolent offenders and offer them alternative, more cost-effective programs, the states can use the money to run military-style boot camps. These camps provide a regimented program of work and activities for nonviolent offenders under 25 years old; they must be combined with job training and supervision on release to ensure low recidivism rates. Running boot camps costs about one-third what a prison costs on a per inmate basis, so moving non-violent offenders into boot camps is a cost-effective response to the prison space shortage.

Finally, both the federal and state systems suffer from the same key shortcoming: the lack of drug treatment. Drug treatment, as former Drug Director Bill Bennett acknowledged, cuts recidivism rates in half, and it is cost effective: for every \$1 dollar we spend treating drug offenders, we save \$3 dollars later — in reduced crime and in the other high social costs of addiction. The need is great.

Each year, over 200,000 drug-addicted offenders are released from state prisons or jails without being treated; approximately 15,000 addicts are released annually from federal prisons without ever receiving adequate treatment. At the federal level, the bill sets a schedule for the bureau of prisons to place all eligible federal prisoners into drug treatment programs lasting within the next three years — in

facilities separate from the general prison population. The bill also requires periodic drug-testing of federal offenders on post-conviction release. At the state level, the greatest challenge is to reach those first entering the criminal justice system. About one million drug arrests are made every year, but the response of the criminal justice system to these offenders has been ineffective.

Let me address for a moment the notion recently raised anew that the answer to drug related crime is to legalize drugs. Proponents argue that legalization will reduce the crime rate. Drug addicts, they suggest, will not need to commit crimes because they won't need the money to buy drugs. This would reduce the black-market price of drugs such as crack, heroin, and cocaine, and criminal organizations will have little incentive to sell them.

But the legalization argument fails both in theory and in practice. In order for legalization to eliminate drug related crime, all drugs — crack, ice, heroin and any new product that comes on the market — must be free and supplied in unlimited quantities. Otherwise, demand either for drugs not offered by the legal system or for additional quantities of drugs would continue. The result of this continued need for a source of illegal drugs would be a flourishing black market to fill this gap, and drug related crimes would not decrease.

In addition, "legal drugs" would have to be made available to everyone, at an estimated cost in the billions of dollars, including juveniles. This is an issue that legalization advocates have glossed over. But according to the most recent statistics, those under the age of 18 account for roughly one tenth of drug use in America. If they are not included in the legalized system, criminal organizations will focus their attention on the juvenile market and schools will become the leading drug bazaars in our communities.

Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, most drug-related crime is committed by drug users, not sellers. Legalizing drugs will not end drug-related crime. It is no answer to either the crime or the drug problems in our country. The better answer to both is to force drug addicts who break the law into treatment — always backed up by the sure threat that any individual given the chance to "straighten up" who returns to drugs or crime will go to prison. The Senate's crime bill does this by offering \$1.2 billion to states to run "drug court programs." As with boot camps, the key to drug programs is to identify those nonviolent offenders who can be diverted from a criminal career. In most states, such offenders are either simply released back onto the streets, or they occupy prison spaces that are in short supply for violent offenders. Neither option is a good one.

These are not programs for violent offenders; they are cost-effective programs that combine the concepts of prevention plus responsibility to reach those offenders whose minor crimes have just brought them into the criminal justice system. Drug court programs combine the "carrots" of intensive supervision by probation officers and mandatory drug testing and treatment — with the "stick" of a certain prison term if the individual again strays from the straight and narrow.

Here's how a drug court works — a nonviolent offender arrested on a drug charge is given a choice: Go to prison or enter an intensive supervision/treatment program. The alternative to prison is no free ride. Participants must get and keep a job. They must agree to random, mandatory drug

testing. If they successfully complete the program, they don't have to do time. Punishment is certain unless they succeed. Moreover, sanctions are increased incrementally each time there's a lapse. The idea here is that there must be immediate and direct consequences for every mistake.

The results of one existing drug court program, in Dade County, Florida, are impressive: from June 1989 to December 1991, 1,740 offenders successfully graduated from the program and only three percent have been rearrested. Before the drug court program was instituted, the rearrest rate for these offenders was 33 percent. And the program is saving money that can be redirected to incarcerating and treating violent, career criminals. In Miami, it costs \$17,000 year to keep an offender in the county jail. That same offender can get the benefits of the drug court at a price of about \$2,000 a year. This is smart punishment. Currently, 600,000 offenders nationwide who meet the drug-court profile — of a nonviolent drug offender without a serious criminal record — are now effectively ignored by the system. The drug-court programs can make a difference with that part of the offender population that can be deterred from future, more serious, crime.

The second key approach taken in the crime bill is an effort to deter crime before it occurs by putting more police on our streets. As simple as this sounds, the need is acute: In 1950, America had more than three police officers for every violent crime; today there are three violent crimes for every police officer. Trying to fight a "war on crime" without more police is like trying to fight a military conflict without an army. The crime bill just passed by the Senate promises to put 100,000 more police officers on our streets over the next four years.

And these police will engage in what is known as "community policing." Today, a typical urban police department assigns officers to large precincts; they ride in cruisers and respond to radio calls from any and all parts of the oversized "beat." This system isolates police officers; they are strangers in the very communities they are trying to protect. As a result, they are always behind the curve — responding after the fact to a crime's occurrence, picking up the pieces after the violence is already done.

Community policing is designed to integrate police officers back into the life of the community, so they can help prevent crime from occurring in the first place and be better positioned to respond when it does occur. It takes police out of their cars to walk smaller "beats" of five or ten block areas. It allows them to learn who is in the community — so they know the trouble spots, the trouble makers, the at risk juveniles. They work cooperatively with community leaders, school officials, family workers, and others to tailor preventative programs to best fit the community. Where it has been put in effect, in four major metropolitan areas, the crime rates have dropped from 18 percent to 23 percent.

The third step we must take is to get deadly weapons off our streets. Banning assault weapons would at least make our streets less lethal, if not less violent. The Senate's crime bill contains a ban on the manufacture, sale and possession of military-style assault weapons — guns with no sporting purpose, useful for one thing only — killing people.

Finally, this year, the Congress acted to limit the availability of handguns, passing the Brady Bill to provide for a five-day waiting period and background check for handgun purchases while an instant-check system is put in place.

This modest step toward controlling guns must be a first step only — we must impose a rationale system of managing all guns if we are to end the senseless killings like those that occurred on the New York commuter train last week.

The Senate's crime bill takes other first steps. It contains up to \$2 billion for states to initiate education, training and prevention programs to steer at-risk youth away from teenage gangs and criminal careers. Larger scale, intensive intervention programs for all those at risk — and beginning at the earliest ages — are the long term answer. Although we have resisted such efforts because of the expense, we must remember that the cost of inaction is staggeringly high. And until we decide to undertake such a massive effort, we should remember that smaller versions of these ideas can work, too. These smaller steps are what the Senate's bill contains. The money provided through the bill can be used for programs like boys and girls clubs in public housing projects. Projects that have such clubs report teen crime rates lower than those without such facilities. We should not stop until there is a club in every housing project in the country.

We must also start the long fight to stop family and child abuse. I believe the ultimate "cure" to this violence is to fundamentally change our attitudes about it. Somehow, we seem to forget that society suffers what it tolerates. If we remain indifferent to the fact that crime is rising fastest against women and children, we must expect this violence to grow even worse. As a society, we remain largely indifferent to the violence flowing from one generation to the next; we must declare the cycle of violence against women and children intolerable. That's why I drafted legislation designed to educate the public, the courts and law enforcement about violence against women.

Now part of the Senate's crime bill, this legislation combines practical programs such as education for prosecutors and judges as well as the public and funding for battered women's shelters and family violence hotlines, with the cre-

ation of a civil rights remedy for victims of violence motivated by gender bias. This last provision will have a real impact, but, even more importantly in my view, it will signal our clear and unambiguous disapproval of violence against women. Again, this is a first step toward ending the cycle of abuse that trains far too many children in the ways of violence.

The crime bill is, by anyone's standard, the most significant attempt in years to deal with violent crime in America, but it pales in comparison to what could happen in this society, if we were better able to educate our children, if they had both fathers and mothers in their households, and if there were some credible notion of economic opportunity ahead of those Americans who struggle with poverty.

If the nation is to make lasting progress in the fight against violent crime, we must undertake a second phase of more fundamental change — change that can happen only over the long-term. Over the long-term, we must find ways to ensure that all children grow up in homes with two parents to provide the care and the guidance children need. We must make sure that all children have enough to eat, so they can concentrate on learning at school. In the end, all these things — and much more — must be done to stem the rising tide of violence that is gripping our country.

Violence is a social problem, and like all the other difficult problems (poverty, racism, homelessness), it feeds dual temptations: on the one hand, we try to ignore it as long as it doesn't immediately affect us; on the other hand, we are overwhelmed and see it as inevitable and intractable. We must resist both temptations. Today, crime affects all of us — maybe not as immediate victims but as ultimate victims, robbed of our sense of security and our peace of mind.

Nor can we afford not to respond. We must not give in to the violence in our streets. Because if we do, our children will reap the whirlwind of chaos. No society can endure, politically or economically, where violence is the rule rather than the exception.

The Future of United States Air Force Space Operations

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DIMENSION

By THOMAS S. MOORMAN, JR., *Vice Commander, United States Air Force Space Command*

Delivered before the National Security Study Section, Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, California, December 1, 1993

MOST of you, when you think about space, think about NASA. It's not surprising the public generally thinks of NASA — interplanetary, space spectaculars, astronauts, the Apollo programs — but I want to emphasize to you that there are two other space sectors in the United States. NASA represents the civil side but there is the national security side which is military intelligence and then there is the commercial space industry, a great percentage of which is right here in California.

Military space has existed since the dawn of the space age. In 1958, President Eisenhower created NASA when he signed the NASA Act. He also created the military space

program and directed the program be separate and distinct from NASA. You didn't hear a lot about the military space program because it generally was very classified and sensitive, and focused on the Cold War. We flew reconnaissance satellites for national technical means and we flew warning satellites to warn of an impending attack on the United States by the former Soviet Union. Another phenomena was that military space was generally a product of the research and development community.

Space was not mainstream in the Air Force or mainstream in the military services. Most of us in space were right here in California. The satellite builders were here,



Bureau of Justice Statistics Crime Data Brief

National Crime Victimization Survey

December 1994, NCJ-147004

Young Black Male Victims

By Lisa D. Bastian and Bruce M. Taylor
BJS Statisticians

In 1992 black males age 12 to 24 experienced violent crime at a rate significantly higher than the rates for other age or racial groups. Males age 16 to 19 were particularly at risk; their violent victimization rate was almost double the rate for white males and 3 times that for white females in the same age range.

- Among persons age 16 to 24, the rate of violent crime that black males sustained was more than 1½ times the rate for white males.
- While black males between the ages 16 and 24 comprised only about 1% of the population age 12 or over in 1992, they experienced 5% of all violent victimizations. White males 16 to 24 made up about 6% of the population and were victims in 17% of violent crimes.

Serious violent crime victimizations, 1987-92

The most serious violent crimes (rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults) comprised 60% of all violent victimizations of black males age 12 to 24 in 1987 and 65% in 1992. The proportion of these crimes against white males in the same age range remained stable at about 45%.

- During the same 6-year period, more than half of the violent crimes committed against young white males were simple assaults — crimes that involved no weapon and resulted in little or no injury. For young black males, slightly more than 1 in 3 violent crimes were simple assaults.

Weapon involvement in violent crimes, 1987-92

Black youth were more likely than white youth to be victims in crimes involving weapons. Black males age 16 to 24 were 1½ times as likely as white males to be victimized by an armed offender or offenders.


Between 1973 and 1992, the rate of violent victimizations of young black males increased about 25%. Overall, among persons age 12 to 24, there was 1 violent victimization for 10 black males in 1973 and 1 for 8 in 1992.

Black males age 20 to 24 sustained 1 violent crime for —
• 10 persons in 1973
• 8 in 1992

Black males age 16 to 19 sustained 1 violent crime for —
• 11 persons in 1973
• 6 in 1992

Black males age 12 to 15 sustained 1 violent crime for —
• 10 persons in 1973
• 14 in 1992.

Violent victimizations (rapes, robberies, and assaults)
per 1,000 black males



These data are drawn from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), an ongoing survey of U.S. residents age 12 or older.

From 1987 to 1992 the average annual rate of handgun victimization per 1,000 young black males was 3 to 4 times higher than for young white males

Age of victim	Average annual rate of crime committed with handguns (per 1,000 persons)*			
	Male victims		Female victims	
	White	Black	White	Black
12-15	3.1	14.1	2.1	4.7
16-19	9.5	39.7	3.6	13.4
20-24	9.2	29.4	3.5	9.1
25-34	4.9	12.3	2.1	9.0
35-49	2.7	8.7	1.4	3.3
50-64	1.2	3.5	0.7	1.6
65 or older	0.6	3.7	0.2	2.3

*Rates per 1,000 persons age 12 or older in each specified category of the population. Rates do not include murder or nonnegligent manslaughter committed with handguns.

- For victimizations involving a weapon, among male victims age 16 to 19, 52% of the black victims and 22% of the white victims faced a handgun. Specifically, the average rate of handgun victimizations per 1,000 black males age 16 to 19 was 39.7 from 1987 through 1992, 4 times the rate for white males.

Violent offender characteristics

In those violent victimizations when the victim could determine characteristics of the offender —

- Victim and offender were of similar ages. Persons under age 21 committed two-thirds of the victimizations of black males between 12 and 21.
- Among the victims of violence age 12 to 24, 82% of the victimizations of black males and 71% of the victimizations of white males involved an offender or offenders of the same race.

Homicides

- Even though black males age 12 to 24 represent 1.3% of the population, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) 1992 data show that they experienced 17.2% of single-victim homicides. This translates to a homicide rate of 114.9 per 100,000 black males in this age range.
- Black males age 12 to 24 were almost 14 times as likely to be homicide victims as were members of the general population. The homicide rate for older black males was 67.5 per 100,000 in 1992, 8 times that for the general population.

UCR homicide and nonnegligent manslaughter, 1992

Sex, age, and race	Population		Single-victim homicides*		Homicide rate per 100,000
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent of total	
Males, 12-24					
Black	3,234,950	1.3%	3,718	17.2%	114.9
White	18,939,790	7.4	2,220	10.3	11.7
Males, 25 or older					
Black	7,561,440	3.0%	5,103	23.6%	67.5
White	66,116,290	25.9	5,138	23.8	7.8
Other	159,229,530	62.4%	5,249	24.3%	3.3
Total	255,082,000	100 %	21,617	100 %	8.5

*96.2% of all homicides. Undetermined characteristics existed for 0.9% of victims.

Sources: NCVS, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, and Uniform Crime Reports.

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Terry Yanulavich
Mary Breslauer**NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY EXPERTS IDENTIFY STARTLING
TRENDS IN VIOLENT CRIME**

Juveniles and young adults are committing murder and violent crimes in the U.S. at higher rates than ever before, even as demographic reports show they now make up a smaller percentage of the population, a Northeastern University analysis of FBI crime statistics has revealed.

In addition, only towns with fewer than 10,000 people experienced little or no increase in violent crime between 1985 and 1991 when the homicide rate rose 24 percent and violent crime jumped by 36 percent.

Criminal homicide arrest rates for adult and juvenile males rose by as much as 217 percent for 15-year-olds. The phenomenon is widespread geographically, according to the analysis conducted by Center for Applied Social Research Director Glenn Pierce and Criminal Justice Dean James Fox.

"This rise is alarming because the most violence prone portion of the population, 18-to-24 year-olds, declined during the 80s," said Pierce. Between 1980 and 1991, the percentage of 18-to-24 year-olds dropped from 13.2 percent of all residents to 10.4 percent.

"We had expected to see a decrease in violent crime as the numbers dropped, but the age dividend never materialized," he added. "It appears that fewer teenagers and young adults are accounting for a greater proportion of crime and the perpetrators are younger. Sixteen-to 20-year-olds are committing murder at a much higher rate."

Pierce and Fox found that during the first half of the 1980's arrests for criminal homicide declined for all age groups to a 15-year low with the trend completely reversing for young adult and juvenile males after 1985. During the decade, the number of prison inmates rose to an historic high of 823,000, a 67 percent increase.

-More-

News

"Clearly we have become a more violent society," said Fox. "The recent wave of youth violence cannot be explained away as a function of demographic shifts or changes in criminal justice policy. Compared with their parents when they were teenagers, the new youth generation has more dangerous drugs in their bodies, more deadly weapons in their hands and are being socialized into a culture having a far more casual attitude toward violence."

-30-

**** PLEASE SEE ATTACHED DETAILED ANALYSIS COMPLETE WITH TABLES AND GRAPHS.**

Recent Trends in Violent Crime: A Closer Look

prepared by:

Glenn L. Pierce, Ph.D.
Director, Center for Applied Social Research

and

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Dean, College of Criminal Justice

October 1992
National Crime Analysis Program
Northeastern University

The nation has experienced a dramatic and pervasive increase in juvenile homicide, despite the fact that demographic shifts would have predicted a decline. This recent upsurge in youth violence is largely responsible for a 24 percent increase in the U.S. homicide rate since 1985 (see Table 1). Along with the upswing in criminal homicide, overall crimes of violence have also increased by 36 percent since 1985.¹ Importantly, these figures reversed a downward trend in violent crime that occurred during the first part of the 1980s.

The increase in violent crime over the last six years has been fairly pervasive. As Table 2 shows, all groups of cities and towns with populations above 25,000 (comprising nearly half of the U.S. population) experienced increases in criminal homicide. Only in cities and towns with populations fewer than 10,000 or in unincorporated rural and suburban areas (not shown in Table 2) was there little or no increase in criminal homicide between 1985 and 1991. Of the nation's 25 largest cities individually--cities with 500,000 or more people, nineteen experienced increased levels of homicide between 1985 through 1991.

These statistics are especially disturbing for two reasons. First, the historically most violence-prone segment of the population, 18 through 24 year-olds, has been declining as a percentage of the population since the early 1980s (see Figure 1). Indeed, between 1980 and 1991, the percentage of the population 18 to 24 declined

¹ While some of the increase in the overall violent crime rate (which consists of homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) may reflect improved crime reporting by police and citizens, the changes in criminal homicide primarily reflect genuine change in violent criminal behavior. Because of the relative high reliability of homicide data we will focus on criminal homicide as the primary indicator in the remainder of this report.

from 13.2 percent of all residents to 10.4 percent. All other things being equal, we would expect (and did expect) violent crime to decrease as a result of the diminishing size of this violence-prone age group. Obviously, all other factors are not equal. Whatever ameliorating benefits in terms of crime rates that have come from an aging population have been completely overshadowed by economic, social and cultural changes in our country.

Second, in addition to demographic shifts, the nation has experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of persons in prison. Between 1980 and 1991, the number of inmates in state prisons increased from 493,000 to 823,000, an historic high. Clearly, factors other than demographics and criminal justice policy are having a dramatic effect on violence in the United States.

A recent FBI crime report, *Crime in the United States--1991*, indicated that between 1980 and 1990 the juvenile violent crime arrest rate (arrests for youths 10 to 17) was 27 percent higher in 1990 than in 1980. While this represents a dramatic and disconcerting trend for the nation's youth, a more detailed analysis of age-group arrest rates for homicide reveals an even more disturbing picture. The age-group specific arrest rates for males (females have very low rates throughout this period) shown in Table 3 for the period 1980 through 1991 reveal two major features. First, between 1980 and 1985, arrest rates for criminal homicide actually declined for all age groups. Second, the trend changed markedly among young adult and juvenile males after 1985. Specifically, between 1985 and 1991, arrest rates for criminal homicide increased among 13-14 year-old males by 140 percent, among 15 year-old

males by 217 percent, among 16 year-old males by 158 percent, among 17 year-old males by 121 percent, and among 18 year-old males by 113 percent. During this same time period the percentage of murders resolved by the arrest of a suspect declined, suggesting that these increases may even be considered somewhat conservative.

Figure 1
Criminal Homicide Rate per 100,000
and Percentage of Population 18-24




Figure 2
Arrest Rates for Criminal Homicides
per 100,000 Males within Selected Age Groups




Figure 3
Arrest Rates for Criminal Homicides
per 100,000 Male Youths 16 & Under within Selected Age Groups




Table I

**Annual Trends in Violent Crime and Criminal Homicide for the
United States from 1970 to 1991**

Rate per 100,000 inhabitants	Violent crime	Murder and non- negligent manslaughter
1970	363.5	7.9
1971	396.0	8.6
1972	401.0	9.0
1973	417.4	9.4
1974	461.1	9.8
1975	487.8	9.6
1976	467.8	8.8
1977	475.9	8.8
1978	497.8	9.0
1979	548.9	9.7
1980	596.6	10.2
1981	594.3	9.8
1982	571.1	9.1
1983	537.7	8.3
1984	539.2	7.9
1985	556.6	7.9
1986	617.7	8.6
1987	609.7	8.3
1988	637.2	8.4
1989	663.1	8.7
1990	731.8	9.4
1991	758.1	9.8

Table 2

**Trends in Criminal Homicide Rates Across Population Groups Between
1985 and 1991**

<u>Population Group</u>	<u>Criminal Homicide per 100,000</u>		
	1985	1991	% change
United States Total for Cities and Towns	9.2	12.7	38.0
Cities with population 250,000 and over	19.0	26.7	40.5
Cities with population 100,000 to 249,999	10.2	12.5	22.5
Cities with population 50,000 to 99,999	5.9	8.1	37.3
Cities with population 25,000 to 49,999	4.7	5.5	40.4
Cities with population 10,000 to 24,999	3.7	4.1	10.8
Cities with population under 10,000	3.5	3.6	2.8

Table 3
Arrest Rates for Criminal Homicide per 100,000 Males
within Selected Age Groups

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1991	% Change 85 - 91
12 & Under	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	100 %
13 - 14	4.2	3.6	4.4	4.0	8.8	9.6	140 %
15	17.2	14.9	13.5	11.8	31.0	37.4	217 %
16	26.8	24.9	24.6	22.4	56.5	57.7	158 %
17	32.9	29.2	38.2	34.5	72.4	76.1	121 %
18 - 20	44.5	43.4	46.4	41.8	73.5	89.0	113 %
21 - 24	45.6	45.4	44.3	39.0	49.4	54.7	40 %
25 - 29	36.1	36.9	34.4	30.4	31.4	31.2	3 %
30 - 34	27.7	26.5	28.0	22.3	21.2	21.5	- 4 %
35 - 44	19.5	19.5	19.4	15.4	13.9	12.9	- 16 %
45 - 54	11.8	9.6	9.8	8.5	7.7	7.1	- 16 %
55 - 64	7.1	6.0	5.4	4.9	3.8	3.3	- 33 %
65 & Over	3.5	3.2	2.5	2.1	1.7	1.6	- 24 %

What To Do About Crime

James Q. Wilson

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Jose
Jonathan Prince
+ return to me
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Few of the major problems facing American society today are entirely new, but in recent years most of them have either taken new forms or reached new levels of urgency. To make matters more difficult, in many cases the solutions formerly relied upon have proved to be ineffective, leaving us so frustrated that we seize desperately on proposals which promise much but deliver little.

In the hope of bringing greater clarity to the understanding of these problems, and of framing workable solutions and policies, we are inaugurating this new series of articles. Like James Q. Wilson's below, each subsequent piece in the series will begin with a reexamination of a particular issue by a writer who has lived with and studied it for a long time and who will then proceed to suggest "What To Do About" it. Among those already scheduled for publication in the coming months are Charles Murray and Richard J. Herrnstein on welfare; Gertrude Himmelfarb on the universities; William J. Bennett on our children; Robert H. Bork on the First Amendment; and Richard Pipes on Russia.

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WHEN the United States experienced the great increase in crime that began in the early 1960's and continued through the 1970's, most Americans were inclined to attribute it to conditions unique to this country. Many conservatives blamed it on judicial restraints on the police, the abandonment of capital punishment, and the molycoddling of offenders; many liberals blamed it on poverty, racism, and the rise of violent television programs. Europeans, to the extent they noticed at all, referred to it, sadly or patronizingly, as the "American" problem, a product of our disorderly society, weak state, corrupt police, or imperfect welfare system.

Now, 30 years later, any serious discussion of crime must begin with the fact that, except for homicide, most industrialized nations have crime rates that resemble those in the United States. All the world is coming to look like America. In 1981, the burglary rate in Great Britain was much less than that in the United States; within six years the two rates were the same; today, British homes are more likely to be burgled than American ones. In 1980, the rate at which automobiles were stolen was lower in France than in the United States; today, the reverse is true. By 1984, the burglary rate in the Netherlands was nearly twice that in the United States. In Australia and Sweden certain forms of theft are more common than they are here. While property-crime rates were

declining during most of the 1980's in the United States, they were rising elsewhere.¹

America, it is true, continues to lead the industrialized world in murders. There can be little doubt that part of this lead is to be explained by the greater availability of handguns here. Arguments that once might have been settled with insults or punches are today more likely to be settled by shootings. But guns are not the whole story. Big American cities have had more homicides than comparable European ones for almost as long as anyone can find records. New York and Philadelphia have been more murderous than London since the early part of the 19th century. This country has had a violent history; with respect to murder, that seems likely to remain the case.

But except for homicide, things have been getting better in the United States for over a decade. Since 1980, robbery rates (as reported in victim surveys) have declined by 15 percent. And even with regard to homicide, there is relatively good news: in 1990, the rate at which adults killed one another was no higher than it was in 1980, and in many cities it was considerably lower.

This is as it was supposed to be. Starting

¹ These comparisons depend on official police statistics. There are of course errors in such data. But essentially the same pattern emerges from comparing nations on the basis of victimization surveys.

around 1980, two things happened that ought to have reduced most forms of crime. The first was the passing into middle age of the postwar baby boom. By 1990, there were 1.5 million fewer boys between the ages of fifteen and nineteen than there had been in 1980, a drop that meant that this youthful fraction of the population fell from 9.3 percent to 7.2 percent of the total.

In addition, the great increase in the size of the prison population, caused in part by the growing willingness of judges to send offenders to jail, meant that the dramatic reductions in the costs of crime to the criminal that occurred in the 1960's and 1970's were slowly (and very partially) being reversed. Until around 1985, this reversal involved almost exclusively real criminals and parole violators; it was not until after 1985 that more than a small part of the growth in prison populations was made up of drug offenders.

Because of the combined effect of fewer young people on the street and more offenders in prison, many scholars, myself included, predicted a continuing drop in crime rates throughout the 1980's and into the early 1990's. We were almost right: crime rates did decline. But suddenly, starting around 1985, even as adult homicide rates were remaining stable or dropping, *youthful* homicide rates shot up.

Alfred Blumstein of Carnegie-Mellon University has estimated that the rate at which young males, ages fourteen to seventeen, kill people has gone up significantly for whites and incredibly for blacks. Between 1985 and 1992, the homicide rate for young white males went up by about 50 percent but for young black males it *tripled*.

The public perception that today's crime problem is different from and more serious than that of earlier decades is thus quite correct. Youngsters are shooting at people at a far higher rate than at any time in recent history. Since young people are more likely than adults to kill strangers (as opposed to lovers or spouses), the risk to innocent bystanders has gone up. There may be some comfort to be had in the fact that youthful homicides are only a small fraction of all killings, but given their randomness, it is not much solace.

THE United States, then, does not have a crime problem, it has at least two. Our high (though now slightly declining) rates of property crime reflect a profound, worldwide cultural change: prosperity, freedom, and mobility have emancipated people almost everywhere from those ancient bonds of custom, family, and village that once held in check both some of our better and many of our worst impulses. The power of the state has been weakened, the status of children elevated, and the opportunity for adventure expanded; as a consequence, we have experienced an explosion of artistic creativity, entrepreneurial zeal, political experimentation—and criminal activity. A global economy has inte-

grated the markets for clothes, music, automobiles—and drugs.

There are only two restraints on behavior—morality, enforced by individual conscience or social rebuke, and law, enforced by the police and the courts. If society is to maintain a behavioral equilibrium, any decline in the former must be matched by a rise in the latter (or vice versa). If familial and traditional restraints on wrongful behavior are eroded, it becomes necessary to increase the legal restraints. But the enlarged spirit of freedom and the heightened suspicion of the state have made it difficult or impossible to use the criminal-justice system to achieve what custom and morality once produced.

This is the modern dilemma, and it may be an insoluble one, at least for the West. The Islamic cultures of the Middle East and the Confucian cultures of the Far East believe that they have a solution. It involves allowing enough liberty for economic progress (albeit under general state direction) while reserving to the state, and its allied religion, nearly unfettered power over personal conduct. It is too soon to tell whether this formula—best exemplified by the prosperous but puritanical city-state of Singapore—will, in the long run, be able to achieve both reproducible affluence and intense social control.

Our other crime problem has to do with the kind of felonies we have: high levels of violence, especially youthful violence, often occurring as part of urban gang life, produced disproportionately by a large, alienated, and self-destructive underclass. This part of the crime problem, though not uniquely American, is more important here than in any other industrialized nation. Britons, Germans, and Swedes are upset about the insecurity of their property and uncertain about what response to make to its theft, but if Americans only had to worry about their homes being burgled and their autos stolen, I doubt that crime would be the national obsession it has now become.

Crime, we should recall, was not a major issue in the 1984 presidential election and had only begun to be one in the 1988 contest; by 1992, it was challenging the economy as a popular concern and today it dominates all other matters. The reason, I think, is that Americans believe something fundamental has changed in our patterns of crime. They are right. Though we were unhappy about having our property put at risk, we adapted with the aid of locks, alarms, and security guards. But we are terrified by the prospect of innocent people being gunned down at random, without warning and almost without motive, by youngsters who afterward show us the blank, unremorseful faces of seemingly feral, presocial beings.

CRIMINOLOGY has learned a great deal about who these people are. In studies both here and abroad it has been estab-

lished that about 6 percent of the boys of a given age will commit half or more of all the serious crime produced by all boys of that age. Allowing for measurement errors, it is remarkable how consistent this formula is—6 percent causes 50 percent. It is roughly true in places as different as Philadelphia, London, Copenhagen, and Orange County, California.

We also have learned a lot about the characteristics of the 6 percent. They tend to have criminal parents, to live in cold or discordant families (or pseudo-families), to have a low verbal-intelligence quotient and to do poorly in school, to be emotionally cold and temperamentally impulsive, to abuse alcohol and drugs at the earliest opportunity, and to reside in poor, disorderly communities. They begin their misconduct at an early age, often by the time they are in the third grade.

These characteristics tend to be found not only among the criminals who get caught (and who might, owing to bad luck, be an unrepresentative sample of all high-rate offenders), but among those who do not get caught but reveal their behavior on questionnaires. And the same traits can be identified in advance among groups of randomly selected youngsters, long before they commit any serious crimes—not with enough precision to predict which individuals will commit crimes, but with enough accuracy to be a fair depiction of the group as a whole.²

Here a puzzle arises: if 6 percent of the males causes so large a fraction of our collective misery, and if young males are less numerous than once was the case, why are crime rates high and rising? The answer, I conjecture, is that the traits of the 6 percent put them at high risk for whatever criminogenic forces operate in society. As the costs of crime decline or the benefits increase; as drugs and guns become more available; as the glorification of violence becomes more commonplace; as families and neighborhoods lose some of their restraining power—as all these things happen, almost all of us will change our ways to some degree. For the most law-abiding among us, the change will be quite modest: a few more tools stolen from our employer, a few more traffic lights run when no police officer is watching, a few more experiments with fashionable drugs, and a few more business deals on which we cheat. But for the least law-abiding among us, the change will be dramatic: they will get drunk daily instead of just on Saturday night, try PCP or crack instead of marijuana, join gangs instead of marauding in pairs, and buy automatic weapons instead of making zip guns.

A metaphor: when children play the schoolyard game of crack-the-whip, the child at the head of the line scarcely moves but the child at the far end, racing to keep his footing, often stumbles and falls, hurled to the ground by the cumulative force of many smaller movements back along the line. When a changing culture escalates criminality, the at-risk boys are at the end of the line, and

the conditions of American urban life—guns, drugs, automobiles, disorganized neighborhoods—make the line very long and the ground underfoot rough and treacherous.

MUCH is said these days about preventing or deterring crime, but it is important to understand exactly what we are up against when we try. Prevention, if it can be made to work at all, must start very early in life, perhaps as early as the first two or three years, and given the odds it faces—childhood impulsivity, low verbal facility, incompetent parenting, disorderly neighborhoods—it must also be massive in scope. Deterrence, if it can be made to work better (for surely it already works to some degree), must be applied close to the moment of the wrongful act or else the present-orientedness of the youthful would-be offender will discount the threat so much that the promise of even a small gain will outweigh its large but deferred costs.

In this country, however, and in most Western nations, we have profound misgivings about doing anything that would give prevention or deterrence a chance to make a large difference. The family is sacrosanct; the family-preservation movement is strong; the state is a clumsy alternative. "Crime-prevention" programs, therefore, usually take the form of creating summer jobs for adolescents, worrying about the unemployment rate, or (as in the proposed 1994 crime bill) funding midnight basketball leagues. There may be something to be said for all these efforts, but crime prevention is not one of them. The typical high-rate offender is well launched on his career before he becomes a teenager or has ever encountered the labor market; he may like basketball, but who pays for the lights and the ball is a matter of supreme indifference to him.

Prompt deterrence has much to recommend it: the folk wisdom that swift and certain punishment is more effective than severe penalties is almost surely correct. But the greater the swiftness and certainty, the less attention paid to the procedural safeguards essential to establishing guilt. As a result, despite their good instincts for the right answers, most Americans, frustrated by the restraints (many wise, some foolish) on swiftness and certainty, vote for proposals to increase severity: if the penalty is 10 years, let us make it 20 or 30; if the penalty is life imprisonment, let us make it death; if the penalty is jail, let us make it caning.

Yet the more draconian the sentence, the less (on the average) the chance of its being imposed; plea bargains see to that. And the most draconian sentences will, of necessity, tend to fall on adult offenders nearing the end of their criminal careers and not on the young ones who are in their

² Female high-rate offenders are *much* less common than male ones. But to the extent they exist, they display most of these traits.

criminally most productive years. (The peak ages of criminality are between sixteen and eighteen; the average age of prison inmates is ten years older.) I say "of necessity" because almost every judge will give first-, second-, or even third-time offenders a break, reserving the heaviest sentences for those men who have finally exhausted judicial patience or optimism.

Laws that say "three strikes and you're out" are an effort to change this, but they suffer from an inherent contradiction. If they are carefully drawn so as to target only the most serious offenders, they will probably have a minimal impact on the crime rate; but if they are broadly drawn so as to make a big impact on the crime rate, they will catch many petty repeat offenders who few of us think really deserve life imprisonment.

Prevention and deterrence, albeit hard to augment, at least are plausible strategies. Not so with many of the other favorite nostrums, like reducing the amount of violence on television. Televised violence may have some impact on criminality, but I know of few scholars who think the effect is very large. And to achieve even a small difference we might have to turn the clock back to the kind of programming we had around 1945, because the few studies that correlate programming with the rise in violent crime find the biggest changes occurred between that year and 1974. Another favorite, boot camp, makes good copy, but so far no one has shown that it reduces the rate at which the former inmates commit crimes.

Then, of course, there is gun control. Guns are almost certainly contributors to the lethality of American violence, but there is no politically or legally feasible way to reduce the stock of guns now in private possession to the point where their availability to criminals would be much affected. And even if there were, law-abiding people would lose a means of protecting themselves long before criminals lost a means of attacking them.

As for rehabilitating juvenile offenders, it has some merit, but there are rather few success stories. Individually, the best (and best-evaluated) programs have minimal, if any, effects; collectively, the best estimate of the crime-reduction value of these programs is quite modest, something on the order of 5 or 10 percent.³

WHAT, then, is to be done? Let us begin with policing, since law-enforcement officers are that part of the criminal-justice system which is closest to the situations where criminal activity is likely to occur.

It is now widely accepted that, however important it is for officers to drive around waiting for 911 calls summoning their help, doing that is not enough. As a supplement to such a reactive strategy—comprised of random preventive patrol and the investigation of crimes that have already occurred—many leaders and students of law enforcement now urge the police to be "proactive":

to identify, with the aid of citizen groups, problems that can be solved so as to prevent criminality, and not only to respond to it. This is often called community-based policing; it seems to entail something more than feel-good meetings with honest citizens, but something less than allowing neighborhoods to assume control of the police function.

The new strategy might better be called problem-oriented policing. It requires the police to engage in *directed*, not random, patrol. The goal of that direction should be to reduce, in a manner consistent with fundamental liberties, the opportunity for high-risk persons to do those things that increase the likelihood of their victimizing others.

For example, the police might stop and pat down persons whom they reasonably suspect may be carrying illegal guns.⁴ The Supreme Court has upheld such frisks when an officer observes "unusual conduct" leading him to conclude that "criminal activity may be afoot" on the part of a person who may be "armed and dangerous." This is all rather vague, but it can be clarified in two ways.

First, statutes can be enacted that make certain persons, on the basis of their past conduct and present legal status, subject to pat-downs for weapons. The statutes can, as is now the case in several states, make all probationers and parolees subject to nonconsensual searches for weapons as a condition of their remaining on probation or parole. Since three-fourths of all convicted offenders (and a large fraction of all felons) are in the community rather than in prison, there are on any given day over three million criminals on the streets under correctional supervision. Many are likely to become recidivists. Keeping them from carrying weapons will materially reduce the chances that they will rob or kill. The courts might also declare certain dangerous street gangs to be continuing criminal enterprises, membership in which constitutes grounds for police frisks.

Second, since I first proposed such a strategy, I have learned that there are efforts under way in public and private research laboratories to develop technologies that will permit the police to detect from a distance persons who are carrying concealed weapons on the streets. Should these efforts bear fruit, they will provide the police with the grounds for stopping, questioning, and patting down even persons not on probation or parole or obviously in gangs.

Whether or not the technology works, the po-

³ Many individual programs involve so few subjects that a good evaluation will reveal no positive effect even if one occurs. By a technique called meta-analysis, scores of individual studies can be pooled into one mega-evaluation; because there are now hundreds or thousands of subjects, even small gains can be identified. The best of these meta-analyses, such as the one by Mark Lipsey, suggest modest positive effects.

⁴ I made a fuller argument along these lines in "Just Take Away Their Guns," in the *New York Times Magazine*, March 20, 1994.

lice can also offer immediate cash rewards to people who provide information about individuals illegally carrying weapons. Spending \$100 on each good tip will have a bigger impact on dangerous gun use than will the same amount spent on another popular nostrum—buying back guns from law-abiding people.⁵

Getting illegal firearms off the streets will require that the police be motivated to do all of these things. But if the legal, technological, and motivational issues can be resolved, our streets can be made safer even without sending many more people to prison.

THE same directed-patrol strategy might help keep known offenders drug-free. Most persons jailed in big cities are found to have been using illegal drugs within the day or two preceding their arrest. When convicted, some are given probation on condition that they enter drug-treatment programs; others are sent to prisons where (if they are lucky) drug-treatment programs operate. But in many cities the enforcement of such probation conditions is casual or nonexistent; in many states, parolees are released back into drug-infested communities with little effort to ensure that they participate in whatever treatment programs are to be found there.

Almost everyone agrees that more treatment programs should exist. But what many advocates overlook is that the key to success is steadfast participation and many, probably most, offenders have no incentive to be steadfast. To cope with this, patrol officers could enforce random drug tests on probationers and parolees on their beats; failing to take a test when ordered, or failing the test when taken, should be grounds for immediate revocation of probation or parole, at least for a brief period of confinement.

The goal of this tactic is not simply to keep offenders drug-free (and thereby lessen their incentive to steal the money needed to buy drugs and reduce their likelihood of committing crimes because they are on a drug high); it is also to diminish the demand for drugs generally and thus the size of the drug market.

Lest the reader embrace this idea too quickly, let me add that as yet we have no good reason to think that it will reduce the crime rate by very much. Something akin to this strategy, albeit one using probation instead of police officers, has been tried under the name of "intensive-supervision programs" (ISP), involving a panoply of drug tests, house arrests, frequent surveillance, and careful records. By means of a set of randomized experiments carried out in fourteen cities, Joan Petersilia and Susan Turner, both then at RAND, compared the rearrest rates of offenders assigned to ISP with those of offenders in ordinary probation. There was no difference.

Still, this study does not settle the matter. For one thing, since the ISP participants were under

much closer surveillance than the regular probationers, the former were bound to be caught breaking the law more frequently than the latter. It is thus possible that a higher fraction of the crimes committed by the ISP than of the control group were detected and resulted in a return to prison, which would mean, if true, a net gain in public safety. For another thing, "intensive" supervision was in many cases not all that intensive—in five cities, contacts with the probationers only took place about once a week, and for all cities drug tests occurred, on average, about once a month. Finally, there is some indication that participation in treatment programs was associated with lower recidivism rates.

Both anti-gun and anti-drug police patrols will, if performed systematically, require big changes in police and court procedures and a significant increase in the resources devoted to both, at least in the short run. (ISP is not cheap, and it will become even more expensive if it is done in a truly intensive fashion.) Most officers have at present no incentive to search for guns or enforce drug tests; many jurisdictions, owing to crowded dockets or overcrowded jails, are lax about enforcing the conditions of probation or parole. The result is that the one group of high-risk people over which society already has the legal right to exercise substantial control is often out of control, "supervised," if at all, by means of brief monthly interviews with overworked probation or parole officers.

Another promising tactic is to enforce truancy and curfew laws. This arises from the fact that much crime is opportunistic: idle boys, usually in small groups, sometimes find irresistible the opportunity to steal or the challenge to fight. Detering present-oriented youngsters who want to appear fearless in the eyes of their comrades while indulging their thrill-seeking natures is a tall order. While it is possible to deter the crimes they commit by a credible threat of prompt sanctions, it is easier to reduce the chances for risky group idleness in the first place.

In Charleston, South Carolina, for example, Chief Reuben Greenberg instructed his officers to return all school-age children to the schools from which they were truant and to return all youngsters violating an evening-curfew agreement to their parents. As a result, groups of school-age children were no longer to be found hanging out in the shopping malls or wandering the streets late at night.

There has been no careful evaluation of these efforts in Charleston (or, so far as I am aware, in any other big city), but the rough figures are impressive—the Charleston crime rate in 1991 was about 25 percent lower than the rate in

⁵ In Charleston, South Carolina, the police pay a reward to anyone identifying a student carrying a weapon to school or to some school event. Because many boys carry guns to school in order to display or brag about them, the motive to carry disappears once any display alerts a potential informer.

South Carolina's other principal cities and, for most offenses (including burglaries and larcenies), lower than what that city reported twenty years earlier.

All these tactics have in common putting the police, as the criminologist Lawrence Sherman of the University of Maryland phrases it, where the "hot spots" are. Most people need no police attention except for a response to their calls for help. A small fraction of people (and places) need constant attention. Thus, in Minneapolis, *all* of the robberies during one year occurred at just 2 percent of the city's addresses. To capitalize on this fact, the Minneapolis police began devoting extra patrol attention, in brief but frequent bursts of activity, to those locations known to be trouble spots. Robbery rates evidently fell by as much as 20 percent and public disturbances by even more.

Some of the worst hot spots are outdoor drug markets. Because of either limited resources, a fear of potential corruption, or a desire to catch only the drug kingpins, the police in some cities (including, from time to time, New York) neglect street-corner dealing. By doing so, they get the worst of all worlds.

The public, seeing the police ignore drug dealing that is in plain view, assumes that they are corrupt whether or not they are. The drug kingpins, who are hard to catch and are easily replaced by rival smugglers, find that their essential retail distribution system remains intact. Casual or first-time drug users, who might not use at all if access to supplies were difficult, find access to be effortless and so increase their consumption. People who might remain in treatment programs if drugs were hard to get drop out upon learning that they are easy to get. Interdicting without merely displacing drug markets is difficult but not impossible, though it requires motivation which some departments lack and resources which many do not have.

The sheer number of police on the streets of a city probably has only a weak, if any, relationship with the crime rate; what the police do is more important than how many there are, at least above some minimum level. Nevertheless, patrols directed at hot spots, loitering truants, late-night wanderers, probationers, parolees, and possible gun carriers, all in addition to routine investigative activities, will require more officers in many cities. Between 1977 and 1987, the number of police officers declined in a third of the 50 largest cities and fell relative to population in many more. Just how far behind police resources have lagged can be gauged from this fact: in 1950 there was one violent crime reported for every police officer; in 1980 there were three violent crimes reported for every officer.

I HAVE said little so far about penal policy, in part because I wish to focus attention on those things that are likely to have

the largest and most immediate impact on the quality of urban life. But given the vast gulf between what the public believes and what many experts argue should be our penal policy, a few comments are essential.

The public wants more people sent away for longer sentences; many (probably most) criminologists think we use prison too much and at too great a cost and that this excessive use has had little beneficial effect on the crime rate. My views are much closer to those of the public, though I think the average person exaggerates the faults of the present system and the gains of some alternative (such as "three strikes and you're out").

The expert view, as it is expressed in countless op-ed essays, often goes like this: "We have been arresting more and more people and giving them longer and longer sentences, producing no decrease in crime but huge increases in prison populations. As a result, we have become the most punitive nation on earth."

Scarcely a phrase in those sentences is accurate. The probability of being arrested for a given crime is lower today than it was in 1974. The amount of time served in state prison has been declining more or less steadily since the 1940's. Taking all crimes together, time served fell from 25 months in 1945 to 13 months in 1984. Only for rape are prisoners serving as much time today as they did in the 40's.

The net effect of lower arrest rates and shorter effective sentences is that the cost to the adult perpetrator of the average burglary fell from 50 days in 1960 to 15 days in 1980. That is to say, the chances of being caught and convicted, multiplied by the median time served if imprisoned, was in 1980 less than a third of what it had been in 1960.⁶

Beginning around 1980, the costs of crime to the criminal began to inch up again—the result, chiefly, of an increase in the proportion of convicted persons who were given prison terms. By 1986, the "price" of a given burglary had risen to 21 days. Also beginning around 1980, as I noted at the outset, the crime rate began to decline.

It would be foolhardy to explain this drop in crime by the rise in imprisonment rates; many other factors, such as the aging of the population and the self-protective measures of potential victims, were also at work. Only a controlled experiment (for example, randomly allocating prison terms for a given crime among the states) could hope to untangle the causal patterns, and happily the Constitution makes such experiments unlikely.

Yet it is worth noting that nations with different penal policies have experienced different

⁶ I take these cost calculations from Mark Kleiman, et al., "Imprisonment-to-Offense Ratios," Working Paper 89-06-02 of the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (August 5, 1988).

crime rates. According to David Farrington of Cambridge University, property-crime rates rose in England and Sweden at a time when both the imprisonment rate and time served fell substantially, while property-crime rates declined in the United States at a time when the imprisonment rate (but not time served) was increasing.

Though one cannot measure the effect of prison on crime with any accuracy, it certainly has some effects. By 1986, there were 55,000 more robbers in prison than there had been in 1974. Assume that each imprisoned robber would commit five such offenses per year if free on the street. This means that in 1986 there were 275,000 fewer robberies in America than there would have been had these 55,000 men been left on the street.

Nor, finally, does America use prison to a degree that vastly exceeds what is found in any other civilized nation. Compare the chance of going to prison in England and the United States if one is convicted of a given crime. According to Farrington, your chances were higher in England if you were found guilty of a rape, higher in America if you were convicted of an assault or a burglary, and about the same if you were convicted of a homicide or a robbery. Once in prison, you would serve a longer time in this country than in England for almost all offenses save murder.

James Lynch of American University has reached similar conclusions from his comparative study of criminal-justice policies. His data show that the chances of going to prison and the time served for homicide and robbery are roughly the same in the United States, Canada, and England.

OF LATE, drugs have changed American penal practice. In 1982, only about 8 percent of state-prison inmates were serving time on drug convictions. In 1987, that started to increase sharply; by 1994, over 60 percent of all federal and about 25 percent of all state prisoners were there on drug charges. In some states, such as New York, the percentage was even higher.

This change can be attributed largely to the advent of crack cocaine. Whereas snorted cocaine powder was expensive, crack was cheap; whereas the former was distributed through networks catering to elite tastes, the latter was mass-marketed on street corners. People were rightly fearful of what crack was doing to their children and demanded action; as a result, crack dealers started going to prison in record numbers.

Unfortunately, these penalties do not have the same incapacitative effect as sentences for robbery. A robber taken off the street is not replaced by a new robber who has suddenly found a market niche, but a drug dealer sent away is replaced by a new one because an opportunity has opened up.

We are left, then, with the problem of reducing the demand for drugs, and that in turn requires either prevention programs on a scale heretofore unimagined or treatment programs with a level of effectiveness heretofore unachieved. Any big gains in prevention and treatment will probably have to await further basic research into the biochemistry of addiction and the development of effective and attractive drug antagonists that reduce the appeal of cocaine and similar substances.⁷

In the meantime, it is necessary either to build much more prison space, find some other way of disciplining drug offenders, or both. There is very little to be gained, I think, from shortening the terms of existing non-drug inmates in order to free up more prison space. Except for a few elderly, nonviolent offenders serving very long terms, there are real risks associated with shortening the terms of the typical inmate.

Scholars disagree about the magnitude of those risks, but the best studies, such as the one of Wisconsin inmates done by John DiIulio of Princeton, suggest that the annual costs to society in crime committed by an offender on the street are probably twice the costs of putting him in a cell. That ratio will vary from state to state because states differ in what proportion of convicted persons is imprisoned—some states dip deeper down into the pool of convictees, thereby imprisoning some with minor criminal habits.

But I caution the reader to understand that there are no easy prison solutions to crime, even if we build the additional space. The state-prison population more than doubled between 1980 and 1990, yet the victimization rate for robbery fell by only 23 percent. Even if we assign all of that gain to the increased deterrent and incapacitative effect of prison, which is implausible, the improvement is not vast. Of course, it is possible that the victimization rate would have risen, perhaps by a large amount, instead of falling if we had not increased the number of inmates. But we shall never know.

Recall my discussion of the decline in the costs of crime to the criminal, measured by the number of days in prison that result, on average, from the commission of a given crime. That cost is vastly lower today than in the 1950's. But much of the decline (and since 1974, nearly all of it) is the result of a drop in the probability of being arrested for a crime, not in the probability of being imprisoned once arrested.

Anyone who has followed my writings on crime knows that I have defended the use of prison both to deter crime and incapacitate criminals. I continue to defend it. But we must recognize two facts. First, even modest additional reductions in

⁷ I anticipate that at this point some readers will call for legalizing or decriminalizing drugs as the "solution" to the problem. Before telling me this, I hope they will read what I wrote on that subject in the February 1990 issue of COMMENTARY. I have not changed my mind.

crime, comparable to the ones achieved in the early 1980's, will require vast increases in correctional costs and encounter bitter judicial resistance to mandatory sentencing laws. Second, America's most troubling crime problem—the increasingly violent behavior of disaffected and impulsive youth—may be especially hard to control by means of marginal and delayed increases in the probability of punishment.

Possibly one can make larger gains by turning our attention to the unexplored area of juvenile justice. Juvenile (or family) courts deal with young people just starting their criminal careers and with chronic offenders when they are often at their peak years of offending. We know rather little about how these courts work or with what effect. There are few, if any, careful studies of what happens, a result in part of scholarly neglect and in part of the practice in some states of shrouding juvenile records and proceedings in secrecy. Some studies, such as one by the *Los Angeles Times* of juvenile justice in California, suggest that young people found guilty of a serious crime are given sentences tougher than those meted out to adults.⁸ This finding is so counter to popular beliefs and the testimony of many big-city juvenile-court judges that some caution is required in interpreting it.

There are two problems. The first lies in defining the universe of people to whom sanctions are applied. In some states, such as California, it may well be the case that a juvenile *found guilty of a serious offense* is punished with greater rigor than an adult, but many juveniles whose behavior ought to be taken seriously (because they show signs of being part of the 6 percent) are released by the police or probation officers before ever seeing a judge. And in some states, such as New York, juveniles charged with having committed certain crimes, including serious ones like illegally carrying a loaded gun or committing an assault, may not be fingerprinted. Since persons with a prior record are usually given longer sentences than those without one, the failure to fingerprint can mean that the court has no way of knowing whether the John Smith standing before it is the same John Smith who was arrested four times for assault and so ought to be sent away, or a different John Smith whose clean record entitles him to probation.

The second problem arises from the definition of a "severe" penalty. In California, a juvenile found guilty of murder does indeed serve a longer sentence than an adult convicted of the same offense—60 months for the former, 41 months for the latter. Many people will be puzzled by a newspaper account that defines five years in prison for murder as a "severe" sentence, and angered to learn that an adult serves less than four years for such a crime.

The key, unanswered question is whether prompt and more effective early intervention would stop high-rate delinquents from becoming

high-rate criminals at a time when their offenses were not yet too serious. Perhaps early and swift, though not necessarily severe, sanctions could deter some budding hoodlums, but we have no evidence of that as yet.

FOR as long as I can remember, the debate over crime has been between those who wished to rely on the criminal-justice system and those who wished to attack the root causes of crime. I have always been in the former group because what its opponents depicted as "root causes"—unemployment, racism, poor housing, too little schooling, a lack of self-esteem—turned out, on close examination, not to be major causes of crime at all.

Of late, however, there has been a shift in the debate. Increasingly those who want to attack root causes have begun to point to real ones—temperament, early family experiences, and neighborhood effects. The sketch I gave earlier of the typical high-rate young offender suggests that these factors are indeed at the root of crime. The problem now is to decide whether any can be changed by plan and at an acceptable price in money and personal freedom.

If we are to do this, we must confront the fact that the critical years of a child's life are ages one to ten, with perhaps the most important being the earliest years. During those years, some children are put gravely at risk by some combination of heritable traits, prenatal insults (maternal drug and alcohol abuse or poor diet), weak parent-child attachment, poor supervision, and disorderly family environment.

If we knew with reasonable confidence which children were most seriously at risk, we might intervene with some precision to supply either medical therapy or parent training or (in extreme cases) to remove the child to a better home. But given our present knowledge, precision is impossible, and so we must proceed carefully, relying, except in the most extreme cases, on persuasion and incentives.

We do, however, know enough about the early causes of conduct disorder and later delinquency to know that the more risk factors exist (such as parental criminality and poor supervision), the greater the peril to the child. It follows that programs aimed at just one or a few factors are not likely to be successful; the children most at risk are those who require the most wide-ranging and fundamental changes in their life circumstances. The goal of these changes is, as Travis Hirschi of the University of Arizona has put it, to teach self-control.

Hirokazu Yoshikawa of New York University has recently summarized what we have learned about programs that attempt to make large and lasting changes in a child's prospects for improved con-

⁸ "A Nation's Children in Lock-up," *Los Angeles Times*, August 22, 1993.

duct, better school behavior, and lessened delinquency. Four such programs in particular seemed valuable—the Perry Preschool Project in Ypsilanti, Michigan; the Parent-Child Development Center in Houston, Texas; the Family Development Research Project in Syracuse, New York; and the Yale Child Welfare Project in New Haven, Connecticut.

All these programs had certain features in common. They dealt with low-income, often minority, families; they intervened during the first five years of a child's life and continued for between two and five years; they combined parent training with preschool education for the child; and they involved extensive home visits. All were evaluated fairly carefully, with the follow-ups lasting for at least five years, in two cases for at least ten, and in one case for fourteen. The programs produced (depending on the project) less fighting, impulsivity, disobedience, restlessness, cheating, and delinquency. In short, they improved self-control.

They were experimental programs, which means that it is hard to be confident that trying the same thing on a bigger scale in many places will produce the same effects. A large number of well-trained and highly motivated caseworkers dealt with a relatively small number of families, with the workers knowing that their efforts were being evaluated. Moreover, the programs operated in the late 1970's or early 1980's before the advent of crack cocaine or the rise of the more lethal neighborhood gangs. A national program mounted under current conditions might or might not have the same result as the experimental efforts.

Try telling that to lawmakers. What happens when politicians encounter experimental successes is amply revealed by the history of Head Start: they expanded the program quickly without assuring quality, and stripped it down to the part that was the most popular, least expensive, and easiest to run, namely, preschool education. Absent from much of Head Start are the high teacher-to-child case loads, the extensive home visits, and the elaborate parent training—the very things that probably account for much of the success of the four experimental programs.

IN THIS country we tend to separate programs designed to help children from those that benefit their parents. The former are called "child development," the latter "welfare reform." This is a great mistake. Everything we know about long-term welfare recipients indicates that their children are at risk for the very problems that child-helping programs later try to correct.

The evidence from a variety of studies is quite clear: even if we hold income and ethnicity constant, children (and especially boys) raised by a single mother are more likely than those raised by two parents to have difficulty in school, get in

trouble with the law, and experience emotional and physical problems.⁹ Producing illegitimate children is not an "alternative life-style" or simply an imprudent action; it is a curse. Making mothers work will not end the curse; under current proposals, it will not even save money.

The absurdity of divorcing the welfare problem from the child-development problem becomes evident as soon as we think seriously about what we want to achieve. Smaller welfare expenditures? Well, yes, but not if it hurts children. More young mothers working? Probably not; young mothers ought to raise their young children, and work interferes with that unless *two* parents can solve some difficult and expensive problems.

What we really want is *fewer illegitimate children*, because such children, by being born out of wedlock are, except in unusual cases, being given early admission to the underclass. And failing that, we want the children born to single (and typically young and poor) mothers to have a chance at a decent life.

Letting teenage girls set up their own households at public expense neither discourages illegitimacy nor serves the child's best interests. If they do set up their own homes, then to reach those with the fewest parenting skills and the most difficult children will require the kind of expensive and intensive home visits and family-support programs characteristic of the four successful experiments mentioned earlier.

One alternative is to tell a girl who applies for welfare that she can only receive it on condition that she live either in the home of *two* competent parents (her own if she comes from an intact family) or in a group home where competent supervision and parent training will be provided by adults unrelated to her. Such homes would be privately managed but publicly funded by pooling welfare checks, food stamps, and housing allowances. *

A model for such a group home (albeit one run without public funds) is the St. Martin de Porres House of Hope on the south side of Chicago, founded by two nuns for homeless young women, especially those with drug-abuse problems. The goals of the home are clear: accept personal responsibility for your lives and learn to care for your children. And these goals, in turn, require the girls to follow rules, stay in school, obey a curfew, and avoid alcohol and drugs. Those are the rules that ought to govern a group home for young welfare mothers.

Group homes funded by pooled welfare benefits would make the task of parent training much easier and provide the kind of structured, consistent, and nurturant environment that children need. A few cases might be too difficult for these homes, and for such children, boarding schools—

⁹ I summarize this evidence in "The Family-Values Debate," COMMENTARY, April 1993.

once common in American cities for disadvantaged children, but now almost extinct—might be revived.

Group homes also make it easier to supply quality medical care to young mothers and their children. Such care has taken on added importance in recent years with discovery of the lasting damage that can be done to a child's prospects from being born prematurely and with a very low birth weight, having a mother who has abused drugs or alcohol, or being exposed to certain dangerous metals. Lead poisoning is now widely acknowledged to be a source of cognitive and behavioral impairment; of late, elevated levels of manganese have been linked to high levels of violence.¹⁰ These are all treatable conditions; in the case of a manganese imbalance, easily treatable.

MY focus on changing behavior will annoy some readers. For them the problem is poverty and the worst feature of single-parent families is that they are inordinately poor. Even to refer to a behavioral or cultural problem is to "stigmatize" people.

Indeed it is. Wrong behavior—neglectful, immature, or incompetent parenting; the production of out-of-wedlock babies—*ought* to be stigmatized. There are many poor men of all races who do not abandon the women they have impregnated, and many poor women of all races who avoid drugs and do a good job of raising their children. If we fail to stigmatize those who give way to temptation, we withdraw the rewards from those who resist them. This becomes all the more important when entire communities, and not just isolated households, are dominated by a culture of fatherless boys preying on innocent persons and exploiting immature girls.

We need not merely stigmatize, however. We can try harder to move children out of those communities, either by drawing them into safe group homes or facilitating (through rent supplements and housing vouchers) the relocation of them and their parents to neighborhoods with intact social structures and an ethos of family values.

Much of our uniquely American crime problem (as opposed to the worldwide problem of general thievery) arises, not from the failings of individuals but from the concentration in disorderly neighborhoods of people at risk of failing. That concentration is partly the result of prosperity and freedom (functioning families long ago seized the opportunity to move out to the periphery), partly the result of racism (it is harder for some groups to move than for others), and partly the result of politics (elected officials do not wish to see settled constituencies broken up).

I SERIOUSLY doubt that this country has the will to address either of its two crime problems, save by acts of individual self-protection. We could in

theory make justice swifter and more certain, but we will not accept the restrictions on liberty and the weakening of procedural safeguards that this would entail. We could vastly improve the way in which our streets are policed, but some of us will not pay for it and the rest of us will not tolerate it. We could alter the way in which at-risk children experience the first few years of life, but the opponents of this—welfare-rights activists, family preservationists, budget cutters, and assorted ideologues—are numerous and the bureaucratic problems enormous.

Unable or unwilling to do such things, we take refuge in substitutes: we debate the death penalty, we wring our hands over television, we lobby to keep prisons from being built in our neighborhoods, and we fall briefly in love with trendy nostrums that seem to cost little and promise much.

Much of our ambivalence is on display in the 1994 federal crime bill. To satisfy the tough-minded, the list of federal offenses for which the death penalty can be imposed has been greatly enlarged, but there is little reason to think that executions, as they work in this country (which is to say, after much delay and only on a few offenders), have any effect on the crime rate and no reason to think that executing more federal prisoners (who account, at best, for a tiny fraction of all homicides) will reduce the murder rate. To satisfy the tender-minded, several billion dollars are earmarked for prevention programs, but there is as yet very little hard evidence that any of these will actually prevent crime.

In adding more police officers, the bill may make some difference—but only if the additional personnel are imaginatively deployed. And Washington will pay only part of the cost initially and none of it after six years, which means that any city getting new officers will either have to raise its own taxes to keep them on the force or accept the political heat that will arise from turning down "free" cops. Many states also desperately need additional prison space; the federal funds allocated by the bill for their construction will be welcomed, provided that states are willing to meet the conditions set for access to such funds.

Meanwhile, just beyond the horizon, there lurks a cloud that the winds will soon bring over us. The population will start getting younger again. By the end of this decade there will be a million more people between the ages of fourteen and seventeen than there are now. Half of this extra million will be male. Six percent of them will become high-rate, repeat offenders—30,000 more muggers, killers, and thieves than we have now.

Get ready.

¹⁰ It is not clear why manganese has this effect, but we know that it diminishes the availability of a precursor of serotonin, a neurotransmitter, and low levels of serotonin are now strongly linked to violent and impulsive behavior.

The Communitarian Network

Communitarian Council

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Nat'l Assn for Community Ldrshp
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Martha Darling
The Boeing Company
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John Parr
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Margaret O'Brien Steinfels
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Daniel Yankelovich
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Pres., Nat'l Council of La Raza

May 4, 1994

Dr. William A. Galston
Deputy Assistant to the President
Domestic Policy Council
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bill:

This is a preliminary report on the discussions during the White House Conference on the Protection and Development of Public Spaces hosted by you and organized by The Communitarian Network. The summary does not constitute minutes but rather a focus on select items that are actionable. A list of the participants is attached. In many cases, references are made to ideas that require more exploration. This is the case because this meeting was exploratory and deliberately open ended. We hope to have more conclusive suggestions following future work of some sub-groups now envisioned. Thank you again for your leadership and guidance. Please note that copies of this memo are being shared with conference participants.

Background:

1. The conference recognized that there are no magic bullets (single policy initiatives) that will ensure public safety once and for all.
2. A recent social science review of the evaluations of a large variety of anti-crime measures has shown that each by itself provides at best limited benefits; a combination of several programs is necessary -- even for partial treatment of the tough problems American society faces in this area.
3. The same review (*Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective Community Control*, by Robert J. Bursik, Jr. and Harold G. Grasmick: New York: Lexington, 1993) stresses the importance of community building and participation in enhancing the development and protection of public spaces.

4. There was universal consensus among the participants that to nourish community, public spaces need to be developed and protected; that communities happen not in private homes and cars but in plazas, parks, streets, etc. It follows that new investments, design, placing (for instance entertainment), and protection of public spaces are cardinal elements of pro-community (or communitarian) policies.

5. The media has been recently arguing that crime is really declining, and that the issue is fear. This is like saying that because a patient's temperature has fallen from 104.5 to 104.3 she should not worry unduly about her health. Violent crime has declined only a few percentage points. Moreover, its victims are "accumulative." That is each year we add millions of citizens who have been mugged, assaulted, raped, etc. to those of previous years. Hence, the proportion of the society that has direct personal experience in being victims of crime is still growing and very much so. We need to enhance public safety and not merely or mainly focus on fear. (George Kelling has strong data on these issues and Mark Kleiman has numerous insights.)

I. Fourth Amendment Issues

There is a need for a systematic new rationale on Fourth Amendment issues. As recent events in public housing in Chicago illustrate, narrow interpretations of this amendment stand in the way of serving the common good, as perceived both by most members of the communities involved and by fair-minded observers. This holds not merely for sweeps but also for drug checkpoints, screening gates, drug testing, and other such measures.

Instead of searching ad hoc for justifications for this or that public safety measure, we should note that (a) practically all of them are under attack by civil libertarians; (b) their interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as to what constitutes unreasonable search is not shared by courts in many cases but is implanted in the minds of the public, many editorial writers, and even in some members of the Administration.

We hence recommend that a small task force be appointed of members of the Administration, especially from the Department of Justice, and some outside constitutional scholars and social thinkers to examine the case that search is allowed ("reasonable") when the intrusion is minimal and the common good is considerable. One need not diminish people's rights, let alone treat some citizens, say in public housing, as "second class citizens," in order to justify legally and morally certain kinds of searches. The task force would share its brief with district attorneys and prosecutors throughout the country as well as with the public. (Roger Conner has worked on these issues and I explained it in *The Spirit of Community*, chapter 6.)

Closely related is a need to call attention to new forms of community traffic patterns and gates that enhance both public safety and community identity. By localizing traffic and reducing access to neighborhood streets from highways, as well as new patterns of flow among neighborhoods, these new devices both reduce crime and enhance community bonds. A separate report on these should be prepared, maybe in conjunction with the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Justice. (Oscar Newman did important work in this area.)

II. Strategies for the Inner-City

A major strategic issue that arose during the meeting is what is the best way to deal with the inner-city. The following options were charted:

- A. Bring businesses to the inner-city (e.g., empowerment zones).
- B. Bring inner-city people to jobs.
- C. Thin the inner-city by placing families in other neighborhoods (one or two families per block).
- D. Transfer the population en masse to the suburbs (e.g., as was done in Gautreaux in Chicago).

I do not see evidence that these alternatives, other options, or mixes have been fully examined by the new Administration. Indeed, several of the participants, including Vince Lane, Bart Harvey, and Oscar Newman, argued that the prevailing focus of trying to bring businesses to the inner-city, rather than people to jobs and ~~de~~-intensifying the inner-city, is misplaced. The Domestic Policy Council (and The Department of Housing and Urban Development) may wish to decide if this deserves additional deliberation.

Closely related is a much more delineated issue of law. Conference participants indicated that there are several laws that hinder even experimentation in these matters. For instance, attempts to relocate some of the poor to middle class neighborhoods are hampered by legal prohibitions on "caps" (promising a neighborhood that if it will incorporate some low income families, its culture and economy will not be "tipped" by the introduction of ever more families from a different background). Legal objections were also raised when housing developments attempted to use caps to preserve integrated communities. While the more encompassing strategic matters are contemplated, this issue seems to deserve attention in which one may wish to draw on both The Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Justice.

III. Community Filters

One of the issues you flagged is the trouble people face when various facets of the same person are treated separately, aiming a public service (sometimes several) at each facet rather than dealing with the whole person. During the meeting several ideas were expressed that might provide leads to deal with this difficult issue. In combination they amount to introducing a filter between the services that flow into a community from numerous sources (which it is assumed will continue to happen rather than the services being integrated into one pipeline) and the individual members of the community. Two examples follow. They do not necessarily provide The Answer but illustrate the kind of thinking that deserves additional examination.

- A. Travis County Community Justice Council:
Public safety officials in Travis County have created a unique community justice system, which consists of three decision making bodies: community justice council, task force, and

action committee. The council consists of ten elected officials in the field of public safety. The task force is made up of appointed officials whose jobs have a similar nature. Finally, community citizens are nominated onto the four community justice action committees. These three organizations are required to work together to create community justice plans for Travis County. (Additional information is available from Ron and Twila Earle.)

B. Nurturing Village:

The Urban Family Institute has developed a program designed to create a "seamless web of care" for children. The strategy is based upon the idea that the entire community-- relatives, friends, neighbors, schools, churches, elders-- comes together as the "nurturing village." The village would be comprised of "Kids Houses" (single unit family groupings) and "Corridors of Care" (where providers of care are located). A group of "village elders," a coalition of all child and family organizations and community leaders, would oversee and guide the "nurturing village." Source: Kent Amos

These and related ideas about community-filters are particularly novel and require much more study before one may be ready for a recommendation. I will try to get such a study going.

IV. Thick Community Policing

The Administration may well cease to refer to community policing of the old thin kind as a new major source of public safety and instead call attention to the need for the real thing. Merely getting cops out of their cars and away from a responsive mode, to walk the beat and be proactive will not do. The community must be truly involved in its protection. The ways this may be achieved remain to be determined but a report to the conference illustrates the direction one might search for such an approach.

A. PACE (Police Assisted Community Enforcement):

Norfolk, VA has created a type of community-oriented government which is defined as a partnership of city departments, community groups, businesses, and religious organizations who have come together to address a variety of community needs and problems, including: community policing, safe housing, health and social services, education, recreation, and the environment.

PACE initiatives include: PACE-SAFE (a coalition of religious organizations which sponsor neighborhood block parties, music, and inspirational speakers for youth); PACE Athletic League (involves youth in productive recreational activities); Nighthawk Basketball (program for older teens in the evening); PACE-ALERT (supports and provides training to develop community leaders); Community Development Corporation (a new way of coordinating community services to address and resolve neighborhood concerns); Youth Forums (an opportunity for students to voice their concerns and propose solutions); and Community Police Mini-Stations (Formed in collaboration with citizens

and businesses and staffed by volunteers. the mini-stations act as neighborhood offices for community police).

Since PACE's inception in 1990, overall crime has dropped in the city of Norfolk by 18 percent. From 1992-1993, residential burglaries are down by 21 percent, commercial burglaries down 24 percent, vandalism down by 12 percent, stolen cars down by 21 percent, homicide down by 42 percent, and overall crime in initially targeted PACE neighborhoods declined by 23 percent.

More information on this effort is available from George Crawley and Melvin High.

V. Quality of Life Issues

The conference showed interest in protecting public spaces by coming down hard on lifestyle offenses such as people relieving themselves in public, using boom boxes, aggressive begging etc. I suggest that these experiments deserve careful watching for now before one runs them up the flag pole. However, the vexing question of how to ensure that public spaces are available to one and all and not monopolized by any one group, whether they are drunks or gangs, requires additional attention both from legal experts and social scientists. I will be looking into the question of who could attend to this matter. (Meanwhile particularly good sources of ideas on these matters are Jeremy Travis, Antonio Pagan, Fred Siegel, Roger Conner, George Crawley, and Melvin High.)

VI. Guns

The strong presentation on this matter by Katherine Kaufer Christoffel left little doubt that the Communitarian Position Paper that calls for domestic disarmament rather than gun control is the correct ultimate goal. There was no discussion of where the next opening for work in this direction might lie.

I would like to call attention to one matter: it is now almost easier to become a gun dealer than to buy a gun. One should examine the registration of gun dealers (a list seems to be currently unavailable to local authorities), the ways and costs of licensing them, etc. (Debbie Leff is supporting important surveys in this area.)

VII. Set Asides for Public Spaces

Currently, when the Department of Housing and Urban Development grants funds to communities or housing developments for redesign or improvement, as a rule there is no portion that is set aside for community institutions such as schools, neighborhood centers, libraries, parks, playgrounds, etc. As a result, often housing developments are built or refurbished around

rundown core institutions, leaving incomplete communities. One should consider requiring that grants include a given proportion to be set aside for core community institutions. (Robert Embry made significant observations on the role of schools as core community institutions.)


VIII. A Random List of Specific Limited Ideas

- A significant proportion of the population in state prisons are illegal immigrants. They are now released upon completing their term and asked to show up for deportation hearings, of which many do not do. Suggestion: hold deportation hearings in prison, before they complete their term.
- There seems to be a serious decline in the quality of work done by US attorneys. The proportion of cases they bring to trial that are dismissed or acquitted has risen sharply. The reasons and remedies seem to require urgent attention.
- The conditions under which one may draw on the National Guard's and Department of Defense's resources to enhance public safety require examination. There are many idle resources here.
- The new American Disabilities Act seems inadvertently to define active (as distinct from past) addiction to drugs or alcohol as a disability, entitling the person to continue disability payments that are in effect used to subsidize the addiction.

Please note that rather little attention was paid, at the conference and in this memo, to non-safety issues, such as the development of schools, parks, libraries, and museums as public spaces. It is a topic to which we need to return.

I need to reiterate that this is but a preliminary report. We are looking for ways to reconvene sub-groups of those who participated in the White House conference and others to work out at least some of these ideas.

Sincerely,


Amitai Etzioni

enclosed lists of participants:
March 19 from the community
March 19 from the Administration
March 18 additional participants

**White House Conference
on the Protection and Development of Public Spaces
March 19, 1994**

**Participants
(from outside the community)**

Kent Amos
President
Urban Family Institute

Roger Conner
Executive Director
American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities

Ellis Cose
Contributing Editor
Newsweek

George Crawley
Assistant City Manager
Norfolk, VA

Ronald Earle
District Attorney
Travis County, Texas

Robert Embry
President
The Abell Foundation

Amitai Etzioni
University Professor
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**White House Conference on
The Protection and Development of Public Spaces
March 19, 1994**

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(from the Administration)

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**White House Conference on
The Protection and Development of Public Spaces**

Conference Dinner
March 18, 1994

Additional Participants

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Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources

Crime Facts

By

Abe Newman

(Speechwriting x2777)

12/13/93

Note: These quotes have not been fact checked against other sources.

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Executive Summary:

This document provides clear and persuasive statistics and examples of the severity of crime and violence in our society. The hope is that the document can highlight the crisis areas in the crime debate and provide a persuasive and quick reference to those who wish to be further informed about the topic.

This document considers: the expansion of violence, the proliferation of firearms and crime, the failure of the criminal justice system, regional examples of the problem, the public response, problems with current solutions and possible policy options. These seven sections have been isolated as critical areas with which individuals should be familiar in order to deal with the crime issue.

Executive Summary:

A series of events in the last two years has brought crime and violence to the attention of the American Public. Concern and fear have spread across the country demanding answers from their government.

Unfortunately, concern is not enough, action has to be taken. At the same time, we must resist the temptation to act simply for the sake of acting. Policy makers must focus their attention and develop a coherent program to combat crime.

In order for proper decision making to occur both policy makers and the public must both be informed and be able to persuade others about the need for action on crime.

This document considers the expansion of violence, the proliferation of firearms and crime, the failure of the criminal justice system, regional examples of the problem, the public response, problems with current solutions and possible policy options as critical areas with which individuals should be familiar.

The document provides clear and persuasive examples of the severity of the problem with regard to the examples respective area. The hope is that the document can highlight the crisis areas in the crime debate and provide a quick reference to people who wish to be informed about this topic.

1A. Violent Crime

General

* Dr. C. Everett Koop, said violence was as pressing a public health issue as smallpox had been generations ago. (NY Times 11/16/93)

* [T]he number of deaths caused by violence, which kills over 50,000 persons yearly, is greater than the number caused by AIDS -- which is over 30,000 per year -- and greater than the number of deaths caused by drunk driving -- which kills nearly 18,000 per year. (Joycelyn Elders Federal News Service 11/1/93)

* By many measures, the United States ranks first among nations in its rates of interpersonal violence. The United States has the highest homicide of any Western industrialized country -- a rate that is, in fact, many times higher than that of the country with the next highest rate. At current rates, more than 25,000 Americans are murdered each year, and homicide is the tenth leading cause of death in our nation. (Violence and Youth, The American Psychological Association Vol. 1 1993)

* ...the FBI says violent crime has risen nearly 19% since 1988. (USA Today 10/28/93)

* Violent crime in 1992 was 41% above the 1983 figure. (USA Today 10/4/93)

* The national murder rate last year was 9.3 per 100,000. (U.S. News and World Report 10/11/93)

* All told, some 14 million serious crimes were reported to the police last year, a number that surely understates the actual magnitude of America's No. 1 problem. (Business Week 12/13/93)

* And in the first half of 1990, big-city murder rates surpassed the record year of 1970. Murders in New York City totaled 1,077 for the first six months of 1990, up from 837 for the first of 1989. (U.S. News and World Report 12/3/90)

* Newly released FBI statistics show two different trends in crime rates: occurrences of violence in cities and towns with populations under 1 million are nudging upward, while such incidents are declining in the densest urban enclaves. (Time 8/23/93)

Violence Against Youth

* The federal center for Disease Control recently labeled youth violence as the nation's No. 1 health problem. (San Diego Union 10/11/93 p.b6)

* One striking change in the last three years is that people from 15 to 24 years old now have the nation's highest homicide-victim rate. (NY Times 12/8/93)

* And the homicide rate for young males ages 15-34 in the U.S. is the highest of any industrialized nation, roughly 20 times higher than rates in most other nations. (Joycelyn Elders Federal News Service 11/1/93)

* Teenagers are 2 1/2 times more likely to be victims of violent crimes than those over the age of 20. (Violence and Youth, The American Psychological Association Vol.1 1993)

* A UNICEF report released last week found that 90 percent of youth homicides in the industrial world are committed in the United States. (Dallas Morning News 9/27/93)

Economic Cost of Crime

* ...crime cost Americans a stunning \$425 billion each year. That figure comes from a detailed analysis of all of the direct and indirect costs of both property and violent crimes. (Business Week 12/13/93)

* ...the real cost of violent and property crime -- when properly totaled up -- far exceeds the \$300 billion defense budget. (Business Week 12/13/93)

* ...annual damage to large urban economies from high crime rates is about \$50 billion. (Business Week 12/13/93)

1B. Race and Violent Crime

Race on Race Violence

* A 1990 Bureau of Justice Statistics victimization study found that 72% of violent crimes against whites were committed by other whites; 84% of violent crimes committed against blacks were by other blacks. (USA Today 10/28/93)

* In 1990, in 93% of the cases, African American offenders murdered other African Americans. (Joycelyn Elders Federal News Service 11/1/93)

* We lose more lives annually to the crime of blacks killing blacks than the sum total of lynching in the entire history of the country. (Rev. Jesse Jackson in USA Today 10/28/93)

* An estimated 8,000 black males are homicide victims each year in the United States, and more than 90% are killed by other blacks, according to FBI figures. (Newsday 11/18/93)

* Benjamin F. Chavis, Louis Farrakhan, and Jesse L. Jackson, who this weekend characterized the urban peace movement as a natural extension of the civil rights movement. "This is the new frontier of the civil rights struggle. It's the first time internal threats and self-destructive behavior...eclipses the external threats," Jackson said, referring to killing and violence in the black communities. (Washington Post 10/25/93)

Minority Criminals

* Blacks are winding up in jail at a rate six times that of whites, according to figures from the Justice Department document on prison overcrowding. (Jet 9/10/93)

* I am worried that 1/4 of all young African American males ages 20-29 are incarcerated, on probation or on parole, while only 1/5 are enrolled in higher education. (Joycelyn Elders Federal News Service 11/1/93)

* 23% of all young black men are caught up in the criminal justice system: in prison, on probation, or on parole. (Washington Post 11/23/93)

* There are more young black men in prison today than in college. (Washington Post 11/23/93)

* For every Latino male with a BA, there are 24 behind bars. (Washington Post 11/23/93)

* Blacks make up almost half the country's prison admissions. (Business Week 12/13/93)

* 60% of inmates in the prison system are black and Latino. (Washington Post 11/23/93)

* The arrest rate for violent crime is about six times greater for blacks than whites. (Wall Street Journal 11/5/93)

* Since 1984...incarceration for blacks rose from 339 per 100,000 residents to 619 per 100,000. That compared to the ratio of whites jailed, which increased from 68 per 100,000 to 109 per 100,000, national figures show. (Jet 9/10/93)

* In Washington D.C., 70 percent of all black males have been involved in the criminal justice system by the age of 35. (U.S. News W.R. 11/8/93)

* A university of Washington study...found...that children of color were four times more likely to be sentenced to confinement, and African-American children were 11 times more likely to be confined. (Seattle Times 10/18/93)

Minority Victims

* Nearly half the 21,500 murder victims in the United States in 1991 were black, although blacks constitute 12.1% of the national population. (Newsday 11/18/93)

* Homicide is the leading cause of death among young black men. (Washington Post 11/23/93)

* Black men between the ages of 15 and 24 are murdered at 10 times the national average. (NY Times 11/5/93)

* To put this into perspective, one should consider that if the rest of the population was being murdered by firearms at a rate equal to that of young black males, over 260,000 Americans would be shot to death each year. (Kids and Guns, The Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)

* The homicide rate for black males 15-19 nearly doubled between 1984 and 1988. (CQ Researcher 9/11/92)

* [APA] study found that black females are four times more likely to be killed than non-blacks; and black males are 11 times more likely than non-blacks. (Jet 9/20/93)

* The homicide rate among black youths has nearly tripled since 1978. Over the past five years, the violent crime rate for black male teen-agers has risen sharply, to 113 per 1,000. (NY Times 11/13/93)

* For blacks, the 1992 violent crime rate was the highest recorded -- nearly 15 robberies for every 1,000 blacks, compared with fewer than five for every 1,000 whites. (USA Today 11/15/93)

Minority Gun Victims

* 57% of all African American teenage males who died in 1990 were killed with guns. (Joycelyn Elders Federal News Service 11/1/93)

* [M]ore young black men die each year from guns than the total who died from lynching by the Klan. (LA Times 10/10/93)

1C. Violence by Youth

General

- * In the next decade, the nation's most violent population -- teens between 15-19 -- will balloon by 23%. (USA Today 10/28/93)
- * In 1992, the state's (Colorado) youth finally surpassed their elders, committing crimes with guns at a higher rate than people over age 18. (Dallas Morning News 9/27/93 p.1a)

Youth Murderers

- * From 1985 to 1990, the number of 15-year-old males charged with murder has increased by 217%. (Kids and Guns, The Education Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)
- * According to the FBI, juvenile arrests for murder, robbery and assault all increased by 50 percent between 1988 and 1992. (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)
- * In 1992, 2,829 juveniles were arrested for murder in the United States, roughly 2 1/2 times more than were arrested for the same crime in 1984, according to the ATF. (Washington Post 12/13/93)
- * A Northeastern University study indicates that the increased rate of criminal homicide in every city or town with a population of over 25,000 people is due to the increased number of homicides committed by youth. (Kids and Guns, The Education Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)
- * More than 11,000 persons died between 1980 and 1989 as a result of homicides committed by high school-age youth using firearms, cutting instruments or blunt objects. (CQ Researcher 9/11/92)
- * In 1984, a total of 1134 juveniles were arrested for murder. But by last year, that number had gone up 2 1/2 times to 2829. According to the Justice Department, the vast majority of these murders were committed with firearms, and most were committed with handguns. (Cong Rec 10/28/93 Sen Kohl)

Ten Year Comparison

- * An FBI report this month said the number of youngsters under 18 arrested for homicide soared more than 128% since 1983. Arrests for violent crime overall shot up 57%. (USA Today 10/29/93)
- * Between 1979 and 1989, there was a 61% increase in homicides by shootings committed by 15 to 19 year old White and African American youth. During the same period, the rate of homicides by objects other than guns declined 29%. (Violence and Youth, The American Psychological Association Vol.1 1993)

* While 49 out of every 100,000 Colorado juveniles committed weapons offenses in 1980, the rate had more than doubled by 1991, to 111 out of every 100,000. (Dallas Morning News 9/27/93 p.1a)

* ...the number of murders committed by youth, aged 10 to 17, with guns, rose 79 percent between 1980 and 1990. (Cong Rec 9/21/93 Mr. Glickman)

* [APA study] Homicides committed by teens ages 15-19 with guns went up 61 percent between 1979 and 1989. (Jet 9/20/93)

* In 1982, 21,122 juveniles were arrested on weapons charges nationally. But by last year, that number has spiraled to more than 46,000. Again, guns were involved in the vast majority of these arrests, and handguns in most of them. (Cong Rec 10/28/93 Sen Kohl)

1D. School Violence

Schools Need Protection

* 160,000 schoolkids stay home each day for fear of their lives. (USA Today 9/16/93)

* The Joyce Foundation poll ...found that only 21% of students feel they are safe from violence in the schools and only 30% feel they are safe travelling to and from school. (Kids and Guns, The Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)

* In 1989, an estimated 430,000 students took a weapon to school to protect themselves from attack or harm at least once in a six-month period. (Joycelyn Elders Federal News Service 11/1/93)

* In suburban Jefferson Parish, La., where 21 percent of high schoolers say they carried a gun in the past year., 73 percent said they did so for protection. (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)

* Sixteen percent of eighth graders, 14 percent of 10th graders and 12 percent of 12th graders told University of Michigan researchers that they feared for their safety. (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)

* At least 45 urban systems now screen students with metal detectors. Even elementary schools are using them. (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)

Crimes at School

* Today more than 3 million crimes a year are committed in or near the 85,000 U.S. public schools... (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)

* From September 1986 to September 1990 at least 71 people -- 65 students and 6 school employees -- had been killed with guns at school; another 201 were severely wounded; and 242 individuals were held hostage at gunpoint. (CQ Researcher 9/11/92)

* Shootings or hostage situations in school had occurred in at least 35 states and the District of Columbia from September 1986 to September 1990. (CQ Researcher 9/11/92)

* 45% of the students in the Justice Department survey said they had been threatened with a gun or had been shot at on the way to or from school during the previous few years. (Washington Times 12/13/93)

* Approximately 100 teachers have been assaulted annually by students in the past four school years. (CQ Researcher 9/11/92)

* Last year there were 2,643 assaults, 403 robberies and 2,444 incidents of weapons possession reported in the city (New York) schools, an increase from the previous year in each category. (NY Times 11/23/93)

* There were 5,761 violent incidents in New York City schools last year, up 16 percent from a year earlier.

* Researchers at Cincinnati's Xavier University interviewed principals in 1,216 school systems last year. Sixty-four percent of urban principals said violence has increased on their schools in the past five years; so did 54 percent of suburban principals and 43 percent of those in rural areas.

Guns at School

* One in five high school students now carries a firearm, knife, or club to school. (Cong Rec 9/15/93 Mr. Dodd)

* ...rural students are twice as likely to carry a gun to school than the national average. (Kids and Guns, The Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)

* In heavily suburban Los Angeles, 405 guns were confiscated in schools in 1992, 28 of them in elementary schools. (CQ Researcher 9/3/93)

* [APA study] students carry about 270,000 guns to school daily. (Jet 9/20/93)

* ...an estimated 270,000 guns go to school every day. (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)

* According to one survey, 135,000 students in this nation of ours bring a weapon, a gun, a handgun to school every single day. (Cong Rec 10/21/93 Sen from RI)

* ...100,000 students bring handguns to school every day in the United States. (Cong Rec 9/21/93 Mr. Glickman)

* A University of Michigan study reports that 9 percent of eighth graders carry a gun, knife or club to school at least once a month. (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)

* Twenty percent of the suburban high schoolers surveyed by Tulane researchers Joseph Sheley and M. Dwayne Smith endorsed shooting someone "who has stolen something from you." (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)

1E. Gangs

Number of Members

* The Crips and the Bloods, originally Los Angeles street gangs have now spread to more than 100 cities and total more than 40,000 members. (U.S. News and World Report 12/3/90)

* The Justice Department reported that 4,881 gangs were operating in the country in 1991 with 249,324 members who committed 1,051 homicides. (NY Times 11/10/93)

* Delinquent gangs no longer are confined to certain states and to the inner city, and their membership encompasses a wider age range, with members as young as 9 and as old as 30. (Violence and Youth, The American Psychological Association Vol.1 1993)

Gang Violence

* [b]etween 1987 and 1990 the annual number of gang-related murders almost doubled, from 51 to 101, at a time when other violent but nonlethal incidents motivated by gang membership declined slightly. (Washington Post 11/29/93)

* Gang violence appears to have increased in levels and in lethality during the 1980s. Studies in the early 1970s revealed few or no homicides in the United States attributable to gang violence. By 1980, however, there were 351 gang-related homicides in Los Angeles alone, and more than 1,500 gang-related homicides in Los Angeles between 1985 and 1989. (Violence and Youth, The American Psychological Association Vol.1 1993)

* Homicides and aggravated assault are three times more likely to be committed by gang members than by nongang delinquents. (Violence and Youth, The American Psychological Association Vol.1 1993)

Gangs and Guns

* Gang killings involving automatic, semiautomatic and heavy caliber (.38 caliber or greater) weapons almost tripled, from 24 in 1987 to 70 three years later. (Washington Post 11/29/93)

* Virtually the entire increase in the number of street gang-motivated homicides seems attributable to an increase in the use of high-caliber, automatic or semiautomatic weapons -- concluded Chicago researchers Carolyn and Richard Block. (Washington Post 11/29/93)

LA Gang Violence

	1992	1987	1983
Killed	803	387	216
Known Gangs	1,078		
Members	150,000		
Violent Felons (Robbery, Rape...)	20,000		
Serious Injury	25,000		
Drive-By Shootings	3,500		
Arrests involving:			
firearms	12,170		
handguns	10,562		
assault weapons	105		
Guns Recovered by Police	2,369		

* Due to the fact that gang violence has only become a major concern in recent years LA County-wide statistics are unavailable before 1990.

* The LA office did say that gang membership in the early 80's was about 70,000 and there were about 480 reported gangs.

* They also said it is fine to say that gang membership has more than doubled in the last ten years as has the number of reported gangs.

(G.R.E.A.T. -- a LA gang reporting group (310) 603-3100)

1F. Crime and the Health Care Crisis

- * The total medical cost of all violence in the U.S. was 13.5 billion in 1992. (Joycelyn Elders Federal News Service 11/1/93)
- * When someone is shot in New York City, the average cost that person incurs in medical treatment is \$9,646...It also escalates if intensive care is required, reaching as much as 150,000 per patient. (Time 10/11/93 p.59)
- * A study at a San Francisco hospital noted that 86% of expenses incurred by firearm injuries are paid out of taxes. (Time 10/11/93 p.59)
- * The cost of firearm injuries in the U.S. exceeds \$4 billion a year. (Time 10/11/93 p.59)
- * In 1985, the total medical costs of gun violence were more than \$900 million. Three years later, the cost had risen to \$1.2 billion. Low ball figures for 1990 place the number at \$1.4 billion. (USA Today 10/1/93)
- * Between 1986 and 1991, nearly 20% of the nation's trauma centers were forced to close, largely due to rising gun-related costs. (USA Today 10/1/93)
- * We also pay a huge tangible price -- billions of dollars a year -- to care for those who are maimed by gunfire. Billions are spent each year on prisons, with seemingly no effect on crime rates. (Chicago Tribune 8/15/93)
- * The vast majority -- 85 percent -- of the hospital costs for treatment of firearm injuries is unreimbursed care. (Joycelyn Elders Federal News Service 11/1/93)
- * Incidents of violence against health-care workers has increased 400% since 1982. (Time 8/23/93)

2A. Firearm Death

General

- * Gun death, including suicides, now total more than 37,000 a year, and handgun homicides have reached 13,000 a year. (Newsweek 10/11/93 p.33)
- * There were more than 15,300 gun homicides nationwide last year, up from more than 14,200 in 1991. (LA Times 10/15/93)
- * Over the last 25 years, more Americans have died in gun-related murders than were killed in the Vietnam War, the Korean War and World War I combined. (LA Times 10/15/93)
- * [M]ore young black men die each year from guns than the total who died from lynching by the Klan. (LA Times 10/10/93)
- * Homicides involving guns have risen sharply, from 45% of all murders in 1988 to 55% last year. (USA Today 12/9/93)
- * California had 2,690 firearm homicides out of 3,876 in 1991. Texas had 1,840 out of 2,659 and New York had 1,564 out of 2,337. (USA Today 9/29/93)
- * Walton, a former prosecutor who is known for his tough sentences, said, "it seems easier than ever for young men to get high-powered guns in the District, and they seem to have no hesitation about using them. Police report that 83% of last year's homicides involved a gun. (Washington Post ?)

Every __ Amount of Time, __ People are Killed by Firearms

- * Nearly every 30 minutes someone is murdered with a firearm. (LA Times 10/22/93)
- * Every 20 minutes someone is cut down by gunfire. (USA Today 11/29/93)

Handgun Death

- * Over the past five years, handgun related murders in the U.S. have soared 59%, while non-handgun-related murders actually have declined by almost 10% in the same period. (Wall Street Journal 11/18/93)
- * The FBI reports that handguns are used in more than 80% of all gun murders. (Kids and Guns, The Educational Fund to End Youth and Violence 1993)
- * More than 50% of homicide victims in 1992 were killed by handguns -- 12,489 deaths. (USA Today 10/19/93)

* 70% of cops killed in the line of duty are shot with handguns. (Wall Street Journal 11/18/93)

Firearms Kill More Than They Save

* The risk of being killed is 2.7 times higher in homes with guns than in homes without them. (LA Times 10/17/93)

* ...a multi-state study of hundred of homicides has found that keeping a gun at home nearly triples the likelihood that someone in the household will be killed there. (Washington Post 10/7/93)

* A handgun in the home is 43 times more likely to be used to kill a family member or friend than it is to be used in a justifiable homicide and over 86% of those deaths were suicides. (Kids and Guns, The Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)

* ...guns are much more likely to cause the death of a member of the household than they are to be used to kill in self defense, the study reported. (Washington Post 10/7/93)

* The same research team found in a previous study that the risk of suicide increases fivefold in homes where guns are kept. (Washington Post 10/7/93)

2B. Firearm Access

General

- * Weapons...production and sale totaling 2 million to 4 million new ones yearly. (LA Times 10/22/93)
- * 70 million people own guns, half the households have firearms and 20 million people buy hunting licenses. (Washington Post 10/18/93)
- * Estimates are that between 40% and 50% of American households have guns, and half of these are handguns. (Violence and Youth, The American Psychological Association Vol. 1 1993)
- * ...200 million weapons in circulation. (LA Times 10/22/93)
- * ...if all gun manufacturing and sales ceased now, about 200 million guns would remain in circulation -- nearly one gun for every man, woman, and child in this country. (LA Times 10/15/93)
- * In 1980, the U.S. gun industry produced 1.6 million revolvers and just 764,000 pistols. By 1989, the industry was turning out 1.4 million pistols, but only 629,000 revolvers. (U.S. News and World Report 12/3/90)

Handguns

- * Seventy million handguns are in circulation in our country, and 2 million are being added every year. (Cong Rec 10/21/93 Sen from RI)
- * There are an estimated 65 million to 70 million handguns in America today, or more handguns than there are children under the age of 21. (Wall Street Journal 11/18/93)

Assault Weapons

- * 200 million firearms are in the hands of American private citizens... One to three million of these are large-clip, high-rate-of-fire automatic and semiautomatic assault weapons.
- * [T]he existing stock of assault weapons in private hands is 1 million. (LA Times 11/?/93) and (NY Times 11/18/93)

2C. Firearm Homicide--International Comparison

General

* In 1991, 74 people were killed in firearm-related homicides in Japan, a nation of 124 million; handguns were used in 69 of those deaths. Over the last 5 years, Japan has averaged about 80 gun murders a year -- a far cry from the 14,200 gun murders in 1991 alone in the United States, which has a population of 250 million. (LA Times 11/8/93)

* Although crime has risen in Germany since 1990, the criminal misuse of guns accounts for only .3% of all criminal acts. (LA Times 11/8/93)

* Firearms are used in 75% of U.S. killings and only 25% of killings in comparable industrialized countries. The overall U.S. homicide rate is 15 times as high as Japan's. (LA Times 11/8/93)

Handguns

* In 1990, handguns killed 291 people in all of these countries (Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, and Australia); in the same year 10,567 in the United States died from handguns. (LA Times 10/15/93)

* The number of handgun murders in Britain during 1990 was 22. (Newsweek 10/11/93 p.33)

* A few years ago there were 10,099 handgun-related murders in the U.S.; that same year there were 22 handgun-related murders in Britain, 68 in Canada and 87 in Japan. (Wall Street Journal 11/18/93)

2D. Youth Firearm Death

General

- * While juvenile homicides that do not involve firearms have declined since 1983, juvenile gun homicides have more than doubled. For young black men, the rate nearly tripled just from 1985 to 1990. In fact, gunshot wounds to children ages 16 and under nearly doubled in major urban areas between 1987 and 1990. (Kids and Guns, The Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)
- * From 1985 to 1990, gun deaths among 15 to 19 year-olds jumped 70%. (USA Today 9/16/93)
- * Mireille Kanda, MD, at Children's National Medical Center in Washington, DC, noted that the rate of penetrating trauma caused by violence seen in her emergency department increased 1,740% between 1986 and 1989. (Youth and Violence, American Psychological Association vol 1 1993)
- * Gunshot wounds, including homicides, suicides, and unintentional shootings, are the leading cause of death for both African American and white teenage males, and they kill more teenage boys than all natural diseases combined. (Joycelyn Elders Federal News Service 11/1/93)
- * The availability of firearms has made firearm injuries the second leading cause of death behind motor vehicle accidents for youth ages 10-19. For black males ages 10-19, the rate of death from firearms now exceeds that from motor vehicle accidents. (Kids and Guns, the Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)
- * Firearm homicide is the second leading cause of death for all youth, aged 15 to 24. (Cong Rec 9/15/93 Mr. Dodd)
- * Guns constitute the third leading cause of death for children. (LA Times 10/22/93)
- * The criminology community was startled to see that 36% of suburban teenagers personally knew someone who had been killed or injured from gunfire. (CQ Researcher 9/3/93)

Suicide

- * Every six hours a youth uses a gun to commit suicide. (LA Times 10/22/93)
- * Data indicates that 55% of suicides among youth ages 10-14 are committed with a firearm, while 67.3% of suicides completed by

youth ages 15-19 are committed with a firearm. (Kids and Guns, The Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)

Firearms Kill More Youth Than __

* In America firearms kill more people between the ages of 15 and 24 than do all natural causes combined. (Newsweek 10/11/93 p.33)

* In Texas and Louisiana , guns kill more 15 to 19 than highway accidents. (USA Today 9/16/93)

Every __ Amount of Time, __ Youth Die from Firearms

* Every day 14 American children are killed by guns. (LA Times 10/22/93)

* Every day 13 children under the age of 19 are killed by gunfire and scores more are injured. (Kids and Guns, The Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)

* Firearm violence kills an American child every 3 hours -- 25 children every three days. (Cong Rec 9/15/93 Mr. Dodd)

* 11 children and adolescents die daily from firearms injuries. (USA Today 9/16/93)

2E. Youth Firearm Access

General

- * 1.2 million elementary-school-age, latchkey-children have access to guns in the home. (LA Times 10/22/93)
- * More than one of five male high school students surveyed in crime ridden neighborhoods reported owning a gun, according to the Justice Department. (Washington Post 12/13/93)
- * 83% of the juveniles surveyed, who had been incarcerated, admitted that they had a rang of firepower readily available to them. (Washington Post 12/13/93)
- * Guns bought by law-abiding adults for "protection" increasingly end up in the backpacks of schoolchildren and the pockets of small time drug dealers and robbers, gang members, and professional thugs. (LA Times 10/15/93)
- * At one school, a juvenile, when asked a question about the caliber of his gun, pulled it from his jacket to examine it before responding, according to the Justice Department report. (Washington Post 12/13/93)
- * The situation is similar in the suburbs: 18 percent of Jefferson Parish's students owned handguns and 66 percent told Shelley they would have only "a little trouble" obtaining one. (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)

State Laws

- * Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting the possession of handguns by teen-agers. (Dallas Morning News 9/27/93 p.1a)
- * There are currently 22 states that continue to allow unlimited possession of handguns by juveniles under 18. (NPR 9/13/93)

3A. Prison Overcrowding

General

- * The nation's prison population has tripled in the last 20 years. (Washington Post ? not direct quote)
- * The number of criminals in prison has climbed by almost 400 percent since 1960. (Washington Times 11/28/93)
- * The nation's prisons are fast approaching the 1 million mark -- 925,247 inmates in June and growing by 1,600 a week. (USA Today 10/4/93)
- * ...\$25 billion has been spent on prison construction in the past four years in the United States. (San Francisco Chronicle 7/5/93)
- * By the year 2001, the United States will house 125,000 prisoners over the age of 55, at a cost of \$ 4 billion. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

State Prison Overcrowding

- * Because 42 states are currently under court orders to relieve prison overcrowding, very few people actually serve the time required under new sentencing laws. (Washington Monthly 4/93)
- * California built nine prisons in the eighties to relieve overcrowding and has plans to build another eight. Planners are already warning that the system will be just as crowded when construction is finished in 1996, with 163,100 inmates crammed into space designed for 74,700. (Washington Monthly 4/93)
- * With more than 113,000 people incarcerated in California prisons, the state is 88 percent over capacity -- and has more people behind bars than the entire federal system. (San Francisco Chronicle 7/5/93)

Federal Prison Overcrowding

- * During the 1980's, the federal prison population more than doubled to almost 57,000. By this year, it had shot up to more than 85,000 -- 44 percent above capacity. (San Francisco Chronicle 7/5/93)
- * ...the federal prisons are bulging at 143% of capacity. (LA Times 10/25/93)

International Comparison

* The United States has the highest incarceration rate of the world's industrialized nations, with 426 people per 100,000 behind bars. South Africa is second with 333 per 100,000. (LA Times 2/7/93)

* The United States now incarcerates the largest percentage of its population of any country in the world -- nearly a million people. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

* The United States currently locks up more people per capita than any other nation on Earth. (Washington Post 11/23/93)

Mandatory Sentences Cause Overcrowding

* [F]ixed sentences have caused the federal prison population to more than double since 1986 from 44,000 to the current 89,000, with drug offenders occupying 62% of the prison beds. (USA Today 11/15/93)

* 60% of inmates in federal prisons and 20% of inmates in state prisons are there on drug charges. That helped drive up spending on prisons without doing much to deter violent crime. (Business Week 12/13/93)

* In 1990, 54.2 percent of the prisoners in federal prisons were serving sentences for drug related crimes, up from 22.7 percent in 1980...If the trend continues half of all prison inmates will be drug offenders. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

* The number of adults in state and federal prison on drug charges more than tripled between 1986 and 1991; nearly one in every three new state prisoners is a drug offender, up from one in 25 in 1960. (Newsweek 6/14/93)

Prison Populations

	<u>States</u>	<u>Federal</u>	<u>National Total</u>
1963	194,155	23,138	217,283
1983	381,665	23,836	405,501
1992	750,122	60,741	817,863

* This data under represents the total number of people behind bars because it only tracks prisoners who have been sentenced for over one year. Total numbers are not available for 1963.

* It is fine to say that there are currently over 1.3 million people behind bars in the U.S.

* Another good comparison is that in 1963, 116 people were sentenced to prison per 100,000 as a national average. In 1992, 344 people were sentenced to prison per 100,000.

(Bureau of Justice Statistics--Corrections Specialist)

3B. Early Release

- * About 75 percent of convicted criminals now under correctional control are not behind bars. (Washington Times 11/28/93)
- * Because of overcrowding, most everyone but drug dealers and murderers in Florida's prisons serves no more than 20 to 30 percent of the original sentence. (U.S. News and World Report 10/11/93)
- * Because 42 states are currently under court orders to relieve prison overcrowding, very few people actually serve the time required under new sentencing laws. (Washington Monthly 4/93)
- * Every year, more than 60,000 violent criminals receive probation, largely because of overcrowding, according to Michael Block, a University of Arizona economist. (Business Week 12/13/93)

3C. Probation/Parole Failure

Probation Fails

* Nationally, 43% of offenders violate the terms of their probation. (LA Times 2/7/93)

* ...nearly two-thirds of probationers in California and in the rest of the country end up back in prison. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

Overload of System

* About three out of every four people under correctional supervision -- some three million convicted criminals -- are not incarcerated. (NY Times 11/13/93)

* Approximately 111,000 people are on probation in Los Angeles, where a single officer can at times have 1,000 cases. (LA Times 2/7/93)

* In New York 77% of probationers are felons, and fully a third of active cases are people who have been found guilty of violent crimes. (LA Times 2/7/93)

* In Los Angeles, where 3,300 probation deputies struggle to supervise 90,000 convicted adults and 21,000 juveniles, it's easy for young criminals to fall back into old patterns in their neighborhoods. (LA Times 2/7/93)

* ...we already have a massive community-based penal program. In fact, more than 60 percent of the people under the corrections tent are in it. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

* About 2.7 million people are on probation and another 500,000 are on parole in the United States right now. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

* According to the National Association of Criminal Justice Planners, between 1981 and 1987 the number of people paroled jumped 81 percent -- a figure that makes the 51 percent increase in the prison population seem almost manageable. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

* ...California probation officers frequently have more than 200 cases apiece, giving them about 10 minutes a week to work with each person under supervision. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

3E. Recidivism

General

* The fact is that the vast majority of violent crimes in the United States are committed by a relatively small group of predators. University of Pennsylvania Criminologist, Marvin Wolfgang studied the Philadelphia arrest records of males born there in 1945 and 1958. He found that 7% of each group committed two-thirds of all violent crime. (Phil Gramm Washington Post 10/29/93)

* Fully 62% of criminals are back behind bars three years after release. Some 108,000 studied by the U.S. had an incredible 1.9 million arrests. (USA Today 12/8/93)

* Only one percent of inmates released after the age of 55 return to the system within a year, as compared to 20 percent of offenders under the age of 25. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

* ...nearly two-thirds of probationers in California and in the rest of the country end up back in prison. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

Juveniles

* Nationally, about 60% of juvenile offenders end up breaking the law again. (Time 10/11/93 p.58)

* Habitual criminals have generally been arrested five or more times by the age of 18, and between arrests they get away with a dozen crimes. (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)

* A study by the National Institute of Justice found that 7 percent of violent teen-age criminals were responsible for 79 percent of violent criminal activity by youth. In California, the juvenile recidivism rate is 70 percent and rising, and 50 percent of its juvenile inmates have been arrested more than six times. (Washington Times 10/26/93)

* One report found that 80 percent of youths released in 1982 from juvenile were convicted of new offenses in a 6 1/2 year follow up period, and 40 percent were returned to confinement during the period... (Seattle Times 10/18/93)

* A 1990 survey of kids in confinement did a sample of offenders and found the youths had committed an average of 10.2 offenses prior to commitment. (Seattle Times 10/18/93)

* Two thirds of the teen-agers who break the law and appear in juvenile court will be back in front of a judge. (Dallas Morning News 9/20/93)

* ...the state's attorney in Miami remarked that 80 percent of the crimes in Dade county are committed by repeat offenders and the typical offender sentenced to 10 years in prison for armed robbery in fact serves 18 months or less. (Washington Times 9/24/93)

3F. Court Clog

* From 1982 to 1992 criminal drug cases in the federal courts increased 197% from 4,218 in 1982 to 12,512 in 1992. (LA Times 10/25/93)

* According to The Post's study, it took 17 months on average to complete a homicide case if it went to trial; plea-bargained cases took about a year to reach conclusion. (Washington Post ?)

4A. California Crime

Firearm Death

* Los Angeles County, where 1,530 were gun shot homicides victims in 1992.(LA Times 10/15/93)

* Last year, one in 10 U.S. gun homicides occurred in Los Angeles County.(LA Times 10/15/93)

LA County Firearm Death

	<u>Handgun Death</u>	<u>Total Firearm Death</u>
1992	1310	1530
1988	725	919
1983	620	784

(Uniform Crime Report--California branch (916) 227-3554)

Firearm Control

* California, which has a 15-day waiting period for the purchase of any gun..., last year halted sales involving 3,000 buyers with assault records and 34 with homicide records.(Phoenix Gazette 8/13/93)

* In California 11,622 handgun purchases have been stopped in the past two years, well over half of those by convicted criminals.(Wall Street Journal 11/18/93)

* Comdr. David Gascon of the Los Angeles Police Dept., pointed out that the state turned down more than 5,000 applications for gun permits each year because the buyers are felons or mental patients or have been convicted of certain violent misdemeanors.(NY Times 11/24/93)

Probation

* In Los Angeles, where 3,300 probation deputies struggle to supervise 90,000 convicted adults and 21,000 juveniles, it's easy for young criminals to fall back into old patterns in their neighborhoods.(LA Times 2/7/93)

* Approximately 111,000 people are on probation in Los Angeles, where a single officer can at times have 1,000 cases.(LA Times 2/7/93)

* ...California probation officers frequently have more than 200 cases apiece, giving them about 10 minutes a week to work with each person under supervision. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

LA Probation Statistics

	<u>Probation Officers</u>	<u>Adults on Probation</u>
1983	1,425	45,535
1988	1,798	67,771
1992	2,370	76,851

* Note that this does not include juvenile offenders

(Uniform Crime Report--California branch (916) 227-3554)

Prison System

* With more than 113,000 people incarcerated in California prisons, the state is 88 percent over capacity -- and has more people behind bars than the entire federal system. (San Francisco Chronicle 7/5/93)

* California built nine prisons in the eighties to relieve overcrowding and has plans to build another eight. Planners are already warning that the system will be just as crowded when construction is finished in 1996, with 163,100 inmates crammed into space designed for 74,700. (Washington Monthly 4/93)

Prison Population

	<u>California</u>
1963	26,133
1983	38,025
1992	105,467

* This data under represents the total number of people behind bars because it only tracks prisoners who have been sentenced for over one year. Total numbers are not available for 1963.

(Bureau of Justice Statistics--Corrections Specialist)

LA Gang Violence

	1992	1987	1983
Killed	803	387	216
Known Gangs	1,078		
Members	150,000		
Violent Felons (Robbery, Rape...)	20,000		
Serious Injury	25,000		
Drive-By Shootings	3,500		
Arrests involving:			
firearms	12,170		
handguns	10,562		
assault weapons	105		
Guns Recovered by Police	2,369		

* Due to the fact that gang violence has only become a major concern in recent years LA County-wide statistics are unavailable before 1990.

* The LA office did say that gang membership in the early 80's was about 70,000 and there were about 480 reported gangs.

* They also said it is fine to say that gang membership has more than doubled in the last ten years as has the number of reported gangs.

(G.R.E.A.T. -- a LA gang reporting group (310) 603-3100)

4B. Florida Crime

Crime Rate

* For years, Florida has suffered the highest overall crime rate of any state and the highest rate of violent crime. (U.S. News and World Report 10/11/93)

* Dade County's crime rate is the worst of all the nation's large Metropolitan areas, according to 1992 statistics released Saturday by the FBI...For every 100 residents, there were more than 12 serious crimes, more offenses per capita than anywhere else. (Orlando Sentinel 10/3/93)

Recidivism

* ...the state's attorney in Miami remarked that 80 percent of the crimes in Dade county are committed by repeat offenders and the typical offender sentenced to 10 years in prison for armed robbery in fact serves 18 months or less. (Washington Times 9/24/93)

Prison System

* Because of overcrowding, most everyone but drug dealers and murderers in Florida's prisons serves no more than 20 to 30 percent of the original sentence. (U.S. News and World Report 10/11/93)

5. Public Response

General

- * According to a USA Today/CNN/ Gallup Poll
 - 80% favor putting more police on the streets -- and paying higher taxes to do it.
 - 82% want to make it harder to parole violent inmates
 - 79% want tougher sentences for all crimes
 - 90% believe the USA's crime problem is growing
 - 64% want tougher gun laws
 - 86% say courts don't deal harshly enough with criminals(USA Today 10/28/93)
- * 45% believe police protection is worse in black neighborhoods. Among blacks it's 74%. (USA Today 10/29/93)
- * When asked what measures should be used for first-time juvenile offenders who commit major crime excluding murder, only 12% of those polled chose prison. Nearly 85% said military boot camps or job training were more appropriate. (USA Today 10/29/93)

Fear of Crime

- * In a Time/CNN poll conducted last week, 30% of those surveyed think suburban crime is at least as serious as urban crime -- double the numbers who said that true five years ago. (Time 8/23/93)
- * In a Time/CNN poll conducted last week, 61% of those surveyed say crime is increasing in their community and 57% think the Federal Government can do something significant about the problem. (Time 8/23/93)
- * ...only 29% of parents believe that most children are safe from violence while in school. (Kids and Guns, The Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence 1993)
- * The share of Americans who feel that most children in America live in safe neighborhoods dropped in the past seven years from 36% to 25%, according to a national poll released this May by LH Research. (CQ Researcher 9/3/93)

Gun Reform

- * A Los Angeles Times poll released yesterday found that, since the Brady gun control bill was passed last month, 64% of Americans still think gun control laws are not strong enough, while only 7% say they are too strong and 24% find them adequate. (Minneapolis Star Tribune 12/9/93)

* In a recent national poll, 52% favored a federal ban on handgun ownership and 63% supported a ban on the sale of automatic and semiautomatic weapons. (LA Times 10/15/93)

* A recent poll shows that 75% of those surveyed would support a tax on guns to pay for health care reform. (San Diego Union 10/11/93 pb6)

6. Social Cohesion

General

- * ...the most effective deterrent to crime is confidence in the future...the problem of crime and other improvident behavior is the problem of young people who think they have nothing to lose. (William Raspberry Washington Post 9/11/93)
- * Benjamin F. Chavis, Louis Farrakhan, and Jesse l. Jackson, who this weekend characterized the urban peace movement as a natural extension of the civil rights movement. "This is the new frontier of the civil rights struggle. It's the first time internal threats and self-destructive behavior...eclipses the external threats," Jackson said, referring to killing and violence in the black communities. (Washington Post 10/25/93)
- * Murder and gunfire are at record levels across the nation. It's not just the numbers, though, but the circumstances that are becoming so scary: more random, more insane, more petty, more unmitigatedly vicious. (Chicago Tribune 8/15/93)
- * ...we can't punish our way out of our crime problem and that effort to do so amount to trying to dig our way out of a hole. (Washington Post 10/27/93)
- * One person gets beaten and then another person. We've lowered ourselves to something that is not human. (NY Times 10/22/93)
- * "People used to know one crime victim. Now they know five -- or they have been one themselves." -- Pam Lychner founder Justice for All (Time 8/23/93)

Child Abuse

- * Eighty-four percent of prison inmates were abused as children. (Cong Rec 9/15/93 Mr. Dodd)
- * Psychologist Charles Ewing predicts that the annual number of juvenile homicides will continue to skyrocket, rising from 2,555 in 1990 to 8,000 by the year 2000. What seems to be driving this increase, he says, is an increase in child abuse, a characteristic he invariably finds in the backgrounds of young killers. (CQ Researcher 9/11/93)
- * ..child abuse in the home has increased 50 percent since 1985. (Cong Rec 9/15/93 Mr. Dodd)
- * Child abuse fatalities increased 50 percent between 1986 and 1992. (Cong Rec 9/15/93 Mr. Dodd)

Single Parents

* El Paso County District Attorney John Suthers, who notes that 70 percent of youthful offenders have no fathers at home. (Dallas Morning News 9/27/93)

* About a third of all American babies -- and a fully 68 percent of African-American infants -- are born to unwed mothers. (U.S. News and W. R. 11/8/93)

* Fully 70 percent of juvenile court cases involve children from single-parent families. (U.S. News and W.R. 11/8/93)

* Today 16.6 million children -- one in four -- live with one parent, double the proportion of two decades ago. Among black children, only about one third live in two parent households, while two-thirds lived in such households in 1960. (NY Times 11/14/93)

7A. Community Policing

Current Force Inadequate

* The U.S. spends some \$90 billion a year on the entire criminal-justice system. That includes \$35 billion for police protection, less than the country is spending on toiletries each year. (Business Week 12/13/93)

* Spending on prisons and the judicial system soared in the 1980s, but the number of police per 10,000 people barely rose. Indeed, in the second half of the decade, the total number of state and local police increased by only 16% while the number of violent crimes jumped by 37%. (Business Week 12/13/93)

* Inner-city America has a severe cop shortage. In the 1980's, as the inner-city crime problem grew, many big city police forces contracted. Today no major police force has enough officers to greatly increase the number of officers on foot patrol in its worst neighborhoods. (NY Times 11/13/93)

* 45% believe police protection is worse in black neighborhoods. Among blacks it's 74%. (USA Today 10/29/93)

Reduces Crime

* ...in Kansas City, Mo., Police Chief Stephen Bishop says homicides in housing projects were cut 50% by taking police out of cars and putting them on foot patrols. (USA Today 11/15/93)

* Vallejo, Ca., which has used community policing for six years and seen violent crime drop by 33%. (Business Week 12/13/93)

* New Haven's new law-enforcement policy, known as community policing, has yielded measurable results. Reported crime for the first six months of 1992 fell by 10.3% from the first half of 1991 -- a far bigger decline than the nationwide drop of about 2% over the same period. Preliminary crime figures through November 1992, the latest available, indicate that the downward trend is continuing. (CQ Researcher 2/5/93)

* Drug policy chief Brown cites the program he introduced when named New York police commissioner in 1990. After a year, he said, crime decreased in every category for the first time in 16 years. (Gannett News Service 9/25/93)

* Evidence from economic studies shows that putting more police on the front lines has more of a deterrent effect than longer prison sentences. Judge Richard Fitzgerald of Louisville explains: "Most cops I know think that what really deters is the certainty of apprehension, not the sanction that would be imposed." (Business Week 12/13/93)

Community Policing Increasing

* 400 cities use community policing. (CQ Researcher 2/5/93)

* A survey by the FBI and the National Center for Community Policing at Michigan State found half the cities with 50,000 or more residents have applied some form of community policing. Another 20% plan to in the next year. (Gannett News Service 9/25/93)

7B. Boot Camps

Prevalence

* 41 boot-camp programs for young adults exist in 25 states, with a total of 6,000 beds.(City and State 4/26/93)

* Prison boot camps were first established in 1983 in Georgia and Oklahoma, and today exist in 29 states in the US.(AP 10/27/93)

Recidivism

* Enax said the results square with statistics compiled by the Harris County Community Supervision and Corrections Department, which found that 85% of the over 2,300 men and women completing the program have not committed new crimes.(Houston Chronicle 11/5/93)

* A Sam Houston State University study found graduates emerge from the demanding probation regimen with better attitudes -- the key to staying out of trouble, officials said Thursday.(The Houston Chronicle 11/5/93)

Cost Savings

* In Louisiana, officials estimate they save \$750,000 for every 100 inmates who attend boot camp instead of being incarcerated.(City and State 4/26/93)

* The 23 boot-camp programs operating in the United States are also considered economical. In Massachusetts, each prison bed costs the state \$17,500 a year, but because the boot camp lasts four months, it handles three inmates in a year for the price of one.(Boston Globe 12/7/92)

* By giving inmates early release the state coincidentally has saved more than \$220 million over five years. New York is the largest program with a 3,000 per year inmate capacity...Illinois' Dixon Springs facility in the Shawnee National Forest is saving the state almost \$2 million a year by graduating inmates after a four-month program.(AP 4/11/93)

* The Boot-camp program in New York, the largest and perhaps the most successful, is believed to be saving the state millions of dollars a year.(Star Tribune 11/1/93)

* Georgia spends \$26-\$50 a day on a boot camp inmate, while the cost for each inmate in regular prison is \$48 a day.(Atlanta Constitution 11/28/93)

Other Benefits

* Officials told Townsend that youths in the program are able to go from an average 4.6 grade level to a sixth-grade level in three months, thanks to an educational program connected to the camp (near Cleveland). (The Plain Dealer 11/24/93)

* Besides being cheaper, these new prisons save nearby communities and the state thousands of dollars by the work they do on roads, irrigation ditches, municipal projects like school repair and dozens of other community service projects. (AP 4/11/93)

7C. Federal Firearm Licensing Reform

* More than a quarter-million Americans hold federal firearms licenses -- or FFLs -- allowing them to ship and receive large quantities of guns and ammunition. (LA Times 11/?/93)

* Too many dealers -- including some with criminal records -- peddle guns out of their homes and private offices often in direct violation of federal, state, and local firearm law. The feds estimate that these so-called "kitchen table" dealers make up fully four-fifths of those holding FFLs. (LA Times 11/?/93)

* Nationally, the AFT (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) has only 1,947 agents and even fewer compliance inspectors. (LA Times 11/?/93)

* 270,000 people now hold federal firearms licenses, which permit them to sell guns. Of those, about 20,000 are "stocking" gun dealers -- people who actually run gun stores. (Washington Post 11/19/93)

* The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms requires every dealer to submit an application plus \$30 to get a license. (Washington Times 12/6/93)

* Michael K. Beard, president of the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, said a tough national gun licensing system was reasonable. As an example of what he describes as a lax system where routine checks are not made, Mr. Beard said AFT has issued gun dealer permits to people in the District of Columbia, where gun sales are illegal. (Washington Times 12/6/93)

THE WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF DOMESTIC POLICY

CAROL H. RASCO
Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy

To: Reed
Corda

Draft response for POTUS
and forward to CHR by: _____

Draft response for CHR by: _____

Please reply directly to the writer
(copy to CHR) by: _____

Please advise by: _____

Let's discuss: _____

For your information: ☒ _____

Reply using form code: _____

File: _____

Send copy to (original to CHR): _____

Schedule ? : ☐ Accept ☐ Pending ☐ Regret

Designee to attend: _____

Remarks: _____



UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR

July 12, 1994

Mr. Phil Lader
Office of Chief of Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Lader:

One needs to worry now, even before the Crime Bill has passed, what is the next position the Administration is going to take on this key issue. Crime is high on people's minds. There is no sense suggesting that they are obsessed with the subject or act on the belief that the issue is fear and not violence and hence what they need is reassurance rather than crime control. The fear is realistic. Not only is crime still very high, but it is accumulative! The victims of each year's crime and their families and relatives and friends are added on to those of previous years. No one should underestimate the scope of the problem and the intensity of the feelings.

The current Crime Bill has some good stuff in it, but this is largely water under the bridge and it tends not to evoke much enthusiasm. The main question is: what are you going to do for me next? I suggest that a small group be set to focus on this question. While I do not have the answer to the question, I would like to bring to the table a suggestion for discussion: Enhance the certainty that a criminal be caught, convicted and serve the sentence. The problem now is that even with higher penalties, so few of the criminals are caught and from those caught -- only a few are convicted and from those only few serve time, that there is little deterrence and little public assurance even with three-strikes-you-are-out. We could get much better results, without increasing penalties and even eventually mitigating some (especially for first-time and non-violent ones) if we could ensure that a higher proportion of the criminals will be punished.

Ltr to Phil Lader
July 12, 1994
Page 2

If the group would agree that NO CRIMINAL SHOULD WALK is the next issue, we can turn to discuss what it entails to enhance certainty.

Just an idea for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Amitai Etzioni

Enclosure

Clip from the Washington Post
July 12, 1994

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The Washington Post

Sections

A News/Editorials
B Metro/Politics
C Business
D Sports/Columns/Classified
E Style/Features
F Reader Health
Today's Contents: Page A2

25c

Printed May Vary in Areas Outside
Metropolitan Washington (See Box on A3)

TUESDAY, JULY 12, 1994

Weather

Today: Partly sunny, hot. High 90.
Low 72. Wind southwest 6-12 mph.
Wednesday: Partly sunny.
Hot, humid. High 94. Low 74.
Wind southwest 6-12 mph.
Yesterday: Temp. range 69-86.
AQI: 50. Details on Page B2.

117th Year ... No. 219

117th Year

No. 219

THE GOVERNORS FLORIDA'S LAWTON CHILES

Social Reformer of '90 Now Toes the Hard Line *Expediency or Not, Crime Is the Issue*

By William Booth
Washington Post Staff Writer

MIAMI

At a recent town meeting in this city that has grown increasingly uneasy about violent crime, Florida Gov. Lawton Chiles (D) did what he vowed he would never do. He bragged about executing death row prisoners.

"I have had as many go down as my predecessor," Chiles boasted, responding to an angry question about why he refuses to sign more death warrants.

The public transformation from the aw-shucks "Walkin' Lawton" of years past to a tough-talking crimebuster says more about Florida and the nation than it does about Chiles. For this is an election year in a frightened and fickle state whose fears have become a crystallization of the national obsession with crime.

When he was elected governor four years ago, the former senator was rebounding from terminal burnout after 18 years in Washington, D.C. He vowed to "reinvent government" in Florida and to "invest"—the modern politician's term for spending—vast amounts of money

in education, "Healthy Start" programs and elderly care.

But in his state-of-the-state address to the legislature this year, Chiles flatly stated a far different theme: "The most urgent priority facing us this session is crime." His list of 1994 accomplishments begins with 17,033 new prison spaces.

The many Republicans who want to replace Chiles say he is cynically repositioning himself in an election year. But less partisan Chiles-watchers say he is doing something far more revealing: Giving the voters what they want.

"Four years ago, Chiles was in a position to define the political agenda. Now he's a captive of it," said Richard Scherr, a University of Florida political scientist.

In his address introducing this year's agenda before the regular legislative session, Chiles spoke as much about social control as he did about social programs, particularly about getting tough with "deadbeat dads," welfare moms and gun-wielding teenagers.

While Chiles still believes in prevention—and is willing to work for it, particularly his version of health care reform—more often these days

See GOVERNORS, A4, Col. 1



Saying he was burned out in nation's capital, Chiles went home to reinvent government. The crime issue seems to have transformed him.

the Hard Line Against Crime



Democrats Lawton Chiles, right, and Buddy McKay thank Floridians for electing them governor and lieutenant governor in November 1990.



Chiles in '70 ran for U.S. Senate with 1,000-mile hike across the state.

Chiles often wants to put Florida on the cutting edge of social reform, envisaging a state where children go to magnet schools, needy mothers get free prenatal care and the elderly play canasta in subsidized day-care centers. It is a progressive vision in which "a reinvented government" does more, not less, does it better and pays for it—in Chiles's heart of hearts—by higher taxes.

Chiles says he believes his state—and the country—wants creative, progressive but pragmatic solutions for health care, crime and governmental organization. And in the last

few months, the activist governor has been in the spotlight.

First, he sued the U.S. government to recoup money spent on illegal aliens. Then he and his allies sneaked an amendment through the legislature to allow them to sue tobacco companies for the money Florida spends on caring for sick smokers. Bashing tobacco is popular, but the bill was so broadly written it evoked the wrath of Florida's business community.

Then, Chiles again tried—unsuccessfully—to push through an extension of his health care reform during a highly politicized special session of the legislature last month.

But for all his pushing, Chiles repeatedly has been forced to accept that many Florida voters want nothing more complicated than personal security and low taxes.

Though still populated with retirees, Florida increasingly is filled with young families and immigrants, who mostly work in the service industry.

"It's a real middle-class state with a real middle-class philosophy with real limitations on the pocket book," said Lance deHaven-Smith, associate director of the Florida Institute on Government at Florida Atlantic University.

The voters want decent but not expensive public schools, accessible universities, better highways, low taxes and minimum government, de-

Haven-Smith said. They care far less about bullet trains running between Orlando and Miami and world-class universities. DeHaven-Smith calls it "a discount California."

"The people made the message very strong and very hard, and I think Chiles is adapting," said Dominic Calabro, executive director of Florida Tax Watch, the state's fiscal watchdog. "I think Chiles is responding to what Floridians want and what they're willing to pay for."

In his inaugural address in 1991, Chiles spoke of cleaning up government, strengthening ethics rules, winning back the trust of the voters and entering into "a covenant" with the people to help the state become more of a community. It was the same "covenant" that Bill Clinton spoke of in 1992. Both politicians, however, have since dropped the term.

In 1992, Chiles spoke of the need for \$1.3 billion in new taxes, the largest increase ever proposed in the state, mostly to pay for social programs, including his first proposals to dramatically reform Florida's health care system. He called for an additional \$600 million for education, the largest single increase. Public safety consumed only six lines of his 18-page speech.

Yet his attempt to increase taxes before the "right-sized" government was a disaster that, two years later, still makes voters seethe. And the tax issue promises to be a club that Republicans will use to beat up on Chiles throughout the campaign.


Indeed, in the aftermath of Chiles's attempted tax hike, his approval rating plummeted. Even today, in a state where over half the voters are registered Democrats, Chiles does not get 50 percent of the vote in polls against GOP challengers such as Bush and state Insurance Commissioner Tom Gallagher.

What people seem to want before anything else is for somebody to do something about crime.

In the last year, Floridians have been barraged by splatter-news about violent crime, particularly crimes committed by seemingly remorseless and well-armed teenagers, such as the one who shot and killed a hapless German tourist as he drove with his pregnant wife to his Miami Beach hotel.

There is an edginess about the place, a feeling that even the old safe harbors—interstate rest stops, shopping malls, the home—are no longer secure.

FLORIDA: THE PEOPLE AND THE ISSUES




SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1993

... and a get-tough stance by Gov. Lawton Chiles (D) recently has helped his standing.

"How would you rate the performance of the governor?"

(Those who answered excellent or pretty good)



SOURCE: Mason-Dixon Political/Media Research Inc.

In a recent survey of likely female voters, for example, Mason Dixon Florida polling found that 49 percent considered the state "very dangerous" and 45 percent said "somewhat dangerous." Only 6 percent of respondents felt relatively safe.

It is not surprising that, when asked about the 1994 legislative session, Chiles told the Miami audience, "it was about juvenile justice, juvenile justice and juvenile justice."

Now, criminal juveniles are no longer treated by the state's Health and Rehabilitative Services agency but by a new juvenile justice agency.

Chiles's early attempts to reinvent government have met with mixed success. The state did pass new ethics rules, but many of the governor's most ambitious plans to streamline government are still in the planning stages.

Calabro of Florida Tax Watch characterizes the overhaul as "a lot of little steps in the right direction."

Yet, a recent poll by a group of Florida newspapers, called the Voice of Florida Project, found that 72 percent of voters listed government waste as a critical concern.

Clearly, Chiles's prescription for reform has not satisfied the public. They think the Chiles administration discovered that reinventing government makes for bad politics," Phillip Longman, political editor of Florida Trend, the state's top business magazine, which recently concluded that the Chiles administration has only just begun to "right government bureaucracies. In an illustration accompanying Longman's view of Chiles's right-sizing effort, a turkey is shown entering a Rube Goldberg apparatus, only to emerge as the same turkey at the end.

"They thought they needed simplistic issues the public could understand and they could run Longman said.

This year, the issue is crime.



Jose -
F41

UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR

October 26, 1993

Mr. Bruce Reed
Dr. William A. Galston
Deputy Assistants to the President
Domestic Policy Council
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bruce and Bill:

From the side lines it seems desirable to have a small group thinking through a position on violence. There seems to be no visible strategy on the matter and many of the details are fraught with obvious and not so self-evident dangers. Community policing is a very good idea, but it does not reduce crime, most times. (There are other reasons to favor it, but those need to be articulated.) Gun control is very effective but ... Longer sentences do not do the trick; we need more certitude that those who commit crimes will be caught, convicted and serve. Attacking violence on TV scares our friends in Los Angeles, etc. etc.

In the very truncated welfare exercise I was urged to bring in one of each kind and not to have an agenda. That may have served its purpose, but here what is needed is a more focused effort, maybe a group of four people from the inside and maybe a few from the outside, who share the same perspective, to see if a basic position can be worked out that gives the numerous policy items some kind of theme-home.

For your consideration.

Best,

Amitai Etzioni

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THE ROAD AHEAD:

This morning, the Bulletin invites John J. DiIulio, Jr., Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at Princeton University, and a Senior Fellow in Governmental Studies at the Brookings Institution, to discuss the crime bill.

BULLETIN: How do you see the crime bill being resolved?

DIULIO: I think that there will be a crime bill and the bill will look much more like the House May 1994 version than the Senate November 1993 version. But it will be a compromise bill in which both sides will get a fair amount of what they want. The movement toward the House provisions will be a movement toward greater emphasis on prevention programs and social service style programs, and also an emphasis on changing the sentencing structure with respect to certain categories of drug offenders. It doesn't by any means dismantle sentencing guidelines, but it really would reduce the number of people who are in Federal prisons for drug offenses by reducing their terms. Given where the Senate began in November 1993, that is really a sea-change. The Senate version of this bill kept all existing mandatory minimum sentences, increased some of the gang-related mandatory minimum terms and also created new categories of mandatory minimums for certain drug-related and gang-related sentences.

BULLETIN: How do you think they will resolve the issue of "racial bias" in capital punishment sentencing?

DIULIO: My guess is that this is a huge bargaining chip for some House Democrats who will in the final analysis yield [on racial bias] and push more dollars from prison construction to prevention. I can't believe that the Senate will allow anything that looks like the Racial Justice Act to go through.

BULLETIN: If the bill does pass, how soon will we see 100,000 new policemen on the street, and what difference will they make in helping to deter crime?

DIULIO: Today, you have about 600,000 police officers in the US. So 100,000 additional police would represent a significant increase over present manpower levels. But the money in the crime bill for officers is essentially seed money; 85 percent of the money gets spent on manpower, 15 percent gets spent on everything else -- plans to encourage community policing, innovative policing, etc. I'm hoping that the Office of Justice Programs will figure out a way to target the money on big city jurisdictions, and that they would make the extension of those funds contingent in the out years on [cities] targeting such funds as they get on the most crime-plagued inner city neighborhoods.

Also, the states and localities are going to have to figure out a way to make sure this program doesn't become another back-door, unfunded mandate. The carrot here could be a poison carrot. Jurisdictions that go on and hire new officers could find the Federal money running out by the time they are just beginning to find out if they [new officers] make a difference at the margin.

Finally, it takes about 10 officers to get one officer on the beat around the clock. So, 100,000 new officers translates into 10,000 officers on the beat around the clock. And if you spread those new officers out in various jurisdictions this provision at best might increase the police force actual street enforcement strength at any given period in a big city by about 10 percent or less. If those cops aren't deployed in the most crime-torn areas, I wouldn't expect to see any impact. The cumulative probability that the policing title of the bill will have any direct, solid impact on crime I think is really small.

BULLETIN: Will we have to revisit our investment in crime prevention when the "demographic time bomb" of millions of inner-city teenagers reaching their most crime-prone age explodes in a few years?

DI IULIO: The interesting thing about the debate thus far is that we've been conducting it on the assumption that the crime problem now is about as bad as it's going to get. We have on the horizon a huge population of young males -- white, black and brown -- who have all the characteristics of people at risk of becoming victims of crime and of becoming criminals. The implications there for what will be needed just to maintain present levels of crime-control, let alone decrease crime or enhance public safety, haven't really been addressed. So, in the final analysis this whole debate may look like a rather fanciful exercise.

BULLETIN: So what possible solutions should we be looking at?

DI IULIO: First, we should be looking at ways that people in poor, crime-torn neighborhoods can do what the rest of American society has done -- namely take measures to make the environment in which they live, work, recreate, and go to school relatively crime-free. There are things the government can do, whether it is Uncle Sam helping to evict drug dealers from public housing, or providing vouchers so people can put dead bolt locks in public housing or in private housing for that matter. Secondly, I think increased police manpower would be a good thing. But unless we are really talking about targeting it -- saturation, community-based policing of inner city neighborhoods -- I don't think we should bother. If we're going to spread the money around and have an increase of only one or two police officers on the beat it's not worth it.

Third, given the amount of crime that is committed by probationers and parolees, we are going to have to get serious and end policies that put violent offenders back on the street.

BULLETIN: Are you suggesting, then, that instead of "three strikes and you're out," that we should have a system where on the first strike the criminal really serves a lengthy prison term?

DI IULIO: I would suggest that if you have a situation where someone has been through the system who has committed one or two violent crimes, you should subject them in their most crime-prone years to a definite period of time to incarceration or very intense supervision. Of the 4.5 million people on corrections supervision, 3.5 million are not incarcerated. Of those who are not incarcerated, the vast majority are on probation, and the vast majority of probationers don't comply with even the basic terms

of their probation, like showing up for meetings with their probation officer or taking drug tests or anything else. We know that over a fifth of all murder arrestees are on probation or parole at the time of the murder.

BULLETIN: One of President Clinton's most impassioned speeches was to the black ministers in Memphis, where he called to an end to the cycle of inner-city violence. How do you evaluate his performance on this issue?

DIJULIO: In that speech, when President Clinton said words to the effect that if Dr. Martin Luther King could come back to the pulpit today, he might say, "I fought for the right of black people to live without being harmed by whites. I didn't fight for the right for blacks to be killed with reckless abandon by other blacks," his heart and head was in the right place. But I think he has a lot of internal contradictions to solve within the Justice Department. It was not until the President's 1994 State of the Union Address that the Attorney General and the Justice Department generally stopped saying the things they had been saying about crime -- that there are way too many drug offenders behind bars. Not that they are necessarily wrong in every respect, but I think that the President's position is much closer to the position of most Americans on this issue.

Will the President who gave that State of the Union speech sign what is likely to be in the compromise version of this crime bill, with all of its watered-down provisions? For example, House Democrats are pushing and the President is not pushing against these provisions that would water down the drug laws and relax drug sentences...Either he's not focusing on it or he's focusing on it and thinks this is the best he can do in the way of a compromise.

Secondly, for the kinds of community policing the President has been talking about, he has to know there is seed money...There's no evidence that I can see that the President has followed through to do either the political bargaining or the administrative follow-through to see that the policy reality matches his policy rhetoric....

You could propose something more ambitious by shifting funds around in the \$30 billion crime bill to increase community policing and police manpower. This priority would be ahead of prison construction, ahead of these prevention and treatment programs, with the possible exception of prison-based drug treatment, which is a relatively small piece of this budgetary pie anyway.

dpc special report

Fighting Crime and Violence: The Democratic Agenda

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Democratic Policy Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

George J. Mitchell, Chairman
Thomas A. Daschle, Co-Chairman

democratic policy committee

Fighting Crime and Violence: The Democratic Agenda

"Americans have been, are, and will continue to be absolutely outraged at violence. They consider it the first priority of any criminal justice effort in America. They want something done in their communities, in the State, and in this Nation...if we start talking about it in common sense terms, if we start putting our dollars where our mouths are and start using common sense approaches that balance punishment and prevention, we can make a difference."

Attorney General Janet Reno
Speech at Dept. of Justice
October 15, 1993

Democrats are ready to act on a comprehensive crime and anti-violence agenda to make Americans safer and more secure. There are three measures in the Democratic package:

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993:

- a comprehensive anti-crime package to put more police on the streets and to put more effective tools in the hands of State and local law enforcement officials, with three significant new programs in this year's bill.

The Violence against Women Act:

- the first comprehensive Federal effort to address the growing problem of violent crime affecting women.

The Brady bill:

- a gun control measure to help prevent criminals from purchasing handguns.

As a package, these measures are a significant first step toward a safer and more secure America. They will provide:

- more police on the street;
- swift, certain, and effective punishment for criminals;
- more prisons to house violent state offenders;
- special drug courts to deal with the Nation's most pervasive crime problem;
- safer neighborhoods, with special programs dealing with gang violence and schools;
- greater control of handguns; and,
- assistance to victims of domestic violence.

According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Democratic agenda provides resources at the State and local level — where the need is greatest.

- State and local police are responsible for 95 percent of all arrests.
- State and local prosecutors and officials prosecute 95 percent of all defendants and punish 95 percent of all convicted criminals.
- Thirty-two States are under court order to ease prison overcrowding.

The President and Attorney General strongly support this approach, along with the National District Attorneys Association and many attorneys general.

Crime: The Nation's Dilemma

"Violence in America is an epidemic. It is one of the leading causes of death and injury for our young people...."

"We, as taxpayers, are paying the price for violence in our society."

Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders
Testimony before House Government
Operations Committee
November 1, 1993

Americans are concerned about their personal security: 29 percent of Americans either have been a victim or had a family member be a victim of crime in the last three years; 55 percent of Americans believe that they will be victims of crime; and, 86 percent list crime as an important personal fear.¹

The latest FBI statistics², which underscore the need for effective action, show that violent crimes reported in 1992 exceeded 1.9 million offenses. According to this report, in the United States there is:

- one violent crime every 22 seconds;
- one murder every 22 minutes;
- one forcible rape every five minutes;
- one robbery every 47 seconds; and,
- one aggravated assault every 28 seconds.

In terms of the number of victims, the statistics are shocking.

- Over 1.5 million individuals are victims of assault each year; more than 650,000 women are the victims of rape; and, over 22,000 people die from homicide.³
- Homicide is the tenth leading cause of death in the United States.⁴
- Homicide is the second leading cause of death among 15- to 24-year-olds, and is the leading cause of death among 15- to 34-year-old black males.⁵

The United States has the highest homicide rate of any western industrialized nation, particularly among 15- to 24-year-old men. For example, the rate of 21.9 homicides for every 100,000 young men between 15-24 far exceeds the rates in other industrialized nations. Canada's rate for this same age group was approximately four for every 100,000 young men. Most other nations, including Germany and Japan, had rates of fewer than 2.0 for every 100,000 young men.⁶

Crime and Punishment. Meanwhile, prison space for criminals is becoming scarce. Currently, more than one million persons are serving prison terms throughout the United States, the highest number in the Nation's history. Thirty-two States are under court order to address their prison-overcrowding problems. Judicial orders to alleviate prison overcrowding do not differentiate between inmates for whom early release may be appropriate and those who pose a continuing threat to others.

By the end of 1992, State prisons housed 840,000 inmates and local prisons held an additional 450,000 persons. The price tag for this incarceration is steep: State spending on prisons doubled between 1986 and 1992.⁷

Crime and Health Care. Crime and violence also affect our health care system. According to former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, "Violence is as much a public health issue for me and my successors in this country as smallpox, tuberculosis, and syphilis were for my predecessors in the last two centuries."

- Medical care for violence cost \$13.5 billion last year, much of it in unreimbursed costs.⁸
- Criminal violence in the United States costs \$3.5 billion a year in hospital charges alone, with \$1.5 billion of that due to firearm injuries.⁹
- An average cost of a gunshot wound patient is \$8,000, with 80 percent of the cost paid by public funds.¹⁰

In the District of Columbia alone, 11 acute-care hospitals spent more than \$20 million treating injuries from violent crime in 1989.

"Violence is driving up the costs of health care," Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders told the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Human Resources on November 1.

Crime and the Family. In recent years, U.S. Surgeons General have warned that family violence poses the single largest threat of injury to adult women in this country.

- One million women a year seek medical attention for injuries caused by violence at the hands of a male partner.¹¹
- One-third of all women who are murdered die at the hands of a husband or boyfriend.¹²
- Children in homes with family violence are 15 times more likely to be abused or neglected than children in peaceful homes.¹³

A comprehensive approach to crime should include measures to address domestic violence, as the Democratic agenda does.

The Democratic Agenda on Crime

The Democratic Agenda can make a difference in its fight against crime because it addresses the needs for safer streets, more effective punishments and treatment of offenders, greater control of handguns, and domestic violence.

I. The *Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993*

A significant portion of **S. 1607**, the *Violent Crime Control bill*, is new. This year's *Violent Crime Control bill* provides for a larger, more visible police presence in the streets to reduce opportunities for crime and enhance the security of neighborhood residents. It revives the concept that criminal activity will result in a cost to the criminal by ensuring appropriate and adequate punishments for all offenders. It helps ensure that drug offenders receive appropriate treatment, and it targets programs to reduce gang violence and rural crime.

Community Policing

Police, criminal justice professionals, and community leaders all tell us that more police on the street means less crime. Yet most U.S. police officers today cover large precincts in cruisers or spend their days behind desks at precinct offices. Because of demands on their time, police appear on the scene only after a crime has been committed.

The focus must switch from showing up and making an arrest after a crime is committed to police being there, on the street, in the neighborhood before a crime is committed.

Many local communities have begun to incorporate community policing strategies in their crime prevention programs. In Houston, cops on the beat reduced violent crimes by 17 percent. In New York City neighborhoods, community policing programs have cut violent street crimes by seven percent. This strategy is successful and deserves replication nationwide.¹⁴

The crime package will help localities put this program into effect in two ways:

- The community policing program will put 100,000 officers on the streets over the next five years. This fulfills the President's pledge of 100,000 additional police officers.
- The Police Corps program will recruit more than 5,000 college students to serve as police officers, and 4,000 in-service officers will receive college scholarships to enhance their skills. This seed program is modeled on ROTC to give all willing students, particularly inner-city students, the ability to pursue higher education by making a commitment to spend no less than four years in payback time on a local police force, following graduation.

Prisons and Boot Camps

The *Violent Crime Control bill's* goal is tough punishment which is swift, certain and effective for all criminals, including juveniles. First and foremost, this means that violent criminals must be removed from our communities and held in secure prisons. Many States do not now have sufficient space to house all their violent offenders; nor do the Federal and State governments combined have the money to continue to build more and more prisons.

Violent Offenders. Violent offenders must go to jail and serve lengthy sentences. This bill authorizes grants for the construction of new regional prison facilities for violent offenders or operating costs for existing State facilities which are under-used due to lack of funds.

Non-Violent Offenders. Non-violent offenders deserve punishment, but it need not be high-cost \$20,000 per capita per annum incarceration. Non-violent offenders deserve to be deprived of freedom of movement, they deserve monitoring and control, but none of these activities has to occur in a traditional high-cost prison setting to be effective.

The *Violent Crime Control bill* encourages States to run boot camp prisons — at one-third the cost of traditional prisons — for nonviolent offenders who can be punished effectively in boot camps, but now are taking up precious prison space. Separating out those nonviolent offenders for more cost-effective sentencing is just as “tough,” but it is much smarter. Today, 41 boot camp prison-style facilities operate in 26 State correctional systems. The rate of recidivism, or offenders who repeatedly return to prison, is consistently lower than cases where traditional in-prison incarceration has been used.

Drug Treatment for Prisoners. Those criminals who are addicts must get treatment. As former Drug Director William Bennett has acknowledged, drug treatment programs in prisons are effective at cutting crime. Indeed, evidence shows that drug treatment for prisoners cuts recidivism in half. Drug treatment is also cost-effective. Every \$1 spent on treatment of drug offenders saves \$3 later.

The bill funds drug testing and treatment in the new regional prisons authorized for construction. These prisons will house and treat State violent drug offenders.

Drug Court Programs

Drug courts seek to take the processes of criminal courts beyond their current limits of arraignment, conviction, and sentencing to a step beyond.

Drug courts take the place of community support systems where those systems have broken down, most particularly in our inner cities. In addition to the arraignment, conviction, and sentencing process, drug courts take the further step of assigning eligible (nonviolent, younger, first-time) drug offenders to a program of intensive supervision and strictly enforced requirements for personal responsibility. Drug court offenders are required to stay off drugs, to find and keep a job, and to submit to random testing for drug use, with prison time as the disciplinary incentive.

In Florida, Dade County’s drug courts in the past four years have seen the recidivism rate by offenders fall from 33 percent to three percent. It has proven to be a practical and money-saving approach that deserves to be replicated nationally. It could save taxpayers billions over time as drug offenders are disciplined to steer themselves into responsible, law-abiding life styles.

Youth Violence and Safe Schools

Polls indicate that nothing creates more intense fear among American parents than the dangers associated with unsafe schools. Data from the 1990 national school-based Youth Risk Behavior survey¹⁵ indicate that approximately one out of every five high school students carried a firearm, knife, or club at least once during the month preceding the survey.

Children bringing weapons to school, gangs of truants and dropouts harassing and intimidating schoolchildren all create an environment in which learning is secondary to personal safety. The crime package addresses the problem in two direct ways: prevention, to steer youngsters away from violence, and enforcement, to make sure violent youngsters are punished and others are deterred.

Prevention. The *Violent Crime Control bill* provides grants to States for anti-gang and drug education programs. The Boys Club/Girls Club programs in public housing projects are an example of successful ways to give children in impoverished or insecure neighborhoods an alternative place to spend their time and energy rather than on the streets. States want to expand such programs; these grants will give them the resources to do so.

The bill also contains grants for schools to develop more effective programs of drug education, dispute resolution and mediation, and other efforts geared to teaching children non-violent ways to resolve conflicts, to create peer communities to compete with the tug of street gang loyalties; and, to reach the children before gang members reach them.

Enforcement. The *Violent Crime Control bill* stiffens the penalty for using children to sell or distribute drugs in "drug-free" zones, such as around schools, and toughens penalties for gang-related and drug-related offenses by minors.

The *Violent Crime Control bill* encourages States to treat those most violent among juveniles as adults. It provides grants for programs, referred to as bind-over systems, which permit States to charge and prosecute the most violent minors as adults. Too many 16- and 17-year-olds are relying on the relative leniency of juvenile courts. These offenders need to understand that age alone will not be the only criterion by which their actions will be judged. Additionally, it authorizes funds for secure facilities to house violent juveniles.

Rural Crime

Although crime in rural areas pales numerically against crime in urban areas, the rate of rural crime has risen astronomically in recent years. FBI Uniform Crime Reports show that in 1992 in rural America violent assaults rose 30 times faster than in urban settings; rural rapes rose nine percent while urban rapes decreased by four percent; and, rural drug abuse arrests rose 23 percent. New drugs such as ICE (smokable metamphetamine) and CAT (an inhalant) have joined marijuana growth and production as a serious element in criminal substance abuse in rural areas.

The *Violent Crime Control bill* includes \$50 million in additional funds to allow smaller rural police agencies to take advantage of more sophisticated criminal investigation techniques through partnerships with Federal officials and to set up drug task forces, as well as to provide additional law enforcement agents for rural forces.

II. The Violence Against Women Act

"Today I rise to speak about one of the most tragic and growing health care threats in our country today: violence against women. National statistics are shocking and demand our concern and attention.... Over 3,800 adults and children fled their homes and stayed in shelters to avoid domestic violence in 1992."

Senator Jay Rockefeller, (D-WV)
Congressional Record
January 26, 1993

This bill, **S. 11**, has been incorporated into **S. 1607**. While the escalating occurrence of violent crimes afflict all people, there are some crimes, including rape and family violence, that disproportionately burden women. This measure attempts to make both streets and homes safer for women.

The Violence against Women Act:

- provides State and local governments over \$300 million for various programs to combat crimes against women;
- authorizes the creation of a national hotline to provide assistance and information to victims of domestic violence;
- creates a Federal remedy for interstate incidents of domestic abuse;
- requires protective orders issued in one State for the purpose of keeping a violent spouse away to be recognized and enforced in other States; and,
- provides a civil rights remedy for victims of gender-motivated violent crimes.

In her floor statement on January 26, 1993, Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA), author of the House version in the 102nd Congress, said that this Act "would break the cycle of domestic violence by providing additional funding for the arrest and prosecution of spouse abusers, for battered women's shelters, and for educating youths in all school grades about domestic violence and violence among intimate partners."

III. The *Brady Bill*

"[P]olls show that 95 percent of Americans support it, 87 percent of gun owners support it. Every single major law enforcement organization in the country supports the Brady bill. Four former Presidents — Reagan, Carter, Ford, and Nixon — support this measure."

Senator Howard Metzenbaum
Congressional Record
February 24, 1993

The *Brady bill* is named after James Brady, the Reagan Administration press secretary who was permanently disabled from a gunshot wound sustained during an attempted assassination of the President. Since this incident, both Jim Brady and his wife Sarah have become the pre-eminent lobbyists for gun control legislation at the Federal level.

The purpose of the *Brady bill* is to keep guns out of the hands of criminals. The bill requires a background check of prospective handgun purchasers. It contains a two-phase approach to gun control, requiring States to implement a five-day waiting period until a computerized background check system can be set up.

Building on this experience, the *Brady bill*:

- requires a five-day waiting period prior to the purchase of a handgun, during which time a background check of the prospective purchaser can be conducted by local law enforcement officials; and,
- establishes a centralized criminal record system, to be used in the development of an instant criminal background check system for point-of-purchase screening of prospective buyers of firearms.

The waiting period will be removed when the computerized criminal background check system is operational.

Several States have laws requiring waiting periods or background checks. Statistics show that in these States felons are being stopped by the thousands in their attempt to purchase firearms. For example:

- California has a 15-day waiting period that stopped 5,859 prohibited firearm sales in 1991 and 5,763 in 1992.¹⁶
- Maryland has had a seven-day waiting period in effect since 1966. Every year approximately four percent of all handgun sales are prevented, because the buyer is a prohibited owner.¹⁷
- New Jersey law requires a background check for handgun purchases. According to New Jersey State Police, more than 10,000 felons have been caught trying to purchase handguns.¹⁸

Conclusion

This comprehensive crime and anti-violence package strikes at crime with proven programs and has the ability to make a real impact in the Nation's ability to fight crime. The community policing program, the drug court program, the provisions to deal with the prison overcrowding problem, the programs aimed at curbing youth violence, the rural crime initiatives, the *Brady bill*, and *Violence Against Women Act* together can make a difference in our attack on crime. While these programs are only a first step — it is a big step.

As Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and author of the *Violent Crime Control Bill*, has stated, "passing this bill...is about solutions — solutions that are going to make things better for people in our communities to deter crime and improve the safety of our communities."

U.S. SUBURBS ARE UNDER SIEGE

A new wave of carjackings, muggings, and parking lot robberies is frightening residents and shoppers. Businesses are scrambling for ways to cope. ■ by Alan Farnham

ON MOCKINGBIRD LANE: rape. On Magnolia: robbery. On Spruce: gunshots. All across suburbia—on streets named after birds and trees and blossoms—fear is spreading. It is beginning to change the way suburbanites (nearly half the U.S. population) spend their money, how they drive, where and when they shop, how they dress. It has darkened the thoughts of parents when they hear something that goes bump in the night.

In a bedroom in Fairfield, Connecticut, a

little girl awakens in the dark. There, in the middle of her floor, is a man sitting in the moonlight, emptying her coin jar. She doesn't know it, but he has been in the house for an hour. He has removed the TV and stereo from downstairs already. Now he's going after pennies. She stays still, hoping he won't notice her. Finally she fidgets. A pillow falls off the bed. The robber bolts. Her daddy shouts, "Who's there?" But the thief is already gone.

A few blocks away, on another night, a

neighbor and his wife are driving home from their country club, to which GE's Jack Welch also belongs. Suddenly a car pulls ahead of them, cutting them off. Before they know what is happening, a man jumps out, pulls a gun, and forces them from their Mercedes convertible. They've suffered a carjacking—three blocks from home.

These crimes aren't peculiar to Connecticut or the Northeast. They're happening nationwide. A 1991 survey by the National Opinion Research Council found that

Scared consumers don't shop. To reassure them, retailers are getting help: Detective Mitch Jacobs watches over Dadeland Mall near Miami, Florida.



more than 42% of residents in suburbs of major cities were afraid to walk in their neighborhoods at night.

And for good reason. Suburban crime recently *has* gotten worse. Violent crime (robberies, rapes, aggravated assaults, murder, and manslaughter) increased over 30% between 1985 and 1991, according to FBI statistics. True, on a crime per capita basis, suburbia was more dangerous in the 1970s; today's rate, while rising, is still below historical highs. Nevertheless, people don't find comfort in such statistics once they hear of a rape or mugging at the local mall.

Everyone has stories to tell—if only from TV. The Exxon executive who was surprised in his driveway, kidnapped, killed. Gail Shollar, the woman from Piscataway, New Jersey, who was carjacked while trying to return an overdue video of *Beauty and the Beast*. After police circulated a missing-person poster of her, she was found days later—dead, stripped naked—her face and her fate forever burned into the minds of anyone who saw the poster.


Where fact ends, rumor starts. A new suburban folklore is aborning. The same man whose Mercedes was stolen in Connecticut has since told his wife not to patronize the local mall. Why? Because he has heard—no, he *knows*—that a man is hiding under the parked cars there, waiting to reach out with a razor and slash women's legs. (Local variations of the rumor are circulating in Iowa, North Carolina, and other states. The Carolina version has the man, disguised as an old lady, asking shoppers for a lift. Once he is in the car, he brandishes a hatchet.)

Justified or not, fear is altering suburban life. It is the reason old people leave the streets at dusk, the reason young parents miss work to walk their sons and daughters to school. It is why drivers, fearing they'll be carjacked if they slow down, run red lights and ignore stop signs. Says Amitai Etzioni, a professor of political science, sociology, and economics at George Washington University: "There is a new level of fright, and it's a psychological time bomb. Sooner or later, people may ask for somebody to save them. It could be a demagogue."

Meantime, fear is already affecting business, making locksmiths and the producer of Mace happy but cutting further into the profits of retailers, who must devote an increasing share of their take to protecting—

REPORTER ASSOCIATE Tricia Welsh

or at least reassuring—customers. For months, mall shop owners have been concerned that a recent spate of highly publicized suburban crimes along the East Coast might deter a sorely needed surge in Christmas shopping. So far the falloff has not materialized, but at best an uneasy calm prevails.



This New Jersey carjacking victim was later found—dead.

Nobody ever claimed crime was quarantined within big cities. "You look at these scattered houses, and you are impressed by their beauty," says a country-weekending Sherlock Holmes to Watson in an 1889 story. "I look at them, and the only thought which comes to me is the impunity with which crime may be committed there. The lowest and vilest alleys in London do not present a more dreadful record of sin than does the smiling and beautiful countryside." Indeed, one of the vilest crimes in U.S. history was 1932's suburban kidnapping and murder of Charles Lindbergh's 20-month-old son.

Lindbergh, however, was a celebrity, and rich to boot. One might have expected him to be a target. Today's victims, by contrast, are nobodies.

Who, after all, was Pamela Basu? Just a mother, driving her daughter to preschool in Savage, Maryland, when, suddenly, she was carjacked. Tangled in her seat belt, she was dragged more than a mile before she died. When so heinous a crime strikes an ordinary citizen, millions of her peers think: Wait a minute—that could have been me.

Suburban police alone can do little to quell the fear. Used to facing down tavern drunks, they are having to confront the boldest big-city gangs, who increasingly come out to suburbia to recruit members, steal, or go joy riding. "I'm worried some officers may not know how dangerous these people are," says Chief Steven Harris of Redmond, Washington, the president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Says Dr. James Turner, a Savannah clinical psychologist and an expert on violence: "There's a reckless criminality moving out. Public and private law enforcement aren't always prepared."

That reality, say law enforcement experts, helps explain why suburban citizens and police are forming neighborhood watch programs—19 million Americans belong to them.

Here are some other ways the rise in suburban crime is changing society:

■ A BOOM IN PRIVATE GUARDS AND WALLED COMMUNITIES.

In suburban Detroit, the 2,300-home East English Village Association has just hired its own private police force to supplement patrols by public-payroll officers. Jackie Rybinski, president of the association, told the *Detroit News*, "We figured if we wanted to keep this neighborhood stable, we couldn't stick our heads in the sand and say the police should take care of it. We realized there's only so much they can do." She cited 50 incidents in the past month in which locals were robbed or assaulted. As of 1990, more than 2.6% of the U.S. work force (double the percentage in 1970) was employed in private security, outnumbering the ranks of police.

Richard Kobetz, a security consultant in Berryville, Virginia, observed to a *New York Times* reporter in October, "We seem to be reverting to the days of the highwayman, when everybody got into the castle at night and pulled up the drawbridge." How right he is. Thirty-five neighborhoods in Los Angeles alone have asked local government for permission to separate from their surrounding areas by installing gates. Gated, walled, and even moated subdivisions already have been built in Nevada and Texas—some by Ross Perot.

■ A TOUGHER SELL, DOOR TO DOOR. "No doubt about it, fear is changing our business," says Jerry Johnson, branch manager



A worried shopper considers buying a little personal security at the Hardware Store in Austin, Texas.

for Electrolux vacuum cleaners in Northern California. His territory includes bucolic Marin County. "Customers don't open their doors so much. They're more wary." He gets around the problem by making more appointments, fewer cold calls.

In New Jersey, Tom Colt, who goes door to door for Electrolux and Fuller Brush, is hoping to turn the problem into profit by adding a third company to his stable: alarm supplier Quorum International. Quorum's line includes the \$29 Paal Personal Attack Alarm, no bigger than a pager. Pull the pin and activate a 104-decibel sound—roughly the same amount of noise that a jetliner makes taking off. "Our neighborhoods and lives are not the same," the brochure says. "Personal security outside our homes is no longer an assumed right."

■ BEEFED-UP MALL SECURITY. Shopping malls close to highways offer easy entry and escape, making them ideal sites for drug deals, shoplifting, and carjackings, says Norman Bottom, a specialist in parking lot security. Criminals view malls as happy hunting grounds for still more serious crimes—like rape. Asks a plaintiff's attorney rhetorically: "Where else will you find so many unattended women with money and with their minds in other places?"

Mall operators aren't taking chances. Says developer Harry Newman Jr., chairman of Newman Properties in Long Beach, California, which operates five centers in three states: "We've increased lighting in our lots. We have a jeep cruising all the time." Malls are introducing more drastic changes too. These include valet parking (which removes the fear of finding a slasher under one's car) and patrols by mounted police.

Protection doesn't come cheap. Direc-

tors of security for shopping centers held their first-ever conference in Chicago a month ago. Their departments' budgets, they agreed, were up sharply (from a low of around 5% of centers' total budgets a few years ago to more like 15% to 20% now). Most of the increase went into hiring more guards. "We're beefing up forces, hiring better-trained officers—and not at the minimum wage," says Tom Stephenson, a senior vice president of Hahn Co., which operates 53 regional malls. In an effort to keep security costs down, some mall owners are innovating: One Texas mall gets volunteers from a nearby ROTC program to do its rooftop spotting.

■ BRISK SALES OF SECURITY SYSTEMS FOR CARS AND HOMES. The best-known auto antitheft device, the Club, a bar that locks the steering wheel, has become so ubiquitous it now comes in five colors. Ironically, say crime experts, the effectiveness of such products is one reason you are more likely to be carjacked: It's easier to steal your car while you are driving it than when it is parked and locked.

Eric Bergen, owner of Custom Safe & Sound in Milford, Connecticut, sells many types of theft deterrents. For instance, you can buy a radar alarm that senses when someone's hand enters a car's interior. There are alarms activated by cellular phone that allow you to dial a code and bring the car to a dead stop. Other anti-carjacking systems accomplish the same thing with a simple, unobtrusive kill switch, which you can press before the carjacker makes you get out. Three minutes later, while the

thief is tearing down the road, the car dies.

Suburbanites, following futurist Faith Popcorn's injunction, have been cocooning for some time. Now, acutely aware that their homes, stuffed with VCRs and microwaves and giant-screen TVs, are just so many nutmeats waiting to be shelled, they have begun, as Popcorn puts it, *burrowing*: spending hefty sums to protect their cocoons. Since 1986, sales of home alarms by such manufacturers as ADT, Westinghouse, and Brinks have risen 80%, says Joseph P. Freeman, a home security consultant in Newtown, Connecticut. Prices range from about \$100 to \$5,000.

■ MACE—THE NEW STOCKING STUFFER.

This holiday season, you can buy Mace from displays sporting a candy-cane motif. These make the point that a disabling chemical spray is a timely Christmas gift. The pitch is working in Texas and in New Jersey, where at Fair Haven Hardware, a fresh display of 36 canisters sold out in three days.

Where is fear taking us? Not anyplace soon, says Herbert Gans, professor of sociology at Columbia University, who notes that in the current economy even suburbanites eager to move will have trouble selling homes. They'll have to make do buying better locks and lobbying for more police. In any event, where would they go?

Jack Lessinger, economist, sociologist, and professor emeritus at the University of Washington, believes that by 2020 the cream of the middle class will have decamped to what he calls Penturbia—enclaves of telecommuting professionals in bucolic areas beyond the suburbs and even exurbia. But in the main reason for this migration is to escape crime, rather than the eternal quest for a cleaner, quieter, simpler life, the best it will do is buy them a little time.

Policymakers have barely begun to grapple with this rising middle-class anxiety. In the short run, look for more laws that crack down on suburban-style crime. Already, Representative Charles Schumer of New York has pushed a bill through Congress that makes carjacking a federal offense. Eventually, if the current fear persists or deepens, it may even lead to national recognition that problems once confined to our urban centers are rapidly moving nationwide and that enhanced security alone is no solution.

**Homes
stuffed with
giant-screen
TVs are
just so many
nutmeats
waiting to
be shelled.**

As grim crime scenes fill our newscasts and nightmares,
But the surprising truth
for most people is that...

SAFER

TO LIVE IN AMERICA

BY WALTER L. UPDEGRAVE

THERE IS NO SAFE PLACE ANYMORE. That fearful message is driven home by the endless rat-a-tat-tat of pointless carnage that marks us as one of the world's most violent societies. Listen to the grim crime tally: Every 22 minutes, on average, someone is murdered in America. Someone is raped every four minutes, robbed every 26 seconds, seriously assaulted every 17 seconds. You see the reality of those statistics on television every day; network news coverage of violence has doubled over the past year. And since the violence is often random—a massacre on the Long Island Rail-

road yesterday, a child gunned down in the projects today—it's not surprising that 77% of Americans told MONEY in an exclusive national poll that they worry about becoming violent-crime victims. This fear runs almost equally strong among blacks and whites, rich and poor, city dwellers and suburbanites alike.

This pervasive dread is understandable—but misplaced. MONEY's ground-breaking four-month investigation, built around an analysis of more than 20 years of crime statistics, shows that Americans share a number of fundamental misconceptions about crime and its impact. In particular, while violence remains a serious problem—justifying measures like the estimated \$22 billion anticrime bill making its way through

Americans feel more threatened by violence than ever

Congress recently—most of us are much more afraid of crime than the facts warrant. Some evidence:

■ **Violent crime is not at an all-time high.** "All this talk about a crime wave is more myth than reality," says Darrell Steffensmeier, a Penn State criminologist. "The risk of being a victim of a violent crime for most Americans is really very small and actually lower than it was 10 years ago." Figures collected by the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics suggest that more than 90% of Americans are safer today than they have been during much of the past two decades. Indeed, the most recent figures released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation show a 1% decrease in violent crime in 1993. The exception to the trend is our young people, especially minority teens: they are suffering through a crime

epidemic of tragic proportions (see "Voices From the Mean Streets" on page 129).

Still, some criminologists worry that the drop in violent crime since the early 1980s—largely the result of a decline in the number of teens in the U.S. population—could reverse itself as the most violent-prone segment of the population (15- to 19-year-olds) grows nearly twice as fast as the overall U.S. population over the next decade.

■ **Violent crime is not an equal-opportunity offender.** Your chances of being attacked vary tremendously according to your age, race, sex and neighborhood. The risk of becoming a victim of a serious violent crime is nearly four times higher if you are 16 to 19 years old, for example, than 35 to

Homicide scenes, like this one in Houston, get wide media play, but the murder rate is down from its peak.

SPECIAL REPORT

49; almost three times higher if you are black instead of white; two times if you are male, not female; and again double if you live in a city rather than in a suburb or in the country. Lump several of these risk factors together and the differences become enormous: For instance, the chances of a white woman 65 or older becoming a victim of serious violent crime are just one-seventieth the odds a black male teen faces.

■ **Your risk of being a victim does not increase as you make more money—it actually declines.** Although our poll shows that people with high incomes are about as afraid of crime as those who are less well off, your odds of being victimized are two to three times lower if you make \$50,000 or more a year than if you earn less than \$10,000. Ironically, the fact that crime rates are so low among the affluent may partly explain their outsized concern, according to Mark Cohen, a Vanderbilt University professor who specializes in the economics of crime. Says Cohen: "When you don't know what violence really looks like firsthand, you may have an exaggerated fear of it."

This article is not intended to soft-pedal crime or diminish the anguish it causes victims and relatives. But it does aim to counteract the widespread and near-hysterical fear of crime by debunking the common myths that our nationwide telephone poll documented. The poll (margin of error: plus or minus 3.1%) was conducted in March by ICR Sur-

vey Research Group of Media, Pa. In each of the six sections that follow, we present the answers that a representative 1,002-adult sample of the U.S. population gave in our survey—and then the truth of the matter. We also propose what society might do to prevent crime and, in the box on page 126, point out what you can do to make yourself more secure.

IS THE RATE OF VIOLENT CRIME AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH?


YOU SAID

Yes.....88%



Sure, the *number* of violent crimes hit a new high of just over 6.6 million in 1992, the most recent year with complete statistics. But the U.S. population has gone up too. What really counts

is your chance of becoming a victim, which is reflected in the overall violent-crime rate. And that rate, now 32.1 per 1,000 people per year, is actually down about 9% from its 1981 peak of 35.3, according to the National Crime Victimization Survey of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Moreover, the rate of so-called serious violent crime—rape, robbery and aggravated



Violent crime is down for most people...

...but not for black teens.



Serious violent-crime rates (victims per 1,000) All U.S. Whites ages 50 to 64 Blacks ages 16 to 19

Source: Bureau of Census, Bureau of the Census

Source: Bureau of Census, Bureau of the Census

Source: Bureau of Census, Bureau of the Census

assault—has fallen 16% from its 1974 high.

As for murder, some 78% of those we polled believed that the homicide rate now stands at an all-time high. It's simply not true. The 1993 estimated rate of 9.5 murders per 100,000 people, which is based on FBI figures, remains 7% below the 10.2 peak back in 1980—and is even lower than the level reached in 1933 at the end of the Prohibition era.

There is, however, reason for concern: The murder rate has climbed roughly 20% since 1985. Furthermore, a homicide rate of 9.5—more than 15 times that of England—is nothing to brag about. One more chilling stat: Our nation's estimated 24,500 murder victims last year equal five times the average annual number of Americans killed in battle in the Vietnam War.

The steely truth is that 5% to 10% of Americans—including both poor black and white youths—are becoming violent-crime victims at record rates. For 1991, the most recent statistics available, the homicide rate among black males ages 15 to 24—159 per 100,000—was nine times higher than the 17 per 100,000 for whites. To put that staggering difference another way, if young white men were dying at the same rate as young black men, more than 23,000 of them would be killed this year alone—nearly doubling the U.S. homicide rate and, presumably, spurring a public outcry for an end to the slaughter.

WHO IS MOST LIKELY, AND LEAST LIKELY, TO BE A VICTIM?

YOU SAID

Most likely victim:

Black male, 12-19

Least likely victim:


White male, 35-64

THE FACTS

While the largest segment of poll respondents—31%—correctly identified black male teens as the most likely victims, they didn't have a clue about the risk other groups face. They greatly underesti-

mated the threat to young black girls, for instance, and overestimated the likelihood of crime against young adult white women. When we asked people to name the group in greatest danger, black teenage girls ranked only sixth; actually, those girls are the second most likely to be victimized, following

How likely are you to be a victim of violent crime?



black male teens, out of 16 demographic groups we tracked (see the chart above). White women ages 20 to 34 were the third most popular choice, though these women actually rank ninth. Whites were the main source of that error, by the way. Some 11% of them named young white women as a high-risk group, vs. only 1.5% of blacks.

Our poll respondents were also off the mark in identifying the least likely victims. Only 7% chose the correct answer: white women 65 and over, whose victimization rate of roughly one per 1,000 makes them easily the safest of all. One reason: They're far more careful than younger people about avoiding dangerous situations. The group that our poll identified as safest—white men ages 35 to 64—are nearly eight times more likely to be attacked than elderly white women.

Such confusion isn't surprising. Criminologists point out that the most atypical crimes—such as vicious attacks on young suburban mothers or defenseless older women—tend to make news. Bombarded by splashy press and TV images of these unusual victims, the public naturally gets false

The answer: Your odds vary dramatically depending on your age, sex and race. Younger people, on average, are assaulted more often than older ones, men more often than women, and blacks more often than whites. Most at risk: a black male teen, who is nearly 10 times likelier to be a victim than an adult white man. In fact, with few exceptions, blacks are two to three times as likely to suffer a violent crime as their white counterparts. Safest of all are white women ages 65 and over, who, ironically, tend to be among the most neglected of crime. Their victimization rate is just 1.5 per 1,000, 93% below the U.S. homicide rate.

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ideas about who is actually most often at risk.

People also concluded—wrongly—that the largest metropolitan areas are the most crime-ridden; but as the box on page 121 explains, medium-size cities and their suburbs can be more dangerous than the corresponding parts of urban behemoths. Crime rates may vary widely among cities of similar size, though, as our listing at right demonstrates. Example: Little Rock, with a population of 176,000, is America's fifth most dangerous city out of the 187 we examined, while Madison, Wis., with 202,000, is the eighth safest. That's because there are more crucial indicators of local crime than a city's size. The rate of violence tends to be higher, for instance, in places with larger minority populations (36% in Little Rock vs. Madison's 11%) and a concentration of single-female households with children under 18 (9% in the Arkansas capital vs. 5% in Madison). This is not to say that skin color or family status breeds crime; rather, most criminologists believe these are proxies for root problems such as the level of poverty and dysfunctional families.

Keep in mind also that your chances of becoming a victim change dramatically as you move around a city. Stop by a convenience store late some night in a crime-prone neighborhood and your odds of getting hit are the same as for anyone else shopping there. Says Robert Figlio, a University of California-Riverside sociology professor and a founder of Cap Index, a Valley Forge, Pa. company that specializes in predicting local crime rates: "It's where you are even more than who you are that determines whether you will be a victim."

WHO IS MORE LIKELY TO BE VICTIMIZED BY A STRANGER: A MAN OR A WOMAN?

YOU SAID

A woman.....82%

A man.....14%

THE FACTS

The opposite is true. Men are roughly twice as likely as women to be attacked by strangers. Women, on the other hand, are five times more likely than men to suffer at the hands of someone intimate with or related to them. Worse, a woman victim is twice as likely to be injured—59% vs. 27%—if her assailant is a spouse or boyfriend rather than a stranger.

stranger. (The major exception is rape; there, the chance of injury is greater—60% vs. 43%—in the four out of 10 rapes committed by unknown offenders.)

While the rate of serious violent crime against women (10.9 per 1,000) is down 11% from its 1981 peak of 12.3, simple assaults against women—attacks without a weapon that don't cause severe injury—are at an all-time high of 15 per 1,000. Experts blame the rising number of simple assaults against women on family violence. The fact that many men batter their wives, ex-wives or girlfriends may explain why 84% of the women we polled said they worry about becoming a victim, vs. 68% of men. "Women are scared," says American University criminologist James Lynch, "because the place where they're most vulnerable is where we all ought to feel safest—at home."

WHO COMMITS THE MOST CRIMES—WHITES, BLACKS OR OTHER MINORITIES?

YOU SAID

Blacks.....54%

THE FACTS

Blacks, who represent just 12.5% of the U.S. population, account for a disproportionate share of violent crime. Still, the fact remains that whites commit more such crimes—54% vs. 45% for blacks, according to FBI arrest statistics. The numbers also vary widely depending on the crime, with blacks responsible for more murders and robberies (55% and 61% of these crimes, respectively) and whites committing more rapes and aggravated assaults (56% and 60%). The proportions also change with location: In the suburbs, whites commit 65% of the crime and blacks only 34%. In the cities, whites hold a thin 50% to 49% edge.

Our respondents do know one thing. Nearly 44% said 15- to 19-year-olds commit the most violent crimes, and that's true. In fact, federal statistics paint a grim—and worsening—portrait of violence by American teens. According to the FBI, 15- to 19-year-olds accounted for 22% of the 641,250 arrests for violent crime in 1992, more than any other five-year age group and more than the total for all age groups from 35 up. Moreover, the level of violence among teens in this age group soared in recent years. Between 1985 and 1992, for example, the mur-

Safest cities Irvine, Calif. the most dangerous: Atlanta

California's six of the 15 U.S. cities with the lowest violent-crime rates among the 187 places with populations above 100,000, according to the FBI. New York City had the most crimes but the 22nd highest crime rate.

THE 15 SAFEST CITIES

Irvine, Calif.: 114
Amherst, N.Y.: 163
Livonia, Mich.: 241
Shel Valley, Calif.: 243
Sunnyvale, Calif.: 255
Virginia Beach: 295
Sterling Heights, Mich.: 310
Madison, Wis.: 313
Scottsdale, Ariz.: 314
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: 318
Rancho Cucamonga, Calif.: 329
Pine, Texas: 332
Salmon, Ore.: 336
Arlington, Va.: 345
Glendale, Calif.: 353

THE 15 MOST DANGEROUS

Atlanta
Miami
St. Louis
Tampa
Little Rock
San Bernardino, Calif.
Baltimore
Baton Rouge
Detroit
Flint, Mich.
Cleveland
Washington, D.C.
Columbus
Birmingham

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der arrest rate for 18-year-olds more than doubled to 52 per 100,000, pushing it to five times the national average. Today, the most likely person to commit murder in the U.S. is an 18-year-old male.

WHEN A WHITE PERSON IS A VICTIM, WHO IS THE MOST LIKELY OFFENDER?

YOU SAID

A nonwhite person.....49%

WHAT ABOUT WHEN A BLACK IS A VIOLENT-CRIME VICTIM?

YOU SAID

A black person.....69%



Our poll shows that 49% of Americans believe that whites are preyed on more often by nonwhite criminals who are either black (20%) or members of another racial minority (29%), rather than by other whites (26%). Another 21% said the chances were equal of the criminals being white or black.

In fact, blacks and whites are most often victimized by someone of their own race. For example, of the 5.1 million violent crimes with white victims in 1992, the perpetrator was white 66% of the time and black only 21%. And in the 1.1 million crimes with black victims, the criminal was black 86% of the time and white 7%. (The remaining percentages involved incidents where the race was neither black nor white or unknown or where the assailants included both blacks and whites.) The bottom line: While a white person is far more likely to be victimized by a black than the other way around (21% vs. 7%), the chances are three times as great that a white person will be victimized by another white than by a black. The exception here is robbery. Whites are held up by blacks 49% of the time and by whites only 37%.

Still, though violent crime is predominantly white on white or black on black, it is also true that black criminals commit more crimes against white victims (nearly 1.1 million in 1992) than they do against blacks (just under 1 million). Be careful about drawing conclusions from those figures, though. BJS statistician Patsy Klaus points out that because whites outnumber blacks nearly 7 to 1, there are simply many more white targets around.

WHAT PERCENT OF VIOLENT CRIMES INVOLVE GUNS?

YOU SAID

41% to 80%

(the most common answer)



Considering the attention that pro- and anti-gun lobbies receive in the press, it's not surprising that most of us have an inflated idea of how often criminals use firearms. Although 40% of U.S. households now own a gun, FBI stats indicate that guns figure in only 31% of violent crimes. That's up from the low of 26% in 1988, yet below the peak of 32% in the early '80s. Still, the weapon of choice is the handgun: it is used in an estimated 80% of crimes that involve guns. No one has sold statistics on the use of military-type assault weapons, but experts believe they are used in less than 2% of all violent crimes.

More alarming to criminologists is the fact that so many teenagers are arming themselves. The FBI says the number of people under age 18 arrested for carrying or owning a weapon jumped 106% between 1983 and 1992, compared with a 14% increase in arrests for those 18 and older. Even more frightening, many kids don't mind pulling the trigger. A 1991 Justice Department survey of predominantly minority male high schoolers in 10 high-crime areas found that 10% of the students agreed it was acceptable to shoot someone "if that is what it takes to get something you want," and 28% believed it was okay to shoot a person "who hurts or insults you." The result: Teenage robberies or assaults that once resulted in beatings are now more likely to end in lethal shootings.

Many criminologists believe drug pushers, who often carry guns, are largely responsible for the arms race. "Kids see their friends and enemies with guns, and they want them too for protection," says Carnegie Mellon university criminologist Alfred Blumstein. "Gun ownership is a communicable disease."

How can society lower the level of violence? Unfortunately, the pending crime law won't do much, according to virtually every criminologist we interviewed. They hold that the law, which will provide more police, more prisons and tougher sentences, fails to address adequately the fact that we grow criminals faster than we can arrest and jail them. Four more promising suggestions to curb violence:

1. Target additional police to high-crime areas. The crime legislation is likely to put 100,000

Big-city suburbs offer the lowest crime rates

For all the talk about crime in the cities, you probably think that the highest U.S. cities are the places where you're most likely to be attacked. Wrong. As our table shows, there is little difference between the violent-crime rate of large and medium-size cities, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics National Crime Victimization Survey. What's more, cities in metro areas with populations of 1 million or more are actually a tad safer than those in places with 500,000 to 999,999 people. And yet this is the safest U.S. suburbs are the ones near the big metro areas. Their victimization rate is 19%, or 25% lower, respectively, than the suburban crime rates in metro areas with populations between 250,000 and 999,999. One possible reason: Suburbs in giant cities are farther away from violence-prone inner-city neighborhoods.

50,000-249,999	15.1	12.7
250,000-499,999	26.9	12.1
500,000-999,999	27.5	14.8
1 million and over	27.1	13.6

SPECIAL REPORT

**A white person
is three times
more likely to
be victimized by
another white
than by a black**

more police on the streets over the next five years at a cost of \$9 billion. Unfortunately, that sounds more impressive than it is. After factoring in off-hours, sick days, vacation time and the like, criminologist David Bayley of the State University of New York at Albany estimates that the net increase in manpower at any given moment will be a mere 10,000 officers. Worse yet, the law does not make any effort to channel these officers to high-crime areas; any of the nation's 17,360 police and sheriff's departments can apply for reinforcements. By the time the new recruits are spread around, says Bayley, "you won't notice the difference and neither will the criminals." The only way these recruits will have much impact is if they're assigned to inner-city neighborhoods where crime is rampant.

2. **Accept that some dangerous teens and young adults must be put away for a long, long time.** While simplistic approaches like "three strikes, you're out" sound good, tying a life prison sentence to any particular number of crimes is too formulaic to work. Criminologists do believe, however, that judges should have discretion to take truly dangerous and irredeemable violent criminals out of circulation until they're no longer a threat. "If you're dealing with kids who were led astray, treat them as juveniles and try to reshape them," says Blumstein of Carnegie Mellon. "But kids who are clearly real menaces and lack self-control should be put away till they're in their fifties."

3. **Get guns out of the hands of teenagers.** We might get more bang for our gun-control buck, so to speak, by hanging in on armed teens—whose

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
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SPECIAL REPORT

**Adding 100,000
police officers
won't do much
to cut the level
of violent crime
in America.**

numbers are growing rapidly—rather than society at large. UCLA public policy professor James Q. Wilson advocates encouraging cops to stop and frisk people who they reasonably suspect are armed—and confiscate the gun if it is illegal.

4. Stop producing violent criminals. No level of gun control or sterner punishment can change the fact that we've allowed our inner cities to become "hothouses for growing violent people," in the words of Philip Heymann, the former deputy U.S. attorney general who quit in February after a disagreement with the Clinton Administration's crime-fighting policies. He and others argue that our real enemies are the poverty and despair that nurture crime. A few programs take a step in the right direction, such as the \$525 million job plan in the House crime bill aimed at kids in high-crime areas. But initiatives like these must be combined with efforts to strengthen families and, specifically, to discourage unwed teens and young adults from producing children they can neither afford nor control. Today, nearly 45% of black babies and 14% of white infants are born to unwed mothers under age 25. MONEY's own crime analysis confirms what criminologists have been saying for years: Cities with the largest presence of homes headed by single women have the highest crime rates. Until the U.S. finds effective ways to promote two-parent households and to help schools and communities teach values to children who aren't properly supervised at home, we won't be able to replace today's rampant fear of crime with a renewed sense of personal security. **\$**

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Smart ways to protect yourself from crime

Just because you visit or work in a high-crime area doesn't mean that you have to become a crime target. There are several steps that you can take to protect yourself—and a few that you should not. For example, the 12 crime-prevention specialists we consulted stressed that carrying a deadly weapon, including a gun, is a bad move unless you have been trained as an expert in self-defense. Instead, our experts advocate three protective measures that don't involve deadly force:

- **Carry a pocket-size alarm.** Once activated, these \$20-to-\$100 devices emit an ear-splitting racket that alerts everyone nearby that you need help. Muggers sometimes flee, and in other cases the intended victims escape in the confusion. "And if an alarm is

knocked from your hand," notes Joe Mele, assistant professor at the National Crime Prevention Institute, "it will continue to yell for help—even if you can't." One top model: Quorum's PAAL II (\$39; 800-883-0035), which has a 103-decibel siren—as loud as most home burglar alarms—plus an eye-catching strobe light.

- **Consider packing a defensive spray.** A number of manufacturers now make \$10-to-\$35 aerosol sprays, some not much larger than a lipstick tube, that can disable an attacker for as long as 20 minutes. Our experts felt that the pepper-formula sprays are more effective than tear-gas models, like Mace's, against attackers under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The active ingredient in pepper sprays: capsaicin, a fiery extract of cayenne. Or you can get a combination spray like the Defender Plus from Citizens Against Crime

(\$20; 800-466-1010), which emits pepper, tear gas and an invisible fluorescent dye that can mark crooks for positive identification later by police. Note: Some states, such as California and Massachusetts, require you to get a permit for the sprays. Others, like New York and Wisconsin, prohibit you from carrying them. So check with your police department before buying a spray.

- **Take a self-defense course.** Rather than the martial arts, which can require years to master, consider a basic three-hour course on commonsense ways to stay out of trouble. The crime-prevention unit of your police department can recommend a class. Or call Resources for Personal Empowerment, a nonprofit group that provides one-night seminars at 25 area chapters across the U.S. (\$60; 800-443-5425).

—Amanda Walmsley

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