

Building Support for Community Policing An Effective Strategy

By
ROBERT C. TROJANOWICZ, Ph.D.



For any community policing effort to be successful, police administrators must not only have the support of their departments but also of citizens, elected officials, community agencies, and the media. Each of these groups has its own priorities and concerns. Therefore, a goal of each police administrator should be to develop an overall community policing strategy designed to promote consensus building among all five groups. This can be accomplished by identifying areas of agreement and disagreement, and then building a community policing

strategy on the former while resolving the latter.

To increase the level of commitment to community policing, police administrators must address certain issues for the concept to become viable within both their departments and communities. Addressing these issues up front can benefit those departments that are considering a shift to community policing, as well as those that have already started to implement the approach.

Understanding the Change

Police administrators who plan to shift to community policing can

avoid problems by first understanding the concept and what is required for a department to adopt a community policing strategy. It is important for administrators to do their homework to obtain a clear understanding of what community policing can and cannot achieve and what it does and does not demand from police administrators and the five main groups on which these administrators depend for support.

To achieve this, administrators should review the literature to recognize that community policing is both a philosophy and an organizational strategy. They should also



Dr. Trojanowicz is the Director of the National Center for Community Policing in East Lansing, Michigan.

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realize that this organizational strategy requires a permanent assignment of community policing officers to defined beats, where they have the opportunity for daily interaction with area residents.

Most importantly, however, police administrators should look at community policing in the context of the “big picture.” This simply means that the community policing approach should not be looked upon as a cure-all to the problems of society.

A shift to community policing does not take place in a vacuum. It alone cannot undo the root causes of crime (unemployment, welfare dependence, decaying schools, drug abuse, and child abuse and neglect). It can, however, make a valid contribution to help address these serious problems, but only when police administrators become ardent spokespersons for social change.

The Police Department

Building consensus within the department requires police administrators to practice the politics of

inclusion. The philosophy of community policing stresses the importance of building trust with the community by empowering average citizens and making them a part of the process. And, the first place to perfect those skills is within the police department.

The commitment to community policing must be reflected through the personnel management process. To accomplish this, the police administrator must involve the upper command staff in providing input and making decisions. Then, it is important to seek actively the support and input of all levels of police personnel, including civilians, on developing a workable plan.

Police administrators should also encourage feedback from within the department, and they must be willing to provide visible backing for mistakes and failures. After all, community policing impinges on everyone within the department.

A defensible plan for the deployment of community officers is also needed. In no way should as-

signment to a beat be used as punishment. Instead, police administrators should expand the role of community officers to that of generalist, rather than specialist, thereby recognizing them as professionals.

Citizen Support

A shift to community policing implies dramatic changes for the “winners” and the “losers.” Community policing makes obvious “winners” of the law-abiding people who live in decaying, high-crime neighborhoods plagued by violent crime and open drug dealings. These people receive the full-time support of community policing officers, and in turn, become the most vocal supporters of the approach.

On the other hand, the high visibility of community policing officers can inspire a backlash from middle- and upper-class residents who resent what they perceive as more of their tax dollars flowing into neighborhoods that already consume a disproportionate share of the police department’s time. This approach to policing can also engender resentment among those who see their previous level of service reduced, i.e., the business owner whose foot patrol officer now spends time in residential areas as well as the middle-class taxpayer who is asked to report a bicycle theft by phone. Under community policing, citizens have to do more for themselves to free up patrol time so that problem solving can be facilitated.

To achieve citizen support for community policing, administrators must develop a plan to educate the public about the virtues and trade-offs of this approach. This means

talking to civic groups, issuing press releases, and placing articles in community newsletters. All this should be done before implementation. Essentially, police administrators must take advantage of every opportunity to explain to citizens "what's in it for them."

Along these same lines, community policing sometimes forces departments to restructure their response priorities. Therefore, the issue of response time must be addressed at the outset. Citizens need to know that the police are constantly being asked to do more with less. When restructuring is part of the shift to community policing, people must be told why the tradeoffs will benefit them in the long run. Above all, citizens must be guaranteed a quick response for life-threatening situations; however, everything else is negotiable.

Another "must-do" for police administrators is to inform citizens that their participation is crucial. Community policing issues a challenge to residents to become part of the solution to the problem. Oftentimes, this means citizens will be asked to solve problems themselves rather than turning to the police for help.

Citizens should be reminded that it is the job of the entire community to make their neighborhoods safe and attractive places to live and work. And, they must be made aware that the community policing effort requires the participation and support of everyone, not just community leaders.

Police administrators can gauge support of community policing efforts by conducting on-going surveys. Surveys provide a good

baseline against which community policing can be evaluated and also allow for continued monitoring to prevent the momentum from becoming stalled.

Feedback from the community also becomes a part of the accountability process and involves the community in performance evaluation. One way for this to happen is for sergeants to ask citizens firsthand how community officers are performing. However, community residents should be made to realize that they will also be evaluated in terms of their contributions to make community policing work. This can be accomplished by determining how many citizens are involved in block clubs, volunteer work with youths, or beautification projects.

“By involving community agencies, police administrators emphasize teamwork and eliminate duplication of services.”

Elected Officials

Community policing attracts strong bipartisan support, but it also has its detractors. Conservatives worry that it may be "empowering" community agitators, adding to instability. Liberals worry that it may imply an erosion of civil rights, including the right to privacy.

Yet, the primary political resistance is not ideological but practical. Elected officials have good reason to worry about any change that threatens their existing level

of political support. Restructuring police priorities in ways that imply a reduction in the level of service is a serious issue for police administrators.

To address the concerns of elected officials, administrators must educate politicians on the criteria of community policing. While some community policing initiatives are very attractive to elected officials, others may not be so well received. Therefore, administrators must carefully explain the tradeoffs implicit in community policing to elected officials.

Dealing with the concerns of elected officials is not an easy task. They must be convinced not to subvert the process by promising special consideration for the affluent and influential. And, they must be persuaded not to politicize the initiative. A defensible plan for community policing is on the basis of need—high crime rate, high fear of crime, disorder, and a large percentage of problem people, including juveniles.

City council members whose districts enjoy the services of a community policing officer must understand that the officer is not their personal servant. Instead, politicians and community officers should work together on initiatives, so they can share the acclaim. But, it is the community, not the politician, who sets the priorities.

On the other hand, it is essential for politicians who do not have a community policing officer in their districts to understand why they should support community policing. They need to grasp why the shift to community policing will improve the quality of life in

Violent Crime and Community Policing

The current staggering levels of violence in the United States prompt such intense and pervasive fear that citizens are clamoring for law enforcement to do more. Yet, in the urgency to find solutions, law enforcement must not forget that what people really want is prevention. They want law enforcement to prevent them from becoming victims of violence in the first place, not just to apprehend the suspects after the violence takes place.

Along with prevention, it is important for law enforcement to remember that the term "violence" is merely a catchall that covers a broad and diverse array of crimes and problems. For instance, even in a case of murder, the dynamics that impel a battered wife to shoot her husband are vastly different from drive-by shootings that result in fatalities or murder-for-hire contracts.

When most people talk about the violence in American society, they are, for the most part, referring to the overall climate of violence—the wife beatings and the child abuse occurring in the homes, as well as the gang violence on the streets. The image of beleaguered police officers attempting to bring order out of chaos during a riot in Washington, D.C., contrasts significantly with the disturbing image of police officers beating a motorist.

The perception is that when all the different kinds of violence reinforce each other and blend with the violence depicted on TV and in the movies, communities risk spawning more and more youngsters so inured to violence that they simply do not place value on other people's lives. In fact, the age at which youthful offenders commit their first acts of violence is dropping, particularly in troubled urban neighborhoods,

and law enforcement must play a role in turning that around.

Community policing can play a vital role in reducing three important kinds of violence in the community:

- Individual violence, ranging from street crime to domestic abuse to drug-related violence
- Civil unrest, which can often include gang violence and open confrontations among various segments of society, specifically the police, and
- Police brutality.

Community policing provides fresh answers because it involves the community in developing proactive short- and long-term solutions to the dynamics that contribute to the climate of violence in troubled neighborhoods. While community officers remain full-fledged law enforcement officers who answer calls and make arrests, their daily, face-to-face contact with law-abiding people in the community allows them to broaden their focus beyond reacting to violence into developing new efforts to reduce and prevent violence.

Building bonds of trust between the police and the community also allows community policing to contribute to the goal of promoting color-blind policing, where people and their police form new partnerships that offer the promise of reducing the potential for civil unrest. By allowing citizens the opportunity to hold the police directly accountable, community policing restores an important check on police behavior that has been lost in the process of "professionalizing" the police by isolating them in patrol cars, where the system encourages them to interact primarily with each other.

their jurisdictions, so that they can explain the rationale to their constituents.

Community Agencies

Over the years, the police have assumed many of the responsibilities of community agencies, mostly because the police department is the only agency open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. However, this does not mean that community agencies should not become a part of the community policing effort. On the contrary, their backing is a key ingredient to the success of community policing.

This is why police administrators must involve community agencies in the planning and implementation stages. Diagnosing each neighborhood's strengths and weaknesses and then developing solutions is essential.

By involving community agencies, police administrators emphasize teamwork and eliminate duplication of services. After all, a team of problem solvers, including a police officer, is much more effective than repeated responses that simply "put out fires" or "apply band-aids" to major wounds.

Another step police administrators can take to involve community agencies in community policing is to encourage agencies to alter or expand their operations from the usual 9-to-5 mode. A simple alteration such as this can have a major impact on calls for service to police departments by increasing officers' free patrol time so that they can work on more serious problems.

Most importantly, everyone should share the credit. Just as it

takes a major team effort to solve the myriad of problems that plague the neighborhoods, it takes a special effort to ensure that all relevant agencies are given credit for any success realized.

There is also a need for other personalized and decentralized service providers in the neighborhood. If community police officers are the only decentralized and personalized service providers, they will become

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inundated with requests for assistance, many of which are not law enforcement related. The use of a facility that could serve as a neighborhood network center to house service providers will stimulate informal communication among professionals and will personalize all services offered to residents.

The Media

It is easy for police administrators to view the media as the enemy since, for the most part, their primary focus is on bad news. However, because of its proactive approach, community policing provides the department with an opportunity to enlist the media to educate the public about the good things the department is doing.

When dealing with the media, police administrators must have a plan in place before going public. Community policing is not an easy concept to explain, so it is important to work out details before using the media to announce the effort.

By making a concerted effort to reach the media, police administrators demonstrate that this group plays an important role in the success of community policing. Citizens need to understand the reasons for controversial changes, and they also need to know that the department will be asking for their direct support and participation. An effective way to do this is through the media.

The challenge for police administrators is to make media representatives realize that this is part of their civic duty. Although it requires time to cultivate media contacts, the effort will pay off in the long run.

Police administrators should use every opportunity to provide information on community policing to the media. This means holding press conferences, inviting media representatives to walk the beat with community officers, and issuing news releases on recognition and awards programs that reinforce the commitment to community policing.

Enlisting the assistance of the media is part of a continuing effort to keep the community informed about new initiatives. However, it is important to remember that the media resent being manipulated and that they resist what may be perceived as news management. Therefore, police administrators should allow community officers to talk

Focus on Community Partnerships

directly to the media. Even if officers make mistakes, or some projects of the community policing effort are not successful, openness with the media can go a long way. It shows that allowing officers a new freedom to succeed also means allowing them to fail. And, ironically, a willingness to discuss a project that flopped can be an excellent opportunity to tout community policing's successes.

Conclusion

An effective community policing effort requires the support and commitment of the police department, citizens, elected officials, community agencies, and the media. Each of these five groups need to become a part of the solution to neighborhood problems rather than being aloof or indifferent.

However, it is important to remember that community policing is not an overnight miracle cure or a quick fix, even though it may make a dramatic and immediate improvement in some target neighborhoods. The community officer who spends time today organizing a sports league for idle inner-city youths has good reason to hope that this effort will pay off in the future, but there is no guarantee.

Community policing is a subtle, but profound, way for police departments to approach problems. And, it offers better odds of making a positive impact as momentum builds in the future. ♦

Combating Violence by Building Partnerships

Violent crime threatens communities across the Nation. This violence can no longer be viewed as isolated acts occurring at random. Instead, an atmosphere of violence, created and inflamed by a number of factors, exists in many communities. Therefore, the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI—like many law enforcement agencies around the country—are developing a community approach to the problem of violent crime.

This response calls for a comprehensive effort, with the resources of the Federal Government, State and local law enforcement, and community groups coordinated to ensure the most effective results. The dimensions of today's violence make one thing clear: No single component by itself can be successful. The problem of violent crime demands the combined efforts of the criminal justice system and community groups.

New Direction

Responding to a dramatic 30-percent increase in the violent crime rate during the 1980s, the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI developed new strategies to confront the devastating effects violence inflicts on communities. In June 1989, FBI Director William S. Sessions designated violent crime as a priority area of

investigation across all FBI programs.

Two years later, in March 1991, the U.S. Attorney General convened a summit of top political and law enforcement officials to outline initiatives and evaluate the most effective ways to address the increasing violence. This conference established the framework for a comprehensive response to the problem of violent crime.

Then, on October 16-17, 1991, the FBI sponsored the National Symposium on Addressing Violent Crime Through Community Involvement. Held at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, this symposium further explored the underlying causes and tragic consequences of violence. The symposium also marked a turning point in the FBI's approach to violent crime. During the conference, the FBI advocated new levels of community involvement to address the problem of violence.

The National Symposium on Addressing Violent Crime Through Community Involvement

The Quantico symposium was the first such gathering of civic leaders and law enforcement officials by the FBI on a national level. It established important lines of communication essential to a cooperative response to violent crime.


Community Policing Is Not Police-Community Relations

By
ROBERT C. TROJANOWICZ, Ph.D.



Confusion persists concerning what community policing is, how it works, and what it can accomplish. Much of the continuing criticism suggests that community policing merely retreads shopworn elements of police-community relations and repackages them with a trendy new buzz word.

This misperception is used to argue that community policing, therefore, cannot address serious contemporary problems, like crime and drugs. It also provides detractors with hope that community policing will someday be discarded as yet another great-sounding gimmick that failed to make a valid difference in the real world. As one



sergeant recently said to me, "We waited the chief out on other programs, so we can wait him out on community policing, too."

Much of the blame for this persistent misunderstanding rests with academics, myself included, because we have hesitated to state clearly that police-community relations was not an evolutionary step on the way to community policing, but an unfortunate detour. In 1972, I wrote a piece bemoaning the loss of the decentralized and personalized police service provided by foot patrol officers: "The direct, extended, face-to-face relationship between police officers and citizens is missing."¹

But we were like the automakers in Detroit who tried to solve deep and fundamental problems with the quality of their cars by tacking on more chrome and bigger fins at the end of the process. We knew that the police had to forge new positive links to the law-abiding people, particularly in inner-city minority communities. We also understood that the police had to shift to becoming more

proactive. And, we were beginning to see that fear of crime, heightened when people feel powerless to protect themselves, was becoming as big a problem as crime itself.

However, instead of proposing a restructuring of the overall mission of the police and insisting that the community take a more active part, we invested our energies in police-community relations. The benefit of 20/20 hindsight makes it seem obvious that such monumental challenges could not be met by merely tinkering at the margins. From today's vantage point, it seems clear that these piecemeal programs all too often ended up as token add-ons—peripheral to the day-to-day operation of the "real" police in the community. Likewise, the community could continue to have unrealistic expectations of the police.

This is not meant to denigrate the many well-meaning, dedicated, and sincere people who struggled to try to make these doomed efforts succeed. The failure was not in the nobility of our intentions, but in the scope of our vision. Police-community relations advocates argued that social conditions of the time required that something be done, because improved police-community

relations was a necessity and focusing efforts in a Police-Community Relations Unit was practical and made sense.

To meet the challenge of becoming more proactive, many departments inaugurated or expanded Crime Prevention Units, and these efforts offered concrete help to the community by showing people how they could do more to prevent their own victimization. In part, it was the success of these efforts that helped to spur interest in how to do more to help communities help themselves. Most crime prevention specialists are enthusiastic supporters of community policing, and many work closely with community officers, training them on the latest techniques and assisting them in presentations in the community.

COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

By comparing and contrasting the differences between community policing and police-community relations, we can clear up lingering confusions. At the same time, we can clarify how community policing works.

Theory

Both community policing and police-community relations are grounded in their respective theoretical frameworks. Community policing is based on organizational theory, open systems theory, critical theory, normative sponsorship theory, and public policy analysis. Police-community relations is based on conflict theory, intergroup relations theory, and communications theory.²



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Dr. Trojanowicz serves as Director of the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan.

freedom to experiment with problem-solving techniques. It can also mean small courtesies, such as providing civilian personnel a revised telephone directory designed to allow them to connect a caller to the right person on the first try.

Yet, the ultimate success or failure of community policing rests primarily with the new community officers, the generalists who operate as mini-chiefs within their own beat areas. They act as full-service law enforcement officers who react to problems as they occur, but their mandate also requires them to involve average citizens in short- and long-term proactive efforts aimed at the department's expanded mission. The resulting improvement in police-community relations is a welcomed byproduct of delivering decentralized and personalized police service, but is not the primary goal.

Freed from the isolation of the patrol car and the incessant demands of the police radio, community officers serve as the department's community outreach specialists and problem-solvers. The community officer must both overcome apathy and restrain vigilantism, recognizing that the police alone cannot hope to maintain order and solve crucial contemporary neighborhood problems. Citizens can no longer expect the police to be "guns for hire." They need to discard the "mask" of anonymity and become actively involved.

As the community's ombudsman and liaison, community officers not only have the right

Mission

Community policing requires a department-wide philosophical commitment to involve average citizens as partners in the process of reducing and controlling the contemporary problems of crime, drugs, fear of crime, and neighborhood decay, and in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in the community.

Police-community relations is not a philosophy, but rather a limited approach that was often viewed as public relations aimed at reducing hostility toward the police among minorities. In essence, police-community relations implies a narrow, bureaucratic response to a specific problem, rather than a fundamental change in the overall mission of the department and increased expectations of the community.

Organizational Strategy

Community policing requires everyone in the department, sworn

and civilian personnel at all levels, to explore how they can carry out the mission through their actions on the job. Equally essential is that the department must permanently deploy a portion of its patrol force as community officers in specified beats so they can maintain direct, daily contact with average citizens.

Police-community relations is an isolated specialty unit, made up exclusively of staff personnel whose duties are bound by the narrow definition of their goals. These units have limited ongoing, intensive outreach to the community and no mechanism to effect change within the police department itself.

Operational Goals

A department-wide commitment to community policing means that everyone's job must be reassessed in light of the new mission. For example, this may mean providing motor patrol officers new

but also the responsibility to mobilize others, individually and in groups. Many situations require input and assistance from other government agencies—code enforcement, animal control, mental health, sanitation. Other solutions require help from nonprofit groups, such as advocates for the homeless. Community officers also involve local businesses in developing new initiatives. The scope of these community-based, police-supervised local efforts is bound only by the time available, the collective imagination and enthusiasm of the community officer and the citizens involved, and the specific resources available.

Because community officers work so closely with people in their neighborhoods, they build trust and they often generate more and better information than other officers and units can. Therefore, the job requires them to share what they know with other units in the department.

In contrast to this grassroots approach that involves average citizens who live in the neighborhood, police-community relations officers tend to communicate most often with the elite, both inside and outside the department. Their outreach consists of meetings with blue-ribbon panels and community leaders, particularly those who represent the predominant ethnic, religious, and racial minorities (and who may or may not have their fingers on the pulse of their constituents).

These sessions usually focus on resolving formal complaints and

discussing issues and concerns, but police-community relations officers have no direct authority to implement change. Instead, the officers serve as advisors to police command, which means that results depend less on the officer's specific actions than on the willingness of top police administrators to take action.

Since police-community relations officers enjoy few sustained contacts with the community, they are unlikely to generate specific information on crime, drugs, and disorder to share with the rest of the department. Conversely, these jobs

clearance rates, number of complaints against officers—toward qualitative measures, such as citizen involvement, fear of crime, improvement in quality of life, and real and perceived improvement in chronic problems.

Accountability

Community officers are not only supervised by superiors but the new relationship with the community also means that average citizens serve as an additional check on their behavior. Community officers must confront every day the people who care most about whether their new solutions are working.

Since police-community relations officers have no direct authority to make changes, they are often perceived by the community as "flak-catchers"—bureaucrats with no real power who are there merely as a buffer between the community and the police department. Particularly in departments where there is little commitment to resolving

problems, police-community relations officers often find themselves trapped between angry community leaders and a defensive police administration.

The problem is compounded because police-community relations officers are never the officers who respond directly to the crime calls, so people cannot hold them directly accountable. It also removes them from the feedback loop that might allow them to tailor their recommendations to local situations.

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also provide no opportunity for the officers to identify local priorities or to initiate and follow up on creative community-based initiatives. Unlike the community officer, they do not have a stake in specific neighborhoods and are viewed as outsiders.

Performance Measures

Community policing implies moving away from narrow quantitative measures of success—number of arrests, average response time,

Comparison of Community Policing to Police-Community Relations

Community Policing

- Goal: Solve problems—improved relations with citizens is a welcome by-product
- Line Function: Regular contact of officer with citizens
- Citizens nominate problems and cooperate in setting police agenda
- Police accountability is insured by the citizens receiving the service
- Meaningful organizational change and departmental restructuring, ranging from officer selection to training, evaluation, and promotion
- A department-wide philosophy and acceptance
- Influence is from "the bottom up." Citizens receiving service help set priorities and influence police policy
- Officer is continually accessible, in person or by telephone recorder in a decentralized office
- Officer encourages citizens to solve many of their own problems and volunteer to assist neighbors
- Success is determined by the reduction in citizen fear, neighborhood disorder, and crime

Police-Community Relations

- Goal: Change attitudes and project positive image—improved relations with citizens is main focus
- Staff Function: Irregular contact of officer with citizens
- "Blue ribbon" committees identify the problems and "preach" to police
- Police accountability is insured by civilian review boards and formal police supervision
- Traditional organization stays intact with "new" programs periodically added, no fundamental organizational change
- Isolated acceptance often localized to PCR Unit
- Influence is from "the top down"—those who "know best" have input and make decisions
- Intermittent contact with the public because of city-wide responsibility, contact is made through central headquarters
- Citizens are encouraged to volunteer but are told to request and expect more government (including law enforcement) services
- Success is determined by traditional measures, i.e. crime rates and citizen satisfaction with the police

Civilian review boards and "blue-ribbon" committees are often viewed as the appropriate methods of insuring police accountability.

In general, the public perception is that community officers are real, personalized police officers who offer concrete help, whereas police-community relations officers are strangers whose assistance, although well-meaning, is sporadic and limited.

Scope of Impact

A department-wide community policing mission carried out directly by community officers on the streets can make dramatic changes fast. Particularly in the case of illegal drugs, community policing has demonstrated the flexibility to respond to emerging problems in creative ways. People who live in crack-infested neighborhoods need relief not only from the dealers but also from intoxicated addicts on the street. Involving average citizens in community-based, police-supervised anti-drug initiatives to drive drug dealing from their neighborhoods offers new solutions that do not focus exclusively on arrest, which rarely does more than clog the rest of the criminal justice system. Citizens are expected to take an active part in solving many of their own problems, using the officer as a leader and catalyst when necessary. In community policing, unlike police-community relations, the officer educates citizens on issues like response time and how they can effectively use scarce resources rather than expect increased services.

Also, in community policing, average citizens nominate the problems and cooperate in setting the police agenda. This process often reveals that the community views social and physical disorder—from potholes to panhandlers—as higher priorities than actual crime. Because they have been involved in setting priorities, they are more willing to cooperate in finding solutions.

Within departments as well, community policing has a much greater impact than police-community relations. In police-community relations, change trickles down from the top with “blue ribbon” committees and top command having the most influence. With community policing, change can bubble up from the bottom. The entire department benefits from enhanced understanding about the underlying dynamics and concerns at street level as viewed by average citizens and patrol officers. When this information reaches the chief and other high-ranking officials, it allows them to balance the needs of powerful special-interest groups, who have always had access to the top, with the needs of many who might otherwise be ignored. The chief of police sees a broader picture and becomes an advocate for the effective delivery of both law enforcement and social services in the jurisdiction.

THE FUTURE

Most police-community relations programs have faded away,

and unrelenting budget pressures will no doubt mean that others will die—often so that the department can put those resources directly into community policing.

The advent of community policing has also threatened budgets

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for crime prevention units. However, because the goals dovetail so well, many departments find that community policing can help reinvigorate crime prevention. In larger units, budget cuts can mean some staff officers in crime prevention simply switch to a line function and become community officers. Most prove to be “naturals” at the job, because of their experience in organizing block watchers and neighborhoods associations and in teaching proactive techniques.

Those who remain in staff positions in crime prevention often find themselves serving more as a resource for others in the department than as direct providers to the community. Many work closely with community officers, providing training and keeping them abreast of the latest advances and assisting them in community projects.

Community policing owes a debt to both police-community relations and crime prevention for clarifying the scope of the problem and attempting to solve it. However, community policing most directly addresses the need to restructure and refocus officer selection, training, evaluation, and promotion. As we approach the 21st century, we see that community policing is the wave of the future because it delivers direct services and challenges the community to do its share.

Among the trendsetting big-city police departments nationwide, more than half have formally and visibly adopted community policing. As urban, rural, and suburban police departments of all sizes follow their lead, community policing makes the transition from being a promising trend to becoming the mainstream.

The challenge ultimately will be to drop the “community” from community policing, as everyone recognizes that it is synonymous with quality policing. As the police continue to strive for excellence, community policing is rapidly becoming the standard by which all departments will be judged.

LEB

Footnotes

¹ Robert C. Trojanowicz, “Police-Community Relations: Problems and Process,” *Criminology*, vol. 9, No. 4, February 1972, pp. 401-425.

² For an extended discussion, refer to *Police Management in the 21st Century*, Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, Prentice-Hall (in progress).

by Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux

The Community Policing Challenge

The community policing concept no longer must struggle for recognition, but that doesn't mean it's been accepted. Advocates still have some serious challenges ahead. Well-known as this idea may be, police managers must be able to effectively communicate that community policing is in everybody's best interest.

A decade ago, when community policing was still just a promising experiment with an uncertain future, this new approach raised many questions.

Could police departments succeed in "selling" the concept to motor patrol officers who often dismissed it as social work? Shouldn't departments instead invest in efforts that directly combat serious crime?

Is Community Policing simply police-community relations repackaged under a new name?

Should police departments allow average citizens

direct input into determining local police priorities?

Would modern foot-patrol officers fall victim to the political corruption that had hastened the demise of the foot patrols of the past?

How can police managers effectively monitor and assess the performance of new community officers? How can their successes be measured?

Where would police departments, especially the smaller ones, find the money required to assign officers full-time to permanent beats?

Time and experience have demonstrated that some of these fears were groundless and that other concerns could be overcome. The community policing revolution has continued to gain momentum. That doesn't mean, however, that all these concerns have been completely laid to rest or that full acceptance is guaranteed.

For community policing to become the primary method of operation, all the questions of the past must

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continually be addressed. In addition there are new political issues that must be answered.

Conservatives question whether "empowering" the community risks the possibility that community officers could become the captives of local agitators, including organized activist groups whose agenda might not reflect the community as a whole.

Liberals fear community policing may echo the discredited War on Poverty, community-action approach and that such efforts might be viewed as too intrusive into people's lives.

Elected officials of all political persuasions, specifically mayors and city council members, worry that community policing could threaten their re-election. Many fear that middle-class voters will balk at any change in police priorities that are perceived as reducing the level of service that they currently enjoy. They believe if those cuts will result in the police spending more time with people who typically pay the least in taxes. These same concerns are often shared by affluent and powerful special-interest groups, especially local business owners, and politicians who depend on their campaign contributions. They may look at community policing and ask what's in it for them.

For community policing to succeed proponents must address the threats to full acceptance.

The Roots of Community Policing

To gain insight into a strategy for today's law enforcement situation requires remembering yesterday. The community policing movement can be traced to the 1960s. The crime rate was soaring and protests were spilling onto city streets. It was an era when the police increasingly found themselves cast in the role of the outsider, viewed by many as strangers to the community. In addition, concern was growing that traditional policing seemed incapable of controlling crime or keeping the peace. The times seemed to demand a new approach capable of adding "high touch" to "high tech."

By the late 1970s, the apparent drawbacks to the traditional policing system prompted renewed interest in finding ways to heal the breach between people and law enforcement. Early experiments in New Jersey and Flint, Mich., clarified that old-fashioned foot patrols had to be re-invented to serve the needs of modern society.

The undirected foot patrols in New Jersey simply failed to produce the results achieved in Flint, where the officers enmeshed themselves in the life of the community.

The Flint foot patrol officers acted as traditional law enforcement officers, but they were also challenged to explore creative ways to make both a short- and long-term impact on crime and disorder. In addition to their regular duties, organized projects enlisting parents for a curfew program aimed at high-risk youngsters, chaperoning the elderly on shopping trips after they received their monthly Social Security checks, and rewarding

kids with sporting goods for participating in beautification programs.

As this enhanced form of foot patrol began to demonstrate that it could make a positive impact on the root causes of crime, research also confirmed that community policing also reduces fear of crime, which can be as big a problem as crime itself. In addition, community policing also demonstrated an ability to reduce racial tensions as a welcome by-product of delivering quality police service

*How do you
communicate
that community
policing should
be encouraged?*

to the community.

Community Problem-Solving

Community policing is far more than social work or just a public relations extra designed to allow the police to make friends in the community. Community policing differs from traditional law enforcement because it allows officers the freedom and autonomy to expand the scope of the job. It balances reactive efforts with proactive initiatives aimed at reducing and controlling contemporary crime and drug problems.

Officers are challenged to become community problem-solvers, rather than simply to react to problems after they occur. Community policing encourages officers to use their time creatively, in efforts to help neighborhoods help themselves. In North Miami Beach, for example, an enterprising community officer personally issued a challenge to each suspected low-level drug dealer that he met on the street. If they were willing to stop dealing, he would help them find a job. If they kept dealing, he assured them that he would arrest them.

To make good on both his promise as well as his



threat, the officer installed a bulletin board in his local office on which he posted a list of jobs available. He also organized a Job Fair, enlisting professionals who provided seminars on various topics such as how to fill out job applications and make a good impression during job interviews.

Serious Crime

As Dr. Bruce Benson, formerly with the Flint Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program and now director of Michigan State University's Department of Public Safety, attests, the biggest police challenge is preventing the 12-year-old, who pulls his first breaking-and-entering crime, from escalating to more serious crimes.

Benson says violent crime so overloads the system that property crime can easily fall through the cracks. In a violent city like Flint, with one of the highest murder rates in the nation, motor patrol officers cannot afford to spend much time tracking down the youngster who swipes a bike.

The failure to take that crime seriously, however, sends the wrong message to young people. The crucial time for the police to intervene in that young person's life is before that first mistake can take root and become a lifelong habit—which also sends a message to that child's friends.

Combatting Open Drug Dealing

Placing a committed community officer in the neighborhood not only allows the police to take juvenile property crime seriously, it also provides the police a unique opportunity to make a positive impact on street-level drug dealing, which often triggers violence among the young. The traditional police response to drugs is to work upward in the drug distribution pyramid, with the goal of arresting top dealers. Experience shows, however, that putting Mr. Big behind bars often fails to translate into any real relief on the streets, because there is always another budding drug kingpin who is often willing to murder his way to the top.

Meanwhile, on the streets, young people grow up amid drugs, crime, and violence—and they also see that low-level dealers rarely face sanctions. Inevitably, this

contributes to luring more young people into the lucrative drug trade.

When the police and the law-abiding people in the neighborhood work together on imaginative efforts to control open dealing, not only does this provide relief, it can also reduce the number of potential drug abusers and drug dealers in the future. Community-based, police-supervised initiatives also provide a much-needed check on vigilantism.

In Newport News, Va., for example, community officers opened a storefront office and immediately addressed a serious problem in a public housing complex nearby, where open drug dealing had literally driven area children out of the playground. By enlisting the support of apartment residents and making visible drug busts, the community officers were soon able to provide neighborhood youngsters a safe place to play.

Building Trust in the Community

While some traditionalists resent seeing the police share power with average citizens, it is unlikely that police will ever be able to impose solutions on the community from the outside. By stationing a community officer permanently in a neighborhood, the department gains a unique opportunity for the officer to become involved in the life of the community. The officer can gather information and intelligence far beyond what even undercover efforts can generate—and do so far more safely for the officers involved.

A community policing approach provides the department with information that allows them to solve serious crimes. In a mid-sized Western department, for example, a concerted outreach to the gay community resulted in tips that led to the arrest of a suspect for a truly gruesome murder that had gone unsolved, illustrating that people often will not share what they know until or unless they trust their police.

For too long, the police have concentrated on securing the information they need from the criminal element—the very people who have the greatest reason to protect their secrets. Community policing recognizes that average citizens often knowingly or unknowingly have knowledge that the police must have to solve



Officers who get involved in the life of the community develop rapport, build trust and gain access to information that leads to a proactive approach to crime.

crimes. Encouraging them to share what they know requires spending the time to develop rapport.

In Morristown, N.J., for instance, police officials were stunned when a new community policing initiative generated precise information about a drug ring operating in the neighborhood. A community officer who was introducing himself to residents in an apartment complex made a routine call on an elderly woman who lived alone. When the officer took the time to discuss how to handle a problem that she was having with her stove, she responded by providing him the names of the major drug dealers and details about the pattern of their deliveries—information that the department had been struggling to uncover for months.

Common Obstacles

Although community policing has demonstrated explosive growth nationwide, departments that continue to resist implementing these methods often cite fear of internal dissension and concern about costs as reasons to avoid change. About the former, the reality is that some traditionalists will always oppose community policing on philosophical grounds. However, the virtue of a paramilitary organization is that people tend to follow orders well. The key for management is not to waste time trying to change attitudes, but to concentrate on changing behavior instead. As long as traditionalists know that the department is serious about community policing—and the message is constantly reinforced from the top, they can become an integral part of making the system work.

Experience also proves that community policing cannot be treated as a special program. The entire department, including both civilian and sworn personnel, must embrace the community policing mandate.

The Aurora (Colo.) Police Department, under the guidance of Chief Jerry Williams, serves as model for a department wide commitment. When Aurora made the initial shift to community policing, it made their officers (Police Area Representatives) part of a community-based police team. Not only does this improve communication among the officers, it also allows them to substitute for each other on occasion, so that each officer has

the opportunity to learn about the benefits and drawbacks of different approaches.

Aurora is now in the process of finding ways to express this new community commitment throughout the department. In addition to revising its mission statement and adopting a new logo signifying the shift to a community policing approach, they also established a core committee that reviews how each element in the department, civilian and sworn, can translate the philosophy into action.

One idea was to develop a new department directory, so calls can be directed to the right person on the first try. While this might seem a small matter, it recognizes the importance that first impressions can make. People who call the police and find themselves bounced from person to person not only feel frustrated, but this sends the message that the police department is an uncaring and forbidding bureaucracy. Aurora wants people to know that they value their input.

Aurora is also developing new performance evaluations that focus on quality rather than quantity. The police know better than anyone that an increase in arrest and clearance rates may not reflect any real improvement on the streets. The goal is to allow officers the freedom to experiment—and make mistakes—yet hold them accountable so that the department can identify those who are not doing the job.

In McAllen, Texas, Chief Alex Longoria simply asks his community officers to write a paragraph or two about their goals for the next month, at the same time they submit a brief report on their achievements for the previous month.

When Flint's Bruce Benson was asked to provide more direction for foot patrol officers, he asked all foot officers to submit three goals each month to their supervisors (and a goal could be as general as a commitment to make more community contacts). To ensure that the officers are allowed flexibility, Benson also encouraged supervisors not to downgrade officers who failed to meet their targets, if it was clear that pressing priorities dictated changing their plans. The challenge is to provide accountability without stifling initiative.

Finding Funding

Concerns about cost remain a problem. In Flint, voters approved a special millage earmarked for foot patrol on three separate occasions, despite the fact the original foot patrol project had been gutted badly during tough economic times. Yet Benson warns that identifying any pot of money for a special purpose can entice local officials into engaging in creative bookkeeping to divert those new resources to other needs.

One possible way of providing is through forfeiture dollars. In many areas, anti-drug initiatives include aggressive use of forfeiture as a way to wring the profits out of the drug trade. When Robert Olson was chief in Corpus Christi, Texas, he was able to use a portion of the department's forfeiture money for initiatives that specifically targeted proactive efforts aimed at juveniles.

Some departments have eliminated or reduced their police-community relations or crime prevention units, while others cut the number of officers who provide security for local officials.

To fund Community Officers, most departments also find they must also reorder existing priorities. Usually, the results increased response time on non-emergency calls.

In Lansing, Mich., for example, the police no longer dispatch an available officer to help motorists who lock their keys in their cars. The dispatcher instead provides the telephone number of a towing service that will do the job for a fee. In Alexandria, VA., shifting resources required changing the way the department handled fender benders. To free officers for proactive efforts, the department now requires motorists involved in minor accidents to drive to the station to secure the police report needed for insurance reimbursement. In Aurora, the department now refuses to handle obscene phone call complaints until the telephone company has tracked a suspect.

Political Concerns

Changing police priorities risks angering individuals and groups who have previously enjoyed higher levels of police service—and that can put the police at odds with local politicians who fear losing votes. Incumbents today rely primarily on two powerful elements in the community for re-election: The middle-class core constituency—the group most likely to vote and campaign contrib-

utors, the affluent individuals and special-interest groups who provide the escalating amounts of money required to run a successful campaign.

It is easy to see why politicians can view community policing as a threat. Why should an incumbent mayor support changes that require a middle-class taxpayer to wait hours before an officer appears to handle a cold burglary call? Why would a city council member visibly embrace a new system that cuts foot patrol in his downtown business district to provide new community officers in residential areas outside his ward?

Yet there are many encouraging signs that city officials are beginning to understand the benefits of a community policing approach. In New York City, where community policing pioneer Lee Brown is the police commissioner, Mayor David Dinkins recently an-

nounced that approximately 500 new recruits will bypass training, and be placed immediately into the city's renowned Community Patrol Officers Program. Shortly afterward, Dinkins decided to add an additional 1,000 new community officers, despite tight city budgets.

Still, many elected officials view community officers as a direct threat to their power base, since people in the community can often begin to turn to the police for the kinds of help that politicians previously provided. In their capacity as the community's ombudsman to City


Hall, for example, community officers often find themselves lobbying for better government service.

Sometimes this means pressuring the sanitation department to increase garbage pick-ups. Or it can mean encouraging code enforcement to speed up efforts to raze abandoned structures. Again, this threatens the political status quo, especially if those efforts are perceived as diverting more tax dollars into helping those who live in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Add in the concern that community policing might upset the balance of power further by encouraging previously powerless groups to become more political, and it is easy to see why some politicians may be hesitant about embracing community policing.

Police Chiefs as Community Leaders

The realities are that crime and drugs are the biggest

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Community Policing

(Continued from page 44)

concerns among voters. Traditional efforts that focus on reacting after the problems occur cannot provide people the safety they seek is also a reality. Police chiefs who recognize what Community Policing can do must accept a new leadership role.

With their unique credibility, police chiefs are often the best messengers to explain to the public and politicians alike that minor inconveniences, such as asking motorists to drive to the station for insurance reports, can provide the department the flexibility it needs to address major problems.

Politicians win elections by promising to solve problems without raising taxes, so perhaps it is the police chief who should remind voters that there is no free lunch—that the police cannot always stretch existing funding far enough to provide both an officer to retrieve keys locked inside a car as well as an officer who works on efforts to keep drugs out of schools.

The biggest management challenge that community policing entails lies in communicating effectively with people inside and outside the department about how community policing is in everyone's enlightened self-interest. It provides fresh answers to the age-old problem of how the police can help strengthen families and neighborhoods, in the hope that all communities can become more crime- and drug-resistant in the future.

Robert Trojanowicz is director of Michigan State University's School of Criminal Justice and a research fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at Harvard University. Trojanowicz is also director of the National Center for Community Policing, for which Bonnie Bucqueroux serves as both assistant director and editor of the newsletter that is published three times a year. They can be reached by calling or writing: National Center for Community Policing, Michigan State University, School of Criminal Justice, 560 Baker Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824-1118; telephone toll-free 800/892-9648 (in Michigan, 517/355-2322).

**THE NEIGHBORHOOD
NETWORK CENTER: Part One**

**Basic Issues and
Planning and Implementation
in Lansing, Michigan**

**Robert Trojanowicz
Bonnie Bucqueroux
Tina McLanus
David Sinclair**

**National Center for
Community Policing**

Community Policing Series No. 23

20. Rapid Response and Community Policing: Are They Really in Conflict?
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Articles

The Foot Patrol Officer, the Community, and the School: A Coalition Against Crime
 Community Policing: Defining the Officer's Role
 Foot Patrol: Some Problem Areas
 An Evaluation of a Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program
 Community Policing is Not Police-Community Relations
 The Community Policing Challenge

SUMMARY

The Neighborhood Network Center concept evolved from Community Policing, the police reform that provides decentralized and personalized policing to the community. The Community Policing approach stations officers permanently in defined beat areas, so that these Community Officers and the people they service can work in partnership to make their neighborhoods better and safer places in which to live and work.

Experience with Community Policing shows that Community Officers are so well received within the community that they often find themselves inundated with tasks beyond the traditional scope of law enforcement. As police problem solvers who act as a catalyst for positive change, Community Officers routinely network with other social service providers, whose support is essential, but whose participation is limited by the fact that they are not out in the community each day, alongside the Community Officer.

The Neighborhood Network Center concept seeks to apply the decentralized and personalized model of Community Policing to the delivery of other public and private social services. This new approach allows other social service providers, such as social workers, public health nurses, mental health professionals, drug treatment counselors, education specialists, and probation and parole officers, to join the Community Officer in the community on a part-time or full-time basis. This new community-based team of professionals operates from a facility located in the target neighborhood.

The Community Officer serves as the vanguard and as the informal leader of this new group of community-based problem solvers for many reasons. First, the Community Officer knows the community intimately, its strengths and weaknesses. Second, the Community Officer has already established a bond of trust with the law-abiding people in the community, which can serve as a foundation for the other service providers. Third, the Community Officer acts as the protector for the other professionals who follow his or her lead back into the community, just as the Community Officer is the protector of the private citizens and volunteers in the beat area. Fourth, the Community Officer has the broadest range of options, ranging from a pat on the back for a job well done to the use of deadly force, in dealing with the problems that the community may face.

This report identifies the basics of the Neighborhood Network Center concept, its evolution from the Community Policing movement, and the ex-

perience of the Lansing (MI) Neighborhood Network Center so far. The National Center for Community Policing at Michigan State University is also consulting with other communities nationally that view this approach as important to neighborhood problem solving.

PUBLICATIONS FROM THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR COMMUNITY POLICING

Books

An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan

A Manual for the Establishment and Operation of a Foot Patrol Program

Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective, by Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, Anderson Publishing Company, Cincinnati, OH

(Please contact Anderson Publishing directly by calling 1-800/543-0883)

Community Policing Series

1. Perceptions of Safety: A Comparison of Foot Patrol Versus Motor Patrol Officers
2. Job Satisfaction: A Comparison of Foot Patrol Versus Motor Patrol Officers
3. The Status of Contemporary Community Policing
4. The Impact of Foot Patrol on Black and White Perceptions of Policing
5. Uniform Crime Reporting and Community Policing: A Historical Perspective
6. Performance Profiles of Foot Versus Motor Patrol Officers
7. Community Policing: A Taxpayer's Perspective
8. Implementing a Community Policing Model for Work with Juveniles: An Exploratory Study
9. Community Policing: Training Issues
10. Community Policing Programs: A Twenty-Year View
11. Community Policing: The Line Officer's Perspective
12. Community Policing: Community Input into Police Policy
13. The Philosophy and Role of Community Policing
14. Community Policing: University Input into Community Policing
15. The Meaning of Community in Community Policing
16. Community Policing: Would You Know It If You Saw It?
17. Reinventing the Wheel in Police Work: A Sense of History
18. Preventing Civil Disturbances: A Community Policing Approach
19. Turning Concept into Practice: The Aurora (CO) Story

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For Ingham County Probate Court—
 Chief Judge
 For Clinton-Ingham-Eaton Community Mental Health—
 Chairperson
 For Ingham Intermediate School District—
 Superintendent

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C. To evaluate and determine specific initiatives that require agency or inter-agency cooperation to meet the needs of unserved and underserved persons in need of coordinated services from these human service agencies.

D. To seek out, consider, and develop possible funding proposals for the funding of coordinated human services from and for these agencies for the residents of Ingham County.

E. To identify and bring consideration to issues that may benefit from joint problem-solving initiatives.

F. To work cooperatively for the commitment and planning of benefits and services to be provided by the agencies to the residents of Ingham County, recognizing that each agency must work within the constraints of that agency's statutory responsibility and limitations.

III. This agreement shall commence (date) and may be terminated by any participating party by thirty (30) days advance notice to the other parties.

IV. This Letter of Understanding relates to discussion and communications in meetings concerning problems of joint and mutual interest as set forth herein.

V. This agreement is not a commitment of funding or specific programs by any party. All programming and funding decisions shall continue to be made by each party in the manner and procedure utilized by that party.

VI. Each party agrees to hold harmless the other parties and their agents, servant, and employees from liability resulting from or arising out of the activities of the indemnifying party related to or arising out of the services provided by that party.

VII. This Letter of Understanding may only be amended by written agreement of the parties hereto.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF that parties have entered this agreement on the date to be effective as set forth herein.

(Signatures included:

For the Ingham County Department of Social Services—
Director

For Ingham County for the Ingham County Health Department—
Chairperson of the Board of Commissioners
County Clerk
Health Officer

For Lansing School District—
Superintendent

APPENDIX A

(A SAMPLE OF THE LANSING INTER-AGENCY AGREEMENT)

This Letter of Understanding is made and entered by and between Ingham County Department of Social Services, Ingham County for the Ingham County Health Department, the Lansing School District, the Ingham Intermediate School District, the Ingham County Probate Court, and the Clinton-Eaton-Ingham Community Mental Health Board.

WITNESSETH

Whereas the signing parties ("Agencies/Agency") are committed to a cooperative process in providing a continuum of quality services for children and families as close to the home environment as possible; and

Whereas the agencies recognized that, for the benefit of servicing clients with multiple problems, who are in the service area of the agencies, it is appropriate to meet, from time to time, to discuss and implement, where appropriate, inter-agency cooperation, with the goal of better servicing the needs of the citizens within the service areas of these agencies; and

Whereas to help fully meet the needs of all children in the Agencies' service areas, the Lansing School District, the Ingham Intermediate School District, the Ingham County Department of Social Services, the Clinton-Eaton-Ingham Community Mental Health Board, Ingham County for the Ingham County Health Department, the Ingham County Probate Court have prepared this Letter of Understanding.

Therefore, the parties have reached the following understanding:

I. The agencies signing this Letter of Understanding agree that the directors of those agencies or their designees will meet from time to time, but no less often than quarterly, for the purposes set forth in this Letter of Understanding.

II. The purpose of this Letter of Understanding and the joint meetings as specified herein are as follows:

- A. Problem identification in the community of gaps in human services and to attempt to identify funding sources to meet those gaps in services.
- B. To identify areas and circumstances in which potential clients of the agencies would benefit from services of more than one agency.

INTRODUCTION

The mini-series

This publication is the first of two (or more) booklets offered as a mini-series on the Neighborhood Network Center concept within the Community Policing Series. This first installment will define the basic Neighborhood Network Center concept and its roots in Community Policing, then it will focus on the planning and implementation of the new Neighborhood Network Center in Lansing, as a means of identifying the issues and obstacles that these new efforts must confront.

The second installment will elaborate on how the Lansing Neighborhood Network Center functions in practice, as well as the impact that it has had on the surrounding community. Future installments will appear, as warranted, to update results on the Lansing experience, to report on the other sites in the United States and England currently being monitored by the National Center for Community Policing, and to discuss emerging issues and concerns.

A brief definition

The Neighborhood Network Center concept adapts the decentralized and personalized model provided by Community Policing to the delivery of other public and private social services to the community. The concept is based on establishing a decentralized office in a defined beat area, from which a team of part-time and full-time service providers can operate as a new community-based team of problem solvers, with the Community Officer acting as both protector and catalyst for improving and enhancing the delivery of social services.

The objective is to allow these professionals to work together to intervene with troubled individuals and families and their social and physical environment, with the goal of helping to make the neighborhood a better and safer place in which to live and work. In addition to the problems of crime, fear of crime, and illicit drugs, the Neighborhood Network Center approach is designed to assist and expand Community Policing's attempts to deal with social and physical disorder in the community.

This means that the Neighborhood Network Center concept will be evaluated on whether it can make a positive impact on problems as diverse as substandard housing, neighborhood decay, child neglect, substance abuse, or any other of the host of ills plaguing many neighborhoods today. The range

of problems to which the Neighborhood Network Center concept can be applied is limited only by the kinds of problems that appear in target neighborhoods and the skills, resources, and creativity that the new community-based team of problem solvers can bring to bear.

Why Lansing?

The Lansing Neighborhood Network Center was chosen for special attention for a number of reasons:

- The Lansing experiment is among the first pilot projects in the Neighborhood Network Center concept in the United States, and it comes closest to fulfilling the basic requirements identified by the National Center for Community Policing.
- The National Center for Community Policing has had the opportunity to work closely with the Lansing Police Department and the various participating agencies early on, prior to the opening of the Lansing Neighborhood Network Center, which allows this publication to provide a detailed history and analysis of the issues that must be addressed in planning.
- The National Center for Community Policing is involved in efforts to monitor the progress of the experiment and to assist in evaluating its impact, which provides the opportunity to continue to update results.
- The Lansing Neighborhood Network Center is unusual in that this experiment has been launched without any substantial extra funding. All too often, innovations that depend on special grants disappear once the funding ends, no matter how promising. So, particularly in this era of tight public-sector budgets, the Lansing pilot project is unique in being able to provide ideas that others can use immediately.

First steps toward a model

As this implies, this publication is offered as an important first step in the process of contributing to a model for Neighborhood Network Centers, not as the final answer. This publication should therefore be viewed as an initial attempt to define the concept, document and analyze the planning and execution phase, and provide a frank exploration of the anticipated obstacles and issues that such initiatives must confront, using the Lansing experience for illustration.

The most critical issue, of course, is whether the Neighborhood Network Center concept can and will fulfill its promise, and, as with Community

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Bartlett, Donald L., and Steele, James B., **America: What Went Wrong?** (Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1992).

5. Inspector Joseph Koenig, Michigan State Police, **The Michigan LBC (Law Enforcement, Business and Community)**, 1988.

If society is a family, then it makes sense to see government agencies as the adult authority figures—the parents who set and enforce the rules and who serve as role models for proper behavior. In that sense, it is easy to see social workers and other human service providers as mothers—as the traditional nurturers and caregivers. And it is also easy to see police officers and other members of the criminal justice system as fathers. In that sense, the Community Officer is not the stern father of the past, who was far quicker to mete out punishment than praise, but the enlightened father of today, who understands that his role requires providing not only discipline but compassion and concern.

As this suggests, Community Policing allows “Dad” to establish a “home” among his family, while the Neighborhood Network Center provides the opportunity for him to move “Mom” with him into a new and bigger house—one where all those aunts and uncles and grandparents can visit and provide a helping hand. It is not that Dad hasn’t been doing a great job, but being a parent is a tough job, made even tougher alone.

The danger in using this metaphor, of course, is that it risks being perceived as sexual stereotyping—though more than nine of 10 police officers are male, while the reverse holds true for the so-called helping professions, such as social work and nursing. Yet perhaps this discussion can contribute to defeating those stereotypes, since the Neighborhood Network Center concept requires the entire community-based team to work together, as equals, just as we see parents embracing equality. A family today may well consist of Mom going to work, while Dad stays home—or where Stepmom and Stepdad blend two families into one, just as the roster of professionals and volunteers who operate from the Neighborhood Network Center can shift and change. And today we understand that the old model of parenting must change, that we can no longer expect to impose our will purely through authority, but that we must challenge and inspire through example.

Our changing society requires exploring new forms—and the bottom line must always be the goal of helping the next generation fulfill its potential.

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1. Greider, William, Welfare Myths, *Rolling Stone Magazine*, May 1992. See also Greider’s *Who Will Tell the People?* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

Policing, it may well take years for that question to be answered fully. Important as well is whether the Lansing experiment will survive over time and also whether the Lansing Neighborhood Network Center will improve the delivery of human services to the community in ways that produce positive results in the lives of the people who live and work there.

Developing and implementing a Neighborhood Network Center takes a tremendous amount of support, commitment, and risk-taking from many different individuals and groups. The Lansing Neighborhood Network Center could never have “gotten off the ground” without the dedication of city government and all the public and private groups that must be involved for any such endeavor to succeed. Space limitations prevent us from listing all of the officials, workers, and private citizens who have been involved in making the Lansing Neighborhood Network Center a reality.

BUILDING ON SUCCESS

The Community Policing Model

The emergence of what has come to be called the Neighborhood Network Center concept builds on the successes achieved through Community Policing. In essence, the Neighborhood Network Center concept applies the lessons learned from providing decentralized and personalized police service through the Community Policing approach to the delivery of other public and private social services to the community. The concept rests on the belief that Community Officers can serve as a model for the creation of a new community-based team of public, private, and volunteer problem-solvers, with Community Officers in the vanguard, as both the protector of those who follow and as the catalyst for positive intervention in the lives of people who live and work in troubled neighborhoods.

As this suggests, understanding the potential future of the Neighborhood Network Center concept requires understanding the history of Community Policing reform, since many of the same dynamics pertain. We should remember that those early experiments with what has come to be called Community Policing were once criticized for being a throwback to an earlier era—a nostalgic attempt to return to a romanticized past. In reality, of course, Community Policing updates the role of the old-fashioned beat cop, by asking today’s Community Officer to do much more than simply pound the pavement and rattle doorknobs, as a visible deterrent to crime.

The multi-faceted role of the Community Officer

Today's Community Officer does indeed function as a full-fledged law enforcement officer, but the job also requires involving average citizens in the process of identifying, prioritizing, and solving problems in the neighborhood. Community Officers help in organizing and mobilizing the resources available in the community, and this includes empowering average citizens, by challenging them to participate in efforts to make their communities safer and to improve the overall quality of life in their neighborhood. This often means recruiting citizen volunteers from inside and outside the neighborhood who are willing to donate their time and talents. Obviously, this also means reaching out to the local business community, to help solve their problems and to ask for their help in return.

In addition, the job requires Community Officers act as both liaison and ombudsman to other public and private agencies that can assist in reducing the social and physical disorder in the community. Dealing with physical disorder often means working with code enforcement on efforts to close dope houses, tear down abandoned buildings, and upgrade rental properties. Efforts can involve agencies ranging from animal control to sanitation to the fire department.

Many problems of social disorder that Community Officers must deal with also benefit from the direct involvement of human services providers—mental health therapists, substance abuse counselors, social workers, public health nurses, education specialists. Sometimes this means inviting one or more of these professionals to help intervene with a specific individual or family, or it can mean providing people with problems with a referral. Other times, Community Officers help organize broad-based efforts, for instance, by working with a public health nurse on providing regular classes for young mothers in the area on how to nurture their babies.

Community Officers routinely involve area schools, churches, synagogues, and temples in creative initiatives, and they also have the mandate and the authority to enlist assistance from non-profit agencies, such as food banks and groups that assist fragile populations such as the homeless and runaways. The roster of public and private agencies that Community Officers may involve is dictated by local needs and resources.

Sharing the workload

Experience also shows that Community Officers who try to "go it alone" risk early burnout. Moreover, Community Policing has been criticized

Community Officers need flexibility in scheduling their hours, and that this can run afoul of work rules.

Among the many questions yet to be answered are: Will all team members be allowed the flexibility to work hours as needed? How will each agency handle issues about overtime? Is it likely that some team members will shift from part-time to full-time and back again, as needed?

Will team members have the right to change the boundaries of the "beat" area that they serve? As the community stabilizes, for example, we might expect the size of the Community Officer's beat to grow.

Will changing demographics in the community require changes in the roster of the team? Will some initiatives be so successful that some team members are no longer needed? If so, does it really make better sense to have them return to working out of a centralized facility? Or should this be the model for the delivery of service, regardless of the level of problems in the community?

• **The role of personality**—Most managers view personality as a negative—the wild card that can trump an otherwise "scientific" management plan. Community Policing and the Neighborhood Network Center concept instead turn the argument around, arguing that the challenge is to find ways to capitalize on individual talents and abilities. The outgoing person who enjoys talking to large groups may well be the best candidate to give speeches. The thoughtful individual who doesn't like to say much may well prove to be the person tapped when a good listener is needed. The virtue of this team approach is that each individual's strengths can be used to counterbalance another's weaknesses, provided that everyone involved gives all they can to the job.

CONCLUSION

The family as metaphor

It bears repeating that this mini-series on the Neighborhood Network Center concept, focusing on the Lansing experience, is merely an initial attempt to define and explain the approach and to deal with some of the major issues that have already surfaced. So, to add to that understanding, perhaps the best recap requires thinking of society as a huge family—a group of very different people, of all ages, whose collective future will be shaped by their relationships to each other.

Network Center. Yet security of sensitive materials is a valid concern, and there may be circumstances where an agency's participation hinges on finding funding for secure telephone lines, dedicated computer lines, and other security devices.

However, overriding concerns that sensitive materials might fall into the hands of outsiders is the question of how to handle the issue of confidentiality within the team. Various laws and regulations govern sharing information on individual students in the public schools; clients receiving health care, mental health therapy, drug treatment, or public assistance; suspects in criminal investigations, etc., and this can create complications for the community-based team.

To work together effectively, the team must share certain kinds of information. At the same time, the team members must all agree to honor the levels of confidentiality required by the participating agencies, and this is best spelled out in the Letter of Agreement that all must sign. However, no formal agreement, no matter how detailed, can cover all eventualities, and no doubt informal sharing of information within the team will occur. The challenge is to avoid a lapse or slip of the tongue to others outside the team that could literally threaten the future of the experiment.

Also at issue, as in the Lansing experiment, is that part of the challenge of working together as a team is that different agencies define problems differently. An "at-risk youth" means one thing to a police officer, another to a social worker or mental health therapist. It is one thing for the mental health professional to claim that a client is "suicidal," and another if the Community Officer says so. Only by working together and discussing the use of professional jargon can the team learn how to function together with mutual agreement.

While we can assume that all participating agencies have written and unwritten codes of ethics, it is important to review areas where they may differ, so that any omissions or inconsistencies can be addressed. As noted, different agencies may have different rules about their ethical responsibility to release information to the press—or to keep it secret. But all guidelines should be reviewed, so that the community team operates with sensitivity to ethical concerns about how they will interact with each other and with the community.

- **Flexibility**—There is not yet enough experience with the Neighborhood Network Center approach to identify all the ways in which the issue of flexibility may arise. However, we often find with Community Policing that

for turning police officers into social workers, when the reality is that Community Officers often find themselves forced to assume duties better handled by other service providers who jobs no longer allow them to spend time in the community. The police remain the only public agency open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, which means that they are often asked to provide assistance in situations better handled by other social service agents.

In that sense, the Neighborhood Network Center concept not only recognizes what is already happening in many Community Policing beats, as Community Officers turn to others for help, but it carries the idea important steps further, by formalizing the relationship of the community-based team of problem solvers and by establishing that they should work together part-time or full-time from an office in the community. The opportunity to network with and involve other service providers can often make the difference between the success or failure of many Community Policing initiatives, not only because it provides more concerned professionals who can apply their talents to the challenges, but because it allows others to share the load, thereby allowing Community Officers to preserve their main role as a law enforcement officer.

As this implies, the Neighborhood Network Center concept puts a burden on service providers to adopt the Community Policing model of providing decentralized and personalized service. And if we remember the pressures that led to Community Policing reform and the resistance that it spawned in its early days, we can more easily recognize the obstacles that the Neighborhood Network Center concept will likely face.

PRESSURES TO CHANGE

Frustrations with the status quo

It is important to remember that Community Policing did not always seem as inevitable as it does today. Community Policing is indeed the wave of the future. Today, the majority of larger police departments nationwide say that they have already adopted some form of Community Policing, or they plan to do so. But, back in the early days of "foot patrol" experiments in Flint, Michigan, and Newark, New Jersey, few would have predicted that these "radical" experiments would someday serve as a blueprint for the way that many police departments would deliver service to the community.

In essence, these early experiments were born of frustration—a response to the failure of traditional policing to provide solutions to a number of grow-

ing concerns. Primary among them was concern about the dramatic surge in violent crime that exploded in the late 1960's. Of deep concern as well was the threat of civil unrest, as cities nationwide exploded in rioting. This also focused a spotlight on the troubled relations between the police and minorities in many communities. Adding to those concerns were incidents such as the "police riot" during the Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968, which fueled debate about the proper use of the police and whether the police had lost touch with average citizens.

Community Policing sprang from the recognition that efforts to "modernize" policing that began in the 1930's, which included recasting the "peace officer" as "crime fighter," had unexpected and undeniable downsides. One obvious problem was that defining the police as crime fighters inadvertently shifted the burden of responsibility for public safety from the community to the police. The cornerstones of this top-down approach were preventive patrol, retrospective investigation, and rapid response—the belief that effective and efficient crime control depended on the speed with which the police arrived at specific crime incidents, rather than on what they did when they arrived.

Also lost in the process was the direct connection between people and their police that had existed in the past, and this provided fertile ground for increasing mistrust and even outright hostility. Instead of the friendly beat cop on the corner that everyone knew, we now had the "thin blue line" of hard-nosed motor patrol officers dashing from call to call. Instead of people and police working in partnership to keep communities safe, this "professionalizing" of the police contributed to the widespread perception, in both police departments and in the community, that it was the job of the police, as the experts, to solve the community's problems by "catching all the bad guys."

Over time as well, the inherent limitations in a reactive approach that focuses almost exclusively on rapid response as the key to crime control began to emerge. A fundamental problem, of course, is that this means that the police cannot act until a crime incident occurs and someone notifies the police. While the ability to arrive as quickly as possible at the scene is an essential function of the police, this approach does little to prevent people from being victimized, which is what people really want.

Research confirmed that the biggest lag was not between the time of the call to the police and the arrival of officers on the scene, but in the time that it takes people to contact the police. Obviously, many calls are delayed because crime victims and witnesses simply cannot get to a phone. Or a

eaucratic impulse whenever it appears. Left unchecked, it is the nature of bureaucracies to exercise rigid hierarchical control, to demand more documentation than is necessary, to require quantitative rather than qualitative results, and to reduce opportunities for innovation, risk-taking, and autonomy among first-line supervisors and line-level personnel. The Neighborhood Network Center breaks the mold of the bureaucrat as part of an uncaring agency, out of touch with the community, that buries both workers and clients in a blizzard of meaningless paperwork and red tape.

It is important to recognize, however, that this kind of profound change in the delivery of service to the community is likely to inspire a backlash within the agency, unless these concerns are dealt with up front. Imagine the social workers and their supervisors, tied to desks downtown, who read a glowing article in the newspaper about the efforts of the community-based team, including comments from the social worker on site who talks about how wonderful it is to see firsthand the positive impact that their efforts are making.

The opportunities for jealousy and friction are enormous, which is why departments that embrace Community Policing recognize the importance of educating everyone about the concept and encouraging a department-wide commitment to the new approach. Yet, while this will help to reduce internal friction, it can never be completely eradicated, which is why administrators must be alert to the dangers of resistance and even overt attempts at sabotage. To expect otherwise would be naive, so the best solution is to ensure that top administrators reinforce their commitment to the concept whenever possible.

• **Security, liability, confidentiality, terminology & ethics**—Security is an issue that underscores the importance of the participation of the Community Officer. However, while the Community Officer acts as the protector for his or her colleagues, it must be understood that the Community Officer's job is not simply to act as the personal bodyguard for team members. This also raises obvious questions about liability, concerning both the team members and their clients.

Another concern that has surfaced is security for sensitive files. In Lansing, as noted earlier, an agency demanded, as a condition of their on-site participation, that the Neighborhood Network Center hire a security guard for the nighttime hours, to guarantee that their files would be safe. It should be noted, however, that the agency did not have an overnight security guard patrolling their central location, which housed thousands of files, while only a few hundred at most would have been kept at the Neighborhood

agency executives who are open to considering this approach, in the hope that their leadership and enthusiasm can bring others into the group.

At the grass-roots level in the Neighborhood Network Center, there is also a need for the community-based team of problem solvers to identify a group leader, formally or informally. Again, we expect that many initiatives will build on the efforts of the Community Officer, so we expect that they may well emerge as the official or unofficial leader of the team.

- **Formal and informal accountability**—There is no one “boss” on site, if we define boss as someone with the power to hire and fire and set raises. Each team member is therefore held ultimately accountable to supervisors in the agency for which he or she works. And the fact that no one team member has authority over another underscores the importance of cooperation.

Success is everyone’s child, but failure is an orphan, so the issue of formal and informal accountability most often comes into question whenever there are problems or mistakes. With Community Policing, experience shows that both the police department and the community hold Community Officers directly accountable for their actions, which makes them even more accountable than other members of the department. As this suggests, we anticipate that the members of the community-based team of problem solvers will find themselves held directly accountable not only to their superiors but to the community as well, which is the most important clientele.

Yet it must be stated clearly that part of why Community Policing makes some police departments “nervous” is that Community Officers often end up identifying strongly with the community—in many cases, more strongly than with fellow police. While this sense of ownership is much of the reason that Community Officers accomplish so much, there can be circumstances where top command perceives this as a problem of “misplaced loyalty.”

The goal is to encourage the community-based team to forge a strong sense of identification with the community and with each other. Participating agencies should clearly expect and understand that this will create new tensions in their relationships with their employees. This puts an additional burden on management to shift from the “control” or “paternalistic” model of supervision to one where line-level employees enjoy greater autonomy and freedom of action, as long as their actions contribute to the goal of making the community a better and safer place.

- **The bureaucratic impulse**—As the preceding paragraph shows, participating agencies must understand the importance of stifling the bur-

burglary victim does not even discover that a crime has been committed until long after the perpetrator has fled. Yet studies also showed that the vast majority of calls to the police do not involve a crime in progress, but other problems for which people want help. And research such as the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Study also called into question whether the mere visible presence of motor patrol cars on the street did much, if anything, to deter crime.

The crises, such as riots and clashes with anti-war protesters, that had added urgency to Community Policing experiments did abate over time. Yet not only did serious crime persist, but problems with illicit drugs exploded, and it has been the failure of traditional policing to halt or reverse the growing chaos in many communities literally overwhelmed by drugs that has sparked adoption of Community Policing reform nationwide.

Why Community Policing works

Indeed, the problem of drugs underscores the limitations of traditional policing and therefore the importance of Community Policing reform. As the epidemic of crack verified, efforts to stop the flow of drugs to the street by having police focus the bulk of their resources on Mr. Big is not enough. Community Policing balances efforts aimed at the top of the drug-dealing pyramid with initiatives that focused on solving the myriad of problems that illicit drugs cause in drug-infested neighborhoods.

Only by stationing Community Officers permanently in the community can the police intervene effectively with problems that range from the corrosive effort of open drug dealing on the community, to the challenge of impelling a pregnant addict into treatment, to the random violence as drug gangs battle for turf, and the child abuse and neglect that all too often result from addiction. Community Officers are the only agents of social control whose options in dealing with such problems range from providing a helping hand, to making a referral, to arrest, and even the use of deadly force.

“Social work”—whose job is it?

Yet it is this broadening of the officer’s role beyond the traditional focus on arrest that impels critics to argue that Community Policing smacks more of “social work” than “police work.” While this ignores the strong social work component that has always been part of police work, Community Policing advocates note that Community Officers have increasingly adopted

more of this role by default. The police remain the only public servants on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week, who still make house calls.

At issue as well is whether too many Community Officers risk burnout trying to wear too many hats. And if we think back to those days when the old-fashioned beat cop patrolled city streets, we should remember that those were the days when an unofficial team of other public service providers spent much of their time making house calls. In that era, social workers routinely made home visits to see firsthand whether children were neglected or abused. At the same time, the public health nurse might be out in the community, visiting the homes of the young, the elderly, and the infirm. Probation and parole officers, too, made scheduled and unscheduled home visits, to ensure that their clients were living up to the terms of their release. Those were also the days when so-called truant officers roamed the streets, making sure that kids were not "playing hooky."

Centralization of public services

As this suggests, many of the same dynamics that pulled the police away from direct contact with the community resulted in centralizing—and thereby depersonalizing—the role of other public service providers. If we use social workers as an example, we see again that well-meaning attempts to professionalize the job dramatically changed the nature of the relationship between service provider and client. In place of the social worker, going from house to house, checking up—or snooping—on their clients, centralization created the image of social workers as educated professionals, seated behind desks in a downtown office, where clients come to them.

Part of the rationale for this shift toward centralization was the desire to reduce opportunities for individual discretion. Viewed positively, discretion was what had previously allowed the social worker whose heart was moved by a struggling family's plight to bend the rules a bit, to give them more than the rules might allow. Viewed negatively, discretion also meant that a social worker who disapproved of a parent's lifestyle could threaten to cut the family's benefits. Centralization shifted power and control to supervisors downtown, in the hope that this would reduce opportunities for fraud and abuse, just as pulling police from the community and setting their agenda through the police radio allowed police managers greater control over their agenda.

Drawbacks to centralization

Among the unintended consequences of removing service providers (including the police) from the community was that this reduced opportuni-

problems with troubled individuals and families, and whether this has contributed to making the neighborhood a better and safer place in which to live and work.

An additional challenge in evaluating the Neighborhood Network Center concept relates to the "critical mass" issue raised above. We anticipate that experiments with the Neighborhood Network Center concept will vary in their ability to attract the direct participation of a full roster of "core" professionals. Unless these efforts are evaluated by researchers who can analyze the results in terms of how well the experiment fulfills the ideal, their relative success or failure may be misunderstood. The risk, of course, is that the Neighborhood Network Center may be deemed a failure without receiving a "fair shake" unless the issue of critical mass is fully understood and addressed in evaluations.

This underscores the importance of investing in rigorous research on evaluating the Neighborhood Network Center concept. Unless this is done, there is good reason to believe that half-hearted experiments with the Neighborhood Network Center concept, which may well be doomed to fail from the outset, will unduly poison the waters. Community Policing survived, despite negative results from foot patrol experiments that failed to give the officers the autonomy and authority to do more than act as a visible deterrent to crime, because research uncovered the flaws in this model. Had there been no such research, Community Policing might well have been stillborn, before it had the chance to demonstrate its true potential.

• **Leadership**—As noted earlier, the support of the Big Five is essential to Community Policing, and the same model applies to the Neighborhood Network Center. However, it must be stressed that the Neighborhood Network Center complicates the challenge even more, because many of the participants depend on funding from various levels of government—federal, state, county, and local. As this suggests, building broad-based political support, from elected and appointed officials and average citizens, is an even thornier issue with so many people to please.

Implicit in these concerns is that the Neighborhood Network Center requires strong leadership at both the executive and grass-roots levels. As we saw in Lansing, the time was ripe for the National Center for Community Policing to propose consideration of the Neighborhood Network Center concept, because of the fertile ground provided by the Bingham School group and the preparatory work done on the Inter-Agency Agreement. The challenge in other communities will be for the police department to identify other

sionals from public and non-profit agencies and volunteers from inside and outside the community.

But what if social services announces that it cannot afford to provide a social worker? Is the social worker's participation so essential that the effort risks failure if they do not eventually provide a worker on site? Will other agencies use that as an excuse to do less than they could? Will other agencies simply refuse to participate unless the social worker is brought on board? And while the community-based team may be able to make up for the lack of a social worker on site, is that fair to the others who must take up the slack? And if special funding is used as a lure to entice reluctant agencies to participate, will other agencies balk unless they receive special funding, too?

At issue as well is what constitutes "critical mass." The community-based team may be able to work around the lack of a social worker or a public health nurse, at least for a while, but how many of these "core" professionals can the Neighborhood Network Center afford to do without? This has implications for funding, since future funding will depend on the success or failure of Neighborhood Network Center efforts.

• **Evaluating success**—In early experiments with foot patrols that spawned Community Policing, there was a tendency at first to focus on crime rates as the primary measure of success, with mixed results. In some communities, crime rates went down, while in others, the rates stayed the same or went up, yet people said that they felt safer. Were the people simply wrong? Or were these efforts having a positive impact that could not be captured by the crude yardstick of crimes reported to police?

Over time, it became apparent that the people were not wrong, they did feel safer, and they felt safer because Community Policing has a demonstrable and dramatic impact on reducing fear of crime. A closer look also confirmed that fear of crime can be as big a problem as crime itself, since it is what keeps people trapped inside their homes like prisoners, which robs the community of its spirit. Judged by that yardstick, Community Policing is a success.

As this implies, evaluating the efforts of Neighborhood Network Centers will require developing new measures. The relative success or failure of these efforts will require focusing on qualitative rather than quantitative outcomes. In plain language, it is not enough to look at statistics about the number of clients served, the number of interventions, and the number of calls to police. The evaluation must focus on whether the community-based team has solved

ties for them to act as informal agents of social control. In the past, everyone from the youngster tempted to skip school on a warm spring day, to the purse-snatcher, to the alcoholic parent who might otherwise leave a toddler unsupervised had reason to fear that their misbehavior would be detected by someone with the authority to intervene.

Pulling those agents of social control from direct contact with the community also meant that only those problems that reached a certain threshold of severity would come to the attention of the formal system. Neighbors concerned about that unsupervised toddler, for example, might think twice about filing a formal complaint, if only because of fear of retribution. Yet that is the kind of concern that might well be conveyed informally to a police officer, social worker, or public health nurse who was known and trusted by the community. With Community Policing, for example, not only do we find that Community Officers find out more about illicit activities than even undercover officers, but their sustained presence allows them to take so-called "petty crime" seriously, before the problems escalate, just as the problems with that neglected toddler may well magnify and multiply over time, if no one acts.

This shift also reduced opportunities for these service providers to act as positive role models for the young. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the transition to centralization took place at the same time that rising crime rates also persuaded those members of the community who could afford to do so to flee to safer neighborhoods.

Over the years, it has become apparent that one of the crucial difficulties that youngsters face growing up in low-income/high-crime neighborhoods is that the most "successful" adults that they are likely to see are those who break the law—the pimps and the drug pushers. Corrosive as well is that this narrows the yardstick of success to money. Public servants who help make the neighborhood a better and safer place demonstrate firsthand that there is satisfaction in work beyond the size of the paycheck. They also serve as a vivid example of the virtues of delayed gratification—that staying in school on that warm spring day and studying hard can pay off in the future.

Another downside to centralization is that it contributes to alienation on both sides. Imagine the challenge that the mother on welfare clad in second-hand clothes faces in confronting an impersonal bureaucracy. First, she must find a way to visit the agency, which may well be far across town. Then, she must arrange for child care or take her children with her. When she arrives, she may be forced to wait for hours to be heard—by educated pro-

professionals who may not speak her native language or who may employ a vocabulary that she doesn't understand or finds intimidating. Maybe she finds herself shunted from desk to desk, line to line, rarely seeing the same person twice on repeat visits. It is easy to see why she views government as a faceless and impersonal bureaucracy—and the bored and tired youngsters at her side are not inspired to want to grow up to become the professionals that Mommy cursed all the way home.

On the other side of those desks are the professionals, trapped in offices where they spend more time talking with each other than with the people that they are supposed to serve. All day long, they listen to complaints and problems, as a stream of clients struggle to make themselves understood. On their way home at night, no doubt many routinely avoid the neighborhoods where most of their clients live, and they may, in fact, never go there. Again, it is easy to see how this structure promotes the attitude on the part of social workers that clients typically try to manipulate the system and that they always have a ready excuse for each problem or failure.

The job rarely if ever provides opportunities for these professionals to see the challenges that their clients face and to see the progress that many people make despite the odds. Just as with the police, centralization inadvertently promotes an "us" against "them" mindset on both sides.

Public clamor for change

Trapped in the middle are restive middle-class taxpayers, increasingly frustrated at paying more and more for government services that seem to accomplish less and less. Many automatically resent seeing so many tax dollars spent on services that they never expect to use themselves. But resentment can turn to fury when they believe that these expensive efforts do not seem to make any dent in the violence and the misery that they see on the nightly TV news.

Admittedly, voters have many misperceptions about those who are trapped in low-income/high-crime neighborhoods. According to journalist William Greider, in the case of welfare, 60% of the poor receive no public assistance, though costs for such help have risen dramatically during the last decade, as nearly a million more recipients have been added to the welfare rolls. Two-thirds of all poor families have at least one worker, often someone trapped in a menial job insufficient to support the family.

Important as well is that "[w]elfare is still a badge of shame for most people, white and black, and they get off as soon as possible. The majority

unique challenges. The following is a brief discussion of all the new issues that Neighborhood Network Centers must confront, and, again, at this stage of the research, there are more questions than answers:

- **Funding**—As noted in the introduction, the Lansing experiment was selected for special attention in part because the Neighborhood Network Center was launched without significant outside funding. Yet it was still an immense challenge for the group to find operating funds for the center, for example, to pay for utilities. Fortunately in Lansing, an anonymous donor provided enough funding to pay for utilities for a year, but this raises questions about the stability of this kind of funding over time.

It makes sense to find ways to launch a Neighborhood Network Center through existing funding, so that its future does not depend on money that may someday disappear. But some communities may well have difficulty finding a free facility. Other communities will open a Center with full or partial grant funding and then face the challenge of maintaining it when and if the funding ends.

This raises the issue of what role the business community can play. Can local businesses and corporations provide some of the necessary resources? Does the concept require a new partnership that includes a strong business component? Complicating matters further is that some participating agencies rely primarily on local funding, some on funding from federal, state, and county coffers. Obviously, there may be problems with various revenue sources over time, and it will be a challenge for each participant to maintain necessary funding without expanded budgets.⁵

We anticipate that many communities will face problems where one or more of the agencies whose participation is deemed essential has funding problems—what does this mean for the future of the entire community-based team? For example, we consider the participation of the Community Officer essential, but what if the department faces budget cutbacks that threaten its ability to keep the Community Officer in place? And what if the Center is so successful that the area no longer seems to require the full-time attention of a Community Officer? Can district police officers adequately handle the job if the Community Officer is removed?

As noted earlier, the ideal roster of members in the community-based team of problem solvers located at a Neighborhood Network Center would undoubtedly include a Community Officer, a social worker, a mental health professional, an education specialist, probation and parole officers, and a public health nurse. Working alongside them would also be a host of other profes-

"build to suit" office space. The local laundromat, unfortunately, was razed, making it extremely difficult for any family in the area to do laundry. Some families found it easier to obtain new used clothes from the churches and other charities than to haul laundry for a family of six on a bus miles away. This is a priority if you live in the neighborhood, and may be more of a priority than closing down a drug house if your child is being made fun of at school for his dirty clothes.

The challenge professionals face as well is to focus on the mission of their approach which is to serve the needs of the community residents. During an Inter-Agency Group planning session, for example, more than an hour was spent wrangling on reasons why one agency could not put someone in the Neighborhood Network Center. The moderator turned to a community resident and asked if she thought the group was making progress in reaching the goal of improving quality of life in the community. She explained that her primary concern was during the summer when two preteen girls would circle an intersection near her home on their bicycles. Seated on the curb was their pimp. How was all this discussion going to help with that problem? Community input about immediate needs of people who live in the neighborhoods is an important part of the process of reminding professionals what the real goals are.

Another issue plaguing the Neighborhood Network Center is that there is no lease signed, since there is no rent paid for the building. If the building is sold, the Neighborhood Network Center must find a new location or close its doors. There is hopes that new grant monies will allow the Center to pay rent and secure a lease, giving them more stability in their location. But what happens if the building is sold? Where would they find a new facility in the neighborhood?

Officer Christy's motto is: "Expect the best, and you won't be disappointed." Simple though it is, it seems to be that attitude among the Neighborhood Network Center workers that's making a success of this tremendous undertaking in Lansing, Michigan.

ISSUES AND OBSTACLES

Specific Challenges

The Community Policing model requires philosophical, structural and organizational reform. This also applies to Neighborhood Network Centers. But, as the Lansing experience suggests, this new approach faces its own

are on AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) for less than a year, a quarter for less than four months."¹

Another myth, debunked by a study in California, is that welfare mothers have a higher birthrate than other mothers. In fact, in the past two decades, the number of children in the average welfare family has dropped from three to two. Greider also reports, "A nationwide survey found that welfare mothers in states like California with higher benefits do not have more babies than welfare mothers in states with meager benefits."²

Adding to the controversy about services for the poor is the volatile issue of race. Two-thirds of the poor are white, yet many taxpayers continue to think of welfare in terms of a black single mother with more children than they themselves can afford, which contributes to endangering their willingness to support welfare funding. Instead, we are seeing cutbacks. Michigan dropped 82,000 single adults from the welfare rolls, and other states are considering cuts or rule changes to eliminate additional benefits for each child. California's Governor Pete Wilson is also promoting an initiative where voters will decide whether to cut AFDC benefits by 25%.³

As this suggests, the delivery of services to low-income/high-crime neighborhoods cries out for reform, not only because the people who live there want programs that really work, but because perceived failures of the existing system threaten support for future funding. Primary among voters' concerns is that the prevailing system does not put enough of the responsibility for positive change on the community. Just as traditional policing fostered the attitude that crime is a problem for the police to solve, many fear that the current system of delivering public services to troubled communities fosters dependence.

Community Policing challenges people to find solutions to the problems that they care about, and this subtle but profound shift extends to the Neighborhood Network Center concept. The goal is to empower and assist, not to step in and provide all the answers.

A worrisome future

In their Pulitzer-Prize winning essays, reporters Donald L. Bartlett and James B. Steele report that the number of jobs in manufacturing are dropping, as lower-paying jobs in retail and service are climbing. In their book, *America: What Went Wrong?*, the authors note that the percentage of all workers employed in manufacturing dropped from 33% in the 1950's to almost half that today, "17%—and falling."⁴

Free trade between the United States and Mexico is also expected to accelerate the trend where U.S. companies export manufacturing jobs to Mexico. According to the authors, since 1965, more than 1,800 plants, employing more than 500,000 workers, have been built in Mexico, most by U.S. corporations. Competing in the new global economy also means that companies are slashing their white-collar workforce; for example, General Motors recently announced that it will trim thousands of white-collar jobs from middle management as part of restructuring.

Meanwhile, the places hit hardest by unemployment and underemployment are often those where the tax base to support public services is shrinking. According to a report on ABC's Nightline, between 1980 and 1990, workers wages rose on average 53%, while corporate profits rose 78%—and executive salaries for CEO's rose 212%.

Of particular concern to urban police, who depend on local taxes for the bulk of their support, is that those who benefited most from the boom of the 1980's tend to live outside their jurisdictions. Many human services agencies, such as social services and public health, depend instead on a mix of state and federal funding, which means that the wealthy still pay their share. So while we can expect to see public and non-profit agencies exploring the opportunities in the Neighborhood Network Center concept, because the idea makes sense, it is the police who are most likely to spearhead this change. Not only do they see firsthand what a decentralized and personalized approach can accomplish, but their unique financial problems mean that they cannot afford to pick up any slack for other agencies. Indeed, for Community Policing to survive the current economic crunch, many departments will be forced to agitate for Neighborhood Network Center reform.

THE IDEAL

The "perfect" Neighborhood Network Center

Several years ago, the National Center for Community Policing began to explore how the Community Policing model could be applied to the delivery of other public, private, and volunteer services to the community, coining the term "Neighborhood Network Center." While there is indeed nothing new under the sun, and some communities in the United States and Canada have experimented with community-based service delivery of social services,

Community Officer, the school psychologist, a code enforcement officer, a police supervisor, the head of the police drug unit, and three district police drivers. The team targets a specific house in the neighborhood, much as the Bingham School Working Group targets a child and his or her family, checking the record weekly to follow the progress on improving the house without pricing it out of the reach of people in the community. The team brainstorms ideas on how to deal with the multitude of problems that the target house may have. They coordinate their efforts and chip away at the problems, sometimes bringing in other specialists to help.

The team is responsible for the closure of eight drug houses from January to February, 1992. If the drug houses had cooperative landlords, the eviction process was used to oust the tenants. Or the district drivers would pressure the dealers by stopping all cars going to and from the house. Or the drug unit might arrange for a raid. If all else failed, the code enforcement officer would hit the house with violations.

One argument against Community Policing is that it only displaces problems but doesn't solve them. The team hopes to keep the problems where they are, but focus on making better neighbors out of the people already there—whether it means helping them get a job or obtain counseling, or whether this requires making their homes more liveable. Although the number one priority of the Problem-Solving Team is to tackle the drug houses, other issues have surfaced which have been addressed successfully with this approach. A single mother in the Sparrow Estates neighborhood was about to be evicted. Some work was being done with the children in their school, and this would have been discontinued if the family had to move. The team scoured the neighborhood and found them new housing in the same area so that the children would not have to change schools. Information surfaced that the mother was being abused by her boyfriend, and Christy was able to help her to get a court injunction to keep him away. The district police officer drivers were knowledgeable about the situation, and were alerted to pay special attention to the situation if a call should come in about a domestic dispute at her address. Because of the trust that was built between the team and the mother, she confided that she has some substance abuse problems, and they are currently working with her to get her help.

Part of the challenge in structuring the Problem-Solving Team is to assure that the community has a voice in the nominating and prioritizing of problems. A recent urban renewal project in the Sparrow Estates/Green Oaks neighborhood leveled a block of businesses in order to make space for

soon rent the parsonage of a local church, to house their "hands on" projects, because of the restriction that the Neighborhood Network Center cannot be a "drop in" center. This new site will be considered an extension of the Neighborhood Network Center, and it will also house such activities as the parenting groups, the neighborhood newsletter committee, and nutrition and composting classes. A Michigan State University intern will oversee the daily operation during business hours, and Gateway will have substance-abuse counseling on site in the evenings.

Structure and leadership

Lansing's experience may be unique, because the Neighborhood Network Center was a risk, and everyone was willing to "wing it." When problems arise, they're dealt with within the resources at hand—not a typical bureaucratic response to problem solving. There is no rigid management scheme in place, and there are no written procedures as to how things will be handled—mostly perhaps because they do not yet know the kinds of problems they will face.

Officer Christy, who coordinated the opening of the Neighborhood Network Center, seems to be the unofficial leader, acting more as a catalyst than a supervisor. It was a natural role for him, since he knows the people and culture of the neighborhood better than anyone, because of his long-standing work with the community. Traditionally, as the Community Officer, he is often the first to field problems, whether it is homicide or a "cat in the tree," whether it's that somebody is ill or that a family needs food or medical care. It's unlikely, for instance, that a nurse will get information on drug dealing, so Christy has logically become the person that all others in the Neighborhood Network Center turn to for input on their ideas. Cooperation as equals is essential because everyone knows it's up to them to find ways to work together to solve common problems.

General meetings are held monthly to determine who's going to sweep the floors and replace the coffee, and the general operation has been smooth so far. There is a petty cash account set up for the Neighborhood Network Center, but no actual funding structure at this time.

The Problem-Solving Team

In December 1991, the Problem-Solving Team at the Neighborhood Network Center was formed on a basis similar to that of the Bingham School Working Group. The core group, which meets once a week, consists of the

these efforts have often been piecemeal, and most have ignored the crucial role that Community Officers can and should play. In this section, the goal is to identify the ideal—how the theory of the Neighborhood Network Center would be realized in a perfect world.

The roster

The initial question, of course, is what agencies beyond the police should participate. However, there is no easy answer to that question—no ideal list—since the roster should be based on the needs of the community.

In a perfect world, the police department and the area's Community Officer would be involved early on in the planning process. The input of the Community Officer is essential, since they have the best handle on local needs, through their work in the community, and they could suggest and invite community residents whose input would be valuable. Most importantly, the people who live in the area must be the catalyst in all efforts to make the neighborhood safe. Ideally as well, the Neighborhood Network Center would soon attract the support and participation of all public and private agencies identified as useful in solving the kinds of problems that the community faces.

Almost always, the ideal Neighborhood Network Center would require the direct participation in the facility of the following public-sector agencies: police, social services, community mental health, public health, probation and parole. In some communities, it might make sense for a code enforcement official to move into the Center. In Lansing, it made sense to offer space to school personnel. We could also envision circumstances, such as if the Center is located in a fire department substation, where fire fighting personnel might spend part of their time helping out. Again, the roster of public agencies depends on local needs and resources.

In addition, there are many non-profit agencies that could logically place all or part of their personnel in the Center: Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, Salvation Army, and groups that help fragile populations, such as the homeless or people with AIDS. The support of local religious institutions is also essential, though it may or may not make sense to station their personnel on site unless the Center is located in one of their facilities. Ideally as well, volunteers recruited from the community would donate time for office chores, such as answering phones, opening mail, and keeping records. Volunteers with special skills, from inside and outside the neighborhood, should also be recruited to help.

The site

As the list of essentials that follows attests, the Neighborhood Network Center concept requires establishing a local office in the community. In many ways, locating this office in a school is ideal, because so much of the work required to improve the overall quality of life in the community over time requires intervening with juveniles, and the support of local schools is integral to success. It should be noted, however, that many schools simply have no space to spare, and, in Lansing, the reverse occurred, when school district personnel asked for space in the new Neighborhood Network Center located in the former State of Michigan Library.

Churches and recreational centers may also provide free or inexpensive space for a Neighborhood Network Center, but it must be clearly understood that the Lansing Neighborhood Network Center is not a social center. While the lease prevents the Lansing facility from serving as a true "drop-in center," it is a place that people turn to for help. Neighborhood Network Centers can also be the site for various enriching activities, such as classes on how to find a job or perhaps for AA meetings. Ideally, it can become a place where community volunteers can help their neighbors with special needs ranging from babysitting to tutoring. The community-based team of problem-solvers must have the flexibility to host activities that they deem useful, and residents of the community must feel welcome, but it cannot be allowed to degenerate into a place where people merely "hang out."

Part of the challenge in establishing the ideal Neighborhood Network Center is finding an affordable site, or, preferably, one that is free. In Fort Pierce, Florida, the city donated a house to the police department for use as a Neighborhood Network Center, and it might be poetic justice to have a structure seized through drug forfeiture turned into a Neighborhood Network Center. Perhaps there is free space available in public housing or in apartment complexes whose owners recognize the benefits in having this kind of facility located in their midst.

Getting started

Ideally as well, the community-based team will challenge individuals, businesses, and corporations from inside and outside the neighborhood to donate office equipment and to provide the budget for utilities and telephone. A logical first project in which to involve the community might well be a campaign to paint, decorate, and ready the new facility for its Grand

• Neighborhood Youth and Parent Prevention Partnership Program—

This federal grant employs four people in the Neighborhood Network Center. Two of them, the Neighborhood Partnership Consultants will hire four adults, four high school, and four middle school students from the neighborhood to act as neighborhood recruiters in an attempt to bring people together for drug-abuse education and other risk-reduction efforts. Also on site are the grant coordinator and an administrative assistant.

• **Gateway Social Workers—**The supervisor of the Gateway Social Workers is housed at the Neighborhood Network Center where she oversees a number of social workers. Two social workers serve the beat area, spending their time in the schools and at children's homes. Gateway Community Services, located in neighboring East Lansing, is a multi-service agency concerned with substance-abuse, health care, crisis intervention, runaway youth, and homeless families and youth. Gateway has provided a copy machine and other office supplies for use by everyone in the Center.

• **Michigan State University Nurses—**Two days a week, 15 nursing students from MSU who are completing their bachelor degree are assigned to the Neighborhood Network Center to fulfill their public health work. Neighborhood people are referred to them by the Community Officer, the Chapter One Nurse, and the school psychologist.

• **Others involved—**A volunteer program, staffed by a recent criminal justice graduate of MSU, oversees the adults in the neighborhood who are doing community service as part of their court sentencing. The community service adults perform a variety of tasks, including handing out flyers for events, picking up trash, and doing janitorial work. Overtime hours can knock off some time from their sentences, and those who live in the neighborhood seem the most responsible, since they have a stake in what's happening in their own neighborhood.

A Vietnamese interpreter will soon be coming on board to assist in getting the Vietnamese community involved in the Neighborhood Network Center. One apartment complex in the Sparrow Estates neighborhood houses all Vietnamese families, and they have been the hardest to involve in community activities due to cultural and language difficulties. The interpreter will also work to provide social service referral in order to stabilize the community.

The Ingham County Department of Social Services (DSS) is attempting to identify what needs the neighborhood has, and it will put someone into the Center to handle those needs. DSS currently has a telephone liaison to cut red tape for any questions that arise in the neighborhoods. Gateway will

an incentive during hard financial times. Along with them came a secretary who acts as a receptionist who also answers calls for Officer Christy as a cooperative effort. From last August to the time of this writing, the Neighborhood Network Center staff roster has expanded and includes the following:

- **Student interns**—From nearby Michigan State University and Lansing Community College. Help on special projects and supervise court-appointed community service kids in the Green Oaks/Sparrow Estates neighborhoods, may also analyze radio calls to the area, find apartment vacancies and possible placements, and babysit children during parenting classes.

- **Region 13 parenting class teacher**—Works out of the NNC approximately 10 hours a week to provide parenting classes for neighborhood people.

- **School psychologist** (Lansing School District)—Works as the Community/School liaison psychologist. Ellen Chaney also heads the Bingham School Working Group. Shares the same geographic beat boundaries as the Community Officer.

- **Infant training for new mothers** (Community Mental Health)—Grant-funded social worker provides infant training for new mothers. Matches a successful mother in the area with an “at-risk” mother. If the workload in the area decreases, will expand into another Community Policing beat as well.

- **Learning specialist** (Lansing School District)—Works with youth who live in the beat who are identified by the school district. Beat area has priority, but works in other areas of city as well.

- **Chapter One nurse** (Lansing School District, Chapter One Program)—Chapter One is a program where federal money is funneled to those school districts who demonstrate the greatest need by academic scores. When a child is labeled as Chapter One, they receive medical and dental coverage. The Chapter One nurse supervises other nurses who provide medical services and the child health advocates (see below). Beat area is priority.

- **Child health advocates**—Two Lansing School District employees who assist Chapter One nurse by making health care appointments and providing transportation to and from medical facilities.

- **Operation Graduation coordinator** (Lansing School District)—Works with high school students “at risk” of dropping out of school. A ten-hour a week job is provided to students in the program who stay in school and maintain good grades. A student answers the telephone two hours a day at the Neighborhood Network Center.

Opening. Asking local businesses to donate the cleaning products and paint might be a good way for the new staff to introduce itself to the private sector.

Basics identified from Community Policing

A Neighborhood Network Center differs from other community-based efforts because it implies creating a new community-based team of service providers who work together as problem-solvers in the community. Again, if we look to Community Policing as the model, we see that true Neighborhood Network Center reform requires:

- **A commitment to structural and organizational change within the participating agencies.**

There is a tendency in any bureaucracy to want change in theory, but to resist change in practice. Community Policing requires that the entire department adopt the philosophy implicit in developing a new relationship with the community (the easy part). But it also requires structural and organizational change that allow civilian and sworn employees to express this commitment in their jobs, and it also requires that the department deploy line officers permanently as Community Officers in defined beats (the hard parts).

Applying this model to Neighborhood Network Centers means that participating public and private agencies and volunteers must embrace the philosophical change embodied in the commitment to involve average citizens as partners in the process of identifying and prioritizing problems and implementing solutions. All activities must contribute to the goal of improving the overall quality of life in the community.

To make that commitment real requires that everyone in the participating agencies, from top administrators to support personnel, must find ways to express the change in philosophy in their jobs. It also means making the structural changes required to place one or more line-level employees permanently in the Neighborhood Network Center facility, part-time or full-time, where they will operate as a member of the community-based team of problem solvers.

- **A formal mission statement and letter of agreement.**

Institutionalizing change is an important part of the process, and the discussions required to document the change often serve as an important way to clarify goals. Ideally, each participating agency should rewrite its mission statement to reflect the new commitment, and all participating agencies

should spell out as many specifics as possible in their basic agreement to work together in the Neighborhood Network Center.

- **Tailor the response to local needs and resources.**

As noted above, the roster of participating groups beyond the police that should be on site at the Neighborhood Network Center should be determined by local needs and priorities, and this roster may change over time. In addition, once we move from the ideal to the real world, it may well be that some desirable agencies may not move in immediately, for various reasons. Also important is that the community-based team operating from the Neighborhood Network Center should not have a predetermined agenda, but should solicit input from the community concerning both the needs of the community and the resources available.

- **Clear support from the top of each participating agency.**

Experience with Community Policing verifies that the commitment from management requires much more than words on paper. Administrators and supervisors must recognize the importance of reaffirming their commitment to the concept at each opportunity. They must publicize successes inside and outside the department. And they must be willing to visit the Center and provide visible support for their personnel, to send the message to everyone within the agency that such efforts are valued.

- **The delegation of authority and responsibility to line-level employees.**

Community Policing is a bottom-up, grass-roots effort, and the new community-based team must have this kind of autonomy, if the Neighborhood Network Center concept is to succeed. Administrators and supervisors must resist the temptation to micromanage, and their roles must change so that they become facilitators and assistants, rather than traditional "bosses." Management's job is to find ways to help the members of the community-based team to achieve their goals, and that means standing by them both when they succeed and when they fail.

- **The establishment of a community-based facility in a defined beat area.**

The concept of ownership is essential to Community Policing, since it makes Community Officers feel responsible for and care about the neighborhoods that they serve. Engendering this feeling in the community-based team not only requires defining a beat area, but also providing a facility in the community that allows the entire team a place where they can interact and field questions, complaints, and input from the public.

Gotting feels that it is tricky when outsiders go into a neighborhood and attempt to do something. Just because the service providers are outsiders, there is resentment and suspicion, mixed with gratitude. This, she felt, may be part of human nature and would have been an obstacle in any similar situation.

Another obstacle at first seemed so large that it threatened to close the doors of the center as soon as it opened. Michigan's new Governor Engler had been elected only months before and quickly began "Right-Sizing" all government agencies because of a severe budget problem in Michigan. The problem was very pronounced and the idea of expanding into the Neighborhood Network Center during such a time seemed impossible. The fear was that no agency could afford to place a service provider at the Neighborhood Network Center.

Although the ideal was to decentralize and personalize a social service provider from agency, it seemed impossible to do at the time. In one case, it wasn't the cost, but the caseload. Probate Court, with its offices located less than a mile away from the Neighborhood Network Center, found only 10 or 12 juvenile cases in the Green Oaks/Sparrow Estates neighborhood. A typical caseload for a juvenile probation officer is 30 to 40 cases. Since their office was already so close, it seemed to make better sense to stay where they were and instead offer a telephone liaison to the Neighborhood Network Center, to answer questions when they arose.

An anonymous donor came up with money to pay for utilities for the first year of operation of the Neighborhood Network Center, and it was then decided by Assistant Chief Dave Sinclair of the Lansing Police Department, Bob Trojanowicz of the National Center for Community Policing, and others meeting in the Inter-Agency Group to forge ahead anyhow, knowing that they no longer had the luxury of developing a roster of services based on neighborhood need. The Neighborhood Network Center was opened with free rent to any service provider who might desire to relocate into the Neighborhood Network Center.

First to commit was the Lansing Police Department. Other than Officer Christy's office, space was provided for an office for the three district patrol drivers who serve the area which included Green Oaks/Sparrow Estates. In addition to providing a restroom, the officers could use the facility to make phone calls, write reports, drink coffee, or have lunch.

By August 1991, the Lansing School District moved some of their people in. The convenient location saved money on mileage, and the free rent was

Michigan Library, which had been purchased by a local real estate developer. The entire second floor of the building was available, since there was a glut of office space on the market. Christy, with his uncanny ability to "scrounge" and pull things together, convinced the landlord to donate the space for the Neighborhood Network Center. Having the space donated turned out to be the real "drawing card" that got the Neighborhood Network Center up and going, as is discussed later.

The Neighborhood Network Center space had been neglected for years, and with the help and skills of people in the neighborhood, Christy organized a massive cleanup and the site was opened officially in January of 1991.

Karen Gotting began working with the Inter-Agency Group after a project she was working on was completed. Gotting worked for Highfields, a non-profit social service organization, that had obtained a grant for a specific project from the Gannett Foundation to explore inter-agency cooperation among three neighboring counties. Her work was completed early, but the grant continued, so she was sent to the Inter-Agency Group to offer her skills in problem identification and inter-agency cooperation. Using a technique she calls "storyboarding," Gotting held meetings with the Inter-Agency Group, neighborhood representatives from the Green Oaks/Sparrow Estates neighborhoods, and Officer Christy to help them identify and prioritize the problems of their neighborhood and develop a roster of services that could be delivered from the Neighborhood Network Center.

It became clear from these meetings that there was a difference in what the neighborhood representatives wanted as opposed to the Neighborhood Network Center concept which the Inter-Agency Group and Community Officer were working toward. The Neighborhood Network Center concept allows neighborhood leaders a voice, but, in this case, it created a conflict for two reasons: On the one hand, the agreement to occupy donated space included agreeing not to use it as a community center or drop-in center, due to increased liability for the landlord. On the other hand, the neighborhood representatives wanted it to be exactly that. In some circumstances, this could have split the factions against each other—neighborhood vs. service providers—but the reality was that the neighborhood representatives, on closer examination, had little community support. Down the road, the neighborhood representatives formed an eight-person "Oversight Committee" that is informed of any news regarding the Neighborhood Network Center and which then offers its suggestions.

Community Policing demonstrates that Community Officers, who maintain daily, face-to-face contact with people in defined beats, are held directly accountable to the people they serve, of obvious importance in light of the Rodney King incident and the riot in Los Angeles. Experience shows that this constant interaction breaks down anonymity on both sides. This means the Community Officer knows who deserves a pat on the back and whom to keep an eye on; at the same time, the people in the community know that they can confront their officer personally about any concerns related to his or her behavior. We anticipate that the same dynamics will enhance the mutual accountability between the other service providers and the people in the community.

It should be noted, however, that some members of the team may operate within different geographic boundaries, because their workload may dictate that they need to work within a smaller or larger space. As a general guideline, however, the beat area for all participating professionals should follow the boundaries established by the Community Officer, whenever possible.

• Opportunities for part-time and full-time line-level employees (and volunteers) to have sustained, face-to-face contact with the community.

As noted above, it is easy to embrace the philosophy of Community Policing, but much harder to commit to the organizational change required. The concept requires stationing a Community Officer permanently in a defined beat area, where the officer can maintain constant and direct contact with the community, and the same holds true for the rest of the community-based team. It is not enough to say that the service providers will "visit as necessary," if that in any way implies that this is a euphemism used to obscure a lack of commitment to the structural and organizational change that the Neighborhood Network Center requires.

The same holds true for the decision concerning whether the participating professional will work out of the Neighborhood Network Center part-time or full-time. The decision should reflect the needs of the community and not the needs of the bureaucracy. It should be evident that the agency is making a full commitment, even when the team member spends less than 40 hours a week at the facility.

• Community input in identifying and prioritizing problems (through surveys and direct contact).

Perhaps the biggest danger in creating a community-based team of professionals is that they will spend too much time talking to each other and not enough time with people in the community. For this to be a grass-roots

effort mirroring the best of Community Policing, it is essential that the community must have a voice in setting the agenda and in fashioning solutions. The community-based team should employ formal techniques, such as surveys and community meetings, but they should also take the time to find out people's feeling, through informal home and business visits and chats on the street and at the Center.

- **Education and support of the Big Five.**

Community Policing requires the support of the Big Five—the police department, civic officials, the community, other agencies, and the media, and the Neighborhood Network Centers must follow this model, if they are to succeed. As this implies, the members of the community-based team must have the support and commitment of their own agencies, and they must be alert to the dangers of internal friction and jealousies. The support of civic officials is obviously essential, since they will ultimately be held accountable by voters. Part of their education must include an awareness that there will be failures and embarrassing mistakes—that is simply the implicit price of allowing this new community-based team the freedom to experiment.

In terms of community support, the challenge is often to make sure that both average citizens and community leaders understand and support the efforts. A new challenge will be to ensure that agencies which do not place any of their personnel in the Center must still be willing to assist with community-based initiatives, when and if they are asked. Informing the media about the concept can also help in efforts to educate the community about this approach, its goals and objectives, and the tradeoffs that it may imply.

- **A focus on problem-solving, through a team approach.**

As with Community Policing, the goal is not just to work hard, but to work smart. The community-based team must always focus on results, shifting and adjusting the roster of professionals and volunteers who will work on various efforts, to ensure that their efforts contribute to making the community a better and safer place in which to live and work.

The difference with the Neighborhood Network Center approach is that the team can mobilize its members to attack problems from many different angles. Consider the possibilities if a school counselor brings the team concerns about a youngster whose grades have plunged suddenly and who has begun skipping school. Perhaps a visit from the social worker raises concerns that the youngster needs help from a mental health therapist. Perhaps the parents have problems with substance abuse and should be referred to treatment. Maybe part of the problem is that the youngster isn't eating properly,

to decentralize and put a provider into an office, the Neighborhood Network Center would have to provide an expensive computer hookup to central headquarters and provide an overnight security guard to protect the computer and the caseworker's files. When asked if they had that kind of security at central headquarters where there were thousands of files, the answer was "no." The bureaucratic mindset often finds reasons not to change, even if the change may be for the better, sticking instead with the status quo.

As the issues surfaced for discussion, so did a multitude of questions, many of which still have no answer:

- **Confidentiality**—Different agencies have different restrictions on who the service providers can talk to and about what. Although the Bingham School Working Group has the sign-off sheet that permits agencies that are working on the same case to share information, what about the breach of confidence that could occur at the coffee machine as part of talking about the job at the worker bee level?

- **Jargon**—As stated earlier, there is no common lexicon to define the problems.

- **Turf**—The concern was raised that turf battles would surface. What happens when you put a group of professionals from different agencies together in the same place? How will they act? Who will handle what? Who takes credit for the successes and failures?

- **Worker safety**—Does liability increase for the worker who is now making home visits in a "bad" neighborhood? Does the Community Officer provide enough protection? What risks will they be taking?

- **Funding**—If an umbrella grant should come into the Neighborhood Network Center, how will the money be used? Who will decide? Who pays for what in the general operation of the Neighborhood Network Center?

- **The bureaucratic impulse**—Will there be a tendency for the group of professionals in the Neighborhood Network Center to talk mostly among themselves and turn the effort back into a bureaucracy?

- **Personnel**—What type of person works best in the Neighborhood Network Center setting? How do you develop a job description for that person, and a pay scale? How will they be evaluated?

- **Accountability**—Who is boss? Who will be accountable, and who will resolve issues among the agencies?

The next step was for Officer Christy to see if there was a site available that could be used as a Neighborhood Network Center. Christy was then renting an office in his beat located in the basement of the old State of

- meet from time to time to discuss and implement inter-agency cooperation with the goal of better servicing the needs of the citizens in the service areas of the agencies,

- fully meet the needs of all children in the agencies service areas,
- identify gaps in human services in the community and identify funding sources to meet those gaps,
- identify areas and circumstances in which potential clients of the agencies would benefit from services of more than one agency,
- evaluate and determine specific initiatives that require agency or inter-agency cooperation to meet the needs of unserved and underserved persons in need or coordinated services from these human service agencies,
- seek out, consider, and develop possible funding proposals for the funding of coordinated human services from and for these agencies for the residents of Ingham County,
- identify and bring for consideration issues that may benefit from joint problem-solving initiatives, and
- work cooperatively for the commitment and planning of benefits and services to be provided by the agencies to the residents of the county while recognizing that each agency must work within the constraints of that agency's statutory responsibility and limitations.

Although at this time the agreement was still in the works, it was apparent that the agencies involved in the Inter-Agency Group were willing to make a commitment to begin to do something cooperatively to assist their clients, and the Neighborhood Network Center concept seemed to fit with their commitment. With the National Center for Community Policing located nearby at Michigan State University in East Lansing, the opportunity was there for the Center staff to consult on the project, and in return, the Center could use the Lansing experiment as a research lab for the concept.

Obstacles

The Bingham School Working Group was operating successfully, because they were given permission to cut red tape in order to get things done. However, trying to pull a similar project together and eliminate red tape among the top level bureaucrats of the Inter-Agency Group was not as easy as it was at the "worker bee" level. There were many obstacles to overcome before the Neighborhood Network Center could be a reality.

In some cases, wrenches were thrown into the gears because of the bureaucratic mindset. One service provider argued that if her agency were

and the public health nurse could assist the parents by showing them how to prepare nutritious meals on a tight budget.

Perhaps the youngster has joined a gang that deals drugs, and the Community Officer should play a role. Or part of the answer may be to encourage the youngster to participate in new community-based activities instigated by the team that are designed to build self-esteem. Maybe the youngster needs specific tutoring help that a community volunteer could provide, through a referral list kept at the Center. It is even conceivable that a code enforcement official could play a role; maybe the family's apartment has decayed to the point where the youngster has no place to study, or the house next door may be a dope house where customers keep him up all night, and code enforcement could provide a remedy.

Through specific and broad-based efforts, the community-based team can focus on using their resources and the resources in the community to solve problems.

• A commitment to recruit and involve local volunteers.

As noted before, the goal of the Neighborhood Network Center is to empower the community, so that it takes responsibility for solving its own problems. Part of this new partnership with the community requires that average citizens must help, through support and direct participation. The community-based team should also attempt to identify individuals who have special talents or abilities that they can contribute, and it will often make good sense to have local volunteers provide office help. Some may be willing to donate their time out of goodwill, while others will benefit from compiling experience and references that can help them land a paying job later.

• A mandate to be creative and innovative.

The challenge is not just to identify the neighborhood's weaknesses, but its strengths as well—and to turn problems into opportunities. For example, fear of crime is often a serious problem among the elderly, exacerbated by loneliness and boredom. At the same time, many single parents are often struggling to raise children alone. The community-based team may decide to recruit retirees to provide emergency care for youngsters whose parents have problems, or when a parent needs someone to watch a sick child while they work. Encouraging contact between the elderly and the young can help make the kids less likely to vandalize or otherwise victimize their new "friends," at the same time that communication with these youngsters can help ease the fears of the elderly. The Neighborhood Network Center approach is unique in encouraging service providers to use all their skills,

including their imagination, and only through experience over time will we learn all the ways that it can be applied.

With this ideal in mind, we will now look at how the Lansing Neighborhood Network Center made the transition from being a promising idea to becoming concrete reality. As you still see, there was fertile ground in Lansing for a Neighborhood Network Center, because of the past history where the Lansing Police Department had a successful Community Policing effort in place in the neighborhood, and because the Bingham School Group had introduced the idea that problems in the community demanded greater coordination among service providers. Following the history of the Lansing experiment so far, we will explore issues and obstacles specific to Neighborhood Network Center and the obstacles which all such initiatives must confront.

THE LANSING EXPERIMENT

Setting the Stage

Since January 1990, Community Officer Don Christy has committed himself to reversing the spiral of decay that plagues the Sparrow Estates neighborhood, and, since 1991, the adjoining Green Oaks neighborhood in Lansing, Michigan, focusing his energies on projects to physically improve the neighborhood, shut down drug houses, and by organizing social events to help the neighbors get to know one another, "Uncle Don," as he is affectionately known by the neighborhood children, has had a positive impact in his beat area, by restoring a sense of "neighborhood" to an area that not long ago was identified with drugs, prostitution, and disorder.

Plenty of door-to-door contact with the residents has resulted in the sharing of information most crucial to help solve the crime problems that the neighborhood faces—the drug dealing and prostitution, and the frequent social events that he puts together help to lessen the fear of crime. Christy says that the events tend to moderate the behavior of troubled people, and all ages attend—from 6 months to 80 years. The 19-year-old vandal is less likely to attack the home of the 70-year-old widow down the street, if he knows her by name and they spoke at a social event. Hence, the 70-year-old widow is less likely to fear the 19-year-old, and the fear of crime diminishes.

The social events have ranged from a non-alcohol New Year's party in 1991, to the annual overnight campout held in the local elementary schoolyard. Parents and children alike experience the country in the city,

worker, above and beyond his role as the Community Officer. Other than the fact that wearing all these other hats took time away from his law enforcement duties, it took up much of his personal time as well. One of the biggest problems that Community Officers face is burnout, because they don't have the resources available to do the things that need to be done in their neighborhoods, and they end up trying to do things themselves that are commonly the jurisdiction of other social-service providers.

Christy had also built up a great deal of trust between himself and the people in the neighborhood. Knowing the individuals and their problems on a personal level, it was hard for Christy to have anyone else come in to do anything to help. It would be difficult to delegate responsibilities to anyone who did not know of the culture and people of the neighborhood firsthand, since they would not have the same level of trust.

Robert Trojanowicz, director of the National Center for Community Policing, had long been a proponent of decentralizing and personalizing police through Community Policing and he began to see how decentralizing and personalizing other social services was the next logical step for the Community Policing movement. He envisioned having the Community Officer act as the catalyst and protector for a number of social service providers, operating from a storefront in a troubled neighborhood, to help to tackle the wide range of problems plaguing urban areas. Calling this the Neighborhood Network Center concept, Trojanowicz had a theory but no site. He approached the top command of the Lansing Police Department with information about the Neighborhood Network Center concept, as a way to make a more significant change in the neighborhoods and to ease Christy's burden as the sole decentralized and personalized service provider. At this juncture, Assistant Chief David Sinclair of the Lansing Police Department invited Trojanowicz to join him at the Inter-Agency Group meetings to discuss the possibilities of making the Neighborhood Network Center concept a reality.

The Letter of Understanding

The Inter-Agency Group was working on a document that would formalize their commitment to work together and identify common ground, and it was signed by the agency heads in February 1991, the result of two years of effort. The Letter of Understanding formalized their commitment to:

- cooperate to provide a continuum of quality services for children and families as close to the home environment as possible,

enforcement problems. Unemployment, inadequate housing, poor health care, lack of parenting skills, substance abuse problems, and child abuse and neglect were rampant, and crime was one outcome of those underlying problems. Christy was overwhelmed by the need for multiple services, as most Community Officers are, once they get out of the car and onto the beat.

Since the Bingham School Working Group was offering multiple services to the families of children attending the school in Christy's beat area, he began to attend the meetings. This began a give-and-take with Christy sharing what information he could to help bring solutions to the problem families that had a child attending Bingham School. In return, he was given information that would aid him in solving some of the problems on his beat. This, however, was limiting. Only those with school-aged children attending that school were served. Those who fell through the cracks were the elderly, singles, families with preschool aged children (many of whom are single parents), and those whose children attend school outside of the Bingham School area—about half of the Sparrow Estates neighborhood. The group had no way to address other problems, such as the physical and social environments of the neighborhoods. These were beyond the scope of what could be done from the school perspective, but they certainly influenced the quality of life of clients served by the Bingham School Working Group, as well as the rest of the neighborhood.

With the Bingham School Working Group already in place, and discussions at the top administrative level still taking place with the Inter-Agency Group, a launching pad for a new method of service delivery was already in place that might be expanded to include a broader range of people and problems in the Green Oaks/Sparrow Estates neighborhoods. Officer Christy; his supervisor, Sgt. Andy George; and Assistant Chief Dave Sinclair of the Lansing Police Department, along with a neighborhood representative from each of the two neighborhoods, began attending the Inter-Agency Group meetings, to see what could be done. Christy had already begun to act as a catalyst for change in the neighborhood, to reduce drug trafficking and fear of crime, and the neighbors were beginning to feel safer. Using Christy as a catalyst for change and using him to pave the way and make it safer, why not bring the multi-service approach to Green Oaks/Sparrow Estates, to solve problems as the Bingham School Working Group had done?

Community Officers can only do so much in their beat area alone. Christy found himself acting in the capacity of a social worker, mental health professional, employment counselor, medical referral source, and welfare case-

sleeping out in tents donated by the National Guard, roasting hot dogs and marshmallows on an open fire, with the skyline of downtown Lansing in the near distance.

Improving the physical appearance of the Sparrow Estates/Green Oaks neighborhoods has been part of Christy's commitment, and he organized a neighborhood trash pickup that netted 37 dumpsters of trash that were hauled away. With federal beautification money, the neighborhood obtained 300 flats of flowers which they planted. The beautification efforts resulted in a restoration of neighborhood pride. One prostitute who lived in the neighborhood even told Christy that the Sparrow Estates neighborhood looked so good, she didn't want to ply her trade there and planned to take it somewhere else.

The birth of the Interagency Group

Prior to Officer Christy's arrival, Jacque Urso became the new principal of the Bingham Elementary School that serves the entire Green Oaks and part of Sparrow Estates neighborhoods. Six months into the job, she realized that the problems she had with the elementary school children were not disciplinary problems, but that they were mental health problems, a result of dysfunctional social structures at home and in the neighborhoods.

She directed her concerns to Marc Cory, Director of Instructional Support, Lansing School District. Cory feels that schools have accepted responsibility for problems that weren't theirs alone. Unlike a social-service agency, a school's mission is much larger, Cory feels, in that they deal with all children of school age, and with a wide range of problems and behaviors, whereas social service provider agencies are in place to deal only with specific dysfunctions. Cory feels that the schools have historically accepted responsibility for problems that really aren't part of their expertise, and that the real problems facing the children need to be addressed by the agency catering to those particular dysfunctions before the school can educate the children.

"The terms you use to define the problem dictate the solution," was the advice offered by one of Cory's friends. This rang true with Cory, and it led him to organize a meeting for the top administrators of various social service agencies to discuss his concerns about the school system. The directors of the Ingham County Department of Social Services, Tri-County Mental Health, Ingham County Health Department, and the Ingham County Probate Court, the Superintendents of the Lansing School District and the Ingham Intermediate School District, and Cory initially met to discuss how they could

improve services to those dysfunctional families in response to a crisis in the schools. Thus began the Interagency Group which continued the discussion on a regular basis.

Cory recalls that there were communication problems early on. First of all, there is no common lexicon used among the agencies to describe a common problem. An "at-risk" child may mean one who is at-risk for malnutrition or disease to the health department, while it may point to a child whose parents are abusive to the mental health department. The Probate Court may identify criminal behavior as a shoplifter who steals food to feed the family, while the mental health department may identify the same behavior as survival. The meetings helped them identify common ground, and to develop an "inter-agency language" to be able to speak with one another.

The agencies, by nature of their function, tended to be territorial and protective of their turf. If families had two or three service agencies involved to help them with their various problems, the agencies might be unaware of the participation of the other, and nobody seemed willing to accept responsibility for the whole problem. The nature of the business is to pass the buck, so to speak. Families commonly are passed from agency to agency, with nobody acting in a position of responsibility for the whole problem. The Inter-Agency Group meetings helped the administration of the agencies see that the problems shared common ground and that it would be worthwhile to continue to meet to talk about finding ways to work together and share information and ownership of problems.

The Bingham School Working Group

A year after the first Inter-Agency Group meeting, Jacque Urso said that she needed services, not more discussion. She needed access to the service providers, not the administrators. An inter-agency meeting was held, and it was agreed that the administrators would allow a group of service providers (five levels down from them) to meet at Bingham School, at a grass-roots level, to see what they could do to work together to aid the dysfunctional families of the children at Bingham School.

Since 1989, the Bingham School Working Group has met on a monthly basis, to target the troubled school children and their families, working with multiple agencies to try to solve the numerous problems that the family may face. Initially, the group consisted of Jacque Urso, school psychologist Ellen Chaney, various teachers, representatives from the Ingham County Department of Public Health, a public health nurse, Ingham County Probate Court,

and Community Mental Health. The group has expanded to encompass anywhere from four to 15 service providers at the meetings, depending on the case. Only those service providers working on a case are invited to attend that meeting, but others may be brought in, if the group decides that they may be able to help. Ellen Chaney chairs the group and calls in "consultants" from a list of 35 different specialties and agencies.

Urso states that the only obstacle to overcome with the group initially was to build up a sense of trust among the participants. This was a new approach, and they were travelling into unknown territory. Some of them feared breaches of confidentiality. The group built up a sense of trust after working closely together over time, and the meeting format has been revamped so that only those working on a particular case can be in the room at the time of the discussion. In order to maintain the confidence of clients, the families are asked to sign a "sign-off sheet" developed by the Inter-Agency Group which allows the various agencies working on their case to share information. Urso or Chaney often take the sign-off sheet to clients' homes and explain how the sharing of information can further help the child or family. So far, they have only had one refusal.

Chaney cites an example of how working together, the Bingham School Working Group was able to turn a youngster around by focusing on his talents, not his weaknesses. The child was targeted by the group because of his reputation as a neighborhood "terror." He also exhibited behavioral problems at school, as well as a learning disability. The child was placed in special education for the learning disabled, which lowered his already fragile self-esteem. The mother was hesitant to have the group intervene and was uncooperative and unhappy that her child was placed in special education. They called in a self-esteem specialist to work with the child and uncovered a talent for gymnastics. The group invited a coach to evaluate him, and he confirmed that the child did, indeed, have quite a talent. The Bingham School Working Group found a local business to sponsor him in gymnastics classes, which would have been too costly for the mother to afford. The child's behavior and self-esteem took a turn for the better, as did the mother's willingness to cooperate with the Bingham School Working Group.

Expanding the model

When Officer Christy arrived on his beat a year after the Bingham School Working Group started, he shared many of Urso's feelings. The problems in the Sparrow Estates neighborhood were more than disciplinary or law

SUPPLY REDUCTION

REUBEN M. GREENBERG

Chief of Police, Charleston, South Carolina

Chief Reuben Greenberg is Chief of the Charleston Police Department. He was formerly the Undersheriff of the San Francisco County Sheriff's Department; Major with the Savannah, Georgia, Police Department; Chief of Police in OpaLocka, Florida; Chief Deputy Sheriff in Orange County, Florida; and Deputy Director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Chief Greenberg has taught Sociology at California State University, Hayward; Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and Criminal Justice at Florida International University. He has appeared on national television shows and has authored numerous police-related articles and a book, Let's Take Back Our Streets. Chief Greenberg received his B.A. from San Francisco State University and Masters Degrees, both in Public Administration and in City Planning, from the University of California, Berkeley.

One day about nine years ago, three drug dealers came to the Central Investigations Unit of the Charleston Police Department and said, "You know, you've got a really bad armed robbery problem on the east side of town, and we'd like to help you resolve it." We were shocked that drug dealers would come and tell us about an armed robbery problem. We were further surprised to learn that armed robberies were occurring in that area. So, we checked our records, and while we found one or two robberies here and there, we didn't have a record of a real problem.

Subsequently, we did some intelligence work and discovered that, indeed, there were numerous armed robberies taking place near the interstate. What had happened was that victims weren't reporting them because the victims were on their way to buy drugs. Because the robbers knew these people were in that neighborhood for that purpose and because the robbers knew these people weren't going to report a crime to the police, these potential buyers were being robbed at gun point.

People had gun barrels placed in their nostrils and their ears. Armed robbers were playing Russian roulette with them. And, of course, the robbers were taking all their money. Occasionally, a car would be stolen or somebody would be beaten badly enough that they would report it, but the record as a whole didn't show it as a serious problem. But based on the information from the drug dealers, we determined that it was a serious problem. And they made it easy for us, giving us the names of the persons who were robbing these people.

The drug dealers had an incentive, of course. These armed robbers were ruining their business. People were becoming afraid to come and buy drugs because they were being pistol-whipped, robbed at gun point, and threatened if they didn't have enough money. So people became afraid to go there. And the dealers were losing business. They were running a retail business, and retail businesses depend upon volume. If volume drops, the profits drop, and they go out of business. Because they didn't want to go out of business, they wanted the police to help them remove the people who were intercepting the money that was going to be used to buy their product.

One of our officers said, "You know, if armed robbers can impact the drug dealers' business in such a negative fashion unintentionally, then we ought to be able to do it intentionally." Something else happened that helped us crystallize a game plan. A neighboring community across the harbor arrested a long-time drug dealer. This fellow had been arrested numerous times by all the different local agencies. The night he was arrested, there were lots of police officers and deputy sheriffs lined up outside the jail, all trying to get their prisoners booked in. This dealer thought that he'd take advantage of the hectic situation. Even though he was handcuffed behind his back, he was able to push the police officer and knock him off guard. He then took off running down the street. The police officer chased after him, of course. This dealer ran into the street and was struck by a truck and was killed. So the problem of that dealer's trafficking was no longer an issue.

We felt pretty good – for one day. The very next night, there was another drug dealer standing on the corner that had belonged to the first drug dealer, selling just as freely as could be. And we realized then, even if this dealer were to receive the death penalty, it really wasn't going to do us any good as long as that locale was a profitable place to sell drugs. So, the key to it was to destroy that location as a place where one could sell drugs and make money.

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Street level drug dealing is a retail business, albeit illegal, on the local level. Most sales are for \$5, \$10, \$25, and \$50. Businesses of this kind, to be profitable, depend on volume. If you reduce the volume, you reduce the profits, and if you reduce the profits enough, the business will fail. Now, our objective was not to eliminate all drugs from the face of the Earth. It would be a good thing to do, but we didn't feel that in Charleston, South Carolina, we had those kinds of resources.

So we decided that we would do something else; we would go after the customer. We had always before gone after the drug dealer. We had employed all types of schemes. We had arrested some individuals 50 times. I don't know why we did that because I've never met a district attorney that would prosecute more than four, five, maybe six drug cases. You might have 100 cases against a dealer, and the district attorney is still going to pick out the best five or six cases out of that 100, and those are the ones he's going to prosecute. So we decided we're just going to give the district attorney six or seven really good cases, and then forget about the others and hope the criminal justice system, through its machinations and so forth, would eventually take them off the street. We were going to target the customers, and we were going to do that in a very interesting way.

We decided that we were going to go after these buyers using top-notch, physically fit, uniformed officers. While we had 31 highly intense drug markets in our city, we didn't have the personnel to deal with all locations. So we chose five locations that were in close proximity to each other. We put five officers, one at each location, on the street corners with the drug dealers. And we came to learn a lot about their business. We learned they couldn't go across town, like everybody said they would do, because they would lose their customers. And, as one dealer pointed out, "That's how you get killed, moving across town to somebody else's turf." The dealers were already ensconced in their particular locale where they had set up their particular retail business.

We also learned that the dealers didn't communicate with their customers very much. Most didn't know their customers' names, and the customers didn't know their names. All the customers knew was that on that street corner, a person wearing a red cap, a black jacket, or certain types of other kinds of clothing would sell drugs. And, so, the customer/buyer relationship was not a very strong one. We felt that if we could break that relationship, perhaps these people would

stop selling drugs. Later, we discovered that that was, indeed, the case.

We decided to place our officers 40 feet away from the transaction sites; that was the ACLU agreement we made in Mobile, Alabama – the officer in uniform would stand 40 feet away from the drug dealer. That way, if the dealer wanted to have a conversation, he could do so without being interfered with by the police, and he wouldn't be subject to harassment.

And so we set up in that manner, and some interesting things happened. Nobody came up to the drug dealer, even to say hello. We didn't say anything to the dealers; we didn't try to arrest them. We knew they had drugs on them, because we'd already arrested them six, seven, eight times before. We were just waiting for them to go through the system. The criminal justice process will take care of that person sooner or later. And customers would come around in their cars, and would try to make that connection. They'd come around the block one time. They'd come around a second time. And one of our officers, using a little box camera, would go up and take a flash picture. We always used a flash to let these people coming around in the automobiles know photographs had been taken of them. If the drug dealer went down to the next block, we went down to the next block. We found that he really couldn't travel more than a block or so to a different spot because he'd either enter another person's territory and get killed for it, perhaps, or his market wouldn't be able to find him.

So we applied a similar strategy to some of the crack houses. Instead of kicking the doors in, we simply placed an officer on his beat out in front of the particular crack house. We didn't stop anybody from going in; we wanted them to go in. We became interested when they came out. And what happened is that people did not go in. And, if they did go in, they for sure wouldn't come out. Because they didn't know what we knew; they didn't know what kind of probable cause to arrest we had.

Some of the officers were quite innovative. Two or three would get together; one would go to the front door; one would go the side yard; and one would walk around to the back yard. They were always in uniform because we wanted them to know it was the police. One officer would have a piece of paper, which would be folded over, and he'd knock on the door. And the dealers and buyers would think it was a search warrant, and, of course, they wouldn't open the door; they'd start flushing toilets and everything else. At that point, we had

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no probable cause whatsoever to enter; then the windows would open; drugs would be thrown out into the yard. Once this happened, we'd have probable cause to go in. And we used this strategy many times, and it worked almost every time because they couldn't be sure whether we had a search warrant or not; they just couldn't absolutely be sure. And it worked very well.

Now, clearly, this particular program was not based on arrest. If you arrest a street level drug dealer, he spends four hours in the slammer, and then he's back out on the street with another stash, selling just as wildly as ever. And even if he's had all these arrests, he's likely to get probation for the third or the fourth or the fifth or the sixth time.

We had decided that we were not just going to destroy a dealer, but were going to destroy a business. Our objective was to destroy that illegal, retail business called street level drug selling in the same way that the street level drug dealers destroyed so many other businesses. The reason why "Joe's" butcher shop went out of business was not because he started selling bad meat; it was because his customers became afraid to come into the area. The reason why "Dorothy's Boutique" went out of business or "Helen's Beauty Salon" went out of business in that neighborhood was because the drug dealers had taken over the neighborhood. The kinds of people they had there in that particular neighborhood, and who were attracted by those drug dealers, were not the kind that the salon or boutique customers wanted to encounter as they parked their cars, many of which were broken into.

So we went in, we occupied, and then we did something that turned out to be very good for the community, but was selfishly inspired. We cleaned up the area. We brought prisoners from the jail and had them pick up trash, eradicate all graffiti, and board up old buildings. Now, as I said, that was good for the community. Why did we do that? We did it to improve the working conditions of our officers out on the beat. They got tired of standing around flies and dead animals in the street, half-eaten food in the gutter, and so forth. They asked us, "Can't you give us some relief." So we said, "Sure," and by giving them relief from this bad physical environment, we also gave relief to people in the community.

We were successful in reducing the amount of drugs changing hands in the area, although the decrease was not as much as we would have liked. But our main objective was to reduce the violence, and in the last five years we've had one drive-by shooting. Our best

estimate, and it's a conservative one, is that we eliminated about 30 percent of the street level drug dealers, not because they were arrested – they'd been arrested many times and weren't eliminated. It was because they went out of business for the same reason Eastern Airlines went out of business; they couldn't make any money. It just wasn't profitable to be out there, the volume had been cut so much.

People said, "Oh, you've got to cover these dealers 24 hours a day." Wrong. They don't sell drugs 24 hours a day. It turns out that they went to sleep just like everybody else does, and during that period of time, they weren't selling drugs.

We also found out that, at least in our community, 80 percent of the drugs were sold between six o'clock at night and two o'clock in the morning, on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. Our officers work a four-day week so we added Wednesday. So Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, from six o'clock at night until about two in the morning, our objective was to stop that dealer from selling drugs. The market was there on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday; we didn't have the resources to do anything about that, but most of the demand is not at that particular time. The demand for these recreational users is typically toward the end of the week, and that's where we put the time on the job. That's when we were effective. We didn't have to do it 24 hours a day; we didn't have to do it seven days a week.

You could see what would happen if you owned a movie theater and a local ordinance was passed that you could only open a movie theater on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. What would happen? That business would fail because the recreational time available to watch movies is toward the end of the week. So, if you reduce their ability to operate during the end of the week, you'd, in effect, have eliminated that movie theater business. They can't make it worthwhile with a schedule like that. That's how we approached the drug business.

Now this approach has two important advantages. Number one, as I said, it's not arrest based, so there isn't a lot of paperwork. There aren't a lot of court appearances, and a lot of jail space isn't taken up. And the people that were targeted and photographed were not the drug dealers. We've already got their pictures dozens of times. We're now looking at the doctors, the lawyers, police officers, plumbers, carpenters who we caught coming to purchase illegal drugs. The objective we had was a very narrow one; it was to reduce the incidence of violence on the street. And we have been able to do that.

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QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

Judge Carnes: We have a few minutes for questions, so if anyone wants to come to the center microphone to ask questions of this very distinguished panel, please come forward.

Statement: I'm from Southern California, Orange County, specifically. A year ago, I mounted an effort with gang investigators to establish uniforms in the public schools as a way of obviating gang attire, to reduce violence, and to bring safety into our schools. The effort, I am glad to say, is starting to catch on, and it's taking notice with the chiefs of police. And the people of South Central Los Angeles have given me a tremendous amount of support.

Chief Greenberg, you struck a note with me today, and I will share this with all of you. As you know, we live in a tremendous pressure cooker in Southern California; it is intolerable. We have now passed the first trial of Rodney King, and now we are facing the Reginald Denny trial. The greatest desire of the people of South Central Los Angeles is for some sort of mediation in this problem, that creativity be used in what is dispensed to these young men who are coming up on this trial. Their desire and their wish is that these young men be put in shackles and placed in the community, and that they produce and do public service in a very visual manner. They feel this would be a way to reduce the pressure cooker of what is being produced. I think that what you stated today was marvelous because these are very effective tools. It really does bring a salutary effect to the community, some self worth at the very least.

Question: This meeting has been one of the high points in my 20 years as a district judge. I serve in New York City. I try a lot of drug cases, take a lot of guilty pleas, and pass sentences. But, I'd just like to suggest, gently, that one thing seems to be missing. I think the word "morality" has been used a couple of times in passing. The phrase "value systems" has been used a lot, but no definition has been given. In public discourse, "morality" and "right and wrong" are not stylish terms. I know that huge problems like the ones we're talking about have many causes, and so you can't simplify it. But it may be worthwhile at a meeting like this, perhaps the next one, to hear from people who would be willing to discuss the question of whether the

change in the public's moral standards in this country – which I believe has occurred – has something to do with what we're talking about.

And, let me just mention without going on at length, there's been a lot of talk about violence shown on television, and I agree with that criticism, fervently. There is also a lot purveyed about sexual license and the absence of sexual standards. In our schools there's a lot of literal indoctrination about the lack of a need for any sexual standards – anything goes. Now, is that not related in some way to the question of teenage pregnancy? If the opinion makers – the television, the radio, the books, the paperbacks, the magazines – are purveying a no-holds-barred view of sex, is it surprising that weaker members of our society might take after that?

Now, I would only suggest that morality is a very hard thing to talk about; it's a hard thing to talk about in connection with government activities. But it's possible it should be talked about because it really is one of the core things that needs to be addressed.

We talk about parents nurturing – what are they supposed to teach? Are they going to teach that there are moral standards? Are they going to teach what is purveyed a lot by our intellectual and so-called leaders, that everything is relative and everything goes? So, what are the standards of morality in the society? Or are we losing them? It's not a dogmatic suggestion. It's a suggestion that maybe you could have at the next meeting somebody like James Q. Wilson, who has been a Professor of Government at Harvard, who is not a prissy bluenose, but he talks about these things.

Judge Carnes: You've raised some provocative issues. Let me ask if our panelists have any feedback. We talk about interdiction and treatment. Is there an absence of discourse on a breakdown of a value system? The question I want to ask is, are there enough mentors, enough treatment facilities, enough jails, if 14-year-old girls continue to have babies, babies that they themselves are not prepared to parent? Do any of you have a reaction?

Mayor Schmoke: One of the reasons why I continue to talk about this issue and about my critique of the national drug policy is that I do think there is a need not only for discussion of values and standards but for a consensus to be developed about what our goals are with respect to this policy. That is, what is it that we're actually trying to achieve as a society as it relates to these national drug control policies?

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When people ask me about the drug problem, I usually say that the drug problem, at least in my view, is three interrelated problems. It's addiction, it's violence, and it's AIDS. Now, two of those, in my view, are clearly health problems, and one – obviously the trafficking on the street and the violence related to drug trafficking – is a crime problem. What is the strategy that we're using to try to eliminate or control those three interrelated problems?

We have to come not only to a view on what are our values, but with respect to this policy, what are the goals we want to achieve. If it is simply to make sure that people don't take substances that will harm them – if that's the goal – then we would clearly have to make cigarettes illegal or alcohol illegal. Well, we've taken that route before, and we know what problems have arisen because of that.

Is it some other goal we are trying to achieve, that we think these particular substances – marijuana, cocaine, heroin – are in and of themselves inherently bad? Is that the goal? I don't think we have a consensus in this country. Is it to become a 100 percent drug-free America, that is, to make sure that nobody is taking any drugs – is that the goal? I'm not sure that's a realistic goal to achieve.

But there is a need for us to have further discussion, to talk about where we want to go – where this Commission wants to go, where the country wants to go. We've got to have a consensus on what the goal is of this policy.

If you go up on the Hill now and ask your Congressman, "What's the goal of national drug policy?" I don't think they could tell you. I think it is very important for us to achieve a consensus – if we don't want to repeat what's been the problem since this drug war started in 1914 with the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act. We want to get off the treadmill of the last 79 years. Let's come up with not only the values discussion but the goals discussion. I think that's very important.

Judge Carnes: Chief Greenberg would like to respond to this.

Reuben Greenberg: I don't know if I can shed a great deal of light on the problem the judge brought up. It's one that I've thought an awful lot about. I know that I'm a police officer and I work on trying to establish external controls for people's behavior. My own belief is that we can be effective – as law enforcement people, court officials, or prison system people – with probably no more than the three-to-four percent of our population that would decide, for whatever

reason, to violate various types of laws or standards of behavior or decency, whatever they may be.

In every society – whether you're talking about a tribal group, a monarchy, one that's based upon a democracy or republic system, or perhaps even communism – it's really based upon internal control, where people follow the law or follow the dictates of their particular society, assuming people understand what they are. People don't do things that are against the law, because it hurts people – because it hurts society. In other words, it's internal control, and people don't have to have a police officer or a prison officer or someone watching them.

Most of you can see this in a simple example of a traffic situation. It's three o'clock in the morning on almost any American downtown street, with very little traffic relative to other times of the day, and the light turns red. People stop. Why do they stop? They can see to the left and to the right and in every direction. And there's no police officer. But they stop because it's against the law to continue on. They follow that rule.

There are millions of people in this country who don't use drugs because it's against the law. In other words, the law itself can have an effect on stopping people from doing such things. The law can have a tremendous impact on changing behavior.

But it's in the area of internal controls, under which every society has to operate, that we have our difficulties in this country. We're not going to find very soon the kinds of things the judge talked about, because you're really talking about ethics – you're really talking about accountability. In our society, it's fashionable to blame others for your problems or for your group's problems. We are not going to find very much interest in this, because ultimately you have to start talking about, exploring various aspects of religion. And you know what a red flag that will be if you introduce that into any kind of learning process where these things are obviously not taking place.

So, I don't think our society is ready to deal with those hard problems and things that really count – away from the punitive aspects I represent but toward the kinds of things people don't do to their fellow human beings in their community, because it's bad for the community and because it hurts other people.

Question: Yes, this is directed to Chief of Police Greenberg. A great deal of the attention of this Symposium has focused on the root

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causes of violence and drug abuse – and the need for fundamental change in society so that every child grows up with the belief that he or she can be someone. This kind of change, I hope, will put back in society the internal controls that were just spoken about. But, in the meantime, we have very pressing problems of out-of-control violence and raging drug abuse. The kind of program discussed in Charleston seems to be effective. The question is, is that being followed in other cities? And, could that be a model for some sort of national controls, perhaps, with the help of the additional 100,000 police officers that President Clinton is speaking about?

Reuben Greenberg: My share of those 100,000 police officers, by the way, would be six – if it was done equitably across the country.

Yes. In some places, it is. In Charleston, we have a different view of accountability than a lot of people do. For example – and this will shock some of you, but nonetheless it's true, and many people, including "60 Minutes," have come down to check it out to see if it was true and have all determined that it is – the safest place in the city of Charleston to sleep at night, or to park your automobile, is in public housing. Most cities would never tell you anything like that. If I wanted to make sure that my vehicle would be safe, I would park it in public housing because it's the safest place in the city.

This didn't happen by accident. It happened by holding people accountable for their particular behavior that negatively impacted the quality of life of their neighbors. We felt we had to do this. This was the only housing we control – we were the landlords. And it was incumbent upon us to make public housing a safe place, as it was designed to be, for people who were without means to raise their families – people who couldn't flee to the suburbs or go other places. We went through a process of doing that, and we've duplicated it in other cities as well.

It seems to me that our society is not looking to hold an individual accountable for his or her misdeeds. You hear all kinds of reasons – everything from the "Twinkie Defense" in the Dan White case to all other kinds of reasons – where you try to explain away criminal behavior. I'm very distraught, for example, that for the first time in our country, the majority of people killed were African-Americans – we're talking about killed feloniously in 1991 and 1992 – 11 percent of the population, but 51 percent of the homicides. There's got to be a solution to that, and that solution has to be found, I think, within our own community. It

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can't be found someplace else. We can't depend on people from somewhere else in the country to have a great impact upon that.

In another example, in 44 percent of the reported rapes in this country, the victim is a black female. That's not right! I don't accept that. There's got to be another way; that doesn't have to be the case. And there are various other kinds of situations as well.

This is a very, very great problem. We have to deal with myriad problems in our society. And we're able to accommodate anything, or to explain away any type of criminal behavior, however terrible it might be. On the Jeffrey Dahmer case, for example, I heard a psychiatrist on one of the late night talk shows conclude that all those murders were really the fault of his grandmother who didn't buy him a tricycle in the same year all the other kids got one. He resented that from the time he was four years old, and this created the adult resentment. We're always looking for some other kinds of reasons.

I wish I could have a more direct response to you. But it seems to me that we have had some success in Charleston because we do place great stock in accountability. We do a lot of things that are so simple. And I tell other people they don't cost any money – you don't have to pass any laws.

For example, we could decide in this country, starting at this meeting, that it's a good thing to have kids in school and off the street during school hours. We decided that in Charleston. We went back to something old fashioned. Would you believe that we have truant officers in the city of Charleston? They work for the police department. Truant officers! Every kid on the streets between eight o'clock in the morning and 2:30 in the afternoon, whether they're doing anything or not, is picked up and taken back to his or her school. And if they've been expelled or suspended, they're taken to their homes.

Guess what happened? The number of larcenies, purse-snatchings, and daytime burglaries went down 43 percent without putting anybody in jail – without bringing anybody before the court. Guess what else happened? We haven't had a single kid become the victim of a violent crime during school hours, because they're not out on the street. They're not out being victimized by others away from the school. We're taking action before they get into trouble – and not afterwards through the criminal justice system. It's a good thing to have them in class.

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You could do that. I don't know any state that doesn't have truancy laws. I've studied it as much as I can. I can't find any bad things about having these kids in class, or about taking them to their homes if they've been expelled or suspended. There's nothing bad about that. But why don't we do that with the police business? Because we don't have any measurement of how effective you are with doing that. We pick them all up, and when I say all, I'm talking about private school kids, tall, short, fat, skinny, Black, White, male, female, and even occasionally kids that were deservedly out of school because their school systems are out and they're visiting our city from out of state. We've picked them up as well.

Judge Carnes: We have another question.

John Coleman: Thank you very much. My name is John Coleman from the Drug Enforcement Administration, and I'd like to make a comment and then ask a question.

It's a common occurrence with people who study public policy to conclude that things occur because of strategies - or occur because particular strategies have been carried out. But, oftentimes, things occur in public policy, particular with crime and drugs, despite the best of strategies. In thinking about changing course, we should be somewhat careful, because there are some things that we have taken a great deal of time and effort, study, and consideration to develop in this country in terms of our approach to the drug problem and to crime in general. And I think these difficult challenges are probably the greatest we all have for the future.

Now, having said that, I would like to address my question to Chief McNamara. On the question of gun control, I think the majority of folks in law enforcement today believe strongly in gun control - as do, I believe, my colleagues in this room. However, I would like to ask how you can have a consistent view of advocating restricting the supply of guns to communities - thereby limiting the violence that those guns visit upon those communities - if you don't similarly feel that by restricting the drugs to those communities we can likewise restrict the amount of drug abuse in those communities? Why are these policies not compatible?

Joseph McNamara: Thank you, John. That's a good question that my friends in the NRA like to ask. The fact is that guns are quite different than chemical substances. The chemical substance transaction takes place in private, between willing sellers and dealers.

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Comparative death statistics show 33,000 deaths by firearms and perhaps 6,000 by all illegal drugs combined – probably less than that in my opinion. But, you can see there's a great deal of difference in the harm caused and, as Mayor Schmoke mentioned, we're not even talking about AIDS spreading through the use of hypodermic needles. But, the drug user, fundamentally, is making a decision of what to put into their blood stream. That is a personal decision.

The person killed by a firearm, by a mechanical device that is manufactured to kill, often has no choice in that decision, outside of the suicides. There are so many accidents, so many homicides, and so much violence that the presence of a firearm turns a verbal argument into a potential homicide.

By contrast, probably 20 million Americans use cannabis. There's never been a cannabis murder that we know of, outside of dealers in their commercial turf wars.

So, I think there are very clear distinctions – and also in enforceability, in that firearms are much easier to enforce the law against. But the basic philosophical difference is that drug use is primarily harmful only to the user; the presence of firearms puts us all in grave danger.

Judge Carnes: Before we leave, Chief Greenberg says I simply must let him respond to the legalization question. Since I'm afraid he'll get a truant officer after me, I will let him do so.

Reuben Greenberg: I'd just like to say that this whole idea – particularly for somebody who works down in the trenches – of legalizing or decriminalizing drugs is very, very seductive. On the surface it seems to solve so many problems and redirects so many monied resources to other things. But, there are some wrinkles in it as well.

Every study I've seen has indicated that if we decriminalize the use of the drugs we have now – we're talking about marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, I think there were five different drugs – we would have a 20 to 30 percent permanent increase in the use of those drugs. If you remember, there are – believe it or not – millions of people who obey the law because it's the law. If it were otherwise, this country would be in much worse shape than it is – simply because it's the law and that's the drug laws as well.

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A lot of social and pathological problems would come from decriminalizing drugs. It would have some benefits, and I think those benefits have been described very ably for you here. However, there'd be some increase, one would assume, in the number of accidents or persons under the influence of these other drugs who operate airplanes, trains, taxis, automobiles, buses, just like we have with alcohol. I mean, part of that 20 to 30 percent increase would increase those numbers as well.

What benefit would it be to cocaine babies? Would it make any difference that a baby developed under the influence of illegal cocaine or legalized cocaine? When are we going to say, "Well, you've had enough?" Are we going to give people narcotics until they're overdosed? At some point you've got to say, "No more!" Well, at that point, the black market starts again.

I haven't heard anyone suggest that 12-year-olds should be permitted to utilize any of these decriminalized substances, and somebody is going to want to provide it to 12-year-olds. And, if they want to do that, then some police officer, some enforcement person from someplace is going to have to make some effort to prevent 12-, 13-, and 14-year-olds from getting that particular drug.

Also, many of the criminals we're talking about are criminals first - and drug use is just an aspect of their behavior, just one of many other illegal things they do, and not necessarily the cause of their drug behavior. I would be the first to tell you that a drug addict will steal more to satisfy his drug habit - no question about that. But it doesn't mean that he suddenly becomes a law abiding individual if drugs are legalized. And that's what's forgotten about. Most of these people started anti-social activities - committed crimes, burglary, and in many cases, assault as well - when they were younger, before they ever knew what cocaine was, before they ever knew what crack was, or even marijuana.

And there are other kinds of things on which we need to focus beyond simply taking away the drugs, and suddenly everybody is living very, very happily ever after. I think the situation is much more complex than that. While there are certain advantages to this very, very seductive idea, there are also some unknowns and some very clear disadvantages as well.

Judge Carnes: I think Dr. McNamara wants to respond quickly to that.

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Joseph McNamara: I am not one who has advocated decriminalization or legalization. However, I do think that the idea that we should consider whether there isn't a better way of doing this should not be put down by what my friend and colleague, Reuben, has just said. We don't know how many more people might use drugs. Some people clearly use drugs because they are illegal. We know that, and we don't know what would happen. After prohibition, consumption of alcohol rose slightly, then stayed steady for years, and then declined recently as was earlier mentioned here.

So, I think there are dimensions to this and value systems that are at work that we simply don't know a lot about because of the very illegality of these drugs. Certainly, there would always be laws, as there are with cigarettes and alcohol, against children using them, against people abusing them, or driving under the influence – and those laws should be vigorously enforced. But I might point out, for example, the fact that drunks being legally prohibited from purchasing alcohol doesn't lead to wholesale bootlegging and violence such as occurred during prohibition when it was illegal.

So, I think this is a complex area, and there are lots of societal harms that are caused by the illegality itself that have to be weighed against changes in public policy. And I think it's really time to get an objective commission that would represent the arguments that Reuben makes and consider some of the arguments on the other side.

Statement: Yesterday, we started this Symposium by identifying drug addiction as a disease. It seems to me that fundamentally this is a medical problem. I don't think that medical problems are resolvable within the context of the criminal justice system. And if we choose law enforcement and criminalization as the prescription, it seems to me we ought to approach it as all doctors do. You go to the doctor, you have a disease, he gives you some medicine. The side effects are intolerable, so he takes you off the medicine. It seems to me that the side effects of our current approach have demonstrated themselves to be so intolerable that it is critical that we do have the new approach. And I certainly hope that something comparable to the Wickersham Commission, which Mayor Schmoke talked about, or somebody takes a look at what we're doing, because what we're doing now is a colossal boondoggle.

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
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June 1992

HELPFUL HINTS FOR THE TRADITION-BOUND CHIEF

By John E. Eck

This paper is not meant for [law enforcement leaders who are dedicated to improving policing practices], but rather, for those neglected, tradition-bound law enforcement practitioners.

In my job as the Police Executive Research Forum's (PERF's) Associate Director of Research, I am given the opportunity to observe and assist police leaders who are dedicated to improving law enforcement practices. I have also had the dubious honor of working with a few law enforcement practitioners who seem determined to sabotage innovation — that ugly monster of change — at all costs. Contrary to popular belief, killing progressive programs can require as much creativity and subtle coercion as fostering positive change. PERF has a long tradition of helping law enforcement's pioneers advance innovative programs so that all citizens can enjoy a better quality of life. This paper is not meant for them, but rather, for those neglected, tradition-bound law enforcement practitioners. After all, they need help too.

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Toward Development of
Meaningful and Effective
Performance Evaluations

**Toward Development of
Meaningful and Effective
PERFORMANCE
EVALUATIONS**

by

Robert Trojanowicz
Director
National Center for Community Policing

Bonnie Bucqueroux
Associate Director
National Center for Community Policing

National Center for Community Policing
School of Criminal Justice
Michigan State University

MICHIGAN STATE
UNIVERSITY

Armilla Simon

Secretary, The National Center for Community Policing

School of Criminal Justice

College of Social Science

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East Lansing, Michigan 48824-1118

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
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- Provides promising solutions to community drug problems by instructing police departments on how to launch aggressive new anti-drug efforts without alienating the community or risking vigilantism.
- Details the evolution of the Community Policing Officer (CPO), who acts as the police department's community outreach specialist.
- Shows how a CPO can interact with the people to develop long-term solutions to community concerns and ultimately restore order to a community.
- Includes close-ups submitted by officials from nine communities nationwide concerning their community policing efforts.

Robert Trojanowicz is the Director of the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. He is also a Research Fellow, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Bonnie Bucqueroux is a Specialist Editor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. She is also the Editor of *Footprints*, the official newsletter of the National Center for Community Policing.

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Los Angeles Police Department
Baltimore County Police Department
New York City Police Department
Madison Police Department
McAllen Police Department
Newport News Police Department
Edmonton Police Department
Evanston Police Department

N 15
Rubenstein
Article

University of Massachusetts.

An extensive literature search was conducted by the staff of the Center for Research on Institutions and Social Policy, and an effort was made to meet with law enforcement officials and public policy specialists.

Crime and the police

Levels of crime unthinkable a generation ago have become part of our way of life, and there is a growing sense that our police system is being overwhelmed by the task it confronts. As a society, we have asked our police to do more, while at the same time giving them fewer resources to do the job. In 1948, there were 3.32 police officers for every violent crime reported in an American city; by 1978, the ratio had fallen to 0.5 officer for each reported violent crime. Nor has the declining ratio reflected merely the increase in crime. In many cities, the number of police officers has declined in absolute terms. Boston, for example, had 2,800 officers in 1950 and about 1,800 in 1982. Detroit lost 20 percent of its police force from 1970 to 1982, and Pittsburgh lost 25 percent over the same period.

These fewer officers, as a result of unionization and the general betterment of working conditions nationwide, work fewer hours than their predecessors -- 8 to 10 hours less per week than police officers of a generation ago.

At the same time, police departments have been forced to confront increased demands by a public that has come to expect a diversity of services from its police. Calls-for-service (aided by the general institution of "911" or other emergency numbers) consume a greater and greater portion of each officer's day.

Yet another deployment factor to be considered is the aging of U.S. police forces. When required to cut back on manpower, the typical response is to recruit fewer new officers and to let the retirement process trim the ranks. Thus the average age of a Buffalo police officer is 42 years, while the average in Boston is over 44 years. In New York, fully 75 percent of the police force is either eligible for retirement or will become eligible within five years.

One response to an increasing workload and a reduced workforce has been to rely more heavily on technological advances in communications and on specialized forms of patrol. Another has been the use of unpaid civilians working as "auxiliary" or "reserve" officers; civilians are also increasingly used in clerical tasks.

Review of social science research

In the early 1970s, the Kansas City Police Department conducted a "Preventive Patrol Experiment" designed to measure the impact of routine patrol on crime and the fear of crime. The researchers' conclusions were surprising and controversial: that it did not seem to matter whether patrol was carried on at traditional levels, was intensified, or was abolished

except to respond to calls-for-service. However, we cannot conclude from the Kansas City study that a greater police presence has no effect on crime or fear. The project tested only traditional preventive patrol in vehicles, and it may not actually have tested the effect of increases or decreases in patrol resources. Furthermore, other studies have found that increasing certain types of police activity -- foot patrol, for example -- can have a significant impact on certain types of crime. Finally, an increased police presence can lead to an increase in reported crime even though crime is being more effectively controlled.

Thus the Kansas City experiment is of relatively minor importance in evaluating the Police Corps concept. What it does demonstrate is that how police increases are used is as least as important as the increase itself.

James O. Wilson and Barbara Boland studied the relationship between patrol units on the street, the aggressiveness of police behavior, and robbery rates in 35 large U.S. cities in 1975. They found that the robbery rate was strongly and negatively correlated with the arrest rate for robbery; the arrest rate, in turn, was affected both by the number of patrol units and by the frequency with which they interacted with the community.

In 1974 and 1975, the Nashville Police Department tested saturation patrol in high-crime areas. The researchers found that crime rates declined as a consequence of saturation night patrol, but not as a result of daytime patrol, and that crime rates increased when the saturation patrols were discontinued.

Between 1963 and 1964, the number of reported felonies in the New York City subway system increased sharply, and the city ordered a 150 percent increase in subway patrol from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m. When researchers analyzed the results over an eight-year period, they found that reported crime during those hours dropped dramatically, and that the crime rate for daylight hours also showed a short-term drop. The study suggested that the deterrent effect was costly (\$35,000 for each deterred felony) and that there may have been a displacement of crime from the subway system to the bus system.

In 1965 four British cities experimented with varying the number of police officers walking foot patrols. Reported crime decreased when foot patrol went from zero to one officer, but adding a second officer did not lead to any further decrease. Unfortunately, the beats were small and the implications therefore unclear.

In 1954 a four-month experiment in doubling police patrol, and especially foot patrol, was carried out in Manhattan's 25th precinct. The number of reported crimes declined dramatically. A similar experiment was carried out in the 20th precinct in 1966, when increased patrol was accompanied by a decline in street robbery, auto theft, and grand larcenies visible from the street, but not in burglary or assault. Here again, the implications are unclear because the time periods were short and no attempt was made to measure displacement or unreported crime.

Several other studies of the relationship between police manpower and the crime rate are discussed in the full report but appear to have little

relevance for the Police Corps concept.

What can be concluded from research in this area is that there are ways in which increases in police patrol can be wasted. The kind of routine daytime car patrol tested in Kansas City may be one of these. But the research literature indicates that other ways of using police -- foot patrol, slow patrol at night, "aggressive" patrol, patrol in business districts, and patrol in subways or enclosed areas -- can be productive. Nearly every police chief in the country could describe productive ways of using additional police officers, ways consistent with the limited conclusions that can be drawn from social science research.

2 - THE STUDENT SURVEY

The Police Corps proposal attempts to address two societal problems: how students are to fund the costs of higher education, and how police departments are to increase the number of patrol officers. To explore student perceptions of the Police Corps, we surveyed college students in Massachusetts about their response to the program in general and to alternative ways in which it might be structured. Massachusetts was chosen for the survey because Commonwealth officials were considering such a program.

We drew the student sample from sophomores and juniors attending the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the University of Massachusetts at Boston, Salem State College, and Boston University. These four institutions represent a range of college options and costs. UMass/Boston and Salem State are public universities with relatively low tuition rates and no dormitory facilities. For students commuting from home, these institutions provide the most economical college option. UMass/Amherst is also a public institution, but one in which most students rent rooms on campus or in the community, with correspondingly high living costs. BU is a private university, with high tuition levels and a diversity of accommodations.

We chose sophomores and juniors chosen for the sample because they have had experience with the problem of meeting college costs and must look forward to another year or two of meeting those costs.

At UMass/Boston, we obtained a complete list of sophomores and juniors, identifying the racial background of some students and the academic field of specialization for those who had selected a major. From this list we drew a sample that included all students majoring in criminal justice, all black males, and two-thirds of the black females. Otherwise, we chose males at twice the rate of females. We anticipated that men would be more interested than women in the Police Corps, and we were therefore concerned with identifying factors affecting their responses to the program.

At Salem State and UMass/Amherst, a list of sophomores and juniors was provided, ordered by class and gender. A systematic sample was drawn from that list, again selecting males at twice the rate of females.

Boston University officials declined to provide names without student permission. They contacted students who had volunteered to serve as escorts in a campus security program, plus sophomores and juniors chosen haphazardly, until they had a sufficient number of students willing to let their names be passed on to us. It is impossible to know how the resulting sample would compare to a properly drawn sample at BU.

Interviewing was done by telephone during a three-week period in the spring of 1984. At least eight calls were made to hard-to-reach students,

What Does Community Policing Mean for Daily Police Work?

by Stephen D. Mastrofski

Although interest in community policing has grown rapidly in the last decade, we know remarkably little about what it means to the work of the street-level officer. The term has been used to describe aggressive order maintenance, community crime prevention, problem-solving, and a host of police-community-relations strategies.

This article is not so much concerned with defining community policing as with identifying how community policing—whether a state of mind, strategy, or program—affects police officers' daily work, including how they spend their time, with whom, and for how long.

Most evaluations of community policing to date have focused on describing some program and its impact on crime or victimization rates, citizen satisfaction, fear of crime, or other quality-of-life indicators. Reports resulting from these evaluations have described program goals, methods, and activities. Some include anecdotal accounts of the experiences of police and citizens in carrying out the program, but these are selective and fail to provide a larger context for understanding what community policing means for the everyday work of the men and women who engage in it. If the driving force of community policing reform is to change the way that police do their work, we must know what the police do when they do

community policing. Only then will we know how to interpret the findings of even the most rigorous impact evaluations.

Accordingly, the National Institute of Justice is sponsoring a new study that will develop new information on the specific activities police engage in when they take on community policing responsibilities, who determines the activities, and what proportion of time officers spend on them.

The new study builds on previous NIJ research, most of it concentrated on a well-established tactic of community policing—foot patrol.

Foot patrol studies

Some researchers have concluded from foot patrol research that this form of community policing can reduce fear of crime, increase citizen satisfaction, and perhaps even reduce crime itself. Others point to mixed results. From the researcher's perspective, studies of foot patrol offer a striking example of the need to learn more about what happens at the officer level.

Newark. One of the first foot patrol studies to offer encouraging conclusions was one conducted by the Police Foundation for the National Institute of Justice in the late 1970's.¹ Although the researchers in Newark found that foot patrol had no impact on reported crime and victimization, they concluded that it

did have a positive effect on citizen perceptions about crime and police services. The thrust of the study, however, was not so much on the actions of the foot patrol officers as on the impact of the strategy on crime and the fear of crime. Efforts were made to verify that foot officers were indeed on their assigned beats, but there was no analysis to indicate how foot patrol activities differed from motorized patrol activities.

A second study of foot patrol in Newark² did obtain foot officers' activity reports. Foot patrol was one of several strategies designed to intensify enforcement of laws regulating conduct in public places.

Foot officers were expected to engage in a wide variety of non-enforcement as well as enforcement activities. It appears that relatively little of their effort was given to enforcement, judging from patrol officers' activity statistics. Officers averaged only about 1.5 enforcement activities per 8 person-hours (or 3 activities per shift for each two-officer team). About half of these actions were summonses.

Flint. A study of foot patrol was also conducted in Flint, Michigan, at about the same time as the first Newark study.³ Although some of the study's conclusions are in dispute, the study did attempt to document systematically what police did on foot patrol and how that differed from motorized patrol.

Looking at the department's daily report forms, the researchers found that foot officers reported many more self-initiated activities—such as home and business visits and security checks—than police in cars. Officers on foot averaged much higher levels of productivity across most of the standard performance measures: arrests, investigations, stopping of suspicious persons, parking citations, and value of recovered property. The only category in which motor patrol officers clearly outproduced their foot patrol counterparts was in providing miscellaneous services to citizens.

Of course, foot patrol and motor patrol officers had different responsibilities and were monitored for different forms of activity. For instance, motor patrol officers had exclusive responsibility for dealing with traffic violations and accidents. Foot patrol officers were the only ones monitored for a wide range of police-public contacts: meetings and speaking engagements, business and home visits, and security checks. Not surprisingly, foot patrol officers had a much higher rate of nonadversarial public contact and a much lower rate of adversarial public contact than motorized patrol offi-

cers. They spent more time on training, roll call, office and administrative time, and meetings with the public and much less time on complaints than their motorized counterparts.

Edmonton. A 1988 time budget study of foot and motorized constables in Edmonton, Alberta, provides an instructive counterpoint to the Flint study.⁴ Some findings were compatible with Flint's. Foot constables handled many fewer calls for service than motor officers. They spent much less time on the street and in family residences and more time in schools and police offices. They also spent much less time with complainants and victims and more time with other constables, professionals, business people, and the general citizenry. This may be because they were oriented to solving rather than only responding to problems.

Some Edmonton findings were different from Flint's. Foot constables were more likely than motor constables to have contact with white-collar workers. This runs counter to the speculation of the Flint researchers that foot patrol was more "egalitarian." It may also help explain why foot patrol appears to be far more effective at changing citizens' feelings about their safety and about police service than in actually changing their risks of being victimized. If a larger proportion of foot patrol contacts are at the officer's discretion, the officer will

A Community Police Officer's Day

In addition to traditional law enforcement activities, such as patrol and responding to calls for service, the day might include:

- ◆ Operating neighborhood substations.
- ◆ Meeting with community groups.
- ◆ Analyzing and solving neighborhood problems.
- ◆ Working with citizens on crime prevention programs.
- ◆ Conducting door-to-door surveys of residents.
- ◆ Talking with students in school.
- ◆ Meeting with local merchants.
- ◆ Making security checks of businesses.
- ◆ Dealing with disorderly people.

“How much time officers devote to problem-solving, how they do it, with whom, and for whom all remain to be determined.”

seek out people of higher social and economic status in the community—or at least those people likely to offer a pleasant interchange. Stated another way, given more personal freedom to choose, police officers on foot will spend less time with troublemakers. This situation may make potential victims contacted by the police *feel* safer without actually *being* safer.

Oakland. A final NIJ-sponsored foot patrol study was conducted in Oakland, California.⁵ As part of a field study of Oakland's efforts to improve policing in its central district, foot officers were observed and interviewed, and 2-week activity statistics were obtained. Oakland's interviews and observations provide a somewhat different dimension than the other studies, which were based solely on activity statistics.

The Oakland observers noted great diversity in the tactics foot officers employed: keeping drunks moving, rounding up truants, checking buses for fare cheaters and disorderly persons, tailing people who harass others, chasing disorderly people out of the area (in lieu of arrest), surveilling prostitutes, and having abandoned autos disposed of. Sometimes a foot officer restored order to a troubled corner merely by standing there, making his or her presence felt. Although foot officers did respond to assigned calls, their activities were predominantly self-selected. The distinctly different *impression* one gets from these

observations is that Oakland foot officers, unlike Edmonton constables, used their discretion to concentrate their attentions on the “troublemakers” of their beat.

Beyond foot patrol

Of course, foot patrol is only one of many ways police departments can strengthen their links with the community. Others include permanent beat assignments, door-to-door surveys of residents and businesses, park-and-walk patrol, neighborhood substations, and police involvement with citizen groups in crime prevention, problem-solving, and policy guidance. As with foot patrol, there has been little systematic monitoring of how these strategies have been put into effect.

Yet the need for such monitoring and evaluation is particularly strong where problem-oriented policing strategies are undertaken. How much time officers devote to problem-solving, how they do it, with whom, and for whom all remain to be determined.

NIJ to use direct observation in upcoming study

NIJ's upcoming research study will use direct observation techniques to get answers to these questions. An observational study of the impact of community policing at the street

level will build on already developed field observation methods.⁶ Such methods have provided many insights into what police do and why. For instance, one systematic observation in England⁷ suggests that officers with community policing responsibilities deal with incidents differently from other officers.

Accompanying officers for 8-hour shifts, the British researchers observed more than 1,200 police encounters with the public. From a statistical analysis of a subset of these encounters, they found that “community constables” dealt with incidents differently from traditionally oriented constables. They were less inclined to seek legalistic solutions in disputes and more likely to serve as impartial referees. They defined their success in terms of what the citizens wanted and tried to establish sustained relationships with members of the public.

NIJ's study will adopt a similar observational methodology to obtain detailed data on the cognitive aspects of police work—those aspects that distinguish good and bad policing. They will observe officers in the course of their work, and debrief them shortly thereafter, to learn what decisions they make and why.

For example, if greater familiarity with the residents and regulars of an officer's beat is a product of community policing, then that should be reflected in the things an officer weighs in deciding how to deal with

What Foot Patrol Studies Show

Although foot patrol studies have offered some insight into what police do when they do community policing, they have many limitations. First, nearly all rely on officers' own reports of their activities, which suffer from the usual problems of diligence in recording and reaction to being monitored. Problems with data reliability were acknowledged by the Flint researchers and suggested as a consideration in Oakland.

Second, department records leave out a great deal that would be useful to know about police activity. The records are brief (but hypothetically important) on order-maintenance time, confrontations with the "move-along" and inquiries into suspicious situations. And even events that are officially recorded are seldom described in sufficient detail to know the context of the situation, what police actions were taken (aside from arrest), and in what manner.

Third, with few exceptions, department records provide virtually no insight into the decisionmaking that produced a given police response. If, as its advocates suggest, foot patrol really does alter what officers know about the public

they serve, and if it changes their beliefs about the means and ends of police work, these changes should be reflected in what information is obtained in public encounters, how it is analyzed, and how it is applied. For example:

- ◆ Does foot patrol expand the range of police familiarity with citizens in the assigned beat, or does it limit it to particular segments of the population?

- ◆ Do encounters with citizens generate information for the police regarding crimes and other incidents in the beat?
- ◆ Do citizens' personal characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, influence the patrol officer's decisions?

- ◆ How does a patrol officer's increased knowledge of a citizen's reputation affect the officer's interpretation of the citizen's actions?

- ◆ Are the complainant's wishes given greater weight under foot patrol?

- ◆ Are officers more or less likely to use force or tactics to control disorderly conduct situations?

problems during encounters. If officers are in fact assuming a problem-oriented perspective, their decisionmaking should draw on a broad range of concerns extending beyond the immediate circumstances of the situation.

That is, problem-oriented officers would presumably be more inclined

to see how the situation fitted into larger patterns of similar situations. Officers would consider a broader range of alternative responses, would be interested in following up on their chosen responses to see how well they worked, and would incorporate that knowledge into subsequent decisions in similar situations.

Single study site

The NIJ study will focus on a single municipal police department, one that for at least a year will have been engaged in two aspects of community policing—community outreach and problem-solving. The department will have taken a "generalist" approach to community policing rather than focusing on a small specialist unit. Patrol officers will be observed throughout the city for approximately 100 full work shifts. In addition, ridealong observations of patrol supervisors will be conducted for approximately 10 full shifts.

This study will differ from previous observational studies in two major ways. First, in addition to officer encounters with the public, all other police "activities" will be noted as well. This includes roll call, time enroute to dispatched assignments, general patrol, traffic patrol, crime-focused strategies, information gathering, meetings with the public and other government officials, administrative matters, and personal business.

Notes will be made about which of these activities involve problem-oriented policing. Thus, between "activities" and "encounters," all of the observed patrol officer's work time on a given shift will be accounted for.

The second departure from most previous studies is the systematic

Under community policing, the work of the street-level officer approaches that of the researcher and planner.

debriefing of observed officers about their decisionmaking in the observed encounters. This will take place soon after the encounters, usually when the officers begin to complete paperwork on the encounter or resume general patrol. The observers will ask the officers to describe what they were thinking as the encounter unfolded and what things affected their decisions about what to do. While in the field, observers will take only brief field notes. But within 12 hours of the completion of a ridealong session, the observers will record their observations through a systematic process designed to capture all key information.

Conclusion

Effecting change is not easy. Police have long valued decisiveness in handling encounters with the public, even when they had sparse information to act on. But now they must be able to make more systematic inquiries into problems. Under community policing, the work of the street-level officer approaches that of the researcher and planner. Giving officers greater leeway to identify and analyze problems, implement solutions, and evaluate these efforts means that differences in work style among officers are likely to increase.

Reshaping the way America is policed is particularly challenging if we review the history of police

reform in America. Ideas that look promising on paper may turn out to be quite different when implemented on the beat. It is not too early to pay close attention to what community policing looks like when viewed at the street level—where policing is actually done.

This case study of one police department will take a preliminary step in that direction. It will give police leaders, researchers, and policymakers a better idea of what this reform means to the everyday work of police.

Notes


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Stephen D. Mastrofski is a Visiting Fellow at the National Institute of Justice, on leave from his duties as Associate Professor of Administration of Justice, Pennsylvania State University. His research has focused on police, organizational change, and drunk driving enforcement.



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Crime and Policing

By Mark H. Moore, Robert C. Trojanowicz, and George L. Kelling

The core mission of the police is to control crime. No one disputes this. Indeed, professional crime fighting enjoys wide public support as the basic strategy of policing precisely because it embodies a deep commitment to this objective. In contrast, other proposed strategies such as problem-solving or community policing appear on the surface to blur this focus.¹ If these strategies were to leave the community more vulnerable to criminal victimization, they would be undesirable alternatives. In judging the value of alternative police strategies in controlling crime, however, one should not be misled by rhetoric or mere expressed commitment to the goal; one must keep one's eye on demonstrated effectiveness in achieving the goal.

Professional crime-fighting now relies predominantly on three tactics: (1) motorized patrol; (2) rapid response to calls for service; and (3) retrospective investigation of crimes.² Over the past few decades, police responsiveness has been enhanced by connecting police to citizens by telephones, radios, and cars, and by matching police officer schedules and locations to anticipated calls for service.³ The police focus on serious crime has also been sharpened by screening calls for service, targeting patrol, and developing forensic technology (e.g., automated fingerprint systems, computerized criminal record files, etc.).⁴

Although these tactics have scored their successes, they have been criticized within and outside policing for being reactive rather than proactive. They have also been criticized for failing to prevent crime.⁵

Reactive tactics have some virtues, of course. The police go where crimes have occurred and when citizens have summoned them; otherwise, they do not intrude. The police keep their distance from the community, and thereby retain their impartiality. They do not develop the sorts of relationships with citizens that could bias their responses to crime incidents. These are virtues insofar as they protect citizens from an overly intrusive, too familiar police.

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.

James K. Stewart
Director
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice

Mark H. Moore
Faculty Chairman
Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

Moreover, the reactive tactics do have preventive effects—at least in theory. The prospect of the police arriving at a crime in progress as a result of a call or a chance observation is thought to deter crimes.⁶ The successful prosecution of offenders (made possible by retrospective investigation) is also thought to deter offenders.⁷ And even if it does not deter, a successfully prosecuted investigation incapacitates criminals who might otherwise go on to commit other crimes.⁸

66 Reactive tactics do have preventive effects — at least in theory . . . 99

Finally, many police forces have developed proactive tactics to deal with crime problems that could not be handled through conventional reactive methods. In drug dealing, organized crime, and vice enforcement, for example, where no immediate victims exist to mobilize the police, the police have developed special units which rely on informants, covert surveillance, and undercover investigations rather than responses to calls for service.⁹ In the area of juvenile offenses where society's stake in preventing crimes seems particularly great, the police have created athletic leagues, formed partnerships with schools to deal with drug abuse and truancy, and so on.¹⁰ It is not strictly accurate, then, to characterize modern policing as entirely reactive.

Still, the criticism of the police as being too reactive has some force. It is possible that the police could do more to control serious crime than they now achieve. Perhaps research will yield technological breakthroughs that will dramatically improve the productivity of police investigation. For now, however, the greatest potential for improved crime control may not lie in the continued enhancement of response times, patrol tactics, and investigative techniques. Rather, improved crime control can be achieved by (1) diagnosing and managing problems in the community that produce serious crimes; (2) fostering closer relations with the community to facilitate crime solving; and (3) building self-defense capabilities within the community itself. Among the results may be increased apprehension of criminals. To the extent that problem-solving or community strategies of policing direct attention to and prepare the police to exploit local knowledge and capacity to control crime, they will be useful to the future of policing. To explore these possibilities, this paper examines what is known about serious crime: what it is, where and how it occurs, and natural points of intervention. Current and proposed police tactics are then examined in light of what is known about their effectiveness in fighting serious crime.

Serious crime

To individual citizens, a serious crime is an offense that happened to *them*. That is why police departments throughout the country are burdened with calls requesting responses to offenses that the police regard as minor. While there are

reasons to take such calls seriously, there is also the social and administrative necessity to weigh the relative gravity of the offenses. Otherwise, there is no principle for apportioning society's indignation and determination to punish; nor is there any basis for rationing police responses. The concept of serious crime, then, is necessarily a *social* judgment—not an individual one. Moreover, it is a *value* judgment—not simply a technical issue. The question of what constitutes serious crime is resolved formally by the criminal code. But the criminal code often fails to give precise guidance to police administrators who must decide which crimes to emphasize. They need some concept that distinguishes the offenses that properly outrage the citizenry and require extended police attention from the many lesser offenses that pose less urgent threats to society.

Like many things that require social value judgments, the issue of what constitutes serious crime is badly neglected.¹¹ Rather than face a confusing public debate, society relies on convention, or administrative expertise, or some combination of the two, to set standards. Yet, if we are to assess and improve police practice in dealing with serious crime, it is necessary to devote some thought to the question of what constitutes serious crime.

66 To individual citizens, a serious crime is an offense that happened to them. That is why police departments . . . are burdened with calls requesting responses to offenses that the police regard as minor. 99

Defining serious crime

The usual view of serious crime emphasizes three characteristics of offenses. The most important is physical violence or violation. Death, bloody wounds, crippling injuries, even cuts and bruises increase the severity of a crime.¹² Sexual violation also has a special urgency.¹³ Crime victims often suffer property losses as well as pain and violation. Economic losses count in reckoning the seriousness of an offense. Still, society generally considers physical attacks—sexual and nonsexual—as far more serious than attacks on property.¹⁴

A second feature of serious crime concerns the size of the victim's losses. A robbery resulting in a murder or a permanent, disfiguring injury is considered worse than one that produces only cuts, bruises, and fears. An armored car heist netting millions is considered more serious than a purse-snatching yielding the price of a junkie's next fix.

Third, the perceived seriousness of an offense is influenced by the relationship between offenders and victims. Commonly, crimes against strangers are viewed as more serious than crimes committed in the context of ongoing relationships.¹⁵ The reason is partly that the threat to society from indiscriminate predators is more far-reaching than the threat

from offenders who limit their targets to spouses, lovers, and friends. Moreover, society judges the evil intent of the offender to be more evident in crimes against strangers. In these crimes, there are no chronic grievances or provocations in the background to raise the issue of who attacked whom first and in what way. The crime is an out-and-out attack, not a mere dispute.¹⁶

These characteristics—violence, significant losses to victims, predatory strangers—capture much of what is important to societal and police images of serious crime. The intuitive appeal of these criteria is reflected in the categories of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. Murder, rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and auto theft (most presumably committed by strangers) are prominently reported as Part I Offenses. This key, national account of crime not only reflects, but anchors society's view of serious crime as predatory street crime.

“ Society judges the evil intent of the offender to be more evident in crimes against strangers. ”

While this notion has the sanction of intuitive appeal, convention, and measurement, it also contains subtle biases which, once pointed out, might cause society and the police to adjust their traditional views. First, the accepted image of crime seems to downplay the importance of crime committed in the context of ongoing relationships. From the perspective of the general citizenry, such offenses seem less important because they do not pose a *general* threat to society. From the perspective of the police (and other criminal justice officials), such crimes are less clear-cut because the existence of the prior relationship muddies the distinction between offender and victim and increases the likelihood that a case will be dropped when the antagonists resolve the dispute that produced the offense.

From the victim's point of view, however, the fact of a relationship to the offender dramatically intensifies the seriousness of the offense. A special terror arises when one is locked into an abusive relationship with a spouse or lover. A date that turns into a rape poisons a victim's psyche much more than an attack by a stranger. And, as Boston Police Commissioner Mickey Roache found when he was heading a unit dealing with interracial violence in Boston, serious interracial intimidation and violence did not appear in crime reports as robberies or burglaries. Rather, the serious crimes appeared as vandalism. What made the vandalism terrifying was that it was directed at the same address night after night.

Second, the view of serious crime as predatory violence tends to obscure the importance of fear as a separate, pernicious aspect of the crime problem. To a degree, the issue of fear is incorporated in the conventional view of serious crime. Indeed, fear is what elevates predatory street crimes above crimes that occur within personal relationships. What the conventional view misses, however, is the empiri-

cal fact that minor offenses and incivilities trigger citizens' fears more than actual crime victimization. Rowdy youth, abandoned cars, and graffiti frighten people, force them to restrict their movements, and motivate them to buy guns, locks and dogs. To the extent that the conventional view of serious crime deflects attention from fear and the offenses that stimulate fear, it may obscure an important opportunity for the police to contribute to the solution of the serious crime problem.

Third, defining serious crime in terms of the absolute magnitude of material losses to victims (without reference to the victim's capacity to absorb the loss, or the implications of the losses for people other than the victim) introduces the potential for injustice and ineffectiveness in targeting police attention. In the conventional view, a jewel theft at a swank hotel attracts more attention than the mugging of an elderly woman for her Social Security check. Yet it is clear that the stolen Social Security check represents a larger portion of the elderly woman's wealth than the losses to the hotel's well-insured customers. The robbery of a federally insured bank would attract more attention than the robbery of an inner-city convenience store. But the robbery of the ghetto store could end the entrepreneurial career of the owner, drive the store from the area, and, with the store's departure, deprive the neighborhood of one of its few social underpinnings.

Fourth, to the extent that the conventional view of crime emphasizes the reality of individual criminal victimization, it underplays crimes that have symbolic significance. The current emphasis on child sexual abuse, for example, is important in part because it sustains a broad social commitment to the general care and protection of children. The current emphasis on domestic assault, among other things, helps to sustain a normative movement that is changing the status of women in marriages. The interest in white-collar economic crimes and political corruption can be explained by the desire to set higher standards for the conduct of those in powerful positions. The social response to these offenses is important because it strengthens, or redefines, broad social norms.

“ The view of crime as predatory . . . misses the terror of the abused spouse or molested child, the wide social consequences of driving merchants out of business, the rot that drug dealing brings . . . , and the polarizing effects of fear. ”

In sum, the view of crime as predatory, economically significant violence stresses the substantial losses associated with street offenses. It obscures the losses to society that result from offenses that poison relationships, transform neighborhoods into isolated camps, and undermine important social institutions. It misses the terror of the abused spouse or

molested child, the wide social consequences of driving merchants out of business, the rot that drug dealing brings to an urban community, and the polarizing effects of fear. An alternative view of serious crime would be one that acknowledged violence as a key component of serious crime but added the issues of safety within relationships, the importance of fear, and the extent to which offenses collapse individual lives and social institutions as well as inflict individual losses. This enlarged conception rests on the assumption that the police can and should defend more social terrain than the streets. Their challenge is to preserve justice and order within the institutions of the community.

Levels, trends, and social location of serious crime

It is no simple matter to represent the current levels, recent trends, and social location of serious crime. Still, several important observations can be made.

First, in any year, a noticeable fraction of American households is touched by serious crime. In 1986, 5 percent of American households experienced the violence associated with a rape, robbery, or assault. Almost 8 percent of households were touched by at least one serious crime: rape, robbery, aggravated assault, or burglary.¹⁷ When considering the likelihood that a household will be victimized sometime in the next 5 years, these figures increase dramatically, for a household faces these risks *each year*. Thus, most American households have first- or second-hand experience with serious crime.

Second, from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's, the United States experienced a dramatic increase in the level of serious crime. In fact, the level of serious crime reached historic highs. Since the mid-seventies, the level of serious crime has remained approximately constant, or declined slightly.¹⁸

“Criminal victimization is disproportionately concentrated among minority and poor populations in the United States.”

Third, criminal victimization is disproportionately concentrated among minority and poor populations in the United States. Homicide is the leading cause of death for young minority males living in metropolitan areas.¹⁹ Black households are victimized by violent crimes such as robbery, rape, and aggravated assault at one and a half times the frequency of white families. The poor are victimized at one and a half times the rate of the wealthy.²⁰ These numbers probably underestimate the real differences in the losses—material and psychological—experienced by rich and poor victims, since those who are black and poor have fewer resources to deal with the losses associated with victimization.

Precipitating causes of serious crime

In searching for ways to prevent or control serious crime, the police look for precipitating causes. While it may be useful to examine what some call the root causes of crime (e.g., social injustice, unequal economic opportunity, poor schooling, weak family structures, or mental illness), such things are relatively unimportant from a police perspective since the police exercise little influence over them.²¹ The police operate on the surface of social life. They must handle incidents, situations, and people as they are now—not societies or people as they might have been. For these reasons, the immediately precipitating causes of serious crime are far more important to the police than are broader questions about the root causes of crime. Four precipitating causes of crime seem relevant to policing: (1) dangerous people; (2) criminogenic situations; (3) alcohol and drug use; and (4) frustrating relationships.

“The police . . . must handle incidents, situations, and people as they are now — not societies or people as they might have been.”

One way the police view serious crime is to see the precipitating cause in the character of the offender. A crime occurs when a predatory offender finds a victim. One could reduce such events by teaching potential victims to avoid situations and behaviors that make them vulnerable. And, to some degree, the police do this. But the far more common and attractive path for controlling predatory crime is to identify and apprehend the predators. Thus, dangerous offenders can be seen as a precipitating cause of serious crime and an important focus of police attention.²²

Recent research on criminal careers provides a firm empirical basis for this view.²³ Interviews with convicted criminals conducted by the Rand Corporation indicate that some criminal offenders committed crimes very frequently and sustained this activity over a long career.²⁴ Moreover, these violent predators accounted for a substantial amount of the serious crime.²⁵ Now, an investigation of the root causes of such patterns of offending might disclose strong influences of social disadvantage and psychological maltreatment in shaping the personalities of such offenders. Moreover, the influence of these factors might reasonably mitigate their guilt. One might also hold out some hope for their future rehabilitation (through the natural process of aging if nothing else). So, the criminal proclivities of violent predators need not be viewed as either inevitable or unchangeable. From the vantage point of the police, however, the presence of such offenders in the community can reasonably be viewed as an important precipitating cause of crime. Controlling such offenders through incapacitation or close surveillance thus becomes an important crime control strategy.

Having noted the role of dangerous offenders in producing serious crime, it is worth emphasizing that such offenders

account for only a portion of the total amount of serious crime—far more than their share, but still only about half of all serious crime.²⁶ The necessary conclusion is that a significant portion of the serious crime problem cannot be attributed to determined attacks by career criminals or to predatory offenders. These crimes arise from quite different causes.

Some of these crimes might be produced by situational effects. Darkness and congestion around a subway exit may create an attractive location for muggings. An after-hours bar may host more than its share of fights. A rock house from which crack is being sold may become a magnet for violence. Closing time in a popular disco may produce fights among teenagers leaving the scene. In sum, there are some places, times, and activities that bring people together in ways that increase the likelihood of serious crime.

The fact that this occurs is knowable to police. By analyzing calls for service, they can observe that there are repeated calls made from certain places and at certain times.²⁷ These "hot spots" become important targets of police attention.²⁸ For example, patrol units might be dispatched just to sit and observe at the appropriate times. There may also be other solutions including permanent changes in the criminogenic situations. For example, the subway area could be lighted; the attention of a neighborhood watch group could be directed to the troublespot; the after-hours bar could be put out of business; aggressive street-level enforcement could be directed against the rock house; or transportation could be arranged for the kids leaving the disco so the crowd thins out more quickly.²⁹

Crimes are also significantly related to alcohol or drug abuse.³⁰ It is now quite clear that: (1) a surprisingly high percentage of those arrested for serious crimes are drug or alcohol users;³¹ (2) many offenders have drunk alcohol or taken drugs prior to committing crimes;³² and (3) victims as well as offenders are often intoxicated or under the influence of drugs.³³ What is unclear is exactly how alcohol and drugs produce their criminogenic effect. Four hypotheses have been advanced to explain this phenomenon.³⁴

66 Intoxicated people make particularly good victims. 99

The first is that physiological effects stimulate or license the person to commit crimes. The theory of stimulation may be appropriate to methamphetamines or PCP, which sometimes seem to produce violent reactions among consumers. The theory of licensing or disinhibition seems more appropriate in the case of alcohol where the release of inhibitions is arguably the mechanism that permits offenses to occur.³⁵

Second, dependence or addiction forces users to spend more money on purchasing drugs, and they turn to crime in a desperate effort to maintain their habits. This is a powerful

theory in the case of heroin (under conditions of prohibition), and perhaps for cocaine. It is far less powerful for alcohol or marijuana.

Third, drug use gradually demoralizes people by putting them on the wrong side of the law, bringing them into contact with criminals, and gradually weakening their commitment to the obligations of a civil society. Again, this seems more appropriate for those who become deeply involved with drugs and alcohol over a long period of time, and therefore relies more on the dependence-producing attributes of drugs rather than on the immediate intoxicating effects.

Fourth, intoxicated people make particularly good victims. In some cases, intoxication makes people vulnerable to victimization.³⁶ In other cases, it causes victims to provoke their attackers.³⁷ In either case, a serious crime can result.

Whichever theory, or theories, is correct, the close association among drugs, alcohol, and serious crime suggests that the amount of serious crime might be decreased by reducing levels of alcohol and drug use, or by identifying those offenders who use drugs intensively and reducing their consumption.³⁸

66 Many serious crimes — including murders, robberies, rapes, and burglaries — are disputes and grievances among people rather than criminal attacks. 99

Finally, the fact that many serious offenses occur in the context of ongoing relationships suggests that some relationships may be criminogenic. Relationships can cause crime because they create expectations. If the expectations are not met, the resulting disappointment produces anger. Anger may lead to vengeance and retaliation. In such cycles, the question of who caused the ultimate crime becomes confused. Usually, the offender is the one least damaged after the fight. A court may conclude that the crime stemmed from the evil intentions of the person identified as the offender. But this may not be the best way to view the problem from the vantage point of crime control or crime prevention.

It might be more suitable to see the crimes as emerging from a set of relationships that are frustrating and provocative. The proper response might be to work on the relationship through mediation, restructuring, or dissolution. Indeed, this is often the challenge confronting the police when they encounter spouse abuse, child abuse, and other sorts of intrafamily violence. In such situations, arrests may be appropriate and effective in deterring future crime and in restructuring the relationship.³⁹ There are many other crimes which emerge from less obvious relationships: the personal relationships of

neighbors and friends; the economic relations of landlord and tenant or employer and employee; or transient relations that last just long enough to provoke a quarrel or seed a grudge. Seen this way, many serious crimes—including murders, robberies, rapes, and burglaries—are disputes and grievances among people rather than criminal attacks.

Controlling serious crime

Currently the police fight serious crime by developing a capacity to intercept it—to be in the right place at the right time so that the crime is thwarted, or to arrive so quickly after the fact that the offender is caught. Reactive crime fighting is intuitively appealing to both the police and those to whom the police are accountable. It is unclear, however, whether the reactive response really works. Over the last two decades, confidence in the reactive approach has been eroded by the accumulation of empirical evidence suggesting that these tactics are of only limited effectiveness. It is not that the approach fails to control crime. (It would be foolish to imagine that levels of serious crime would stay the same if police patrols and investigations were halted.) Rather, the limits of the reactive strategy are now becoming apparent. Further gains in police effectiveness in dealing with serious crime must come from different approaches. Key research findings suggesting the limitations of the reactive approach are these.

First, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Study found that levels of serious crime were not significantly influenced by doubling the number of cars patrolling the streets.⁴⁰ This cast doubt on the potential for reducing serious crime simply by increasing the level of preventive patrol.

Second, a study of the effectiveness of rapid response to calls for service (also in Kansas City) found that the probability of making an arrest for most serious crimes was unaffected by the speed with which the police responded. The crucial factor was not the speed of the police response, but the speed with which citizens raised the alarm. If citizens did not notice the crime, or did not call the police quickly, no amount of speed in the police response helped much.⁴¹

“If citizens did not notice the crime, or did not call the police quickly, no amount of speed in the police response helped much.”

Third, studies of the investigative process revealed that the key factor in determining whether a crime was solved was the quality of the information contributed to the investigation by victims and witnesses about the identity of the offender.⁴² If they could not be helpful, forensic wizardry generally was not up to solving the crime.

It is important to understand that these weaknesses appeared in precisely those areas of crime control where the reactive strategy should have been particularly strong: i.e., in dealing with crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, and burglary. These crimes could be expected to produce alarms; they also were interceptable and solvable by a vigilant police force waiting to be mobilized by outraged citizens.

There are, of course, many other kinds of serious crimes for which the reactive police strategy is much more obviously inappropriate.⁴³ It cannot, for example, deal with consensual crimes such as drug dealing behind closed doors. Nor can it deal with crimes such as extortion and loan sharking where the victims are too afraid to report the crimes. A reactive strategy cannot deal with sophisticated white collar crimes or political corruption where the losses associated with the crimes are so widely distributed that people do not notice that they have been victimized. Finally, a reactive strategy cannot deal even with traditional street crimes in those parts of cities where confidence in the police has eroded to such a degree that the citizens no longer call when they are victimized.

“Confronted by high levels of crime and limited budgets, the police felt a growing need for initiative and thoughtfulness in tackling serious crime.”

Although these findings and intrinsic limitations of the reactive strategy have not unseated the intuitive appeal of and wide experience with the reactive crime fighting strategy, they have added to a growing sense of frustration within police departments. Confronted by high levels of crime and limited budgets, the police felt a growing need for initiative and thoughtfulness in tackling serious crime. Working within the logic of their current approaches, but reaching for additional degrees of effectiveness, during the 1970's the police developed new proactive tactics.

Developments in proactive crime fighting

To deal with serious street crime, the police developed the tactic of directed patrol. Sometimes these patrols were aimed at locations that seemed particularly vulnerable to crimes, such as branch banks, convenience stores, and crowded bars. Other times, the patrols were focused on individuals who, on the basis of past record or recent information, were thought to be particularly active offenders.⁴⁴

The police sought to attack street robberies and muggings through anticrime squads that sent decoys into the streets to prompt active muggers into committing a crime in the full view of the police. The police also sought to control home robberies and burglaries through sting operations involving undercover officers who operate as fences to identify and gather evidence against the offenders.

Finally, the police sought to enhance the effective impact of their enforcement efforts by increasing the quality of the cases they made. Quality Investigation Programs⁴⁵ and Integrated Criminal Apprehension Programs⁴⁶ were adopted by many departments to increase the likelihood that arrests would be followed by convictions and long prison sentences.

For the most part, each of these innovations produced its successes. The perpetrator-oriented patrols, sting operations, and quality investigation efforts were a little more successful than the location-oriented directed patrols and the undercover operations directed against street robbery. Nonetheless, the police did demonstrate that concentrated efforts could increase arrests, clearances, and convictions. These efforts did not show that these programs alone—without the support of courts and corrections and the involvement of the community—could reduce aggregate levels of serious crime in the cities in which they were tried.

Moreover, insofar as each program took a more aggressive and proactive approach to crime, it also troubled those who were concerned that the police not become too intrusive. Perpetrator-oriented patrols, for example, raised the question of whether it was appropriate to target offenders rather than offenses, and if so, on what evidentiary basis.⁴⁷ The use of undercover tactics to deal with both robbery and burglary raised important questions about entrapment.⁴⁸ And the emphasis on producing convictions from arrests prompted worries that the police might be motivated to manufacture as well as simply record and preserve evidence. Arguably, these civil liberties concerns were inappropriate at a time when the police seemed unable to deal with high crime rates. The fact that these concerns arose, however, indicated that the police were, in fact, using their authority more intensively than they had when they were relying principally on reactive strategies. Such concerns must be reckoned a cost of the new efforts.

The police also made substantial investments in their ability to deal with those crimes that could not be handled through routine patrol or investigative operations, either because the crimes were too complicated to handle with ordinary arrest and investigative methods, or because the routine operations would not disclose the crime. In terms of dealing with especially demanding crimes, like hostage takings or well-armed offenders, the police developed Special Weapons and Arrest Teams. They also enhanced their capacities to deal with riots and demonstrations. And at the other end of the spectrum, the police developed special procedures for dealing with deranged and disordered offenders who often looked violent (and sometimes were) but mostly were simply mentally disturbed.

To deal with crimes that were not always revealed through the ordinary procedures of complaints by victims and witnesses, the police developed special units skilled in investigating the sensitive areas of child sexual abuse, rape, and domestic assault. They also created special investigative units to deal with high-level drug dealing, organized crime, arson, and sophisticated frauds. These units often relied on special intelligence files as well as special investigative

procedures, such as the recruitment of informants, electronic wiretaps, and sustained undercover investigations. These programs also scored their successes and enhanced the ability of the police to deal with serious crime.

Missed opportunities in crime fighting?

These innovations demonstrated the resourcefulness and creativity of the police as they faced the challenge of high crime rates with limited financial resources, diminished authority, and constrained managerial prerogatives. With the benefit of hindsight, however, some crucial oversights are apparent.

“Long before it was demonstrated that the success of rapid response . . . depended on the willingness of victims and witnesses to report crimes . . . , the police had mounted campaigns mobilizing citizens to support their local police.”

First, there was little appreciation of the crucial role that better information from the community could play in strengthening police performance.⁴⁹ It was not that the police were unaware of their dependency on citizens for information. Long before it was demonstrated that the success of rapid response to crime calls and retrospective investigation depended on the willingness of victims and witnesses to report crimes and aid in their solution, the police had mounted campaigns mobilizing citizens to support their local police.

The real problem was that the police did not adequately consider what was needed to attract that support. They thought that their interest and ready availability would be sufficient. They did not understand that citizens felt vulnerable to retaliation by offenders in the community and needed a closer connection with the police if they were going to help them solve the crime. Nor did the police understand that a partnership with the community could be constructed only from the material of daily encounters with the public; in particular, by taking seriously the public's concern with less serious offenses. In short, while the police knew that they were dependent on the community for information about crime, they never asked the public what was needed to obtain help beyond setting up 911 systems.

Second, the police rarely looked behind an offense to its precipitating causes. Nor did they think about crime prevention in terms of managing the precipitating causes. They knew, of course, that much crime was being produced by dangerous offenders, criminogenic situations, alcohol and drug abuse, and aggravating relationships. But they were

ambivalent about acting on that knowledge. They tended to limit their responsibilities to applying the law to incidents to which they were summoned; they did not think in terms of applying instruments of civil law or the capacities of other city agencies to work on the proximate causes of crime. Criminal investigations emphasized legal evidence of guilt or innocence—not the question of precipitating causes.

There were many reasons to maintain this narrow focus on law enforcement. To a degree, it protected police organizations from criticisms that they were lawless and out of control. The police could explain that they merely enforced the laws and that they exercised no discretion beyond this basic function. The narrow focus on law enforcement also protected the organization from failure in its basic crime control mission. If the police role was limited to applying the criminal law to offenses rather than to the more challenging goal of actually preventing and controlling crime, the police could succeed even if crime were not controlled. They could blame the other parts of the criminal justice system for their failures to deter and incapacitate the offenders whom the police had arrested. Finally, the narrow focus was consistent with the training and aspirations of the police themselves. Arresting people and using authority was real police work; mediating disputes, mobilizing communities, and badgering other city agencies for improved services was social work.

“Arresting people and using authority was real police work; mediating disputes, mobilizing communities, and badgering other city agencies for improved services was social work.”

Whatever the reasons, the police remained reluctant to develop the internal capabilities needed to make their anecdotal impressions of precipitating causes systematic and powerful. Crime analysis sections merely kept statistics or characterized the location of crime; they did not identify dangerous offenders or trouble spots and avoided examining the role of alcohol and drugs in the serious crime problem. Nor did they propose alternative methods for dealing with crime problems. From the perspective of the police, it was far better to stay at the surface of social life and respond to crimes as they occurred rather than to intervene more widely and actively to manage the immediate conditions that were producing crimes.

Third, the police never fully exploited the self-defense capacities of the community itself. They did offer advice to merchants and citizen groups about how they could protect themselves from criminal victimization. And they helped organize neighborhood watch groups. But the main efforts went into helping the communities become more effective operational auxiliaries to the police departments. Citizens were encouraged to mark their property not only because it helped the police solve the crime, should the item be stolen, but also because it allowed the police to return the property

to the owners. Crime watch groups were instructed to call the police rather than to intervene themselves. This was consistent with the desires of the police to maintain their monopoly on both expertise and operational capability in dealing with crime. They did not really want any growth in private security—whether it took the form of volunteer associations such as the Guardian Angels or commercial operations such as Burns Security Guards. Because of that interest, police commitment to building a community's self-defense capacities was always ambivalent. And, because they were ambivalent, the police did not think through the question of whether and how such efforts could actually help them control serious crime.

Problem-solving and community approaches to crime control

In the 1980's, police departments throughout the country have begun to explore the crime-fighting effectiveness of tactics that build on previous approaches, but seek to extend them by looking behind offenses to the precipitating causes of crimes, building closer relations with the community, and seeking to enhance the self-defense capacities of the communities themselves. These efforts are guided mostly by a theory of what might work and some illustrative examples. The theory is that the effectiveness of existing tactics can be enhanced if the police increase the quantity and quality of their contacts with citizens (both individuals and neighborhood groups), and include in their responses to crime problems thoughtful analyses of the precipitating causes of the offenses. The expectation is that this will both enhance the direct effectiveness of the police department and also enable the police department to leverage the resources of citizen groups and other public agencies to control crime.

Some examples, drawn from recent experiences, suggest the ways in which these new approaches can lead to enhanced crime control.

Enhanced police presence. From its inception, patrol has sought to prevent crime through the presence, or potential presence, of a conspicuous officer. Patrolling in cars is only one way to communicate police presence, however. Activities such as foot patrol, visiting citizens in their homes, and attending group meetings also increase the awareness of police to which all citizens respond—those intent on crime as well as those not. This presence both deters potential offenders from committing crimes and affords officers the opportunities to note criminal acts in progress.

Example: A youth walking down a street in a small business section of town sees an unlocked automobile with the key in the ignition. He is tempted to steal it. Glancing around, he notes a police officer a short distance away walking down the street. The youth decides not to enter the car for fear of being caught by the officer.

Example: An officer, through crime analysis, becomes aware of a pattern of burglaries in a neighborhood. Increasing her patrol in alleyways, she notes a youth attempting to enter the back window of a residence. She makes an arrest.

“In England . . . , when an anticrime unit is sent in to deal with a serious crime problem, as often as not it consists of foot patrol.”

Although the success of foot patrol tactics in controlling crime is counter-intuitive to those accustomed to patrol by automobile, confidence in this approach is common in England. There, when an anticrime unit is sent in to deal with a serious crime problem, as often as not it consists of foot patrol. The approach is successful because foot patrol officers have access to areas unavailable to officers in cars: walkways and areas between houses, for example. Unpublished work by Glenn Pierce suggests that some crimes, such as burglary, tend to be patterned within limited geographical and chronological space. If this is true, when combined with what is known about how burglars enter homes and businesses, properly targeted foot patrol might be the strongest potential anticrime tactic to deal with such crimes.

Better surveillance and deterrence of dangerous offenders. From the outset, police have sought to control crime through close surveillance of those who have committed crimes in the past. The problem has been to accurately identify those offenders. Police officers who work closely with a neighborhood are in a position to learn who behaves in criminal or delinquent ways within the community. By stationing themselves in particular locations, officers can surveil known troublemakers and forestall criminal behavior.

Example: Police investigation of a rash of robberies committed by juveniles involved house-to-house interviews of the neighborhood. In these interviews, photographs of suspects were shown to residents. While no information about the crimes was produced, the word rapidly spread through the neighborhood that the police were keeping close tabs on specific individuals. The robberies stopped without an arrest.

It is also legally and procedurally possible to consider assigning neighborhood police officers to the surveillance of probationers and parolees. Such surveillance would be more immediate and regular than that now provided by probation or parole officers. Aware that neighborhood police officers had easier access to information about their activities, people who were in the community on a conditional basis might be deterred from committing illegal acts.

Example: Paroled sexual offenders in a conservative state regularly move to a community known for its relatively open values. A plan is worked out between local police and the state correctional agency. Upon parole, all sexual offenders returning to this community are interviewed by the chief of patrol and the neighborhood officer policing the area in which the parolee is to live. An offender known for attacks on teenage girls returns to the community. Regular contacts between the officer and parolee are scheduled to enable the police officer to oversee the parolee's behavior while in the community. The police officer discovers that the parolee is

now working in the local fast food restaurant—a workplace which regularly hires teenage girls. The officer, in conjunction with the parole officer, requires that the parolee find a different job, one in which young girls are not always present.

Increased access to information. Community policing emphasizes the development of close communication between citizens and police. This communication helps police gather information for both *preventing* and *solving* crime.

Example: In an area frequented by many street people, a street person approaches a neighborhood police officer to inform him that a stranger from another neighborhood is attempting to recruit assistance to commit a street robbery. The street person describes the newcomer to the police officer. Shortly afterwards while patrolling, the officer notices a person on the street who matches the description. The officer approaches the person, questions him, tells him that he (the officer) is aware of what he is planning, and instructs him to leave the area.

“Use of information gathered by patrol officers is one of the most important ways in which police can improve their ability . . .”

Example: Shortly after leaving her church a woman is mugged on the street. She appears to be seriously injured as a result of being knocked to the ground. Police and medics are called. The neighborhood officer responds by foot. She is approached by several children and their parents. The children were playing in an open space in the public housing project across the street from the church and saw the youth mug the woman. They know the youth and where he lives. Accompanied by a neighborhood entourage, including the parents and children who identified the youth, the officer proceeds to the apartment and makes the arrest.

Familiarity with the social and physical characteristics of their beats also helps neighborhood police officers in understand linkages between various pieces of information gathered from their own observations and from other disparate sources.

Example: Parents have complained to a neighborhood police officer about an increase of drug availability in their neighborhood. Several parents have found drugs in their children's possession. In addition, the officer has noticed many youths congregating around an entrance to a second-story apartment over several stores. The officer contacts the drug unit and informs them of his suspicion that drugs are being sold to children from that apartment. The drug unit arranges an undercover “buy” and then “busts” the dealers.

Work by Pate,³⁰ Greenwood, Chaiken and Petersilia,³¹ Eck,³² and Skogan and Antunes³³ suggests that use of information

gathered by patrol officers is one of the most important ways in which police can improve their ability to apprehend offenders. In 1982, Baltimore County, Maryland initiated a Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement unit (COPE), designed to bring the police into closer contact with the citizens and reduce their fears. A 1985 study showed that not only had COPE reduced fear, but also it had apparently produced a 12 percent reduction in the level of reported crime.⁵⁴

Early intervention to prevent the escalation of disorder into crime. In a widely read article, Kelling and Wilson argue that there is an important causal link between minor instances of disorder and the occurrence of serious crime.⁵⁵ Disorderly behavior—youths congregating, drunks lying down, prostitutes aggressively soliciting—left untended, can escalate into serious crime. The implication is that intervention by police to stop uncivil behavior keeps it from escalating.

“An important part of community policing is providing anticrime consultation to citizens, businesses, and other community institutions.”

Example: Youths panhandle in a subway station. Citizens give money both out of charitable motives and because they are fearful. Youths, emboldened by citizen fear, intimidate and, finally, threaten and mug subway users. Intervention by police to end panhandling by youths reduces threatening and mugging of citizens.

Although this argument has intuitive appeal, little direct empirical evidence exists about exploiting its anticrime potential.

Crime prevention activities. An important part of community policing is providing anticrime consultation to citizens, businesses, and other community institutions. The recommendations range from home target hardening (locks, strengthened doors, etc.) to street and building design.

Example: Residents of a neighborhood have been troubled by daytime burglaries. In addition to planning a police response, police consult with homeowners about ways in which they can make their homes more secure from burglars. Suggestions include moving shrubs away from doorways, strengthening locks, securing windows, and taking other burglary prevention precautions.

A 1973 evaluation of Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program, which used this approach, found a significant reduction in burglaries.⁵⁶

Shoring up community institutions. Institutions of neighborhood social control include families, churches, schools, local businesses, and neighborhood and community organizations.

In many communities, the corrosive effects of social disorganization have seriously weakened such organizations. Police, working with such institutions and organizations, can reinforce their normative strength in a community.

Example: Drug dealing is a serious problem in an inner-city neighborhood. Drug dealers not only have dealt drugs freely, but also have intimidated residents to the extent that they are afraid to complain to police. A local church decides that the problem is so serious that an organized effort must be made to attack the problem. Church officials contact the police and ask them to work closely with the neighborhood group. Citizens demonstrate against drug dealing, getting both police protection and great publicity. Citywide and local political leaders, as well as other public and private agencies, become concerned about the problem and develop a concerted effort to reduce drug dealing and intimidation. Sustained street-level enforcement ends drug dealing in that location.

Example: Using up-to-date technology, police are able to identify the patterns of a burglary ring which is moving through a neighborhood. Police contact the local neighborhood anticrime group and inform its members of the patterns so that they can be alert and watch their own and each others' homes.

Example: A woman who lives in public housing has been troubled by attempts of local gangs to recruit her youngest son. Up to now, his older brother has been able to protect him. Now, however, the older brother is going into the service. Approached by the mother, the neighborhood police officer now keeps an eye out for the youngster on the way to and from school as well as on the playground.

Example: A local school is plagued by dropouts who continually hang around the school intimidating both students and teachers. Crime has increased in and around the school. The principal decides to crack down on the problem. The neighborhood police officer becomes involved in the efforts. He teaches a course in youth and the law, increases his surveillance of the grounds, consults with the teachers about handling problems, and invokes other agencies to become involved with the youths who have dropped out of school.

Although promising, it is unclear what impact the strengthening of community institutions has on serious crime. It is an attractive idea, however.

Problem solving. Police have historically viewed calls for service and criminal events as individual incidents. Many such incidents are part of a chronic problem amenable to diagnosis and preventive intervention by either police or other agencies.

Example: Police and citizens note an increase in daytime burglaries in a particular neighborhood. This neighborhood has also been characterized by high rates of truancy. Suspecting that many burglaries are committed by truants, police, citizens, and school officials plan a carefully integrated anti-truancy campaign. Daytime burglaries drop.

Problem solving appears to be a promising approach to deter crime. When, in 1985, the Newport News Police Department turned to problem-oriented policing as an approach to dealing with crime, it was successful in dealing with three stubborn crime problems that had beset the community: a series of prostitution-related robberies; a rash of burglaries in a housing project; and larcenies from vehicles parked in downtown areas. In each case, the problem was solved not simply by solving the crimes and arresting offenders, nor by increasing levels of patrol (though both were done), but also by operating on the immediate conditions that were giving rise to the offenses.⁵⁷

“Police have historically viewed calls for service and criminal events as individual incidents. Many such incidents are part of a chronic problem amenable to diagnosis and preventive intervention . . .”

These ideas, examples, and results lend plausibility to the notion that problem-solving or community policing can enhance the crime control capabilities of professional crime fighting. They do not prove the case, however.

A strategic view of crime fighting

While police executives can produce increased levels of arrest and local reductions in crime through the creation of special programs, they are frustrated because they do not know how to produce reductions in citywide levels of crime. The main reason for this might be that their main force is not engaged in a serious crime-fighting effort even though it seems that it is. After all, it would be unreasonable to imagine that any single small program, typically engaging less than 5 percent of the force, could have much impact on aggregate levels of crime. The important question is what is the remaining 95 percent of the force doing? For the most part, the answer is that they are deployed in patrol cars, responding to calls for service and investigating crimes after they have occurred. These tactics have only limited effectiveness.

What remains unanswered is the consequence of shifting a whole department to a radically different style of policing. Moreover, the answer is hard to determine, since the period of transition would be quite awkward. In the short run, were officers taken from patrol and detective units to do problem-oriented or community policing, it is almost certain that response times would lengthen—at least until the problem-solving efforts reduced the demands for service by eliminating the precipitating problem that was producing the calls for service.⁵⁸ And even though an increase in response times does not necessarily indicate a real loss in crime-fighting effectiveness, it would be perceived as such because the public

and the police have learned to equate rapid response to crime calls with crime control effectiveness.

What is tempting, of course, is to avoid choosing among these strategies, and to adopt the strengths of these various approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. This would be reflected in decisions to establish special units to do problem-solving or community policing within existing organizations whose traditions and main forces remained committed to reactive patrol and retrospective investigation.

But it may not be this easy. Indeed, experience demonstrates that it is not. Previous initiatives with team policing or split-force policing succeeded in building capacities for both styles of policing within the same department, but tended to foster eventual competition and conflict.⁵⁹ The problem-solving and community policing aspects have usually eventually yielded to administrative demands to keep response times low, or to officers' desires to avoid the demanding engagement with the community. The reason seems to be partly a matter of resources—there has never been enough manpower to maximize performance in both domains at once. But it also seems to be a matter of administrative style and structure. Problem-solving and community policing both require a greater degree of decentralization than does the current policing strategy. They depend more on the initiative of the officers. And they reach out for a close rather than a distant relationship with the community. These are all quite different than the administrative emphases of the current strategy which prescribe centralization, control, and distance from the community.

“Problem-solving and community policing . . . reach out for a close rather than a distant relationship with the community.”

So while logic and evidence suggest the crime control potential of adding problem-solving and community policing to the concept of rapid response and retrospective investigation, it is hard to add these functions without increasing the resources and significantly changing the administrative style of a police organization. That is hard for a police chief to decide to do without convincing evidence that it would work. The only things that make such a move easy to contemplate are: (1) a deep sense that the current strategy and tactics have reached their limits; (2) the plausibility of the idea that increased effectiveness lies in working on proximate causes and mobilizing communities; and (3) the little bit of evidence we have that the alternative approach works. A few departments, such as Houston, Newport News, Baltimore County, and Philadelphia, have committed themselves to these alternative approaches. If they succeed over the next 3 to 5 years in reducing serious crime as well as in attracting citizen support, then the field will know that it has a better strategy of policing available than is now being used.

Notes

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Mark H. Moore is Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Professor of Criminal Justice Policy and Management and Faculty Chair, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Robert C. Trojanowicz is Director and Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. George L. Kelling is Professor of Criminal Justice at Northeastern University. Both are Research Fellows in the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Points of view or opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or of Harvard University.

The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates the activities of the following program Offices and Bureaus: National Institute of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and Office for Victims of Crime.

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The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met six times. During the 3-day meetings, the 30 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

ROBERT E. WILK

Policing a Chicago Enclave



The 15th District is a 'challenging urban environment.' That is, a bad neighborhood.

This is not a column about the potential U.S. involvement in policing ethnic enclaves in Bosnia.

CHICAGO

When Nature assembled, from a lot of good material, Leroy O'Shield, Nature had a policeman in mind. Thick-armed and barrel-chested, with close-cropped hair and a salt-and-pepper mustache, Commander O'Shield's visage expresses, in quick succession, stolid authority, intense curiosity and knowledge of life as it actually is lived. An African American, his demeanor is that of someone who has seen many discouraging things without becoming discouraged.

However, when, 26 years ago, O'Shield, who is now 50, decided to become a cop, he did not have anything like today's 15th Police District in mind. Located in Chicago's Far West Side, it is 90,000 people in 3.2 square miles of what sociologists call a "challenging urban environment," and the rest of us call a bad neighborhood. It is not the sort of place you would want to stroll at night or raise children any time, but many decent people must do the latter and would like to be able to do the former. O'Shield and his 242 officers want to help by using "community policing."

His recurring word is "proactive," the antonym of "reactive." It means police not controlled by 911 calls for help. Such calls are, in a sense, always too late—too late for preventative policing and the informal social controls that can prevent disorder. Police, says O'Shield, can be quite efficient at arresting criminals without reducing crime. This is because the drug epidemic has swamped the revolving-door criminal justice system—courts, prisons, probation. That system, he says tersely, is "no deterrent."

But what can prevent the crumbling of the thin, brittle crust of civilization when the culture itself is assaulting that crust? O'Shield says one of Chicago's most violent weekends followed the showing on national television of "Boyz N the Hood," the movie about Los Angeles gangs. There was a rash of drive-by shootings and some young men arrested for the shootings said they "just wanted to see what it was like." After the Los Angeles riots, California's Gov. Pete Wilson said "everybody in America" should see that movie because of its portrayal of a strong, caring father. O'Shield wishes he saw more such fathers in his District, where most young males come from homes without fathers, and most have been arrested for something before they are 21. But O'Shield calls the movie a "training film" for crime and says the message young men get from it

(and from others, such as "New Jack City") is "the mystique of being tough." O'Shield goes to such movies so he can know "what to expect" on the streets.

O'Shield and his officers would be forgiven for surrendering to fatalism and despair—for feeling that their task is to bail an ocean with thimbles. He notes that when he became a policeman, police and teachers were like parents—they were sources of authority. Drug abuse was aberrant and stigmatized behavior even in rough neighborhoods. Today, he says, police work must include—must begin by—working with all community groups to re-establish the "informal social controls" of community mores.

He has two master's degrees, in criminal justice and corrections. His conversation is salted with matter-of-fact and to-the-point references to scholarly works, citing authors and publication dates. He cites one study showing that young police officers' cynicism rises, on a scale of zero to 100, from zero to 60 in their first three years. He recommends community policing for police morale as well as community morale, because it gives officers the inspiring sense of taking the initiative.

It is not arcane. It is common sense adaptation to the fact that most crime is committed by a few people in a few places. So: Find out who and where they are. Have a police presence throughout the community establishing relationships with merchants in their stores, with the elderly on their stoops, with young people in gymnasiums.

White flight, black flight: Chicago's West Side has been called "Up South," so many residents came from Mississippi and Arkansas. In 25 years the area has suffered white flight and black flight. The white working class fled the black working class, which in turn fled the crime and drugs that came as the manufacturing jobs left for South Carolina, South Korea and south of the border. Social and physical disorder and fear of crime precede, and breed, crime. But disorder and fear can be driven back by bite-size efforts to bring people out of their homes into nonthreatening streets.

Even a dash of beauty can be a bulwark against the menacing sense of encroaching chaos. So community groups plant trees and flowers, and the city provides paint for covering graffiti. When the bureaucrats were slow to give permission for boarding up some abandoned buildings that had become drug markets, community groups bought plywood and notified the police that they were not waiting for permission, and the police looked the other way.

Today we seem to spend a lot of time proving with sophisticated research that Grandmother knew a thing or two. Such as: Eat your vegetables and an apple a day. And: Befriend a cop walking the beat. Community policing can be as elemental as shoe leather. Asked how many more officers he needs, O'Shield says words rarely uttered in government: "I have enough." Enough, that is, if the community becomes engaged; if noncoercive social measures regain control of the children and hence of the streets; if drug treatment becomes available on demand, and made mandatory for the people involved in the drug-related crime that is 90 percent of the 15th District's crime. O'Shield stresses that the gangs that run the drug business constitute highly organized crime: "They meet just as we do." But he and community activists are meeting not just to plan to catch dealers but to prevent people from becoming customers.

The embattled enclave that is the 15th District will eventually be much better because the community is energized by involvement with O'Shield's extraordinarily patient and determined officers. Of course, "eventually" might come a lot sooner to embattled ethnic enclaves throughout urban America if we did not also police Bosnian enclaves, but this column is not about that.

Leroy O'Shield, Commander
(312) 746-8300
for may want to call him

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4480 Chennault Beach Road

P.O. Box 178

Mukilteo, WA 98275

(206) 353-8222

FAX 348-1275

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Chief of Police

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DIRECTORS

Mike Erp
Washington State Institute for
Community Oriented Policing
Washington State University-Spokane
509/456-3275

Quint Thurman
Criminal Justice Program
Washington State University-Spokane
509/456-3275

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The Washington State Institute for Community Oriented Policing (WSIPCOP) is a non-profit organization that was established in 1971. It is a part of the Washington State University system. The WSIPCOP is a research and training organization that focuses on the study of crime and the criminal justice system. It is the largest school of study in the Pacific Northwest and today bestows degrees at the BA and MA levels, and offers the PhD in conjunction with Political Science. Currently, the graduate faculty consists of 16 professors with a broad range of research interests in police innovations, judicial processes and community corrections.

The Criminal Justice program at WSU continues to be the largest school of study in the Pacific Northwest and today bestows degrees at the BA and MA levels, and offers the PhD in conjunction with Political Science. Currently, the graduate faculty consists of 16 professors with a broad range of research interests in police innovations, judicial processes and community corrections.

The Criminal Justice graduate faculty include: Steven Burkett, Velmer Burton, Cornell Clayton, Louis Gray, Nella Lee, Nicholas Lovrich, Otwin Marenin, Lisa McIntyre, Walfred Peterson, Charles Sheldon, James Short, Mark Stafford, Steven Stehr, Brent Steele, Quint Thurman, and Charles Tittle.

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601 West First Avenue
Spokane, Washington 99204-0399
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MISSION:

- conduct **training** programs on community oriented policing to police officials and community members
- provide **technical** assistance to law enforcement agencies
- conduct **research** on implementation and effects of community oriented policing

GOALS:

- provide **services** to improve organizational effectiveness, leadership capabilities, and policy implementation skills for those involved
- provide **centralized information sharing and problem solving forum** among Community Oriented Policing agencies and dissemination of research findings at state and federal levels
- promote **sensitivity** to community needs, empowerment of citizens and police, commitment to long-term problem solving, and enhance cultural awareness

The Institute offers an invaluable opportunity to assist and assess the implementation of the most important innovation in policing since the formation of municipal police departments.

ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE

In collaboration with the Washington Criminal Justice Training Commission, the Institute provides specifically focused training regionally either on-site, at regional centers, or through utilization of Washington State University's electronic classroom capability that allows classes to be interactively linked throughout the state.

Technical assistance components of the Institute serve to connect research experts with police departments and the communities they serve, address problem identification and problem solving, identify individuals to work in collaboration, and appropriately allocate resources.

An intended consequence of the organizational structure is to facilitate on-going law enforcement-citizen-University collaborative research.

The Institute also provides a comprehensive research program for evaluating innovative community oriented policing efforts in the following areas:

- the implementation of the community oriented policing model and determine how the model is shaped to meet the varying community structures and needs
- assess actual changes in police-community relationships and increase in community participation
- assess change in citizen satisfaction with police
- assess change in officer satisfaction with work
- assess changes in fear of crime, and quality of life
- assess changes in levels of actual crime

STRUCTURE OF THE INSTITUTE

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University and college faculty members

COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING ROUND TABLE:

- Serves an advisory role allowing broader involvement of law enforcement officials of the state

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- Cross section of citizenry interested in promoting citizen-police partnerships

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Through training, technical assistance and research, the Institute intends to bridge the gap between research results and day-to-day policing.


As a clearinghouse for information sharing and problem solving among community oriented policing agencies, the Institute will serve as a conduit for the dissemination of validated creative efforts and improved service delivery on a broad scale.

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Perspectives on Policing



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John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Implementing Community Policing: The Administrative Problem

By George L. Kelling and William J. Bratton

The current generation of police leadership, tuned to changes in American society, technology, and economics, is revising the strategy of municipal policing. Whether identified as community or problem-oriented policing, the current changes represent nothing less than a strategic shift in the basic "business" of policing. As dedicated as they are, as supported by research, as responsive to neighborhood demands for change, this generation of reformers finds regeneration and strategic repositioning as difficult as has any other. Why is it that innovators of every generation have so much difficulty shifting the strategies of their organizations and professions?

For police executives, three sources of resistance seem to be foremost in their minds and conversations: unions, detectives, and mid-management. This paper will deal with mid-management. We have repeatedly heard top police executives say with frustration, "If only it wasn't for mid-management," or "If only I could wipe out lieutenants, I could really change this department." The experience with team policing during the 1970's seemed to confirm this impression empirically. Sherman et al. conclude in their case studies of team policing: "Mid-management of the departments [studied], seeing team policing as a threat to their power, subverted and, in some cases, actively sabotaged the plans."¹

Yet, there are problems with this formulation. Review of the literature on mid-management presents a more complicated picture. On the one hand, many articles, especially those in journals of a semipopular nature, portray mid-managers as a dying breed in organizations, especially in those organizations that are being downsized or in which their services or products are information-based. Certainly, many organizations are portrayed as top-heavy, especially at mid-managerial levels. This is not just a "pop" view; Peter Drucker states it strongly.

Community policing represents a new future for American law enforcement, changing the way our Nation's police respond to the communities they serve. This report, one in a series entitled *Perspectives on Policing*, is based on discussions held in the Executive Session on Policing sponsored by NIJ at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed as part of the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and is funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations. The success of the police mission now and in the years ahead is the common goal of those who have participated in the Executive Session. Helping to achieve that goal is the purpose of these reports.

The Executive Session on Policing has brought together police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and many others in periodic meetings to focus on modern strategies that produce better results. The rapid growth of these strategies shows the willingness of American police executives to test new approaches to crime, disorder, drugs, and fear in their communities.

Michael J. Russell

Acting Director
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice

Mark H. Moore

Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

[M]iddle managements today tend to be overstaffed to the point of obesity. . . . This slows the decision process to a crawl and makes the organization increasingly incapable

■ SPECIAL REPORT



Building trust. As part of San Diego's problem-oriented approach to policing, officer Christopher Ball makes time for local kids.

What the LAPD ought to try

Police forces in some large cities press ahead with significant reforms

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It is not the first time police have gone

through wrenching transformation. Modern American police forces were created in the late 1800s. Still, well into the 1920s, big-city cops were little more than corrupt political hacks who owed their employment to ward bosses and did whatever they pleased. The profes-

sionalizing did not really take root nationally until the 1950s and 1960s. Under the reforms, police were rigorously trained, organized into a centralized, paramilitary structure and removed from the worst of local political interference. Crime control became the primary

focus. Thanks in part to advances like the patrol car and the two-way radio, the core of police work became random patrol, rapid response to radio calls, arrests and after-the-fact investigation of serious crimes.

Questions about this "professional" model of policing were rejected by cops for years. As trained, professional crime fighters, they figured they knew best and no one else could possibly comprehend what they faced



Arrest. Despite new methods, force is still an option.

SPECIAL REPORT

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Nevertheless, the riots of the 1960s began a period of soul-searching. Post-mortems found that police practices had contributed to many of the disturbances: that police conduct included brutality and harassment, that police-community relations were poor and that employment of black officers badly lagged behind the growth of the black population. Still, the studies did not se-

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The new generation. The real impetus for change, though, came not from the revelations of the research but from a new generation of better-educated police leaders more willing to challenge the conventional wisdom. Today, it is rare to find a big-city chief who has no college degree. And street cops are better educated, too. In 1967, the average education

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Of all the catalysts for change, however, the single most powerful was the drug-and-crime crisis that has shaken America since the mid-'80s. Even old-line chiefs find the trends disturbing—and concede that the old forms of police work seem to have no effect. For instance, the number of full-time state and local law enforcement officers grew by 5.4 percent between 1987 and 1990, and arrests burgeoned by 12 percent. But after dipping in the early 1980s,

violent crime has ballooned from a rate of 539 per 100,000 Americans in 1984 to 732 per 100,000 in 1990. "People have clearly begun to recognize that our strict law enforcement-arrest approach isn't getting the job done," says Darrel Stephens, executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum and a former chief in Newport News, Va. "You've got a greater number of people in the police community who have come to realize that more is not the solution to this problem."

These frustrations have led progressive police executives to a broader set of conclusions: that crime has many complex causes and that police departments cannot keep the streets safe by themselves. If crime is to be controlled, police must reach out to other local institutions, and indeed to the broader community at large, and create partnerships. That thinking is responsible for the most radical

and controversial innovation sweeping the field these days—so-called community-oriented or problem-oriented policing. The basics are these: Police must form community alliances to focus on prevention, addressing the causes and circumstances leading to crime, rather than careening from incident to incident. Improved lighting, for instance, might cut down on a string of convenience-store robberies. Changing bus routes might prevent rival gangs from having repeated fights at a particular bus stop.

Despite the pressures to change, potent obstacles remain. A rigid, traditional police culture continues to dominate some departments, and police unions sometimes resist new ideas as well. Innovation may offend special interests, such as wealthy neighborhoods




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Night shift. The interrogation process begins with some questions in the patrol car.

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KANSAS CITY

Where cops are taught how not to be bad

Months before Rodney King became a household word, the police department in Kansas City, Mo., faced its own Armageddon of police brutality. Within a month in mid-1990, one officer struck a Baptist minister with the butt of a shotgun and another fiercely beat a priest with a nightstick. The city was outraged. For Police Chief Steven Bishop, a bespectacled, cerebral, 20-year KCPD veteran only days into the job, the turmoil represented an opportunity to begin changing the department's ethos.

He acted decisively: One officer was fired, another suspended for six months without pay. The strict discipline sent rank-and-filers into an uproar, but the new chief was firm. The days of street justice administered by cops and slaps on the wrist for offending officers were over.

STEVE GONZALES — KANSAS CITY STAR



Chief Bishop. A no-nonsense approach

Bishop ordered a departmental study on the incidence of excessive force, and the results were instructive. Just 29 officers were responsible for 303 of the 756 citizen complaints filed in the previous two years. Most of these officers were in their 20s, with three years or less on the job. Many of the complaints reflected the cops' inability to cope with challenges to their authority—sarcasm or back talk, for instance, from civilians. "It wasn't as much an excessive-force problem as a communications problem," says Capt. Dean Kelly, who is in charge of all advanced training for the KCPD. In fact, some experts think physical presence and communications skills alone could handle up to 98 percent of the incidents potentially requiring force. Yet police departments prefer to concentrate training on the use of firearms and batons, instead of on how to talk to civilians.



The question for Bishop was how to head off brutality problems. The KCPD's answer is two pronged: The department developed an early-warning system that flags the force's "bad boys," as they came to be called, and it created an intensive training course to enhance cops' communications skills.

The reform was launched a little over a year ago, when 30 of the department's top complaint getters were put through a course developed by officers from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. The KCPD has since created its own curriculum, taught by nine respected sergeants. Citizen gripes are tracked by a computer, which flags any cop with three or more complaints in six months. The problem cops meet with division commanders, who have the discretion to refer them to the communications course. And late last year, the KCPD decided to give the course to all officers with three years' or less experience.

The eight-hour strategic-communications workshop is both academic and pragmatic, combining lectures with role-playing sessions that are videotaped. Officers are told that communication is not just about words but about tone, pitch, distance and body language as well. Barriers to communication are discussed at length. For instance, cops need to know that parts of their traditional garb, like leather gloves or mirrored sunglasses, may send an unintended menacing message. "These things are like shields in front of you," says Sgt. Gary Majors, one of the course instructors. "We know we don't mean anything by it, but people think we're trying to be intimidating, and that could start something." Supportive listening—sustained eye contact and frequent nodding—is also emphasized.

In addition, instructors offer a variety

The printer with a split personality.



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SPECIAL REPORT

of simple but specific communication tools that may help smooth out potential confrontations. For example, they recommend that officers begin traffic stops by first introducing themselves and immediately telling motorists exactly why they were stopped. "You can win a confrontation without kicking someone's ass," Sergeant Majors tells them.

Officer Troy Meyer, 27, had 27 complaints in 5½ years before he took the course last spring, but he hasn't had any since. "The class taught me that if you listen to what people say, it opens more avenues to handling the situation," he says. Some of the communication tricks featured in the course "seem to almost disarm people," adds officer David Huskey, another graduate.

Preliminary results are encouraging. The first 30 officers to take the course totaled 73 complaints between January 1990 and April 1991; in the following year, they had only 25.

Not all the reviews are raves, to be sure. Some cops mock the workshop as "charm school." Others think the course is too brief to do much good or is merely a restatement of the obvious. Many officers are resentful that even unsubstantiated complaints are used in tabulating who should attend.

But for Bishop, there's no turning back. "Police are notorious for being one of the hardest groups to initiate change in. We must learn to change with the times," he says. "And we're going to do that if I've got to drag half the department yelling and screaming across the 21st-century line."

SAN DIEGO

Where citizens get involved

Sgt. Mark Jones is describing how a new problem-solving police team is involving San Diego residents in crime prevention when his patrol car radio crackles with reports of a "211 in progress." Two men have assaulted and

robbed a young man on a nearby school playground. Jones flips on the flashing lights atop his car and guns it down the street. Nearing the school, he suddenly wheels the car around. "There he is!" he yells, pointing to a man who has run down an alley. Screeching to a stop, Jones leaps out and sprints after the fleeing suspect, then tackles him and slips handcuffs around his wrists.

The abrupt transformation of mood and scenery is illustrative of the dilemma facing today's police officers. While experimenting with sometimes controversial community-policing initiatives, which some believe turn cops into social workers, officers still must race to

emergency calls that put their lives on the line in America's combat zones.

While many departments have grabbed the "community" or "problem-oriented policing" labels for the sake of public relations, San Diego's police force has proved that it is serious about balancing enforcement with citizen involvement. In 1988, San Diego was one of four cities chosen for a federally backed project to apply problem-oriented policing to neighborhood drug problems. Officers in the Southeast Division got specialized training in how to involve citizens and other city agencies in their struggle. In one case, several officers enlisted the city's housing authority to bar rent subsidies for apartment-complex tenants involved in illegal narcotics activity. A year later, San Diego was given an Innovation Award by the National League of Cities.

Since then, the program has been introduced to all uniformed divisions. Officers are encouraged to focus not on a specific incident stemming from a 911 call but on the conditions that create a problem. Among the recent efforts:

■ Two years ago, the corner of Skyline and Meadowbrook drives in southeast San Diego had become a hangout for gang members, who sold drugs, scrawled graffiti and harassed residents. Officers went door to door, soliciting neighborhood advice and urging citizens to take a stand. Within



Beach duty. In San Diego, cops in shorts are part of the effort to mix with the community.



Pulse taking. Citizen surveys reflect the new plan.

■ SPECIAL REPORT

nine months, local residents had cleaned up a vacant lot at the corner, helped police pinpoint drug activity and pressured a local market to stop selling gang and drug paraphernalia. Last summer, they formed a neighborhood association and staged a job fair and family carnival at the intersection. Kathy Ramsey, a nursing recruiter who owns a nearby home, says the officers inspired residents. "We worked closely with the police department," she says. "For the first time, I am hanging out on my street. Now I wouldn't move."

■ After a rash of convenience-store robberies in central San Diego, Sgt. Carey Brooks and Detective John Lusardi conducted a computerized analysis of the crimes and then brought their data to the corporations that own the stores. After the owners bought into their plan of attack, the officers visited each store manager and employee. They recommended steps to discourage robberies, including removing window signs that might block the view from passing squad cars, playing loud opera music outside to drive off loiterers and employing two clerks at peak robbery times. Since the project began four months ago, there hasn't been a robbery at any of the stores.

These and other episodes suggest that San Diego's approach to community policing may work. Although some crime numbers have increased, there have been fewer calls for police service. Politicians and community activists have jumped on the bandwagon, and favorable editorials have appeared in San Diego newspapers.

Several elements have helped: an imaginative commitment to training officers; Police Chief Bob Burgreen's unstinting endorsement of the new approach; a state-of-the-art crimes analysis unit that churns out crime data requested by officers, and cooperation from other government agencies in cleaning up trouble spots. Most important, the officers themselves seem more satisfied with the results they're seeing from a Japanese-style management approach. "This went from the bottom up, not top down," says Sgt. Guy Swanger.

Problem-oriented policing still raises

lots of questions. More than a few officers think it is just the latest "flavor of the month" experiment that detracts from the nuts and bolts of crime fighting. Some San Diegans are wary of intrusions by police into their privacy, and ethnic groups continue to allege police insensitivity. Early evaluations of the strategy in cities like Houston don't show much improvement in crime rates. Still, it is clear that the alternatives haven't worked, so the program seems in place to stay. "It may not be completely successful," shrugs officer Gaye Wagner, "but it's a start."

years, the distinction is crucial. And it is the essence of the Tactical Narcotics Team, an 18-month-old neighborhood drug cleanup and reclamation program that selects some 200 police officers across the Metro-Dade force to work with community residents in taking back crime-ridden areas.

To date, the program has resulted in 5,257 arrests, \$1.7 million in drugs and currency seized, 316 firearms confiscated and 40 crack houses demolished—all without one complaint of excessive force. Where the program has been completed, yearlong follow-up surveys



New approach. These Miami officers work closely with Metro-Dade County cops.

MIAMI

Where besieged blocks are swept clean

One of Maj. Dan Flynn's training tools is a television news clip of inappropriate police behavior. A dealer hides a packet of drugs in his mouth, and a cop puts a gun to his head demanding that he spit the stuff out. "What's going to happen?" Flynn asks his class of Metro-Dade Tactical Narcotics Team trainees sarcastically. "If the guy swallows the drugs, will the officer shoot him in the head?" It is a scene, says Flynn, that inner-city Miami residents will never see. "People want heavy-handed enforcement that is aggressive, not abusive."

In Miami, a city rocked by cop-vs.-community riots five times in the past 11

have found violent crime down between 19 and 46 percent.

The five-phase program lasts three months and can cost as much as \$330,000 per neighborhood. First, police meet with community leaders to identify and target areas of high drug crime. Then undercover officers move in, working with local residents, often confidentially, to identify dealers and selling locales. Next comes two weeks of aggressive enforcement, often in conjunction with the neighboring Miami Police Department, which tightens the screws in adjacent areas under its jurisdiction. Local dealers are arrested and zealously prosecuted, and drug stings are set up to catch buyers, who are often offered drug treatment instead of prosecution.

When the neighborhood is relatively drug-free, the cleanup, saturation pa-

trol and community education phase begins. While uniformed officers cruise the neighborhood, other county agencies move in, demolishing crack houses, towing broken-down vehicles and clearing vacant lots. Other officers go door to door answering questions and providing residents advice on how all the local agencies can help them respond to the possibility of renewed drug dealing.

The program has received the overwhelming support of community leaders. "I have seen a difference," says Fred Morley, chairman of the Liberty City area Citizen's Advisory Committee. "It's only part of the solution, but the key is getting the community involved."

TNT officials are well aware of the program's limitations. Some residents benefit financially from the local drug trade. Others have a knee-jerk dislike of police or are simply too scared to help. And dealers do creep back into clean areas. But to local police, the value of repeatedly uprooting them is immeasurable. "When the dealers get too entrenched," says TNT Lt. Dennis Hattermann, "the perception is the police can't do anything. And citizens just shut up." Such an outcome can create a mutual distrust between the cops and the community. But thanks to the TNT approach, that hasn't happened here. Says Miami University Prof. Roger Dunham, who studied the program: "Police are able to go into these neighborhoods, do intensive enforcement and keep the people on their side."

CALIFORNIA COLLEGE

Where cops learn how to be leaders

As a commander in the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department's Safe Streets bureau, Capt. Carole Freeman deals with the likes of gangs and drive-by shootings. So what is she doing gathering data on the deterioration of the American steel industry and prospective layoffs in the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard?

Like a growing number of California police officers, Captain Freeman is applying the knowledge she gained at the state's Law Enforcement Command College. For the past eight years, she and fellow graduates have been filling the

upper ranks of California's police agencies. Participants attend 10 two-week workshops over an 18-month period, then spend six months composing an independent study project like "The Future of Helicopters in Law Enforcement" or "Solving Serial Crimes in the 21st Century." Between sessions, the students work at regular police jobs. The instructors are civilians, often from California universities, and classes are held at a variety of sites around the state.

A candidate for the college must be nominated by a higher-ranking officer and has to pass a two-day evaluation by

down application for street officers who routinely face life-or-death decisions. But the college's advocates contend that the management tools they learn are an antidote to the orthodox view that law enforcement is simply reactive. "The Command College has taught us to be more proactive, to assess, to anticipate," says graduate Rick TerBorch, police chief at Arroyo Grande, a town of 15,000 near Pismo Beach. TerBorch and his officers used what he learned about problem-oriented policing to deal with an abandoned house long suspected of being a drug den: "We coordinated, and

STEPHEN SHAMES - MATRIX FOR US&WR



Getting religion. California is teaching cops to build relationships with community leaders.

college "assessors." Many graduates go on to become chiefs or commanders of their own departments, and they frequently swap advice at an annual brainstorming conference.

The curriculum reads like something from an Ivy League professional school: Defining the Future, Strategic Planning, Human Resource Management. Freeman is using her own database to learn whether steel industry unemployment back East might cause increased migration to the Sun Belt. That could mean more jobless in California and a possible rise in homelessness and crime. Reduction in Reserve and National Guard units could portend a fertile recruiting ground for the sheriff's department.

Despite generally favorable reviews, some critics wonder whether the college's curriculum has enough trickle-

the fire department burned it down."

One recent week, 21 officers attended a two-week seminar at Lake San Marcos, northeast of San Diego. From 8:30 a.m. until 5 p.m., the officers sat around a horseshoe-shaped table and listened to J. Thomas Miller III, president of South Carolina-based Leadership Seminars Associates, walk them through the concept of managing change. After one session, Lt. Dennis Hegwood of the Los Angeles County Housing Authority Police talked about the benefits of the courses. "I've learned how to implement ideas without stepping on toes, so it covers all the stakeholders," he says.

Would Daryl Gates have said that? ■

BY GORDON WITKIN WITH MIKE THARP IN LOS ANGELES AND ANNE ARRARTE IN MIAMI

A different reality for us

How can jurors who represent all that is right and decent about America deny the horror of King's beating? The answers are scary

For months, the 81-second burst of official violence on the body of Rodney King seemed the essence of tragic racial drama. There was a *frisson* of moral outrage and bad conscience. Even President Bush was briefly sickened by what he had seen. But suddenly, with last week's acquittal of the four officers charged in the attack, the entire event took on a meaning more frightening to many Americans than the event itself: What had seemed a quasi-lynching, the official verdict declared, was really not criminal behavior at all. As one juror put it: "Not much damage was done." King's offense, apparently, was that even in the prone position, while protecting his head, he might attack the officers who nearly killed him.

The key question is this: How is it possible for a jury of comfortable, concerned, educated folks from the suburbs, who represent all that is supposedly decent and right about America, to deny the horror of a beating they witnessed with their own eyes? There are two ways to answer the question. The first is that the verdict was confirmation of the fall from grace black people have suffered in recent years. Blacks have lost the moral high ground. They are no longer the brave soldiers of conscience. In the span of a single generation, young black men like Rodney King have come to be seen as violent, predatory, out of control.

Few white people will admit in public to this reversal of perspective, but many seem haunted by black people in general and by black young men in particular, often terrified of "danger" that exists only in the imagination. As riots exploded after the verdict, at least one of the jurors in Simi Valley said: "These people would have rioted anyway." They were, she suggested, only waiting for an excuse. In this environment of racial intolerance, it is a short leap to the idea that the rights of a black man like King are secondary to what he symbolizes—a danger to white society that must be suppressed. Few recalled Martin Luther King Jr.'s great summary of violence: "A riot," he said, "is the language of the unheard."

The second answer about this verdict is more disturbing and, to black people, more obvious. There is a growing perception among blacks I know that the jury acquitted the officers because they were *not revolted* by the police beating, now described as "careful police work" by one of the defense attorneys. This jury, in fact, fully approved the police conduct. This is the message black people have heard.

It doesn't help that some young black men of south-central L.A. reacted by playing to stereotype and scorching their own communities. Part of the tragedy of the King verdict is

that it seems to set back so much of the stubborn work of a generation of hard-won civil-rights victories. A crucial lesson has been lost on black youth: Revolt rarely travels to places like Simi Valley. Many black neighborhoods have never recovered from the 1965 riots. Tragically, another lesson hasn't been lost at all: The main reforms of the past generation—changes that gave Los Angeles a black mayor, an incoming black police chief, much greater black representation on the police force and a host of minority legislative leaders—still were not enough to block the King beating or the acquittal.


In the end, this outcome confirms the worst fears of black men. The police are not your friends. Always, it is the fear of white people that they serve first. They stop you when you ride through white neighborhoods, including the one you may live in. They respond to the calls of clerks if you object to not being buzzed into a store. They, or their proxies in a private security force, might be the ones to show up at your tableside in a nice restaurant if you demand to see the maitre d' because your service has not been good.

So, the polarization grows. The people of Simi Valley may truly believe justice has been served. By contrast, more blacks now believe that equal justice doesn't exist. Such disparities will not make American life safer for anyone. The verdict won't help those white officers who courageously came forward to testify against their fellows. It won't help black and white relations in corporate suites, in schools, in courts. And

the officers who beat King might have won at their trial, but they have helped elevate King to a moral symbol with power great enough to inspire throngs to turn parts of America's urban landscape into rubble.

How to explain? Recently, a friend related that when the videotaped quasi lynching of King was shown on the television, her 5-year-old son looked at the screen and said in disbelief, "But they are policemen. They can't be doing that!" Her question was this: "How do I explain this verdict and not teach them racism?"

It's a good question. As a black man, my concerns about justice and equity exist in a different reality from those of my white colleagues. Like most people of Simi Valley, they probably have never been followed by police. I have. In a world where racial fears run so very deep, this verdict has failed to make the world seem fairer, more free or more just. It is another wedge that will drive us further apart. ■



"Careful police work"? Rodney King

BY SCOTT MINERBROOK

1120 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W., SUITE 930
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
PHONE: (202) 466-7820
FAX: (202) 466-7826
TTY: (202) 466-2670



CHUCK WEXLER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Contact: Martha Plotkin (202) 466-7820
Date: September 30, 1994

**Police Executive Research Forum and Yale University Launch Private Sector
School Violence Program During National Crime Prevention Month**

Washington, DC—The chalk drawings on the school sidewalk are of hop-scotch squares and tic-tac-toe games; but too often, they mark the outline of a child's body—another victim of violence on our country's school grounds.

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is joining forces with the Yale University Child Study Center to launch a national program. The project will link the work of police officers, school personnel, and child mental health practitioners and the work of PERF and two projects at the Child Study Center: the innovative program in school reform developed by Dr. James Comer and the Child Development-Community Policing program, developed jointly with the New Haven Police Department. The partners will merge effective strategies that will address the physical and emotional damage that violence inflicts on children. This unprecedented initiative, entitled "Summoning the Village," is funded through a three-year \$662,700 grant from The Prudential Foundation and is designed to produce a model program that can be emulated across the United States.

"The fervor surrounding the recently enacted crime bill is testimony to the American people's foremost desire to see our children safe from the violence in our communities," said PERF Executive Director Chuck Wexler. "We have an obligation to complement the crime bill programs with private sector initiatives like this that show a commitment to keeping our youth safe and creating a secure environment where they can learn. "

The Prudential grant will support the creation of a Problem Analysis and Coordinating Team (PACT), made up of teachers, administrators, students, police, and mental health workers, who will come together to devise and implement antiviolence initiatives. The project is expected to identify the most effective ways to reduce the incidence of violence in and around schools, and to increase antiviolence resources available to children. By securing children's safety, the project team hopes to improve children's in-school behavior and achievement, and to decrease the rates of juvenile arrests.

"We're proud to support this first-of-its-kind initiative to prevent violence in our schools," said Gabriella Coleman, president of The Prudential Foundation. "Bringing all relevant parties to the table is the first step in finding permanent solutions."

-over-

"On the eve of National Crime Prevention Month, the Yale Child Study Center staff is pleased to announce that by joining with PERF on this landmark collaboration some real advancements in preventing violence at our schools may at last be at hand," said Dr. Steven Marans, Harris Assistant Professor of Child Psychoanalysis.

PERF is an organization of progressive police executives and professionals dedicated to improving policing practices through experimentation, research, leadership and national debate. PERF members serve more than 40 percent of the nation's population and have pioneered the concept of problem-oriented policing.

The Yale Child Study Center is an internationally renowned site of treatment, research, social policy and program development involving children and adolescents.

The Prudential Foundation, the philanthropic arm of The Prudential Insurance Company of America, has awarded more than \$160 million in grants throughout the United States since it was founded in 1977. It funds nonprofit children's initiatives and programs in education, health and human services, urban and community development, business and civic affairs, and culture and the arts.

Having to Sell as New an Old Idea: the Cop on the Beat

NY 1019

By GEORGE JAMES

In a poster on the back of a Manhattan bus, an elderly couple walks serenely along a desolate street. The scene would radiate urban menace except for one thing: it contains the reassuring figure of a police officer walking a beat.

The poster — a stark black and white photograph with a message that says simply "The beat cop is back" — promotes New York City's new official police philosophy of community policing.

Appearing on buses, telephone booths and billboards throughout the city, it is part of a new campaign to sell community policing to a public weary of crime but sometimes wary of police officers — and to a tradition-bound police force estranged from some of the communities it serves.

A Hard Sell

That it is necessary to sell the idea of reviving an institution with the nostalgic appeal of the beat cop reveals just how skeptical people both in and out of the department have become about any police program to improve relations with the citizenry. Many people in some communities simply do not trust the police and in some cases regard them as insensitive at best and brutal at worst. Within the department, many officers complain that community policing will reduce them from crime-fighters to what they scornfully call "social workers with guns."

That note of disdain echoed in the voice of an officer recently as he walked his beat in Manhattan. Told that another uniformed officer had won an award for helping 25 brides retrieve their gowns from a Staten Island dress shop that had suddenly gone out of business, he said incredulously, "He won it for that?"

It is this sort of attitude that the department is trying to dispel in a promotional

campaign that has its chief advocate, Police Commissioner Lee P. Brown, stumping for it wherever he goes.

Yesterday the setting was Minneapolis, where Mr. Brown addressed a convention of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Mr. Brown, who was stepping down as the group's president with his one-year term expiring, predicted that as "urban conditions worsen, there will be mounting

pressure to abandon community policing and use the police as temporary occupying forces, there to put down disturbances."

But he said that the greater the complexity of social problems beyond the control of the police, the greater the need for community policing to help in addressing them.

"I can assure you that in the end the community police officer permanently assigned to the neighborhood is a better deter-

rent to unrest than a SWAT team waiting in the wings," he told the convention.

Besides the poster-ad campaign, which began last week, the Police Department is also trying to sell community policing through newly opened "neighborhood service vans" and citizen awards. Public-serv-



Jack Manning/The New York Times

A poster on the back of a bus promoting New York City's new official police philosophy of community policing.

Continued on Page B7

Having to Sell the Idea Of the 'Cop on the Beat'

Continued From Page B1

for radio spots are also planned. To sell the idea to police officers, the department has begun training sessions, formed focus groups to discuss officers' concerns and created an award to recognize officers who perform a community service while on the job. Videotaped messages from Commissioner Brown are being shown at station houses, and soon advertisements directed at police officers will begin appearing there.

Mr. Brown has been championing community policing since his days as police chief in Houston, where he first put his ideas into practice. Since coming to New York City two years ago he has called it the law-enforcement philosophy of the 90's.

Legislative Green Light

The idea is essentially to enlarge a police officer's role from that of one who simply responds to 911 calls in a patrol car. It involves assigning a foot patrol officer to work with residents to resolve immediate social problems

A policing strategy faces skepticism and distrust.

that may lie at the root of a neighborhood's crime. An officer, for example, might be the catalyst in bringing in outside services to help with a particular problem.

A major step toward community policing in New York City was taken last February, when the State Legislature approved money for a large Police Department reorganization and expansion. Under the plan, the force would grow from 26,000 to 31,351 officers by 1994, when community policing is scheduled to be in operation in all 75 precincts. The first to start the program in April was the 72d Precinct in Sunset Park, Brooklyn.

Other precincts have been expanding foot patrols, partly through an infusion of rookies from two Police Academy classes. They brought the force's current strength to 27,500. At the end of this month, 1,133 additional rookie officers will graduate. In the past they would have been sent to borough command for training and used for such duties as crowd control. But like the two classes before them, they will be sent to precincts to get their training in neighborhoods.

The ad campaign posters, manufactured at cost for about \$30,000, were paid for by the Finest Foundation, a nonprofit group. Hundreds of posters are to appear both inside and outside buses, on telephone shelters and on billboards, said William M. Apfelbaum, president of Transportation Displays Incorporated, which provided an estimated \$2 million in free display space. The ads were designed, also at no charge, by Ketchum Advertising in New York.

Community Vans to Roll

"When you basically boil down what community policing is, it's the old beat cop I grew up with and people are familiar with from years ago," said Hank Seiden, the chairman of Ketchum and a native of Brownsville in Brooklyn. "I knew the beat cop. I knew his name. He was a friend. You always felt secure when he was around, and he always seemed to be around." In one ad, an officer is shown keeping an eye on children in a school playground; in another, an officer protectively surveys a busy shopping street.

A component of the community policing will be three police vans called

Neighborhood Resource Centers — 28-foot modified recreational vehicles painted Police Department blue and equipped with telephones, radios and fax machines. Police officers, representatives from other city agencies and neighborhood volunteers will operate the vans with the aim of helping residents deal with drug abuse, family violence and other social problems.

"It's an attempt to bring government right into the neighborhoods," said the Chief of Department, David Scott.

He was present when the first of the vans was opened on Sept. 30 on East 109th Street in East Harlem, between Alternate Education Complex 117, a kindergarten-through-9th grade school, and Public School 83. The second van was dedicated on Monday at P.S. 11 at 1257 Ogden Avenue at West 167th Street in the High Bridge section of the Bronx. A third will open next week at Junior High School 136 in the 72nd Precinct.

Image Enhancer

The van "insures access to resources in the community that people don't normally use and it provides linkages to services that will improve the quality of life and overall health of the community," said Debbie Quinones, an East Harlem resident and a member of Community Board 11.

It will also enhance the image of the police, Ms. Quinones said. "I think they're making an effort to change their reputation as hard-nosed police officers," she said.

To further publicize community policing, Mr. Brown created a new award, Citizen of the Month, to recognize residents who work with the police to tackle neighborhood problems. The first award, given on Sept. 26, went to the Rev. Hardy Smallwood, a Brooklyn pentecostal minister who helped rid an East Flatbush apartment building of drug dealing, prostitution and violence.

There will also be a radio public-service campaign, said the Deputy Police Commissioner for Public Information, Suzanne Trazoff.

But perhaps the hardest sell may be the police officers themselves.

"I think you probably have a problem with the older police accepting this community policing — those who are macho and think of the cops only as a paramilitary operation," said Mr. Seiden, of Ketchum Advertising.

Sgt. Terrence Magagnos, a 28-year-old supervisor of a community policing unit in the 23d Precinct — a unit that will soon expand from 13 to 25 — said the transition will be difficult for many

officers. "It's a different style," Sergeant Magagnos said. "But when they see the results coming back at them, when they're able to get something done for the community, they'll feel very happy about it."

Commissioner Brown said the department was working on ways to reward uniformed officers on patrol "for the success they achieve in making a neighborhood a better place."

On Oct. 3, Mr. Brown presented the first such award. As usual, the Cop of the Month Award from the Finest Foundation went for a feat of bravery. Capt. Charles Wells, the executive officer of the Midtown South Precinct, received it for saving the life of a hostage being held at knifepoint in a Manhattan fabric store. Captain Wells shot and killed the attacker.

But a second Cop of the Month Award was added. It went to Officer Thomas Collins, a 37-year-old, 10-year veteran of the 123d Precinct for saving 25 weddings on Staten Island.

After a bridal shop closed without notice, Officer Collins calmed angry customers demonstrating outside the store and persuaded frightened employees to open it for the brides. Mr. Brown called Officer Collins's response "an act of compassion and initiative which epitomizes problem-solving policing."

Officer Collins said he had stepped in because he thought the protesting customers would go out of control. "Some of the brides-to-be came down and assaulted one of the girls in the store and knocked the cash register off the counter," he said. "They came down there in a crazed way." He said he feared that "either the store could have been burned down or it would have been burglarized."

Officer Collins said community policing may be "the best route toward defusing a lot of crime in the city." But he said he did not feel that other officers, by and large, shared his opinion.

"I think they still feel this department is very much law-enforcement oriented, arrest oriented, summons oriented," he said. "And maybe it isn't."

'I knew the beat cop. I knew his name. He was a friend.'

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M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Members of the Subcommittee
on Crime and Criminal Justice

FROM: Charles E. Schumer, Chairman
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice

DATE: July 9, 1991

RE: Putting the Cop Back on the Beat: Working with the
Community

On July 10, 1991, the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice will hold an oversight hearing on the topic of "Putting the Cop Back on the Beat: Working with the Community."

Approximately 300 police departments nationwide are working to put the cop back on the beat. This is part of a movement becoming more widely known as "community policing." With certain unique variations in method departments are changing the way they deliver police services and are working hard to build a rapport, and more importantly a working partnership, with the residents of their jurisdictions.

Criminal Justice experts believe that when the officers and the citizens of a neighborhood know each other it is harder for both to act in unlawfully. Community policing efforts serve to strengthen the relationship between the people and the police, increase "accountability" of both to each other.

Part of community policing is a focus on community involvement in the policing process. When a neighborhood supports and assists the officer assigned to that area to attack the crime problem, they both have a stake in the future of that neighborhood. They work together to identify and develop solutions to problems ranging from broken windows on abandoned buildings (which provide haven to drug dealers or juvenile delinquents reeking havoc in a community), to helping neighborhoods get their street lights fixed, vacant lots cleared of rubbish, and streets paved. These efforts do not result directly in arrests, but are geared toward helping people to take

back their neighborhoods from criminals who have claimed it as their turf and reduce the potential for crime.

As communities come to trust that officer, he has a professional interest and stake in the future of that community. Through the use of extended period permanent beat assignments, rather than constant rotation, officers are more likely to know the people in that beat area. This familiarity increases his accountability to those, his knowledge of the criminal element in that area and the problems it causes. It also increases his ability to obtain helpful information and cooperation of residents in dealing with the problems.

If an officer worked closely with residents and was out on the beat in that neighborhood every day, he would lose his anonymity. He would no longer be an insurgent force imposing order. He would be known by the residents. Research indicates that this contributes to a community's level of fear perception of disorder.

Evolution of Community Policing:

In early America the police were multi-faceted public servants who performed a number of different functions beyond just enforcing the criminal laws. True, they were always keepers of the peace, but they also did such things as keep street lights well supplied with oil, assist the hurt and disabled, and addressing such issues as rounding up stray animals. In those days police power was decentralized and the officer was not closely supervised by a central command. He became well known in his beat area and in appointment was subject to local political control. Under this rubric, officers often imposed harsh treatment on those who were different from the norm or political order to whom they were accountable. These factors lead in many cases to allegations and proof of corruption and abuses.

In the 1920's and early 1930's a reform movement emerged which reorganized the structure and methods of policing. The reforms of this era relied predominantly on removing political influence and emphasizing the professionalization of policing. The police officer was stripped of all but his law enforcement responsibilities and departments strove to improve the image of the police officer through exercise of greater control over his actions. This was the foundation of the legitimacy of modern law enforcement. From then on, it was thought, the police function was to control crime and apprehend criminals. Community input was shunned as "social work".

Through division of labor, the restriction on the officer's role in the neighborhoods by increased central control, the widespread use of the automobile and the advent of increased radio technology police officers became further and further

removed from the communities they were supposed to protect. And finally, with 911 telephone systems, the police were able to rapidly respond to calls for service. The orientation of policing toward incident-driven calls for service became the widespread practice through the middle portion of the century. As a consequence, police were relegated to scurrying from call to call. The race to respond to crimes which have already occurred and where the perpetrator has long since fled has made the job of a modern day officer increasingly futile. One recent study shows that in New York City officers spend 90% of their time going from call to call taking complaints and submitting them to the department. According to that same study, they once spent only 50% of their time in this mode. The present level of demand leaves little time for solving crimes and conditions which result in crime.

Experts say that this leaves no time to address quality of life issues or minor disturbances which trouble residents most and lead to an environment of fear and ultimately breeds crime. Residents no longer frequent the businesses located near their homes, stay locked up inside their homes, and lose ties to their neighbors. It is under these circumstances that neighborhoods deteriorate; those residents who can afford to relocate do so. The result is a descending cycle of more crime leading to more fear leading to more crime.

Holes began to be punched in the foundation which supported the development and sustaining of the incident-driven/patrol model of police job performance. During the period of increased technology, centralized control, and growing anonymity of officer who served only as law enforcer, the police were unable to meet their objectives in crime control. Crime continued to spiral despite the efforts of departments to add more patrol cars and maintain quick response time to calls for service. In 1988, reported crimes reached 14 million, four times the number in 1960. As further evidence of the escalation, there were 1.5 million violent crimes in 1988. This is five times the amount reported in 1960. Violent crimes rose by 14% alone between 1980 and 1988.

The most serious criticism of the effectiveness of "911"-driven police service is the "clearance" rate for violent crimes, or the rate of crimes for which an arrest is made. From 1960 to 1988, the national clearance rate for homicides dropped from 92% to 70% and for rapes from 70% to 50%. At present only about 25% of reported robberies result in arrest. These low numbers do not reflect the even smaller number of these cases in which a plea of guilty or conviction results.

Research during the 1970's on preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service found that neither was an effective crime control tool. Studies in two major cities found that 60%

of the 911 calls for service came from 10% of the households. This communicates that these responses are doing little to effectively address the causes of the calls and thereby reduce them. In New York City, 90% of the patrol force is deployed to respond to approximately 4 million calls per year, while only 10% of the force does any investigation. Not all "911" calls are emergencies or merit immediate emergency response. For example, in Aurora, Colorado determined that only about 25% of its calls were emergencies. As part of their innovative community policing programming they have devised a "911 triage" where they will analyze the need for appropriate forms of police or other governmental agency response. This cuts down on the non-essential calls and frees the officer to engage in other proactive policing activities. Another example of innovative service demand control is used by the Houston Police Department. The department has developed a "911" call management system which prioritizes calls for service and allows Houston's street officers more time to devote to neighborhood oriented policing.

In addition, researchers also measured increases in fear of crime and found that fear was more closely correlated with disorder than with crime. Finally, the regard in which police were held by those who they were charged with protecting and those they were to keep in line began to diminish. The low perception of the police inhibited their ability to maintain order in an increasingly unstable environment.

Community Policing:

Community Policing combines a variety of policing tactics which intensively involve the same officers in the same community on a long term basis. By developing continuity of beats in specific geographic areas officers have the opportunity to know the residents, the streets, the alleys, and the spots ripe for criminal activity. It calls on departments to use a bottom up approach to maintaining law and order: community input and involvement in identifying criminal problems and crafting solutions to those problems.

Community policing goes beyond involving the community in problem-solving police techniques, although that is a major part of the philosophy and practice. It goes further by broadening the police mandate beyond a narrow focus on response to calls for service as the mode of dealing with crime. It also restructures the department to decentralize most relevant decision making authority to the individual most familiar with the nature of the conditions in the problem area.

Although serious crimes are worthy of substantial police efforts, serious crimes are like the heart attack that the police must treat. They must also find a way to deal with the underlying causes. They must involve the patient in the efforts

to promote good health. The police through implementing community policing shift the focus of efforts away from coping with the illness in a community to promoting wellness through educating people on how they can combat crime and enlisting their assistance in identifying and reversing the tide of deterioration in their neighborhoods.

Community Policing requires crime to be analyzed in the broader context, not as isolated incidents, but as manifestations of underlying problems. Creative intervention might attack the underlying cause and reduce the overall crime patterns which result from allowing conditions to remain as they are.

The community policing-problem solving era evolved from the frustration with the ineffectiveness of 911 service police operational model. During the same period of the 1970's when research was revealing infirmities in the police ability to control crime and maintain order, some of the early experiments of community policing were showing small amounts of promise. New Jersey's Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program in cities like Newark; Boston, Massachusetts; and Flint, Michigan began a return to foot patrol programs which proved to be very popular with the communities in which they operated.

As foot patrol programs developed in various jurisdictions around the country, researchers found that foot patrols reduced fear, increased citizen satisfaction with police, improved police attitudes toward residents, and bolstered morale and job satisfaction of police. Fear reduction was found directly related to foot patrol and other programs which at least in part focused on improving the quantity and quality of police-resident interaction. Cumulatively viewed, the favorable findings for foot patrol/fear reduction and the value of citizen input in the process gave promising opportunities to departments willing to experiment.

At about the same time, problem oriented policing techniques were being developed and implemented by departments in Madison, Wisconsin; Baltimore County, Maryland; and Newport News, Virginia. Problem oriented policing rejects the view that police should deal with an incident as an isolated event. Studies analyzed calls for service and found that most of the calls were coming from a small number of sources in the jurisdiction. Experts reasoned that if police could attack the underlying causes of these repeat calls, then the number of calls for service would go down. This would allow the officer more time to deal with other problems and more time to respond to other more pressing calls.

Contemporaneously, researchers were also finding that information about crimes could be obtained from citizens more easily by foot patrol officers and face to face contact between

officers and the community. This information, when properly managed, could result in significant increases in a department's effectiveness in dealing with the crime.

Several jurisdictions experimented with pilot projects or special units devoted to building police - community partnerships. Currently, there are approximately 300 jurisdictions applying some principles of community policing. And several jurisdictions, like New York City, Houston, Aurora, Mc Allen (Texas), Tulsa (Oklahoma), Madison (Wisconsin), East Lansing (Michigan), are attempting to convert their entire department into community policing departments.

There are many success stories. For example, in Houston, when a drug dealing gang set up shop at a bank of public phones outside a convenience store, the beat officer had the phones removed. In Tulsa, drug dealers began to strangle the life out of a housing complex through a rein of criminal acts against the residents and their property. In response, the department established a substation in the complex, began regular foot patrols, and directed the officers to work with the tenants in identifying and solving the troublesome conditions. The officers gained the trust and support of the residents and with their help identified the dealers. Several jurisdictions are moving beyond foot patrols and requiring motorized patrol officers to get out of their vehicles by successfully including horse mounted and bike patrols in appropriate areas as a part of their policing tactics.

WITNESSES

The first panel consists of one witness who will discuss in general terms the principles, organizational requirements, tactics, and implementation of community policing. New York City Police Commissioner Lee Brown will discuss his efforts to transform his department to a neighborhood based police organization. He proclaims that this is a cost-effective and efficient organizational strategy which will help create an urban environment free from fear, with minimal crime and disorder. Currently, the NYPD has 10 foot patrol officers in each of its 75 precincts and under the reorganization plan being implemented more than 21,000 department officers would be available for neighborhood based crime fighting. Also a part of the Commissioner's plan is a revamping of the 911 emergency call system which is being overused for non-emergency requests for service. Under the Brown plan, officers would go from currently spending 90% of their time answering calls for service to 60% of their shift time. The remaining 40% of their duty would be devoted walking their neighborhoods to detect and resolve situations which are leading to or heightening the potential likelihood of criminal activity.

Before becoming Commissioner in the nation's most populous city, Commissioner Brown served as Police Chief in Houston, the nation's fourth largest city where he initiated neighborhood oriented policing as well. Commissioner Brown is recognized as the leading policing practitioner in the area of community oriented policing and is also a member of the Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Executive Session on Policing.

The second panel will highlight the work of several police departments putting the cop back on the beat, with examples of community policing in practice. Particular attention will be paid to the interaction of the police officer and the community through testimony a community resident from Tucson Az., Aurora Co., and New York City and the officers they have worked with in addressing a particular problem.

From Tucson, Chief Peter Ronstadt will discuss his department's efforts to build police-community partnerships in the war on crime. Ms. Betty Liggins and Tucson P.D. Sergeant Ron Zimmerling will describe their cooperative efforts to rid Ms. Liggins' neighborhood and local park of gangs and drugs. During the course of this effort Ms. Liggins' life was threatened by these same gangs and drug dealers.

From Aurora, Uniform Division Chief Ronald Sloan will describe the Aurora Police Department's version of community policing and their belief in the importance of putting the cop back on the beat. As part of the Aurora program, a domestic violence program was suggested, designed, and implemented as the result of line officer John Brungardt's frustration with the inability of the police department to effectively prevent such abusive conduct. He grew impatient with the all-too-frequent situation of having to make 8-10 repeat calls to the same location. Now as a result of his efforts, there is an effective early intervention system in place which drastically reduces the number of times officers will be called to the same household. He devised a system where both the perpetrator and victim are ordered to appear in court on the day following the initial incident. Testifying with Officer Brungardt about Aurora's work in domestic violence will be Ms. Emma Webster of the Gateway Battered Woman's Shelter. She will provide insights into the value of the new police initiated approach to the problem of domestic violence and be able to share with the Subcommittee the views of woman who have been helped by the police department's program.

Sergeant Andrew McGooey, assigned to the 72nd Precinct of New York City for several years. He has been there since 1977 and is Sergeant responsible for the CPOP program in that precinct which has been operational since 1984. Sergeant McGooey can describe the long-term impact of community-police cooperation. The 72nd Precinct was recently selected as the model precinct for

New York's transition to a total community policing force -- a system of specific foot patrol beats designed to detect and prevent crime before it happens. Testifying with him will be Mr. Jose Vega of Sunset Park, Brooklyn. They will share with the Subcommittee examples of how they have worked together with Mr. Vega's block association to rid his community of drug dealers. They also established a court-watching program with the local merchants' group. This program makes sure that the court follows through on the prosecution of arrestees from the area.

Finally, policing experts have played an important role in the evolution of police departmental efforts to put cops back on the beat and develop police-community partnership. Dr. Robert Trojanowicz, Director of both the School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University and the National Center for Community Policing located there, will explain the underlying justifications for making the transition to neighborhood oriented policing. Dr. Trojanowicz, like Commissioner Brown, is a member of the Kennedy School's Executive Session on Policing. Through his work with the National Center for Community Policing Dr. Trojanowicz will be able to describe programs implemented in different jurisdictions around the country and some of the difficulties of community policing efforts. Also testifying on this final panel will be John Eck, Associate Director for Research at the Police Executive Research Forum. He will be discussing different police departments' work with community oriented problem solving and can testify about different departments which have utilized this component of police-community cooperative partnership.

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		Box Number	
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