

This paper is forthcoming through the National Institute of Justice.

Kennedy School of Government
Draft

Closing the Market: Controlling the Drug Trade in Tampa, Florida

In the last years of the 1980s, drug dealers owned the streets of Tampa, Florida. Dealers congregated, sometimes by the dozen, on sidewalks, at intersections, and in vacant lots, parks, and empty buildings. Drive-by customers flocked so heavily to some spots that neighborhood streets were choked to a standstill. Dealers fought over prime turf, scrapped in the street to be the first to buyers' cars, blocked traffic and rode pickups' running boards to hawk their goods. Long-time residents in some parts of the city felt like their neighborhoods were coming apart at the seams. "I would get four or five phone calls a day from people who were just terrified," says Linda Hope, head of a civic association in a middle-class section of town called Sulphur Springs. "People would say, I don't want to drive down the street. If you drove by they'd try to flag you down; you'd have to wait at the corner behind cars while they got through with dealing. It was like scraping a raw nerve, it just made people crazy. It was more than just the business trade. It was grandmothers whose daughters wouldn't bring the grandchildren over to visit. The very essence of community life was endangered." Tampa police were equally frustrated. They made thousands of drug arrests every year without, as far as they could tell, making the slightest dent in the problem. Crime and the police workload soared; public confidence in the police plummeted.

A year into the 1990s, all that was over. One was hard pressed to find any open-air dealing at all, and the heavy concentrations of sellers and crowds of buyers were gone altogether. For perhaps the first time in any crack-plagued American city, Tampa's police figured out how to suppress street dealing almost entirely. Their answer was QUAD—for Quick Uniform Attack on Drugs—an unusual and innovative combination of traditional, problem-solving, and community policing approaches. QUAD was not designed to stop Tampa's drug trade, incarcerate dealers, seize drugs and assets, or any of the other traditional goals of narcotics enforcement. It was designed solely to restore public order and

This paper was written by David M. Kennedy, Research Fellow in Criminal Justice, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

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community safety by suppressing street drug markets. The results were all the police had hoped. Afflicted neighborhoods improved and even recovered, reported crime and calls for police service returned to pre-crack levels, and the police department's reputation seemed restored. All with, given the scale of the original problem, remarkable speed.

The ideas behind QUAD may well represent a fundamental step forward in drug policy and operations. They embody both the insight that shutting down street drug sales is a worthy end in itself, and a set of tactics to fit that goal. Tampa's experience with QUAD contains important lessons about the strategic value of disrupting drug markets, about the merits of shaping those markets into different forms, about how to build effective police-community partnerships against the drug trade, and about the crime-control value of street drug enforcement. Tampa's experience also raises certain questions about the best way to organize and administer QUAD-type street-level drug operations. This paper will explore that experience, those lessons, and those issues.

Tampa's Drug Problem

Crack hit Tampa in 1985, roughly the same time the drug made its first major appearance in a number of other eastern-seaboard cities. It wrought, as far as the police were concerned, immediate and dire ill. Tampa is a city of 280,000 on central Florida's gulf coast, adjacent to St. Petersburg and the center of a metropolitan area of over two million, with a police department of, at the time, 752 sworn. It had, prior to 1985, what the police viewed as ordinary and manageable crime problems, with very little in the way of overt public drug dealing. Crack changed all that very quickly.

Tampa suddenly had a major street drug dealing problem. "Prior to 1985," a department report says, "Tampa's drug trafficking was generally thought to be 'behind the scenes.' It was indoors, in out-of-the-way places, in bars, poolrooms, and private homes." Not anymore. Starting primarily in the city's several black sections, police say, and eventually spreading--though less heavily--into many more prosperous neighborhoods, streetside markets catering to drive-by consumers proliferated wildly.

Buyers were of all ages and races, and came from all parts of town and the surrounding areas. Dealers were largely young and black. Some set up couches, brought out coolers of drinks, lit fires in barrels in cool weather, left their empties and food wrappers where they fell. "It's obvious where these guys sell," says Captain John Sollazzo, "just by the litter, even when they're not there." Many would swap crack for jewelry, appliances, and sex. Turf fights over prime locations were common, as was the brandishing and use of often high-powered weapons. When the department took a rough inventory of these "dope holes," as they came to be called locally, in 1989 as part of the lead-up to QUAD, it counted 61 (some large areas flooded with dealers were counted as one site; if each active corner and lot had been counted separately, as the department later took to doing, the number would have been considerably higher).

Reported crime surged: from 1984's 33,959 index crimes (12,325.8/100,000 residents) to 1986's 48,246 (17,018). Calls for police service grew from 490,509 in 1984 to 580,900 in 1986. Nobody could prove that crack was responsible, but the police harbored no doubts whatsoever. Major Bert Hatcher, in charge of the department's tactical division, was hearing so much about the drug from prisoners in 1985 that he had four months worth of robbery arrestees interviewed and discovered that some 85% had committed their crimes either under the influence or in order to buy more. Sgt. J. L. Counsman, then a patrol sergeant, saw what he calls a "terrific increase" in street crime and burglaries. "We were completely overwhelmed," he says. "Working 10-11 hour shifts, holding lots of calls, no time at all to do directed patrol and our traditional proactive work." When he switched into detectives, it was the same story: the city was hit with a sudden wave of housebreaks and construction site burglaries aimed not just at ordinary valuables but at new targets like wiring, pipe, and raw metal stock. "People were tearing houses and bridges apart for scrap," he says. "It was all going to feed their drug habits, at least that's what we thought."

The city, by all accounts, was outraged. Cherryl Franklin, a black single mother, lived in a low-income apartment complex whose common space and adjacent park had been taken over by a huge

group of dealers, sometimes up to sixty at a time. "Every day, it was Vietnam," she says. "I've never been to Vietnam, but if it was worse than this, I don't want to go, you know? Just drive-through drug service, anything you wanted, it was there. We had people in the park, bad drug deals going down. But it wasn't even just the drugs; it was the things that they did to get their drugs. You had tricking going on out here and in the parking lot; there were a lot of little nasty things going on, seriously." Even in parts of the city where the dealing had not spread, the effects were felt. "We had the drug dealing problem, which was primarily going on in inner-city black neighborhoods," says Tampa mayor Sandy Freedman. "But the victims of burglaries and robberies and thefts were all over the city and they were clamoring for something to be done.... The residents were irate."

The police, by their own account, were not set up to deal with the problem. "You've got your inside dopers and your outside dopers: and the outside dopers, as I see it, have been neglected," says Captain Sollazzo. Tampa had an active narcotics division that pursued, in the main, the "inside dopers," serious mid- and upper-echelon traffickers. It mounted large-scale, long-term investigations, often in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, aimed at major seizures of drugs, money, and other assets. It was neither inclined nor organized to pursue hundreds of--by its lights--penny-ante street dealers. They were left to the patrol force, which was not particularly well-equipped either. Patrol officers often knew perfectly well who was dealing where, but cases were not necessarily easy to make. Dealers posted look-outs to warn of marked cars, hid their stashes off their persons, sometimes paid juveniles to carry freshly sold dope to cars. Ordinary street officers had neither the authorization nor--as the department's call load spiralled up--the time to work plain-clothes buy-bust operations. Street dealers, in consequence, were largely free from significant police attention.

The Tampa Police Department, as would perhaps most departments facing a like predicament, assigned a number of officers to special duty on an anti-street dealing task force. It made thousands of arrests: without, by any account, improving the situation. "It was strictly an enforcement effort, strictly

statistics," Sollazzo says. The task force typically shut down one spot only to find the same dealers shortly in business around the corner or dispersed to several new locations. Following them to their new haunts often simply meant they went back to work in the original location. "It was all short term," Sollazzo says. "The problem in fact escalated and spread throughout the community." The task force apparently made things hot enough in predominantly black neighborhoods that dealers, for the first time, moved heavily into more affluent white parts of town. This was what brought crack to the streets of Sulphur Springs, where dealing had been restricted to a small black section called Spring Hill Park. Police attention, says civic association leader Linda Hope, "scattered the dealing through the whole neighborhood. It was just like a shotgun, all over the Springs." The dealers soon discovered that they were scarcely more vulnerable in their new spots than they had been in the old ones.

This inability to handle Tampa's crack problem was enormously frustrating to the police. "I guess I was obsessed," says Bob Smith, Tampa's Public Safety Administrator, who sits over both the police and fire departments. "Every single day I'd ride the streets and look at different drug holes and contact the vice squad, or call the district to send somebody in uniform out to just get them off the corner. It was just total disorganization; we were just making it up as we went along. We never had anything like this before, never had a plan to deal with it. You begin to question your own ability, say, maybe we can't lick this, maybe this is bigger than our police department. Then you start blaming other people: the prisons, the families. Those were the kinds of things that were going on in my mind. I was just totally perplexed."

The same was true in the ranks. Department morale slipped, anger built, and as top department and city officials demanded action a certain recklessness was increasingly inviting. "You can only go out to these corners—10, 15, 20 real scum hanging there, people can't walk or drive by, they're calling the women names, dropping garbage all over the place—so many times and have them say '— you' to you," says one Tampa officer. "You can't make a case, you don't have the drugs, you saw them pass something into a car but you can't swear what it was, and you've got all these dirtbags saying, '— you, leave.'

Well, we just started saying, 'No. — *you*. *You're* leaving.' And we'd move them on. Nobody got hit, nobody got hurt, but we made sure that corner got cleaned up. It was the only way to protect the people who lived around there. And I'd go home at night and I'd think to myself, is this legal? Answer was, probably not. But we didn't ask anybody, we just did it. And I didn't lose any sleep over it."

Not even such genteel strong-arm tactics made much of a dent in the problem. "We had neighborhood people who would have hung me in effigy," says Mayor Freedman, "and the rest of us [in city government] would have been lined up in the trees alongside, they were so frustrated." In 1988, she launched a crackdown on abandoned houses being used as drug bazaars, burning down 54 in one weekend (and earning a rebuke from the EPA). The move seemed popular but failed to stanch the flow of drugs. Police, from Smith on down through the ranks, are one in believing that they had lost the city's confidence. They seem correct. Cherryl Franklin recalls with disdain a police captain telling her to buy private security if she wanted her area cleaned up. Linda Hope actually had a dream late in 1998 or early in 1989 that Tampa's citizens had gathered outside a huge glass building full of police, and the police were looking through the walls, offering to help, but refusing to come out or let the people in. By mid-1991, she had grown philosophical about this stage in Tampa's trials. "The police were trying to figure what to do; they didn't know what to do then," she says. At the time, she was furious. "They're the cops, they're supposed to know, they get all the big salaries," she says. "That's what their job is."

Street Drug Dealing and Alternative Strategies

Tampa's was a typical modern kind of street drug problem: extensive, fluid, pervasive, and extremely resistant to ordinary police tactics. Police experience with public drug dealing was once predominantly with heroin and, to a lesser extent, marijuana markets. Large examples of such markets, ones that affected whole neighborhoods and even whole cities, were relatively rare (New York's "Alphabet City" heroin market (cocaine was also sold) on the Lower East Side, which served buyers from all over New York and New Jersey and was so open and well organized that the clientele waited on

the street in orderly double lines, is a legendary example of the latter¹). Today, the drug is more likely to be cocaine, particularly crack cocaine, and markets with grossly deleterious direct and indirect effects on large areas are not particularly uncommon.

Cocaine markets take various forms. Some are densely concentrated in particular neighborhoods, developments or housing projects. Houston's Link Valley market took over a large cluster of good-quality residential apartment buildings; dealers in Los Angeles' Wilshire market worked primarily from front yards in a residential neighborhood.² Washington, DC's drug market, like Tampa's, seems to be spread more diffusely over a larger area, with every corner and vacant lot in large parts of town a potential retail outlet. All, however, seem to be oriented largely toward a drive-through clientele: buyers drive in, often from other areas of town or from out of town, make their purchases without leaving their vehicles, and drive out again. And while detailed research to prove the point is largely lacking, such markets are associated, in the minds of police and residents alike, with very high levels of serious crime and disorder.³

Traditional enforcement strategies have shown little success against street cocaine markets. Operations aimed at high-level traffickers show no sign of interrupting street-level drug supplies; one searches in vain for accounts of street markets affected to any significant degree by major drug

¹Kleiman, Mark A.R. "Crackdowns: The Effects of Intensive Enforcement on Retail Heroin Dealing" in *Street-Level Drug Enforcement: Examining the Issues* Chaiken, Marcia R, ed, National Institute of Justice, Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice, September 1988. 15. Also personal communication, former New York City Police Commissioner Ben Ward.

²On Link Valley, see Kennedy, David M. "Fighting the Drug Trade in Link Valley," Kennedy School of Government Case Study C16-90-935.0, 1990. On Wilshire, see Kennedy, David M, "Neighborhood Policing in Los Angeles," Kennedy School of Government Case Study C16-87-717.0, 1987.

³The case for a link between crack markets and crime is strengthened by anecdotal evidence from both Tampa and Houston that street crack dealers are willing to barter drugs for stolen goods and credit cards. It is not necessarily the case that even successful street drug enforcement will bring crime control benefits in train; as Mark Kleiman notes, the tendency of enforcement to drive up the price of heroin and increase addicts' criminal activity led to the conventional police wisdom that "the drug squad makes work for the robbery squad." Kleiman, "Crackdowns," 12. Cocaine users may not be addicted, or so seriously addicted as heroin users, and thus more likely to curtail use as their sources constrict. Alternatively, evidence that the "Broken Windows" hypothesis is correct and that stemming public disorder is an effective crime-control strategy may mean that quelling the disorder associated with street cocaine dealing brings important crime-control benefits in its wake. On "Broken Windows," see Skogan, Wesley, *Disorder and Decline: The Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods* (Free Press, New York, 1990).

prosecutions. Interdiction shows no more promise; street dealers' access to cocaine appears to be unaffected by seizing drugs at the border or on their way to market. Street-level enforcement as normally practiced, whether by patrol officers as part of their regular duties or through episodic task-force-style crackdowns, is costly, not easily combined with regular patrol, generally fails to take dealers off the streets for long, does nothing to prevent the entry of new dealers into the business, and frequently simply displaces dealers or the market to a new location (and that often only temporarily)⁴. Crackdowns, in particular, are often seen within police circles as a temporary expedient: useful for assuaging the community but ineffective long-term and rife with civil liberties problems.

Happily, there are new reasons to believe that not all street-level police responses need be a waste of time and energy. One set of findings stems from analysis of *successful* police crackdowns, primarily against the massive heroin and cocaine market in Alphabet City and a much smaller one in Lynn, Massachusetts.⁵ In each instance, intensive long-term street drug enforcement resulted in an apparently lasting suppression of street dealing. The Alphabet City and Lynn crackdowns were very similar. In each instance police used standard police tactics—on-sight arrests, undercover investigations, confidential informants, hot lines, and the like—to arrest as many dealers and buyers as possible, as often as possible (in Alphabet City, police also heavily enforced traffic and vehicle laws). Results showed, in each instance, within six months to a year. Street dealing declined dramatically (perhaps entirely in Lynn), public order improved, and reported crime fell markedly. In the Alphabet City area robberies, burglaries, and homicides went down 47, 37, and 62 per cent respectively, and public order increased to the point that development and gentrification became local political issues; in Lynn,

⁴Another issue frequently cited by police managers is the potential for corruption of patrol officers. This seems overdone; if anything, corruption is likely to be less of an issue for uniformed officers working in public against obvious, minor dealers than it is for plain-clothes officers working behind the scenes against traffickers with both resources and anonymity. My thanks to Robert Trojanowicz, Director of the School of Justice at Michigan State University, for this point.

⁵Kleiman, "Crackdowns"; Kleiman and Smith, Kerry D. "State and Local Drug Enforcement: In Search of a Strategy" *Drugs and Crime*, ed Tonry, Michael and Wilson, James Q. (University of Chicago Press, 1990). The following discussion of both the operations and of drug markets draws heavily from these papers.

robberies, burglaries and crimes against the person fell 18.5, 37.5, and 66 per cent citywide. In neither instance was either the market or the crime evidently displaced to surrounding areas.

The crackdowns' successes cannot be explained simply by looking to arrest and incarceration rates, though at least the former was very high in each instance: there is no reason to believe that either the Lynn or the New York City police put all their potential heroin dealers in prison and kept them there. One explanation is that the heavy enforcement so disrupted the markets—taking “market” here in both the geographic and the *economic* sense—that the drug trade was no longer sustainable.⁶ For street drug trade to perpetuate itself, buyers must have a reasonable expectation of making safe connections; dealers must have a reasonable expectation of making both safe and profitable connections. Intensive enforcement decreases the ease, the security, and the profitability of the street trade. It drives dealers into less visible and obvious locations, making them harder for buyers to find. Buyers and dealers who do connect become less willing to trade freely, since the risk of arrest for each transaction has increased. Arrests take dealers off the street for some length of time, reducing their productivity, and reduce return by causing the loss of drugs and money. Each buyer and dealer deterred or arrested means more police resources focussed on those who remain. At some point the game is no longer worth the candle and the market dries up. The key to crackdowns, on this analysis, is to maintain a level of effort great enough, for long enough, to cause this “tipping.” The Lynn and New York City experiences suggest that the crime control benefits can be considerable and that displacement is perhaps not as inevitable as is often supposed.⁷

The other major set of promising approaches to fighting street drug markets are drawn from community- and problem-solving policing theory and experience, which suggest that fresh preventive approaches may succeed where ordinary law enforcement cannot. One basic notion in these policing

⁶For a more complete economic analysis of important constituents of drug markets, see Mark Kleiman and Rebecca Young, “The Factors of Production in Retail Drug Dealing,” *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, forthcoming.

⁷This analysis is not universally accepted. For a critique, see Barnett, Arnold, “Drug Crackdowns and Crime Rates,” *Street-Level Drug Enforcement*.

strategies is that local conditions of one kind or another—abandoned buildings, bad lighting, other criminal activity, a cowed community—may facilitate drug dealing, and that those conditions can be addressed through nontraditional police tactics. The “Broken Windows” theory suggests that such combined efforts against serious crime and disorder are likely to be mutually reinforcing. Another basic notion is that the public and other government agencies can be useful police partners if the right working relationships can be established.⁸

One dramatic application of these ideas comes from Los Angeles, whose Wilshire drug market had proved extremely resistant to regular enforcement. In an operation aimed not only at street dealing but also at a severe prostitution problem, public drinking and various other order problems, and a wide variety of physical and other quality-of-life improvements, eight Wilshire patrol officers freed from their normal duties organized residents into block clubs and neighborhood watches; worked with the city to fix lighting, trim trees, haul away trash, and tow abandoned cars; staged graffiti “paint-outs,” and the like.⁹ Drug enforcement was ultimately facilitated by activist residents who passed police detailed intelligence gleaned primarily simply by looking out their windows: where dealing was taking place, descriptions of dealers and their schedules and travel patterns, and descriptions and license numbers of distributors’ and buyers’ vehicles. Progress against the geographically diffuse market was not as dramatic as in Lynn and Alphabet City, but it was considerable; most important, local residents and families once again felt free to use the streets. Similar police-public partnerships against street drug dealing have had equally positive results in Washington, DC, and elsewhere.¹⁰

⁸A large literature has accumulated on the relationship between crime and order, and on policing strategies designed to link police with others in the coproduction of public safety. On crime and order, see, for instance, Skogan; on policing strategies, see Goldstein, Herman, *Problem-Oriented Policing* (McGraw-Hill Publishing Co, 1990), and Sparrow, Malcolm K, Moore, Mark H, and Kennedy, David M. *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing* (Basic Books, New York, 1990).

⁹See “Neighborhood Policing in Los Angeles.”

¹⁰For Washington, DC, see Simon, Harvey, “The Orange Hats of Fairlawn: A Washington DC Neighborhood Battles Drugs,” Kennedy School of Government Case Program C16-91-1034.0, 1991. For a sampling of antidrug (and

While the police involved did not have them in mind, Wilshire and similar community-policing efforts undoubtedly benefitted from some of the same market-disruption effects as did the Lynn and Alphabet City crackdowns: heavy, prolonged, and effective enforcement, however organized, will serve to increase the risk and difficulty, and reduce the return, of buying and selling drugs on the street. One operation noteworthy for combining all these themes—market disruption, community partnerships, and Broken Windows problem-solving—in one premeditated package was the Houston police department's successful strategy to shut down Link Valley.¹¹ The Link Valley market, which dealt primarily in powdered cocaine, had taken over the streets and buildings of a six-block area off a major freeway in the heart of Houston. Buyers from as far away as Louisiana exited the freeway into a grid of service roads, bought dope without getting out of their cars, and had their choice of several routes back on to the freeway. Dealers had made a terrible mess of the area's buildings and open spaces. Houston police made hundreds of arrests every year without making any dent in the trade; dealers frequently operated in plain view of marked cars. One operation was so robust it used flashlight wands to manage its traffic flow.

Finally, the department and an active coalition of residents from adjoining neighborhoods decided to try something new. One main idea was, says Sergeant J. W. Collins, who handled the matter for the police, to break the connection between buyer and seller. "If you don't have the consumer, then you're not going to have the buyer: the man in the McDonald's is not going to keep his McDonalds open if he doesn't sell enough burgers." The second main idea was to clean up and secure the area and its buildings, so that buyers and sellers alike would feel less at ease doing business there.

The plan was extraordinarily successful. The department first made a massive sweep, which was so heavily publicized no dealers were around that day to arrest. The city then blocked most access roads with concrete barriers, and officers freed from their ordinary duties staffed checkpoints to warn

other) partnerships from New York City, see "CPOP: Community Policing in Practice," Vera Institute of Justice, October 1988.

¹¹See "Fighting the Drug Trade in Link Valley."

vehicles using the remaining entry points that they were entering a dangerous area. Vehicles were not searched; the idea was simply to break the nerve of drive-through buyers. Police on the checkpoints say that many drivers simply turned around when they saw the checkpoints; many who did enter the area just cruised through and came back out again almost immediately. Local residents, meanwhile, mounted a huge clean-up, emptying ten semitrailers of trash out of the area, and encouraged landlords, sometimes with legal help from the city, to secure their buildings. Dealing ground to a halt: police made not a single narcotics arrest in Link Valley during the entire operation. The market evaporated: after a month the police lifted their cordon and neither dealers nor consumers returned. As far as the department could tell no similar market established itself elsewhere in town. Crime fell substantially in surrounding areas, and the neighborhood coalition turned its attention to promoting Link Valley's redevelopment.

The operation in Link Valley, Wilshire, Lynn, and Alphabet City suggest that disrupting markets, promoting order, and forging new forms of police/public partnerships may hold considerable promise against street drug dealing. They were, however, *localized* operations, mounted against more-or-less major, clearly identifiable concentrations of dealing. It has not been at all clear how to apply their lessons to the more dispersed, more easily displaced street-corner dealing of the kind that plagued Tampa and many other cities. It was fairly easy to crack down on buyer and sellers in Lynn, Alphabet City, and Link Valley: how to do so when dealers, and thus buyers, are not so conveniently concentrated? It was fairly easy, in Wilshire and Link Valley, to make physical improvements and recruit community allies; how to do so when the problem is less localized, less severe, and likely to change location rapidly? It was fairly easy, in all these cities, to recognize a particular drug-dealing problem and shape an unusual police response to address it; how to do so when the problem is not restricted to a single neighborhood or precinct and requires some kind of new operations throughout a department's jurisdiction?

These were not easy questions. Houston's Sgt. Collins could take visitors through a resurgent Link Valley, then cruise other parts of his precinct where small knots of crack dealers worked street corners, vacant lots, inside parking garages, and the like. They were problem enough to bother the residents and businesses nearby, but not problem enough to send the whole community up in arms. He knew of no easy way to keep buyers away. Regular police work just moved them around or led to their replacement by fresh faces. This was the same problem Tampa faced, if on a much smaller scale: suppressing an active, but geographically dispersed and easily displaced, street drug market. Neither Collins, nor, evidently, anyone else in policing knew how to do it. Shortly after William Bennett was named head of the Office of National Drug Control Policy in 1989, the new drug czar hosted a major law enforcement conference in Washington. "There must have been five hundred police officials in this place," says Tampa public safety administrator Bob Smith. "And Bennett asked a question from the podium: how many of you have a drug problem? Well, every hand went up. And then he asked the question, how many of you feel like you are making headway? No hands went up. I mean, *no* hands went up. And, talking to them, we were all doing the same thing. At some point, if we are all doing the same thing, and we are all not making any headway, you've got to ask yourself, is there a better way?"

Designing QUAD

By then, the Tampa Police Department was actively trying to find some better way. A planning group consisting of Smith, Chief of Police Austin McLane, Deputy Chief of Police Tom DePolis, and Major Bert Hatcher, by then head of the Tactical Division, had started throwing ideas around late in 1988, trying to come up with some fresh approach. They were driven, in more or less equal parts, by frustration over their lack of success to date and by a need to do something high-profile in the face of what it felt to be a swelling chorus of public dissatisfaction. "We had reached the point," says Smith, "where we had to do something dramatic."

What they wanted, inspired by the results from Lynn and some similar operations, was a way to crack down more or less simultaneously on all of Tampa's dope holes. The group was convinced from the outset that enforcement as such had and would continue to fail: the department had made more than 12,000 drug arrests in the last three years—equal to some 5 per cent of the city's population, an early planning document noted—to “minimal” effect. They held out some hope, though, for market disruption. Heavy street-level enforcement seemed like a promising tactic, but the goal was not arrest and incarceration as such, but to interfere with the market. The objective, the planning document says, “is to make it very difficult for dealers to make sales and for buyers to ‘score.’”

Much of the rest of the plan followed fairly directly from that key strategic decision. If they were going to crack down on the current street-selling sites, they knew that they had to have a way of identifying new sites resulting from the inevitable displacement. One way to accomplish that was to promote surveillance by residents, which meant that they needed some way for the public to cooperate with the police without exposure to retribution. They were inclined to believe in the “Broken Windows” link between disorder and crime, and thus that municipal help with physical problems in drug-dealing areas would be helpful. They wanted, for public relations purposes, the new operation to be clearly identifiable, high-profile and very responsive to the public. Finally, they had a clear and, for the police, somewhat unusual way to measure progress: by the *absence* of street drug sales and community complaint about the drug trade. Unlike Tampa's first crackdown, this one would not be measured by arrests and drug seizures. Only quiet streets and resident satisfaction would count. (See Exhibit 1 for the department's list of key QUAD program elements.)

Smith, Hatcher, *et al* decided early on to give a special unit primary responsibility for the crackdown. “This was a bigger problem than uniformed patrol could handle,” Smith says. “There was no way that they had the intelligence resources or could devote the full time that it took to bring it under control.” Using volunteers from the rest of the force, they created four ten-person teams, each made up of a sergeant, a corporal, and eight officers (including a K-9 officer). Tampa's active street-

selling locations were inventoried, and the city divided into four areas such that each had a more or less even share of the 61 sites identified (nearly half the city—the wealthier half—fell into one area).¹² One “QUAD Squad”—the name was originally simply short for “quadrant”; the “Quick Uniformed Attack on Drugs” came later—team was assigned to each area. The teams were originally under Hatcher’s direction; after QUAD had been running for about nine months they were put under a lieutenant in the Tactical Division’s Special Enforcement Bureau.

Their job was to do anything they legally could to make dealers’ and buyers’ lives miserable and improve public confidence in the police. Dealers were to be dissuaded by heavy enforcement: on-sight arrests for dealing, public drinking, et cetera; short-term undercover work and buy-busts; and the use of confidential informants. The QUAD teams thought that the resulting displacement might even work in their favor, since dealers might not feel as safe or work as readily in new locations, especially if the police were able to keep moving them around. A city code enforcement officer was detailed to the squad to organize the physical clean-up of dope holes, speed the condemnation and wrecking of abandoned buildings, and the like.

Buyers were to be directly dissuaded by mounting “reverse stings” in which officers posing as dealers sold drugs and then arrested the buyers; under Florida state law, buyers’ vehicles could also be seized. They were to be indirectly dissuaded by making it harder to find dealers: displacement, again, working in the police’s favor. The department planned to reinforce its work by actively encouraging media coverage, especially of enforcement against buyers. “When I came on here” at about the time QUAD got under way, says Steve Cole, who handles public relations for the department, “the complaint was all about perception: they think we’re not doing anything. And I said, that’s going to change. They’re going to think we’re *everywhere*. Nobody is going to buy crack anywhere in Tampa without thinking we’re looking over their shoulder.” Cole worked hard to win QUAD frequent media coverage, which the department considered essential to the strategy’s success.

¹²This was not a formal survey; narcotics officers simply cruised the city for one night shift and made a list.

Links with the public were to be handled according to two principles: responsiveness and confidentiality. Responsiveness had to do primarily with repairing the department's tattered reputation. All complaints having to do with street dealing were to be routed to QUAD, and Smith, as top policymaker, and Hatcher, as QUAD's effective commanding officer, made very clear that *every* one was to be attended to. Some visible action was to be taken, even if that meant, for instance, tending to a relatively minor problem in the evening, when the police presence would be noticed, and neglecting a more sizable early-morning problem. The department's concern for visibility also led the planning team to impose a one-day limit on QUAD's undercover work. Smith wanted QUAD officers out on the streets in uniform, not working undercover a week at a time. Each QUAD unit had a designated "sister squad" in narcotics to handle more sustained undercover work.

Confidentiality had to do with the department's crying need for intelligence. It wanted all the information the public was willing to pass on, and it did not want to inhibit people by insisting on names and addresses or that they be willing to appear in court, or expose them by sending officers to their doors. The department was particularly eager to have public help identifying dealers and new street-dealing spots. "Once they're setting up in a new neighborhood, we feel like it gives us an advantage," says Hatcher. "They're hungry now, they want to make sales. They're a little more eager, not as cautious. We need the public to tell us where they're at before they get entrenched. And we told people, 'For God's sake, if you see it, don't wait till it becomes a real problem. Call us right away, even if you got a doubt. Call us and let us be the judge.'"

To make safe contact as easy as possible, each QUAD officer was issued a digital beeper, the numbers of which were distributed in neighborhood watch and community meetings, which QUAD officers attended routinely, and through department pamphlets. The public was told to call whenever and however often it wanted, and that the police would do absolutely nothing to compromise their safety; they didn't even have to give their names if they chose not to. "We promised them total anonymity," Hatcher says. "We will call you on the phone, and we'll use the information you have to

try to do something, but if you don't want to get involved, you don't want to go to court, you don't have to. I promise you we will not come to your house. If it ever boils down to a judge saying, 'Well, the only way this case can proceed is, you have to bring forth the person who gave you this information,' we promised that we would dismiss the charges. It's not worth it. We will not expose you." QUAD officers and Smith took particular pride in having stuck to this pledge; to their knowledge QUAD never compromised any of their allies in the community.

The department knew that at best--if QUAD worked, if the market was disrupted, if the public signed up, if the dealers were driven off the corners--the most that might happen to the drug trade per se would be that it moved indoors. That seemed, nonetheless, a worthy goal. It would bring with it a huge improvement in the quality of life in afflicted areas. It seemed likely to cut down on violent battles over turf, and on the sex trade and related crime and disorder associated with the worst street locations. Many in the department suspected that it would cut down on drug use, particularly new drug use. "A lot of people aren't willing to actually get out of their cars and go into some stranger's house, or walk through the projects, or something like that to buy the drug," Hatcher says. "I think when you eliminate the drive-by trade, you eliminate a lot--maybe the biggest part--of the retail market." That, though, was a dream--possibly a fantasy--for the future. When QUAD was formally launched in February 1989, Tampa was still awash in street sales, and it was not at all clear things would get better anytime soon.

QUAD in Action

The density of the street trade at least made dealers and buyers alike ripe for the picking in QUAD's early days. Some of its first operations, massive reverse stings against buyers, were limited only by QUAD's ability to process arrestees. "We had it down to a science," says Hatcher. The squad, operating as one unit on these occasions, would set up a mobile command post--a large motor home complete with stenographer, property room, and vehicle-processing room--a few blocks from a heavy

dealing location. The real dealers would soon leave, but the drive-through buyers had no way of knowing the game had changed. One set of officers posed as dealers, another videotaped the transaction from under cover, another swooped in to arrest buyers and seize vehicles. "The buy would go down, the bust team would come in and arrest them and haul them off, pick up the tape and evidence; the secretary would be back there at the command post typing up the report, another guy is processing the evidence, another would be interviewing the prisoner, another one processing the car," says Hatcher. "End of the day we'd have what looked like a parking lot full of cars." A typical one-shift operation netted 30 to 45 people and almost as many vehicles (most vehicles were returned to their owners for a negotiated price; one unfortunate buyer lost and bought back his panel truck three separate times). The public, by all accounts, just loved this kind of thing. "They started doing the buyer knockdowns and people started to have a little bit of hope," Linda Hope says. Her Sulphur Springs group sent cheering sections to the command post when QUAD was in the neighborhood to provide coffee, sandwiches, and moral support.

The department took pains to give the media good access to the reverse stings. "We were on the tube all the time," says Hatcher. "It seemed like we really started to have an impact then: we were telling them, hey, that \$20 rock may cost you a \$20,000 car." For whatever reason, the impact of the stings was considerable. "29th and Lake was bad, extremely bad, probably the worst intersection in the city," says QUAD officer M. B. Hopper. "It was just unreal. When we first started doing reverses, we'd go out and arrest 30 people in a night. Then, all of a sudden, it just dropped off, went down to 3, 4 arrests a night. The bottom just dropped out; they quit buying."

Dealers, while always warier than buyers, were relatively easy to get in the early days as well. QUAD officers initially used, for the most part, standard enforcement techniques, making plainclothes buys (often while driving cars seized in the stings), setting up observation posts for on-sight arrests, using confidential informants to make buys and then taking out arrest warrants, and the like. The street sellers quickly became much more cautious. "They're real careful now; they're much,

much, much more careful," says Hopper. "If they have the slightest hint or the slightest feeling, they're not going to sell to you." That made arrests harder, but the police took it as a good sign, since genuine buyers were presumably equally inconvenienced. New tactics developed to replace the old. Some officers took to dressing in camouflage and sneaking up on dealers through vacant yards and drainage ditches; some used decoys like "stalled" cars to give them excuses to linger near dealers; one borrowed a wheelchair from a local hospital and wheeled himself all over his area one night buying dope from overly secure, and ultimately very unhappy, street vendors.

Some of the new tactics had nothing to do with arrest at all. One favorite activity was simply to make it unappealing to do business. QUAD officers sometimes parked marked cars at each end of a dealing area and strolled around in uniform: nobody got busted, but nobody made any money either. "People just start disappearing," Hopper says. One officer shut down an intransigent group of dealers who'd set up, complete with lawn chairs, near a public housing project by showing up one day with his own lawn chair and keeping them company for his whole shift. QUAD officers got in the habit of driving marked cars by dope holes every time they were on their way to anywhere else, sometimes taking a few minutes to make repeated passes or waiting half an hour for dealers to resume business and then coming back. They took particular delight in making dealers physically uncomfortable: hauling away chairs and couches dealers had set up on street corners, confiscating coolers of beer and wine, having the city trim trees and shrubs that provided shade from the hot Florida sun. That attention alone was sometimes enough to shut a spot down. The city streamlined both its civil abatement and code enforcement procedures. The first allowed it to close businesses—chiefly bars, convenience stores, and the like—that were fronts for or catered to drug dealing, the second to speed up the condemnation and razing of substandard, often abandoned structures that had become havens for street dealers. By the fall of 1991, acting on leads from QUAD, the city had leveled over a hundred buildings.

Reach Out and Bust Someone

Much to the surprise of many of QUAD'S line officers, there was broad support from Tampa's public, and people did pass on useful information. Participation and support from white and more affluent neighborhoods had never been much in question. Even before QUAD got underway, Linda Hope's association had compiled a complete, written analysis of where and when drugs were being dealt in Sulphur Springs, and as far as it could tell by whom, and turned the whole lot over to an astonished department. That continued with the new beeper links to QUAD. "One of the gals one time called and said, 'I did it,'" says Hope. "Did what? She goes, 'I called, a guy is dealing across the street and I've had it and I called and I got somebody and I said, 'Listen, he's out there now, and he's wearing this and he's wearing that, and he's got the dope in this pocket, and I'm going to stay on the line till somebody comes and arrests him.'" And somebody did."

The support of the poorer black community had not been so certain. "It's always been," says Officer Hopper, "you go to a scene, in the poorer parts of town, you try to get information, and you don't get the information. Nobody's seen anything. Nobody knows what happened; nobody knows how this guy got shot or got hurt or who sold the dope or whatever it may be. So when I first started [QUAD], I'm thinking, we're swimming uphill here. These people aren't going to help us at all. And it was just the way I thought; it was a very hard swim to begin with. But then, once they started to get a little confidence in what QUAD was doing, and started reading articles about it, and the news media started helping with showing the stuff we're doing out there, more and more people came along into the program. Even if it was just to pick up the phone and call your beeper number and say, there's dope dealers here."

QUAD's officers thought that the anonymity afforded by their beepers was crucial to recruiting allies. "Providing beepers gave people the perfect opportunity," says Hopper. "I don't know why anybody didn't think of it before, because it's so obvious. Just call the beeper; I don't even need to know your name. Just give me a description of the guy and the corner he's standing on and I'll do what I

can for you. The beepers have worked really, really well." This seemed particularly important in Tampa's black community. "Black people, especially, only want to call anonymously," says QUAD Sergeant J. L. Counsman. "I want to tell you about my problem, but please don't send a car to my house." We say, that's fine, we just want the information; just tell me over the phone." This new, positive contact with even the poorest parts of the black community changed some officers' views considerably. "You get this 'us and them' attitude, and I've been as guilty of it as anybody else," says Hopper. "This kind of takes away from that. You actually get to see that not everybody that lives in the projects is bad. There's a lot of bad in there, but not everybody. It kind of sheds new light on the way you look at things as a policeman." Abe Brown, a black minister active in community anti-drug organizing, agrees. "There was a bad feeling from the police department toward the black community, and from the black community toward the police department," he says. "It went both ways. Both sides are turning around now. That's how the black community is. When we find we're being fairly treated, we're quick to forgive."

In an unexpected twist, QUAD's beepers turned out to facilitate an unusual and highly effective tactic for impeding dealers' cash-flow. Street dealers typically keep relatively small stashes of drugs on their persons in case they're arrested or ripped off, replenishing as required from a larger supply hidden somewhere nearby. Residents watching a drug hole from, say, a nearby house could often tell, after some time, that drugs were probably hidden in a particular tree or a certain patch of tall grass. After they'd been in business for a while, QUAD officers started getting phone calls, sometimes anonymous, passing that information on: and if they didn't have the time or the inclination to make a proper arrest (which involved making a buy personally or through an informant, or getting close enough actually to see drugs change hands), they could simply go to the tree and take the crack. Officers report that this happened quite a lot; K-9 officers and their dogs sometimes were able to do much the same thing without the public input. For whatever reason, the department's contacts in the Tampa drug trade reported, some six months after QUAD started work street dealers stopped being able to get crack

on credit, which had been a common practice until then. Street dealing in Tampa had become a pay-as-you-go business.

The department and the city developed several new statutory tools to help QUAD's operations. One was a new city ordinance, based on an existing city antiprostitution law, called "Manifesting For the Purpose of Selling Illegal Drugs." It applied to known drug sellers or users and to people in known drug-dealing locations, and made it a crime if such a person "repeatedly beckons to, stops, attempts to stop or engage in conversation with passersby," or "repeatedly passes to or receives from passers-by" drugs or drug-related materials. The department took pains, it says, to use the law sparingly for fear of perceptions of abuse: departmental policy authorized its application only for serious problem areas where other methods were unproductive, and then only by certain specially-trained officers. The ordinance survived several court challenges during QUAD's first two-and-a-half years.

QUAD officers took the idea a step further by printing up an international-orange adhesive poster citing the law and saying in heavy black letters

WARNING
HIGH DRUG ACTIVITY AREA

Persons observed loitering
for the purpose of engaging
in illegal drug activity are
subject to Tampa Police
Department Officers
questioning and arrest.

These were posted liberally in and around active dope holes (some time after the worst of Tampa's problem was behind it, they still dotted many sections of town, in various degrees of fadedness and tatteredness, leaving a kind of sedimentary history of the street drug trade). They served several

purposes. They arguably did something to deter dealers and buyers, they let local residents know QUAD was on the case, and dealers often ripped them down as fast as they went up: at which point QUAD could arrest them for littering.

Department and city lawyers also developed a form business and property owners could sign empowering police officers to prevent trespass on their premises. Without the form, using trespass law to move dealers off a privately-owned vacant lot, the parking lot of a closed business, or even the yard of a vacant house meant, in each instance, tracking down the owner and obtaining a complaint. With the form signed, police could simply get on with it. Businesspeople and absentee landlords, by department report, particularly liked the option, and their premises too were liberally blazoned with posters--these fluorescent green--announcing the department's power to act.

All these different tactics added up to quite a rich menu of possibilities QUAD applied as seemed needful to the various problem areas it faced. "All the things we've done," says QUAD Lieutenant Steve Hogue, "the buy-busts, the reverse stings, the sitting in lawn chairs, search warrants, tearing down houses--I'm sure it's all been discounted, there aren't very many brand new ideas, I don't have some crystal ball up here--but what it amounts to is basically applying all of those different things. And each area may be different. You go to one area and the problem is trimming the trees back so there isn't so much shade, or maybe the problem is just cutting the grass, or maybe the problem is when he throws his dope down we can never find it because the place is like a landfill, so we have to get the Sanitation Department to come clean it up for us. Or maybe we just go in and make arrests; maybe we use a very traditional approach. Each situation comes up different. We do whatever it takes to instill the community with confidence and get the job done."

Impact

By the summer of 1989, six months or so after QUAD hit the streets, it was starting to be clear to the police and the public that they were winning. Cherryl Franklin, who desperately wanted her

building and park cleaned up, was an early and eager volunteer, and made liberal use of her beeper numbers. As far as she knows she was the only one in the area to take that risk, but that turned out to be enough. "Within two or three weeks I had seen results," she says. "Right after we had had our first meeting they came out the next couple days. The way they worked: I just sit in the backyard, drink a glass of lemonade and watch 'em, it was nice. They'd drive up from different directions and swoop down on the park and they just sort of corralled everybody out there, take pictures, take names and what they called intelligence, come out with the dogs, let the dogs sniff around for a while. I thought it was effective just because it showed some concentrated police effort. Whereas before the QUAD Squad, they were used to seeing a squad car, maybe two; they'd see that blue and white and start running through the project.... The way QUAD just came down on them, it was nice."

Dealers in her area started working nights, and QUAD—guided and goaded by Franklin's calls—followed them; they started working exclusively inside the complex, and QUAD followed them there. Inside of six months the area was the next best thing to clean. "There are still some days now when you can come through and I'll see one," she says. "It's because I know them; you, or just an observer, just coming through here, would think it's clean. And it is clean, for the most part. I can do things now that I've never done; I can go outside, and sit outside, and the kids can use the park."

It was the same in Sulphur Springs. "It was probably within a couple of months that you could see a real difference," says Linda Hope. Inside six months to a year, Sulphur Springs had returned almost to its pre-crack self. Obvious street dealing had stopped entirely. Where once dealers were so bold as to stop cars in the street and hitch rides on pickup trucks, even Hope with her eagle eyes and vast local intelligence network could only find one or two instances of even semipublic dealing. "A couple of months ago, up there on Eskimo just north of Yukon there was a guy standing in the yard and there was somebody in a little shed out back," she says. "And then over on 17th Street there was a door cracked in a duplex and there's a guy there with a red hat that we'd seen over on the other side of the neighborhood. So it's just little things like that: the average person wouldn't have seen it."

Things had gone pretty much as Smith and his planning team had hoped. Displacement had occurred. In the first year, 80 new dealing locations were added to the original QUAD list of 61 (some of those new spots, the department says, would have been on the original list had it known about them at the beginning). The department's own surveillance and the public help evidently did an adequate job of keeping QUAD current on where dealing was occurring. Enforcement had been heavy: In its first year QUAD arrested 2,472 people and charged them with 4,342 offenses; patrol officers arrested another 2,522 people for narcotics offenses over the same time.

Something new had clearly happened, however. Those figures were not that much higher than those of the previous, largely ineffectual enforcement efforts of the pre-QUAD years, and there was no way that QUAD's 41 officers could come close to maintaining a constant presence, much less constant enforcement, at all 141 spots (much less the infinitude of potential sites). Nonetheless, the street drug trade was all but dead. By the department's accounting, only nine of the 141 were active in March 1990; by the fall of 1991 the count had eased up to 15: mostly in housing projects, "our nemesis," says Lieutenant Hogue. "I wouldn't say we've solved the problem, because it would come back if we stopped," says Captain Sallazzo. "But we're on top of it." The department was convinced that any slackening of pressure would see the dealers return, and both old and new spots episodically showed small-scale activity that QUAD did its best—mostly successfully—to shut down promptly. For the most part, though, outside of this continuing "maintenance" work, the battle seemed won. "I see QUAD as having done a tremendous job helping us clean up the drug problem, all over town," says black activist Abe Brown.

Somewhere along the line, as the department had hoped, buying and selling drugs on Tampa's streets had stopped being an attractive proposition. Nobody could tell which elements mattered the most to QUAD's success—the pressure on consumers, the forced displacement of dealers, the sheer volume of arrests, the artful market disruption, the "Broken Windows" work, or the various markers that the public and police tolerance for the drug trade had ended. But successful it certainly seemed to

have been. "I can't remember," says Mayor Freedman, "the last time I heard a complaint about drug dealing."

There were other gratifying signs. Demand expanded at DACCO, the city's main drug-treatment program, though large waiting lists make it impossible to say by just how much. Tampa's crime rate for 1989 fell 12.4 per cent and the number of index crimes per 100,000 residents fell to 16,400: not as low as pre-crack's 1985 level, but lower than 1986. The downward movement ran counter to trends both state-wide—Florida's index crimes per 100,000 residents grew from 8228.4 in 1986 to 8804.5 in 1989—and in neighboring St. Petersburg, where the measure moved from 9,983 in 1986 to approximately 12,000 in 1990.¹³ Any effect on calls for police service is hard to figure, since Tampa went to a 911 system for the first time late in 1988, but calls did fall—from 606,755 to 549,402—between 1989 and 1990. Drive-by shootings and similar violence associated with turf battles for street dealing territory had stopped almost entirely. Homicides the department classified as drug-related fell by 50 per cent between 1988 and 1989—from 16 to 8—then down to seven in 1990.¹⁴ "They're not having gun fights out on the street corners anymore," says Lieutenant Hogue. "QUAD's effective. There's no other way to explain it."¹⁵

¹³Tampa's rates for the relevant period were 12,325.8 index crimes/100,000 in 1984, 15,109.8 in 1985, 17,324.9 in 1986, 17,564.2 in 1987, and 15,178.6 in 1989. Accurate figures for 1988 and 1990 are not available. Tampa Police Department. Florida's were 7574.2 index crimes/100,000 in 1985, 8228.4 in 1986, 8503.2 in 1987, 8937.6 (est) in 1988, 8804.5 in 1989, and 8810.8 in 1990. FBI. St. Petersburg's were 8,695 in 1985, 9,983 in 1986, 10,876 in 1987, 12,527 in 1989 (approx), and 11,969 in 1990 (approx). Accurate figures for 1988 are not available. St. Petersburg Police Department.

¹⁴Statewide drug-related homicides were 112 in 1985, 114 in 1986, 137 in 1987, and 119 in 1989. Accurate figures for 1988 and 1990 are not available. Florida Department of Law Enforcement.

¹⁵Assessing QUAD's impact is complicated by the fact that the department hired an additional 101 officers in May 1989, bringing its strength to 853 sworn. It seems unlikely, for three reasons, that the department's increased strength was responsible for much of the effect attributed to QUAD. First, much of the increase was used to refill patrol positions left empty when QUAD was formed, serving to bring the department's production of patrol activities back up to the pre-QUAD baseline from the *lower* level of QUAD's first several months. Second, most of the remaining new strength was used to form two street-crime task forces deployed in Tampa's toughest housing projects. Insofar as the teams were able to suppress drug sales in those projects, as they likely did to some extent, one would expect the street crack trade to be displaced elsewhere, making QUAD's job harder rather than easier. Finally, the department and residents saw marked, city-wide improvements in street conditions both before and in the first months after the new officers came on. In the first case the new patrol strength could not have mattered; in the second it is not likely to have made much of a contribution very quickly, particularly since the department had it focused on call-response rather than narcotics or crime prevention duties. In the longer run the new strength may have helped; both Tampa's pre-QUAD experience, and policing's general experience, with the inefficacy of ordinary patrol activities against street drug sales suggest that the contribution would not have been large.

Lessons Learned

QUAD raises the welcome prospect that street drug sales can be dealt with, even in large, geographically dispersed markets. The common inability to jail street dealers for long stretches, and to prevent enforcement from causing displacement, need not be seen as insurmountable obstacles to effective suppression of street dealing. QUAD seems to bear out the theses that attacking the *market* in which drug sales take place is a powerful strategy, that attacking disorder is at the very least a powerful supporting tactic, that suppressing street drug sales is a productive crime control strategy, and that close working partnerships with the public are both possible and productive. Tampa's use of beepers represents a significant innovation for the field, both as a tool for building links to the community in troubled areas and as a way to facilitate partnerships against mutable and geographically widespread problems. They also raise the possibility that confidentiality may be a key police tool in promoting community responses to crime and order problems, a notion applicable to a wide variety of issues beside drug dealing.

It is worth noting that the Tampa police make no claim to have significantly reduced drug use in the city: for the most part, they suspect, dealing has moved off the street and indoors, primarily in the black community. It stands to reason that many casual and first-time users, particularly whites, would find it difficult to learn of the new sites, and that many who could will choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity.¹⁶ Drugs, however, are still being sold in Tampa, and further inroads against drug-related crime and order problems, and other important drug-related issues like crack babies and AIDS, require additional and different solutions. This is not to slight QUAD's accomplishment. QUAD's very success, however, underscores the fact that drugs as such, and drug-

¹⁶The notion that many crack users are episodic, and thus relatively easily deterred, consumers is bolstered by police observation of housing-project drug markets in Los Angeles, where drive-through crack purchasers—who may or may not ever return—are considered fair game for ripoff artists, while dealers put heroin buyers—steady long-term customers—off limits. My thanks to LAPD officer Joe Walker for this point.

related street crime and order problems, need to be addressed through distinct--if, undoubtedly, mutually reinforcing--responses.

The Tampa police were itself, two years into the QUAD operation, suffering to some extent from a conflation of the two. By mid-1991, QUAD, as noted, had largely accomplished its stated original goal of suppressing the street trade and making the streets safe, or at least as safe as they'd ever been. QUAD itself, however, at least in the lower ranks, had never entirely embraced the formal view that it was, at bottom, a a safe-streets squad rather than a drug squad. As the streets quieted down, QUAD increasingly began to function as kind of lower-tier narcotics unit, following the small-scale drug trade into the homes and project apartments where it had been forced by the pressure outside.

What this meant, in practice, was that QUAD was serving a lot of warrants--and kicking down some doors--in the black parts of town. This may or may not have been a good idea; it certainly represented a new phase in the operation. It is likely that the crime and order benefits of heavy enforcement will differ depending on whether the drug trade is private and hidden from public view or is public and overt. It is possible that community reaction to large numbers of forced police entries into residences will differ from community reaction to enforcement against street dealing, or that the new phase demanded a new community relations strategy.

The department was in a difficult position, however, having won its first war against the street dealers. Having decided to set QUAD up as separate unit, it was now faced with the problem of keeping it busy. Disbanding it seemed impossible, since "maintenance" seemed necessary to prevent the resurgence of street sales. Maintenance work was not demanding enough, though; QUAD needed more to do, and chasing drug sales, wherever they might be, seemed the obvious answer. It may not have been. Public Safety Administrator Smith thought that public housing projects and certain neighborhoods might benefit more from a Wilshire-style community policing project that addressed a whole range of local problems rather than simply drug dealing. Neither QUAD, however, nor at least for the moment any other part of the department, saw that as its job (though QUAD had at least taken a few tentative

steps in this direction, working with residents in Sulphur Springs and elsewhere to mount big neighborhood cleanups and with Abe Brown to support anti-drug streetcorner pickets).

The situation represented a classic problem in police administration: should one set up a special unit to do a special job, or try somehow to integrate it with the patrol force or another existing strength? Special units bring energy and focus to a task, and then problems when the problem is solved or changes form. The patrol force is large and at least potentially flexible, but hard to focus on jobs that interfere with answering calls for service.¹⁷ Departments seeking to emulate Tampa's success may want to devote some thought to ways to integrate QUAD's insights about market suppression, order maintenance, and community mobilization into patrol operations, or, alternatively, how to manage a special unit once it has been successful in the field. Managing success against the street drug trade is, at least, a happier problem than wondering if success is possible. Such is Tampa's contribution.

¹⁷For a discussion of attempts to deal with these issues, see *Beyond 911*.

Cops Enter Homes to Seize Kids' Guns

By Laurel Shaper Walters

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

ST. LOUIS

IN St. Louis, police have come up with a novel way to get guns out of the hands of kids. They're looking under their beds and in their closets.

It's part of an unusual search-and-seizure program in which officers go door-to-door in high-crime areas and ask families if they can come into their homes to look for firearms.

Many parents are welcoming them - either because they are afraid to confront their chil-

dren about the guns or they don't suspect them of hiding any.

In fact, these searches are turning up a lot of weapons. The year-old program is credited with helping achieve last year's record seizure of nearly 4,000 guns in St. Louis. More than 400 firearms were confiscated in 1994 after parents signed consent-to-search forms.

Now the idea is spreading: San Diego and Pasadena, Calif., have established their own consent-to-search programs. At least 25 other cities have expressed interest.

"The option has always been there," says Lt. Joseph Richardson, an aide to St. Louis Police Chief Clarence Harmon. "Consent-to-search is one exception under the Constitution to the search-warrant rule. However, it was mostly used in situation-specific or reactionary situations. This is more proactive."

If a consent-to-search form is signed, officers can search the house without a warrant. The consent-to-search form states that no arrests will be made if illegal guns are found in a home. But the firearms will be seized. "Our primary focus is on getting the weapons away from the child," Lieutenant Richardson says.

Ninety-five percent of parents sign the form, according to the St. Louis Police Department. In about half of the searches, at least one gun is found stashed in a teenager's closet or hidden under the bed.

As frustration with juvenile crime grows, police departments are aggressively looking for new approaches to combat the problem.

"This is evidence of very creative, innovative responses to the crisis level of firearms violence in

urban communities," says Richard Rosenfeld, a professor of criminology at the University of Missouri in St. Louis.

Constitutional concern

But the broadened use of consent as an exception to the constitutional requirement for a search warrant concerns the American Civil Liberties Union and others who are leery of broadening police powers.

"There can be a very strong chilling effect," says Joyce Armstrong, director of the St. Louis ACLU office. "We're talking about a slippery slope here. There could be problems with coerciveness and intimidation, maybe even corruption. It has to be monitored very, very closely."

"Programs like this have to be scrupulous with respect to the violation of people's civil liberties," agrees Professor Rosenfeld. "But I think the St. Louis program is scrupulous."

"We've put in a lot of safeguards so we are not violating people's rights," Richardson says. A sergeant always accompanies two officers to homes that are searched, and they never go inside without a parent or guardian present. Although the consent-to-search idea can be applied in other circumstances, the department is for the most part limiting its use to juveniles.

Police point to evidence that the program has widespread support in the community. "We have parents call our hot line and say, 'I think my son has a gun in his room, but I'm afraid to confront him about it,'" says Sgt. Simon Risk. "They leave a name and address and ask us to act like we don't know anything when we come over."

Few complaints

One mother who works evenings wanted to sign 10 consent forms and have officers drop by anytime to check the house. "We told her we couldn't do that," Sergeant Risk says.

Roger Goldman, a professor of law at St. Louis University, sees no problem with searches that are

initiated by a parent. "But," he says, "when you have police officials standing in your doorway in the middle of the night like that, it's just too close to a police state to me."

This shift toward "the carrot rather than the stick" is disturbing, Mr. Goldman says. "In effect, it's saying, 'Let us violate your rights and we will reward you by

'We have parents call our hot line and say, 'I think my son has a gun in his room, but I'm afraid to confront him about it.'

- Sgt. Simon Risk

not arresting anyone.' That to me is an implicit threat."

The ACLU office has received few complaints about the program, Ms. Armstrong says. "But some people have called and said they felt they had no choice [but to sign the consent form and allow the search]. They were told that they did have a choice, but they were standing there facing the police."

Richardson emphasizes "that this program takes a 'soft approach.'"

"We don't go crashing down doors," he says. If someone does not want to sign the consent form, "we say thank you very much and we walk away."

That may be the case in St. Louis where Chief Harmon is credited with running a tightly monitored department, Goldman says. "But what is worrisome is that the program is catching on in other places. Abuses are there waiting to happen."

Consent should be an exception rather than the rule, Goldman argues.

"These kinds of short circuits around the Constitution seem appealing in the short run. But overall it is a dangerous way to go."

✓ The Math Is Haywire

Almost 194,000 federally licensed gun dealers, only 200 compliance agents

The arrest of a Temecula truck driver last week on charges of being involved in an illegal gun-dealing operation that supplied hundreds of cheap firearms to gang members and others in Orange County is an example of effective police work. This kind of work deserves a lot of praise. It also deserves greater support by those who write federal laws.

Here's what we mean. According to the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, there are about 969 federally licensed gun dealers for every federal agent assigned to ensure compliance with the law. With only about 200 inspectors for 193,924 licensed dealers, violations tend to slip through the cracks. And

when they do, the burden of cleaning up the mess usually falls on law enforcement in the field. In this case, authorities say, the mess was created by James Larry Simmons and two accomplices, who allegedly were able to acquire quantities of weapons on the cheap and then sell them to all comers.

About 1,700 firearms reportedly were traced to Simmons. Guns were said to have been sold without proper federal paperwork, the requisite criminal background checks and the 15-day waiting period required under California law. Authorities say the flow of weapons was broken only when a firearm used in a shootout between a gang member and a Santa Ana police officer was traced.

According to federal authorities, the full effects of Simmons' gun selling are still unknown. As it now stands, guns sold by Simmons' merry band have been found in six states, authorities say. Simmons' lawyer says it's all a tempest created by the suspect's sloppy paperwork.

Congress last year increased licensing fees and required gun-dealer applicants to comply with state and local laws before they could receive a license. That's fine, as far as it goes. But 194,000 gun dealers are still more than the government can possibly keep track of. And if Congress fails to further tighten the licensing requirements, thereby making it tougher to qualify as a gun dealer, no one should wonder why the slaughter goes on and on.

Los Angeles Times

Tactics Designed to Stop Crime Before It Occurs

DATE: 4-14-95

PAGE: B2

■ **Law:** Measures bar would-be wrongdoers from activities such as walking on the street or carrying a baseball bat. But such prohibitions have angered civil liberties groups, who claim they violate the Constitution.

By JULIE TAMAKI
TIMES STAFF WRITER

Once a lady of the night, "Passion" now plies her trade on Sunset Boulevard in broad daylight. She changed her hours after a judge convicted her of prostitution and then, as a condition of her probation, banned her from performing a laundry list of otherwise legal acts from dusk to dawn.

Now police can arrest her for violating her probation if they spot her walking down the street or talking to motorists.

"I don't think it's fair," she said.

City and county officials in Southern California—pushed to the limit by panhandlers, prostitutes and gang members—are experimenting with a wide range of methods that attempt to curb crimes before they are committed. It is one of the newest trends in fighting crime. Seemingly mundane acts—carrying a cellular phone, standing on a street corner, even wearing a belt buckle—can now be punished by fines or jail time.

To the dismay of public defenders and civil libertarians, far-reaching local laws and court orders have sprung up from Bakersfield to Panorama City to Burbank since the late 1980s, banishing gang members from favorite hangouts or barring them from being seen together in public.

A tough anti-loitering ordinance aimed at drug dealing is on the books in Monrovia, and, at the request of police, prosecutors in the northwestern San Fernando Valley have quietly begun asking judges to banish panhandlers from profitable corners.

From South-Central Los Angeles to the Valley, strict probation conditions have driven prostitutes out of their old neighborhoods.

The new tactics are gaining converts, or at least sparking interest, in cities across the nation.

"California is leading the way in many respects in anti-crime programs," said Kim Ogg, the anti-gang director for Houston, who stopped in Los Angeles County last fall to get a firsthand look at injunctions issued against gangs in Burbank and Norwalk.

But the programs are not without critics, who contend illegalizing behavior that is legal in almost all other circumstances is just a temporary solution—Passion still works steadily—and flies in the face of the Constitution.

"What we're really saying is, we don't have the resources to wait until you commit the crime," said Los Angeles County Deputy Public Defender Alex Ricciardulli. "So we're not going to punish you for what you do, we're going to punish you for what you are."

Not so, say prosecutors and police, who applaud these new "tools" to stomp out crime in neighborhoods torn by vice and violence.

"We have to become more progressive, more innovative and employ new techniques," said Burbank Police Sgt. Eric Rosoff.

While the trend apparently began in Southern California when Los Angeles City Atty. James Hahn obtained a broad injunction against a Westside gang in 1987, other cities and communities took the prohibitions to new levels.

In 1991, the San Fernando City Council banned gang members from Las Palmas Park after a mother and her three young children were wounded by gang

cross-fire.

The following year, Burbank authorities won a court order banning suspected gang members from being seen together on a section of West Elmwood Avenue, including some who lived there, after two people were shot and injured within hours of each other on a single day.

The slaying of apartment owner Donald Aragon on Van Nuys' infamous Blythe Street in the fall of 1992 prompted the city attorney's office to obtain a controversial court injunction to curb the acts of a gang they said had taken over an entire block.

"We had a neighborhood under siege," said Los Angeles Deputy City Atty. Jule Bishop, who helped draft the injunction

and has prosecuted gang members for violating it.

Issued in 1993, the injunction bars gang members from doing everything from possessing portable telephones to standing on rooftops. The order also established a curfew for juvenile gang members.

Last August, county prosecutors received an injunction against a Norwalk gang establishing curfews and forbidding 22 members of the Orange Street Locos to, among other things, carry crowbars, baseball bats or other potential weapons.

Law enforcement authorities and some residents say the methods have been effective.

The restrictions imposed on the Westside and San Fernando gang members, for example, were allowed to expire after violence in those communities subsided.

Norwalk residents said the injunction there has restored calm to a street where they were once regularly terrorized by fire bombings, gunfire and car break-ins.

Los Angeles County Dist. Atty. Gil Garcetti touted the Norwalk program, saying it "restores hope that you can take your communities back."

And in Burbank, "the gang that was prevalent is much less active," Rosoff said. "They got an idea that 'this is our kingdom,' but the order took a lot of wind out of their sails."

But not everyone is satisfied that justice is being served.

Jennie Marquez and other Elmwood residents said they have never considered the boys on the block to be gang members, and that little has changed in their neighborhood since the injunction took effect.

"The cops have their view and we have our view," Marquez said.

Some critics go a step further. They say gang injunctions ignore the right to due process, promote guilt by association and perpetrate stereotypes.

"You get a mentality in the mind of police and the public that if you see groups of black and brown men they are gang members," said Edward Chen, a staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, which is appealing an injunction issued against a San Jose gang. (Legal challenges are also pending against the Burbank and Blythe Street injunctions.)

Jonathan Turley, a professor of constitutional and criminal law at George Washington University, chastises the tactics as a "mutation of the legal system."

"There are many nations around the world that have all but eliminated crime by eliminating most individual freedoms," Turley said. "Los Angeles County seems to have forgotten that the challenging task in a free society is to restrict criminal activity while accommodating individual freedoms."

Turley, who believes at least several of the court orders are unconstitutional, said he finds the trend particularly troubling because it signals a willingness among judges to go along with the public's increasing desire for retribution against criminals.

Some judges, however, have agreed with Turley.

Saying it violated the Constitution, an Orange County Superior Court judge last year dissolved a temporary court order that had prohibited four dozen members of a gang from "standing, sitting, walking, driving, and gathering or appearing anywhere in public view" with each other in a 25-square-block area of Westminster. The district attorney's office has appealed the decision.

The previous year, a group of Beverly Hills Municipal Court judges resisted imposing a set of tough probation conditions recommended by prosecutors that would have prohibited convicted prostitutes from nine acts, including sitting on any bus bench without boarding the first bus that arrived.

Residents of Blythe Street say the injunction on their street has led to police harassment.

"It's like we're in prison," said Gisela Valenzuela, 16, who, like others on the block, said she has been stopped and questioned by police on numerous occasions, even though she is not a gang member. Valenzuela, who said she generally likes the police, said the problem usually arises when new officers are assigned to the beat. Officers familiar with the residents don't make as many mistakes, she said.

Anne Stumpo Sanchez, of the Immaculate Heart Community, a religious society of lay people who have been acting as advocates for Blythe Street residents, agreed that the most frequent complaint her organization receives is that police apply the injunction too broadly.

Her organization began offering training programs for residents earlier this year to help them learn how to address the problem and others. "When it hits you personally, you stop and think, 'What is this all about?'" she said.

Police counter that Blythe Street is still plagued by drug dealing and that if officers accidentally question the wrong person it's a price that must be paid for better police protection.

"In order for us to help people in the area have to put up with something," said Officer George Flores, who has patrolled Blythe for more than four years.

Back in Hollywood, it is clear to Los Angeles Deputy City Atty. Bill Sterling why he worked with police to draft the probation conditions that restrict prostitutes.

"The fact is, people in this neighborhood have the right to be protected from street-walking prostitution and the blight that comes with it," Sterling said.

In the past, police officers had three ways to catch prostitutes: The officers had to be solicited, catch them in the act with a customer, or get a prostitute to agree to engage in a sex act and then wait for her to attempt to carry it out.

Under the new program, which has since spread to the San Fernando Valley and South-Central Los Angeles area, convicted prostitutes are handed maps marked with areas where they are not welcome.

Prostitutes like "Jazz," for example, can now be arrested between 5 p.m. and 6 a.m. for talking to motorists, sitting in parked cars with them or accepting rides. She is also barred from standing on a public street unless she is engaged in a lawful activity.

To the frustration of police, instead of stopping crime, the court orders have merely moved it around. Or at least changed its hours.

"I don't miss working nights at all," said Jazz with a grin.

Vice officers hope to quash the prostitutes' countermeasures with even more restrictions, such as extending the prohibitions around the clock.

"We have to keep playing this chess game with the prostitutes," said LAPD Sgt. Bryan Wong, assigned to the Hollywood vice unit.

Sterling thinks he may have another solution. He is waiting for the state attorney general's office to issue a decision on whether a pair of local laws passed by the city of Bakersfield are preempted by state law.

The Bakersfield ordinances make it illegal for people to loiter or wander about public property with the intent to commit prostitution or drug dealing if the opportunity arises.

"If we could get a law like the one in Bakersfield, that would be a gigantic tool," Sterling said. "We could put prostitutes out of business."

Bakersfield officials said they modeled the laws after the anti-drug loitering ordinance adopted by Monrovia in 1990, which has served as a model for several other cities as well.

But trying to battle the world's oldest profession by banishing prostitutes has a history of failure.

"This way of dealing with prostitutes and petty thieves goes on all throughout medieval Europe," said David Cohen, a professor of rhetoric and classics at UC Berkeley. "Cities would proclaim they

were going to put an end to prostitution and clean up the city, but of course it's always futile because the demand is always there."

Jazz is among those who agree.

Asked what she would do if the officers succeed in Hollywood, Jazz laughed as she replied: "I'd go to Ventura Boulevard. I'd go to the Valley."

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City & State

February 1, 1993 / February 14, 1993

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SECTION: GOVERNMENT MANAGER; Public Safety & Corrections; Pg. GM4

LENGTH: 707 words

HEADLINE: Some community policing gets close to home

BYLINE: By RODD ZOLKOS

BODY:

With the notion of community policing the rage with city officials, several cities are taking the concept to its logical next step, encouraging officers to live in the high-crime areas they patrol.

In the process, officers come to know the neighborhood's crime victims -- and its criminals -- personally.

The neighborhoods' residents, meanwhile, become better acquainted with the officers, grow more comfortable with approaching their new neighbors for help and ultimately develop a cooperative relationship with those individuals as they work together toward reducing crime.

Residents also see the police force actively at work in their neighborhoods and feel less abandoned by their local government.

Elgin, Ill., has become a model for the resident officer approach.

"We've been doing it now for two years," said Elgin Police Chief Chuck Gruber. "What we tried to do some time ago was look at our neighborhoods ... some of our lower socio-economic areas and some of our more deprived areas, and see what we can do so that these neighborhoods know that we care, that we know of their plight and that we are committed to helping them."

Those three messages the Elgin police force sought to convey to city residents "are not law-enforcement related issues," Mr. Gruber said. "But they are if you're living in those kinds of conditions."

The Elgin force calls its program the Resident Officer Program of Elgin (ROPE). It was put in place in the spring of 1991 and involves both the use of a special assignments team that targets troubled neighborhoods with short-term, high-visibility saturation patrols, and officers who move into areas considered trouble spots.

One of the officers moved into a federally-subsidized housing complex plagued with gang crimes and drug deals.

Today, crime in that complex has been reduced dramatically, and two more volunteers from Elgin's 136-officer force have taken on similar live-in beats.

One is in a home in an historic district and the other is in a rented apartment in a serious crime neighborhood.

City & State February 1, 1993 / February 14, 1993

The public's response to the program has been "very, very positive. Most of the communities love it," Mr. Gruber said. "Of course now everybody wants a resident officer, but in some neighborhoods the need is not really there."

The resident officers clearly are reducing crime in their areas, Mr. Gruber said. "There's been a demonstrable difference in the areas where the officers are working," the Elgin police chief added.

While the number of calls may have increased in those areas because the familiarity with the resident officer has made citizens more willing to report crimes to the police, the number of violent crimes in those areas is down.

The program's success comes largely because the officer becomes part of the neighborhood he serves, Mr. Gruber believes.

"There's a bonding and a relationship that takes place," the chief said. "I heard one of the officers say 'You used to just get in the squad car and answer a call, and when you were done just leave and not worry about it.'"

"In this case the officer said, 'The problems in the neighborhood are my problems.'"

Other cities are seeking to duplicate Elgin's success with the resident officer formula. Alexandria, Va., is undertaking a one-year pilot program placing an officer in an apartment in a high-crime area.

In Fort Wayne, Ind. city officials hope that moving police officers into public housing or high-crime neighborhoods will "promote more identification between the police officer and the people who live in public housing or the central city," said Karen Goldner, assistant to the director of the Fort Wayne Department of Community and Economic Development.

But for now, the program has run into a major stumbling block; in a city like Fort Wayne, housing costs are low enough that police officers can live almost anywhere, so there is little incentive to live in public housing.

Fort Wayne officials may look for different ways to market the program to prospective volunteers including an open house to show off city public housing units to likely participants.

But given the nature of the city's housing market, there probably aren't many officers to market to, Ms. Goldner conceded.

GRAPHIC: Photo, The cop next door: Elgin Ill., Police Officer Terrance D. Allen lives and works in a high-crime areas as part of the Chicago suburb's model program. Richard A. Chapman/Citicorp Sun-Times

AURORA,⁶⁵ COLORADO

Officer Jeri Thomas' duties include playing basketball with the kids at Sable Elementary School. Thomas is part of Aurora, Col.'s, Police Area Representative program, one of 21 specialty beats where cops focus on everything from eliminating drug dealers and purse snatchers to teaching kids like these about the harmful effects of drugs.



P.F. BENTLEY FOR TIME

Nation

Back to the Beat

As an antidote to police abuses and street crime, many cities are sending cops into communities to protect, serve—and often befriend—local residents

By RICHARD LACAYO



While the Los Angeles Police Department has long relied on SWAT teams and helicopters for high-tech law enforcement, police departments in many other cities are turning to methods that are decidedly low tech. Their weapons of choice? A good pair of walking shoes and a gift for small talk, coupled with rigorous training in the basics of policing.

Frustrated by the failure of standard methods to reduce crime, more than 300 cities and towns nationwide—including Boston, Houston and San Francisco—are adopting the concept of community policing. Through Community Patrol Officer Programs, these municipalities work to build rapport between police officers and the neighborhoods they patrol. "The message is: the beat cop is back," says New York City police commissioner Lee Brown, who last month launched one of the nation's largest CPOP programs to date.

When police officers and the citizens of a neighborhood know each other, CPOP theory holds, it is more difficult for both

criminals and cops to break the law. "Community policing is a deterrent to the improper use of force because it strengthens officers' relationships with the community," says Herman Goldstein, professor of criminal law at the University of Wisconsin. "The neighborhood support gives police a greater sense of confidence and authority, which reduces their need for using force. If police officers feel they don't have the authority, the power, to handle a situation, they're more likely to resort to brute force." Referring to the L.A.P.D.'s beating of Rodney King, Goldstein says, "It's incomprehensible that a police officer imbued with community policing would engage in that type of behavior."

• One typical CPOP officer is Donald Christy, 36, of Lansing, Mich. A little over a year ago, he was assigned to cover a nine-block area of the city. At first disheartened by the sight of crack houses and blighted streets, Christy took pains to get on a first-name basis with many of the area's 700 residents and learn what neighborhood problems concerned them most. Those conversations led him to recognize, he says, "that the good people far out-

numbered the bad." Meanwhile, he organized a volunteer community cleanup, which filled 30 Dumpsters with litter; arranged federal funding for floral plantings; and even held a contest to choose a name for the neighborhood: Sparrow Estates.

His unconventional approach to policing paid big dividends in terms of crime control. Residents began to give Christy tips that helped him drive away criminals. Indoor dealers found themselves evicted by absentee landlords. "You can walk around the block now without fear of being attacked," says Ralph Casler, a retired mechanic who has lived in the area for 30 years. Says Christy: "I haven't made an arrest in eight months."

The history of the beat cop has traveled full circle: once, he was nearly driven to extinction by a series of well-intended but ill-conceived reforms. Until the first decades of this century, police were all-purpose keepers of the peace. They ran lodging houses for the homeless, tracked down offensive smells, rounded up stray animals and kept the streetlamps supplied with oil. They also gained a reputation for taking

an older
article —
but I thought it
might be useful

PORTLAND, OREGON

Starting in 1989, the city of Portland, Ore., embarked on a five-year plan to implement community policing. Here, members of the police gang-enforcement unit watch a high school basketball game, hoping their presence will deter violence and become more familiar in the community.



BENTLEY

payoffs and doling out a rough brand of curbside justice.

By the 1930s and '40s, reformers had refashioned police departments along more narrowly focused lines. Officers were trained to concentrate on apprehending criminals, especially for the most serious crimes such as murder, assault, robbery and rape. Other functions were handed off to city health and welfare departments or similar agencies. After World War II, patrol cars and two-way radios came into wider use. Police became a mobile force, cruising anonymously through neighborhoods they knew mostly as the staging ground for each night's disturbances.

The final reform was the all but universal adoption of the 911 system for emergency calls. With that, police were reduced to chasing from one crime scene to another, all the while consolidating the bleakest impression of the people they served. A recent study found that New York City police spend 90% of their time on the job attending to such calls; they once spent just 50%. That leaves almost no time for anything else.

Though the reforms were designed to make police better crime fighters, it was the law of unintended consequences that they wound up enforcing most effectively. Many academic experts believe the changes fostered conditions that contributed to the sharply higher crime rates of the past three decades. A spate of scholarly studies has demonstrated that the offenses to quality of life that police now routinely overlook—such things as loud radios, graffiti and aggressive panhandling—create an atmosphere in which more serious crime is likely to occur. Those petty disturbances are the ones that trouble and frighten ordi-

nary citizens the most. In turn, their fear acts like an acid to disintegrate neighborhood ties. It leads citizens to shun the streets and abdicate responsibility for conditions outside their doors. That invites a dismal cycle of deteriorating conditions, more fear—and more crime.

Accordingly, CPPOP cops try to discourage crimes before they happen by maintaining—or creating—stable neighborhoods. That requires them to learn which local problems are of greatest concern to residents, and help them find solutions. "Police lost the most valuable thing we had, which is contact with people," says Washington police chief Isaac Fulwood. "We really got away from basic common-sense approaches." In a city where the murder rate soared 10% last year, partly owing to drugs, Fulwood has established community-policing pilot programs in two crime-ridden districts. In addition to a lawbook, patrol officers now have access to a fat directory of government services.

"We deal with broken playground equipment and potholes just as we do with crime," says David Couper, chief of police in Madison, Wis., which has committed its entire force of 310 officers to the community-policing concept. Officer Joe Balles, who patrols the city's low-income Broadway-Simpson neighborhood, hands out a business card with the phone number of the answering machine in his office. At the end of every day he has a tape full of pleas for assistance, messages from tipsters and calls from people who just wanted to chat with their cop.

"The police here are more on top of

things than they've ever been," he boasts. Balles may act as point man with the bureaucracy to get streetlights for a dark alley, or arrange marital counseling for a household that accounts for repeated 911 calls when the couple starts fighting. Defusing situations like that can be highly cost effective. In many cities, more than 60% of emergency calls are generated by just 10% of the households.

Community police may also use unconventional means to combat more serious crimes. When drug dealers in Houston turned a bank of pay phones outside a convenience store into their personal business office, a patrolman got the phones removed. In the same city, a deserted apartment complex where dealers flourished was finally boarded up after a community cop tracked down and harangued the property's bankruptcy trustee.

Whether CPPOP can actually drive down the crime rate is still unproven. The most thorough study of its effectiveness, a 1981 examination of an experimental foot-patrol program in Newark, found that it did not decrease crime. It did pay off, however, in psychological well-being. The visible presence of so many patrolmen made people feel safer and better disposed toward the police.

More recently, though, other cities have reported lower crime rates in specific neighborhoods where the CPPOP approach has been given a try. On Madison's south side, property crime was reduced 14% between 1987 and 1989. A west Houston neighborhood recorded a 38% drop in serious crime over a six-month period in 1988. But the neighboring Houston area reported increases in crime, which suggests

that community policing simply relocated the problem.

One big difficulty for police departments is finding the time and resources to make community policing work. Though some CPOP cops are assigned full time to the job, many cities are trying to rely largely on patrol-car officers' doubling as community police. But the frequency of 911 calls means that their time for closeup patrolling is limited. Houston's Neighborhood Oriented Policing program, known as NOP, is sometimes referred to derisively by police themselves as Nobody on Patrol.

Because the 911 system can never be

abandoned—woe to the mayor of any city in which the police cannot be summoned quickly during a break-in—many departments are looking at ways to cut down on the number of calls. In the Denver suburb of Aurora, where only about a fourth of an estimated 190,000 calls each year are for real emergencies, police operators perform "911 triage." Where appropriate, they direct nonemergency callers to other city agencies. Police officers take the less urgent crime reports over the phone.

"We've ingrained the mentality that a stolen bike will bring an officer to your doorstep quickly," says Aurora division

chief Ronald Sloan. "That has to change."

Community policing is reshaping police forces themselves. Some police academies are revamping their curriculums to train cadets in social-service skills. To dispel the impression in minority neighborhoods that police are a white army of occupation, many CPOP plans require increased hiring of minority officers.

In a system in which the number of arrests made is no longer the mark of success, new yardsticks will be needed to measure individual performance for promotions. "It's hard to measure what *doesn't* happen in an area," says Aurora's Sloan. One proposal is to look at achieved reductions in the crime rate. Police unions are sure to resist that idea, which would make officers answerable for the countless variables beyond their control—everything from a local recession to a summer heat wave—that can lead to increased crime.

Among the people who don't want to see cops back on the beat are many of the cops themselves. Middle-level department brass are suspicious of plans that make patrol officers more independent. Many of the rank-and-file personnel also scoff at anything that smacks of social work. "There's an unfounded fear that it detracts from the macho image and takes the fun out of putting the bad guys in jail," says Carolyn Robison, a Tulsa police major. A lot of officers just don't like walking. For years, being assigned to the beat was a standard way to punish officers.

The most daunting aspect of CPOP may be that it so dramatically expands the idea of what it means to be a police officer. "This is a radical notion for police," says University of Wisconsin's Goldstein, "that they have 30 or 40 tools at their disposal to bring to bear upon complex problems." But after so many years of getting mixed results from just a few tools—handcuffs, a billy club and a gun—many police are ready for a change. And so are most of the citizens they serve. —Reported by

Elaine Shannon/Washington and Richard Woodbury/Tulsa

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

Officer Myron McNair wears a smile as he pounds his beat. A year ago, Major Alvin Winkler, commander of Baltimore's tough eastern district, reinstituted foot patrols in five high-crime areas of Baltimore. Now, says Winkler, "average citizens are more willing to volunteer information to the police."



CYNTHIA JOHNSON FOR TIME

TULSA, OKLAHOMA

Cruising downtown, bicycle patrolman Neal Walters is part of Tulsa's expanding community-policing program. "It used to be 'we' and 'they,'" says Chief Drew Diamond. "Now it's the 'community' and 'us' working together." The chief has assembled an inch-thick book of the city's shifting demographics to help in understanding crime patterns.



BENTLEY

possibly know — that in a market economy there is no “profit,” only “profit and loss” — no “reward,” but only “risk and reward,” and that freedom is not just the absence of restraint, but requires the rule of law, self-discipline and responsibility. The profit must be earned . . . and not everyone earns a profit. That’s true in the United States as well as elsewhere. The latest business figures for the United States show that approximately 88,000 firms failed in 1991.

Ukrainian leaders in government and business have to help mold a new and positive mindset and set an example of optimism. IESC can’t pass on a changed mindset to Ukrainians as though it were a baton in a track race. We’ll need the help and example of your leaders.

I live in a small town near the Sikorsky Aircraft factory in Stratford, Connecticut. Igor Sikorsky, a native son of Kyiv, lived a life of exile in the country nearby. As you may know, his three greatest aeronautical achievements were the multi-motored airplane, the big amphibious flying boat, and the helicopter. Igor Sikorsky wrote more than a chapter in the history of aviation. He wrote a chapter in the history of freedom. Let me tell you what I’ve learned about him from his son. When Mr. Sikorsky first began his free enterprise in America in the 1920’s, he had no money. The famous composer and pianist Sergei Rachmaninoff gave him financial support. Aviation was a dangerous activity back then. But Sikorsky said the greatest danger in aviation was starvation. Whenever the task looked impossible and people got discouraged, Igor Sikorsky said,

“After all, we designed and built the helicopter because we didn’t know it couldn’t be done.”

He succeeded not only because he was brilliant but because he was essentially optimistic and hopeful. He certainly took

risks. He enjoyed the freedom to make mistakes. He had a keen awareness of the importance, even the magnificence, of people’s capacity to transform wisdom, will, and work into achievement. He even insisted that radical socialism would one day disappear. He said:

“The freedom of the individual is the spark that moves mankind ahead.”

A pioneer helicopter pilot once said,

“Back of our efforts stood the unswerving faith of Mr. Sikorsky. I believe that his success can be charged to his calm, forceful, sometimes dogged confidence, coupled with sound engineering and intuitive judgment.”

Not a bad description of how Ukraine’s government and business leaders should act today!

I’m not a believer in miracles. But I feel certain that with your leadership and courage you can transform your country and bring it to new levels of productivity and prosperity. We at IESC are proud to be a part of your campaign.

We are totally in sympathy with Ukrainians’ desire to build a nation where all people, regardless of ethnic background, religion, education or economic status are equal under the law and have equal opportunity. That is something dear to us and that we strive for in America. That is why I’m here today — to assure you that we are ready to roll up our sleeves and work with you toward that success.

Let us take as our motto Shevchenko’s immortal words, engraved on his monument in our capital:

“I CHUZHOMU NAUCHAYTES SVOHO NE TSURAYTES!” . . . Read, learn, and study others but do not forsake your own.

Thank you.

Community Policing

BRING THE COMMUNITY INTO THE BATTLE AGAINST CRIME

By LEE P. BROWN, *Police Commissioner, New York City*

Delivered at the 13th Annual Lehman Lecture Series at Long Island University, New York, New York, March 11, 1992

IT IS A pleasure for me to join you in honoring Dr. Maxwell Lehman, and to deliver the 13th Annual Lecture that Long Island University has named in his memory.

As many of you know, Dr. Lehman was a dedicated scholar and writer who taught public administration at the Brooklyn campus of L.I.U. for many years.

It is particularly fitting, therefore, that we examine tonight what I consider to be one of the leading, if not the paramount issue concerning public administration for the 1990s, and well into the 21st Century.

And that is the way we police urban America in the face of social stratification, economic uncertainty, family break-up, and other issues which have consequences the police must deal with, but over which the police have little control.

The public becomes acutely aware of the consequences when they are dramatized by a particularly horrific act, like the shooting deaths of students by a student *inside* a school.

But the less dramatic incidents and the wide-spread availability and use of guns and drugs and alcohol . . . all of these lead to numbing statistics.

One that is particularly compelling for the African American community is that homicide is now the leading cause of death of young black men.

Low level street crime and nuisances also combine to make life in many urban neighborhoods *feel* as dangerous as actual life-threatening situations.

Collectively, street disturbances, vandalism, prostitution and the like create a hostile environment that invite more serious crime, and at the very least, intimidate law-abiding citizens.

Ultimately, a safe environment and the *perception* of a safe environment are important to the long-term health of the city.

I believe that community policing is essential to insure both the perception and reality of the public safety and quality of life in the city.

And I also believe that community policing is the future of policing in America.

In New York, we have adopted community policing as dominant philosophy and operational style, and we are now actively implementing it throughout the five boroughs.

What is community policing?

It is a working partnership between the police and the law-abiding public to prevent crime, arrest offenders, find solutions to repeat problems, and ultimately to enhance the quality of life in the city, particularly in its residential neighborhoods where we are bringing back the old-fashioned cop on the beat, but in a modern way.

My vision of community policing is to have a police officer or a group of officers and their supervisors responsible for every street or group of streets in the city. I want police officers to know the community well.

I want them to form partnerships with clergy, community leaders, merchants and others to find solutions to recurring crime-related problems.

In New York City, community policing means getting more police officers out of the patrol car, on foot and into the community.

The conventional way to police a city has been to deploy officers in radio-equipped patrol cars, randomly patrolling a given area until they are dispatched to the scene of a 911 emergency.

The officers respond to emergencies, but they never get to know a community well.

They keep responding to the same situations, over and over again.

With the advent of the radio-equipped patrol car, police officers in city after city become incident responders, not problem solvers.

It was thought to be an efficient way to police a large city.

It also discouraged familiarity with the people we serve. The concern a few decades back was that familiarity bred the kind of corruption that was uncovered in the Police Department by the Knapp Commission.

But there are ample safeguards against corruption now in place in the Police Department. So we can encourage close contact with the community without the fear of corruption.

As to the efficiency, a landmark study showed that conventional, routine motorized patrol was never the efficient deployment of resources that many assumed.

Known as the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, and conducted by the National Police Foundation, the Kansas City study found that traditional routine patrol in marked police cars did not appear to affect the level of crime. Nor did routine motorized patrol affect the public's feeling of security.

Most importantly, the study demonstrated that urban police departments could test various deployment strategies without jeopardizing public safety.

Another study was the Fear Reduction Experiment, carried out simultaneously in Newark and Houston.

It showed that increased communication between police and community reduced fear of crime, and, in some instances, crime itself.

The result of these studies over the years pointed to community policing.

The questioning of total reliance on radio car patrols . . . the positive community response to foot patrols . . . the

importance of improving police-community communication and cooperation.

They all pointed to community policing.

Much like the goal of the cops of a by-gone era, the goal of the community police officer is, ultimately, to have nothing happen on his beat.

Instead of measuring police success by the number of arrests, we should measure it by the absence of crime . . . by the peace and stability on the street.

New York City is particularly well studied for community policing because of the density of its population, and its history with community policing programs.

New York City's history with foot patrol goes all the way back to the Dutch in 1625, and the original "night watch," which was a foot patrol assigned to citizens as a civic duty.

New York City also created the original cop on the beat. In 1970, the Police Department introduced a program called Neighborhood Police Teams, designed to operate in a problem-solving mode. But the teams were disbanded in the city's fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s.

In 1984, the Community Police Officer Program, or CPOP, was introduced in the 72nd Precinct in Brooklyn, and expanded as a limited program in all precincts in 1988.

But now, instead of a program, we are making problem-solving, community policing the dominant style and philosophy of the entire department.

The introduction of community policing is coinciding with a significant expansion in the uniformed strength of the Police Department.

One of my first acts as police commissioner was to undertake a study of the New York City Police Department to determine whether its staffing configuration was adequate to meeting mounting demands of the last two decades.

It was the first such study of the New York City Police Department in a quarter century.

And we discovered, yes, we needed more cops. But we also found we could be a lot more efficient.

We discovered we had become over-specialized.

We found we could consolidate and eliminate some specialized units, and free up more police officers for patrol.

We also found that police officers were doing jobs that civilians could handle, so we could free up police officers for patrol and other enforcement duties by using civilians for non-enforcement tasks.

That staffing study was one of the key elements in the Mayor's "Safe Streets, Safe City" program, which was passed last year by the City Council and State Legislature.

Funds for "Safe Streets" were put into a dedicated fund. They may *not* be used for any other purpose.

The plan provides for an overall increase of 23 percent in our uniformed headcount, from a 1990 base of 25,465 uniformed personnel, to 31,351 as of July 1, 1995.

While this overall increase is certainly significant, we will experience a 50 percent increase in uniformed officers assigned to precincts through the new hires and by taking every opportunity to put police officers back in uniform.

Even before the "Safe Streets, Safe City" program was approved, we devised and implemented ways to increase police visibility. For example, in Operation All Out, we required Headquarters personnel and other officers performing non-patrol duties to return to patrol, in uniform, on foot, for an average of one tour a week.

As a result, we have added 150,000 tours of duty since April 1990.

That is the equivalent of hiring 350 additional police officers. Similarly, by refining the way we dispatch 911 calls in non-life-threatening cases, that do not require police presence, we are reducing 911 responses by an estimated 450,000 radio runs annually. That is the equivalent of 752 police officers.

It means we can devote all the time once consumed by this 911 coverage to policing the neighborhoods in ways that give the police officers a chance to get out of their cars and into the community to better understand the people and their problems.

Police visibility and neighborhood contact are at the heart of the community policing philosophy.

So are partnerships.

We want to build partnerships that bring community people into the decision-making process to combat crime.

As part of community policing in New York, we have created precinct management teams in each of the city's 75 precincts.

The teams are comprised of the precinct commanding officer and other key precinct personnel, along with the local community board district manager, and the precinct community council president.

This is something new.

This is the first time in the history of American policing that civilian members of the community are being directly engaged to regularly develop police strategy at the ground level.

Once the problems have been identified and a strategy is developed and implemented, the team regroups to measure the effectiveness of the strategies they chose.

And once a problem is evaluated as either "corrected" or "significantly improved," the management team replaces it with another problem on the list of precinct priorities.

Let me give you an example of how community policing and precinct management teams were used to fight a chronic problem in Brooklyn's 72nd Precinct, which also happens to be the precinct we are using as a model to develop a number of community policing strategies.

On three blocks of just one street — 49th Street — we had made 418 arrests in 1991, mainly for various drug offenses.

Still, the street was under the virtual control of a few area drug dealers who operated with a significant degree of impunity due, in part, because of the fear of law-abiding people.

The people were afraid that cooperation with the police would be met with retaliation as long as the dealers had their freedom.

49th Street became the number one priority of the pre-

cinct management team. With support from the precinct's Special Operations Unit, the Major Case Team of the Brooklyn South Narcotics Division, the District Attorney's office, and the courts which issued the warrants, eight major dealers were identified, arrests and charged with various felonies, including murder.

This sweep happened one night last month, with the deployment of various Department resources, including helicopters to frustrate any attempt by the targets to flee.

Within hours, community members who had been afraid to come forward, were reporting to the police about the effect of the sweep on lower level associates of those arrested. They reported, in short, that the bad guys were panicking, and law-abiding people had their confidence restored. However, at its next meeting, the management team recognized that once the panic in the drug underworld subsided, there would be a rush by other dealers to fill the vacuum.

The management team recommended continued street level enforcement and high uniformed visibility along 49th Street, and that adjoining areas be targeted for increased drug enforcement.

The civilian members of the management team also maintained contact with the district attorney's office to emphasize the importance of seeking long prison sentences or deportation for the defendants in the case.

As neighborhood residents themselves, the civilian members of the team recognized how devastating it would be psychologically to people now coming forward to cooperate with the police if any of the dealers were seen back on 49th street.

The team also discussed sentencing, and how a livery service in the area had volunteered to transport neighborhood residents to court for the dealers' sentencing.

They wanted the judge to see for himself how important it was to the law-abiding people of 49th Street.

No one believes that a sweep, no matter how effective, is a permanent cure unless there is follow up. And that's exactly what the precinct management teams are focusing on.

They are also tapping other-than-police resources.

Community policing, with management teams as one of its vehicles, recognizes something that can-do organizations like the police sometimes won't readily admit.

It acknowledges that the people most affected by crime may be the best people to help us attack the problems and find the solutions.

That's what's happening in New York City today.

It is something worthy of your own involvement.

It is worthy of the involvement of L.I.U., and it is worthy of the memory of Dr. Maxwell Lehman.

Thank you.

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HEADLINE MEETING SET ON POLICE OVERHAUL
 Byline: By Bill Bryan Of the Post-Dispatch Staff
 LENGTH ESTIMATED INFORMATION UNITS: 2.7 Words: 329
 DATE 12/04/92
 SOURCE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (SLMO)
 Edition: FIVE STAR
 Section: NEWS
 Page: 06A
 (Copyright 1992)

- * Scores of St. Louis police officers some curious and some critical - are expected to jam a special Poice Board meeting Saturday morning in which Chief Clarence Harmon will disclose a reorganization plan for the department.
 The meeting begins at 8 a.m. at headquarters.
 The Post-Dispatch obtained a rough-draft copy of Harmon's proposal from a police source. Barring late revision, highlights of the reorganization plan are:
 The nine district captains will report to Assistant Chief Charles McCrary, who will comman the newly created "Bureau of Community Policing." District captains have been reporting to the Bureau of Field Operations, which will be eliminated.
- * Majors' jobs will be eliminated. The Police Board had previously announced the elimination of the rank but said current Majors John Walsh and George Hydar would retain the rank until they retire. Walsh will become an assistant to Chief of Detectives James J. Hackett and Hydar will assist McCrary.
 Deputy Chief Raymond Lauer, who has been in charge of the Bureau of Field Operations, will head a new "Bureau of Patrol Support," which will include the juvenile, prisoner processing and communications divisions and traffic safety and mounted patrol units.
- * Leaders of two major organizations representing St. Louis police officers perhaps voiced a preview of opposition to the plan when they sounded off in a meeting to Post-Dispatch editorial writers on Thursday.
 "The police department is now being run by incompetent, arrogant civilians," said Officer Ron Oldani, president of the St. Louis Police Officers Association.
- * Board President "David Robbins has no concern or regard for any person wearing the uniform," Oldani said. "He's trying to shove this COPS stuff down everybody's throat before he leaves."
 COPS - Community-Oriented Problem-Solving - has been embraced in recent months by Robbins, who is not expected to be reappointed to the Police Board next month after Gov.-elect Mel Carnahan takes office.
- * Oldani and Sgt. Mike Frederick, president of the St. Louis Police Fraternal Organization, both said morale was sagging within the ranks.

End of Story Reached

HEADLINE Police To Mount Bicycles ... Four Neighborhoods To Get Pedal Patrols
Byline: Joan Little
Of the Post-Dispatch Staff

DATE 06/20/92

SOURCE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (SLMO)

Edition: 5*

Section: NEWS

Page: 3A

(Copyright 1992)

* The St. Louis Police Board moved Friday to turn the cop on the beat into the cop on the bike.

The board authorized \$6,600 for the department to buy six bicycles and the equipment to go with them for a bicycle patrol downtown and in four neighborhoods.

Lt. Col. Ray Lauer said the bicycle patrol will have a two-fold purpose: "It will enhance our desire to bring community-oriented policing to the city, and it's another method for our officers to be visible."

Eventually, Lauer said, the department may expand the bicycle patrols to other areas, including the 19-mile Riverfront Trail bicycle path that is under construction.

The path now stretches from just south of the Chain of Rocks Bridge to Ferry Street and is open to joggers, walkers and those with mountain bikes.

Trail organizers say they expect to start paving the trail in about a month or two to open it to conventional bicycles.

* Lauer said the bicycle patrols would first be used in the four neighborhoods that are part of the community oriented policing program, known as COPS. Those neighborhoods are Fox Park, Grand Center-Blumeyer, Penrose and Tower Grove East.

Lauer said the department planned to use the bicycles night and day, year round. But police will be able to park the bikes if conditions are too icy for safety.

"The weather in St. Louis is amenable for this, nearly every day of the year" he said.

Some of the equipment that will have to be bought includes helmets and a shoulder harness that will allow officers to communicate by radio while riding.

Officers will be recruited from within the districts for the bicycle beats, said Lauer.

Getting police officers out of their cruisers and onto either foot or bicycle patrols appears to be a growing trend across the nation as departments look for ways to make law enforcement an integral part of neighborhoods.

End of Story Reached

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HEADLINE Of Cops And Cop-Outs
A Thin Blue Line That Is Stretched Too Tight Can't Protect Society
Byline: Clarence Harmon
Column: COMMENTARY
COLUMN

DATE 06/01/92
SOURCE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (SLMO)
Edition: 5*
Section: EDITORIAL
Page: 3B
(Copyright 1992)

Police are an instrument of society. They are no better or worse than society's expectations. In St. Louis, we have a first-class police force. Our officers are among the best anywhere.

Could they be better? Of course. But in order for us to get better, you also have to get better. By you, I mean society. So I would like to share with you my thoughts on the kind of society I would like for the St. Louis area.

Let's start with the schools. I was fortunate to have the benefit of excellent schools when I was growing up. Too many children do not have the opportunities I had. Every child is entitled to an education that will help him or her unlock his own unique potential. Society must provide children with the teachers and schools that can unlock that potential.

Another issue that must be addressed is the deterioration of a solid family-support system. Unfortunately, the single-parent family and the working-parents family have become the rule rather than the exception. Crime among children of single parents is much higher than for other kids. I don't know what it is for kids with both parents working. But I don't think there is any doubt that juggling a career and raising kids is putting a tremendous new stress on families.

Society must provide ways in which these new family forms can more effectively cope with the demands of making a living while rearing a child.

Employment also is a serious concern - not just for economic reasons, but also for emotional reasons. Pride and a sense of self worth usually come with a job. If a person has a worthwhile job, it's not likely he or she will resort to crime. Society must figure out how to get unemployed people who are able to work back into jobs.

My major concern is that increasing poverty and increasing crime will stifle the economic growth necessary for the revitalization of St. Louis. Without economic vitality, we are doomed. Business leaders, whether corporate executives or entrepreneurs, have to feel that St. Louis is an attractive place to invest their time and money. They have to feel that their employees will be comfortable working here and raising their families here. They must feel that government at all levels is their friend and not their enemy.

My major concern is that we may be moving in the opposite direction.

Police are sometimes called the thin blue line between civilized society and the worst elements among us. But that thin

blue line of police simply cannot protect us if society allows a deterioration in the quality of schools, families and the strength of our economy.

The demands on police are becoming greater than ever. And perhaps that's why today we are more committed than ever to playing our part in the solution.

* We have started some efforts. We are trying to get more community participation in helping us do our job. A few years ago we adopted a program called OPS - meaning community oriented policing. It's an approach that we hope is getting us closer to the people we serve.

We still arrest people who break the law. And we are still visible enough anywhere in the city to make anyone think twice about breaking the law. What's different today is that we are listening to citizens and neighborhood leaders more than ever before. We're finding that what often is on their minds is not necessarily rapes, robberies, shootings, drugs or other popular images of crime.

What they may be more interested in is some derelict automobile, or an abandoned building - or maybe a drug house in the neighborhood. Somebody's kids might be staying up half the night and playing their stereos too loud. Or a family might be living in a building with some obvious code violations. Or - and this has happened more than once - we might be asked why the police don't come to neighborhood meetings. So we try to attend more meetings with people. And, as a result, we are learning a lot about the people we serve.

In St. Louis, our cops are responsible for the neighborhoods they work in. They belong to the neighborhood. They are getting out of their cars and walking a beat. When they find people with a problem, they try to help solve it.

We think our program is working. Crime has dropped in our targeted COPS neighborhoods - in some cases by nearly 50 percent. Some of the officers in the program - not all of them, I have to admit - are enthusiastic. And the ones who are adapting are finding new rewards in dealing with ordinary people, not just criminals.

By taking the initiative, we are finding that fewer crimes develop. By approaching the guys in a street-corner gang, for example, rather than driving by, we can sometimes get to know them a little better. Sometimes, that can prevent any future criminal activity.

I wish I could say our COPS program is turning crime around in our city. We think it is helping.

But gangs, drugs and violent crimes continue to plague our streets. In 1991, St. Louis had increases in seven of eight crime categories. The murder rate increased by 47 percent. What that means is that we may be losing our fight against crime.

Despite our best efforts, the social forces at play in our city - the inadequate school, the torn families, the lack of jobs - may be simply overwhelming the ability of our thin blue line to protect us.

And many of our officers are discouraged.

The bond between police and society today is under severe stress. The recent events in Los Angeles have placed police in the

- * spotlight more than ever before. In St. Louis, your police department is committed to meeting society's expectations. But I must tell you that many officers wonder how much society cares.
The Board of Aldermen is considering a budget that will result in a \$238 net loss in take-home pay for police families. Police salaries in St. Louis already rank below 60 other major police departments in the country and five others in Missouri. Some of our best, most experienced officers are leaving.
If your thin blue line is stretched any further, it will break. We cannot be your protectors if society fails us. We cannot be your servants without your help. We cannot do our job unless you do yours.
- * Clarence Harmon is St. Louis chief of police. The preceding is adapted from a speech to the annual meeting of Confluence St. Louis.

HEADLINE CITY POLICE ARGUE FOR HIGHER BUDGET
Meager Raises Would Hurt Morale, Aldermen Are Told
Byline: Tim O'Neil
Of the Post-Dispatch Staff

DATE 05/20/92

SOURCE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (SLMO)

Edition: 5*

Section: NEWS

Page: 3A

(Copyright 1992)

- * Top St. Louis police officials turned up the heat Tuesday in their battle for a higher budget by warning aldermen that meager raises would cripple department morale and hurt popular community-policing programs.

Police Chief Clarence Harmon and Police Board President David Robbins took their pitch to the aldermanic Ways and Means Committee, which is reviewing a new city budget for July 1. The department wants \$6.3 million more than the \$87.1 million that the Estimate Board has recommended.

The department's budget campaign actually began Monday night, when officers delivered to the aldermen's homes copies of a video tape of the recent police memorial breakfast and copies of a book about St. Louis officers who had been killed on duty over the years.

Robbins said the department did that to remind aldermen "that there is an important distinction in the risks involved in police work."

"There's been a lot of talk that police are just like any other city employees. That's not the case."

Police officials are hoping the aldermen will take the department's side, as they did during a similar budget battle last year. The department wants to provide raises averaging 5.5 percent, which is substantially higher than the \$300 across-the-board raises that the Estimate Board proposes for all city employees.

That board consists of the mayor, comptroller and aldermanic president. It presents a budget to the aldermen, who can cut accounts but not increase them.

During the 2 1/2-hour committee hearing Tuesday, Harmon and Robbins warned that withholding the higher raise would devastate morale. They cited a national study of police department salaries that listed St. Louis 61st among 100 departments, behind those in Kansas City, St. Louis County, the Missouri Highway Patrol and Clayton and Florissant.

- * "Clearly, this is not an incentive for the best officers to stay with the St. Louis Police Department," Harmon said.

- * He said the resulting reduction in morale could cripple the Community Oriented Policing program, which generally is popular with aldermen and neighborhood groups.

- * "It's vitally important that we maintain a high degree of morale if we're going to effectively make that change," Harmon said of COPS. "I see this {dispute} as having a very bad effect on our morale and our ability to effectively field community policing."

The COPS program, under way in several test neighborhoods, seeks to bring patrol officers closer to residents.

The committee took no action Tuesday, and the department

presentation produced mixed results. Two aldermen questioned some of the statements by Harmon and Robbins.

After both police officials described the city's "promise" of a higher police raise, Alderman Daniel J. McGuire, D-28th Ward, asked them to be more specific.

Harmon said Mayor Vincent C. Schoemehl Jr., who sits on the Police Board, supported the department's system of annual raises based upon length of service. But Harmon said the mayor hadn't endorsed the raise.

McGuire asked, "You call that a promise?" He also questioned the department's practice of paying health benefits for its retirees, which costs the city \$1.9 million annually. "Regular city retirees don't get that," McGuire said.

Alderman Fred Wessels Jr., D-13th Ward, took issue with statements by Harmon and Robbins that questioned city support for a planned new indoor stadium and a new arena when the police budget is being whittled.

@Art Caption: Photo by Wayne Crosslin/Post-Dispatch - Police department financial planner Joseph Miklovic (left), Police Chief Clarence Harmon (center) and David Robbins, Police Board president, making their case Tuesday for a higher police budget to Alderman Steve Conway, D-8th Ward, (lower right) and other committee members.

End of Story Reached

HEADLINE Police To Be Stationed At 12 City Schools
 Federally Financed Program Won't Begin Until Fall
 Byline: Mark Schlinkmann and Ann Scales Cobbs
 Of the Post-Dispatch Staff

DATE 01/03/92

SOURCE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (SLMO)

Edition: 5*

Section: NEWS

Page: 1A

(Copyright 1992)

* St. Louis police officers will be stationed in and around 12 city schools with crime problems under a federal grant announced Thursday by Gov. John Ashcroft and city police officials.

"We will do what we must to provide a safe environment for our students where real learning and achievement can occur," Ashcroft said at a news conference at Roosevelt High School, one of the facilities getting police protection.

Starting this fall, Police Chief Clarence Harmon said, an officer will be stationed at each of the 12 schools at the beginning and close of each school day.

The officer also will patrol "safety zones" within 1,000 feet in each direction of the school.

"They will continually interact with students and teachers and neighborhood residents," Harmon said.

Ashcroft said that 324 crimes took place last year within 1,000 feet of Roosevelt, at 3230 Hartford Street.

The other schools in the program are:

McKinley High School, 2156 Russell Boulevard.

Northwest High School, 5140 Riverview Boulevard.

Southwest High School, 3125 South Kingshighway.

Sumner High School, 4248 Cottage Avenue.

Vashon High School, 3405 Bell Avenue.

Soldan High School, 918 North Union Boulevard.

Shenandoah Elementary School, 3412 Shenandoah Avenue.

Grant Middle School, 3009 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Carver Elementary School, 325 Bell Avenue.

Ashland Elementary School, 3921 North Newstead Avenue.

Scullin Elementary School, 4160 North Kingshighway.

Gary Maddox, deputy state public safety director, said the use of uniformed police on a regular basis in schools appears to be unprecedented in Missouri - although security guards have been used in some city high schools here for several years.

Harmon said he hoped the program could be expanded in future years to as many as 39 other schools with crime problems.

The project, dubbed the School Assistance Program, will be financed by a \$588,000 federal grant for the 1992-93 school year through the Missouri Department of Public Safety. Officials hope to get the grant renewed for three additional years.

David Robbins, police board president, said the money would allow the hiring of about 12 additional employees. He said some of those hired may be retired officers who would return to the force as civilian employees. Others would be new uniformed officers.

He said the elementary and middle schools involved were selected because they are in neighborhoods with crime problems,

while high schools such as Roosevelt were chosen because of crime on campus and because they have older students.

Robbins said the program was an expansion of the Police Department's Community Oriented Policing Services program, known as COPS. Officers walk foot patrols and work with neighborhood residents to try to stabilize residential areas.

COPS began in 1989 in the Fox Park neighborhood and has been expanded to the Covenant-Blumeyer, Tower Grove East and Penrose areas.

Seven of the 12 schools are in the COPS areas.

Ashcroft Thursday also said he would ask the Legislature this year to expand a law barring firearms and other lethal weapons from schools to include school grounds and school buses. Violation of the law is a misdemeanor.

"Lethal weapons have no place in the school environment," the governor said.

Principals interviewed Thursday seemed to like the idea of stationing the police officers around schools.

"I think the concept is great," said Cozy Marks Jr., principal at Vashon High School. He said the police presence would help deter crime.

"It's not a panacea . . . but will go a long way to make the total area safe for the children who want to come to school," he said.

JoAnn Perkins, principal at Grant Middle School, said she was looking forward to the start of the program.

"I think it's wonderful because while we don't have problems during the school day inside the school, the times when we do have problems are in the mornings before school and after school."

Perkins said problems sometimes developed after school because the school is close to a high school, which dismisses its students before the middle school youngsters.

Perkins said students at Roosevelt often hang around Grant School.

"The way it is now, we can look outside and see that we have them out there. If we had somebody here every day, we wouldn't have them, period."

@Art Caption: PHOTO by Odell Mitchell/Post-Dispatch...Gov. John Ashcroft announcing a new federally funded crime prevention program for local schools Thursday at a news conference at Roosevelt High School.

52

HEADLINE Author Of COPS Study Passes Out High Marks

Byline: Bill Bryan
Of the Post-Dispatch Staff

LENGTH ESTIMATED INFORMATION UNITS: 2.2 Words: 264

DATE 10/22/92

SOURCE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (SLMO)

Edition: 5*

Section: NEWS

Page: 7A

(Copyright 1992)

- * The author of a study of the St. Louis Police Department's
- * community policing program says he was impressed by the officers he met in his research.

- * "Their creativity, talent and energy surprised me," Timothy J. Hope of the University of Missouri at St. Louis told the Police Board on Wednesday.

Hope was commissioned by a police consulting firm and the Police Board to assess the progress of COPS in three areas after one year.

The program name is an acronym for Community-Oriented Problem Solving policing.

In the program, police officers work hand-in-hand with citizens and city agencies to tackle a neighborhood's specific problems, which range from violent crime and drug dealing to nuisances such as weeds and loud music.

Police Board President David A. Robbins has said that the department's goal is for COPS to be used city-wide, rather than in only a few neighborhoods.

Police Board Vice President James F. Conway indicated he was not completely pleased by the report. "I had hoped it would give me a better feeling on how to take COPS to the next level," he said.

But Hope said it would be inappropriate for him to make recommendations on COPS.

'Gang Squad' Permanent

In other business at the Police Board meeting, the Board approved Chief Clarence Harmon's request to make the department's "gang squad" permanent. A sergeant and four officers had been detached from other units to comprise the squad.

The gang squad gathers intelligence on the city's numerous gangs and then works with specific police, such as homicide detectives or district patrol officers, dealing with the gangs.

End of Story Reached

HEADLINE New police chief given an ovation

Byline: FRANK KLIMKO

Credit: Staff Writer

Notes: Head varies | Editions Vary

LENGTH ESTIMATED INFORMATION UNITS: 4.2 Words: 537

DATE 05/28/93

SOURCE The San Diego Union-Tribune (SDU)

Pub: UNION-TRIBUNE

Edition: 5,6,7,2,4

Section: LOCAL

Page: B-3:2,5,6,7; B-2:4

Category: SPEECH

(Copyright 1993)

- * In his first community meeting as San Diego police chief, Jerry Sanders received a warm standing ovation last night at a reception in

the Skyline District, which has been plagued with some of the city's worst crime.

The enthusiastic greeting was partly due to a drastic reduction in street crime in the district in the past two years during the tenure of Bob Burgreen, who as police chief retired this month. The crowd also was pleased that Sanders chose the area for his first neighborhood appearance.

- * Crime in the Skyline District has been cut through community policing, where residents work much more closely with police, said the Rev. Robert Ard, chairman of City Councilman George Stevens' Crime and Justice Commission.

The partnership between police and the Skyline community is a significant improvement from past years, Ard said.

"For a great many years, there was a gulf of mistrust between the people and the police," Ard said. "But by working together, that gulf has finally been merged."

About 100 residents attended the event at the Martin Luther King Recreation Center. It was billed as a simple reception by the Crime and Justice Commission, but Sanders gave the crowd a 10-minute sketch

of the police department's future and then answered questions.

The chief promised to continue to emphasize neighborhood policing as well as restructure the patrol beat system. Officer beats are now mostly configured around census tract lines. However, Sanders wants to redraw them along neighborhood lines, to preserve communities such

as Encanto.

"We want to draw precinct lines to respect communities," Sanders said, "and we want neighborhood policing to spread to every precinct in the city."

Affable and well-humored, Sanders seemed to enjoy the audience give-and-take during the short question-and-answer session. Sanders formerly served as an area captain in the department's Southeastern district.

"I consider myself a large part of this community, and it's good to be back here where I started," Sanders said.

Resident Mike Tripoli asked whether the department would have to lay off police officers, and Sanders said no. Another man wanted

increased police visibility through officers altering their patrol routes. Another resident asked why it seemed to take officers a long time to answer some routine calls.

Emergency calls should be answered in minutes, Sanders said, but other calls may take longer.

- * "One result of community policing is that it will take us longer to respond to some calls," he said. "I can't tell you we will respond to all calls in seven minutes."

Councilman Stevens said that his district may provide a sample of how

the police-community partnership can work.

"I think the entire city can do what the Fourth District has done" in

fighting crime, he said.

"For 30 years in the city, there hasn't been the positive relationship between the community and the police (that) we have now."

Sanders plans more community meetings and will begin next week with one-on-one sessions at police storefront offices.

"I think I have to go out and meet the people, hear their concerns and what they have to say," he said.

@Art: 1 PIC

- * @Art Caption: Meeting the top cop: San Diego Police Chief Jerry Sanders greets Skyline District resident Mike Tripoli. (Eds. 4,5)
@Art Credit: Union-Tribune / SEAN HAFHEY

End of Story Reached

HEADLINE The Politics of Policing
 Byline: By Katti Gray. STAFF WITER
 LENGTH ESTIMATED INFORMATION UNITS: 11.7 Words: 1693
 DATE 11/01/92
 SOURCE Newsday (NDAY)
 Edition: NASSAU AND SUFFOLK
 Section: NEWS
 Page: 06
 (Copyright Newsday Inc., 1992)

San Francisco's mayor has fired two police chiefs since his election last December.

In Houston, a newly elected mayor in February fired the city's first female police chief after two years on the job.

Washington, D.C.'s top cop resigned in September, saying he was anguished over what seemed a losing battle in the war on crime.

And Suffolk County has lost two police commissioners this year, in disputes tied to what both men perceived as the county executive's

bid to micromanage the department.

So, when Peter Cosgrove is sworn in tomorrow as Suffolk County's third police commissioner of 1992, he becomes another symbol of departments in turmoil and transition across the country.

Much of what has beset the Suffolk force has hit law-enforcement agencies everywhere: lingering economic recession, unabating violent crime, mounting friction between top cops and elected officials, and turnover among police chiefs that some find alarming and destabilizing. A recent national study of police chief turnover found that the average tenure among top cops in large cities hovered between two-and-a-half and three years.

* "It's a really frustrating job," said Hubert Williams, a former Newark police chief and president of the Police Foundation in Washington. "The person who holds it is denigrated and blamed for things that are far beyond the scope of any police agency . . . We have an incredible rate of resignations of police chiefs or of them being drummed out of office. The problems will ecome exacerbated in future years."

In addition to coping with shrinking resources and increasing demands, departments are finding themselves forced to change the way they operate in a much more fundamental manner. Perhaps most significantly, criminal-justice experts say departments accustomed to

operating as largely independent fiefdoms with political protection are facing steadier scrutiny from citizens and politicians alike. Both groups are concerned with everything from harnessing taxes to increasing cops' accountability, sometimes through civilian review boards like that in New York City that has stirred such controversy.

"We're looking at what will become a totally different situation for cops," said Daniel Guido, who resigned as Suffolk police commissioner in February and believes the expertise of policing is taking a back seat to political consideratins. "It's different for citizens also. They're used to certain services and I'm not sure they'll be willing to give them up."

While some observers contend that the scrutiny will yield more efficient departments, they also argue that the current evolution in

policing carries pain.

"The job of administering the affairs of local police departments has become extraordinarily complicated," said Williams. "The question for people who would hold those jobs is whether or not the burden is worth the benefit."

While hard numbers aren't available, some say anecdotal evidence suggests many - particularly old-school cops - are deciding the answer is no.

FBI data shows the number of sworn, local law-enforcement officers rising consistently in recent years - from 393,000 nationwide in 1980 to about 535,700 at the end of 1991. But some police unions complain that the recession has plundered municipal budgets and sent officer ranks to record lows. Experts say there is at least anecdotal evidence that more officers are retiring earlier than they'd intended. And with police chiefs opting to leave or being forced out of the job, that instability has made rank-and-file officers reluctant to embrace new programs - fearing that yet another change in command will bring a different agenda for them.

"This is a pretty dramatic time," said Darrel Stephens, executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum, a Washington group focusing on law-enforcement policy and lobbying now for municipalities to grant contracts to police chiefs, which most do not

do. Requiring contracts would cut down on turnover and keep politicians from firing chiefs without good reason, the group says. "Some changes are motivated by people outside the departments, by . . . {the police beating of Rodney King} in Los Angeles. A lot of the change has been motivated by the police themselves. What's clear is there will be none of the departmental expansions we've seen in the past."

Indeed, Suffolk County Executive Robert Gaffney said last week that budgetary constraints could preclude the force from ever returning to its 1970s-80s peak of about 2,800 officers. The number now is 2,070.

"What we need to do is create the model for a modern, suburban police department that anticipates that we'll not have as much money to fund it," Gaffney said.

In Nassau, where Donald Kane took over five months ago as commissioner with a mandate to downsize the police department, the department is in the throes of reorganization.

"The people in the county have come to expect a good level of service, and we could no longer provide it unless we did something because we were losing so much manpower," Kane said recently, in announcing a series of structural changes.

* In Suffolk, Gaffney said the county's bare-bones budget means making police patrols by car a top priority, while trying to figure out how to reinvent a popular, short-lived program of community policing phased out in the past year. The program had provided comparatively costly, neighborhood foot patrols and assigned cops as community liaisons for a better understanding of the communities they serve and, thereby, deterring crime.

Gaffney's ideas about reshaping the police department led to charges from some legislators and from the two commissioners who quit that the county executive was meddling

Gaffney says these are different times, which call for different styles.

"In the past, we'd say let's leave well enough alone, give {police} the money and let them do what they want. I wouldn't dream of doing that now," he said " . . . I won't micromanage but I will maintain budgetary policy and oversight."

But that kind of friction is what's creating rapid turnover across the country. And before police departments can be remolded in constructive ways, experts say, politicians will have to find a way to stop the hemorrhaging among top administrators.

In a recent study, the research forum found that 41 of the nation's 50 largest cities changed chiefs at least once during the last five years. During the 1980s, the forum said, police chiefs in cities of all sizes had been in office an average of eight to 10 years.

Chicago, Philadelphia and San Francisco each had three police chiefs during the five years, with San Francisco's Mayor Frank Jordan firing

one soon after his election in December, 1991, and appointing, then dismissing, a second chief six weeks later.

"Either the mayor made the wrong choice to begin with or the termination simply wasn't valid . . . It provides no continuity or stability for the organization," Stephens said.

One technique for increasing stability is to establish contracts between municipalities and police chiefs, he said. So far, Tampa, Fla., and the Dallas suburb of Garland are the only to sign contracts

with new chiefs hired this year, Stephens said. In addition, New York City is among the few cities that already have local ordinances guaranteeing police chiefs - barring any criminal wrongdoing on their part - a set number of years of service. But most municipalities have been slow to warm to the contract idea, he said.

"Any department that keeps changing chiefs is really demoralizing its troops," said Abraham Abramovsky, executive director of the Fordham University International Criminal Law Center in Manhattan. "The officer loses the energy, the tenacity to work."

And if the troops are suffering during an unstable period for policing, so is the community, observers contend.

Abramovsky said several departments sort on officers have begun prioritizing emergency calls, which means not every resident will receive an immediate response from 911.

Last week, the Suffolk Patrolman's Benevolent Association criticized a so-called stacking policy adopted earlier this year, which has, among other things, pushed responses to burglar alarms farther down on the list. The PBA also launched a bid to create a Council on Public Safety made up of residents who would lobby for police issues.

Bolstering the number of police officers in Suffolk is a primary

objective of the PBA, which represents the bulk of Suffolk cops, and two other groups representing high-ranking officers and detectives in the county.

But the research forum's Stephens said particularly during fiscally volatile times like these, departments must learn to do more with less. Sometimes, the solutions are simple.

His organization found, for example, that police in Newport News, Va., pared from 500 to 150 a year the number of police visits to a convenience store plagued by theft and public brawls after the store owner began displaying alcohol and cigarettes differently to keep them from being stolen. And an adjacent, vacant lot was fenced to ward off people who came there to consume alcohol and, frequently, ended up fighting.

More and more, issues of how to allocate increasingly scarce staff and who should make those decisions are dominating the debates over the police departments of the '90s.

Last Thursday, as Suffolk's legislators confirmed Cosgrove as the county's latest police chief, they also sent him a bittersweet sign of the times: They voted to transfer officers assigned as administrators for the Police Athletic League, a youth project, back to police patrol. Cosgrove disagrees with the move, saying the PAL aims to direct its heavy population of at-risk kids toward constructive activities and away from crime.

The legislature's vote also reminded Cosgrove of the back seat police chiefs have taken as elected officials do more to shape policy and hold tighter reins on government's purse.

And while he saw the PAL issue as a bid to micromanage the department he is about to lead, Cosgrove conceded that police chiefs increasingly will have to allow elected officials and the public to outline policy, leaving top cops to carry it out.

"When I talk to police executives across the nation, I know the budgetary crisis we have in Suffolk is not unusual," he said. "But before we had organized police departments, policing was something done by community people. As we organized departments, and departments grew, we moved away from the community. Maybe the changes that are taking place, ironically, mean we'll be returning to

the basics, to the community."

@Art: Photo-Peter Cosgrove, Suffolk's new police chief

HEADLINE OFFICERS RECLAIM AVENUE NEIGHBORS HAIL POLICE WHO RETOOK STREETS
 Byline: Bill Bryan Of the Post-Dispatch Staff
 LENGTH ESTIMATED INFORMATION UNITS: 5.4 Words: 782
 DATE 01/24/93
 SOURCE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (SLMO)
 Edition: FIVE STAR
 Section: NEWS
 Page: 01A
 Category: PROFILE RON HASTY/TIM KAVANAUGH
 (Copyright 1993)

Three months ago, Annie Pride, 70, was afraid to leave her home of 40 years in the 3700 block of Aldine Avenue. Her neighbor across the street, Grace Hayzlett, 77, was scared to leave her home, too.

Rick Green, 42, a businessman down the street, was hesitant to walk to the auto parts store around the corner, on Martin Luther King Drive.

The residents of the 3700 and 3800 blocks of Aldine, in the Jeff Vander Lou Neighborhood, were virtual prisoners in their homes and businesses, frightened by young men who gathered idly on the street at all hours, drinking their beer and wine, dealing their crack and intimidating passers-by. Vandalism and car break-ins were routine.

* Today, thanks to St. Louis Police Officers Ron Hasty and Tim Kavanaugh, the two blocks of Aldine have been returned to the residents. The officers, through constant, vigilant enforcement, ran off the undesirables. Along the way, the officers also helped to close some crack houses on the street and got heaps of litter removed from vacant lots.

"These two guys have done an unbelievable job," said Green, owner of Max German Meats, a neighborhood institution at 3836 Aldine for 70 years.

"I was afraid to walk to Jerry's auto parts around the corner, and I had customers who wouldn't even come here. Now, nobody's loitering in front of my place, and the vacant lot next to my building is clean.

"These two policemen cared about our area. We've never had that before."

Pride said the two officers had improved the area "100 percent."

"I was always harassed and picked on," she said softly at the front door of her small, red-brick home. "The youngsters around here were terrible.

"But I feel safe now."

Hayzlett added: "It sure is a lot different around here, now. I feel safe."

"The change makes you feel kind of good," said Hasty, 30, an outgoing 6-year police veteran with bright red hair. "These people have to live here or work here, and we have to work here for eight hours a day, so whatever is bad for them is bad for us."

Kavanaugh, 28, and also a 6-year veteran, lets Hasty do all the talking.

* The two officers got the idea to target the two blocks of Aldine, just a small part of their beat, after they were told to come up with a COPS project. COPS stands for Community Oriented

Policing, or Community Oriented Problem Solving, depending on who in the Police Department is talking.

Hasty and Kavanaugh said they chose Aldine Avenue because they were bothered by the sudden death of a baby at a "crack house" in the 3700 block. "We thought, 'This is enough.' "

Hasty and Kavanaugh began by taking a "zero tolerance" approach to the loiterers on the street. "We wouldn't let anyone congregate," Hasty said.

"We leaned on them constantly," Hasty said. "Basically, I guess you'd have to say we intimidated them."

As for the crack houses, "We sat in front of them in our patrol car and ate our lunch," Hasty said. "Our presence hurt their business.

"Eventually, they moved out."

The two officers also persuaded the owner of a junkyard - after several warnings, summonses and arrests - to clean up unsightly debris. And they got the city to remove hundreds of liquor, wine and beer bottles from a vacant lot next to Max German.

The neighborhood today is still a montage of vacant lots, boarded-up red brick buildings marked with spray-panted gang graffiti and few neat bungalows and red-brick flats. "But you should have seen it before," Hasty said.

Another appreciative resident is Larry Dotson, 47, who runs a towing service for McCall's Auto Sales and Service at 3717 Aldine.

"There used to be a lot of trouble around here with stealing, drugs, whooping and hollering," Dotson said.

"People kept breaking in here. I was afraid to work late. Our customers were scared to come here.

"Now, I'm not afraid to work late, and the customers don't mind coming here anymore."

Harry Loebner, 55, owns Jerry's Auto Supply nearby at 3869 Martin Luther King Drive and an apartment building in the 3700 block of Aldine that was taken over by drug dealers.

"The drug dealers are gone now, thanks to these two policemen, who deserve some praise," he said.

@Art: PHOTO, MAP

@Art Caption: (1) Color Photo by Ted Dargan/Post-Dispatch - Police officers Tim Kavanaugh (left) and Ron Hasty patrolling the 3700 block of Aldine Avenue, where residents say they once again feel safe

to leave their homes. (2) Post-Dispatch map showing area targeted by police on Aldine Avenue. A second map of St. Louis showing the area of detail also ran.

End of Story Reached

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HEADLINE POLICE WILL START PEDDLING ON PATROL
LENGTH ESTIMATED INFORMATION UNITS: 1.6 Words: 170
DATE 04/16/93
SOURCE GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD (GRNB) (NCNR)

Edition: HIGH POINT
Section: TRIAD/STATE
Page: B2A

(Copyright 1993)

Don't be surprised when you see peddling police this weekend.

* Starting Saturday, High Point police will begin patrolling the shopping centers and single-family neighborhoods north of Montlieu Avenue on bicycles as a part of the department's new community policing program.

These five-hour weekend patrols are expected to run the entire summer. Police will work their way from Skeet Club Road and edge toward other neighborhoods and businesses in District 2, an area encompassing almost 24,000 residents, or 34 percent of the city's population.

"They (residents) don't feel intimidated at all," said High Point police Capt. Mitch Simpson, who oversees District 2. "They'll come up and talk to you because they don't feel threatened."

* The bicycle patrol arose from the department's community policing plan that aims to reduce crime and better acquaint residents with officers protecting their neighborhoods.

So, don't be alarmed this weekend when you see some helmeted guy with black shorts and white knit shirt busting down Eastchester Drive on a mountain bike.

It's just a cop at work.

End of Story Reached

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HEADLINE THE BEAT IS ON, THE HEAT IS OFF COMMUNITY POLICING IN REIDSVILLE
Byline: FRANCES M. WARD Rockingham Bureau
LENGTH ESTIMATED INFORMATION UNITS: 4.1 Words: 584
DATE 04/09/93
SOURCE GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD (GRNB) (NCNR)
Edition: ROCKINGHAM
Section: ROCKINGHAM
Page: R1
(Copyright 1993)

* So far, the "community policing" program at Reidsville's troubled West End Plaza is a hit.

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It's only been about four months, but residents at West End Plaza can see the difference.

"The violence has cut down, the crowds are no longer on the corners, the cars don't speed through the district anymore and the trash problems have been cleaned up," says resident John Pinnix.

Thanks to Reidsville's Police Department and Sgt. Leon Lawson, a special neighborhood beat patrol is succeeding in the western edge of town where regular patrols have failed.

"The officer's presence alone has made a big difference," says resident Alfreda Hairston. "We don't have the traffic up here at night or during the day that we used to have. If drug dealers see police here, they won't hang out."

The Reidsville Police Department opened a small branch office, complete with desk, phone and a full-time officer, in the federally-subsidized West End Plaza apartments in December.

Sgt. Leon Lawson, a 24-year police veteran, was selected to staff the office and was assigned the task of walking the beat. The surrounding neighborhood, near Duke and Lindsey streets, is the area he patrols.

* Police Chief James Festerman said the program is called "community policing," and the approach is becoming popular nationwide. Greensboro and High Point already have similar programs.

According to Lawson, the special patrol has helped prevent vandalism, theft and violence there. Regular patrols, cruising in and out, never addressed the "root causes" of the neighborhood's problems.

"My job is to help these people. I let them know we are all working together to make this a better place to live," Lawson said.

When he began door-to-door patrols at West End, Lawson was surprised by the living conditions. Many people who couldn't afford curtains hung sheets at the windows. Some people didn't have beds to sleep on.

To help with aesthetics, Lawson convinced management officials to put up blinds. He also lobbied Reidsville City officials to ask sanitation workers to beef up efforts in keeping paper and trash off the streets surrounding the area.

"If people feel better about their surroundings, they have more confidence in themselves, they do better in life," Lawson said.

Lawson often sits in on tenant meetings at West End to give advice. He even take elderly residents to the doctor or grocery store in emergency situations.

"I asked for this job. I saw it as an honor to come here. Every

officer can't work in an area like this and make a difference," said Lawson, who has served as a patrolman and detective. "I can get along with people and I work to gain their trust."

Through tips to Lawson from residents, the Reidsville Police Department has made several arrests related to armed robbery and other crimes.

"I would like to think that now you can get a pizza delivered here. In the past, if you said Duke Street, the answer was 'No,' " Lawson said.

"I had one lady to tell me 'Before you came, I hated to come home from work because of fear. Now, I'm glad to come home.' "

The city of Reidsville is paying for the branch office with a two-year, \$76,000 federal grant. The cit has the option of applying for another grant to continue the program.

Lawson hopes that won't be necessary.

"I hope this program is so successful, we won't need to continue it. Once the problems are solved, I hope residents will help in keeping it that way."

End of Story Reached

HEADLINE A NEW ERA / POLICE OFFICERS MOVING CLOER TO THE COMMUNITY

Byline: JERI ROWE High Point Bureau

LENGTH ESTIMATED INFORMATION UNITS: 3.7 Words: 500

DATE 02/03/93

SOURCE GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD (GRNB) (NCNR)

Edition: HIGH POINT

Section: TRIAD/STATE

Page: B2A

(Copyright 1993)

High Point police are switching to a new style of policing today.

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Don't be alarmed if you see a High Pont police officer at your church social, your daughter's school or riding down your street on a bicycle.

It's the new High Point Police Department. Or as one officer says, it's "Back to Mayberry," the fictional town popularized by the "Andy Griffith Show."

That all starts today. After years of planning, the 160-officer department will initiate a new style of policing that aims to reduce crime and better acquaint residents with the officers protecting their neighborhoods.

"For years, we had a professional model ... that we would get into an air-conditioned car, go in and say, 'Just that facts, Ma'am,' " Major Randy Tysinger said. "But during that time, we've lost contact with the citizens. Hopefully, what we're doing now is getting more officers interacting with the community and establishing bridges with the community so we can see what's going on."

- \* Known as community policing, this crime-fighting style slices the city into four districts. Each district, in effect, is a small city, with its own police captain and about 20 officers and several detectives. Each team will develop strategies for combating crime in their district.

The solutions could involve anything from special traffic patrols around heavily traveled roads to reduce accident to riding a bicycle through burglary-prone neighborhoods to cut the number of break-ins.

At the same time, police officers will knock on doors, talk to business owners and attend community meetings so people will know police by name rather than seeing them as just a uniform in a passing car.

That's a big change from what happened before. Patrol officers bolted from one side of the city to another to cover calls, while police captains often forgot about the city's problems once their 12-hour shift ended.

Now, that's over. Starting today, every police officer is more accountable.

"Any change is good," Officer Kent Hamby said. "We're getting away from the traditional policing of 'cuff 'em and stuff 'em.' We're trying to get back to a quality of life that we know it could be. I call it 'Back to Mayberry.' "

This new policing technique surface in a city that has almost doubled in size - the 1990 population was about 70,000 - since

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1973. And during the past five years, the crime rate in this 45-square-mile city has increased 20 percent, while, at the same time, the size of the police force has dwindled.

Three years ago, the police department implemented satellite police stations in four of the city's federal housing communities to better protect people in some of the more crime-ridden areas. The new district policing plan is another step. And the key to this plan's success, police say, is community involvement. "I look at it as a long journey," Tysinger said, "where you have to pace yourself and those people involved every step of the way."

@Art: MAP: Margaret Baxter/ News & Record Police Districts

End of Story Reached

LEVEL 1 - 45 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 Globe Newspaper Company  
The Boston Globe

February 4, 1992, Tuesday, City Edition

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SECTION: METRO/REGION; Pg. 15

LENGTH: 977 words

HEADLINE: Bratton a diplomat on first day of new job

BYLINE: By John Ellement, Globe Staff

KEYWORD: NAME-BRATTON BOSTON POLICE APPOINTMENT

## BODY:

William Bratton yesterday displayed the diplomatic skills that have burnished his reputation as a successful police manager, in his first day on the job as the No. 2 man in the Boston Police Department.

At a press conference at Area B-2 in Roxbury with Commissioner Francis M. Roache by his side, Bratton - who is superintendent in chief - carefully deferred to his titular commander in chief, pausing to ask Roache's permission before answering a question from a reporter.

Yesterday afternoon, Bratton appeared at roll call for Area A-1 in Government Center and told 17 officers that the promised arrival of community policing in Boston should not cause them undue anxiety, saying the concept is nothing more than a "new name" for old tactics.

Community policing, he said, means allowing officers more opportunities for regular contact with the residents the department serves. "What the hell is wrong with that? That's what this business is all about," he said.

He also promised that any changes under his command would be made with input from the officers themselves and cited improvements in uniforms, equipment and morale at the three other police departments he has led.

"I think we took care of the cops," he said.

Bratton's public relations skills came to the fore when he was asked by reporters about the reassignment of Sgt. Robert E. O'Toole to his personal staff. O'Toole was demoted by Roache in 1987 after he was taped by a television news crew slapping a Red Sox fan during the 1986 World Series.

O'Toole's reassignment has been criticized as the wrong message to be sent by a department seeking to repair ties with a community rent by allegations of police brutality.

But Bratton turned the tables. "Sgt. O'Toole five years ago committed one of the most egregious acts a police officer can do in the line of duty: He struck a citizen," he said.

He said that O'Toole's reassignment "to my staff is a sign to Boston police officers that if you do wrong, if you make a mistake, you will be dealt with.

The Boston Globe, February 4, 1992

But at the same time, if it is a mistake that can be corrected, that you can still have a career in the Boston Police Department, that we're not just going to discard you."

In an interview, Bratton said he plans to meet with lawyer James D. St. Clair this week to discuss the findings of the investigation into Boston police management that St. Clair headed. It was the St. Clair commission's conclusion that Roache had failed to manage the department effectively that led to Bratton's hiring at \$ 90,000 a year.

Bratton, who left a job as chief of the New York Transit Authority Police to return to Boston, where he was formerly a member of the city's police force and chief of the Metropolitan Police and the MBTA police, testified before the commission and recommended against a superintendent-in-chief's position.

In a meeting with reporters at Area B-2 and a brief interview at Area A-1, Bratton:

- Said he will complete a review of the St. Clair commission report by March 3 and, with Roache, will announce which of the commission's recommendations they will follow and which they will ignore.

- Pledged to overhaul the command staff within the next two weeks, a move he is making within that period to end the "unease" at the highest levels of the department caused by his arrival.

"I can safely say we are not going to see major upheaval in the command staff," Bratton said. He also said that he and Roache have not yet decided whether new commanders will be required to hold the civil service rank of lieutenant.

The St. Clair commission recommended that the appointive commanders in the department be lieutenants at least. That requirement would force at least four commanding officers from their posts.

- Promised to unveil within the next 150 days a plan laying out how the department will put the community policing concept into practice.

- Offered an olive branch to the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, which has gone to court to block Bratton's hiring. Bratton said he will sit down with union president Donald L. Murray to ease tensions. "I want the union to recognize there is a lot more we can do together," he said. "I am here." He said he is considering having a representative from the three police unions attend monthly command staff meetings.

Murray said last night he looks forward to meeting with Bratton but remains angry that Roache and Bratton have embraced the creation of a Community Appeals Board, which would review police investigations of civilian complaints against officers. Murray said that neither Bratton nor Roache informed the union about the board prior to Roache's announcement on Jan. 17.

"There should have been some dialogue before the Gestapo civilian review board was put into place," Murray said.

The Boston Globe, February 4, 1992

Bratton yesterday also promised that the community policing plan eventually developed would not be "generic" but would be specifically designed for different neighborhoods.

"The secret of our eventual success is the tailor-making of police response that the community is happy with and the cops feel comfortable with," Bratton said.

He also defended the hiring of two civilians from the Metropolitan Police Department at an estimated cost of \$ 80,000 a year and said he expects to increase the size of the staff assigned to his office. He said he expects he will have to go outside the department to hire some help but will also rely on quality staff from inside the department.

Bratton began his day attending roll call at Area D-4 in the South End, which he formerly commanded, and found he recognized only two of the 25 officers there. He said he expects to work 12- to 14-hour days but declared: "The commissioner's a tough act to follow with the hours he puts in. We have an agreement that I do not have to work nearly as long as he does, but close."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, Superintendent in Chief William Bratton addresses a group of Boston police officers yesterday. GLOBE PHOTO / JUSTINE ELLEMENT

## LEVEL 1 - 43 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 Crain Communications, Inc.  
Crain's Chicago Business

May 11, 1992

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SECTION: Pg. 3

LENGTH: 1347 words

HEADLINE: In LA's wake, cops here eye neighborhood tactics

BYLINE: By MARK HORNUNG

## BODY:

Last summer was a hot one in Chicago, except in one enclave on the Far West Side.

As the city saw the murder rate mount to one of its highest levels here in 20 years, homicides in South Austin actually dropped 22% compared with the year before.

The improvement in South Austin -- a neighborhood nestled between Austin and Cicero avenues, Roosevelt Road and Division Street -- is attributable to a three-year experiment in community policing, says LeRoy O'Shield, commander of Chicago Police District 15.

Community policing is a philosophy of law enforcement that takes officers out of their squad cars, puts them on foot and pairs them with community groups, churches and schools. Acting as partners rather than adversaries, these groups jointly devise strategies for dealing with neighborhood-specific problems ranging from gang activity and youth unemployment to help for the elderly.

"My product is the delivery of law enforcement services," the 49-year-old Cmdr. O'Shield begins. "Arresting people is one aspect. The other aspects are the prevention of crime, elimination of fear and promulgation of a safe environment."

Ridiculed by some veteran cops as a glorified term for foot patrols, community policing is drawing renewed attention here and around the country in the wake of the recent riots in Los Angeles.

But even before that outbreak of violence, talk of community policing had been gaining steam in Chicago. A motivating factor is money.

With the hiring of 600 new officers this year, city government will spend \$ 664.7 million on law enforcement, 39% of its entire corporate budget.

An aggravated Mayor Richard M. Daley insists that taxpayers aren't getting a sufficient return on their law enforcement investment -- an assertion borne out by a study conducted last fall for the mayor by Chicago-based consulting firm Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc.

The study found that, in the course of a year, police officers spend up to 80% of their time responding to 3 million to 3.5 million 911 emergency calls. In cases involving the most serious crimes, arrests occur just 16% of the

Crain's Chicago Business, May 11, 1992

time.

Echoing complaints by the mayor, the Booz Allen study pinpointed a management problem. Rather than deploy the department's 8,000 patrol officers to "incident-driven policing," the Booz Allen study recommends that the department adopt a more "proactive policing strategy."

Mayor Daley insists this approach is the wave of the future. Newly appointed Police Superintendent Matt Rodriguez says he, too, is a believer in that philosophy and vows to introduce model programs in another six of the city's 25 police districts.

But barriers to community policing are formidable.

Because the rhythm of police work is established by response to 911 emergency calls, a major criterion of a police officer's performance is the number of arrests made, rather than the number of crimes prevented.

There's also the problem of the Police Department's culture. Can an organization as hierarchically structured as the Pentagon actually embrace a citywide, bottom-up approach to law enforcement?

"The shift to community policing is being made in two-thirds of the nation's cities with more than 50,000 residents," says Robert Trojanowicz, director of the national Center for Community Policing in East Lansing, Mich. "But evaluations for police officers haven't changed in most cases."

Cmdr. O'Shield, a Chicago police officer since 1967, attributes his awakening to community policing to three years he spent recently outside the force.

From 1985 to 1988, Mr. O'Shield served as deputy aviation commissioner in charge of security at the city's airports. A novel feature of his job was seeing financially weak, lower-quality commercial airline companies being taken over or driven out of business by richer, high-quality carriers.

Says Mr. O'Shield: "I saw, in the private sector, how quality service was the only real edge a company could get on its competitor."

By the time he returned to the police force in the spring of 1988, he was a self-described convert. That's why, in addition to his duties in South Austin, Cmdr. O'Shield was dispatched by former Superintendent LeRoy Martin to work on a community policing proposal with a coalition of 30 community organizations known as the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS).

'Not a cure-all'

"This is not a cure-all that eliminates crime or social problems," says Warren Friedman, executive director of CANS.

"But two things do seem to happen with community policing: the gap between the community and police tends to be reduced, and the likelihood of racist behavior is reduced as the community and the police begin to identify with each other," he says.

Crain's Chicago Business, May 11, 1992

The experiences in South Austin show that community policing doesn't need an injection of new resources to be effective.

With the help of Wright Community College, located at 3400 N. Austin Ave., crime prevention courses are held every afternoon at the district police station at 5327 W. Chicago Ave.

The programs provide youths remedial reading and tutoring services, self-defense and self-discipline courses, as well as primers on free enterprise and the criminal justice system.

About 3,000 South Austin youths have gone through the programs, culminating in the commander's award of "junior police" certificates to 7-to-14-year-olds and "explorer scout" certificates to 14-to-20-year-olds.

Participants aren't tracked once they leave the program, though South Austin's rates of truancy and petty theft -- crimes often associated with youths -- have decreased since the classes began in early 1989.

Meanwhile, Wright Community College has realized increased enrollment from South Austin since the classes were started.

"We have seen some real spinoff benefits," says Sally Schwyn, dean of adult continuing education at Wright.

If community outreach is the carrot of community policing, foot patrol provides the cops with a much-needed stick.

#### Success of foot patrols

Of the 250 officers in South Austin, 20 are regularly assigned to foot patrol, a figure Cmdr. O'Shield says he would boost to nearly 100 if demands for more immediate police services weren't so overwhelming.

Cops on foot patrol are responsible for more than walking streets. They're also charged with meeting community organizers, ministers, educators and parents in order to flush out neighborhood trouble spots.

Suspicious at first, community organizers and clergy now view South Austin police as their partners. A major factor has been the tireless lobbying of Cmdr. O'Shield, who has forfeited his allotted five-week vacations in each of the past three years.

"We have a friend in the Police Department who can deliver justice," says Otto McMath, 75, a 25-year resident of the neighborhood and veteran organizer for the South Austin Coalition Community Council.

A drug-busting campaign launched in February is illustrative.

To the chagrin of community leaders a faction of the Vice Lords street gang turned the 5400 block of West Van Buren Street into a drug traffic zone.

Efforts by a nearby pastor, the Rev. Willie Upshire of Prince of Peace Sanctified Baptist Church, to take back the block was met with death threats and acts of vandalism against the church.

Crain's Chicago Business, May 11, 1992

Cmdr. O'Shield dispatched a pair of foot-patrol cops to the area. Their presence not only succeeded in cleaning up the block by May 1, but it enabled the department to gather gang intelligence that would otherwise have taken about a year to obtain if the officers had been in a squad car.

When pressed by a visitor to explain how he can be so sure his cops have succeeded, Cmdr. O'Shield shoots back: "Because my customer says so."

Then, groping for a paper amid the clutter on his desk, the Hyde Park resident regains his normal composure as he produces correspondence from Rev. Upshire. Dated April 30, the highly complimentary letter of appreciation ends with two words that bring a smile to the commander's face: "Mission accomplished."

GRAPHIC: Picture, District 15 Cmdr. LeRoy O'Shield's community policing plan helped South Austin cut its homicide rate 22% last year. BROOKE HUMMER

LEVEL 1 - 42 OF 47 STORIES

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Newsday

June 18, 1992, Thursday, CITY EDITION

46

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 4

Other Edition: Nassau and Suffolk Pg. 7

LENGTH: 1456 words

HEADLINE: Feds Target Dirty Cops;  
Probe focusing on 10 precincts

BYLINE: By Michele Parente, Leonard Levitt and David Kocieniewski. STAFFWRITERS

KEYWORD: COVER; NEW YORK CITY; POLICE DEPARTMENT; BROOKLYN; CORRUPTION;  
POLICE; SCANDAL; DRUG; SALE; COCAINE; MICHAEL DOWD; ABUSE; BRIBERY; MANHATTAN;  
QUEENS COUNTY; BLACKMAIL; INVESTIGATION; FEDERAL; UNITED STATES; LAWYERS; IAD;  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION; ROBBERIES; CRIME

## BODY:

Federal law enforcement authorities have launched an investigation into allegations of police corruption in at least 10 of the city's 75 precincts, sources close to the investigation said.

Some officers in Manhattan, Brooklyn and Queens precincts allegedly are involved in illegal acts that include extorting merchants, taking payoffs to protect apartment houses, dealing drugs, robbing shop owners and acting as spotters for burglary rings.

Three Brooklyn precincts under investigation by the U.S. attorney in the Southern District, Otto Obermaier, are linked to accused "coke cop" Michael Dowd. Investigators are preparing a racketeering case against Dowd, who was one of five officers arrested last month on charges that they ran a cocaine ring from two Brooklyn precincts and sold drugs on Long Island, sources said.

Many of the corruption allegations in other precincts involve officers in Police Commissioner Lee Brown's heralded Community Policing, or "CPOP" units, sources said.

New York Newsday reported earlier this week that, in an unprecedented move, federal investigators are probing allegations of police corruption and excluding the NYPD's Internal Affairs Division because they don't trust IAD's disciplinary system.

The expanded investigation also is being conducted independent of IAD, sources said yesterday.

"We have no information about them [federal authorities] expanding their probe," Police Deputy Commissioner Suzanne Trazoff said, adding IAD officials conferred with Southern District investigators yesterday.

Andrew Maloney, U.S. attorney for the Eastern District, which includes Brooklyn and Queens, couldn't be reached for comment yesterday.

Newsday, June 18, 1992

Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes also has begun a police corruption investigation, according to sources. Hynes refused comment yesterday.

Because the probe has only recently begun, the allegations haven't been substantiated and do not involve the majority of the 10 precincts' officers. The precincts under investigation are:

The 34th Precinct, Washington Heights, Manhattan. Longstanding allegations of drug-related corruption against officers are now being investigated along with allegations that CPOP officers are "shaking down" merchants.

The officers "go around to the stores introducing themselves to the merchants. They tell the store owners they're also there 'soliciting for burglary insurance,' " said one source involved in the investigation. Some officers allegedly also are selling drugs from their cars and are providing protection to dealers.

The 30th Precinct, Harlem, Manhattan. Some officers on the midnight tour allegedly are dealing drugs. It is unclear how many officers are accused.

The 23rd Precinct, Upper East Side, Manhattan. Some officers are accused of having an unwritten policy of doing favors for neighborhood residents in exchange for payoffs. Doormen, restaurant and store owners and residents are granted extra protection and cops are paid as if they were private security guards, according to the allegations.

The Fifth Precinct, Chinatown, Manhattan. Some officers are accused of robbing merchants. Sources said the Asian merchants are reluctant to report crime and corrupt officers have taken advantage of that.

The Ninth Precinct, East Village, Manhattan. Officers are accused of taking kickbacks from dealers.

The 108th Precinct, Long Island City, Queens. Allegations are that officers have been shaking down owners of small factories and warehouses for protection and that they are "casing the places for the burglars" if they don't comply.

The 90th Precinct, Williamsburg, Brooklyn. Allegations that officers are involved with Dominican heroin gangs.

The 73rd, 94th and 75th Precincts, Brownsville, Greenpoint and East New York, Brooklyn. As many as a dozen officers are being investigated in connection with Dowd and the five other cops charged with operating a cocaine ring from the 73rd and 94th. Investigators also are looking into whether Dowd and other officers may have been involved in a cocaine ring operated by cops in the 75th Precinct and busted in 1988.

Some sources said the FBI is monitoring the investigation, but FBI spokesman Joseph Valiquette said yesterday the FBI hasn't been asked to join a probe.

The investigation is being conducted by the Official Corruption Unit of the Southern District. The unit's head, Assistant U.S. Attorney David Lawrence, refused to comment.

Newsday, June 18, 1992

New York Newsday reported in November that pockets of corruption exist within the city's precincts and that IAD has either been unwilling or unable to root them out.

In the case of Dowd, IAD failed to make a case against him despite allegations that he was using and dealing drugs since 1988.

During New York Newsday's four-month investigation last year, police officers and prosecutors cited allegations of corruption and brutality throughout the city that IAD failed to pursue aggressively. In some instances, sources said IAD deliberately leaked its own probes to its targets.

In the 1970s, the Knapp Commission was formed to investigate widespread police corruption and laxity on the part of police brass in investigating it.

One result of the Knapp Commission was a beefed-up Internal Affairs Division, which became a nationwide model of how police can police themselves. However, sources told New York Newsday that during recent years, police officials have again grown lax in investigating corruption to avoid the embarrassment of scandals.

In November, IAD officials denied the existence of police corruption and said IAD had been successful in weeding it out. However, since Dowd and his cohorts were arrested last month by Suffolk County authorities, IAD Chief Robert Beatty has conceded that his division's procedures need revamping.

#### Under Scrutiny

Some officers in these Manhattan, Brooklyn and Queens precincts allegedly are involved in illegal acts that include extorting merchants, taking payoffs to protect apartment houses, dealing drugs, robbing shop owners and acting as spotters for burglary rings.

#### Brooklyn

##### 73rd Precinct

##### Brownsville

One of Brooklyn's busiest with 78 homicides last year. The number of robberies have risen in the precinct, police say, but burglaries and robberies have declined.

##### 75th Precinct

##### East New York

One of the city's most violent precincts, East New York was the highest homicide area until Manhattan's Washington Heights recently edged it out. More than 100 homicides occur in the precinct each year, mostly in drug-related violence.

##### 90th Precinct

##### Williamsburg

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A precinct in which about two dozen homicides occur each year, Williamsburg has been marred by increasing drug traffic.

#### 94th Precinct

##### Greenpoint

Relatively peaceful area. Only eight homicides occurred in the precinct last year and the murder rate has never exceeded single digits in the past four years. There has been a slight increase in robberies in the area but burglary and assaults in the precinct have declined, according to police statistics.

##### Manhattan

#### Fifth Precinct

##### Chinatown, Little Italy

With about a dozen homicides each year, this precinct has had some instances of Asian gang-related violence and increasing presence of drug traffickers.

#### Ninth Precinct

##### East Village

A mix of yuppies and longtime residents, art galleries and drug dealers, violence in this neighborhood has declined in recent years as homicides dropped from more than 20 each year in 1990 and 1989 to 13 last year.

#### 23rd Precinct

##### Upper East Side

A neighborhood that has slowly become more economically mixed as gentrification moves uptown and drug trafficking moves south. Over the past four years, homicides have remained at around 30 each year.

#### 30th Precinct

##### Harlem

In this area which police say has had a longstanding drug trade, violence has escalated each year, from 44 homicides in 1988 to 56 last year.

#### 34th Precinct

##### Washington Heights

Cocaine has made Washington Heights the home of one of the city's busiest, and most controversial, police station houses - the 34th Precinct. It leads the city in drug arrests, and is the city's most murderous neighborhood, with 119 murders last year. In the past three years, robberies have increased by 45 percent; assaults by 35 percent. All crimes are up in the Washington Heights neighborhood, law enforcement officials say - including those committed by

Newsday, June 18, 1992

cops.

Queens

108th Precinct

Long Island City

A precinct in which homicides have declined each year - until last year.  
Homicides dropped from 19 in 1988 to only six in 1990 and then jumped to 10 last year.

## LEVEL 1 - 30 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 The New York Times Company  
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August 9, 1992, Sunday, Late Edition - Final

36

SECTION: Section 1; Page 48; Column 1; Metropolitan Desk

LENGTH: 848 words

HEADLINE: How a Precinct Puts Theory Into Practice

BYLINE: By DONATELLA LORCH

BODY:

The emergency call crackled across the police car radio, telling of a cardiac arrest. But there was little the two officers could do when they reached the Brooklyn apartment house. A 47-year-old man had died, apparently hours ago, and was not discovered until his companion returned home from work.

Wails and screams filled the small apartment and a little girl cried silently on the stairwell. For Officers Hanna Tonuzi, 26 years old, and her partner Nicole Medico, 23, it was a routine 911 emergency call. Officer Tonuzi stopped to comfort the little girl and then began the long process of preparing a death report, gently questioning the relatives, calling the medical examiner and waiting for the morgue truck. But as with any emergency the officers have been trained for, the overall philosophy was community policing.

"It's real hard for anyone to take death," whispered Officer Tonuzi as screams rent the room. "If an autopsy is not required, we usually help to make funeral arrangements. By handling a job, it kind of brings people closer together. You get to know them and they remember you."

Experimental Approach

For more than a year, Officers Tonuzi and Medico as well as the entire 72d Precinct in Sunset Park have been part of an unusual experiment in community policing. Unlike other city precincts, in which only foot patrol officers have been part of the Police Department's community policing strategy, the 72d has enrolled all 204 uniformed officers, including patrol-car and foot-patrol officers, as well as the 18 detectives.

For Officers Tonuzi and Medico, who are in patrol cars, the change has meant being given the same patrol sectors each shift. As often as possible, patrol cars are assigned 911 emergency calls in the sector they work in. The goal is for patrol cars to spend 60 percent of their time answering 911 emergency calls instead of the city average of 90 percent.

Detectives, instead of receiving cases according to shifts, are now assigned cases by the neighborhood they are responsible for.

"I really like this idea," said Officer Tonuzi. "We get to deal with the community but we still get to deal with 911 calls." When not responding to emergency calls, the partners patrol buildings for drug users or concentrate on blocks identified as trouble spots by foot-patrol officers.

The New York Times, August 9, 1992

## A 'Medium' Precinct

The 72d, an area with significant Hispanic, Asian and white populations, was selected by the Vera Institute of Justice, a Manhattan-based research organization, because it was considered a "medium" precinct with neighborhoods that ranged from middle-income areas to low-income areas with severe drug problems. As an experimental precinct, the 72d was given an increase of 30 officers.

The 72d Precinct is experimenting with "hot sheets" or daily printouts for all officers that provide lists of emergency calls for the previous 24 hours, divided by beat and sector, as well as lists of crimes and arrests. Monthly meetings, at which all officers participate, are aimed at exchanges of information about neighborhoods.

The special narcotics unit and the anticrime unit were eliminated as separate specialized units. The precinct station house has become a center of the community. From a boxing team to an explorers club, more than a dozen sporting activities have developed with neighborhood children during the last two years.

"It's a philosophy, it's a way of working, not a program," said Sgt. Andrew McGoey, who began community policing at the 72d Precinct in 1984 under Commissioner Benjamin Ward and has been one of the major players in the present transformation. "Police work is so many unforeseen things. We're not social workers. But we're the only contact many people have with the government. We shouldn't ignore problems because they don't fall in the official realm of police work."

## Theory and Practice

Certain theories have not worked well in practice. Dissolving the specialized anticrime unit proved inefficient and now the new model is closer to the traditional one, employing several specialized officers, said Michael J. Farrell, associate director of the Vera Institute of Justice, which is monitoring the experiment. The precinct bureaucracy has proved recalcitrant at times over problems as minor as which officer should do the fingerprinting of suspects.

"Problem solving is a mind set," said Mr. Farrell, who spent 30 years in the Police Department. "There are problems that are never going to be solved. There will always be drug dealers in New York. But this is the best thing that's happened to the department."

The successes stand out the most. More than a year ago, 49th Street was known throughout Brooklyn as a major drug distributing area, the turf of four drug dealers. There were frequent muggings and a couple of murders. It took a year and four beat patrol officers working on the problem before the dealers were arrested on warrants in February. They are in prison facing felony and murder charges. The block is now a favorite play area for neighborhood children.

GRAPHIC: Photo: "We get to deal with the community but we still get to deal with 911 calls," said Hanna Tonuzi, center, who, along with her partner, Nicole Medico, and the entire 72d Precinct in Sunset Park, have been part of a yearlong experiment in community policing. Officers Medico and Tonuzi during a recent tour of a play block closed to traffic during the summer on 49th Street near

The New York Times, August 9, 1992

Fifth Avenue in Brooklyn. (Nancy Siesel/The New York Times)

Map of Brooklyn, indicating 72d Precinct.

SUBJECT: POLICE

ORGANIZATION: POLICE PRECINCTS (NYC); POLICE DEPARTMENT (NYC)

NAME: LORCH, DONATELLA; TONUZI, HANNA (POLICE OFFICER); MEDICO, NICOLE (POLICE OFFICER)

GEOGRAPHIC: NEW YORK CITY; SUNSET PARK (NYC); BROOKLYN (NYC)

## LEVEL 1 - 37 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 Crain Communications, Inc.  
City & State

July 27, 1992 / August 9, 1992

37

SECTION: SPECIAL REPORT; Public Safety; Pg. 16

LENGTH: 1388 words

HEADLINE: Cities take diverse paths to community policing;  
Ultimate goal is to reduce crime

BYLINE: By GARY ENOS, Staff Writer

BODY:

Ask 100 city officials about community policing, and most will say their police departments either are doing it or are thinking about it.

Ask the same 100 to define community policing, and you might get 100 different answers.

Therein lies the dilemma facing cities that are riding the new wave in law enforcement. Because people don't always agree on what community policing means, there is little consensus over whether it is working -- or even how to make it work.

Community-or neighborhood-oriented policing seeks to reduce the physical and psychological distance between police and citizens. It is a strategy designed to involve residents in crime prevention and welcome their help in investigating incidents and attacking social problems.

All neighborhood-oriented policing efforts have crime reduction as their ultimate goal through dealing with the root causes of crime in declining communities. But there is no Bible on how to achieve community policing, so cities have taken widely divergent paths.

Community policing in Elgin, Ill., involves moving several police officers and their families to high-crime housing projects. In Seattle, it means officers giving up their cars and bicycling their ways around their beats. In Springfield, Ohio, it means giving police flexible hours so they can tailor their schedules to neighborhood needs.

"The philosophy behind community-oriented policing is that the police need to start thinking service," said E. Roberta Lesh, director of police programs for the International City/County Management Association, Washington, which conducts training sessions for mayors and police chiefs interested in the concept. "This is as opposed to the young person seeking adventure in the police department, or what I call the 'John Wayne syndrome.'"

According to the 9-year-old National Center for Community Policing at Michigan State University, East Lansing, 65% of cities with at least 50,000 residents say they either have implemented community policing or are about to do so.

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Robert Trojanowicz, the center's director, said smaller cities probably have been into community policing all along because their officers are more familiar with the community's key personalities.

In recent years, city officials have been compelled to consider a new policing strategy because of a growing sense that neighborhoods are declining.

"It might just be that rowdy kids are terrorizing the elderly, or there might already be open drug deals," Mr. Trojanowicz said. "But people come to realize that, if they don't deal with it now, it'll be much worse in 10 years."

One community that reached that conclusion is Aurora, Colo., once a quiet suburb of Denver but now a city with 225,000 low-to middle-income residents and a host of urban problems. Facing a rise in street-gang activity and drug trafficking, the Police Department in 1983 assigned officers to act as community ombudsmen in five pilot areas.

Community policing now encompasses all of Aurora, division chief Ron Sloan said. Police at first dismissed the effort as liberal window-dressing, something that resembled social work more than police work. But the department has succeeded in selling community policing as a more effective way of doing business -- preferable to sitting in a squad car waiting for the next call.

"I would say I'm a convert to community policing," Mr. Sloan said. "I can look back at things I did as a patrolman that were more oriented toward the community side. They were much more satisfying than the typical reactive approach."

A more recent convert is Springfield, Ohio, a city of 70,000 located west of Columbus. After city voters in 1990 authorized a tax increase to add 24 officers to a 100-member Police Department, city officials decided they would not place all of the new officers in traditional roles.

Officials selected two neighborhoods in transition as pilot areas for community policing, City Manager Matt Kridler said. In June, three officers were assigned to each area to serve as neighborhood liaisons, working closely with families and community groups and recommending intervention by social service agencies on specific problems.

Unlike police officers in most cities, who are routinely transferred from beat to beat, these Springfield officers will spend more time in their assigned neighborhoods to build relationships with community leaders and problem youths.

Mr. Kridler and other city officials will meet monthly to assess community policing's progress.

But how can cities measure the success of these efforts?

That is a question which puzzles officials in New York City, where Police Commissioner Lee P. Brown has preached community policing almost from the first day of his 1990 arrival. City Councilman Sheldon Leffler, representing Queens, wants a group of academics to evaluate the city's effort.

"It's not sufficient to say this person or that is working more with the community now," Mr. Leffler said. "Are you also preventing crime? Are you

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uprooting patterns of crime? Is there a sense among members of the community that the police are being more responsive?"

Mr. Trojanowicz is not surprised by such concerns. But he warns against measuring the success of community policing in the same way traditional police work is evaluated.

#### Emphasizing long-term success

Community policing is a long-term strategy too often subjected to short-term reviews, Mr. Trojanowicz said. In the short term, community policing might cause crime rates to increase because citizens with a closer relationship to police feel less reluctant to report crime than they did before, he said.

Community policing also can mean slower response times for non-emergency calls.

Crime rate increases should subside in the long term under community policing, Mr. Trojanowicz said, but elected officials often do not want to look past the next election.

Then there are those who simply dismiss community policing as being soft on crime. Cities like Richmond, Va., fight that notion by stressing that community policing and a tough approach to law enforcement are not mutually exclusive.

The hallmark of Richmond's 3-year-old community policing effort is a program designed to enlist residents in helping bring drug criminals to justice. In the city's "Drug-Free Blocks" program, at least 80% of a neighborhood's residents pledge in writing not to be involved in drugs and to report suspected drug activity.

In the seven Richmond neighborhoods designated as drug-free, residents agree they will testify in court against accused drug dealers, City Manager Robert Bobb said. That not only helps achieve convictions, but reduces a community's fear of crime, he said.

"Community policing may appear to be soft, but we have an aggressive law enforcement effort coupled with it," Mr. Bobb said.

He reports that crime has virtually disappeared from the seven areas, which are marked with street signs. He says improvement was noticeable almost from the start.

As is the case in many cities, Richmond police have decentralized their management structure under community policing. Precinct captains have more authority to involve officers in specific community-oriented programs. Some officers are working out of apartment buildings in low-income neighborhoods, and one police substation is being relocated to a drug-infested area.

#### Cities sometimes don't benefit

A community-policing philosophy can generate unlimited innovation, but the strategy might not be for everyone. Flint, Mich., one of the first cities to embrace the concept, has retreated from a community-oriented approach because its police force has been overwhelmed with incident calls since the local

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economy collapsed, Mr. Trojanowicz said.

A department must have time to allow officers to work with citizens or it must hire additional officers for those duties, experts say.

Aside from such considerations, politics still looms as the greatest threat to community policing's potential success.

Elected officials who treat community policing as a program instead of a philosophy, expecting it to produce overnight results, are bound to be disappointed. And if that feeling becomes widespread around the country, community policing could become a short-lived approach to municipal law enforcement.

GRAPHIC: Picture, Neighborhood outreach: Police in Aurora, Colo., use community policing to break down barriers between officers and local residents.

## LEVEL 1 - 38 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 Chicago Tribune Company  
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July 26, 1992, Sunday, FINAL EDITION

38

SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 1; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 1336 words

HEADLINE: Police hoping to stop crime before it starts

BYLINE: By Sharman Stein; Sharman Stein reports on the Chicago Police Department for the Tribune.

## BODY:

The Chicago Police Department is now facing one of its greatest challenges of the last 30 years. Mayor Richard Daley and Police Supt. Matt Rodriguez on Wednesday announced with fanfare a brave new world of policing - one that involves a streamlined and more efficient department primed to move toward community policing.

It is also a plan that requires imagination and innovation from the Police Department, patience and cooperation from the public, and a willingness by the city administration to share the power with communities and their leaders.

Aimed at changing the traditional and discredited method of emergency-driven police work, community policing calls for officers to work closely with residents to assess crime problems, such as drug dealing and vandalism, and to devise solutions. Police must think prevention and deterrence, as much as arrest.

It is a complicated process that offers no panacea for crime and many opportunities for fear and controversy.

The plan to reshape the Police Department was introduced last week in the long-awaited evaluation of the department by the consulting firm of Booz, Allen & Hamilton. As part of the report, five experimental community policing districts will be set up in January. The plan also includes proposals to cut back on bureaucracy, putting the equivalent of 1,600 more officers back on the street by closing police stations, eliminating unnecessary administrators and decentralizing special units.

Among these recommendations, the closing of stations is the one always dreaded by the public, who feel safer with a nearby stationhouse. The department has said it will keep the buildings open as auxiliary stations to handle community policing services.

Another controversial point is the department's desire to put more officers on duty alone to save manpower. The Fraternal Order of Police has already declared its intention to resist such a change.

The controversial elements, however, should not obscure the fact that it is a forward-looking plan that is overdue, and one for which communities have been clamoring for two or three years. It acknowledges that police in Chicago, along with their colleagues nationally, have been doing little besides

Chicago Tribune, July 26, 1992

containing crime, as their authority has eroded.

"Police have depended for a number of years on the aura of authority they derived from their capacity to arrest," said University of Wisconsin law professor Herman Goldstein, an expert in policing. "That aura of authority has been greatly eroded because of the revolving door of the criminal justice system. This is an effort to arm police with a different kind of authority that derives from the community's support for their efforts."

George Kelling, a professor at Northeastern University in Boston and a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, wrote the famous "Broken Windows" study in 1975, which showed that citizens were most disturbed by the signs of social disorder such as broken windows, graffiti, public drinking and vandalism. Those signs of disorder, Kelling discovered, created the atmosphere in which more serious crimes could occur.

"Community policing by definition inherently responds to what people are primarily concerned about," Kelling said. "In the past, police tended to set priorities. Community policing gets citizens involved in setting priorities. The things people most fear, like disorder, prostitution, and panhandling, that plague neighborhoods and lead ultimately to serious crime, are not treated by traditional policing.

"Traditional policing is essentially reactive," Kelling said. "It waits for something to happen and responds. Community policing is preventive. It tries to see problems developing and deal with them before they become a rash of incidents. It's much more aggressive and intrusive than traditional policing."

Despite the inevitable tumult, community policing could also help citizens feel their crime problems are being addressed systematically instead of sporadically. If successful, some crimes could be deterred and others reduced. At the very least, people would feel the police were trying something new instead of continuing to operate under the present system.

"There is no substitute for arrests," Goldstein says. "But if you can deal with a problem at an earlier stage, or you can resolve minor problems, like conflicts, without resorting to arrests, you are still getting the job done without depending upon the complex and difficult process of taking people through the criminal justice process."

The five prototype districts where community policing will be tried will still have a cadre of officers on duty to handle emergencies. But a majority of those police will be working smaller beats that will be realigned to correspond with neighborhood boundaries. The beat officers, some on foot, some in cars, will work their beats at consistent times, making it possible to get to know the people they are guarding instead of switching shifts.

Cmdr. LeRoy O'Shield of the West Side Austin District, who has deployed a small portion of his officers in a limited form of community policing, has found it to be successful in attacking problems such as drug dealers who had taken over a particular block.

"If you locate your efforts where the problems are, you can knock back 100 percent of the crime problem there down to 10 percent," O'Shield said. "There's no question it can work throughout the city. But it has to have the full

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support of everybody in the Police Department."

There are several other things that have to happen in order for the new methods to be effective.

The department will, for example, have to look for other ways to allow citizens to reach their local officers with problems that are not necessarily emergencies. Some departments, Kelling says, have given their officers beepers, cellular phones and answering machines.

The department will also have to make sure beat officers are allowed to do their job effectively by maintaining consistent shifts so that they can actually get to know a neighborhood and its inhabitants.

Officers will also have to be rewarded on a basis other than arrests made because if they are doing their new jobs effectively, they will be preventing crimes and thus making fewer arrests.

Conversely, Kelling points out, crimes may appear to be rising if, for example, citizens begin to feel more comfortable with local officers and start reporting more crimes.

One way to assess the new system, Kelling says, is to adopt new evaluation methods, such as postcard surveys of citizens or focus groups, in which representative groups of people are asked about their reaction to police and crime.

Officers who are not involved in community policing will have to be encouraged to feel part of the program rather than excluded, to encourage cohesion. The participation of middle managers is especially important.

Citizens will have to help by doing more than dialing 911 and by understanding that such radical change does not come without confusion and hard work, much of it involving close involvement with police. Residents will have to share information with police, attend meetings and learn how to prioritize their requests for attention.

Warren Friedman of the Citizens' Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, which has been spearheading the local push for community policing, warns that citizens must receive training to learn how to work with police and that police will have to make sure to draw on community groups that know how to encourage residents' involvement.

Ald. William Beavers (7th), head of the City Council's Police and Fire Committee, is optimistic. Citizens are bound to get better service from police if there are more officers on the street, he said.

"We've got to try it," Beavers said. "The only information comes from people. The police officer is only as good as his source of information, and if you don't have the community involved, you're not going to solve crimes."

TERMS: ISSUE; CHICAGO; POLICE; AGENCY; CHANGE; CRIME; ALTERNATIVE

LEVEL 1 - 40 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 The New York Times Company  
The New York Times

July 8, 1992, Wednesday, Late Edition - Final

39

SECTION: Section A; Page 18; Column 4; Editorial Desk

LENGTH: 261 words

HEADLINE: Has Community Policing in New York Begun to Reduce Crime?

BODY:

To the Editor:

In a June 9 news article, you report on awards to members of the New York Police Department for doing the many good deeds that form the cornerstone of community policing. While this change in police management is newsworthy, such instances of professional excellence do not tell us whether or not community policing is reducing crime citywide. Individual acts constitute anecdotal evidence and are no substitute for systematic data collection and analysis.

In response to testimony presented at a City Council Public Safety Committee hearing last November, I plan to convene a panel of criminal justice experts to help us assess community policing. The panel will use conventional performance indicators (crime rates) and devise new ways to determine the effectiveness of precinct management teams. Indicators such as number and types of cases solved and number of reported crimes may also be recast to reflect and set standards for public safety improvements.

This panel would also evaluate internal Police Department program development, decision making and monitoring of community policing.

The "Safe Streets, Safe City" program, financed by an increase in property taxes, has promised New Yorkers more police on the streets. Community policing, the management strategy for these officers, promises police personnel more responsive to community concerns and thereby more effective at fighting crime. This hypothesis is yet to be tested.

SHELDON S. LEFFLER  
Council Member, 16th Dist., Queens  
New York, June 18, 1992

TYPE: Letter

SUBJECT: POLICE

NAME: LEFFLER, SHELDON (COUNCILMAN)

GEOGRAPHIC: NEW YORK CITY

## LEVEL 1 - 29 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 The New York Times Company  
The New York Times

August 9, 1992, Sunday, Late Edition - Final

35

SECTION: Section 1; Page 41; Column 3; Metropolitan Desk

LENGTH: 1630 words

HEADLINE: Bending the Thin Blue Line

BYLINE: By CRAIG WOLFF

BODY:

Long before he had ever heard of community policing, Officer Pete Mulroy's job on the Lower East Side of Manhattan had become a nightly chore. Drive down 10th Street. Head south. Pop out of the car to make an arrest. Pop back in. After 18 years in the Ninth Precinct, he felt he was "running on automatic."

Now as a prototype of the Police Department's vision of the future, he can point to dozens of buildings, apartments and storefronts he has cleared of addicts and dealers. He has mapped a year of arrests on his office computer and with the help of residents, led prosecutors to valuable seizures of property and drugs. In Officer Mulroy's view he has done "more in the last one year on the job than I did in the first 18."

But across town, in the east Bronx, neighbors grumble about community police officers who barely learn the job when they are yanked back into their old roles, ricocheting in their squad cars from crisis to crisis. In some Brooklyn communities, residents complain that many of the officers are too young to understand the depth of neighborhood concerns. And in Queens, fledgling community police officers find themselves deluged with cases, as the department tries to mold them into experts on everything.

Promise and Pitfalls

The opposing accounts sum up the promise and pitfalls of a program that has become the soul of the New York City Police Department. The sudden resignation last week of the guiding force behind the drive toward locally based and problem-solving police work, Commissioner Lee P. Brown, has thrown the effort into uncertainty, in the view of many specialists from outside of the department.

The sudden change at the top has also focused new scrutiny on the degree to which Commissioner Brown has been able to impose his philosophy on New York's police force, the nation's largest and in some ways, the most tradition minded. And it lays out the challenge that will confront the next commissioner -- to take Mr. Brown's vision and see it through.

Whoever is chosen, Commissioner Brown said in an interview last week, the Mayor would pick someone who is committed to community policing.

"It's the cornerstone of Safe Streets, Safe City," he said, in a referring to the billion-dollar program to build the department to an unprecedented level of nearly 32,000 officers by 1996. "It's no longer a process. It's how we do

The New York Times, August 9, 1992

business."

More than 400 cities throughout the country have moved to a community policing system, but none with a department nearly as large as New York's. In a field where smaller cities usually serve as models for the rest of the country, New York now fills an unlikely role: it is the ultimate test case for community policing.

While it has a kind of ephemeral, even nostalgic ring to it, conjuring up a time when everyone knew the officer walking the beat, textbook community policing is a comprehensive program that depends on several layers operating in sync.

It seeks to take officers whose first reflex is to make an arrest, write a summons and be on to the next emergency radio call and turn them into problem solvers who have a stake in staying with and curing a particular community ailment.

Michael Clark, president of the nonprofit Citizens Committee for New York, which aids neighborhood groups and trains officers in community policing, said that the process was hampered by misconceptions.

"You have to get past the shallower definition of community policing as foot patrol or community relations or greater sensitivity to community needs," he said. "They're all nice, but not the heart of the matter. The heart is collaborative."

#### Steps to a Goal

To make community policing work, the department is taking a number of steps, including these:

- \*It is creating a new system to reward and promote officers, not only for heroism, but also for the less glamorous tasks of building links to the community.

- \*Every rookie coming out of the Police Academy starts as a community police officer on foot patrol.

- \*The department is changing the way it recruits. Advertisements for a police career used to speak to the "adventure" of the job; now they say that an applicant should be "caring, service-oriented and community-minded."

- \*Beat officers from most precincts meet regularly with community groups and in town meetings.

But it is not a simple matter to gauge how the grand ideas of community policing have taken hold. Arrests for serious crimes are down, but some experts say that at least in part, this is because community policing calls for less emphasis on arrests and more on problem solving.

And because community policing asks officers to be social worker, psychologist and politician, it takes time for officers to grow into such a complex role.

The New York Times, August 9, 1992

"We're walking down the yellow brick road, but it doesn't mean we're going to get there," said Thomas A. Reppetto, president of the Citizens Crime Commission, a nongovernmental watchdog group. "The program is in jeopardy. It will take a tremendous effort to make it work under the best of circumstances."

Experts and even some department officials say that some parts of the department's vast network are lagging in the change to community policing, including the screening of applicants.

Minority hiring is up, which experts believe will bring police officers closer to minority communities. But an increase in hiring has brought a large number of young officers to the force, and most do not have a college education, suggesting that as a group they lack the depth of knowledge and experience that the ideal community policing force should have.

At the same time, many of the trainers in community policing have not had training themselves. And sergeants and other precinct commanders have often had only a cursory one-day training session in community policing.

### Two Philosophies

Over all, there is a profound philosophical divergence presented by an institution that with Mr. Brown in charge has tried to behave under a progressive, corporate management approach but remains rooted in a paramilitary style.

For the average officer, the problem is illustrated by an incident that began with a handicapped woman protesting over having her car towed. An officer, applying the community-policing philosophy, escorted the woman to the car-impound lot. The incident attracted news-media photographers, one of whom took a picture of the officer with his hat off talking to the woman. When one of the officer's commanders saw a picture of the officer in a newspaper the next day, the officer was disciplined for not wearing his hat, an action ultimately rescinded by the department.

"What happens to them in the academy?" said one community organizer, who asked not to be identified. "They sit in chairs fixed to wooden floors with instructors who are often not gung-ho and they watch a slide projector. What are they being told? That they're back in hygiene class in high school. Then you expect them to go out there and be creative, free-thinking individuals."

Hints of corruption as well as charges of brutality that emerged recently in Washington Heights and Bedford-Stuyvesant can also damage the goals of community policing because the accusations damage the crucial trust between residents and the police. Mr. Brown has acknowledged this, but he added that without community policing, the effect would be far worse.

"People may pick up the paper and read about corruption," said Suzanne Trazoff, deputy commissioner for public information, "but they are also likely to say, 'I know Officer Jones and he's great,' so they continue on a personal level to trust the police."

### Achievements Block by Block

The New York Times, August 9, 1992

Tales from around the city show how the breakthroughs achievements of community policing emerge not on a grand scale but block by block, even door by door and depend on individual officers.

In the 49th Precinct in the Morris Park section of the Bronx, one officer saw that a company that had bought an abandoned building was permitting a pit bull to roam the property. Instead of issuing a summons or ignoring it, he contacted the A.S.P.C.A. The dog is now chained.

Andrew Laiosa, who works with the Neighborhood Initiative Development Corporation, said that this kind of diligence and creativity is common, but he complains that community police officers are regularly pulled from their beats to special details or to patrol cars.

"They can disappear for two weeks," Mr. Laiosa said. "It has interrupted projects. The department sends someone else to meetings, but there's no continuity. People want their beat officers."

But with someone like Officer Mulroy of the Ninth Precinct, the potential of community policing becomes clear. While he said that he knew his turf after 18 years of working out of a patrol car on the Lower East Side, "all I really did was drive down the block, not responding to the community."

Now, he said, he keeps files on all the problem buildings on his beat with records of what not only he has done to solve the problem, but also records on actions taken by the Manhattan District Attorney and other city agencies.

When a man suspected of drug dealing died, residents in his building worried that one of his friends, also a drug dealer, would move into his apartment. Working with the landlord, Officer Mulroy provided a list of tenants to the District Attorney and helped seal off the building from outsiders who were not welcome there.

When the community complained about a hotel in the Bowery that had become overrun by drug dealers, it was Officer Mulroy who tracked all the arrests on a computer and coordinated an effort that would have resulted in the seizure of the hotel's assets had the problem not been cleaned up, which it was.

SUBJECT: POLICE

ORGANIZATION: POLICE DEPARTMENT (NYC)

NAME: BROWN, LEE P (COMR)

GEOGRAPHIC: NEW YORK CITY

LEVEL 1 - 25 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 Newsday, Inc.  
Newsday

August 28, 1992, Friday, CITY EDITION

34

SECTION: VIEWPOINTS; ABOUT POLICING; Pg. 54

LENGTH: 826 words

HEADLINE: The Beat Cop, After Lee Brown

BYLINE: By Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux. Robert Trojanowicz is the director and Bonnie Bucqueroux the associate director of the National Center for Community Policing at Michigan State University's School of Criminal Justice.

KEYWORD: OPINION; NEW YORK CITY; POLICE; LEE BROWN

BODY:

WHEN LEE BROWN, the pre-eminent chief of the community policing movement, was named police commissioner of New York City, advocates of this new form of proactive policing celebrated. If community policing could prove itself in New York, the bellwether of the nation, it might well become the way that all police departments deliver service to their communities.

The danger now, of course, is that Brown's sudden resignation may call that bright future into question. His departure may at least slow the momentum of policing reform, and, if it falters in New York, critics will use that ammunition to kill it elsewhere.

New York is both the best - and worst - laboratory to demonstrate what community policing can do. The approach makes sense for a police department that fields 7.5 million calls for service each year since it recognizes that long-term solutions to crime, fear of crime, illicit drugs, social disorder, neighborhood decay and civil unrest must come from the grass roots. Yet the sheer scale of New York's police bureaucracy itself poses a daunting challenge. Expecting any new commissioner to restructure and re-educate the department quickly, especially one in the throes of expanding from roughly 27,000 to a proposed 31,000 officers (including 3,000 new community officers), ranks with turning a herd of elephants around on a dime. Police Chief David Couper of Madison, Wis., says it took him 12 years to change the culture within his much smaller department, and he credits his ability to survive long enough to achieve his goals to strong civil service protection. Most chiefs in the United States serve at the whim of local officials and average less than four years in the job.

Brown took the New York post knowing his every move would be played out against the city's highly charged and rancorous political landscape, where every misstep receives intense local and national media scrutiny. It is unfortunate that Brown was constrained from being bolder, considering how much it takes to persuade entrenched veterans in middle management to buy into community policing reform.

From the beginning of Brown's tenure, the race was on to prove community policing's merit before the next bruising mayoral election. Ready or not, it

Newsday, August 28, 1992

will be tested by fire when next year's campaign focuses on the issue of crime. Will the new community patrol officers have had sufficient time to show what they can achieve? Even more important, will Brown's successor be able to explain why a successful community policing effort often makes crime rates go up?

It sounds like doubletalk to argue that rising crime rates are good news, but community policing encourages people to tell police about crimes that would otherwise go unreported. Studies show that only one in three crimes is ever reported to police, and reporting rates are far lower for the "secret" crimes of rape, child abuse and domestic assault. The reasons victims and witnesses remain silent can vary from fear of retaliation to cynicism about whether the police can do much to help. Crime and arrest rates simply cannot tell the full story.

There is no way to count crimes that community policing prevents. And with a pernicious problem like open drug dealing, for example, the police can always generate mass arrests through a sweep or crackdown. But if those dealers are simply back on the street the next day, people see that arrests alone often cannot make them safe. Community policing instead focuses on solving the problems, with arrest as only one weapon in the officer's arsenal.

Community policing allows police to work directly with young people, who constitute a disproportionate share of both perpetrators and victims. Voters reminded of notorious crimes, such as the murder of Yusuf Hawkins and the attack on the Central Park jogger, can easily grasp the wisdom of officers getting close to neighborhoods, where they might hear about plans to ambush outsiders or to go "wilding," before anyone gets hurt. Patrol officers whizzing by in their cars don't hear the word on the street, and can't develop people's trust. New Yorkers also need to be reminded of the lesson of Los Angeles, which is that taxpayers must invest in healing the breach between police and minorities. Community officers can be held directly accountable for their actions day after day.

It has taken years for crime in our cities to escalate into a "riot in slow motion," and it may well take many more years to halt and then reverse the trend. Traditional policing (also called "modern" or "professional" policing), which pulled officers from the community and isolated them in patrol cars, has had half a century to prove itself. Community policing reinvents the old-fashioned beat cop for today's reality. In the past dozen years since early pilot projects showed promise, we've learned that its potential is limited only by the imagination and resources brought to bear.

GRAPHIC: Photos-1) Robert Trojanowicz 2) Bonnie Bucqueroux.

## LEVEL 1 - 27 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 Chicago Tribune Company  
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August 18, 1992, Tuesday, NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION

SECTION: CHICAGOLAND; Pg. 3; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 442 words

HEADLINE: Police plan on 49th Ward ballot

BYLINE: By Robert Davis.

BODY:

Ald. Joseph Moore has spent his first 15 months as alderman championing the cause of community policing in Chicago - taking police out of squad cars and putting them back on the sidewalks to maintain close contact with citizens and community groups.

Now, he wants to make sure that his North Side 49th Ward becomes the site of one of the first five community policing pilot projects promised by Police Supt. Matt Rodriguez in the wake of a consultant's recommendation to give the concept a try.

Monday, Moore submitted to the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners' office petitions containing more than 4,000 signatures of ward residents to place on the Nov. 3 ballot an advisory referendum proposal in his ward asking that the ward be picked for one of the five pilot projects.

Moore said his ward, which contains the Rogers Park community, would be an ideal site for such a project because several community organizations have been working toward that goal.

"Supt. Rodriguez, we're ready to go. You say the word, and I will guarantee you hundreds of Rogers Park and Edgewater residents who understand what community policing is all about and are ready to make it happen," Moore said at a City Hall news conference.

The 4,000 signatures are more than double the number required to place a referendum proposal on the ballot in the ward, Moore said, and the question will definitely be put to the voters during the general election.

The report by Booz, Allen & Hamilton Inc. also recommended stripping seven of the current 25 police district stations of patrol functions and closing one of the six area headquarters.

Moore said Monday he would be willing to have the Rogers Park District Police Station in his area closed except for community policing functions if Rodriguez guarantees that the community policing pilot program is a genuine effort.

But, he added, the Rogers Park station is one of the city's newer ones and it is unlikely that it would be one of the seven.

Rodriguez said that the five pilot programs will be located throughout the city to represent a cross-section of the city and its various law enforcement

Chicago Tribune, August 18, 1992

problems.

At his news conference, Moore said that his North Side ward would be a suitable laboratory for the problems that infest all Chicago neighborhoods.

"Those activities include open and notorious drug dealing, public drinking, gang members intimidating commuters at our 'L' stations and business owners along our commercial strips, loud and disruptive behavior at our parks late at night, and verbally abusive language directed at women and the elderly in our community," Moore said.

TERMS: ALDERMAN; SUPPORT; POLICE; NEIGHBORHOOD; ISSUE; ELECTION

## LEVEL 1 - 24 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 Chicago Tribune Company  
Chicago Tribune

September 7, 1992, Monday, LAKE EDITION

33

SECTION: LAKE; Pg. 2; ZONE: L; Lake watch. People.

LENGTH: 748 words

HEADLINE: New Mundelein chief to enforce people power

BYLINE: By Stanley Holmes

BODY:

Mundelein's new police chief, Raymond Rose, believes the future of policing in Lake County will involve more foot power than horsepower, more people power than fire power.

As deputy chief of Elk Grove Village, he brought a successful community-based policing program to that northwest suburb, and he says he intends to bring the same concept to Mundelein, one of the county's fastest-growing communities.

He said community policing means, among other things, that officers will get out of the squad car, which he calls a "barrier," and make themselves visible by walking the streets.

Officers will reintroduce themselves to the community and to the people on their beat, he said. They will spend time with residents, reassuring them and getting information from those who live on the front lines of crime.

The police officers will learn to be skilled negotiators able to defuse potentially explosive situations without brandishing their guns, Rose said. They will be required to listen to the community's concerns, and possibly even be willing to ride a bicycle and go bowling with teenagers.

"What it does is take the police officers on to the beat and makes them responsible for their beat, and it allows the citizen to contact the officer," Rose said.

Today's police officer will be all of the above and still know how to catch criminals, he said.

"Community problem-solving policing is the wave of the future," Rose said. "If police departments don't realize that, they are not going to be successful."

The 45-year-old Rose, who joined the Elk Grove Village force in 1968 and worked up to the rank of deputy chief of operations, will become the new police chief of Mundelein on Sept. 21. He will succeed Mundelein's acting chief, Walter Frasier, who is resigning for personal reasons.

With the change in leadership comes a change in management styles. The tenure of Frasier, who declined to be interviewed for this story, was marked from time-to-time by an abrasive personality and a strained relationship with

Chicago Tribune, September 7, 1992

the media and Mayor Marilyn Sindles.

"It was well-known behind the scenes among the Board of Trustees and most likely within the Police Department that Frasier was forced out because of his differences with the mayor over his management philosophy," said a Mundelein Village Board member, who asked to remain anonymous.

Attempts to contact Sindles were unsuccessful.

In contrast, Rose is a soft-spoken man who considers himself a consensus builder and described his leadership as "democratic" in principle.

"When there's time for planning, it's important to get everybody's input," he said. "On the other hand, when there's an emergency situation, when timing is critical, you need to make the decision."

Rose has notched numerous academic and law enforcement awards. He graduated from the prestigious FBI Academy program in Quantico, Va., receiving a diploma in police administration. He received honors while earning a master's in public administration from Northern Illinois University, and he was awarded two Distinguished Service Awards for his police work in Elk Grove Village.

Rose's current boss, Elk Grove Police Village Chief Fred Engelbrecht, said his second-in-command will be missed.

"It's tough to see him go because of his abilities," Engelbrecht said. "He's innovative, very intelligent and well-educated. He gets along with people and provides leadership by example - all the good stuff."

In the Elk Grove community, residents have given Rose and the Police Department high marks for the transition to community policing.

"They are working more closely with the community and trying to get to know the people and to be viewed as a partner rather than just appearing when there is a problem," said Rev. Norman Anderson, the senior pastor of the Elk Grove Baptist Church and a member of the Elk Grove Church Council.

Probably, Rose's belief in community policing can be traced to his past experience on the biggest murder case of his career: the triple slayings of Frank, Mary and Michael Columbo at the hands of their daughter, Patricia, and her boyfriend, Frank DeLuca.

The parents and their 13-year-old son were shot, stabbed and bludgeoned to death. Rose played a significant role in solving the case.

Rose, who will earn \$64,135 a year, said he is looking forward to his new job.

"I'm really excited and look forward to meeting and working with the people of Mundelein and Lake County," he said.

GRAPHIC: PHOTO: (Raymond) Rose.

Chicago Tribune, September 7, 1992

TERMS: SUBURB; APPOINTMENT; OFFICIAL; POLICE; BIOGRAPHY; PROFILE; CAREER

LEVEL 1 - 23 OF 47 STORIES

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32

September 20, 1992, Sunday, NASSAU AND SUFFOLK EDITION

SECTION: CURRENTS; NEWSDAY COVER EDITORIAL; Pg. 37  
Other Edition: City Pg. 29

LENGTH: 1354 words

HEADLINE: Cop Culture?

KEYWORD: COVER; POLICE; DEMONSTRATIONS; NEW YORK CITY; DAVID DINKINS; REFORM;  
REGULATIONS; EDITORIAL

BODY:

REMEMBER THIS bunch?

The frenzied cops who blocked traffic on the Brooklyn Bridge, damaged parked cars, waved racist signs taunting the mayor and screamed lascivious comments at women should have been locked up last week for reckless endangerment of New Yorkers' hopes and dreams. They shredded the people's trust and dealt a vicious blow to the ideal of community policing.

Please understand, trust lies at the heart of community policing. It's the glue that holds together the partnership between citizens and cops, that allows them to fight crime more effectively - street by street and neighborhood by neighborhood. Without trust, no community can hope to stem long-term patterns of social disorder. When you threaten this fragile bond, you threaten a community's life.

Yet last Wednesday, some 10,000 cops - many of them raucous, many of them guzzling beer - gathered at City Hall to vent some bile. They were furious at Mayor David Dinkins' proposal to let civilians sit in judgment of cops. They were furious that the mayor visited the family of a drug dealer killed by a cop. They were furious at an administration that refuses to upgrade police firepower.

They have every right to voice their opinions. But they didn't stop there. They acted like brainless thugs.

In a metropolitan region where black-white relations are often troubled, some cops carried racist signs. "Dump the Washroom Attendant," one read - referring to Dinkins, the city's first black mayor. Brooklyn Councilwoman Una Clarke says a uniformed cop called her a "nigger" as she tried to enter City Hall. A man in a Patrolmen's Benevolent Association T-shirt was heard yelling at a female TV reporter: "Let me grab your ass!"

It was unforgivable. It was the kind of scene that confirms the worst suspicions of folks in places like Washington Heights, East New York and Harlem. New York is a city that's home to 178 racial and ethnic groups; it's hard to imagine a more destructive message.

Such behavior shows what a daunting task administrators face as they try to transform the traditional cop culture of the New York Police Department. "We

Newsday, September 20, 1992

want cops who have a spirit of service, not a spirit of adventure," former Police Commissioner Lee Brown was fond of saying. But judging from the scene outside City Hall, the NYPD doesn't yet have enough of what it wants.

For now, the cowboys are still riding high.

Is their attitude insurmountable? Acting Police Commissioner Ray Kelly thinks not. For one thing, Kelly says, a kind of mob psychology took hold on Wednesday. Cops were doing things at the demonstration that they would never do on their beats. Moreover, he contends, the rowdies weren't just from the NYPD.

Police brass put much faith in the army of young recruits they're now hiring. As oldtimers "age-out" of the department, Kelly believes, the notion of a dichotomy between "real cops" and "do-gooders" will fade. You can see progress on the streets already, he says.

You can indeed. Solid community-relations work is one reason New York stayed calm last spring after the Rodney King verdict in Los Angeles. It's one reason why Washington Heights stayed calm recently after a grand jury cleared Officer Michael O'Keefe in the shooting death of drug dealer Jose Garcia.

Yet last week's horror show demonstrates just how far the NYPD still has to go.

No - thank God - the cops who marched on City Hall were not protesting community policing. In fact, Phil Caruso - the PBA president who organized the rally and bears much of the responsibility for its disastrous effect - supports the community approach. But it's hard to see how cops can expect to work in tandem with communities when they are willing to use a list of unrelated job grievances as a license to run amok and show disrespect for citizens of all kinds.

As for the grievances, some are puzzlingly thin.

Grievance No. 1. The cops are incensed because the mayor comforted the family of Jose Garcia and used city money to help pay his funeral expenses. The PBA says this undermined police authority and seemed to condemn Officer O'Keefe's actions. What the PBA hasn't explained is that the 34th Precinct itself sent representatives to the Garcia home the night he was shot - and it even arranged for a visit by City Councilman Stanley Michels. Michels says he spent hours in the apartment as cops sought to persuade the family not to encourage violence. Why is such a visit appropriate for the cops but not for the mayor?

Grievance No. 2. The cops are incensed because the mayor wants to establish an all-civilian complaint review board to investigate reports of police misconduct. Admittedly, Dinkins' plan would be stronger if it provided for a couple of police representatives on the board. That way, the board might have some credibility among rank-and-file cops. But last week's protest should have shattered any illusion that the police can ride herd effectively on each other. As off-duty officers ran wild at City Hall, on-duty cops looked the other way.

Grievance No. 3. The cops are incensed because the city won't let most of them pack 9-millimeter pistols. They should cool it on this one. The mayor has said - correctly - that this is a technical judgment that the police commissioner must make. Dinkins isn't committed to any side. While Brown decided against the

Newsday, September 20, 1992

pistols, who knows what the next commissioner might do?

Meanwhile, community grievances persist as well.

For all the talk about community policing, say too many city residents, it's not at all clear that the NYPD has changed its style in a fundamental way. They cite charges of cops selling drugs in uniform. They cite a report about cops painting over part of a mural memorializing Jose Garcia. They say many cops tend to regard all residents of low-income neighborhoods as criminals.

Last week's outburst reinforced this image. But there are ways the city can patch the torn fabric of trust:

Make all new cops live in the city. One reason New York's police are perceived as outsiders is that 40 percent of them live outside its boundaries. If all the new ones live here, they will have a bigger stake in the city's well-being. Albany should get cracking.

Approve a new civilian complaint review board. The sooner the City Council does this, the faster citizens will be reassured that they have protection against NYPD rogues.

Expand the city's Police Cadet Corps. This innovative program gives city college students tuition loans. If they join the NYPD after graduation, their loans are forgiven. It's a good way to recruit city-smart cops.

Reinstate the special prosecutor's office. Gov. Mario Cuomo zapped this position amid a budget crunch. Big mistake. As the NYPD has shown lately, it's not too good at pressing criminal cases against its officers. It fell to Suffolk County to bust the cops suspected of selling drugs on duty. District attorneys need the goodwill of cops - their key witnesses - if they're to win convictions, so they may hold back. A special prosecutor - beholden to no one - is better situated to clean up the toughest cases of police corruption.

Appoint a new police commissioner quickly. The NYPD is at a crucial juncture. It's committed to community policing - but cop culture isn't yet in sync with the new script. In the best of circumstances, says one police expert, the NYPD has perhaps a 50-50 shot at ultimately making community policing work. Without a firm guiding hand, the odds for success could fall to zero.

The NYPD cannot afford another disaster like the one last week. Neither can the city. That's something Phil Caruso needs to think about. And it's something probable mayoral candidate Rudolph Giuliani - who addressed the mob - should bear in mind.

The worst fact about last Wednesday's unruliness is this: The city can institute new programs. It can send friendly local cops out to talk to merchants and residents. It can play a game of reconciliation for years. But all of this can all come undone in an instant - with foolish cops yelling vile racial epithets at city leaders.

It must not happen again.

GRAPHIC: 1) Newsday Color Cover Photo by Nanine Hartzenbusch- Police protest Mayor Dinkins' plan for all-civilian review board. Photos- 2 - 3) scenes from

Newsday, September 20, 1992

the protest

## LEVEL 1 - 22 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 Globe Newspaper Company  
The Boston Globe

September 22, 1992, Tuesday, City Edition

31

SECTION: METRO/REGION; Pg. 21

LENGTH: 624 words

HEADLINE: A new direction for Boston police;  
Officials to unveil calendar of change

BYLINE: By John A. Ellement and Sean P. Murphy, Globe Staff

KEYWORD: BOSTON POLICE MAJOR STORY

BODY:

Two and a half months late, top Boston Police officials today will unveil their blueprint for changes in the department, but the document warns the city lacks the necessary personnel to fully implement the community policing scheme advocated by the St. Clair Commission.

Despite the complaint of short staffing, the 45-page "Plan of Action" sets 1995 as the deadline for when the community policing theory will be in full force across the city. That year, the department is scheduled to move into a new, \$ 51 million headquarters in Roxbury, according to the report, portions of which were reviewed yesterday by the Globe.

While developing the plan has been a priority of Superintendent in Chief William Bratton since his hiring nine months ago, the report will give area and district commanders another four months to work with community leaders to identify specific locations where beat officers will be assigned under the community policing scheme.

The largest barrier to effective community policing, the report says, "is the current inability of the city to hire more police officers to meet citizens' demands and expectations. Nevertheless, we will press forward on all fronts."

The plan, which Bratton once promised would be released by July 3, also vows to transform the department from one in which officers speed to crimes after they happen into one in which officers stop crime before it occurs.

The goal is to make the officers "society's leading problem solvers in the drive to free every neighborhood from crime, disorder and fear," according to a portion of the plan. "As is true in the case of disease, it is far better to prevent a crime than it is to seek redress after its occurrence," the report notes.

The Flynn administration has decided to call its community policing scheme "Neighborhood Policing." The report said the department will be seeking 50 patrol officers to volunteer to become the first wave of Neighborhood Policing officers and undergo 40 hours of training in "problem solving."

The report also notes that the department will be investing heavily in computer technology to cut the demand on staffing and to increase the speed

The Boston Globe, September 22, 1992

with which officers can obtain information about criminal records, history of violence at a specific address, Registry of Motor Vehicle records and warrants. There are currently 1,900 police officers on the Boston force.

The city will spend \$ 4 million to install a new computer aided dispatch system that is scheduled to be operational by Labor Day and spend other money to install computers in 550 marked and unmarked police vehicles.

Vincent Loporchio, department spokesman, declined yesterday to discuss the Plan of Action prior to the mid-morning press conference at the department's academy in Hyde Park at which Police Commissioner Francis M. Roache and Bratton are to unveil the plan officially.

"We will be briefing officers at roll call on the plan and it's important that they hear it first from police officials," he said, adding that officers will be given their own copies of the 45-page proposal.

Loporchio said holding the press conference at the academy is "an appropriate location because training is a major focus of the Plan of Action."

A written set of goals was one of the major management recommendations made by the mayorally appointed St. Clair Commission, headed by lawyer James St. Clair, which last year examined the department at the request of Mayor Flynn. When the commission's report was issued in January, Flynn rejected its key recommendation and refused to dismiss Roache as commissioner.

Instead, Flynn and Roache hired Bratton from New York City, where he was serving as chief of the transit authority police.

## LEVEL 1 - 21 OF 47 STORIES

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The Boston Globe

30

September 23, 1992, Wednesday, City Edition

SECTION: METRO/REGION; Pg. 1

LENGTH: 1212 words

HEADLINE: Boston police plan touts technology, citizenry as keys;  
But finds staff level shy of goal

BYLINE: By John Ellement and Don Aucoin, Globe Staff

KEYWORD: BOSTON POLICE REPORT NEIGHBORHOOD NAME-BRATTON REACTION MAJOR STORY

## BODY:

Hoping to propel the nation's first municipal police department in a new direction, the Boston Police Department yesterday unveiled its long-awaited community policing plan that seeks to combine citizen efforts with a new, high-tech police force to free the city's neighborhoods of the paralyzing fear created by crime.

But the 44-page report also warns that "Neighborhood Policing" - as Mayor Flynn's administration dubbed its version of the concept - will be severely weakened unless Flynn hires more than 300 new officers within the next several years.

The "Plan of Action" was developed by Superintendent in Chief William Bratton in response to the St. Clair Commission, which in January faulted Police Commissioner Francis M. Roache and the department's top management as having no vision for the police force.

As suggested by the St. Clair panel, which was created by Flynn in the wake of a series of reports in the Globe critical of the department, the department plans to adopt a community policing strategy to improve relations between police and the 600,000 citizens they serve.

After meeting with Flynn at the Parkman House last night, Bratton insisted that the anticipated shortage of personnel will not derail the effort. Earlier this year, Bratton and the administration agreed to spend \$ 2.1 million on computer equipment for the department instead of using the money to hire 110 new officers.

"This is going ahead, with or without more officers," Bratton said. He said about 2,200 officers are necessary to make the plan work most effectively. The current level is 1,960 officers.

But City Councilor John Nucci, who attended the unveiling by Roache and Bratton, ridiculed the idea of proposing sweeping changes for the direction of the department without providing the personnel to make it happen.

"That is like acquiring a new fleet of fire engines that will only have three tires on each," Nucci said, adding that the administration missed its opportunity earlier this year to increase public safety by hiring more

The Boston Globe, September 23, 1992

officers.

The plan has been in the works for nine months and its release yesterday came nearly three months later than first promised by Bratton.

Under the community policing concept, which is designed to increase contact with the public, officers would be assigned to specific locations, on foot and in patrol cars, and would remain there unless a major emergency called them away. As part of their assignment, officers would be charged with helping neighborhoods obtain other city services.

Under the present system, patrol cars range over wide areas, and officers have little sustained contact with citizens in nonemergency situations.

The community policing concept has been implemented in other major cities, most recently in New York, where 4,000 new officers were hired.

The Boston plan also calls for a dramatic upgrade in computer technology and a decentralized management scheme that gives area and district commanders greater control of their budgets for overtime and equipment purchases.

The technological centerpiece is a \$ 4 million computer-aided dispatch system, now out for bid, that will for the first time notify officers of past problems at an address and give commanders the opportunity to study crime trends in their districts.

The system will also allow individual officers to link up with databases run by federal and state law enforcement and to tie in to the new domestic violence database run by the state. The department is also buying a computer network to link up the station houses and computers that officers can operate from their cruisers.

The plan identifies 25 specific steps to be undertaken between now and next September to fine-tune the plan to match the needs of the city's 16 major neighborhoods.

Bratton said that the goal of the overall philosophy is to attack the paralyzing effect that fear of crime can have on a city. He said the public appears not to have reacted to the 15 percent drop in reported crime in the city since 1990.

"It is fear that we need to deal with in the city of Boston. Fear is driving many of our residents to leave. Fear is discouraging businesses," he said at the police academy where he and Roache unveiled the plan. "Fear is what we need to be about dealing with."

Roache said the plan will build on the accomplishments of his tenure during which police stations have been reopened, minority representation has increased among commanders, and civil service promotions have been restored.

But the shortage of personnel was cited by the president of the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Donald L. Murray, yesterday in denouncing the plan.

"I think we have established in Boston another Slick Willie, only this time his name is Bratton," Murray said, alluding to the nickname foes have used to

The Boston Globe, September 23, 1992

describe Bill Clinton, the Democratic presidential candidate. Murray ridiculed the plan as the "Inaction Plan" and said the union will challenge any effort to initiate the community policing scheme as a contract violation.

Murray said his union is not opposed in theory to community policing, but he said the shortage of personnel imperils the health and safety of the 1,352 uniformed officers - the department's lowest staffing level since July 6, 1981.

Murray said he fears that will mean one officer will be sent to a domestic disturbance call and end up "taking a beating" because no backup officer is available. "We're not against community policing, we just don't have the numbers," he said.

But Bratton noted that all three police unions have been without a new contract for three years, and he angrily called on Murray to "read the damned plan and then come back at us."

Yesterday, the detectives' and superior officers' unions both said they had not yet read the plan and could not comment on it. William Broderick, president of the Superior Officers Federation, said the proposal is "worth taking a look at."

Suffolk District Attorney Ralph C. Martin 2d, who met briefly with Flynn last night at the Parkman House, said the approach mirrored his desire to shift more resources to the district courts in the city.

"The concept makes sense," he said.

Reaction among community activists was split yesterday, with some endorsing the effort as a good first step while others charged the proposal was an inadequate response to the stinging criticisms by the St. Clair Commission.

"Until they can show the general public that the Boston Police Department can investigate itself, community policing will not happen," said Louis Elisa, president of the Boston chapter of the NAACP and a member of the Police Practices Coalition.

Lyndel Woodruff, of the Codman Square Housing Development Corporation, credited the department with preparing a plan offering a written "framework" for change where one previously did not exist. But she warned that it will be difficult for the police to get community cooperation in parts of the city where tensions are high between residents and police.

"Cooperation is not going to be a problem for West Roxbury and Hyde Park," she said. "It's going to be a problem where the real problems are, in those areas where those relationships between police and the community are strained."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, Dorothy Selman of Dorchester examines Boston's "Neighborhood Policing" plan released yesterday. / GLOBE STAFF PHOTO / WENDY MAEDA

LEVEL 1 - 20 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1992 Newsday, Inc.  
Newsday

October 14, 1992, Wednesday, QUEENS EDITION

29

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 26

LENGTH: 266 words

HEADLINE: ON THE BEAT/Kenneth Gumbs

BYLINE: Sheila McKenna

BODY:

JOB

Community Police Officer in the 100th Precinct in Rockaway, cited as a 'Community Policing Success Story' by his commanding officer this summer for his effort in closing down a drug operation near PS 42.

BIOGRAPHY

33; born and raised in East New York; attended York College before joining the NYPD 10 years ago, has been in the 100th for 9 years and lived in Rockaway for 8 years; married, four children.

RESIDENCE

Home in Shirley, L.I.

IMPACT

'To see kids, with all the problems they might have, trying to make a success of their lives is very rewarding. I enjoy helping people. When I was in college my major was social work.'

LATEST

ACCOMPLISHMENT

'With the help of my supervisors and the community, we were able to close down a house that was selling drugs directly across from the school.'

ON THE JOB

'I try to show kids that people who sell drugs don't live very long. And I try to make them look and see what's going on around them. During the summer, I hung around the park a couple of days a week just to make sure there were no problems. A lot of kids were afraid to go to the park and I think my being there helped. Now that the kids are back in school, I try to meet them during their lunch hour to talk about anything they want to talk about. The important thing is to get them talking.'

CONCERN

'Seeing children fall through the cracks, whether it's the fault of the educational system or the child welfare program. Some of them could go on to have a better life but there were too many things stacked against them.'

Newsday, October 14, 1992

GRAPHIC: Newsday Photo by David L. Pokress-Kenneth Gumbs

LEVEL 1 - 19 OF 47 STORIES

Times Publishing Company  
St. Petersburg Times

November 8, 1992, Sunday, City Edition

28

SECTION: CITY TIMES; COMMUNITY POLICING; Pg. 3

DISTRIBUTION: CITY TIMES

LENGTH: 844 words

HEADLINE: Bartlett Park revitalization is product of community effort

BYLINE: MARY BRADY

BODY:

A year and one week ago, the Bartlett Park Community Policing Area had cause for celebration. Ronald Eugene "Romeo" Mathis was arrested. The federal charges placed against him and his alleged associates included drug distribution, operating a continuing criminal enterprise, firearms charges and conspiracy.

During his reign of intimidation, I personally witnessed his smugness and air of invincibility when he dealt with me or my fellow officers. People would not come out of their homes after dark because of the nightly gunfire and armed drug transactions. Instead of a burglar alarm system, Mathis had a "police alarm system" that extended for blocks. Youths were used as lookouts and were posted through the neighborhood in trees, on bikes and in bushes and often had walkie-talkies. Understandably, the residents cheered and clapped as "Romeo" was handcuffed and taken away.

Rick Crater is the community policing officer assigned to this area. He is responsible for the neighborhood between 11th and 22nd avenues S between Fourth and Dr. M.L. King (Ninth) streets (Bartlett Park). He already was working that area before it became his permanent assignment in December 1991. He has seen the worst of times here, and he's excited to be involved in its rebuilding. Noting that the residents are becoming more open and accepting of the police, Rick is getting more and more calls about what is going on in the area.

The Crime Watch coordinator, Dorothea Miller, has lived in the neighborhood for more than 20 years. It is partly because of her commitment that crime has decreased in Bartlett Park. Dorothea will not allow her fellow citizens to become apathetic. Even though she is required to have only one Crime Watch meeting a year to maintain the Crime Watch status, Dorothea has monthly meetings. Her spunk and determination have netted her the District-T-Coordinator-of-the-Year award.

The community resource officer for this area, Jim Giambruno, says the crime statistics for the area definitely show a marked decrease in the past year. Here are a few examples:

St. Petersburg Times, November 8, 1992

1/1/91

11/1/92

to 10/27/9

to 10/27/92

|                             |     |    |
|-----------------------------|-----|----|
| Aggravated Battery          | 31  | 26 |
| Armed Robbery               | 31  | 12 |
| Armed with a Firearm        | 24  | 7  |
| Battery on Law Enforcement  | 6   | 2  |
| Burglary Residence          | 102 | 74 |
| Narcotic Drug Law Violation | 319 | 79 |
| Shots Heard in Area         | 124 | 42 |
| Suspicious Persons          | 35  | 11 |

Changes cannot happen overnight, but these statistics are encouraging. Safe streets are the goal of Officer Rick Crater. It is also the name of the program that he and city planners are looking at to help in this neighborhood. Molly Wetzel of Oakland, Calif., introduced the Safe Streets Now program, which uses a unified effort between residents and the city to shut down illegal activities in their midst. Residents in California have been successful in filing civil lawsuits for "mental distress to the community" against disruptive houses and businesses. There have been some foreclosures in which the property was turned over to the petitioning neighborhood association.

Jan Norsoph and Regina Wade of St. Petersburg City Planning are involved in the revitalization of Bartlett Park. Crater attends their monthly meetings, which are geared toward bringing life and beauty back to the area. Part of the plan calls for trees and sod to be planted along Seventh Street and have sidewalks installed. A home on 17th Avenue will be remodeled and sold to a low-income family. It is hoped this will prompt citizens to inquire about the Action Fund, which offers assistance with low-interest loans.

Marty Pope of the city code enforcement department has been busy boarding up vacant homes, clearing vacant lots and removing abandoned cars.

Patrol Officers Mike Egulf, Jim Knight, Denise Schmidt and Paul McWade also have been assisting Rick with all the policing while he is not there.

Youths are also a big part of the growth here. Frank Pierce Recreation Center, St. Petersburg Tennis Club, PAR and Crater are working to develop a sports academy. They will target 7- to 14-year-olds and focus on academic tutoring with sports as a reward. They hope to offer basketball, tennis and golf.

Crater and fellow Community Policing Officer Vinny Trubilla are conducting a neighborhood meeting at 7 p.m. Monday at 855 13th Ave. S.

St. Petersburg Times, November 8, 1992

If you live in this area and would like to contact Crater, his number is 892-5913.

For information on community policing, contact Lt. Don Quire at 893-7925. If you want information on Crime Watch, contact Lt. Mary Brady at 892-5078.

TYPE: COLUMN

LEVEL 1 - 13 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1993 Chicago Tribune Company  
Chicago Tribune

February 3, 1993, Wednesday, NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION 26

SECTION: CHICAGOLAND; Pg. 3; ZONE: N

LENGTH: 803 words

HEADLINE: 2 neighborhoods, 2 reactions  
Crime plan cheered in Rogers Park, not in Englewood

BYLINE: By John Kass.

## BODY:

Under pressure to slow down the murder rate in his city, Mayor Richard Daley ventured out from City Hall on Tuesday to two different neighborhoods in the hopes that residents would be as enthusiastic as he was about his crime-fighting plans.

But what he faced were two different reactions to his plan for community policing, and perhaps even a glimpse into why it is so difficult for city officials to stop the killing. And why some neighborhoods may have all but been defeated.

In Rogers Park, with reporters and television cameras in tow, Daley was smiling as about 250 residents cheered him as he outlined community policing, his plan to allow the neighborhoods to have more of a say in how police patrol their blocks.

In Englewood, which has one of the highest murder rates in a city numbed by the brutality of almost a thousand murders last year, things were vastly different. Only about 25 people showed up to hear Daley, aldermen and top police brass tell them what they were going to do for them.

The look on Daley's face in Rogers Park, with community residents crowding around him eagerly pointing out trouble spots as he walked along Howard Street, was that of a man pleased that he had been able to sell his idea to people who wanted it.

Daley's expression as he walked into the Ogden Park field house on South Racine Avenue a few hours later was glum at best. Except for the political aides and the eager Park District workers and his police, about two dozen people, including children, sat listlessly as he spoke about his vision.

The mayor's office had called several city agencies on Monday, asking for telephone numbers of community groups, business owners and other community leaders, so they could be encouraged to attend both meetings.

"Maybe people have just heard too much talking from City Hall over the years," said Jeffrey Haynes, director of Reach Out and Touch, a grass-roots anti-gang agency in Englewood.

Daley's entourage listened closely to the same speech for the second time in three hours. The audience, made up mostly of middle-aged women with pain

Chicago Tribune, February 3, 1993

written on their faces, seemed to be about as glum as Daley.

Vernice Davis, president of the 63rd and Aberdeen Streets block club, kept asking Daley about the drug dealers who dominate her corner, wondering aloud why they could sell drugs there every day for years and get away with it.

"We must have justice," Davis said. "We are tired. We are working people. We are God-fearing people, but we must have justice because we are human beings. They sell drugs. They laugh at us. They get arrested. They get out. How can they do that to innocent people? How can they humiliate us?"

In answering her, Daley talked about the need for tougher judges and the federal government's failure to stop drugs at the nation's borders. He launched into an argument for national gun control, a topic that drew loud applause in Rogers Park, but elicited a few shrugs on the South Side.

One woman coughed and then sighed as the answers they had heard so many times before were offered again. The people were respectfully polite but resigned to a thorough understanding of how things work in Chicago: If drugs were being sold openly on a street corner in a middle-class neighborhood, the dealers would be hounded out. In Englewood, things are different.

Haynes noted that without active support from the neighborhood, community policing could be doomed. But he said he hoped Tuesday's poor showing did not reflect the neighborhood's true feelings about the plan.

"He's trying hard to do what he can," Haynes said, "but they've been ignored for decades. Just look around. You can see it on their faces. They've seen it before, they've been promised to before, they've been lied to so many times, that sometimes when you think of it, they're almost out of hope."

Outside, police officers were openly skeptical about the community policing plan, weighing their knowledge of the neighborhood and its problems alongside the mayor's efforts to encourage Englewood to help itself.

At the end of his Englewood speech, the mayor shook a few hands and left. He defended community residents who did not attend, saying that they were working.

Aides said privately he was disappointed in the lukewarm response.

Things were different in Rogers Park. There, people sat forward in their chairs and listened to what they wanted to hear, that they would help define police work and that beat cops would be responsible to them.

"I'm very excited about what the mayor's doing," said Barbara Stanley, president of the Edgewater Beach Association. "This has been a long time coming, and we're ready for it. We're organized; we're hoping to take this on and run with it. It's what we always wanted, a partnership with police."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO: Mazar Tiwana (left), who is the father of a crime victim, buttonholes Mayor Richard Daley at Tuesday's Rogers Park meeting to congratulate Daley on his community policing plan. Tribune photo by Chris Walker.

Chicago Tribune, February 3, 1993

TERMS: CHICAGO; OFFICIAL; ISSUE; CRIME; NEIGHBORHOOD; RELATION; POLICE;  
REACTION

LEVEL 1 - 10 OF 47 STORIES

Copyright 1993 Newsday, Inc.  
Newsday

February 11, 1993, Thursday, CITY EDITION

25

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 27

LENGTH: 563 words

HEADLINE: Study: Cops Out of Step

BYLINE: By Michele Parente. STAFF WRITER

KEYWORD: NEW YORK CITY; POLICE DEPARTMENT; REFORM; SUNSET PARK; CRIME;  
PREVENTION; COMMUNITY RELATIONS; STATISTICS; CHRONOLOGY; REPORT; PROFILE;  
RATINGS

## BODY:

Nearly two years after it was created in Sunset Park, Brooklyn, the city's model precinct in community policing has "failed to live up to its promises," including maintaining a high police profile on the streets, according to a local study.

In a 43-page report entitled "The Model Precinct: A Community Review of the 72nd Precinct," the basic tenets of community policing, such as the presence of beat cops and open lines of communication between the precinct and residents, were found lacking.

The report, prepared by the Sunset Park Restoration Committee, a volunteer community-based organization, says the neighborhood at first welcomed the experimental program.

"Unfortunately, this initial enthusiasm has waned because community policing has failed to live up to its promises," the report states. "Today, residents complain that they rarely see their beat cop on patrol any longer and that they find it impossible to reach them at the precinct expeditiously."

The study says that beat cops "are the first to go when a citywide demand for officers is made," such as during the Democratic National Convention and the Crown Heights and Washington Heights disturbances. It also claims that beats are left unattended when the assigned officer is on vacation or out sick.

Other areas of concern cited in the report include the "rapid turnover in staff," which undermines the continuity necessary for the program to succeed, and the inability of residents to reach the precinct staff by phone.

The executive director of the Sunset Park Restoration Committee, Tony Giordano, said yesterday that the report is not intended as an "attack" on the program, but is an effort to better it by pointing out its failings. "There's an overwhelming acceptance of community policing in Sunset Park," he said. "The people love it . . . But this is how we feel and they can't argue with perception, they have to deal with it."

He said a follow-up report written in conjunction with the 72nd Precinct will be released in about six months.

Newsday, February 11, 1993

Responding to the criticisms, Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly said yesterday through spokeswoman Suzanne Trazoff that "community policing is a process, not yet an end product, and the 72nd Precinct is a laboratory so that we can see what works and what doesn't and where we need to strengthen the program."

Kelly asked the Sunset Park residents to "be patient" with the program, which was created by his predecessor, Lee Brown. Introduced in April, 1991, community policing calls for officers to be assigned specific beats where in addition to making arrests, they would work as "community ombudsmen" to deter crime and pinpoint problems.

#### Profiling the 72nd

Crime statistics from the 72nd Precinct in Sunset Park, Brooklyn:

##### Year Homicide

|      |    |
|------|----|
| 1988 | 15 |
| 1989 | 17 |
| 1990 | 24 |
| 1991 | 18 |

##### Year Robbery

|      |       |
|------|-------|
| 1988 | 767   |
| 1989 | 864   |
| 1990 | 1,035 |
| 1991 | 972   |

##### Year Assault

|      |     |
|------|-----|
| 1988 | 495 |
| 1989 | 471 |
| 1990 | 481 |
| 1991 | 545 |

##### Year Burglary

|      |       |
|------|-------|
| 1988 | 1,717 |
| 1989 | 1,558 |
| 1990 | 1,645 |
| 1991 | 1,549 |

##### Narcotic Arrests

|      |       |
|------|-------|
| 1980 | 110   |
| 1985 | 871   |
| 1991 | 1,682 |

1992 (first four months) 475

SOURCE: Sunset Park Restoration Committee

Newsday, February 11, 1993

GRAPHIC: Newsday chart- Profiling the 72nd. SOURCE: Sunset Park Restoration Committee-

## LEVEL 1 - 5 OF 47 STORIES

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23

March 19, 1993, Friday, NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION

SECTION: EDITORIAL; Pg. 18; ZONE: N

LENGTH: 496 words

HEADLINE: It's too early to dismiss police plan

BODY:

No, community policing is not DOA in Chicago.

As the Chicago Police Department prepares its experiment with the community policing concept of crime detection and prevention, there is some reluctance on the part of cops. But that's to be expected with anything billed as radical change.

Community policing marks change, but it can't be considered particularly radical. It does involve some approaches beyond the traditional patrol car response to 911 calls. It involves officers' establishing routine communication with residents and business owners and workers who know, because they're there everyday, what's happening on their streets.

It involves building community trust and confidence in the police. For the police officers involved, it involves flexibility, patience and commitment.

The police department plans a May launch for pilot programs in five districts. To do so, it is adding 209 officers to the Austin, Marquette, Englewood, Rogers Park and Morgan Park Districts - about 40 officers per district.

Given the opportunity to transfer into one of these districts, only 37 veteran officers have volunteered. The remaining transfers will be ordered by the police command and will include probationary police officers and officers with only one to three years of seniority.

The failure of more senior officers to volunteer for a transfer to the test districts has been widely interpreted as a setback. But there is no reason that the cries of failure have to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It's probably not all that surprising that more veterans didn't seek transfers. For one thing, they were not asked to transfer into an elite "community policing" unit; they were asked to transfer into a new district where they would have the opportunity, along with the other 235 to 360 officers in the district, to participate to some degree in community policing. They had no guarantees that they would be heavily involved in the new efforts.

Moreover, several of the pilot programs are in highly dangerous areas. Many cops would think twice about volunteering even for traditional patrol in some of these districts.

Nor does the high number of rookies and younger officers to be called on for mandatory transfer mean that the success of community policing will rest on

Chicago Tribune, March 19, 1993

inexperienced cops. District commanders can use any of their officers for the new approach. In all likelihood, many of the younger transfers will be working overnight shifts, where they will be less involved in community policing work.

Sure there has been resistance in Chicago, just as there was initial resistance in other cities that launched community policing. Resistance, however, has given way to success in many of those locales.

The success or failure of Chicago's experiment will be established by the commitment of the commanders and the officer corps of the selected districts. And if it succeeds, the victory will be a credit to every police officer in the city.

TERMS: ISSUE; CRIME; NEIGHBORHOOD; POLICE

## LEVEL 1 - 2 OF 4 STORIES

Copyright 1992 The Times Mirror Company  
Los Angeles Times

October 18, 1992, Sunday, Home Edition

SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 1; Column 2; Metro Desk

LENGTH: 3395 words

HEADLINE: COMMUNITY POLICING SHOWS PROMISE;  
LAW ENFORCEMENT: GETTING TO THE ROOTS OF CRIME IS PAYING OFF, OFFICERS AND RESIDENTS INVOLVED IN THE PROGRAM SAY. IT IS GETTING FAVORABLE MARKS IN THE SAN FERNANDO VALLEY, WHICH HAS L.A.'S OLDEST PROGRAM AND MAY BE A MODEL FOR CITYWIDE EFFORT.

BYLINE: By MICHAEL CONNELLY, This story was reported by Times staff writers Michael Connelly, Hugo Martin, Josh Meyer and Jim Herron Zamora. It was written by Connelly.

## BODY:

In the eight years that he patrolled Sun Valley, Officer Richard Burrow would often be summoned to a shabby old motel -- a drug hangout on Sunland Boulevard -- over fights, gunshots and complaints from neighbors.

Time and again, Burrow would roll up to the graffiti-covered building, sometimes twice a week. He would step through the trash and arrest trespassers too drug-dazed to know where they were.

All that changed a year ago. Burrow was made a full-time leader of community policing in the San Fernando Valley, and he used a new strategy on the motel.

He had it destroyed.

"If you want to eliminate a problem, you have to go to the source," he said. "That building was the source in that neighborhood."

Burrow met with the motel's neighbors and took their complaints and records on the place to city inspectors and City Council aides. The building was declared a public nuisance and its utilities were cut off. The motel was boarded up and fenced. The city informed the absentee owner that he had to raze the structure or the city would do it at his expense. In August, he complied and the building went.

The motel's destruction presents one face of community policing, begun in the Valley 16 months ago. The effort, consisting of designated police officers working with a new network of hundreds of residents, is aimed at producing a major change in day-to-day interaction between police and the public.

Community-policing efforts are being conducted elsewhere in Los Angeles, but the Valley's program is the oldest and biggest. It contains many aspects of a citywide program that was unveiled last week by Police Chief Willie L. Williams.

Deputy Police Chief Mark A. Kroeker, who ordered the Valleywide experiment to start in June, 1991, says he is pleased. The 16 months have brought a "massive shift" in the attitude of officers and their method of policing, he said.

Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1992

Although statistics show that crime is increasing in the Valley, Kroeker is buoyed because they also show that the rate of increase is declining.

From the public's viewpoint it has clearly been only a beginning. A Times poll found that community policing is not widely known. Three-quarters of those polled were unaware of community-based policing. Only 14% said a community-based policing program was active in their neighborhood.

Still, officers and residents involved in the program give it favorable marks. And ride-alongs and interviews with about half of the 31 supervising officers make it clear that their work has changed profoundly.

On a given day, Burrow and his fellow senior lead officers might be writing community newsletters and busting drug dealers, chasing gang members out of one park and playing softball with them in another, and, increasingly, getting action from various city departments.

Most significantly, they say, they have organized citizens to watch for trouble.

For example:

\* In the northwest Valley, citizen snoopers watch hot spots and use radios to inform officers waiting in squad cars. One night they spy on the dim corners of an apartment complex at Bryant Street and Vanalden Avenue in Northridge. They peer from vacant units, hoping to videotape drug deals. On another night they sit on rooftops in North Hills recording the license numbers of suspected drug buyers. "We see the same cars going by again and again," volunteer Brenda Shaw said. Heavy on retirees, the police-organized Volunteer Surveillance Team has about 50 members and is at least partly mobilized about once a week.

\* During the riots, a police officer and a citizen liaison visited Korean-American merchants. Arsonists were reportedly marking Korean stores as fire-bombing targets. They told storekeepers what symbols to look for. No such bombings occurred. Elsewhere, a Pacoima officer persuaded gang members, with whom she has been working, to protect shops on Van Nuys Boulevard.

\* A few blocks south of Cal State Northridge, schoolchildren are organized into a Junior Neighborhood Watch. They do not go on patrol, but they keep an eye out for graffiti and hold monthly meetings with Officer Sally Barnes. The group has a mailing list of 150. Chris Gayton, 12, said Barnes taught him the truth about gangs. "They're nothing but trouble," he said. "They should all be dumped in the trash."

\* In Pacoima, residents of one street, encouraged by senior lead Officer Stephany Payne, fight crime with floodlights. The streets look "like Las Vegas," one resident said. It works. Gangs stop using the street as a party room.

Senior lead officers are one rank below sergeant. Before last year they performed community relations work two days a month. Kroeker's innovation was to make the duty full time, lay out a plan for community policing and order the recruitment of hundreds of citizen liaisons, whom he officially welcomed last fall in the Cal State Northridge football stadium.

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The Valley's 31 senior leads oversee nine patrol officers apiece. Each senior lead works in an area of about 35,000 residents. Kroeker has ordered lead officers to be visible. They are to attend Neighborhood Watch meetings, start programs and walk beats in business districts.

They are supposed to attack problem spots that breed complaints and crimes. Their arsenal includes calling on city agencies for code enforcement.

Kroeker said traditional policing means answering calls, making arrests and moving on, like Burrow's trips to the motel. He compared it to swatting mosquitoes but ignoring the swamp. "Our focus now is on draining the swamps," Kroeker said.

He said his plan grew out of discussions with Valley senior lead officers, patrol captains and City Council members. Details came from law enforcement experts, who say community policing is so popular that more than 400 U.S. cities say they are using it.

Practices vary widely, said criminologist Robert Trojanowicz, director of the National Center for Community Policing at Michigan State University.

In a perfect program, he said, the police force would embrace the philosophy at all levels. Residents, political leaders and social agencies would be involved. The police force would use the media to tell the public about its activities.

"There is no one city that meets all of the criteria," he said. But he puts several on a list of leaders.

He cites Portland, Ore., for having a five-year plan; Seattle for strong police-community involvement; Aurora, Colo., for teaching the idea during academy training, and Reno for departmentwide change. \*

Last year, after the Valley program started, the Los Angeles City Council ordered pilot community-policing programs around the rest of the city. Then came the spring riots. "It stagnated and then sort of went away," Sgt. Len Hundshamer, one of the coordinators, said of community policing.

Some non-Valley divisions are still running programs on their own, and Los Angeles seems to be firmly on the bandwagon. Williams installed community policing in Philadelphia when he was police commissioner and says he is committed to a decentralized Los Angeles version.

After meeting with Kroeker and the 31 senior lead officers, the new chief came away declaring himself "very pleased with what is going on in the Valley."

Officer Pete Weinzerl never goes far without his black book.

It is not a traffic citation book but a pad of tear-out forms requesting city action. The forms can initiate municipal procedures such as removing abandoned cars and closing public nuisances.

Weinzerl is the senior lead for what officers call the Rock -- the hilly Sunland-Tujunga area. Wielding his black book, he knocks down abandoned houses, clears junkyards and fixes street lights.

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Meanwhile, he estimates that he has made only 20 arrests in the last year, one-twelfth his old norm. Instead of confronting criminals, he tips off city inspectors and rallies homeowner groups.

One day a week he sits in City Councilman Joel Wachs' Foothill Boulevard office. There, residents have easy access to him.

He spends evenings at Neighborhood Watch meetings. On many mornings he investigates problems phoned in from his growing network of activists.

Today he is driving on the Rock, checking a yard after neighbors complained that it is full of junk.

"In the old days we would never attack the source of a problem," Weinzerl said. "We would just put a Band-Aid on it by making an arrest. And we would just keep coming out and coming out and making arrests. Now we go for the root of the problem."

Yes, the yard is full of junk. Weinzerl makes a note to contact a city inspector. "We'll get this cleaned up," he said.

"Before, when I was a plain police officer, I didn't know any of this stuff -- the zoning and codes," said Nancy Reeves, a lead officer in North Hollywood.

Since then she has used city enforcement to run suspected drug dealers out of a house where months of arrests had failed.

"It's been a whole education," she said. "But you can see it working."

The police have always sought city enforcement on occasion. But Valley senior leads' requests have nearly tripled in a year, said Sharon Perry, a city inspector.

Perry, who often tours properties with officers, handles requests from three of the five Valley police divisions. She says 25 structures in her area were razed as a result of community policing in a year, up from 10 or fewer a year earlier.

The main business of community policing is Neighborhood Watch, a well-worn idea, two decades old in Los Angeles. The ~~basic idea~~ of community policing is not new, just new for now with a fresh title.

Community policing by another name was team policing, initiated by Police Chief Ed Davis in the early 1970s. Teams of patrol officers, detectives and supervisors were assigned to neighborhoods to meet all police needs from Neighborhood Watch to murder investigations. The plan fell victim to economics. It was heavy on supervision and needed more personnel. Police veterans say it also lacked support from the ranks.

Kroeker ordered senior lead officers to make Neighborhood Watch bigger and better. Most of their time is spent tending the groups of volunteers, and activities are traditional and innovative.

Officer Rick Gibby, in the northwest Valley, had a program to combat car theft. He showed residents how to install "kill switches" that keep thieves

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from starting cars without keys.

Officer Stephanie Tisdale, a senior lead in Reseda, gets residents of drug-plagued neighborhoods to write down license numbers of suspicious cars. Then she writes to the registered owners, warning them that their cars were seen in drug transactions. She even invites them to call for a talk.

"Out of 300 letters sent, I got two calls," she said of one round of correspondence. "But I didn't see many repeat offenders coming around the area."

Officer John Girard has organized a network of residents to be his eyes and ears. Made up largely of apartment residents and operators of small businesses, they call about problems such as drug dealing, graffiti and vandalism. They tell him about the movements of drug dealers and feuds between gang members. As he tours North Hills, Girard's pager is beeping constantly.

"I used to receive radio calls," he said. "Now people just call me direct when they want to tell me what's going on."

The officers are spread thin, limiting their impact. By the department's own count, fewer than 2% of Valley residents are enrolled in Neighborhood Watch, 17,000 of the Valley's more than 1 million residents.

There is no official count of members before community policing, but Kroeker says he thinks the number has gone up sharply.

Among the 17,000 are 2,000 hard-core activists. These are the block captains and community representatives recruited to be liaisons to the police.

"Without any reservation, I can say citizen involvement has exploded," Kroeker said. "Over the last year and a half, a modest estimate is that there has been a 50% to 75% increase in the involvement of the community. I would measure that by the number of people as well as how much time they are spending on these programs."

Councilwoman Joy Picus said: "Not everybody knows it's out there, but where programs are, people are aware that something is happening that is different. Most of them are aware that something is different on the block because crime is down."

For many of those investing time, the payoff is a feeling that they have better control of their neighborhoods. They like having a direct line to a responsive Police Department. They like the clout that comes from being organized.

"When one person from our group calls, it's one voice with 50 or 60 echoes behind it," a member of Canoga Park Business Watch said.

Becky Leveque of Porter Ranch is a believer. Her house was burglarized twice last year. With a senior lead officer, she formed a Neighborhood Watch program that attracted about 500 residents to its first meeting. She says police tell her that crime in their neighborhood has dropped dramatically.

"For the first time, we have neighbors coming together," Leveque said.

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In Reseda, Tisdale has developed a "predator list" of repeat offenders who make a living off crime. She gives the list and booking photos of the criminals to patrol officers and Neighborhood Watch block captains.

Community policing is not supposed to stop at the 31 senior lead officers. Each is supposed to spread the word in the department, starting with the officers under them.

Police officials say this is happening, albeit slowly. It is not unusual to see officers from rookies to captains shaking hands at Neighborhood Watch meetings.

Officer Mario Rivas, a graveyard-shift rookie, attends a North Hollywood meeting on his own time to meet his clients among the citizenry. He says the department seems to be at the dawn of a new era.

Veteran Officer Rich Groller says community-based policing has renewed his enthusiasm for the job.

"I've been doing this for more than 20 years, and no one ever asked me what I thought until last year," said Groller, who assists a senior lead officer in Van Nuys.

Senior lead officers say results can be slow because they are overworked. A need for more officers is a common theme of discussions.

In the Valley, only the Van Nuys Division has extra patrol officers for community policing -- five to assist the senior leads. In the West Valley station, all seven senior lead officers share one office and one phone. Officers who want to serve refreshments at Community Watch meetings must buy them with their own money.

In the ranks, glad-handing the public does not appeal to everyone. Some officers scorn the soft approach to police work, top officers say.

Ronald Bergmann, the West Valley Division patrol captain, preaches community policing to his officers but not all are believers.

"I keep telling the troops that there is a train coming down the tracks, and you either jump on board or you are going to get run over," he said. "There are still some officers sitting on the tracks."

"I'm afraid they'll make a community relations outfit out of the LAPD, not a law enforcement agency," said Gene Smith of Northridge, a police officer for 25 years who owns an ice cream parlor. He is a self-described member of the Old Guard. "If it's going to be yes sir, no sir, those ex-cons are going to pick up on that right away, and the whole community suffers."

In the rank and file, patrol officers' duties have not changed, but they are supposed to think about problem solving and community relations. One example of community-mindedness is the resolve by more than 100 Foothill Division patrol officers to learn Spanish on their own time. Another is the habit in the ranks, now widespread, of sending notes about neighborhood problems to the senior leads.

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Kroeker said attitudes are changing slowly. That is largely because the staffing shortage gives patrol officers little time for community work.

"The next wave of emphasis is going to be on all the officers out there," he said.

The experts agree with him about the need for top-to-bottom change.

"If you expect these 31 officers to do it all, it is doomed to failure," said Trojanowicz, the Michigan criminologist. "Community policing is a philosophy that has to permeate the entire department."

Predictably, enthusiasm among the citizen participants is high.

"We feel empowered," said Lilian Salin, a community representative in Studio City and Neighborhood Watch veteran. "This is a wonderful thing. It gives a better sense of safety to the community."

On the other hand, Joe Sanchez, another community representative, said he does not feel that the Police Department is giving community-based policing its full support.

Sanchez, a former gang member who works as a youth coordinator in San Fernando, said he has considered quitting his duties as a community representative because police officers in the Foothill Division do not return his calls or provide him with such information as neighborhood crime statistics.

"They have given me no support whatsoever," he said.

Furthermore, not all Valley residents are gung-ho joiners.

Weinzerl said it is hard to interest residents of low-crime neighborhoods, who tend to be complacent. And those who live where crime is high are often a discouraged group, he said.

In parts of North Hills it has taken senior lead officer Girard months to establish functioning Neighborhood Watch groups. Most residents are apartment dwellers who feel little connection to the community.

In Pacoima, Payne sought to tap the longtime residents of high-crime areas.

"Instead of a whole block, you may have a few people," the officer said. "But they can be just as effective."

Such problems are to be expected, according to law enforcement experts who champion community-oriented policing.

Jerome Skolnick, a UC Berkeley law professor who has written about police subjects, said community policing usually takes hold fastest in middle-class, stable neighborhoods where the threat of crime is a high concern. Thus, the Valley may be the best laboratory for a program, he said.

"Community-oriented policing is more than anything else a vision of how you talk to people, how you interact with people," Skolnick said. "It works better with more stable populations."

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Skolnick said success is judged by levels of comfort and fear, not crime statistics.

"The police can only do so much to stop crime that is rooted in persistent social problems stemming from income inequality and social deprivation," he said. "But police can reduce the level of fear, help develop a sense of community pride."

Pamela Delaney, executive director of the New York City Police Foundation, a citizens watchdog group, agrees that results cannot be quantified.

"Ultimately, the goal of solving problems will reduce the number of radio runs," she said. "But there is a long lead time before there are significant results. . . . But if people are satisfied, does it really matter if crime is going down or up?"

Kroeker keeps an eye on a handful of statistics for indications of how community-oriented policing is doing in the Valley.

They show that arrests in the Valley are down while crime and police response time to emergency calls are up. Community policing is presumed guilty for part of both trends because it has taken lead officers away from crime calls.

But Kroeker said that the decline in arrests has been only for minor crimes. And the rate of increase in crime is down -- to 5% for the first five months of this year, compared to 8% during the same period in 1991.

Kroeker said he expected community policing to exact a price in one important measurement of police service: the time it takes to get to an emergency.

The expectation proved true, but Kroeker said the increase -- an average 18 seconds per call -- to 7 minutes and 54 seconds is within bounds.

"I can accept it," Kroeker said. "If it gets to a minute, I won't."

Meanwhile, police in the Valley assume that the project is here to stay, at least in some form.

"Unless I am told otherwise -- and I don't expect to be -- we are not backing away," Kroeker said. "To do that would be to fall back -- to lose the synergy and momentum we've developed. It will be burning bridges with the community. We can't turn back."

Times staff writer Leslie Berger contributed to this story.

GRAPHIC: Photo, Senior lead Officer Stephany Payne, who works the Pacoima area, talks with youths about what is going on at a housing project on Pierce Street. JOEL P. LUGAVERE / Los Angeles Times; Photo, Officer Jim O'Riley checks identification of a bicyclist in Studio City after being alerted by a citizens patrol. ; Photo, Officers talk with members of a citizens task force in Studio City, one of the groups formed as part of community-based policing effort. IRFAN KHAN / Los Angeles Times; Photo, Senior lead Officer Pete Weinzerl uses his book of request forms to initiate removal of abandoned cars or destruction of vacant houses. STEVE PRINGLE / For The Times

Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1992

TYPE: Main Story

SUBJECT: LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT; SAN FERNANDO VALLEY; POLICE PATROLS --  
LOS ANGELES; POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS; CRIME PREVENTION

## LEVEL 1 - 4 OF 4 STORIES

Copyright 1992 The New York Times Company  
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March 27, 1992, Friday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section B; Page 3; Column 1; Metropolitan Desk

LENGTH: 662 words

HEADLINE: Less Crime to Count;  
Was It Community Policing? Experts Try to Explain Drops in Major Crimes

BYLINE: By RALPH BLUMENTHAL

BODY:

With reported crime down in every major category in New York City last year, for the first time since the early Eisenhower years, police officials are asking themselves: Did we do something right?

Experts agree it is too soon to say. But the provisional answer appears to be yes, at least to some extent. While the turnabout was marginal in some cases and hardly qualifies as a trend, examination of the figures suggests that the department's sweeping program of neighborhood patrols and saturation coverage seems to be having an effect in at least certain high-crime precincts.

Moreover, the dip, which bucks the national trend, shows no sign of abating. Robbery complaints were down a marginal 1.8 percent last year. But perhaps more significant is that with one exception, the city has now recorded 18 consecutive months in which the seven major reported crimes totaled less than in the same month the previous year. Robberies in December 1991 were down nearly 4 percent, and down nearly 7 percent in January and February of this year.

Predictably, questions outnumber answers in the wake of the upbeat 1991 figures, the first time since 1955 that all seven "index" crimes -- murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft -- went down instead of up.

Why, for example, if crime was down 4.4 percent citywide, was it down so much more sharply in some precincts and up sharply in others? Of the nearly two dozen high-robbery precincts, those with 1,000 or more robberies per square mile last year, why did some show dramatic downturns and others upsurges?

No one knows for sure, but a closer look at the figures suggests that some precincts are more responsive than others to the stepped-up neighborhood patrols of community policing, Commissioner Lee P. Brown's signature program of teams of foot officers who seek to resolve local problems before they blow up into criminal crises. Midtown South and Midtown North, both notoriously robbery-prone Manhattan precincts, in part because of the supply of business victims, recorded drops of more than 19 and 16 percent, respectively.

Yet another high-robbery precinct, the 28th, just north of Central Park in Harlem, declined a statistically insignificant 1.5 percent.

According to Assistant Chief Michael A. Markman of the Office of Management Analysis and Planning, which puts out the figures, the midtown precincts,

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where crime clusters along corridors like 42d Street and the day population is largely one of transient workers, are particularly responsive to saturation patrolling and community policing. Since April 1990, he said, special programs that added overtime patrols and put desk officers out on the street one day a week added an extra 150,000 tours to the police presence in high-crime areas like Midtown South.

But the same stepped-up police coverage works less well in poor, residential neighborhoods high in violent crime, said Thomas A. Reppetto, president of the Citizens Crime Commission, a watchdog group.

The hypothesis gains some support from subway crime figures, Mr. Reppetto said. With intensified patrols by the transit police, reported robberies in the subway -- included in the citywide tabulations -- were down nearly 12 percent last year. Overall reported felonies were down 15 percent last year, and every month for the last 15 months, there were fewer subway felonies than in the corresponding month the year before.

While citywide figures show interesting fluctuations, experts cautioned against seeking significance in any small sampling, such as one precinct or even a borough. Queens, for example, recorded an 8 percent increase in robbery complaints, with some precincts, like the 100th in Rockaway, showing a nearly 30 percent jump.

But the raw figures are so relatively small that a few active teams of robbers during the course of a year could push the percentages way up.

While local disparities might be interesting, the statistical portrait of crime in the city requires the same kind of perspective as a Pointillist painting: from too close it just looks like a jumble of dots.

But even the broadest brush strokes should be viewed with caution, officials say. While saying, "I'm optimistic some of the things we're doing are beginning to make a difference," Commissioner Brown said, "One year does not constitute a trend." As a career criminologist as well as a longtime street officer, he said, he knew there was no single cause of crime, or single cure for it.

Still, others found the figures encouraging. Hubert Williams, president of the Police Foundation, a research organization in Washington, said he was struck by the way New York City appeared to be "turning the corner on its own historical norms."

"Crime going down is not a phenomenon we see very much of today, especially across the board in all categories."

Marvin Wolfgang, a professor of criminology and law at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, said a 4.4 percent decline in reported crime "is very difficult to explain."

"If you had a 4.4 percent drop in unemployment, it would be very significant," he said.

But to draw further conclusions, he said, he would want to know the role of community policing in achieving such results.

The New York Times, March 27, 1992

GRAPHIC: Table/Diagram: "Crime: High-Robbery Precincts" lists the precincts in New York with more than 1,000 robberies per square mile in 1991, and the percentage change in robberies compared with 1990. (Source: New York Police Department)

TYPE: News Analysis

SUBJECT: CRIME AND CRIMINALS; ROBBERIES AND THEFTS; POLICE

NAME: BLUMENTHAL, RALPH

GEOGRAPHIC: NEW YORK CITY; MANHATTAN (NYC)

# Toward a New Intolerance

## GUN CONTROL AND COMMUNITY POLICING

By RAYMOND W. KELLY, *Police Commissioner of New York City*

*Delivered to the Second Annual FBI National Symposium on Addressing Violent Crime through Community Involvement, Quantico, Virginia, February 16, 1993*

I WANT TO THANK Director Sessions for inviting me to join you today. No New Yorker can speak at an FBI conference without citing the extraordinary relationship between the FBI and the New York City Police Department. The quality of that relationship is due, in large measure, to the leadership of Assistant Director Jim Fox. And the quality of that relationship was dramatically demonstrated once again at Kennedy Airport last week with the peaceful resolution of the Lufthansa hijacking. Just a few weeks earlier, the FBI-New York City Police Department Joint Bank Robbery Task Force recovered over eight million dollars that had been stolen from a local armored car company.

There are many, many examples of this ongoing, cooperative relationship. As have other local jurisdictions, we have used joint task forces in New York City to fight drug trafficking and gun sales, and to send organized crime figures to jail. We welcome federal participation because we know it works.

You just heard Director Sessions cite the fact that 300 special agents formerly assigned to counter-intelligence have been reassigned to the federal "Safe Streets" effort. The fact that the FBI has redeployed a large number of counter-intelligence agents in the fight against violent crime at home is not only practical and helpful to local law enforcement, it is also ironically symbolic. I say that because I believe the fight against crime in America, like that against Soviet domination, is now essentially a fight for freedom.

Fearing crime, or becoming one of its victims, is to lose a fair measure of freedom in a democratic society. And my premise today is that we have gotten far too accustomed to, and accepting of, crime and violence. The public and law enforcement alike have acquired a new tolerance to both. Why? Perhaps the numbers are just too overwhelming. Perhaps it's because we know that law enforcement can't work miracles. We know that the problems that land on the doorstep of law enforcement stem from vast social failures that the police alone will never solve.

Yet, the police can't withdraw either. We are engaged in addressing society's worst problems, and the public looks to us for solutions. They look to us for leadership. We can ill afford to become numb to violence and the community erosion it causes. People rely on the police to make a difference.

I believe the vehicles to help us regain some ground over violent crime are there. One is gun control and the other is community policing. We need to focus on both to make the kind of breakthrough that will make measurable differences in public safety.

There's no doubt about how violent we've become. The annual homicide rate in America is now about 22 for every 100,000 Americans. In Canada the rate is three for every

100,000 Canadians. In Japan, it is less than one. The fact is we have become too tolerant of murder. In New York City, there has somehow arisen a new benchmark for homicides: Over 2,000 homicides a year is considered bad. Up to 2,000 is, well, somehow "expected," or acceptable. The old chestnut of laying things end-to-end to get a sense of proportion becomes frighteningly macabre when you realize that 2,000 bodies end-to-end would stretch for over two miles.

So, of course, it is *not* acceptable. Just as it is not acceptable that our national homicide rate is seven times greater than that of our Canadian neighbors. It is never acceptable. It is simply familiar. We have grown accustomed to the staggering numbers.

We were not always as tolerant. In the current issue of *The American Scholar*, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan writes how shocked the America of 1929 was when seven mobsters were murdered one St. Valentine's Day. "It would appear," Senator Moynihan wrote, "that the society in the 1920s was simply not willing to put up with this degree of deviancy." But now, it seems, we are. Last Sunday, Valentine's Day 1993, we had 12 homicides in New York City; three in one apartment in Brooklyn, six in one apartment in the Bronx, and the rest at various locations. The fact is our larger cities regularly reach a body count of a half-dozen or more over two and three-day periods, but rarely do we call them massacres anymore.

Society's increasing tolerance to crime and antisocial behavior in general is abetting our own enslavement. The erosion of freedom caused by crime is so pervasive that we are in danger of failing to notice it at all. It is accepted practice that the elderly, certainly, stay home at night. They are easy prey so they make themselves scarce. They check before getting into elevators. Women of all ages take similar precautions. And, increasingly, we worry about our children's safety going to and from school. And even *in* school.

No one is immune. A New York City police officer who chased a troublesome teenager away from a school was shot the next day by the same boy who ambushed him from a nearby rooftop. When the boy observed that he wounded the police officer in the foot, he complained to a friend that "I wanted to get him in the cabbage. . ." meaning the head. Yet, we seem to be growing immune to the existence of such sociopaths.

There is an expectation of crime in our lives. We are in danger of becoming captive to that expectation, and to the new tolerance to criminal behavior, not only in regard to violent crime. A number of years ago there began to appear in the windows of automobiles parked on the streets of American cities signs which read: "No Radio." Rather than express outrage, or even annoyance at the possibility of a car break-in, people tried to communicate with the potential thief in conciliatory terms. The translation of "No Radio" is: "Please break into someone else's car, there's nothing

ing in mine." These "No Radio" signs are flags of urban surrender. They are hand-written capitulations. Instead of "No Radio," we need new signs that say "No Surrender."

Another disturbing indicator of our new tolerance has to do with the omnipresence of guns. We see it in people who show up at community meetings to ask if the Police Department can help get metal detectors installed in their schools. When people ask for metal detectors the way they used to ask for more library books, then you know your tolerance level is way too high. For certain, we have become far too tolerant of guns. The police and public should insist on a new level of tolerance. And we should insist that the new Congress adopt the of strictest gun control measures possible.

And what better time, certainly on the national level, now that Congress has declared the logjam broken.

Now is the time for Congress to end all the talk on gun control and enact any number of measures to stop the carnage that guns — especially handguns — are causing. Those of us in law enforcement need to play an important role in that regard. It is time to call the bluff of the vaunted gun lobby. We should hold it accountable — at least, in part, for the mounting body count. The gun lobby talks about individual freedom. But they help rob us of freedom. Certainly, the freedom from fear. They fill the halls of Congress with the rhetoric of liberation. But who is liberated when arsenals for drug dealers, street gangs and psychopaths are protected? The fact is the number of guns in private hands about doubles in America every 20-years to the point where there are now over 200 million guns in circulation. That compares to 54 million in 1950.

Right now, there exists well-known proposals that might begin to stem the flood of guns into illegal use. They include the Brady bill, the banning of assault rifles, and the limitation on some ammunition. Isn't it also time to seriously consider the central registration of all handguns? We register cars everywhere in America. And information about those cars is available through a nationwide computer link.

Why not handguns? There are Federal restrictions and permit requirements for machine guns. But not handguns. Even though handguns are doing most of the blood-letting. National registration will help us trace how guns that are supposed to be sold legally end up in illegal hands. Would it be expensive? Probably. But not nearly as costly as the 22,000 lives lost last year from handguns. National registration would produce a trail of ownership. It would produce an interesting trail of civil liability, as well, for persons who sold or disposed of their guns illegally or just recklessly.

We need to explore all of these alternatives, and more. We confiscated nearly 20,000 illegal guns in New York City last year. Ninety percent of them come from easy-to-purchase states with registration requirements that are nonexistent or dubious at best. I applaud Governor Wilder and those state legislators who recognize the problem and are trying to bring it under control in Virginia. Shouldn't we consider making it a federal offense to commit a crime with a gun obtained in one state and used in another? There is certainly an interstate nexus that would form the basis for such a law.

Eliminating the abuse of the Federal Firearm License is another area to explore. Over 600 such licenses have been issued to people in New York City who have no retail outlet

whatsoever, and who have no New York City gun license. In other words, over 600 individuals have received licenses from the Federal government to help them break the law in New York. Let me quickly add, however, that both the New York City Police Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms recognize the problem and are working jointly to correct it. The Police Department is adding officers to an existing NYPC-ATF Joint Firearms Task Force to track down Federal Firearms Licensees who are suspected of bringing guns into New York City in violation of local statutes.

If we don't get tougher about gun control, then we shouldn't be surprised by the number of corpses we accumulate. Gun control laws, the stricter the better, are critical. But I believe the principal vehicle to stop neighbor crime and violence is community policing.

I know that the introduction of community policing in New York City is forging strong alliances between the police and the public. Make no mistake, we are a long way from perfection. But community policing is working in New York City. It is building a public/police partnership that makes life disagreeable, even dangerous for criminals.

We have committed the entire police department to community policing. It is not relegated to an experiment, or a temporary program. Mayor Dinkins convinced the State Legislature to authorize a dedicated tax to help make it happen. We are putting thousands of additional police officers on neighborhood patrol. We believe the added visibility in the neighborhoods fosters better police and community relations.

Some people said it still wouldn't make a difference in high crime areas. But we have seen significant declines in major crime categories, city-wide, including high-crime areas. We can't yet be certain, but we are confident the decline is related to our community policing strategy.

We do know with certainty that beat cops engaged in community policing have made a measurable impact. Take Washington Heights, an upper Manhattan neighborhood with one of the city's most notorious drug problems and its highest homicide rate: A gang known as the Gerri-Curls operated a murderous reign of terror in one part of the area, until their turf became part of Officer James Gilmore's beat. The gang bought and sold large quantities of cocaine. It traded in guns. It maintained gang discipline through violence. It intimidated some potential witnesses and killed others.

Using a variety of community policing strategies, Officer Gilmore helped persuade reluctant witnesses to come forward. He identified previously unidentified gang members and brought the Police Department's Organized Crime Bureau to undertake a full-fledged investigation. OCCB in turn reached out to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Force, and together, they broke the gang, sending 20 members to jail. Similarly, beat cops took to heart the complaints of neighborhood residents in Washington Heights, and went after small store owners who were supporting the area drug trade through the sale of drug paraphernalia. The result was the seizure of five and a half million crack vials, 250,000 crack pipes, and other items. The store owners were arrested and fined, and we are now looking to the State Legislature to make such activity a

felony. But all the coordinated enforcement activity began with a beat cop.

One of the goals of community policing is problem solving. And one of the problems for the Police Department, and certainly to the residents of 560 West 165th Street, were the multiple 911 calls to that address every day. The building, with over 100 apartments, was being run as a supermarket for drugs. Beginning with the efforts of a single beat cop, and expanding to include multi city and federal agencies, the building was seized and turned over to Federal marshalls. Law-abiding tenants now live there in relative peace and quiet. And there has not been a single 911 call to that location in the three months since the seizure. That's how community policing is designed to work. That's how it is working in one of the toughest parts of the city.

The assumption that community policing wouldn't make a difference in high crime areas is based on the cynical view that some areas are beyond salvaging. But I believe the public, especially those people who have to contend with high levels of violence in their community, is ready to demand adherence to certain levels of civil behavior, and to lower its tolerance for those who violate them. We need to help by committing the kind of resources to community policing that will be felt on the street. More beat cops is one way.

But beat cops can't embark on community policing alone.

They need the resources of police headquarters, city hall and city government behind them. Beat cops also need neighborhood support. Community leaders must help make that support as strong and as visible as possible. It often takes great courage to do so. Another thing: Community policing creates expectations of a safer society. It's not something that can be realized overnight. Mistakes will be made, and we will learn from them. You must commit to it over the long-haul, and not be discouraged by temporary setbacks.

A final word on gun control: I urge that all of us in this room today commit ourselves to passage of the toughest laws possible. If it means banning some guns outright, then help ban them. If it means central registration for all others, then help require registration. If it means limiting the frequency of gun purchases, then help limit them. If it means waiting periods, then help make them wait.

The point is, as law enforcement executives and concerned citizens, you can help deliver a message to the new Congress. And that message is: Do something! We need to "do something" to develop a new intolerance to crime and violence. We need to "do something," or lose our freedom to crime and violence. We need to tear up our "No Radio" signs and reclaim some dignity. We can be slaves to our metal detectors and car alarms, or we can stage a revolt. I'm for staging a revolt.

# The Continuing Search for Community in Higher Education

## ONE OF THE PRIMARY CHALLENGES OF OUR TIMES

By JOHN E. MILLER, *Department of History, South Dakota State University*

*Delivered to the Graduating Class, University of South Dakota, Brookings, South Dakota, December 12, 1992*

**W**HEN I was invited to speak to you this morning, it stimulated feelings of both pleasure and trepidation. Pleasure because it is an honor to be asked to address you, and I join in your sense of accomplishment and happiness in getting over this hurdle and I congratulate you on your success:

— but also trepidation, because, as you well know, we college professors are pretty much programmed to get up and talk in fifty minute stretches and you and I know that fifteen — not fifty — minutes is about a reasonable limit for an exercise such as this.

Realizing that I'm not likely to say anything particularly profound here this morning, and therefore not feeling obliged to, I'd like to focus for the next few minutes on a single theme that, to me, is of particular importance in a university like South Dakota State, and also of particular importance outside the academic setting — in the lives ahead of all of you who are graduating here today.

That theme is COMMUNITY — the kind that exists among students, faculty, administrators, staff — and with the townspeople and all of the people throughout the state

who have some kind of investment — whether material or emotional — in an institution like this.

And in a broader sense, the kind of community that we long for in this country, and, indeed, beyond our borders, in the entire world. The kind of community that has been dreamt about by utopians and by practically minded people since the beginning of time.

Paging back through old copies of *Jackrabbit* yearbooks and dusty files of old *Collegians*, I was struck by the story of another graduation that took place on this campus six decades ago — more specifically, 62 years ago, in 1930. That was the SPRING commencement in June of 1930, which took place out on the campus lawn, at the Sylvan Theatre in the shadow of the Campanile, where graduations took place every Spring for about forty years, before they moved inside here.

This was a particularly memorable graduation, for it was also the occasion for dedicating the new Coughlin Campanile, which had been built the previous year, in 1929, with funds contributed by an alumnus of South Dakota State College — Charles L. Coughlin, who, with 30 classmates,

B4 WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1993

## Montgomery Unveils Police Transformation

By Veronica T. Jennings  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Montgomery County Police Department released its blueprint for "community policing" yesterday, outlining nearly 300 recommendations that would put more officers on the street and gradually transform the way police services are delivered in the county.

Like most police agencies locally and across the nation, Montgomery County is abandoning the more traditional approach of arrests and criminal citations as the main vehicles to curb crime in favor of community-oriented policing.

Under the newer concept, beat officers are encouraged to become more involved with residents and merchants, to help solve recurrent neighborhood problems, and to look for ways to prevent crime.

At a news conference yesterday, Police Chief Clarence Edwards and County Executive Neal Potter discussed the county's five-year community policing plan, the result of 20 months of committee revisions by more than 350 people, from business leaders to community activists and rank-and-file police officers.

The plan calls for the following:

- More police patrols in growing, heavily congested sections of the county, especially the Route 29 corridor, the Piney Branch Road-Flower Avenue area and Olney.
- Redrawing of police districts and beats to allow patrol officers to devote at least 3.5 hours of their 10-hour shifts to community policing.
- Transferring many traditional police functions, such as processing people arrested and serving court warrants, to the county's Department of Corrections and the Sheriff's Department, respectively.
- Routing more non-emergency calls to other county agencies or the police department's telephone reporting unit, which is staffed by civilians.

Officials could not provide cost estimates on the plan, but Potter said it could mean a 28 percent increase in patrol officers. According to police estimates, if the department expanded its patrol beats, 46 to 72 additional officers could be needed.

Skepticism among rank-and-file officers could be one of the major hurdles confronting community policing, officials said yesterday. Still, Edwards said he anticipates officers "will buy into the concept once they become involved and see results."

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# NEW COPS ON THE BLOCK

*L.A. Police Chief Willie Williams is one of a new breed of crime fighters who won't settle for business as usual*



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**W**illie Williams can remember some of those bull sessions as if they were yesterday. He would come from standing inside a freezing sentry box in Philadelphia's Fairmount Park and head with a few other young black park patrolmen to the home of Francis Walker, the first black promoted to captain in the Park Guards—about the only place a black Philadelphian interested in police work could go three decades ago. Sitting around a dining table, the young men would swap war stories. And Walker would push his wards—hard. "He'd holler at us to scare us," Williams recalls. "Then he'd tell us how we'd be successful."

By any standard, Walker's protégé has made the grade. In 1988, he became Phil-

adelphia's first black police commissioner. Last year, in the most scrutinized selection process in law-enforcement history, Williams was named chief of the Los Angeles Police Department—the first black ever and the first outsider in 43 years. Along the way, the once slim patrolman has gone from trying to square his police career with Martin Luther King Jr.'s calls for nonviolence to being a portly 49-year-old administrator bent on reforming the nation's second-largest police force. His priorities have shifted from honing up



for the sergeant's exam to persuading a shellshocked city that its police aren't an occupying army. The nation will be reminded of the difficulty of that this week, as jury selection begins in the trial of the men accused of brutally beating truck

driver Reginald Denny in the aftermath of another trial about an infamous beating—the Rodney King assault.

All else aside, the crucial difference between Williams and his controversial predecessor, Daryl Gates, is his vision of a more open department and a willingness—indeed, an eagerness—to do things that haven't been done before. In this, Williams is emblematic of a new kind of American police chief: risk takers and boat rockers within a culture where daily exposure to life-or-death situations makes officers natural conservators of the status quo.

Williams is one of numerous standouts across the country. The stars range

**THE NEW BLUE LINE** Willie Williams has begun to change the image and the attitude of Los Angeles's police force.



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from Kansas City Police Chief Steven Bishop, who has won respect for coming down hard on renegade cops, to Boston's police commissioner, William Bratton, who gives broad authority to midlevel managers responsible for serving their neighborhoods' needs, to Sylvester Daughtry of Greensboro, N.C., who is revolutionizing the relationship between his officers and housing-project residents. One of the most innovative is Ron Myers, Fla.'s Donna Hansen, whose offbeat approaches include bicycling officers and a weekly "most wanted" television show. All of them are committed to "community policing": getting the police and neighborhoods to work together to attack the roots of crime (story, Page 28). And all see the urgent need for change. "Standing still," says John Eck of the Police Executive Research Forum, "is not only insufficient for them, it is going backwards."

Why are these chiefs emerging now? In part, it's the mounting evidence that traditional methods aren't working. Violent-crime rates have surged since the mid-1980s, and landmark research shows that the old ways—like random patrolling—do little to catch crooks. The riots of the late 1960s led to a concerted search for more police talent. Many of the new top cops are minorities and a few are women, groups that would have stood little chance of rising to leadership jobs until very recently. In addition, the chiefs tend to be better educated than their predecessors and more open to new concepts. Many of them have come to the fore because the furor after the King beating dramatically showed that the status quo will no longer do.

**Risky business.** It isn't clear that the reformers will succeed. In cities like Houston, Dallas and Tulsa, Okla., new police heads have found themselves bogged down or booted out due to politics, union friction or budget woes. In fact, 12 of America's 15 largest big-city police departments have had turnover at the top since 1991. In Los Angeles, Williams is facing all the problems of American law enforcement, with large aftershocks of the 1992 riots, the deepening ethnic fissures and a recession-mired economy.

Like many other new-breed chiefs, Williams stresses core values—the importance of the family and compassion for the underdog—in his fight against

crime. Indeed, his old-fashioned attitudes help explain how he can take on immense challenges. During a 30-year career, he has never fired his police weapon in anger. Describing the role of the modern chief, Williams sounds like a frontier peacekeeper. "Even if you step on some toes," he says, "you have to go in and do what you feel is right."

Doing that has worked so far for Williams. In a city where instant celebrity has been honed to an art form, "Willie

his vision of community-based policing collides with harsh barricades. Some old-guard officers view the program as little more than social work with a badge. And crime rates in Los Angeles remain high, having declined only 6 percent this year from 1992's record-high level. Finally, Los Angeles must cope with a \$23 million budget deficit, which means any money for more street cops, a key element of community policing, will be hard won.

Los Angeles has even deeper prob-



**INTERNAL AFFAIRS.** Kansas City, Mo., Police Chief Bishop has instituted a strategic-communications course for younger cops and assigned officers to work with a citizens' group to clean up drug-infested public housing. Payoff: a 15 percent drop in crime in the complexes.

from Philly" was mobbed at his many public appearances after his selection last year. And, indeed, from its nadir after the King beating, Williams helped burnish the department's reputation. In hundreds of speeches, he hammered away at his vision of allying the LAPD's Thin Blue Line with embattled citizens.

Today, the shine is undeniably brighter. The Los Angeles Human Relations Commission recently surveyed more than 60 community and ethnic groups on the most important developments in the city since the riots. Williams's appointment and performance easily rated highest. "A major nexus of tension was police-community relations," says Ron Wakabayashi, the commission's executive director. "Willie Williams removed that tension."

Now, however, Williams is seeing that doing what he feels is right has limits, as

lems. With 7,600 sworn officers, it is the most underpoliced big city in the country, at 1 officer for every 460 residents. New York's rate is 1 per 236, Chicago's 1 per 247. Officers haven't had a raise in two years or a contract for over a year. Police radios are 12 years old; emergency frequencies are often jammed on prime-crime-time Friday and Saturday nights. Even so, voters rejected ballot measures in November and April that would have raised the number of officers.

**Skating on the surface?** With his honeymoon over, Williams is coming under mounting criticism both inside and outside Parker Center, the department's headquarters. His problems are similar to those that others face who come from outside the forces they lead. Some senior commanders fault him for not learning the system before making changes. "Walking around saying hello

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at roll call doesn't give you the operational sense to run a department like this," says one commander. Many street cops complain that Williams's practice of visiting neighborhood groups doesn't help his officers. "Kissing a lot of babies doesn't really do anything for the department," says a 17-year veteran.

Then there are those for whom change has not come fast enough. Even some early supporters now criticize Williams. Groups that monitor allegations of police impropriety say that after a dip, the number of officer-involved shootings and beatings has returned to the level under Daryl Gates. The chief's true test, says Melanie Lomax, a black former president of the Police Commission, "will be whether he cleans up the lawless element still in the department." She is referring to officers identified by a blue-ribbon panel after the King beating as having records of frequent shootings of suspects. Though some of those officers have been reassigned to desk jobs, many remain on the street.

**New faces.** City politics is an issue, too. Richard Riordan recently won the mayoralty on his pledge to make Los Angeles safer. But, though no one predicts anything like the dysfunctional relationship between Gates and ex-mayor Tom Bradley, Williams and Riordan so far are circling each other warily. The mayor has appointed all new members of the Police Commission, and there are four new faces on the 15-member City Council. Being an outsider isn't helping Williams learn his new bosses' priorities.

Still, the chief has time and again shown his ability to adapt. The son of a Philadelphia meatpacker and a strong-willed mother and the eldest of seven children, Williams worked numerous jobs as a youth because his family had a hard time making ends meet. He entered law enforcement almost by chance. He joined the Philadelphia park police at age 20, not out of a burning desire to become a cop but because he had passed the entrance exam, along with tests for other public jobs, and a patrol opening came up first. He and his wife, Evelina, had three children, all of them grown now. (One is a Philadelphia police officer.) When park officers were merged into the Philadelphia force in 1972, he began climbing through the ranks, though he once nearly quit after failing the exam for captain.

Along the way, Williams earned a

bachelor's degree after-hours and showed an eagerness to attend all kinds of training programs. The effort might not have led to the top for a black man, however, if it hadn't been for the MOVE debacle in 1985, when Philadelphia police bombed the headquarters of a radical black group, killing most of them. By then, Williams was known for paying close attention to his beat's neighborhoods. After the bombing, when Philadelphia's officials needed quietly effective

case him of too much speechifying also say he has spent too little time with officers. "I understand he's planning one-on-one with officers," says a commander. "But that's one of the first things you do when you take over." Recently, Williams was appointed to a panel probing how federal agents handled the Waco Branch Davidian incident, raising his national profile, although Williams says he will fulfill the remaining four years of his five-year term. Whether he will be



**PUBLIC DOMAIN.** Donna Hansen worked 20 years for the Miami area's Metro-Dade police force before taking over as top cop in Fort Myers, Fla., in 1991. She has reached out to the public with a "most wanted" TV show and teamed with schools to teach youth about law enforcement.

five black officers to help in the department's wholesale reorganization. Williams came to their attention.

**Carrying on.** As he grew with the job, he became acquainted with controversy. After he was named Philadelphia's commissioner in 1988, he tried to appoint several loyalists to key jobs, was sued by the police union for violating civil-service rules and lost the court case. As he moved up, he had gone out of his way never to forget the example of his black mentors, regularly forming study groups for young officers to prepare for promotion exams. Still, some Philadelphiaans criticized him for being a good politician but not a great chief. "I don't feel he backs up his men and women," says Joan Krajewski, a Philadelphia council member.

Even though he works nearly 80 hours a week, Williams has faced similar charges in Los Angeles. Critics who ac-

swamped by Los Angeles's intense politics remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, much as he was once pushed to succeed in Francis Walker's dining room, he tries to push younger officers in a rapidly changing police environment. "Our officers have to know it's OK to get out and have personal contact with people," he says. Not long ago, he taught that lesson to a new police academy class, urging 38 recruits to think about their jobs differently than past officers had. Then he asked for questions. No one raised a hand. "A couple of years from now you won't be shy at all," he said, with a rambling chuckle. "You'll say, 'Where is this chief?'" As Williams knows, that's a question he'll be expected to answer as long as he is trying to challenge the way police do their jobs.

BY MIKE TILLER WITH DOBIE FRIEDMAN

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## ■ U.S. NEWS

# Beyond 'Just the facts, ma'am'

*Community policing is law enforcement's hottest new idea. But its promise is elusive*

In Philadelphia, a pulsating tavern jukebox that had caused irate neighbors to log 500 police calls in six months was moved away from a common wall with the adjoining building. The calls stopped. Though it seems simple, such a move is at the heart of what is known as community policing, which has become a mantra for police chiefs and mayors in cities big and small across the country. Indeed, community policing is the new orthodoxy of law enforcement. Rather than just reacting af-

ter crimes by racing to a ceaseless string of 911 calls, police should try to create partnerships with communities in advance to solve problems that otherwise lead to crime. "Thoughtful administrators are asking themselves, 'Is

there a better way?'" says Lee Brown, the nation's new drug czar.

If community policing isn't in your town yet, it's probably coming. "We're determined to put more police officers on the street and to expand community policing," President Bill Clinton has said; he hopes to fund 100,000 more cops for America's crime-ridden cities. In a recent survey by the FBI and the National Center for Community Policing at Michigan State University, 50 percent of police officials serving cities with populations of more than 50,000 people said they were following this approach to policing, and an additional 20 percent planned to inaugurate it within a year. "It's reached the point that it's like mom and apple pie," says John Eck of the Police Executive Research Forum.

And therein lies a problem. Despite its allure on paper, turning the theory into practice on the unforgiving streets of urban America is proving complicated. If community policing can't deliver quantifiable results quickly, it could end

up on the scrap heap of innovation.

In Brooklyn, N.Y.'s Sunset Park neighborhood, where immigrants and tidy row houses uneasily coexist with prostitutes and graffiti-covered small businesses, patrol officer Russ Amato provides an example of how to make community policing work. Strolling along Third Avenue underneath the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, Amato banters with shop owners, who see him as "their" cop. Sometimes, his contribution has little to do with fighting crime

directly, as when Amato prodded local officials to remove abandoned cars from underneath the expressway.

**Crimbaster.** But Amato is proudest of the role he played in clearing rampant crack dealing from the corner of 45th Street and Third Avenue. Local residents and merchants came to trust him enough to tell him that a man working out of a nearby apartment was behind it all. Amato called in narcotics detectives and worked with the building's landlord to arrange to monitor the situation from adjacent units. That led to arrests and contacts with informants who helped the police bring down the main pusher in late June. The crack dealing dried up.

"Community policing made that possible," insists Amato. "A patrol car wouldn't have had the time to spend on it." At Sunset Check Cashing, President Vinny Babino sings Amato's praises: "Russ is always around. And the neighborhood has been cleaned up nicely. The old ladies were afraid to come down here, and now they're not."

But in Houston, neither old ladies nor many others were very happy with community policing—called neighborhood-oriented policing in their city. "The



Brooklyn, N.Y. Police officer Russ Amato watches over the Sunset Park neighborhood.

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words 'neighborhood-oriented policing' are cuss words around here now," says Sam Nuchia, Houston's police chief since 1992. It was drug czar Lee Brown, then Houston's chief (and later New York's commissioner), who instituted NOP as a pilot program in 1983 and citywide in 1987. The idea improved relations between cops and residents in inner-city neighborhoods. But for community policing to work, several goals need to be met, and Houston is a cautionary tale for the idea's boosters across the country.

First, crime rates soared from 1985 through 1991. Meanwhile, Brown and his successor, Elizabeth Watson, had to scale back their plans because Houston lost 655 of its 4,500 officers to budget cutbacks from 1986 to 1991; NOP was ridiculed as "nobody on patrol." And middle managers gave line officers little flexibility in decision making, diminishing enthusiasm for the approach down



*Houston. Rising crime rates dashed reform efforts.*

the line. Management consultants hired by the city said that some officers were so preoccupied with NOP that they lost sight of the need to catch crooks, and the consultants concluded that NOP had "not produced any comprehensive improvement." Nuchia has now shelved most aspects of NOP, preferring old-fashioned get-tough tactics.

Even proponents recognize the pitfalls. False advertising is one recurring problem. Police experts say departments in cities like Richmond, Va.;

Portland, Ore., and San Diego have made major commitments to community policing, but many other cities have borrowed the name while making only cosmetic changes. "The variety of programs that are described as 'community policing' is truly bewildering," wrote Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley in a study for the National Institute of Justice, the Justice Department's research arm. In 1992, for example, a panel studying the Boston police department singled out that city's program as "incomplete and superficial, and lacking the problem-solving component."

The difference between the genuine article and the fakes often comes down to whether the police department appreciates the depth of change needed to make an honest go of community policing. In New York, Lee Brown and his brass identified 57 major changes that had to be made within that department in everything from reward and evaluation systems to criminal investigative techniques. The task is so broad, asserts Robert Trojanowicz, director of the National Center for Community Policing, that "in my opinion, there is no one doing it on a departmentwide basis."

Indeed, the changes recommended typically cut to the core of a stubborn, paramilitary police culture. For one thing, departments must recruit differently, attracting people interested in service, not just adventure. Police academy training needs to expand beyond arrest procedures to include building skills like community organizing. Bean-counting performance measures—like counting summonses—have little meaning in such a system.

**Call waiting.** Departments must also find ways to free officers from what's called the "tyranny of 911": nonstop calls that send cops bouncing around like pinballs. In some departments, dispatchers query callers aggressively to screen out nonemergency calls. But the problem persists. On a recent night in Sunset Park, patrol officers Ricky Lopez and Brian Fusco were tied up on a numbing series of 911 calls for false burglar alarms, domestic disputes and heat exhaustion. "There really isn't the time to work problems," says Fusco. "People call 911, and they want a cop." Community-policing advocates say solving problems at their core will eventually reduce 911 calls, and argue that residents will accept a different response time for nonemergencies if the payback from community policing is clear; studies in Greensboro, N.C., and Toledo, Ohio, back them up. But in Houston, where community-policing efforts faltered, "the public was enraged" by slower emergency-response



*which is part of the city's model precincts for community policing.*

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times, says patrolman Mike Howard.

Ideally, experts say, all officers should participate in community policing, but the crush of 911 forces some departments to split their troops, with a few officers working full time on community problems while others answer radio calls. In New York, this has caused animosity between the two groups. The reality, contend some experts, is that community policing requires more cops, a tough sell for budget-strapped cities.

**Real work.** When practiced well, community policing assumes each neighborhood has unique problems, so precinct commanders and line-level cops are encouraged to customize service, not just follow general edicts from headquarters. Yet many cops feel the philosophy is soft on crime or isn't "real" police work, says Randolph Grinc of New York's Vera Institute of Justice, which is completing an evaluation of eight programs. And many sergeants and lieutenants have resisted allowing street cops to devise their own solutions, fearing a loss of control.

The challenges don't stop with the police. Bringing other government agencies and the community at large into the process as partners is crucial. But overworked city agencies have at times had trouble responding when police have asked for their help. New York's housing agency, for instance, told one Sunset Park cop seeking help in sealing an abandoned building filled with squatters that it would take months of legal hassling before they could do it. And many neighborhoods aren't taking up the new role demanded of them, especially if they're plagued by crime or have a history of bad relations with the police. "People don't care enough, or they're afraid," says a frustrated Sunset Park activist.

Even if all the obstacles can be overcome, there is no clear verdict on whether community policing makes a difference. Research in Newark, N.J.; Madison, Wis.; Baltimore, and Flint, Mich., indicates it can reduce fear and increase citizen satisfaction. But hard evidence of actual reductions in crime is hazy, and the most rigorous evaluations are only now being conducted. As Skolnick and Bayley have written in their National Institute of Justice study, "Community policing is advancing because it seems to make sense, not because it has yet been shown to be demonstrably superior." But for crime-weary cops, citizens and politicians, the clock is ticking. ■

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## NEW YORK STORY

# The power of an insider

**W**hen recruiters sought a top cop for New York City last year, Acting Commissioner Ray Kelly was an early favorite. But there were doubts. As the department's former second in command, Kelly was regarded as an insider who might not make the tough changes required. That concern vanished after a riot in which thousands of off-duty cops stormed City Hall, some shouting racial epithets at Mayor David Dinkins.

plan to intervene after several nights of rioting. And it was Kelly's insider status that made him the right person for the job—and, his supporters hope, for bringing the reform to New York's police force that outsider Brown could only theorize about.

Community policing isn't new to New York. It was introduced in 1984, and since then, the number of officers on foot has jumped from 750 to 4,000. By early next year, 2,863 officers and

thousands of civilians are expected to be added to the city's community-policing project. A 30-year veteran of the force, Kelly is using his savvy to forge consensus about necessary adjustments without getting too far ahead of his some 29,000 troops. "It's going to take years to get officers top to bottom reading from the same sheet of music," he predicts.

Kelly is helped by the fact that he came up through the ranks. And it probably doesn't hurt that he has a bit of a tough, by-the-book image. His jaw looks like it's wired to crush stone, and he can bench press 300 pounds. Indeed, Kelly has shown his mettle in several recent crises, without letting his insider role obscure his vision of the need for change. Last year, five officers were charged with selling cocaine, raising an old question: Can the force po-

lice itself? Kelly conducted an investigation of how the internal affairs unit failed to detect the dealers, finding no corruption and refusing to fire anyone. But he ordered the unit overhauled and placed a civilian over the restructuring, an unpopular move within the department.

Even for someone with wide support like Kelly, there are no guarantees about the future. Kelly's boss, Dinkins, is up for re-election this year. And he is facing a hard challenge from former federal prosecutor Rudolph Giuliani, who has some ideas of his own about law enforcement. Even insider Kelly might have to contemplate life on the outside someday soon.

BY SCOTT MINERBROOK



On guard. Kelly discussing the critical report

Kelly came down hard with charges against dozens of officers. His performance reinforced just how steady the ex-Marine could be. And it showed the difference between what a committed insider can do compared with some of the new chiefs who come from outside the forces they lead.

The police disturbance brought back images of Kelly during the otherwise dismal police performance in the 1991 Crown Heights riots. As a stinging 600-page report issued last week made clear, Kelly's bosses, notably Dinkins and then Police Commissioner Lee Brown, instructed police to let marauding black youths vent their rage after a car driven by a Hasidic Jewish man killed a 7-year-old boy. But it was Kelly who helped devise a

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# The New York Times

## Walking the Beat on Mean Streets

### Tough Neighborhoods Put Community Policing to the Test

By LYNETTE HOLLOWAY

Officer Michael Lopez was walking his beat in East New York, Brooklyn, recently when the barrage began: rocks, bottles and debris hurtled toward him from the rooftop of a housing project.

Officer Lopez ducked, ran for cover and, getting the message, established a new policy: never to walk alone near high-rises again.

"I was on the job and people were throwing things at me," Officer Lopez said. "It was clear that some people didn't want me there."

As a community police officer, Officer Lopez is supposed to build ties and cooperation within neighborhoods to help fight crime, but in the 75th Precinct, one of the city's most violent and a place where mistrust of the police runs high, that is no easy task.

Community policing is being phased in throughout the city and some progress has been reported in more stable neighborhoods. But the most important and difficult test for New York's new crime-fighting philosophy will come in high-crime neighborhoods like East New York, where officers work in an atmosphere of fear, hostility and alienation, the kind of tension that afflicts relations between the police and minority residents throughout the country. Residents say they sense the officers' fear, increasing the friction.

#### Limits to Community Policing

The idea behind community policing is to get officers out of squad cars and onto the streets of neighborhoods. Many experts say the limits of this type of policing are exposed in East New York and areas like it because these communities often lack the civic cohesion that can help prevent crime. This in turn raises the question of whether community policing can work in areas of profound deterioration.

"Other than New York, no other city has tried this philosophy in places as tough as East New York," said Anthony Pate, director of research of the Police Foundation in Washington. "I would think that would be one heck of a challenge."

Top police officials are optimistic that the two-and-a-half-year-old community policing plan can work, even in East New York and other comparably tough areas like Bushwick, Brooklyn, and Washington Heights in Manhattan.

"I think it's too soon to judge whether the plan is working," said Suzanne Trazoff, deputy police commissioner for public information. "We're about midstream in terms of completing it. When you take officers out of cars and put them on the streets it demystifies and personalizes their jobs. That in itself has to change something. It's going to take longer in tougher neighborhoods like East New York."

In the 75th, 38 community police officers are divided into 26 beats throughout the six-square mile precinct. As they walk their beats, they are expected to create networks of cooperation and information-sharing among residents and solve persistent crime problems. Officers have started green thumb programs, growing cabbage and tomatoes in vacant lots

where crack houses once flourished; coordinated street clean ups and most significantly, reached out to the area's youth in the hopes of changing their attitudes about the police.

But such efforts go only so far in East New York, which often resembles a war zone with its many charred buildings, trash-filled vacant lots and barren streets. With a per capita income of \$8,013, it is one of the city's poorest communities. The 75th Precinct counted 90 murders within its borders last year, second only to the 34th in Washington Heights, and the number is up sharply this year, 71 through June. Overall crime fell 3.1 percent last year but that was far below the 7.8 percent drop for the entire city.

#### Code of Silence Envelops the Street

The rules that govern the everyday existence of the people who live on these streets prohibit them from developing close ties with the police, enveloping them in a code of silence almost as strong as that of the "blue wall" of silence that is said to exist among police officers.

Some residents retreat into homes surrounded by ornate iron bars and buy their aspirin, toothpaste, and hair products from drugstores that are completely enclosed in bullet-proof shields. Tenant patrols or neighborhood watch groups are fragmented, if they exist at all.

"People don't want you to come to their houses because the criminals might think they're giving up information," said Officer Lopez, who works in an area west of Pennsylvania Avenue once labeled the "Dead Zone" because of all of the vacant lots and the frequency of killings there. "They could get hit. So I do a lot of work by phone."

Besides working the phones in a cramped office on the second-floor of the 75th Precinct station house on Sutter Avenue, Officer Lopez and his

partner, Kevin Kenney, spend their days running drug dealers and prostitutes off corners. Also, as they walk their beats, they rely on tips from strangers who walk by rattling off places where drugs can be found. Usually in the exchanges, the officers do not break their stride, avoid eye-contact and discussions.

Recently, on a rainy and humid day, the officers showed a visitor around the Dead Zone, renamed the "Field of Dreams" in a public relations effort to bolster community

pride. It is the hope that one day the lots will be filled with new homes.

The officers strolled past barking dogs, abandoned buildings used by addicts as shooting galleries and life-size murals etched on the sides of buildings in memory of slain drug dealers. The light rain disappeared as it hit the pavement during the walk.

#### Search of Bushes Is Part of the Job

They spoke to Stoney, a known drug user, dealer and pimp, who stood outside an abandoned red-brick building adjacent to a sprawling vacant lot just off Snediker Avenue and New Lots Avenue. The man's apparently jangled nerves made the officers stop and search the bushes behind him.

After a few seconds, they found the booty, a large plastic bag filled with 36 vials of crack cocaine worth almost \$200. The vials were inside smaller heat-sealed plastic bags stamped with the Playboy insignia.

Denying that the drugs belonged to him, Stoney wandered onto Snediker Avenue with a look of disbelief, stopping suddenly at the intersection with his eyes downcast and his forehead leaning into his palms. He stood there for awhile before wandering away. The day before, the officers had found 31 vials of crack cocaine that belonged to him.

"This is what we do," Officer Kenney said. "This is how we make community policing work. It may seem insignificant, but I feel we're making a difference. We don't make an arrest but there's some street justice involved. His boss will want to know what happened to the drugs for two days in a row."

Community policing works better in some parts of East New York than in others. Police Officer William Selock patrols the City Line, about three miles east of the Field of Dreams. Officer Selock feels relatively safe walking his beat, strolling among merchants and residents along Liberty Avenue, a commercial stretch. The City Line is a more stable, working-class area where a mix of white, black and Hispanic people live and shop. Residents have everything to gain by working with the police in this part of the community.

"I had never heard of East New York in my life before I was assigned here," said Officer Selock, 32 years old, who grew up and lives in Nassau

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County on Long Island. "I asked some friends about it and they told me I was going to the worst precinct in the city. They said it was drug infested, a hell hole.

"When you come out and walk around you find there are so many good people here."

## Merchants Recite Personal Crime Stats

Alan Adams, 30, owns the Sneaker Barn at 1139 Liberty Avenue. He says his store has been burglarized twice and he has been robbed six times in the last 18 months.

After the sixth robbery, he tried to rally the support of neighboring merchants to hire four full-time security guards to patrol the block.

"It boiled down to them saying to me, 'You have what they want. It's not our problem,' " he said. So he hired one guard to watch his store at night.

"I don't have a death wish," Mr. Adams said. "I'm making money here just like I would in any other neighborhood, except here you have a few wise guys."

In many parts of East New York, residents feel shunned, saying the politicians come around only at election time and the officers who serve their communities do so with great trepidation.

Many residents say they do not know their community police officer. They talk angrily about how often officers will approach them, especially at night, with their guns drawn; their finger trembling on the trigger. And how they could become the next Rodney King because of a sudden movement on the shadowy streets. But they say they also understand that East New York's violent past makes it hard for officers to behave any other way.

"Believe me the cops around here say .38 first and talk later," said Kevin Folks, a father of three who lives at Florentino Plaza, a housing project at 2215 Pitkin Avenue. "We know they're afraid of us. If they would put more black officers in the neighborhood, the tension would ease. You don't see black cops patrolling Howard Beach or Bensonhurst. Why do they have all of these whites here?"

Mr. Folks, 37, said he would be glad to work with his community police officer in cleaning up his neighborhood. But he rarely sees anyone who regularly patrols his block. And when he does see police officers, they're

there on emergencies.

"It's like they're sending us a message of 'Don't call us until ya'll are out there killing each other,'" Mr. Folks said recently as he stood outside his apartment complex surrounded by more than 20 officers waiting for two teen-age robbery suspects who had holed themselves up inside the building. "They need to patrol this area better, but they're afraid."

A short distance from the Florentino Houses, Gaspar Francis, 15, and his cousin, Dwight Francis, 15, were among of crowd of gawkers who gathered on Miller Avenue between Hegeman and New Lots Avenue after a despondent landlord killed two tenants and then himself after an argument over whether water was being wasted in the apartment. They reflected for a moment on the police officers who patrol their neighborhood.

"The police officers around here, they walk around in the daytime like they're all big and bad," said Gaspar, dressed in baggy jeans and a T-shirt. "It's a different story at night. They act like they're afraid. They can't get to their patrol cars fast enough. When they get to the cars, they drop their keys because they're so nervous."

## Even Police Officers Say They Get Scared

A young officer who regularly patrols the block admitted his fear. He declined to give his name.

"It's a crazy, bad block during the night," he said. "I wouldn't walk around there at night."

Earl Williams, chairman of Community Board 5, which covers East New York, has witnessed police officers being taunted by residents — young and old.

"Sometimes these young officers that they hire come in here with fear written all over their faces," he said. "Young people spot this and the insults begin: 'I dare you to arrest me or to pull your gun on me.' The adults will stand on the roof and throw rocks and bottles at them. I've seen it happen. It's just terrible."

Mr. Williams, unlike Mr. Folks, does not believe that increasing the number of black officers on the precinct's 75 percent white force of 383 officers will improve relations.

"A lot of black officers don't get the respect from the folk in the community," he said. "They look at them as sell-outs. They look down on that. I don't know the solution."

James Saunders, president of the 75th Precinct Council, a civilian advisory panel, lamented that all people ever do is complain about the police but very few of them get involved.

"More residents have to get involved instead of going home and closing themselves off behind burglar bars like they're in prison," said Mr. Saunders. "We have to get involved. The police can't do the job alone. A lot of the problems that we have have nothing to do with policing."

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**THE NEW POLICING: CONFRONTING COMPLEXITY**

Herman Goldstein  
Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law  
University of Wisconsin--Madison

presented at

Conference on Community Policing  
National Institute of Justice  
U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C.  
August 24, 1993

Law School

## Goldstein, The New Policing: Confronting Complexity

Community policing is well on its way to becoming a common term in households throughout the nation. That is a satisfying development for many, but causes some anxiety and discomfort for others. What accounts for the mixed reactions?

Under the rubric of community policing, progressive police administrators and interested citizens have, for more than a decade, been working hard to design and implement a form of policing that better meets the extraordinary demands on the police in the 1990s. Within these circles, the term, community policing, has been used to embrace and intricately web together initiatives that have long been advocated for modern-day policing. I think it fair to say that these explorations have stimulated more productive thought and experimentation than has occurred at any previous time in the history of policing in this country. These efforts, taken together, have created a new feeling of excitement and optimism in a field that has desperately needed an injection of both. It is understandable, therefore, why the current wave of popular support for community policing is so welcome in many quarters. It gives a tremendous impetus to these new initiatives.

The downside of this new-found popularity is that the title of the concept, community policing, is widely used without any concern for its substance. Political leaders and, unfortunately, many police leaders, hook onto the label for the positive images it projects, but do not engage with--or invest in--the concept. Some police personnel, relying on little more than the title, fight initiatives bearing the community policing label because they believe they constitute an effort to placate an overly-demanding and critical segment of the community intent on exercising more control over their operations. The popularity of the term has resulted in its being used to encompass practically all innovations in policing, from the most ambitious to the most mundane; from the most carefully thought-through to the most casual. And in the larger public forum, the label is being used in ways that increase public expectations of the police; that create the impression that, somehow, on implementation, community policing will provide a panacea for not only crime, disorder, and racial tensions, but many of the other acute problems that plague our urban areas.

With such varied meanings and such broad expectations, the use of the term, community policing, creates enormous problems for those seriously interested in effecting meaningful change in the police. Carefully developed initiatives bearing the community policing label, fragile by their very nature, are endangered because superficial programs are so vulnerable to attack.

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One understandable reaction to this dilemma is to press for definition and simplification; to seek to reach agreement on a pure model of community policing so that the impostors, on being measured against it, will be exposed. This pressure for simplification is joined by well-intentioned practitioners who, left behind after the cheerleading, understandably want to know--in specific detail--what they are supposed to do.

I understand the craving for a clear definition of community policing. I empathize with the officer who has instructions from his chief to implement community policing in sixty days. And I feel for those in attendance here who may be expected--by those who have paid your way--to bring home a kit that will enable you to quickly put community policing in place. By the end of the conference, you will have learned much that will be helpful, useful, and even subject to immediate implementation. But at the risk of increasing levels of frustration, I want to argue that the single, most important message you can take away from this conference is that the overriding need in attempting to effect change in policing is to confront the complexity of the task.

We all value communicating about concepts clearly and in simplified terms. But simplification, in my view, has been the greatest enemy of progress in policing. The field already suffers severely precisely because so much in policing is oversimplified. Let me illustrate.

The police labor heavily under the burden of being held responsible for dealing with enormous generic problems such as crime, violence, and disorder. These are simple, convenient terms. But their common and indiscriminate use hides the enormous complexity of the police task. How are the police supposed to deal with these amorphous, overwhelming problems? Through equally generic responses--like law enforcement or patrol-- simple terms commonly used by the public without any awareness of the methods they embrace and their value. If community policing takes its place alongside law enforcement as still another simplistic, generic response to a simplistic characterization of the police function, not much will have been gained and the concept will quickly lose its credibility.

I find it helpful to go back to basics; to acknowledge, at the outset, what is rarely acknowledged. The policing of a free, diverse and vibrant society is an awesome, complex task. The police are called upon to deal with an incredible array of quite different behavioral problems, each perplexing in its own way. The police have tremendous power--to deny freedom and to use force--even to take a life. Individual officers exercise enormous

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discretion in using their authority and in making many decisions affecting our lives. The very quality of life in this country and the equilibrium of our cities depend on the way in which the police function is carried out.

Given the awesome, complex nature of the police function, it follows that designing the arrangements and the organization to carry it out is equally complex. Yet, not enough systematic attention has been given to meeting these needs over the years. We are now in a period, as I noted, in which more such attention is being given to the police function than at any prior time. We ought not to lose patience because we have not yet come up with the perfect model. And we ought not get hung up on trying to simplify change primarily so that we can give uniform meaning to a single, catchy, and politically attractive phrase. We are engaged in nothing less than rethinking, in all of its multiple dimensions, the arrangement for the policing of our society. We ought to use this unique opportunity to move more aggressively to confront the complexity in what we are trying to do. We need to open up explorations, rather than prematurely close them down. We need to better understand the complicated, rather than search for the simple.

Some might argue I've overstated the need; that we can get going without taking on the enormous task of developing a master plan for redesigning policing in this country. I agree that you can get going. Many of you have. And I would urge the others among you to do so. I would exhort you to implement some of the most common changes associated with community policing, as, for example, the permanent assignment of officers to specific beats with a mandate to get to know and relate to the community. I sense there is now widespread and very persuasive support for decentralization, permanent assignments, and the development of "partnerships" with the community. But in implementing these changes, I would urge you to do so with at least an awareness of the larger picture.

Meaningful, lasting change in policing cannot be achieved in isolation. Policing is like a large, intricate, complex apparatus with many parts. Change of any one part requires changes in many others and in the way the parts fit together. For example, you may be able to quickly alter the way in which officers are assigned and how they patrol. But for the full value of such changes to be realized, and for them to be sustained, you will ultimately need to make changes in the organization and leadership of a police department; in its staffing, supervision, training and recruitment; and in its internal working environment. Thus, a change in direction requires more than tinkering; it requires, if it is to be effective, simultaneously orchestrating change in many areas

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affecting the enterprise. This requires careful planning and coordination; and perhaps most important, it requires time, patience, and learning from our experience.

I've painted a rather broad perspective (and a very ambitious, difficult agenda for change), but even this perspective is not sufficiently broad. To succeed in improving policing, we need to move beyond focusing exclusively on the police agency. We need urgently to alter the public's expectations of the police; and we need to revise the fundamental provisions that we as a society make for carrying out the police function. We need, for example, to refine the authority granted the police (to curtail it in some areas and expand it in others). We need to recognize the discretion exercised by the police and provide means for its review and control. We need to provide the police with the resources that enable them to get their job done. We need, in other words, without any compromise in our commitment to democratic values, to bring expectations and capacity more into synch so that a job increasingly labeled as impossible is possible.

Having dumped this rather heavy load on you, let me try to clarify what I mean by the multi-branched nature of change in policing by examining, in some detail, five different branches along which we are currently moving. They are illustrative. I am not, by any means, trying to be comprehensive. I intend to describe the specific development and identify some of the complexities it raises. In the course of doing this, I hope to illustrate the interrelationship and interdependence of the many factors affecting change in policing.

### (1) Refining the police function and public expectations

The new forms of policing broaden the police function from crime fighting, without any abdication of that role, to responding to the broader range of functions in which the police are engaged. Maintaining order, dealing with quality of life offenses, and fixing the "broken windows" are now recognized as much more important than previously thought to be. The police have become more proactive--committed to preventing incidents rather than simply reacting to them. These shifts in emphasis appear to have gained widespread support.

But we need to open our eyes to the avalanche of business that this open-ended definition of the police function invites, lest it constitute a serious self-inflicted wound. The volume and nature of the miscellaneous tasks that accrue to the police are infinite. Current cutbacks in other government services are steadily adding

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to their number. In areas that are starved for social services, the slightest improvement in police response generates more business for the police. Like a flooding river finds the lowlands, the incredible array of miscellaneous problems that surface in a large urban area will find their way to the agency most willing to accept them.

If you have not personally experienced this phenomenon, talk to the officer assigned to a specific neighborhood with a broad mandate to improve service. Within a very short period of time, the officer is overwhelmed by the need for services that--despite the greatest creativity and resourcefulness--far exceeds his or her capacity to deliver.

Very often, the police can do more to satisfy citizen needs. They can identify problems and take actions that result in mitigating or solving them, when they are given the time and license to do so. But in the larger scheme of things, the need to reduce public expectations is every bit as important as the need to broaden the police function--not simply to make limited resources fit the demand, but for more complex reasons. Many of the most troublesome aspects of policing stem from the pressure that has been exerted on the police to appear omnipotent; to do more than they are authorized, trained, and equipped to do. Police tend to like challenges. The challenge to fill needs--to live up to one's image as omnipotent--has led to the taking of short cuts, the stretching of authority, and, as a consequence, the potential for abuse of that authority. It is dysfunctional to compound this syndrome. And it is demoralizing to the thoughtful, dedicated officer to create the expectation that he or she can do more than take the edge off of some of the more intractable problems that the police confront.

The new policing seeks to make the police job more achievable by realigning what the police do and do not do; by giving higher priority to some tasks and lower priority to others; by reducing public expectations and leveling with the public about police capacity; by engaging the public in taking steps to help themselves; and by connecting with other agencies and the private sector so that there is someone there to whom to throw the ball. We need to invest much more, in our individual communities, in working through the questions that arise in trying to achieve this better alignment.

(2) Getting involved in the substance of policing

A common theme in initiatives under the community policing umbrella is the emphasis on improving relationships with the citizenry. Such improvement is vital in order to reduce tensions, develop mutual trust, promote the free exchange of information, and acquaint officers with the culture and life style of those being policed.

Improved relationships are important in and of themselves. They would constitute a major advance in some cities. But many would argue that they merely lay the groundwork and create an environment in which to strive for more. When citizens ask if community policing works, they are not so much interested in knowing if the community likes the police or if the police are getting along with the community. Rather, they usually want to know if the community policing initiative has had an impact on the problems of concern to them--their fear of using the streets, the abandoned cars in the neighborhood, or the gang that has been intimidating them. If the initiatives that have been taken do not go beyond improving relationships, the risk is created that community policing will become just another means by which police operate without having a significant, demonstrable impact on the problems the police are expected to handle.

This tendency in policing to become preoccupied with means over ends is obviously not new. It was this concern that gave rise to my own work on problem-oriented policing. I continue to feel strongly that the police must give more substance to community policing by getting more involved in analyzing and responding to the specific problems citizens bring to their attention.

This calls for a much heavier investment within policing in understanding the varied pieces of their business, just as the medical field invests in understanding different diseases. This means that police, more than anyone else, should have a detailed understanding of such varied problems as homicides involving teenage victims; drive-by shootings; and carjacking; and it means that, at the micro level, a beat officer should have in depth knowledge about the corner drug house; the rowdy teenage gang that assembles at the convenience store each Friday night; and the panhandler who harasses passersby on a given street corner. Analyzing each of these quite different problems in depth leads to the realization that what may work for one will not work for the other; that each may require a different combination of different responses. That is the beginning of wisdom in policing; one size clearly does not fit all.

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Problem-solving, as I have described it, is being integrated into community policing initiatives in many jurisdictions. It dominates the commitment to change in some jurisdictions. The need to focus on specific substantive pieces of police business is commendably reflected in this conference, where workshops have been scheduled on such problems as the homeless, family violence, high risk youth, immigrants, child abuse, the elderly, and school violence.

We need to direct more of the momentum associated with community policing to focusing on these and similar problems. Smarter policing in this country requires a sustained effort within policing to research substantive problems; to make use of the mass of information and data on specific problems accumulated by individual police agencies; to experiment with different alternative responses; to evaluate these efforts; and to share the results of these evaluations with police throughout the country. I wish we could do more to reorient the work of research and development units in police departments; and to entice some of the best minds in the field of criminology and related specialties to assist in these efforts. The police should not only make greater use of research done by others; they should themselves be engaged in research.

### (3) Rethinking the relationship between the police and the criminal justice system

Buried in all of the rhetoric relating to community policing is the fact that, with little notice and in subtle ways, the long-standing relationship between the police and the criminal justice system is being redefined. This is a radical change. But it is given scant attention in the literature on community policing; and the full consequences of the changes--and their relationship to some of the developments most commonly associated with community policing--have not been adequately explored.

Since the 1960s, it has been customary to refer to the police as an integral part of the criminal justice system. It has long been recognized that the role of the police in enforcing the criminal law has an overwhelming, pervasive influence on the police--on the shape of their organizations, the attitudes and priorities of personnel, and their relationship to the community. Police officers are referred to, significantly, as "law enforcement officers." The public expects a police officer, first and foremost, to be committed to enforcing the criminal law. The felt need for objectivity and neutrality in law enforcement results in the police being characterized as having no discretion. And the commitment to enforcement carries with it a commitment on the part of the police

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to inflating their capacity to enforce the law in the hope that their image, if not their real capacity, will reduce crime and disorder to a minimum.

Advanced forms of community policing reject many of these characteristics of present-day policing. A neighborhood police officer, for example, is expected to have a much broader interest than simply enforcing the criminal law; to exhaust a wide range of alternatives before resorting to arrest for minor offenses; to exercise broad discretion; and to depend more on resourcefulness, persuasion, and cajoling than on coercion, image, and bluff.

Reconciling these different perspectives has always been difficult. Some would even argue the two postures are incompatible. Simplistically, they are often distinguished as the "hard" and "soft" approaches in policing. But as a result of a sequence of developments in the past decade, the tension between the two approaches has been narrowed.

What has happened? So long as the police were so intricately intertwined with the criminal justice system, they came to depend more heavily on the system. Thus, as violence and especially crimes associated with drugs increased, the police made more and more arrests of serious offenders. To deal with disorder on the streets, they arrested thousands of minor offenders as well--often stretching their authority somewhat, as police are pressured to do--in order to restore order. Predictably, the criminal justice systems in most large urban areas--and many smaller ones as well--have been overwhelmed--to the point that it is no longer possible for the systems to accept some serious offenders, leave alone minor ones.

The consequences of facing up to the limited capacity of the criminal justice system are more far-reaching than is commonly recognized. Police can no longer use arrest, as they so freely did in the past, to deal with a wide variety of ambiguous situations. Moreover, the amorphous aura of authority on which the police have so heavily depended for getting so much of their job done, rooted in their capacity to arrest, has been greatly diluted. Police officers today are simply not as powerful and threatening, in the eyes of those who most frequently come in contact with them, because they can no longer use the criminal justice system as they once did.

What does this mean for some of the central themes under the community policing umbrella? It means that there are new, pragmatic reasons for searching intensively for alternatives to the criminal justice system as the way in which to get the police job done.

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It also means that there is now an added incentive to cultivate positive relationships with the community. The police need to replace the amorphous authority that they previously derived from the criminal justice system and on which they have depended so heavily in the past. What better way to do this than arm themselves with what Robert Peel characterized in 1829 as that most powerful form of authority, the "public approval of their existence, actions, and behavior." The congested state of affairs in the criminal justice system means, too, that the police must conserve their use of that system for those situations in which it is most appropriate and potentially most effective. This latter need should lead the police and others committed to community policing to enthusiastically join Attorney General Janet Reno in speaking out for a more sensible national criminal justice policy--one that curbs the indiscriminate overuse of the system which, unchecked, will draw scarce funds away from the police and from preventive programs where they can do more good.

### (4) Searching for Alternatives

The diversification of policing--the move from primary dependence on the criminal law to the use of a wide range of different responses--is among the most significant changes under the community policing umbrella. It enables the police to move away from having to "use a hammer (the criminal justice system) to catch a fly"; it enables them to fine tune their responses. It gives them a range of options (or tools) that, in their number and variety, come closer to matching the number and variety of problems they are expected to handle. These may include informal, common sense responses used in the past, but never formally authorized.

The primary and most immediate objective in authorizing the police to use a greater range of alternatives is to achieve greater effectiveness. Quite simply, mediating a dispute, abating a nuisance, or arranging to have some physical barrier removed may--without making an arrest--be the best way to solve a problem.

But there are additional benefits in giving police officers a larger repertoire of responses. Currently, for example, one of the greatest impediments to improvement in policing is the strength of the police subculture. That subculture draws much of its strength from a secret shared among police: that they are compelled to bend the law and take short-cuts in order to get their job done. Providing the police with legitimate, clear-cut means to carry out their functions enables them to operate more honestly and openly, and therefore has the potential for reducing the strength--and, as a consequence, the negative influence of the police subculture.

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The diversification of options is also responsive to one of the many complexities in the staffing of police agencies. It recognizes, forthrightly, the important role of the individual police officer as a decision-maker--a role the officer has always had but that has rarely been acknowledged. Acknowledging and providing alternatives contributes toward redefining the job of a police officer by placing a value on thinking, on creativity, and on decision-making. It credits the officer with having the ability to analyze incidents and problems and, rather than respond as a robot, gives the officer the license to choose from among appropriate responses.

But how do we move into this idyllic world in which we formally invest so much responsibility in the lowest level employee, usually operating independently on the streets? Not quickly, that's for sure. Absent sufficient preparation, the results may be troublesome. This is especially so if officers, in their enthusiasm, blend together community support and their desire to please the community to justify using methods that are either illegal or improper. The empowerment of officers in a department that has a record of abuse or corruption is obviously much more problematic. Concern about control can dampen one's enthusiasm for all new forms of policing--until one recognizes that the controls on which we currently depend are much less effective than they are often thought to be.

The need to assure adequate controls of a more independent decision-maker provides a good illustration of the interconnection between and among needed changes in policing. Satisfying the need requires changes in recruitment standards and training; requires setting out guidance for the exercise of discretion; and requires, above all else, inculcating values in officers that, in the absence of specific directions, guides their decision-making. Meeting these needs, in turn, connect with the fifth and final dimension of change that I want to set before you.

### (5) Changing the working environment in a police agency

If new forms of policing are to take hold, we must get much more serious about changing the working environment within police agencies. Much has been written about new management styles supportive of community policing. But with a few remarkable exceptions, relatively little has been achieved on the ground. And where modest changes have been made, they are often lost with a change in administration, or when the handling of a single incident

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brings embarrassment to a department--resulting in a reversion to old styles of control.

By working environment, I refer primarily to the atmosphere and expectations that superiors set in relating to their subordinates. We know all too well the environment in a tradition-bound department where managers, supported by a hefty book of rules, tend to supervise through a tight pari-military, top-down form of control--perhaps reflecting the way in which they have historically sought to achieve control in the community.

The initiatives associated with community policing cannot survive in a police agency managed in traditional ways. If changes are not made, the agency sets itself up for failure. Officers will not be creative and will not take initiatives if a high value continues to be placed on conformity. They will not be thoughtful if they are required to adhere to regulations that are thoughtless. And they will not aspire to act as mature, responsible adults if their superiors treat them as immature children.

In my observations of officers working in a newly-defined mode, I've constantly been impressed by their enthusiasm--by their grasp of the concept, their appreciation of its many dimensions, and the skill with which they fill their new roles. I've watched officers flourish when they have been cut loose and assigned to a given neighborhood. They solve problems, motivate citizens to join together to do things for themselves, and create a feeling of security and goodwill. Equally important, the officers find their work demanding, but very satisfying. We have, in rank-and-file officers, an enormous supply of talent, energy, and commitment that, under quality leadership, could rapidly transform American policing.

The major impediment to tapping this wellspring is our failure to engage and elicit a commitment from those having management and supervisory responsibilities. It is disheartening to witness a meeting of the senior staff of a police agency in which those in attendance are disconnected and often openly hostile to changes initiated by the chief executive and supported by a substantial proportion of the rank-and file. It is equally disheartening to talk with police officers on the street and officers of lower supervisory rank who cite their superior--rather than the complexity of their job--as their major problem.

Because this problem is of such magnitude and so frustrating, one is tempted to propose some bold--even radical--steps that legislative bodies and municipal chief executives might take to address it. Should early retirement be made more attractive for

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the recalcitrant? Should consideration be given to the proposals recently made in England--calling for the elimination of unnecessary ranks; continued service in rank conditioned on periodic review; and a system of performance-based bonuses?

But before one can expect support for such measures, the public will need to be satisfied that police executives have exhausted whatever means are available to them for turning the situation around. And when one looks at what has been done, it is troubling to find that a department's investment in the reorientation of management and supervisory personnel often consisted of no more than "a day at the academy"--and sometimes, not even that. How much of the frustration in eliciting support from management and supervision stems from the fact that agencies have simply not invested enough in engaging senior officers, in explaining why change is necessary, and in giving these supervisors and managers the freedom required for them to act in their new role.

Some efforts to deal with the problem have been encouraging. The adoption of total quality management in policing has demonstrated very positive results and holds much promise. It ought to be encouraged. We should take an important lesson away from these experiences with TQM. Training to support changes of the magnitude now advocated in policing requires more than a one-shot effort consisting of a few classroom lectures. It requires a substantial commitment of time in different settings spread over a long period; a special curriculum; the best facilitators; and the development of problems, case studies, and exercises that engage the participants. It requires the development of teamwork, in which subordinates contribute as much as superiors. And it requires that the major dimension of the training take the form of conscious change in the day-to-day interaction of personnel--not in a training setting--but on the job. That's admittedly a tall order.

### Conclusion

I have described five different dimensions of change associated with community policing. I've tried, in doing so, to illustrate the need for greater depth in our current change efforts; to illustrate the interrelationships and interdependence of the many pieces in the puzzle; and to illustrate, overall, the complexity of bringing a new configuration of policing into being.

Dwelling on complexity is risky, for it can be overwhelming and intimidating. It is difficult. It turns many people off. But for those who get involved, the results can be very rewarding.

## Goldstein, The New Policing: Confronting Complexity

I've been impressed by the extraordinary accomplishments in policing in the past two decades; by police agencies that have taken on some of these difficult tasks. We tend, in my opinion, to underestimate the reservoir of ability and commitment in police agencies--especially among rank and file officers. And we tend, also, to underestimate the willingness of individual citizens and community groups at the grass roots level to engage with the police and to support change. Viewed collectively, these achievements should be a source of optimism and confidence as now, building on past progress and capitalizing on current momentum, we seek more aggressively to effect change that is deeper and more lasting.

But there is an even more compelling, overriding incentive to struggle with these complexities. This country--this democracy of ours--is being challenged today, as it has never been challenged in the past, to commit ourselves anew to our unique character--to the high value we as a nation place on diversity, on equality, on protecting individual rights, and on protecting the freedom of all citizens to move about freely and to enjoy a tranquil life. The social problems that threaten our character as a nation are increasing--not decreasing. It will take major changes--apart from those in the police--to reduce these problems. In this turbulent period, as we struggle with these problems, it is more important than ever that we have a police capacity that is sensitive, effective, and responsive to our unique needs--a police capacity that, above all else, is committed to protecting and extending democratic values. That is a high calling--and one that should inspire all of us to intensify our efforts.

## **FIGHTING FEAR THE BALTIMORE COUNTY C.O.P.E. PROJECT**

**Philip B. Taft, Jr.**

The following article was commissioned by the Police Executive Research Forum, with funds provided by the Florence V. Burden Foundation. It was written by Philip Taft, former contributing editor with Police Magazine and now a writer who specializes in criminal justice issues. The Forum and the Baltimore County Police Department contributed suggestions during the final stages of preparation. But the content, conclusions, and language are entirely Mr. Taft's.

**with an Afterword by**

**Professor Egon Bittner  
Brandeis University**

**February 1986**

**This report was made possible by a grant from the  
Florence V. Burden Foundation.**

## Foreword

How do we improve policing? For as long as I can remember, the answer has been to "make the police more professional." The improvement-minded police manager has been implored to raise recruitment standards; to hold individuals and units strictly accountable for their activities; to develop program budget systems and to manage-by-objectives; to provide officers with better training and a college education. All of these are vitally important. But they are just part of the picture, because they all focus only on the **means** of policing—the administrative procedures needed to get things done. Only rarely have police managers been urged to focus on the **ends**, or ultimate goals of policing: making local communities safer and better places in which to live. Indeed, with frightening regularity, we in the police business have been told that crime and fear are beyond our control.

At the same time, some observers have criticized the police for not being closely attuned to the needs of the community. Patrol officers throughout the country have been characterized as "lone rangers," riding in their air conditioned vehicles, unwilling to talk with residents of the neighborhoods they patrol unless summoned to an emergency. This has never been true, but the criticism hits home nonetheless: if we are to fulfill our goal of making citizens safer, we must work more closely with the community.

In Baltimore County, we have responded to these two challenges by trying something totally new to policing. We call it COPE—Community Oriented Police Enforcement. The COPE units answer the "means over ends" challenge by making police officers real "intrapreneurs"—giving them wide latitude to go beyond the well-trod path of standard procedures, and to try innovative approaches they think will work. And COPE is community policing to the core. COPE officers survey the community, and work with neighborhood organizations, local businesses, and local government agencies, to understand and solve each community's problem, on the community's own terms. COPE officers recognize that every neighborhood has different problems that stem from different causes—and they tailor their responses accordingly.

The results have been exceptional. COPE teams have substantially reduced fear of crime among residents of the communities they served. Residents are more satisfied with their communities,

with the police, and with their local government in general. And, perhaps best of all, the three COPE units' activities have driven serious crime and calls for police service down by 10 percent or more in the neighborhoods they have served.

Don't get the idea that COPE emerged in its present form right away. Far from it: COPE has come a long way from our original conception. When we introduced the concept in 1981, no one knew much about fear of crime; most efforts at community policing amounted to no more than public relations. As a result, we had no model to follow. We had to learn by doing, taking up new ideas and discarding or refining old ones as we went. The freedom to make mistakes, and the time to learn from them, were vital to the success of COPE.

This freedom and the learning that resulted may in fact be the most valuable lessons of the COPE experience. Too often police administrators, stimulated by political necessity or the demands of the budget cycle, look only for immediate successes. State or Federal funding usually lasts for two years or less; sometimes it seems that the public's attention can be held for only a few days. But the kinds of innovations needed in policing often take longer to mature. Police managers must be ready to take risks, to sacrifice short-term gains in favor of long-term gains. It seems fitting that the COPE unit's "intrapreneurial police officer" would never have had a chance without the efforts of our department's intrapreneurial police managers.

The COPE approach is still maturing, but there is no need to wait for the perfect program. For police managers interested in implementing the COPE approach in their departments, my staff has prepared a companion volume—a hands-on, prescriptive package. This package includes forms, standard operating procedures, and detailed case studies; it is also available from the Police Executive Research Forum. For those interested in formal evaluations of COPE's success, an evaluation report is also available.

COPE's problem-solving, community-oriented approach gives us a better understanding of how to reduce fear, and a better handle on crime and calls for service. I believe COPE is one of the missing pieces in the police improvement puzzle, and I think you will believe it, too.

Cornelius J. Behan  
Chief of Police  
Baltimore County, Maryland

**PATRICIA GARY WAS SCARED:** Teenage gangs had taken over the streets of Garden Village—a quiet, blue-collar community of inexpensive town houses on the fringes of Baltimore—and her home was under siege.

Her screens had been slashed by would-be burglars. Youths brazenly fenced stolen goods and sold drugs in front of her home. Then a boy was stabbed in the alley behind her house, and another youth was shot in her own back yard. "It got so bad, no one bothered calling the police anymore," she said.

No matter. Officers in the local precinct had already written off "Garbage Village," as they called it. In fact, most other Baltimore County public agencies had also abandoned the area: potholes scarred the roadways, street lights stood bent and broken, and a small neighborhood park had become a field of broken glass and weeds, visible signs of government's neglect.

Angered by what they saw, Brandt Bradford and Guy Johnson decided to get involved.

Mingling among the teenagers, who accepted the easygoing pair, the men helped police identify and arrest a half-dozen gang ringleaders. That cooled down crime a bit. Then, they helped adults form the Garden Village Improvement Association, personally hand-carrying the registration papers to the library for filing. "We thought they should band together," said Johnson. "They'd lived this way so long, they were actually getting used to it."

Their work didn't end there. The pair contrived ways to convince the county to patch up the potholes and fix the streetlights. They figured out how to apply for federal Housing and Urban Development funds to help clean up the neighborhood. They even persuaded the manager of the Garden Village complex to trim back hedges around windows and install deadbolt locks on the doors, two measures that would foil potential burglars.

After a few months, Garden Village looked and felt safer: The streets were smooth, the lights burned bright. But hundreds of teenagers still crowded those streets at night. Bradford and Johnson knew that, as long as that continued, the neighborhood could erupt again. "There was only one solution," said Bradford. "We had to give the kids somewhere to go."

It took over eighteen months but, working through the department, Bradford and Johnson finally convinced the county's recreation and parks agency to invest \$32,000 in the rubble-strewn park. Now, the same kids who once jammed Garden Village's streets late

at night are racing up and down the park's four new basketball courts, playing fast games of pickup. The crime rate has dropped, and Patricia Gary, now president of the Garden Village Improvement Association, feels safe again. "The community is peaceful now," she says. "And it's all because of those two guys. They're not like any police officers I know."



They certainly aren't. Bradford and Johnson are members of the Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) unit, a bold attempt at a new method of policing being carried out by the Baltimore County Police Department. Begun in 1982 in the wake of a pair of sensational murders, the COPE unit was originally created by the department's progressive chief as a radical attempt to fight citizen fear in the heavily suburbanized jurisdiction of 665,000 residents that surrounds the City of Baltimore. But that mission soon evolved into an even bolder experiment: COPE began fighting fear by addressing the social problems that caused it.

As a result, the 45 officers that make up the three COPE units have become a unique breed of police officer, skilled not only in traditional police tactics but in social research, community organizing and problem-solving. "I go to meetings with other commanding officers talking about infrastructure and demographic makeup

and they say, 'What the hell—we've got a bunch of damn social workers here,'" says Lt. Veto Mentzell, commander of one of the three area COPE units. "And frankly, that's what we are."

Not surprisingly, COPE has created a stir within the Baltimore County department which, though more progressive than most police departments, still depends heavily on traditional methods of policing. Though the unit is gaining acceptance, it is slow. Many officers still consider COPE window dressing, a public relations ploy that has nothing to do with "real policing." Yet COPE may be closer to "real policing" than patrol itself—and more successful as well. "For years people have called the police for any service they want, and the traditional police response has been to send a car and solve that problem, whether it satisfied the community or not," says Lt. Fred Kestler, commander of the eastern patrol area COPE unit. "COPE's response makes much more sense: We're solving problems from the community perspective, not from the police perspective."

COPE is small and still developing. Yet in three short years, the tiny unit has raised some important questions about the efficacy of traditional forms of policing in America and suggested that, in the police force of the future, problem-solving and community organizing may significantly alter the form of routine patrol, as the "backbone of police work." "Community policing, team policing, foot patrol, directed patrol—all those labels are falling by the wayside," says Gary Hayes, executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a Washington-based national professional association of chiefs from large city, county and state departments. "Something much bigger and much more cohesive is emerging with COPE."

## TEN YEARS AGO, THE BALTIMORE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

was virtually indistinguishable from any other large force in the country. "If you didn't bust heads or lock them up, you called social services," recalls one veteran officer. But that all began to change in 1977 with the appointment of a new chief, Cornelius J. Behan. A tough administrator with a reputation for solving problems, Behan had spent 31 years with the New York City Police Department at such posts as chief of Brooklyn South.

head of the planning division and chief of all patrol forces in the city.

Almost immediately, Behan began to overhaul the Baltimore County department, ordering a management audit, reorganizing the agency into four bureaus (including crime prevention), and creating a number of new units to handle specialized assignments. Behan also decentralized the decisionmaking process, sending power down through the ranks of the 1,400 sworn officers, increasing the responsibilities of sergeants and patrol officers as well as captains and lieutenants. "The chief would say, 'Don't give me your problems—give me your solutions,'" recalls Major Phil Huber, commander of the planning and budget division and an early influential force in the development of COPE. "We knew this guy was a risk taker from the start."

Then came the summer of 1981. On August 10, a 22-year old man was shot six times and killed as he opened his family's sporting goods store in a shopping mall in Reisterstown. Five days later and ten miles away in Catonsville, a 61-year-old retiree riding his motor scooter was gunned down and killed, apparently without motive, by two men passing by in a stolen car. The crimes sent shock waves through the county: Though it bordered Baltimore, residents had rarely witnessed such violent crimes.

Neighbors formed vigilante patrols, and relatives of the slain men spearheaded victims' rights groups. Crime dominated the headlines, eventually becoming a volatile political issue. With fear reaching a fever pitch, the county executive and council authorized the addition of 45 new police officers to the force. But rather than assign them to routine patrol, where their impact would be absorbed and diluted, Behan decided to do something radical: Form a patrol to fight fear.

Why fear? Behan knew that crime and fear of crime were two separate and often unrelated phenomena. Crime studies had repeatedly shown that fear of crime could be ignited by the occurrence of either a genuine crime or any number of non-criminal events—the presence of rowdy youths on a street corner, or the physical deterioration of the neighborhood—even though the actual crime rate in the community remained low. Behan reasoned that such a "fear force" would help restore tranquility to the county.

The chief appointed a "project team"—a group of commanding officers with varied and complementary skills—to design and oversee the new patrol's development. After several meetings, the team unveiled a force consisting of three units of 15 officers (one unit in

each of the county's three patrol areas: east, west and central) who would move about on motorcycles. That vehicle, the project team reasoned, would both distinguish these special officers from regular patrol and enable them to have more direct contact with citizens by eliminating the psychological barrier created by police cruisers. These "Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement" officers would engage in intensive patrol, develop close contacts with citizens, conduct "fear surveys" (door-to-door canvassing to identify concerns) and use any means within their power to quell fear.

From the start, it was made clear what COPE officers could not do: To preserve time for their special mission, they were exempted from performing any traffic enforcement duties, responding to routine calls for service, or filling in for regular patrol; those assignments were to be handled by regular patrol officers, the project team said. Just what COPE officers could do, however, was never really made clear—a situation born not of bureaucratic confusion, but out of attempts to innovate. "We had no model for all this," recalls Kai Martensen, management assistant to Behan. "We were flying by the seat of our pants."

Rather than force COPE into a particular form and risk its failure, the project team decided to let the program evolve naturally, making course corrections as necessary. Typical of his management style, Behan exerted little pressure on his subordinates, preferring instead to let dialogue and inquiry shape the form of COPE. "The chief kept asking, 'Is this what we really want to use COPE for? What does this have to do with fear?'" recalls Martensen. "He tried to keep it on track."

What resulted was, for the police world, an extraordinary forum in which senior police officials could challenge the basic assumptions of police work without fear of retribution. "Even though we raised important questions, no one came down on us and said, 'Just what are you doing here?'" says Capt. (then lieutenant) Kenneth Krouse, an original member of the project team. "We asked questions about what was traditional and non-traditional policing. We had a free hand. We were truly experimenting."

"But," he adds, "there was nowhere to turn to see if what we were doing was right."

Indeed, COPE's leadership had few roadmaps to guide them: American police possessed little knowledge of or experience in combatting fear. Only a few limited experiments had taken place. The National Institute of Justice, for instance, had sponsored an

innovative program in Hartford in the 1970s. HUD had conducted crime and fear prevention experiments in federal housing projects in the early 1980s.

For the most part, however, as Huber correctly observed, "fear was something police just hadn't dealt with. When a woman was raped, we dealt with the woman, not the community. When a house was broken into, we dealt with the victim, not the community. We were experimenting with this one."

Problems began to surface as soon as the experiment left the drawing board. Line officers gave a cool reception to the new "fear force:" in one patrol area, there weren't enough applicants to fill 15 positions. Area majors (to whom COPE supervisors would report) nominated lieutenants and sergeants who reflected their own style of policing. "They basically cloned themselves," says Huber. "Conservatives picked conservatives, progressives picked progressives."

Training presented more difficulties. Literature on fear was nonexistent; as a result, COPE candidates spent five weeks learning how to ride motorcycles and only one week learning how to fight fear. Aside from being urged to "stop, walk and talk" on their rounds, COPE candidates were given little else in the way of direction.

"The question in the classroom was always, 'What the hell are we supposed to be doing?'" recalls Martensen. "It all went right over their heads. They were still thinking in traditional police terms." At times, however, so was the project team: "In all honesty, we knew we had a mission to accomplish, but we didn't know just how we were going to do it," says Huber. Determined to try something new, Baltimore County's Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement program was unveiled in July 1982 amidst a flurry of press attention.

Despite the absence of detailed strategies, a few COPE units experienced some early successes. When a body found in one neighborhood was discovered to have been murdered elsewhere, COPE officers went door-to-door to inform anxious residents that it had only been "dumped." A few officers demonstrated the ability to think creatively. When violence threatened to flare up between two groups of black and white students that used adjacent bus stops, COPE officers persuaded the County Board of Education to move one stop to a new location, defusing the trouble.

COPE quickly won the affection of both the press and the public. Articles and television pieces hailed the return of the accessi-

ble cop; letters from citizens praised the new experimental program. "COPE officers were sincerely concerned and willing to help," wrote one woman. Another claimed she felt "at ease and safe" with officers on motorcycles.



But as time passed, the success stories were outnumbered by the dozens of other stories in which COPE had little or no effect at all. To the project team's dismay, officers responded in most situations using directed patrol or holding crime prevention meetings—hardly the creative responses it had hoped for. Some COPE officers complained of boredom; others disliked conducting surveys. ("They were like Fuller Brush salesmen," remembers Huber. "They were very uncomfortable with having doors slammed in their face.")

Most, however, became frustrated by what they perceived to be the severe limitations on traditional tactics being imposed from on high. For example, one officer proposed using bicycles to arrest an elusive group of vandals, but his plan was roundly criticized because it involved arrests. "What you had," remembers Sgt. Ernie Bures of the central COPE unit, "were traditional police officers who felt they weren't allowed to be police officers anymore. We were burning out the unit."

Within six months, the project team was running out of ways to encourage innovation. "We were in a lull, becoming stagnant," recalled one senior officer. "In polite terms, we were experiencing growing pains." On the street, line officers were openly questioning the wisdom of the unit's mission. "A lot of guys were saying, 'If we don't do anything, then why are we out here?'" recalled one.

The project team began searching for ways to inject COPE with new vitality. PERF's Hayes, who had been helping COPE develop its "fear surveys," immediately got involved. "It was clear to me that COPE had great potential," he recalled. "But it was also clear, both to me and to COPE leadership, that the project wasn't going anywhere. They were using traditional solutions that just weren't solving any of the problems. It seemed to me like an ideal time to bring in Herman Goldstein."

Goldstein, formerly Hayes' teacher and a professor of law at the University of Wisconsin Law School, was a leading authority on American police. In 1979, he had published a scholarly article in *Crime and Delinquency* that argued that police had become fixated on organizational matters—personnel, hardware, management procedures and the like—at the expense of producing results that solved community problems. Goldstein wrote that if police are to "mature as a profession," they had to "concern themselves more directly with the end product of their efforts."

Goldstein proposed a "problem-oriented" approach to policing. Using this method, police would employ rational inquiry when confronted with problems. Instead of habitually turning to the traditional solutions of investigation and arrest, police would treat each problem as unique. They would study it carefully, define it precisely, research it thoroughly and then conduct a "fresh, uninhibited search . . . for alternative responses that might be an improvement over what is currently being done."

For example, if a senior citizen high-rise community complained of noisy bands of juveniles, research might reveal a more complex problem: a nearby recreational area changing its hours, and teenagers collecting on the grounds of the high rise where elderly residents played chess. Instead of simply chasing the juveniles off the grounds or arresting them for trespassing, police might negotiate with the parks department to re-open the park, or begin a dialogue between the two groups. Under this approach, Goldstein argued, "the problem itself will be defined and understood, the commitment to past approaches. . . will be shelved temporarily."

ly, and the search [for solutions] will be much broader, extending well beyond. . .the police."

Despite its simplicity, Goldstein's method represented a revolutionary and controversial approach to policing. COPE's project team saw in the problem-solving approach the direction their struggling program needed. "We met with Herman and fell in love with the idea," recalls Huber. "We knew it would be risky, but we decided to give it a try."

Goldstein's theory was originally intended to apply only to management-level staff. Using the problem-solving approach, Goldstein argued, police managers could develop the capacity to analyze how well their department was responding to community-wide problems such as drunk driving, sexual assault and shoplifting. Behan and Huber, however, believed the problem-solving approach could be applied much closer to the street. "If a teenage kid can break into the Strategic Air Command tinkering with a computer for a few weeks, who knows what a street cop could do with time to hack around with a community problem?" says Huber.

During the spring and summer of 1983, COPE's strategy was retooled to incorporate Goldstein's problem-solving approach. Fear problems encountered by officers were to be exhaustively researched, using surveys and other information-gathering techniques. Solutions to those problems would then be "brainstormed" with other officers. Officers assigned to each project would then write a detailed "action plan" that would diagnose the fear-causing problem and describe their proposed solutions. Public and private agencies were to be engaged to help. In fact, COPE officers were to use any legal means necessary—including, on Goldstein's recommendation, even traditional police tactics—to solve the community's fear problem. "We kept saying, 'We don't care what you think the problem is, we care what the community thinks the problem is,'" says Huber. "We kept pounding that into them."

COPE's line officers responded to their new orders with a mixture of disbelief and delight. "Suddenly, we were being asked to solve all the problems of the world," recalled one. "It was a totally new approach to policing, and it blew a lot of guys' minds." But Ernie Bures remembers most officers feeling "relief. We had become so frustrated that we needed a light at the end of the tunnel—and this was our light. It opened everything up for us."

That same summer, Bradford and Johnson, members of the central COPE unit, were called into Garden Village. Precinct pa-

trol officers had warned the pair to expect trouble: The community hated police, they said. "The first thing I thought was, 'Well, we're going to have to crack down here,'" said Bradford. "But it wasn't too long into the fear surveys that Johnson and I realized that these parents were really concerned about their kids. They didn't focus on the crime so much as on the lack of recreational facilities for their kids."

The two officers spent weeks collecting research on the neighborhood, performing community surveys, compiling crime statistics, photographing signs of deterioration, even measuring distances to nearby playgrounds and stepping off their dimensions. Those tasks completed, they then brainstormed solutions with fellow officers and set about methodically implementing each one.



Using statistics to show that most Garden Village crime occurred after dark, the pair convinced Baltimore Gas and Electric to repair the broken street lights. Using photographs of potholes and cracked pavement, they persuaded the county roads department to patch up Garden Village's alleyways. Using the dimensions of other basketball courts and playgrounds, they badgered county park and recreation officials until a dormant rehabilitation and construction project was approved for a local park. "Those guys

got the county to move on it," confessed one official with that department. "They should feel on cloud nine because of what they did."

Garden Village was the department's first visible proof that the problem-solving approach could work. "That was the project that made us say, 'By God, I think they got it,'" remembers Huber. "The other units began looking at Garden Village and seeing how risks could be taken and normally crazy ideas could be taken very seriously. Other people started saying, 'Damn, let's try it.'"

Later that summer, COPE's western unit was called in to a neighborhood where a 69-year-old woman had been brutally beaten during a burglary in her home in Krone Drive. Though the woman could identify her attacker—a teenager who had robbed her once before—she refused to press charges. Instead, she moved away—"the ultimate response to fear," as Martensen called it.

COPE officers organized a community meeting and quickly discovered the attack was only the tip of the iceberg. Residents had been suffering a rash of burglaries and acts of vandalism, and they blamed teenagers from a nearby apartment complex who had found their way onto Krone Drive through a hole in a fence that separated the two communities. Residents claimed they had reported these facts to the local precinct but had received no help. "They really let the police have it," remembers western COPE Off. Rose Miller, who was assigned to the area.

As Bradford and Johnson had done in Garden Village, Miller and her partner, Pat Hammond, first concentrated on solving the problems with the environment. They got the department of highways to repair broken street signs and persuaded the managers of the apartment complex to install a high-intensity mercury vapor light that illuminated the area where the teenagers had broken through. The fence was eventually fixed. Then, to satisfy the community's hunger for justice, Miller twice drove 40 miles to the victim's new home in another jurisdiction, convincing her to press charges against her attacker and promising to provide vans for neighborhood supporters when her case went to trial.

In traditional police terms, the project ended in failure: The case against the teenager was ultimately dropped by the district attorney's office. But in COPE terms, it was a success: According to later survey statistics, fear had dropped, reported crimes had plummeted, residents felt safer, and the image of the police improved.

The "Krone Drive Project" became the western COPE unit's

Garden Village—the first substantive proof that the problem-solving technique could work. "That was the first time we had looked at anything from a problem-solving perspective," says Off. Don Thompson. "It broke the ice. From that point on, we became more innovative in our approach."

By the beginning of 1984, officers in both the central and western COPE units had institutionalized the problem-solving approach and acquired a new attitude toward their work. Brainstorming sessions became longer and more spirited. "We would do action plans on a blackboard and argue about them for two days," says Off. Sam Hannigan of the central COPE unit. "We felt like we were in one of those self-improvement courses where they wouldn't let you go to the bathroom." Action plans grew thicker and more detailed. Officers grew more savvy in their negotiations with other agencies. "It got to the point where we came to expect the runaround," said Off. Blair Melvin of the central COPE unit. "We learned real quick to say, 'Let me speak with your supervisor.'"

Most important, the two units were building an enthusiasm and *esprit de corps* that had been sorely lacking that first difficult year. Officers who had known only the frustrations of traditional patrol began feeling the satisfaction of seeing problems they had worked on get resolved. "When you get ready to send a report up, you ask yourself, 'Is the community better off than when we started?'" said one officer in the western unit. "If you can say yes to that—if you can see that the lights are better and there are places for kids to play—well, that's a terrific feeling of satisfaction."

It was only in the eastern COPE unit, which served the blue-collar Eastern Shore area, where progress had been slow. Residents there were simply reluctant to confess fear to a police officer taking a survey. "You go and knock on some ironworker's door and ask him if he's fearful, and he won't admit it," says Ernie Bures, who was transferred to the unit to help them develop their problem-solving techniques. "He'd probably say, 'No—I'm just concerned.'" But in April 1984, that unit was presented with its first significant opportunity to test the problem-solving approach.

For 20 years, vagrants had inhabited Dundalk, a small working class community on the fringes of Baltimore. Now, Chamber of Commerce officials told the COPE unit, those vagrants were becoming dangerous, accosting local shoppers for money to buy liquor. COPE officers Rick Fox and Fred Grupp performed plain-clothes surveillance and assisted the local precinct with 19 arrests.

The panhandling tapered off. "But we knew that was only a temporary solution," recalled Fox. "That's when we went non-traditional. We asked ourselves, 'Okay—what is it about traditional policing that hasn't solved this problem?'"

The officers convinced the county to trim shrubs and add lights in the park where panhandlers loitered. They helped the Chamber distribute 15,000 copies of a "Stop Panhandling" flyer, an idea they had borrowed from the Madison, Wisconsin, Police Department, and visited liquor store owners to remind them that selling liquor to intoxicated persons is illegal. They researched panhandling laws from different cities and drafted a new version for Baltimore County, one that would make such aggressive panhandling a criminal offense.



But Fox and Grupp knew that even stiffer jail sentences would not prevent the vagrants from returning. So they turned their attention to a more radical solution: establishing Baltimore County's first detoxification and rehabilitation facility.

The officers interviewed officials from six area hospitals, the Salvation Army, the state welfare office and the attorney general's office. They even interviewed the vagrants themselves to determine if they would use such a facility. They performed cost analyses of

emergency services to vagrants and reviewed laws relating to drunkenness and vagrancy. "A couple of times we looked at each other and said, 'Can you believe we're doing this?'" laughed Fox. "But we decided something had to be done, and we would be the ones to get the ball rolling."

In August 1984, Fox and Grupp formally presented their findings through the department to the county executive, requesting a task force to study the feasibility of the facility. That request was granted. As of this writing, Baltimore County's "task force on the homeless"—a panel made up of representatives from various public agencies and, of course, Fox and Grupp—is still examining the issue. "You have to give the police department credit," says the task force's director, Constance Caplan, criminal justice coordinator for Baltimore County. "They understand the community perspective, they come prepared, and they are flexible and willing to learn."


"But you also have to give Fox and Grupp credit: They were the ones who got the whole thing going."

With the success of the Dundalk vagrant project, the principles of problem-solving had finally spread to all three units—and COPE officers had become fully convinced of the value of their approach. "We got almost everything we asked for," says Fox. "We changed the environment. We changed public attitudes. We verified the need for a detoxification facility. We asked for a task force and got it."

"COPE works."

**COPE NOW ENJOYS WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT** throughout Baltimore County. Newspaper and television coverage has been positive—even the skeptical **Baltimore Sun** ran a front-page piece on Garden Village—while county politicians, once doubtful of COPE's real value, now endorse the program. "I was wrong and I admit it," Councilman Ronald B. Hickernell told the **Towson Times**. "COPE has worked out particularly well, and I am very impressed." The program is attracting the growing attention of individuals and organizations interested in police reform, as well. In 1983, COPE received the Maryland Governor's Award for outstanding work in crime prevention, while in 1984 it won a National Association of Counties Government Achievement Award.

COPE has also passed its first statistical test with flying colors. In a study completed in 1985, Gary Cordner, Chief of the St. Michaels (Maryland) Police Department and former professor at the University of Baltimore, found that the program did, in fact, reduce fear of crime by ten percent in target neighborhoods. (While parts of the analysis may have been conducted in a less than scientific fashion—COPE officers themselves performed many of the surveys, a condition that no doubt affected some responses—Cordner called his results "reliable.") Cordner's study also suggested that COPE had other effects: calls for service decreased, citizens reported greater satisfaction with—and awareness of—police, and COPE officers expressed a better attitude toward their work (see chart).



Oddly enough, it is only within its own department that COPE has encountered substantial resistance. The units have yet to overcome "patrol's jaundiced eye", as Huber calls it. "They look askance at COPE," he says. "Our image with them is not as bad as it was, but it could be better."

That can be blamed in part on the almost paranoiac fear of change that pervades every police department. "Even after three years they still feel COPE doesn't do much," said one patrol officer, a COPE supporter. "And even if you show them, they still say,

'So what?' The biggest fear among cops is change." Envy is also a factor: Often riding motorcycles and wearing leather jackets, COPE officers are considered "glory boys" by their counterparts on patrol.

But patrol's opposition to COPE springs from a deeper source. To many of the regular patrol officers in Baltimore County, COPE is nothing more than a showcase unit that has little to do with the real world of policing. "I don't need an action plan to handle a 'B and E,'" grumbled one regular patrol officer. "I just do my job." Fred Grupp summarizes the attitude best: "To patrol, we're not real cops," he says. "They do the 'real police work.' COPE doesn't."

Ironically, there is a growing consensus among police theorists that the reverse may well be true. As originally envisioned by the architects of London's Metropolitan Police—acknowledged to be the first modern police department—and by early American police leaders, a police officer's job was primarily crime prevention and social maintenance, not crime detection. Police were to serve as local marshals who actively maintained order by interacting with the neighborhoods they served.

In the early part of this century, the beat cop—the friendly watchman who kept an eye on strangers, checked locks on shops at night, and shooed troublemaking kids from streetcorners—almost perfectly personified that role. It wasn't until the 1960s, when the radio patrol car had become the symbol of law-and-order and riots were erupting in the inner cities, that the mission of police was understood to be a fundamentally reactive one of detecting and fighting crime.

That mission, however, is now increasingly being questioned. In 1974, extensive patrol experiments in Kansas City cast doubt on the efficacy of motorized patrol. Later foot patrol experiments in Newark (1981), conducted by the Police Foundation, a Washington-based police research organization, and in Flint, Michigan (1979), conducted by Michigan State University, revealed that citizens felt safer with foot patrol officers, but their presence had little bearing on the incidence of crime.

The success of COPE contributes two significant new insights to the ongoing debate over patrol. At its most basic level, COPE suggests that modern police have drifted far afield from their original mission of crime prevention and social maintenance. "Is the police mission so narrow as to be only apprehending criminals?" asks Captain Richard Hauf, Commander of the Baltimore County Police

Department's Project Management Section and an early influential force in the development of COPE. "No. It's a broader mission than that: We are peacekeepers, not simply crime fighters. If you believe in that mission, then COPE is a very important development."

More importantly, the success of COPE suggests that modern police can play an even more active role than their historical counterparts—that in today's complex society police can, if they so choose, become active agents of change by identifying social problems and bringing to bear public and private resources to solve them. "We're going way beyond crime prevention in COPE," says Veto Mentzell. "We're ombudsmen for the community."

Such an aggressive approach to police work has enormous implications for the field. It portends far more than a simple change in patrol strategy: It implies a wholesale philosophical shift within police organizations. "As soon as you comprehend what COPE is doing, you quickly realize that it affects recruitment, training, organizational structure and command leadership," says Hayes. "The COPE approach impacts everything in the organization." But perhaps its greatest effect is on the amount of power and responsibility that is vested in the individual officer.

In traditional police structures, the talents and skills of officers are subjugated in the interests of organizational efficiency. By contrast, the problem-solving approach encourages the imagination, resourcefulness and intelligence of each officer. "Educated, intelligent officers have been terribly frustrated because most police agencies, despite claims to the contrary, are designed so that the officer is expected to function as a non-thinking robot," says Goldstein. "With COPE, we've discovered how the thinking police officer can contribute directly to improving the quality of police services."

COPE's approach exploits the enormous amount of practical experience most officers possess. Rich Fox, for instance, called on seven years' patrol experience in Dundalk to help identify and record the behavior of vagrants there; in Garden Village, Brandt Bradford applied the crime prevention skills that won him a governor's award for outstanding achievement years before. "Officers aren't credited with knowing as much as they do about human behavior and problems," says Goldstein. "But COPE has proven that police as a first line of government have an enormous amount of insight and experience that can be used to solve problems."

Likewise, COPE exploits the intelligence and initiative of police officers. When the county balked at fixing Garden Village's street lights, Bradford and Johnson produced statistics showing that 65 percent of the area's burglaries had occurred at night; the lights were fixed. In Dundalk, Fox and Grupp spent three days combing ambulance records to add up the high cost of sending emergency services to drunken vagrants. "Police are thinking, hard working people—they're just bored," insists Huber. "We don't challenge them enough. We don't make sufficient demands on them. COPE has shown that when you make realistic, healthy demands on police officers, they will come through."

That "thinking police officer" is reminiscent of the kind of officer police as a profession sought in the 1970s, when college education was touted as the key to improving the field. But that movement fizzled and died, in part because that "thinking police officer" could not survive in the rigid, militaristic atmosphere of police agencies. "When you think of the kinds of problems police deal with, they have to be flexible and capable of responding in a number of different ways," argues Goldstein. "A rigid military structure—where the emphasis is on conformity and not questioning the status quo—is about the opposite of what we want to achieve."

COPE minimizes that military rigidity and allows officers to conduct their business in an atmosphere more conducive to professionals. While their time and progress must be strictly accounted for—Huber, in fact, calls COPE "one of the most structured units in the department"—officers are free to manage their own time. "If you're on patrol and you get a 10-19 [officer return to station] the first thing that pops into your head is, 'Uh-oh, what the hell did I do now? The lieutenant is going to chew me out,'" says Off. Richard Moore of the eastern COPE unit. "Here, no one would ever react that way." Moore's lieutenant, Fred Kestler, says he tries to encourage a "private-sector, office kind of atmosphere. This 'I the leader, you the peon' attitude won't work here."

In at least one COPE unit, commanders and line officers have established such a good working relationship that, they insist, rank has become almost superfluous. "As far as I can see, the lieutenant and the sergeant are both one of us," says Off. Sam Hannigan of the central COPE unit. "We do surveys together. We go over action plans together. You could get rid of the titles 'lieutenant' and 'sergeant' and call them 'supervisor' and 'foreman.'" Says Ernie

Bures, Hannigan's sergeant, pointing to his stripes, "I don't need these anymore."



As a result, COPE officers are entrusted with a maximum amount of freedom and independence. On any given day, a unit may hold roll call and then meet as one to discuss ongoing projects. After that, officers are free to organize their own days. In one COPE unit—the eastern unit—officers are allowed to schedule their own work days during the week in order to be present when their projects are most active. "We're our own bosses," say Rick Fox. "We have to be able to work independently."

Such trust fosters genuine feelings of self-worth among line officers—a rare achievement within police agencies. Coupled with the satisfaction they feel from seeing their accomplishments in the field, COPE officers often discover greater potential within themselves than they had ever imagined: "You know what I found out?" Rosie Miller says of her Krone Drive experience. "I found out that I could actually accomplish things—that if I wanted to get that street sign up or that light fixed, I could do it. I could do anything I put my mind to—and people would appreciate it."

Indeed, it isn't odd in COPE to hear compelling testimonials about rejuvenated careers. "I was burned out," says Don Thomp-

son of the western COPE unit. "My attitude was bad. I was callous. I was hard. Now, I work with a team. I can actually see the results of my work. I can feel good about what I am doing. Coming into COPE was the best thing that ever happened to me." In COPE's central unit, Jimmy Chaconas, a former traffic officer, remembers "when people used to say, 'Don't you care?' Well, of course I cared, but I had to be callous. That was the role of the traditional police officer. But in COPE, you can take time to help people out and see things get done.

"This," Chaconas grins, "is the way policing ought to be."

## IS IT? GOLDSTEIN THINKS SO. HE AND OTHERS INVOLVED

in the Baltimore County experiment believe that COPE may be a first glimpse of the police force of the future. "All the pieces of the puzzle are there," he says. "The use of a wide range of alternative responses. The engagement of the community. A bigger and more flexible role for individual officers, the de-emphasis of military structure, and a more thoughtful analysis, on the part of the whole organization, of the problems police are expected to handle. If you fit all these pieces together, you have the beginning of a new vision of what police work could become." Behan is less tentative: "If COPE['s approach] is adopted, it will mean a revolution in policing," he says.

That is a disturbing notion to some. There are those in Baltimore County who are less than enthusiastic about COPE's decidedly aggressive approach to police work. One apartment manager threatened to sue the department after COPE officers made a routine recommendation that residents install deadbolt locks on their doors. Several county bureaucrats have complained that COPE officers overstepped their bounds while tinkering with community affairs in their neighborhood. "It's the tail wagging the dog," complained one. "I don't know where I stand in relationship to COPE when they come into an area. The lines of authority and responsibility start getting very gray."

The problem-solving approach to police work does raise important questions about police and power: How far can an active police department intervene in a neighborhood's affairs before it begins to encroach upon the rights of ordinary citizens? When does

police intervention turn into police control? "For citizens who deal with corrupt, incompetent or harassing police agencies, the suggestion that police come up with their own solutions to problems or organize the community is absurd," says Goldstein. "They'd see a COPE-type operation as providing officers with a license to use heavy-handed techniques for dealing with community problems."

The degree of influence a department wields obviously depends a great deal on the integrity of the police organization—whether its commanders understand and respect the constitutional restraints under which police operate. But, as Gary Hayes points out, the public is the ultimate arbiter of power in the problem-solving approach. "Certainly the police must be mindful of democratic principles," he says. "But without the public's cooperation, a unit like COPE is doomed. If police overstep their bounds and the public becomes aware of it, the game is over."

To a great degree COPE's success can be credited to its broad public support. While the Baltimore County Police Department has always enjoyed good relations with county residents, COPE's rapport seems measurably stronger. In fact, in many of the project areas where the three COPE units have worked, neighbors profess a decided preference for COPE's style over that of patrol. "Talking to a COPE officer is like talking to a regular human being," said one man who helped COPE officers solve a problem that had been festering in his neighborhood for years. "They want to solve problems—not just take a report and get a paycheck. They should make all police officers take some COPE training."

That is precisely what department officials are trying to do. Behan, Huber and other COPE leaders would like to spread the gospel of problem-solving throughout the department, transforming it into a model of progressive policing. "I would like to see the problem-solving approach permeate every part of this department so that it is firmly in the minds and hearts of every police officer," say Behan. "We have to learn to apply those techniques to every facet of police work."

Steps have already been taken to reach that goal. In March and December of 1983, Behan, Huber and Goldstein conducted two intensive weekend seminars with 40 of the department's non-COPE command staff. On an isolated island retreat, far from the workaday world of the police department, those commanding officers experimented with the problem-solving approach using a series of case studies. The experience seemed to have an impact. "They

weren't eight-hour days," recalled one commander. "They went on into the night. I don't think there was one person who thought it was a waste of time. Everyone took something home from it."

At least one of those participants, former Precinct Six commander, Capt. Larry Schissler, credits what he learned on the retreat with changing his approach to police work. After intensive patrols and plainclothes investigations failed to stop a series of rapes that were committed in his jurisdiction, Schissler held a brainstorming session with all officers involved in the affair. "We were getting nowhere fast, and we had to do something," he says.

Those officers suggested a public meeting; 400 angry people showed up. "They had no problem with police performance," recalls Schissler, "They just wanted to know why we hadn't asked them to help. We thought we had been talking with them all along. Apparently, we hadn't."

Neighbors began reporting suspicious incidents. At the department's suggestion, they kept all their lights burning at night. Crime—all crime—virtually came to a halt. "Had we stuck to traditional policing, we probably would have continued to try and catch the guy and gotten pretty frustrated," says Schissler. "Then the neighborhood would have demanded action. It would have come out totally negative. The problem-solving techniques made it work."



Now head of the police academy, Schissler is employing the problem-solving approach there as well. In addition to holding open meetings with his command staff and the field training officers (line officers who train rookies in the field), Schissler spends time at lunch talking informally with recruits about COPE's style of policing. More important, portions of the academy's curriculum are being revamped to include instruction in problem-solving techniques. "At least they'll have a basic understanding of the techniques when they get out on the street," he says.

Curiously, only one group remains skeptical of COPE's potential for incorporating the problem-solving into regular patrol activity: the COPE officers themselves. While enthusiastic about their own experience in the program, the majority of them have difficulty understanding how a regular patrol officer could find the time to put the COPE techniques to work. "Suppose I'm on patrol and I want to do a fear survey," says Off. Richard Moore of the eastern COPE unit. "If I get halfway through the survey, and get a call for service, I have to leave. Patrol officers just don't have the time." Another put it this way: "You can't do proactive stuff in a reactive business."

That, says Goldstein, misses the point. "Those officers who think strictly in terms of time it takes to make inquiries are viewing the concept too narrowly," he insists. "What we are talking about is incorporating more thinking into all aspects of police work—including those officers assigned exclusively to reactive patrol. If a regular patrol officer is working on a long-range problem with someone and he receives a call for service, he can simply say, 'I'll be back and we can talk about this when I have more time.' Sure, there are situations where unusual citizen demand or limited resources force police to dash about from one call to another. But they usually occur only on certain days and during certain hours. There is plenty of time available on patrol for this kind of thinking."

Research has, in fact, repeatedly shown that officers on routine patrol possess enormous amounts of idle time. COPE's supporters say better time management is the key to integrating the problem-solving approach into patrol. Huber, for instance, envisions one officer performing problem-solving tasks while another covers calls for service. The two would then switch tasks. "The time is there—it just has to be managed properly," Huber insists. "The problem isn't that COPE is 'proactive'—the problem is that patrol is reactive. Officers get yanked this way and that, like animals on

a leash. That's what we have to reduce." Behan agrees. "We have to find different ways of responding to calls for service and free up time for problem-solving activities," he says.

But even if that time is found, COPE's supporters will still be faced with the task of convincing traditional police officers—men and women who have invested enormous amounts of time and energy on patrol—to change not only their way of thinking, but the way they do their job. And that may be the most overwhelming task of all. "It will be an incredibly difficult thing to accomplish," says Gary Hayes. "Let's face it: no matter what you say, people join police departments to chase criminals. It's cops and robbers. And it will be very hard to break that stereotype."

Huber believes that the campaign can begin with calls for service. Traditional officers will begin to accept the problem-solving approach, Huber says, when they realize that it can greatly reduce the number of non-criminal calls that exasperate most police officers. "If you're into investment and return, what we are doing has a return of 10 or 11 percent in the reduction of calls for service," says Huber. "If we show the average cop on the street that we're saving him nonsense—calls for service he doesn't want to deal with—he'll begin to accept us. He might not send us Christmas cards, but he'll begin to accept us."

In at least one patrol precinct, some non-COPE officers have come to that realization. "I think the guys here know that COPE saves them trouble," said one patrol officer in the central district. "They're beginning to appreciate what COPE does. It's slow, but they're beginning to see its value."

That's a long way from "revolutionizing policing," as Behan calls it. But it's a start. Given the host of problems facing American policing—shrinking budgets, increasing doubts about traditional patrol, and the public's growing demand for solutions to crime—COPE's problem-solving approach still represents the freshest strategy for intelligent deployment of police in the future.

"As it stands now, patrol is like a posse," says Huber. "We line it up at roll call and it roars off in a cloud of dust and waits for something to happen. We're not saying do away with the posse. Police will always need patrol. We're saying that maybe police need a specialized team to follow the posse. And right now, nobody has anything better to offer than that posse. But I think we have something here."

## Afterword

**Professor Egon Bittner**  
**Brandeis University**

I have followed the activities of the Baltimore County COPE Unit with much interest. This document, which describes the unit's history, its aspirations, and its achievements, also provides an introduction to what underlies the success of the COPE unit—the theory of problem-oriented policing. I fear that casual readers of this document may not see the full significance of this new approach, so let me take a moment to explain what I think COPE is all about.

Problem-oriented policing was introduced in Baltimore County by command initiative and in the form of a special project. For many, it will appear to be a radical innovation. But the truth is that problem-oriented policing is firmly rooted in the practical outlook of the "street cop." To be sure, this is not the way the police officer's work is talked about in textbooks or when departmental budgets are considered in City Halls. Nevertheless, it does contain what the officer in the field knows to be within the purview of his occupational concerns. That is to say, experienced, skilled and judicious officers have always known that, for example, the likelihood of violent teenage conflict in public housing depends upon the layout of walkways, the locations of entrances and exits, and the distribution of transportation facilities. The best officers have always geared their capacities to intervene to the existence of such conditions. Problem-oriented policing, as exemplified by the activities of the COPE unit, builds on the wisdom and on the perception of necessities as seen by these officers. It is the great strength of the COPE project that it makes explicit what was implicit and unrecognized in street practice; it makes routine what was exceptional.

The command of the Baltimore County Department deserves a great deal of credit for encouraging the doing of what the best among their personnel knew should be done. And COPE officers deserve credit for availing themselves of the support and advice of knowledgeable outsiders. But in the end the responsibility of turning theory into practice, and the special project into normal routine, rests inextricably with all members of the department. They will assume this responsibility when they see, as they will if they

take a clear-eyed look, that the introduction of problem-oriented policing is not one more unilaterally imposed change in the conditions of employment. Instead, it is merely the development of the best potential inherent in good police practice, as seen from within the occupation.

The acceptance of the activities of the COPE Unit as rooted in police practice is apt to have important consequences, well beyond the aims of the project itself. It will confirm and strengthen the belief that policing is a progressive profession, one that develops from within itself better and more effective methods, one that formulates increasingly higher standards of excellence for itself. In this respect, the profession of policing will come more and more to resemble all the other professions.

All enthusiasm for the initiative notwithstanding, it might be worthwhile to temper it with a note of caution. Problem-oriented policing means a shift in the targeting of police interventions. At present, the prevailing view of the police mandate is that officers deal with a variety of law enforcement and peace-keeping incidents, in which they employ a variety of provisional remedies. Officers expect that someone else will take over—or that things will hold till next time. These incidents will remain the target of police interest, even after an entire department adopts the problem-oriented approach. The big difference is that police officers will also consider what might be called "background factors". That is, they will understand that some incidents are best seen as related to a general condition, and that the likelihood of their occurrence can be reduced by changes in that condition. As a result, the officers will address themselves to making these changes. In a world in which everything is related to everything else, this raises the question of how to set limits on justifiable police authority and responsibility. This poses few problems for COPE, which is administered under a tight management system that helps to prevent such abuses of authority. But it may pose a problem for an entire department which adopts the problem-solving approach. We must begin to consider the problem, even while we are still at the point of taking the first steps.

That said, let me reaffirm my encouragement that a municipal police department has attempted and succeeded in making routine what has always been exceptional. I look forward to the day when the entire police profession recognizes problem-solving as a regular part of the job.



Don Hogan Charles/The New York Times

Expansion of the community policing program has brought confusion about the mission of the officers. Officer Les Catalano of the 103d Precinct, left, gave directions to a woman on Jamaica Avenue. Behind him was Sgt. James Lettieri.

## Community Policing: A Case Study

In a Precinct in Queens, a Mixture of Praise and Opposition

By RALPH BLUMENTHAL

It was when the bomb squad started calling, asking what it could do for his people in community policing, that Sgt. Louis W. Luciani figured things were getting out of hand. "That was, like, ridiculous," said the community police supervisor long with the 103d Precinct in Jamaica, Queens. "If we need the bomb squad, we'll call the bomb squad."

The call showed, at least, that the word was out about community policing, and the importance attached to it by the New York City Police Department.

But the open-ended offer may also have reflected confusion among some units about the mission of their colleagues in community policing: to get to know their neighborhood beats, and thereby attack the roots of lawlessness and prevent local nuisances from festering into crime.

At the same time, officers say, the quadrupling of the community policing cadres, from one handpicked 11-member unit in each of the city's 75 precincts four or five years ago to more than 3,000 officers and supervisors today, blurred the line between community policing as a philosophy — which the entire department subscribes to — and as a specialty practiced by trained volunteers.

As the expansion of community policing undergoes critical scrutiny by the new Police Commissioner, William J. Bratton, a

look at the program through the lens of a representative precinct studied periodically over the last three years shows both problems and successes.

In contrast, for example, to general shortcomings cited last week in memorandums by former Assistant Chief Aaron Rosenthal, the community policing unit in the 103d does field teams nights and weekends, often on drug enforcement, although at reduced levels.

### Praise From Merchants

And neighborhood merchants and residents praise the officers. In the busy mall next to the bus terminal at 165th Street and Jamaica Avenue, the manager of a jewelry booth, Donna Hill, said Officer Les Catalano and fellow officers from the community police unit were the only protection against youths who rampage through the stalls, snatching goods.

"Keep up the good work," she wrote in a note. "We need you guys here."

Kevin Keenan, whose community beat takes in one of the tougher sections of South Jamaica, got an equally warm welcome from a longtime resident, Muriel Williams.

"Congratulations," she called out to him as he passed her

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# Community Policing: Support Mixed With Criticism in a Queens Precinct

Continued From Page B1

house. He then looked puzzled. "Didn't you just get married?" she asked.

"Sheepishly, he thanked her.

"On the other hand, an unannounced visit to the mall one afternoon last week found a dozen community police and patrol officers congregating in casual conversation. Sgt. Jimmy Latferri shoed them off on their rounds.

"Nearly a decade after community policing was introduced experimentally in the city in a version known as C.P.O.P. — the Community Patrol

Officer Program, designed by the Vera Institute of Justice — disputes and confusion continue to mark the difficult shift to what most experts call a smarter style of problem-solving policing.

According to the coordinator of community policing, Deputy Chief Michael Julian, the department is only now planning "a precinct-by-precinct, beat-by-beat analysis" of how the program is working. Until that is done, the evidence remains largely anecdotal.

The 103d Precinct — a rectangular swath of central Queens taking in about 100,000 residents in wood-frame homes and projects along the

booming commercial spines and transit hubs of Jamaica and Hillside Avenues — is a good case study.

One of the borough's higher-crime precincts, with 30 homicides and 7,525 felony complaints last year, down marginally from the year before, it was a leader in the rapid expansion of the community policing unit. Now with 17 steady beat officers, 18 support and specialized officers and 6 supervisors among the precinct's total force of about 325, it ranks somewhere in the middle. The compact 19th Precinct on the East Side of Manhattan, for example, has 69 in its community policing unit.

## Irrelevant Tasks

Like Sergeant Luciani, who nurtured the original program in the 103d before being reassigned, many say the unit is being burdened with irrelevant tasks. "The job has turned into making sure that all units coordinate with community policing units," said Sgt. Jim Kelly, one of the 103d's longtime community police supervisors.

"We have to be involved with everything now," said Rob Doyle, one of the unit's veteran members. "Like they dump missing persons on us. Nobody's going to find this guy, so they dump it on us."

Many in the 103d believe the community policing unit expanded too fast. "The major problem I had with it was mandated growth," said Lieut. Joseph W. Byrne, the group's senior supervisor. "We put in people I wouldn't have put in."

With 10 members and a supervisor, the original community policing teams were highly selective, favoring officers with a demonstrated talent for working innovatively in the neighborhoods. But the ability to work out their own hours — including, often, nights and weekends off — drew many others to the expanded community policing teams and by necessity few were turned away.

Today the expansion is often described in images of a runaway train. With many more officers than the 17 neighborhood beats, most beats were doubled up with "alternate" officers; finally, the fiction of everyone having a beat was dropped in favor of "support officers," deployed on community policing tasks where needed. Training, too, often became rushed and incomplete, officers acknowledged.



Don Hogan Charles/The New York Times

"We go seven days, around the clock," Capt. Frederick E. Britten, commander of the 103d Precinct in Jamaica, said of the community policing unit. Some officers have been assigned to late-night social clubs to watch for drunks, while others have curtailed street prostitution on Hillside Avenue as well as sales of crack and marijuana.

The flexible hours were also subject to abuse, Lieutenant Byrne said, with many officers starting their 8-hour-35-minute tours at odd times of their own convenience, creating a supervisory nightmare. Finally, he said, the starting times had to be standardized. Members of the unit now come in at 7 A.M., 8, 9-30, noon, 2 P.M., 3 and 10, and on weekends as well.


"We go seven days, around the clock," said Capt. Frederick E. Britten, the precinct commander. Officers assigned to late-night social clubs watch for drunks leaving the clubs and arrest them in their vehicles before they can drive away. Aggressive patrols and arrests have recently curtailed flagrant street prostitution on Hillside Avenue around

161st Street, although the problem often shifts to other locations in the precinct.

And in an innovative partnership, three community policing officers and a sergeant have been working nights and days with a uniformed narcotics enforcement team to combat persistent street sales of crack and marijuana.

Sgt. William Ryan, who supervises the night community policing tour, said the unit made 60 drug arrests in December, in addition to 14 prostitution and drunken-driving "collars."

In a midday anti-drug patrol last week, some of his officers on a building rooftop near the station house at 168th Street at 91st Avenue watched customers entering a suspected



Residents and merchants generally praise the community policing effort in the 103d Precinct.

smoke shop and radioed their description to the sergeant and his officers circling in cars outside.

"Blue backpack, hood, wearing chevrons," came one description.

"Is he a buyer?" Sergeant Ryan asked.

"Ten-four, Sarge."

"Give him a little mileage," Sergeant Ryan radioed. "Take him around the corner."

## A Bag of Marijuana

Minutes later, an unmarked car swerved to the curb, disgorging three of the sergeant's men who stopped a man in a hooded fatigue jacket with mock military stripes. Searching his pockets, they retrieved a \$5 cellophane bag of marijuana.

"You guys are doing good," the man said in evident baffled admiration.

"We can't explain it to you," said one officer, issuing him a summons.

Yet community policing officers in the 103d, as elsewhere, remain the butt of gibes from fellow officers in patrol who rib them as more wedded to paper work on their voluminous spiral "beat books" than honest-to-goodness police work. The books, which record data on every address in the beat as well as monthly problems to be attacked, can take hours a week to maintain but are valuable archives.

When comments critical of community policing appeared in newspapers last week, members of the unit were greeted by taunts from patrol officers, like "You guys are history."

## A Feeling of Vindication

Among the critics has been a former training sergeant from the 103d, Charles Castro, who enraged top commanders three years ago when he assailed community policing as "a stroke" that is "never going to work." Now in the 115th Precinct in Jackson Heights, Queens, Sergeant Castro, is unrepentant. "I feel vindicated," he said of the recent critiques. "These guys accomplish as little as possible." The beats, he said, were so big that officers got lost in them and the paper work could be stretched out to take up most of a tour.

Even true believers like Sergeant Luciani, now in the Internal Affairs Bureau assigned to Manhattan North, concede some truth to the complaints. "Community policing is a great concept but just to expand the community police units is not the answer," he said. "You have to teach the concept, the philosophy and hold people accountable."

"I truly believe in the program," he said. "Just some of the things that happened in the last two years hurt it."

Chief Julian, too, said that "there's room for change."

"There is a learning curve longer than we want," said Chief Julian, the community policing coordinator, who is moving up to Chief of Human Resources. But he added: "Don't throw the whole thing out. The philosophy is too successful."

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# Clash on Policing Effort: Too Soon?

By ALAN FINDER

While members of the Giuliani and Dinkins administrations clashed last week over the merits of community policing in New York City, independent experts said it was too soon to measure its success or failure.

The debate began with the release of internal police memorandums critical of some aspects of community policing, including in-service training and a tendency of too many officers to take weekends off.

Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani joined in the criticism, contending that officers were spending too much time putting people in touch with social services. Mr. Giuliani said he wanted to redefine the program, putting more emphasis on fighting crime.

Raymond W. Kelly, who stepped down as Police Commissioner three weeks ago, responded that Mr. Giuliani did not understand community policing. Mr. Kelly said officers were already engaged in crime fighting, not social work.

## Uneven Results

Michael J. Farrell, associate director of the Vera Institute of Justice, a Manhattan-based foundation that studies the criminal-justice system, said that while there has been no rigorous study of community policing in New York, his general sense was that the results have been uneven.

"In some precincts, it has worked extremely well," Mr. Farrell said. "And in some precincts it has not."

In the 72d Precinct in Sunset

Park, Brooklyn — which has long been the model for the entire city — community police officers have managed to shut down drug activity in apartment buildings that were once overrun by dealers, Mr. Farrell said.

But in other precincts, often when the precinct commander is less enthusiastic about the concept, community policing officers merely walk their beats, getting to know people in the neighborhood, he said.

In New York, as in dozens of other cities around the country — including Chicago, Houston, Oakland, Calif., Birmingham, Ala., and Madison, Wis. — community policing has won broad support as an innovative way for the police to maintain order in neighborhoods.

## New Strategies

It is defined differently from city to city, but two aspects are central to all the efforts: many officers are being moved out of patrol cars and are walking beats to get to know neighborhoods better, and they are being asked to develop new strategies to prevent crime and disorder. The goal is to move the police beyond just responding to crime.

"I think anyone who understands community policing would understand that it's a better way of using police resources," said Lee P. Brown, who presided over the vast expansion of community policing as New York City Police Commissioner and is now President Clinton's director of Federal drug control policy.

"My vision for New York City," Mr. Brown said, "was to have an

officer or group of officers assigned to every block, or group of blocks, permanently, to be there, know people, to know the problems."

Many independent experts said it was too soon to make broad judgments on how well the New York Police Department has performed in shifting toward the new style of policing. They said it was only in 1992 that large numbers of new officers first began arriving in the city's 75 precincts.

## Measuring Productivity

They also said traditional measures of police officers' productivity, like number of arrests, were not relevant to evaluating a community police officer, who, for example, is supposed to figure out ways of driving drug dealers and prostitutes off the streets of the neighborhood so that, in the long run, there are fewer arrests on that beat.

Thomas A. Reppetto, the president of the Citizens Crime Commission in New York, an independent organization that monitors criminal justice, said he and other experts assumed that there would be problems in imposing community policing on a police department as large and as tradition-bound as New York's.

But Mr. Reppetto said the problems exposed last week should not obscure the significant goals of community policing.

"It will take a tremendous amount of effort to make it work, but we must do it," he said. "This is the only strategy available to the police that can take back communities from the criminals."

*New York Times*  
1/31/94

PHOTOCOPY  
PRESERVATION

August 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO

FROM: RANA SAMPSON, WHITE HOUSE FELLOW

SUBJECT: COMMUNITY POLICING

This brief memoranda provides a follow-up to your August 23rd conversation with the Chiefs of Police from St. Louis, Ft. Pierce, Austin, Prince George's County, and Greensboro at NIJ's community policing conference. It is intended to fill in some of the gaps that are inevitable in such a short discussion about a topic as complex as community policing. For years now, I have provided technical assistance and training in community policing to police and city officials throughout the country, including three of the above-mentioned chiefs, and I would be remiss if I did not follow-up with you to underscore community policing's essential elements. In addition, with community, government, and political expectations raised concerning community policing, it is important to have a full picture about the level of progress the police profession has made thus far.

- Community policing is best understood through its component parts -- community engagement and problem solving. These two are integrally linked and must exist in tandem in a department doing community policing. Community engagement just for the sake of improving the police relationship to the community is community relations, not much more. And a problem-oriented approach that does not focus on the crime and disorder problems that communities care about misdirects scarce police resources and undermines police accountability to the public. Many police departments only rely on community engagement limiting their effectiveness in tackling crime and disorder problems.

- Community policing is not a return to a style of policing done in earlier times. Although some in the profession make this claim, it is generally because they were not around 30 or 40 years ago in policing or are truly unfamiliar with those times in our policing history. Not all communities had officers assigned to their areas who were helpful to its residents. Communities of color often do not have as fond memories of policing in their neighborhoods. In addition, the working environment in police departments was paramilitary (in many, it still is), and departments placed a high value on conformity -- both of which are characteristics that do not lend themselves to community policing. Officers were seen as crime fighters, nothing more, and had few skills to help them do anything but criminal apprehension.

- Most police departments that claim to have implemented community policing are only in the beginning stages of their efforts -- even those who have been at it for a few years. The chiefs that you met the other day represent some of the better community policing

departments, yet only a handful of the officers in each of those departments is actually engaged in community policing. Most police officers, even in the better departments, remain unengaged from community policing efforts. This is true, in part, because many chiefs have opted for a split-force concept of community policing where only a small group of officers engage in community policing while the majority go about business as usual engaged in traditional reactive, incident-driven policing. In addition, for those few departments that have opted to implement community policing department-wide, a long-term (probably 10 years), transformational change will be required, offering little in terms of quick successes.

- Community policing is not a series of programs (block watch and mentoring) nor a series of tactics (foot patrol and bike patrol). It is a philosophy that requires the transformation of the way we deliver police service. It requires police to change their organizations internally -- how they recruit, train, deploy, supervise, evaluate, transfer and promote personnel. It requires police to change the way they provide service. Under community policing, officers will be analyzing crime and disorder problems, working with the community on a search for alternative solutions, implementing solutions, and evaluating their effectiveness in between responding to calls for police service. It requires police to change the way they interact with the public -- engaging the public in the responsibility or co-production of public safety. It requires police to change the way they interact with the criminal justice system, reserving for the system only the most serious, deserving or problematic of offenders. It requires police agencies to change the working environment internally, the way first line supervisors and management interact with officers. And it requires police agencies to look to new training and technologies to better understand neighborhood crime and disorder problems. Community policing is all about tailoring solutions, based on thoughtful, in-depth analysis, to unique neighborhood crime and disorder problems, not applying generic models from other communities and overlaying them to the problems of another community.

- Community policing is probably most effective in a community which believes in community-oriented government -- where services are shared, customer-driven, integrated, and turf battles kept to a minimum. Yet we are only just learning about the effectiveness of community policing. In many places, boasts of reducing crime is unsubstantiated when put to greater scrutiny. This is not to say community policing doesn't reduce crime. Rather it must be done right and done well, and efforts must be focused on manageable problems, preferably in a defined geographic area, but most police departments are not doing this.

- Most police departments fail to measure the effectiveness of their community policing projects, (i.e. did moving the bus stop away from the vacant lot really reduce purse snatchings?) Unless the profession is encouraged to document its efforts, it is unclear how assessments can be made.

- Finally, community policing departments are going to have to focus on their

primary business -- crime control and prevention. To some extent, it is easier, as many police do, to focus less on this primary function and concentrate time and limited resources on projects that, while related, are the work of other government agencies (inspecting housing violations, clearing unkempt lots and parks, removing graffiti, establishing park basketball leagues). Police should only provide referrals and work with government officials to make sure the referrals actually work. Otherwise, these new tasks are extremely time consuming and labor intensive, and the hazard is that they distract police from their focus on crime control and prevention. In the long run, community policing will be judged, not on its ability to be a more efficient provider of other government services, but in its ability to prevent and control crime.

Jose  
FYI

August 30, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR LIZ BERNSTEIN

FROM: RANA SAMPSON, WHITE HOUSE FELLOW

SUBJECT: COMMUNITY POLICING

This brief memoranda provides some essential background information about community policing. In addition, with community, government and political expectations raised concerning community policing, it is important to have a full picture about the level of progress the police profession has made thus far in implementing this innovative philosophy.

- Community policing is best understood through its component parts -- community engagement and problem solving. These two are integrally linked and must exist in tandem in a department doing community policing. Community engagement just for the sake of improving the police relationship to the community is community relations, not much more. And a problem-oriented approach that does not focus on the crime and disorder problems that communities care about misdirects scarce police resources and undermines police accountability to the public. Many police departments only rely on community engagement limiting their effectiveness in tackling crime and disorder problems.

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- Most police departments that claim to have implemented community policing are only in the beginning stages of their efforts -- even those who have been at it for a few years. Even in some of the better community policing departments, only a handful of the officers in each of these departments is actually engaged in community policing. Most police officers, even in the better departments, remain unengaged from community policing efforts. This is true, in part, because many chiefs have opted for a split-force concept of community policing where only a small group of officers engage in community policing while the majority go about business as usual engaged in traditional reactive, incident-driven policing. In addition, for those few departments that have opted to implement community policing

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- Most police departments fail to measure the effectiveness of their community policing projects, (i.e. did moving the bus stop away from the vacant lot and environmentally redesigning the bus stop shelter really reduce purse snatchings?) Unless the profession is encouraged to document its efforts, it is unclear how assessments can be made.

- Finally, community policing departments are going to have to focus on their primary business -- crime control and prevention. To some extent, it is easier, as many police do, to focus less on this primary function and concentrate time and limited resources on projects that, while related, are the work of other government agencies (inspecting housing violations, clearing unkempt lots and parks, removing graffiti, establishing park basketball leagues). Police should only provide referrals and work with government officials to make sure the referrals actually work. Otherwise, these new tasks are extremely time consuming and labor intensive, and the hazard is that they distract police from their focus on crime

control and prevention. In the long run, community policing will be judged, not on its ability to be a more efficient provider of ~~other~~ government services, but in its ability to prevent and control crime.

# Police and Community as Partners

By Robert Trojanowicz  
and Bonnie Bucqueroux

**T**HE ugly chain of events that began with the brutal beating of Rodney King confirms the urgent need for community policing reform.

While community policing is no panacea, it promotes mutual trust and cooperation between people and police. At the same time, it helps to empower neighborhoods in danger of being overwhelmed by crime, drugs, and the poisonous mix of apathy, despair, and unrest.

The events in Los Angeles thrust community policing into the spotlight, yet many people still do not know exactly what it is and what it can do. Many now know that there is a new breed of police officer who walks a beat, but true community policing reform does much more. It reinvents the old-fashioned beat cop as today's community officer, who acts as a neighborhood organizer and problem-solver, not just as a visible deterrent to crime.

The community officer's mission is to involve average citizens in assigning priorities to their problems and in developing grass-roots initiatives to address them.

Problems can vary from gunfire to graffiti, from battered wives to barking dogs, from drugs to disorder. By stationing a community officer permanently in a manageable beat, the police can reach out to the law-abiding people imprisoned in their homes by fear, the people that other officers meet only as victims.

By challenging people to work as partners in making their communities better and safer places, community policing produces a subtle but profound shift in the role and responsibility of the police. No longer are they the experts with all the answers, the "thin blue line" that protects the good people from the bad. Community officers are part of the community, generalists who do whatever it takes to help people help themselves.

In New York, a community officer helped residents make sweeps of their drug-infested apartment building in Harlem, driving away dealers and customers alike. In North Miami Beach, a community officer supervised young volunteers who painted the dilapidated homes of the elderly and infirm, since areas in decline act as a magnet for crime and drugs. In Lansing, Mich., a community officer attends apartment showings, sending a signal to poten-

tial predators that they had better look elsewhere.

By encouraging officers to act as the catalyst in confronting not only crime, but also fear of crime and neighborhood decay and disorder, this decentralized and personalized form of policing breaks down the anonymity that plagues traditional police efforts. In a community policing beat, people know their officer by name, which means that they can hold the officer directly accountable if he or she does too little - or goes too far.

The daily, face-to-face contact also allows the officer to learn whom to trust and whom to keep an eye on. And as people start to take back their streets, those who would prey on them eventually find that they have no place to hide.

In addition, community policing allows

**By challenging people to work as partners in making their communities safer, community policing produces a subtle but profound shift in the role and responsibility of the police.**

officers to intervene with youngsters at risk before they grow up to become hardened, adult career criminals. Traditional policing simply cannot provide motor-patrol officers the time, the opportunity, and the continuity to do much about young shoplifters, muggers, and drug-gang lookouts who quickly melt away into the crowd.

Part of the answer might be for the community officer to work on providing kids with recreational activities or summer jobs. In Aurora, Colo., an officer pairs youngsters with cadets from the Air Force Academy as mentors.

While community officers are full-fledged police officers, their performance is judged on how well they solve the problem, not on how many arrests they make and how quickly they answer the next call. Community policing gives them the autonomy to tailor the response to local needs and resources, the chance to see whether the ideas work, and the opportunity to tinker or try again if they don't.

Critics call this social work, not "real" police work, ridiculing community officers as "lollicops" or the "grin-and-wave squad." Yet the police are the only public-service agency open 24 hours a day, seven days a

week, that still makes house calls. And while many community officers risk early burnout trying to do too much, the best response is to decentralize and personalize other social services, using community policing as the model. Then community officers can return to spending more of their time doing the kind of work they do best.

Back when beat cops pounded the pavement in cities, social workers, public-health nurses, and probation and parole officers also made home visits, and "truant officers" scoured the streets looking for kids playing hooky.

So, in the same way that community policing updates the past, what we call the Neighborhood Network Center concept asks other service providers to join the community officer in an office in the beat, where they can work together as a new community-based team of problem solvers.

The Neighborhood Network Center that recently opened in community officer Don Christy's beat in Lansing, Mich., applies the lessons of community policing to the delivery of other public and nonprofit services. He serves as the protector and unofficial leader of the others, and depending on the problem, he can seek help directly from the school psychologist, the social worker, student nurses, drug-treatment counselors, other specialists, and a host of community and outside volunteers who work in the center.

Community policing and Neighborhood Network Center reforms acknowledge that the police must be part of the solution, since they are the only public servants whose options range all the way from patting a youngster on the back for a job well done to the use of deadly force.

At the same time, both approaches make it clear that the ultimate responsibility rests with the people trapped in troubled areas, who have the most to lose and the most to gain. The biggest challenge now is to persuade citizens fortunate enough to live in stable and secure neighborhoods to invest in and support such efforts in those dangerous areas that many have worked hard to escape.

If any good comes from the violence in Los Angeles, perhaps it is the recognition that until we are all safe, no one is truly safe.

■ Robert Trojanowicz is director of the National Center for Community Policing at Michigan State University. Bonnie Bucqueroux is associate director of the center.