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National Institute of Justice *Update*

Jeremy Travis, Director

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The Kansas City Gun Experiment

Gun crime has been increasing rapidly throughout the Nation, especially in inner-city areas. To learn whether vigorous enforcement of existing gun laws could reduce gun crime, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsored an evaluation of the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department's "Weed and Seed" program. The evaluation found that the program's success in getting more guns off the street in one violent Kansas City neighborhood reduced gun crimes there by almost 50 percent during a 6-month period. The data indicate that more than two gun crimes were prevented for every gun seized.

Study design

For 29 weeks, from July 7, 1992, to January 27, 1993, police patrols were increased in gun crime "hot spots" in a target area. The researchers identified the hot spot locations by computer analysis of all gun crimes in the target area, patrol beat 144 in the Central Patrol District. An 80-block neighborhood normally covered by one patrol car, the target area had a homicide rate 20 times higher than the national average. The population was almost entirely nonwhite, with more than two-thirds of all residences being owner-occupied, single-family, detached homes.

In the target area, assigned officers focused exclusively on gun detection through proactive, directed patrol and were not required to answer calls for service. The extra patrol was handled by four officers who worked 6 hours of overtime each night (from 7 p.m. to 1 a.m.) for 176 nights, with only two officers working an additional 24 nights, for a total of 4,512 officer-hours and 2,256 patrol car-hours.

Guns were found by officers on the directed patrols during frisks and searches and following arrests on other charges. To ensure the protection of civil liberties, every search had to conform to legal guidelines for adequate articulable suspicion and every arrest for carrying concealed weapons had to be approved by a supervisory detective.

To gather information, an onsite University of Maryland evaluator accompanied the officers on 300 hours of directed patrol in the target area. Property room data on guns seized, as well as computerized crime reports, calls for service data, and arrest records, were analyzed over two time periods: the 29 weeks before the program began in 1992 and the 29 weeks while the program was active.

Data for the same time period were also collected for a comparison area (patrol beat 242 in the Metro Patrol District), which had about the same volume of violent crime and drive-by shootings as the target area. In the comparison area no changes were made in the number or duties of patrol officers.

Increased enforcement

During the program period, officers working overtime on the directed patrols reported spending 3.27 car-hours of the 12 car-hours per night (or 27 percent of their time) actually patrolling the target area, for a total of 1,218 officer-hours of potential gun detection. The officers thus spent about 70 percent of their time processing arrests and performing other patrol-related duties.

Despite the limited amount of time the officers actually spent on patrol in the target area, the volume of activity was significant. The officers on directed patrol issued 1,090 traffic citations and made 948 car checks, 532 pedestrian checks, 170 State or Federal arrests, and 446 city arrests, for an average of one intervention every 40 minutes per patrol car.

Guns seized

In the target area, 65 percent more guns were seized in the second half of 1992 than in the first half; gun seizures increased from 46 in the first 6 months of 1992 to 76 in the last 6 months. In the comparison area, however, gun seizures decreased slightly in the second half of 1992.

Related findings include:

- Traffic stops were the most productive means of finding illegal guns, yielding an average of one gun discovered for every 28 stops.
- The ratio of guns seized to actual time spent on patrol in the target area was one gun seized per 84 officer-hours.
- Two-thirds of the persons arrested for gun carrying in the target area were not residents of the target area.

Impact on gun crimes

Data from the first and second halves of 1992 show that gun crimes declined significantly in the target area—83 fewer gun crimes were committed, a 49 percent decline—while they increased slightly in the comparison area.

Related findings include:

- Drive-by shootings dropped from 7 to 1 in the target area, while doubling from 6 to 12 in the comparison area.
- Only gun crimes were affected by the directed patrols. No changes were observed (in either the target or the comparison areas) in the number of calls for service or in the total number of other violent and nonviolent crimes reported.
- After the directed patrols stopped, crimes involving guns gradually increased for the first 5 months of 1993. When the patrols resumed in June 1993, gun crimes decreased again, although not as consistently as in the second half of 1992.
- The decline in gun crimes in the target area did not appear to cause a displacement of crime to adjoining neighborhoods. Gun crimes did not increase significantly in any of the surrounding seven patrol beats.

Conclusion

This study shows that a police department can successfully implement a program to increase seizures of illegally carried guns in high gun-crime areas. Police officers can be very productive when given the opportunity to focus on gun detection in identified crime hot spots without being obligated to answer calls for service. In addition, gun seizures do not appear to require large tactical operations; in the Kansas City high-crime target area, the officers worked in two-officer patrol units and no gun attacks on officers were reported during the directed patrols. Directed patrols were also shown to be, on average, about three times more cost-effective in getting guns off the street than routine police activity.

The researchers note that much remains to be learned about gun detection and seizure by police through evaluations of similar programs. But before such studies are completed, many cities will have to make decisions about how to respond to rising gun crime. A citywide version of this program was implemented (without overtime) in Indianapolis, Indiana in October 1994. Whether a citywide program can replicate the results that the Kansas City experiment achieved in a small area is the next important question to be answered.

Results from the evaluation, supported in part by NIJ grant 91-DD-CX-K056, are reported in an NIJ Research in Brief, *The Kansas City Gun Experiment*, by University of Maryland Criminology Professor Lawrence W. Sherman, who directed the study in collaboration with Dennis P. Rogan and James W. Shaw. The Research in Brief can be obtained from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850, 800-851-3420. Ask for NCJ 150855.

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Neighborhood Cops

Making Community Policing Work

George L. Kelling

Community policing is a popular and promising reform. But it is unlikely to succeed unless accompanied by a new way of organizing police departments—one that moves away from the centralized, bureaucratic structure of past decades.

uring the late 1970s, my wife and I visited New York City's Washington Square Park. Despite the presence of several police officers, we were solicited three times by drug dealers before we were more than fifty feet into the park. The officers paid no attention. Perplexed, we moved to a position to observe both dealers and police. The dealers were openly selling drugs and the officers were doing nothing about it.

Was this a case of police corruption? Very likely not. In fact, the phenomenon my wife and I observed was almost certainly the result of police practices developed since the turn of the century for the very purpose, among others, of *preventing* corruption. Understanding and reconsidering these practices is vitally important to New York and other cities that are moving toward community policing.

Community policing entails both a shift in the function of police, from a narrow focus on law enforcement to the provision of a broad range of services, and in tactics, from primarily reactive activities (responding after a crime has occurred) to preventive activities (maintaining order and solving problems before they escalate into violence). But changing the functions and tactics of an organization also requires fundamental changes in the way it is structured and managed. Community policing will fail if police departments remain the highly centralized bureaucratic organizations they have been since the early decades of the twentieth century.

Police often describe their organizations as rubber bands: they can be stretched and twisted, but once the pressure is relaxed, they snap back to their original shape. Some of us remember the attempts at team policing in New York City and elsewhere during the 1960s and 1970s. Team policing had many of the same approaches as community policing: community involvement, permanent assignment of officers to neighborhoods, determination of police priorities on the basis of citizen input, and a focus on neighborhood problems. Team policing vanished, despite its successes, because issues of organization and management were ignored. Unless such issues are addressed, community policing is likely to suffer the same fate.

Today, most departments are organized functionally. That is, each major function—patrol, detectives, and various special units—is organized into a separate bureau run by an upper-level administrator (depending on the department, an assistant or deputy chief, inspector, major, or similar rank). Each of these bureaus runs independently, has

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Steve Berman

The crucial principle of community policing is that the local precinct should provide total police services. Shown (top to bottom) are the Bronx's 52nd and Manhattan's 10th and Central Park precincts.

citywide jurisdiction, and is overseen by the department's chief of operations.

In most cities, a captain or commander, accountable to the head of patrol, runs a precinct or district. Assisted by patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants, he provides the basic patrol services with which most citizens are familiar. A precinct commander may also have a few detectives, community relations officers, and special unit personnel under his command. But criminal investigation (detectives) and special units to deal with special problems (drugs, intelligence, and vice, for example) are for the most part the province of separate centralized commands. Police leaders have considered this organizational structure so basic to policing that, until very recently, the Law Enforcement Accreditation Commission would not certify a police department unless it was organized by function.

This structure grew out of police reform efforts early in the century. Reformers' primary goal was to control officers and departments so as to achieve independence from political meddling and reduce police corruption and abuse. In quieter days—the 1930s through the 1950s—this strategy may have been adequate to deal with urban problems as well; it has, however, proven inadequate since then. Today, a new generation of reformers is recognizing the need for a new organizational approach, one in which the basic function of all other personnel and units is to support patrol, rather than the reverse.

Reform, Then and Now

Early police departments, subject to local political control, provided something akin to community policing. They were structured not by function but geographically, with police precincts or districts overlaying political wards. Ward leaders appointed precinct commanders and held them accountable. Because precinct commanders had to please local leaders, who had a vested interest in pleasing their constituents, it was clear that solving local problems was police business.

The strong links between local politicians and police, however, also bred corruption. Sociologist

Egon Bittner drolly describes the police of that era: "Of all the institutions of city government in late-nineteenth-century America, none was as unanimously denounced as the urban police. According to every available account, they were, in every aspect of their existence, an unmixed, unmitigated, and unpardonable scandal." Reformers identified three forms of corruption which they linked to political meddling in policing: financial (payoffs for underenforcement of laws), political ("getting out the vote" for local politicians), and inequitable (for example, keeping "undesirables" out of neighborhoods).

Initial calls for reform originated outside policing during the 1890s—in New York City most notably from the Reverend Charles Parkhurst. By the 1910s, police officials began to join the movement for reform. The formula reformers devised to end political and financial corruption included several important elements:

- Creation of civil service procedures to ensure that officers would be hired on merit rather than through patronage;
- Provision of tenure to police chiefs to ensure their autonomy;
- Measurement of police success by "scientific" standards such as crime rates and arrests;
- Creation of police districts and beats on the basis of crime rates (and later the number of calls for service); and,
- Narrowing the police function to the enforcement of laws, especially laws against serious crime.

Centralization of police authority was the mainstay of all reform efforts. It took two forms: consolidation of city police into higher political units (metropolitan areas and states) and centralization of police management authority in the office of the chief.

The push for state or regional control largely failed. But the effort to centralize authority in the office of the chief (sometimes called the commissioner or superintendent) was a resounding success. Police executives, supported by Progressives and other advocates of urban reform, gained more and more independence from city hall, ward bosses, and other political figures. In Los Angeles, for example, chiefs in pro-

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ected civil service positions had virtual autonomy in running their department. Boston created a strong commissioner model in which appointments were not coterminous with mayoral terms. (In practice, however, mayors have been able to pressure commissioners into resigning.) A similar form of administration developed in New York City, although, as Thomas Repetto of the Citizens Crime Commission has pointed out, the tradition of each mayor appointing his own commissioner limits the power of the office.

In all these cases, reform efforts substantially reduced the influence of political leaders on police departments. So successful were reformers in gaining independence that the University of Wisconsin's Herman Goldstein has described contemporary police as the most autonomous and least accountable agency in government. (This autonomy created problems in its own right, exemplified by the post-Rodney King developments in Los Angeles.)

Reformers turned to the latest in organizational thinking of the time—the work of Frederick Taylor—to restructure both their organizations and the work of police officers. Taylor invented the factory model of organization we now know: centralized bureaucracy, extensive rules and regulations, lines of authority, layers of command with expertise lodged in middle management, span of control, unity of command, and the routinization and specialization of line functions.

The primary business of police was to be law enforcement—"crime fighting." As law enforcers, police would need the endorsement of neither politicians nor neighborhoods. So as not to be too intrusive, they would concentrate on broadly condemned common-law crimes—murder, rape, assault, burglary, robbery—and withdraw from order maintenance activities that were inherently ambiguous. Police effectiveness would be measured by newly developed and "scientific" Uniform Crime Reports and arrest rates. Police would pass social, medical, family, and other problems to churches and other community institutions.

Tactics would be primarily reactive. Police would patrol in automobiles, intervene in law-breaking that came under their view, and respond to calls



Early reformers envisioned police as remote and professional crime-fighters.

for service. Rules and regulations forbade "idle conversation" with citizens; police were to be remote and professional crime fighters who sought "just the facts, ma'am." Detectives would investigate crimes once they had occurred.

Consistent with Taylor's ideas, police work would be simple, routine, and specialized. Patrol officers would operate with little discretion—if someone broke the law, officers would intervene; if citizens were law-abiding, they had nothing to fear from the police. The organization would be structured by function. Special units would deal with special problems—juveniles, vice, drugs, organized crime—as they developed, and patrol officers would stay out of these matters. This explains the experience my wife and I had in Washington Square Park.

The most important organizational and managerial goal was to break the grip that precinct commanders had over their areas. All would come under central control; their links to local politicians and neighborhoods would be severed. To ensure that precinct commanders could not "build kingdoms," reformers rotated commanders from assignment to assignment—a model developed by J. Edgar Hoover when he took over the corrupt Bureau of Investigation during the

NEIGHBORHOOD COPS

1920s. Extensive rules and regulations would govern all aspects of police performance and organizational decorum. Centrally based middle managers—captains and lieutenants—would design the work, supervisors would direct it, and patrol officers would carry it out. Line officers would do, not think.

In many respects, the reform strategy was remarkably successful. Police departments became relatively well-run organizations. Corruption and abuse lessened throughout the twentieth century. Police embraced the ideology of "crime fighting"—it communicated action, power, and an unambiguous purpose.

The trouble is that although police generated enormous numbers of arrests, the incidence of serious crime continued to rise and street conditions to deteriorate. By the 1960s, the "crime problem" got so bad that it became a major political issue. Yet today, most of us would happily return to that era—at least as far as predatory crime and disorder are concerned. Moreover, the emphasis on "crime fighting" bred a warrior mentality in police: huge areas of cities became battle zones and large numbers of people became enemies—all a far cry from the admonition of Sir Robert Peel, the father of Anglo-Saxon policing, to "keep peace by peaceful means." Ironically, then, the "crime fighting" strategy failed on its own terms—reducing or preventing crime.

The centralized structure of police departments made it difficult to introduce innovations similar to community policing, which might have effectively addressed these problems. This is best illustrated by what happened to team policing in Cincinnati during the 1970s—the most closely studied team policing experiment. After team policing was tried for two years in areas of Cincinnati, almost everyone involved—citizens, police, and evaluators—agreed that it was a success. The department planned to take team policing citywide. But it was understood only as a good tactic; little thought was given to the department's organizational structure, which remained typically bureaucratic.

Over time mid-managers moved to reestablish their authority. In the name of ensuring good personnel management, they reclaimed the right to allocate personnel to teams. In the name of uniform

dress codes (rules and regulations), they withdrew team leaders' authority to assign officers to dress in plain clothes for surveillance or investigation. Other subtle means of control were exerted. But the killer was something called management by objectives (MBO), which the department adopted in the middle of the experiment.

Top management installed MBO to ensure that officers were conducting measurable activities (arrests and the like) department-wide. Teams submitted MBO plans that were based on neighborhood priorities. Management rejected them as not in accord with overall departmental objectives. When neighborhood priorities were resubmitted, management again turned them down. Team members finally got the message that Cincinnati was returning to business as usual. The rubber band snapped back: police work was riding in cars, responding to calls for service, and getting the "stats." The Cincinnati Police Department failed to recognize that team policing, like community policing, was not merely a tactic; it was a strategic shift in the function and tactics of policing that could not be maintained within the organizational structure imposed by turn-of-the-century police reformers.

Reform failed in another respect as well. Turn-of-the-century police innovations had their origins in a desire to control police organizations and line personnel. Reformers were serious about crime control, but if push came to shove, their concern with corruption led them to make control of the police the top priority: don't let line officers combat local drug dealing; create special units to deal with vice; limit the discretion of precinct commanders. This focus on control gives rise to two central ironies. First, line officers actually perform complex tasks with little direction or supervision—despite the fervency of the desire to control them, the general view that officers are under close control, and the existence of voluminous rules and regulations and an elaborate command-and-control superstructure. Second, the organizational measures developed to eliminate the autonomy of the precinct commanders have artificially fragmented police work, alienated citizens from police, and diffused accountability.

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No Control of Patrol

Community policing depends on a recognition of the subtlety and complexity of policing. But the reality of police work—what officers actually *do*—stands in stark contrast with the official representation of policing.

In the official view, an extensive administrative structure oversees all aspects of an officer's work; with great concern given to issues such as span of control (how many officers a sergeant can oversee) and unity of command (each officer takes orders from only one person). Orders flow downward from commanders to officers. Information flows upward for use by planners. Tactics, developed by middle and upper management, specify when, where, and how officers are to patrol. Extensive rules and regulations prescribe organizational manners and mores in extensive detail, down to minutiae about clothing and other forms of decorum.

Elaborate 911, computer, and radio systems keep officers in constant contact with, and under surveillance of, centralized command and control. Formal norms and informal conventions guide how long an officer should spend dealing with each type of call for service. Organizational pressure keeps officers "in service"—riding in cars waiting for the next call—rather than "out of service" and dealing directly with citizens. Reports keep detailed records of officers' law enforcement activities: arrests, summonses, and tickets.

This top-down perspective gives a coherent view of the officer in the police organization: under tight administrative control, making decisions under the supervision of a sergeant or mid-manager, "fighting crime" by enforcing laws, going from call to call with little free time, guided by extensive rules and regulations, and operating with little discretion. But the view from the bottom is quite different.



UPI / Belmann

Most police officers conduct the bulk of their work alone or with a partner. No one can look over their shoulders to determine whether they are doing their work properly.

First, police work is incredibly complex. Reform administrators were wrong to believe that police work consists primarily of enforcing common criminal laws in ways that could be carried out by people with what Egon Bittner called "manly virtues"—men who are big, heroic, honest, and smart enough to write out simple reports. In fact, most police work consists of managing community and neighborhood conflicts and problems that take an infinite variety of forms. Less than 20 percent of police work, regardless of city or neighborhood, deals with common crimes. And dealing with crimes is itself often complex: there is nothing so simple about domestic assault, for example, that suggests that "manly virtues"—as opposed to intelligence and skill—are what is needed to deal with it.

Second, police work is inherently ambiguous. When an officer arrives on the scene of an incident, it is usually not clear who is doing what to whom, who is right and who is wrong—indeed, even what has happened and what is happening. Natural distortions of memory, prevarication, cheerleading and bull-baiting by onlookers, the emotions of victim and perpetrator, and a host of other factors mean that police are often asked to make sense out of confusing and ambiguous circumstances.

Third, despite the total number of calls that come to police departments, officers have considerable free time. How much varies by shift, time, and area, but even during relatively busy shifts, most officers have time that could be used to do things other than ride around in cars. The primary problem police have in scheduling work is its unpredictability rather than its quantity. The result, however, is that officers control their discretionary time.

Fourth, rules and regulations have very little to do with the routine work of police officers. Regulations specify proper procedures for arrests (which constitute a relatively small portion of actual police work), tell officers what they cannot do, and manage the relationships between ranks. But they have little to say about most of the conflicts and problems with which officers deal. Most such work, in fact, goes unrecorded. Suppose an officer sees a

dispute between neighbors. If the officer intervenes before blows are struck, and all is settled, then officially nothing has happened and, except perhaps for the officer's personal log, the department has no record of the activity. If, on the other hand, the officer delays, lets a fight start, and then makes an arrest, an official record is kept.

Finally, police are subject to little direct supervision. Most officers conduct the bulk of their critical work, including using force, alone or with a partner. They are not "overseen" in the sense of Taylor's factory model: no one can look over their shoulders to determine whether they are doing their work properly. Generally, the quality of police work can only be determined after the fact, by reconstructing an incident on the basis of records and personal accounts of the officers, participants, and other observers. In the final analysis, then, police officers' performance is determined largely by their own values, knowledge, and skills—be they appropriate or not.

The reform strategy put control of officers at its very core; created an elaborate control infrastructure of rules and regulations, layers of command, and monitoring technology; and ostensibly narrowed, simplified, and routinized police work. Yet this strategy not only failed in terms of crime fighting, but in terms of control as well. At its best, this strategy, with its functional structure and Taylorian managerial processes, can keep officers out of trouble by isolating them and preventing them from doing much of anything. It cannot produce quality policing because it does not address the essential *work* of police officers.

Powerless Precincts

Community policing is also hampered by the centralized structure's tendency to reduce the power and prestige of precinct or district commanders, which makes police departments less responsive to local concerns.

Specialized units, as we have seen, were created as part of a strategy to achieve centralized control

over the police. The control of the centralized command and neighborhood units, moreover, is often turned into a power struggle between officers and officers view it as akin to detective departments. special hours work, plain clothes, other good jobs. By offering police executives to "cream" the best officers from the precinct.

The precinct commander is what's left of the problems are personnel. Precincts do the responding, vice, patroling, conducting investigation, less of quality, and by detection.

This is not to say that there are particular community police be held resources are policed by they have no centralized control of commanders have little to chief. At the are lost, an local problems few communities out to neighborhood

over the police in an entire city. Such units limited the control of precinct commanders and extended centralized control over day-to-day policing in wards and neighborhoods. Specialized, centrally controlled units, moreover, extended the reach of the police chief into precinct personnel, shaping how patrol officers view themselves and their jobs. Special units, akin to detectives, became prestige units in police departments. Working in a special unit often means special hours, increased pay and recognition, exciting work, plain clothes, and access to

other good jobs in the future. By offering such benefits, police executives are able to "cream" the most talented officers from precincts.

The result is that precinct commanders get what's left over—leftover problems and leftover personnel. Precinct personnel do the residual work of responding to calls for service, patrolling in cars, and conducting preliminary investigations, which, regardless of quality, are often replicated by detectives.

This is troublesome in many ways. Two are particularly important to the prospects for community policing. First, precinct commanders cannot be held responsible for their areas. Stripped of resources at every "emergency," their precincts policed by any number of special units over which they have no control, their priorities determined by centralized planning units, and their officers under control of a centralized 911 system, precinct commanders lack authority and resources and are left with little to do other than follow the dictates of the chief. At the precinct level, initiative and leadership are lost, and commanders are unable to respond to local problems. Precinct commanders might have a few community and special officers to try to reach out to neighborhoods, but "real" police work is con-

trolled and carried out elsewhere. The central bureaucracy commandeers personnel and other resources, establishes priorities, and, through 911 and its requirement that police stay "in service," sequesters the lion's share of officers' time.

Second, the results are equally devastating to patrol officers' initiative. Special units and detectives come into officers' beats with impunity. Specialized personnel share information with beat officers on the basis of their "need to know"—which in practice

means patrol officers are generally left in the dark about important information regarding their beats. This is particularly problematic in departments that formally or informally reward arrests (with assignment to special units, promotions, court overtime, and the like).

Special unit personnel tend to share useless information with patrol officers but to hoard information that may result in arrests. Moreover, it is not unusual for beat officers to know nothing in advance about planned special operations in their areas. Depending on the depart-


ment, patrol officers feel demeaned, frustrated, and bitter. The idea of being "chiefs of their beats" is a joke to most of them. In the worst case, officers are dispatched to a "gang war" call that is really a shootout between special unit officers and drug dealers—a situation that jeopardizes both patrol officers and special unit personnel.

How to Decentralize

Decentralization—that is, devolution of authority to lower levels of police organizations—is essential in large cities because problems are local. No city has a drug problem; no city has a violence problem; no city has a disorder problem. The substance, shape, and importance of problems vary by neighborhood.



NEIGHBORHOOD COPS



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The drug problem in one neighborhood is gangs shooting at each other. In another, it is a traffic problem: cars lined up blocking streets. In another, the drug problem is panhandlers blocking store entrances. In yet another, it is youths partying in parks. And so on. Neighborhood police officers need the time and resources to discover, understand, and deal with local problems. They also need the authority to work with citizens in negotiating priorities and devising solutions.

This is not to say that there are no citywide problems. But the vast majority of urban police business is neighborhood-based. Moreover, policing is, by its very nature, geographical. Since their inception, police departments have always distributed officers throughout cities rather than clustered them in centralized offices where they would be amenable to direct supervision.

The crucial principle of community policing is that the local precinct should provide total police services—including criminal investigation, drug enforcement, and other services that are now the province of centralized units. A variety of means could be employed toward this end—organizing geographically, flattening police organizations (reducing the number of ranks), “de-squading” departments (reducing the number and size of special units), rethinking how demand comes into police departments (recognizing that 911 calls are only one source of demand), and others. All are required to some extent. New York City, for example, could give “superchiefs” jurisdiction over a bor-

ough rather than a function, reduce ranks substantially, and cut back on special units while making them responsive to patrol officers.

Strong leadership would be essential in a decentralized department. The chief (or commissioner) would strive to infuse the department with a vision of policing congruent with democratic governance and constitutional values. The chief would also be in charge of such department-wide matters as recruitment and training, allocation of personnel and resources among precincts, and coordination of activities both among precincts and with other governmental agencies.

Precinct commanders (or captains) would be held accountable for the quality of policing in their neighborhoods, based on both departmental values and local needs. There would inevitably be some tension between the departmental mission and the perceived needs of neighborhood residents; not all neighborhood demands, after all, are legitimate. Precinct performance would be judged on such factors as responsiveness to neighborhood concerns, officer integrity and judiciousness, integration of police activities with those of other problem-solving agencies (private as well as governmental), cooperation with other police precincts, and efficient use of resources. Commanders would structure beats congruent with neighborhoods, assign officers to beats and shifts, and work with those in the community to identify local problems and solutions.

What must be put aside in this mandate for change is the reflexive move to centralize police authority whenever some crisis, especially a corruption crisis, develops. During the mid-1980s, for example, a relatively small number of police officers in a New York City precinct were suspected of financial corruption. An order went out of the commissioner’s office: every patrol officer in the department would be rotated from beat to beat every six months. The assumptions behind this order were that familiarity breeds corruption and that police work is so standardized and routinized that officers can be moved from beat to beat with few consequences. The first assumption is arguably true in

some cases, although the second assumption, as shown, is clearly false, and depends on the neighborhoods. Police officers, and the officers have just

The current attempt to combat corruption; in a departmentalize based on officers will corruption guarantee many of the implemented after the Kr 1970s were nature of corruption referred to “management ethos through trouble.” The course, is to

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some cases, although I will return to this point. The second assumption, as research and experience have shown, is clearly false. Police work is complex, subtle, and dependent on information. Moreover, citizens do not want strangers policing their neighborhoods. Police must earn the respect and trust of citizens, and that takes time—at six months most officers have just achieved it.

The crucial point is that it is one thing to attempt to organize police departments to prevent corruption; it is something else entirely to organize a department to ensure quality policing. To organize based on the misguided assumption that all officers will cynically exploit opportunities for corruption guarantees ineffective policing. Perhaps many of the draconian anticorruption measures implemented in the New York Police Department after the Knapp Commission report of the early 1970s were necessary because of the systemic nature of corruption then. But these measures—referred to by at least one of their advocates as “management by terror”—have also created an ethos throughout the department of “staying out of trouble.” The surest way to stay out of trouble, of course, is to do nothing.

Controlling corruption will always be difficult. But this problem is not unique to policing. In any organization—a university, a pharmaceutical company, a widget maker, or a police department—some corruption will inevitably exist. Acknowledging this does not

imply that corruption is acceptable. Both corruption and abuse still occur far too often in American police departments. But citizens must understand that contemporary corruption and abuse do not begin to approach the “bad old days” of ward bosses or the systematic police abuse of African-Americans during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In no way should this be read as a justification of corruption and abuse. Far from it. It means taking them seriously, but doing the hard work—the *very* hard work—of both maintaining integrity and providing quality police services to communities. Settling for the appearance of control at the expense of good policing is the ultimate form of corruption. The business of the organization becomes looking good rather than regaining control over streets, neighborhoods, and public spaces. Community policing can be made to work only by developing police leadership that inspires a democratic vision of policing—police as an extension of the citizenry rather than as warriors—and by establishing a congruence between the realities of police work and the organization and management of departments. Policing ultimately is neighborhood-based and decentralized—that is its very nature. If police departments’ organizational structure and management processes reflected this reality, officers like those in Washington Square Park would be far better able to do what citizens expect of them. ■

Date: 03/10/95 Time: 14:55

Federal Officers to Join in Guns Crackdown in Capital

WASHINGTON (AP) Federal officers are teaming with local police in a crackdown on illegal guns in the nation's capital.

The plan, dubbed ``Operation Cease-Fire,'' calls for special anti-weapons teams to be dispatched to six of the city's seven police districts, U.S. Attorney Eric Holder said Thursday.

Each team will have at least one agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms assigned to trace confiscated weapons. Some teams will include U.S. marshals to allow them to cross from the district into suburban Maryland and Virginia to pursue suspects.

``We have stressed the need to address this problem in a regional way, and I think this represents an unprecedented amount of law-enforcement talent,'' Holder said after a closed meeting of more than 70 federal, local and state law-enforcement officials.

Last year the Metropolitan Police Department and other agencies confiscated more than 4,200 illegal guns in the District of Columbia, which has one of the nation's highest murder rates.

Illegal guns are assumed to far outnumber legally registered weapons in Washington. In practice, no gun licenses are issued in the district except for law-enforcement officers, said Kevin Olson, a spokesman for the U.S. attorney's office.

``Operation Cease-Fire'' include traffic stops and what Holder calls ``special enforcement operations'' to get illegal guns. Holder pledged the seizures would be ``proper and constitutional,'' but did not elaborate.

The plan includes a proposal for upgrading possession of an illegal firearm from a misdemeanor to a felony. The proposal is now before the city council, where its fate is uncertain.

Holder pledged to appoint a firearms prosecutor to handle cases developed during the operation.

He also has endorsed a citywide curfew for teens under 16, an idea that has been revived in the city council after being rejected last year.

APNP-03-10-95 1459EST



National Institute of Justice

Update

Jeremy Travis, Director

November 1994

The Kansas City Gun Experiment

Gun crime has been increasing rapidly throughout the Nation, especially in inner-city areas. To learn whether vigorous enforcement of existing gun laws could reduce gun crime, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsored an evaluation of the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department's "Weed and Seed" program. The evaluation found that the program's success in getting more guns off the street in one violent Kansas City neighborhood reduced gun crimes there by almost 50 percent during a 6-month period. The data indicate that more than two gun crimes were prevented for every gun seized.

Study design

For 29 weeks, from July 7, 1992, to January 27, 1993, police patrols were increased in gun crime "hot spots" in a target area. The researchers identified the hot spot locations by computer analysis of all gun crimes in the target area, patrol beat 144 in the Central Patrol District. An 80-block neighborhood normally covered by one patrol car, the target area had a homicide rate 20 times higher than the national average. The population was almost entirely nonwhite, with more than two-thirds of all residences being owner-occupied, single-family, detached homes.

In the target area, assigned officers focused exclusively on gun detection through proactive, directed patrol and were not required to answer calls for service. The extra patrol was handled by four officers who worked 6 hours of overtime each night (from 7 p.m. to 1 a.m.) for 176 nights, with only two officers working an additional 24 nights, for a total of 4,512 officer-hours and 2,256 patrol car-hours.

Guns were found by officers on the directed patrols during frisks and searches and following arrests on other charges. To ensure the protection of civil liberties, every search had to conform to legal guidelines for adequate articulable suspicion and every arrest for carrying concealed weapons had to be approved by a supervisory detective.

To gather information, an onsite University of Maryland evaluator accompanied the officers on 300 hours of directed patrol in the target area. Property room data on guns seized, as well as computerized crime reports, calls for service data, and arrest records, were analyzed over two time periods: the 29 weeks before the program began in 1992 and the 29 weeks while the program was active.

Data for the same time period were also collected for a comparison area (patrol beat 242 in the Metro Patrol District), which had about the same volume of violent crime and drive-by shootings as the target area. In the comparison area no changes were made in the number or duties of patrol officers.

Increased enforcement

During the program period, officers working overtime on the directed patrols reported spending 3.27 car-hours of the 12 car-hours per night (or 27 percent of their time) actually patrolling the target area, for a total of 1,218 officer-hours of potential gun detection. The officers thus spent about 70 percent of their time processing arrests and performing other patrol-related duties.

Despite the limited amount of time the officers actually spent on patrol in the target area, the volume of activity was significant. The officers on directed patrol issued 1,090 traffic citations and made 948 car checks, 532 pedestrian checks, 170 State or Federal arrests, and 446 city arrests, for an average of one intervention every 40 minutes per patrol car.

Guns seized

In the target area, 65 percent more guns were seized in the second half of 1992 than in the first half; gun seizures increased from 46 in the first 6 months of 1992 to 76 in the last 6 months. In the comparison area, however, gun seizures decreased slightly in the second half of 1992.

Related findings include:

- Traffic stops were the most productive means of finding illegal guns, yielding an average of one gun discovered for every 28 stops.
- The ratio of guns seized to actual time spent on patrol in the target area was one gun seized per 84 officer-hours.
- Two-thirds of the persons arrested for gun carrying in the target area were not residents of the target area.

Impact on gun crimes

Data from the first and second halves of 1992 show that gun crimes declined significantly in the target area—83 fewer gun crimes were committed, a 49 percent decline—while they increased slightly in the comparison area.

Related findings include:

- Drive-by shootings dropped from 7 to 1 in the target area, while doubling from 6 to 12 in the comparison area.
- Only gun crimes were affected by the directed patrols. No changes were observed (in either the target or the comparison areas) in the number of calls for service or in the total number of other violent and nonviolent crimes reported.
- After the directed patrols stopped, crimes involving guns gradually increased for the first 5 months of 1993. When the patrols resumed in June 1993, gun crimes decreased again, although not as consistently as in the second half of 1992.
- The decline in gun crimes in the target area did not appear to cause a displacement of crime to adjoining neighborhoods. Gun crimes did not increase significantly in any of the surrounding seven patrol beats.

Conclusion

This study shows that a police department can successfully implement a program to increase seizures of illegally carried guns in high gun-crime areas. Police officers can be very productive when given the opportunity to focus on gun detection in identified crime hot spots without being obligated to answer calls for service. In addition, gun seizures do not appear to require large tactical operations; in the Kansas City high-crime target area, the officers worked in two-officer patrol units and no gun attacks on officers were reported during the directed patrols. Directed patrols were also shown to be, on average, about three times more cost-effective in getting guns off the street than routine police activity.

The researchers note that much remains to be learned about gun detection and seizure by police through evaluations of similar programs. But before such studies are completed, many cities will have to make decisions about how to respond to rising gun crime. A citywide version of this program was implemented (without overtime) in Indianapolis, Indiana in October 1994. Whether a citywide program can replicate the results that the Kansas City experiment achieved in a small area is the next important question to be answered.

Results from the evaluation, supported in part by NIJ grant 91-DD-CX-K056, are reported in an NIJ Research in Brief, *The Kansas City Gun Experiment*, by University of Maryland Criminology Professor Lawrence W. Sherman, who directed the study in collaboration with Dennis P. Hogan and James W. Shaw. The Research in Brief can be obtained from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850, 800-851-3420. Ask for NCJ 150855.

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Department of Justice

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**POLICE PATROLS TARGETED TO ILLEGAL GUN DETECTION HAVE A
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON GUN-RELATED CRIME**

WASHINGTON, D.C.-- Increased seizures of illegally carried guns lead to a decrease in gun crime, according to study results announced today by the Department of Justice. Police in Kansas City, Missouri reduced gun crimes in one neighborhood by almost 50 percent in six months by deploying extra police patrol teams focused exclusively on gun detection. This decline did not appear to displace crime to adjoining neighborhoods.

These findings come from an evaluation of the Kansas City "gun experiment" in which supplemental police patrols focused on gun detection in one high-crime neighborhood for six months. During this time, police seized 65 percent more guns, and gun crime declined 49 percent. Researchers estimate that more than two gun crimes were prevented for every gun seized.

"This study shows the impact of focused enforcement targeted at reducing gun crime in high crime neighborhoods," said National Institute of Justice Director Jeremy Travis. "It is our hope that other communities can use these findings to adopt similar gun programs to reduce gun crime."

(MORE)

The evaluation examined an 80-block neighborhood that had a homicide rate 20 times higher than the national average. Four officers patrolled gun crime "hot spots" between 7 p.m. and 1 a.m. They focused exclusively on gun detection and did not respond to calls for service.

Another neighborhood that had a similar crime problem but did not have the enhanced patrol focusing on gun detection served as a control on the study. There was neither an increase in gun seizures nor a decrease in gun crimes in this community during the study period. Drive-by shootings declined from 7 to 1 in the target area, but doubled from 6 to 12 in the control neighborhood several miles away. Gun crimes showed no increase in the 7 beats adjoining the target area.

This study is part of an evaluation of the Kansas City Police Department's "Weed and Seed" program, a comprehensive effort to revitalize high-crime neighborhoods. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the principal research arm of the Justice Department, sponsored the study, which was conducted by a team of researchers led by University of Maryland Professor Lawrence Sherman.

Evaluators accompanied the patrol team and also analyzed property room data on guns seized, computerized crime reports, calls for service, and arrest records. They compared the preceding six months with the study period, which was July 7, 1992 to January 27, 1993.

(MORE)

The researchers are now implementing a citywide version of this program for Indianapolis, Indiana to determine whether the results can be replicated in a larger area.

Results of the evaluation can be found in the NIJ Update, "The Kansas City Gun Experiment," which can be obtained from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Box 6000, Rockville, Maryland 20850, 1-800-851-3420 or in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, 301-251-5500.

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After hours contact: Chris Rizzuto 703-525-1792

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Perspectives on Policing



July 1993

No. 17

A Publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Implementing Community Policing: The Administrative Problem

By George L. Kelling and William J. Bratton

The current generation of police leadership, tuned to changes in American society, technology, and economics, is revising the strategy of municipal policing. Whether identified as community or problem-oriented policing, the current changes represent nothing less than a strategic shift in the basic "business" of policing. As dedicated as they are, as supported by research, as responsive to neighborhood demands for change, this generation of reformers finds regeneration and strategic repositioning as difficult as has any other. Why is it that innovators of every generation have so much difficulty shifting the strategies of their organizations and professions?

For police executives, three sources of resistance seem to be foremost in their minds and conversations: unions, detectives, and mid-management. This paper will deal with mid-management. We have repeatedly heard top police executives say with frustration, "If only it wasn't for mid-management," or "If only I could wipe out lieutenants, I could really change this department." The experience with team policing during the 1970's seemed to confirm this impression empirically. Sherman et al. conclude in their case studies of team policing: "Mid-management of the departments [studied], seeing team policing as a threat to their power, subverted and, in some cases, actively sabotaged the plans."¹

Yet, there are problems with this formulation. Review of the literature on mid-management presents a more complicated picture. On the one hand, many articles, especially those in journals of a semipopular nature, portray mid-managers as a dying breed in organizations, especially in those organizations that are being downsized or in which their services or products are information-based. Certainly, many organizations are portrayed as top-heavy, especially at mid-managerial levels. This is not just a "pop" view; Peter Drucker states it strongly.

Community policing represents a new future for American law enforcement, changing the way our Nation's police respond to the communities they serve. This report, one in a series entitled *Perspectives on Policing*, is based on discussions held in the Executive Session on Policing sponsored by NIJ at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed as part of the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and is funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations. The success of the police mission now and in the years ahead is the common goal of those who have participated in the Executive Session. Helping to achieve that goal is the purpose of these reports.

The Executive Session on Policing has brought together police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and many others in periodic meetings to focus on modern strategies that produce better results. The rapid growth of these strategies shows the willingness of American police executives to test new approaches to crime, disorder, drugs, and fear in their communities.

Michael J. Russell
Acting Director
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice

Mark H. Moore
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
[M]iddle managements today tend to be overstaffed to the point of obesity. . . . This slows the decision process to a crawl and makes the organization increasingly incapable

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Perspectives on Policing



June 1988

No. 1

A publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Police and Communities: the Quiet Revolution

By George L. Kelling

Introduction

A quiet revolution is reshaping American policing.

Police in dozens of communities are returning to foot patrol. In many communities, police are surveying citizens to learn what they believe to be their most serious neighborhood problems. Many police departments are finding alternatives to rapidly responding to the majority of calls for service. Many departments are targeting resources on citizen fear of crime by concentrating on disorder. Organizing citizens' groups has become a priority in many departments. Increasingly, police departments are looking for means to evaluate themselves on their contribution to the quality of neighborhood life, not just crime statistics. Are such activities the business of policing? In a crescendo, police are answering yes.

True, such activities contrast with popular images of police: the "thin blue line" separating plundering villains from peaceful residents and storekeepers, and racing through city streets in high-powered cars with sirens wailing and lights flashing. Yet, in city after city, a new vision of policing is taking hold of the imagination of progressive police and gratified citizens. Note the 1987 report of the Philadelphia Task Force. Dismissing the notion of police as Philadelphia's professional defense against crime, and its residents as passive recipients of police ministrations, the report affirms new police values:

Because the current strategy for policing Philadelphia emphasizes crime control and neglects the Department's need to be accountable to the public and for a partnership with it, the task force recommends: The police commissioner should formulate an explicit mission statement for the Department that will guide planning and operations toward a strategy of "community"

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The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

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James K. Stewart
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
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Perspectives on Policing



June 1988

No. 2

A publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Crime and Policing

By Mark H. Moore, Robert C. Trojanowicz, and George L. Kelling

The core mission of the police is to control crime. No one disputes this. Indeed, professional crime fighting enjoys wide public support as the basic strategy of policing precisely because it embodies a deep commitment to this objective. In contrast, other proposed strategies such as problem-solving or community policing appear on the surface to blur this focus.¹ If these strategies were to leave the community more vulnerable to criminal victimization, they would be undesirable alternatives. In judging the value of alternative police strategies in controlling crime, however, one should not be misled by rhetoric or mere expressed commitment to the goal; one must keep one's eye on demonstrated effectiveness in achieving the goal.

Professional crime-fighting now relies predominantly on three tactics: (1) motorized patrol; (2) rapid response to calls for service; and (3) retrospective investigation of crimes.² Over the past few decades, police responsiveness has been enhanced by connecting police to citizens by telephones, radios, and cars, and by matching police officer schedules and locations to anticipated calls for service.³ The police focus on serious crime has also been sharpened by screening calls for service, targeting patrol, and developing forensic technology (e.g., automated fingerprint systems, computerized criminal record files, etc.).⁴

Although these tactics have scored their successes, they have been criticized within and outside policing for being reactive rather than proactive. They have also been criticized for failing to prevent crime.⁵

Reactive tactics have some virtues, of course. The police go where crimes have occurred and when citizens have summoned them; otherwise, they do not intrude. The police keep their distance from the community, and thereby retain their impartiality. They do not develop the sorts of relationships with citizens that could bias their responses to crime incidents. These are virtues insofar as they protect citizens from an overly intrusive, too familiar police.

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Perspectives on Policing



June 1988

No. 3

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Policing and the Fear of Crime

By Mark H. Moore and Robert C. Trojanowicz

When crimes occur—when a ghetto teenager is shot to death in a gang war, when an elderly woman is mugged for her social security check, when a nurse is raped in a hospital parking lot, when one driver is punched by another in a dispute over a parking place, when a black family's new home is vandalized—society's attention is naturally focused on the victims and their material losses. Their wounds, bruises, lost property, and inconvenience can be seen, touched, and counted. These are the concrete signs of criminal victimization.

Behind the immediate, concrete losses of crime victims, however, is a different, more abstract crime problem—that of fear. For victims, fear is often the largest and most enduring legacy of their victimization. The raped nurse will feel vulnerable long after her cuts and bruises heal. The harassed black family suffers far more from the fear of neighborhood hostility than the inconvenience of repairing their property.

For the rest of us—the not-recently, or not-yet victimized—fear becomes a contagious agent spreading the injuriousness of criminal victimization. The gang member's death makes parents despair of their children's future. The mugging of the elderly woman teaches elderly residents to fear the streets and the teenagers who roam them. The fight over the parking place confirms the general fear of strangers. The harassment of the black family makes other minorities reluctant to claim their rights. In these ways, fear extends the damage of criminal victimization.

Of course, fear is not totally unproductive. It prompts caution among citizens and thereby reduces criminal opportunities. Too, it motivates citizens to shoulder some of the burdens of crime control by buying locks and dogs, thereby adding to general deterrence. And fear kindles enthusiasm for publicly supported crime control measures. Thus, reasonable fears, channeled in constructive directions, prepare society to deal with crime. It is only when fear is unreasonable, or generates

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
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November 1988

No. 7

A publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Police Accountability and Community Policing

By George L. Kelling, Robert Wasserman, and Hubert Williams

The accountability of individual police officers is a fundamental issue for police executives. This is fitting: police officers are the public officials society has authorized, even obliged, to use force. Ensuring that police officers use that warrant equitably, legally, and economically on behalf of citizens is at the core of police administration. The enduring concern of police executives to ensure accountability in American policing is a reflection of their professional commitment.

Not only is it fitting that a police executive give high priority to ensuring the accountability of police officers, it is essential to surviving as the leader of a police department. Police chiefs continually worry about abuse of authority: brutality; misuse of force, especially deadly force; over-enforcement of the law; bribery; manufacture of evidence in the name of efficiency or success; failure to apply the law because of personal interests; and discrimination against particular individuals or groups. These issues are grist for the mill of persistent and influential watchdog groups concerned about impartial enforcement under the law—the media, civil rights groups, and lawyers. Rising crime or fear of crime may be problematic for police administrators, but rarely does either threaten their survival. Scandals associated with abuse of authority, however, do jeopardize organizational stability and continuity of leadership.

As a consequence, it is not surprising that police leaders have developed organizational mechanisms of control that seek to ensure police accountability to both the law and the policies and procedures of police departments. This paper reviews the ways police administrators try to control the accountability of individual police officers and examines the relationship between accountability procedures and community policing.

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May 1989

No. 10

A publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Neighborhoods and Police: The Maintenance of Civil Authority

By George L. Kelling and James K. Stewart

A cardinal tenet of community policing is that a new relationship between police and neighborhoods is required if the quality of residential and commercial life is to be protected or improved in cities. This assertion raises several questions. What are neighborhoods? Do they exist, or are they largely a concoction of nostalgic policymakers, police reformers, and revisionists who perpetuate ideals that may or may not have existed in the past, but certainly are outside of current urban experience? Assuming that neighborhoods exist, what should their relationship be with police? What opportunities are offered both to neighborhoods and to police by restructuring their relationship? How should police resolve the potential conflict between the rule of law and neighborhood standards of conduct which they might be asked to uphold?

This paper addresses these questions by focusing upon three aspects of neighborhoods: (1) the neighborhood as polity; (2) the ability of a neighborhood to defend itself against crime and disorder without eliminating civility and justice from social relations there; and (3) alternate visions of the role of municipal police in neighborhoods.

Neighborhood as polity

At a minimum, neighborhoods are places in which people live or work near each other, recognize their recurring proximity, and signal this recognition to each other.¹ As Suttles² notes, residents of cities construct "cognitive maps" in which they allocate distinctive places as "theirs"—their neighborhood. Moreover, neighbors are not just the residents of a special geographical area but also include shopkeepers and their employees, other workers who frequent areas regularly (postal workers, for example), and even the homeless.³

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Perspectives on Policing



September 1989

No. 11

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John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

The Police and Drugs

By Mark H. Moore and Mark A.R. Kleiman

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The police sometimes seem overwhelmed. Occasionally they are outgunned. More often, they are simply overmatched by the resilience of the drug commerce. Furthermore, their potential impact is neutralized by the incapacity of the courts and penal system to mete out deserved punishments.

Urgent problems and limited resources demand managerial thought for their resolution. Thus, police executives facing the drug problem might usefully consider four strategic questions:

- What goals might reasonably be set for drug enforcement?
- What parts of the police department engage the drug problem and to what effect?
- What role can citizens and community groups usefully (and properly) play in coping with the problem?
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Perspectives on Policing



September 1989

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A publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Community Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officials

By Lee P. Brown

Like many other social institutions, American police departments are responding to rapid social change and emerging problems by rethinking their basic strategies. In response to problems such as crime, drugs, fear, and urban decay, the police have begun experimenting with new approaches to their tasks.

Among the most prominent new approaches is the concept of community policing. Viewed from one perspective, it is not a new concept; the principles can be traced back to some of policing's oldest traditions. More recently, some of the important principles of community policing have been reflected in particular programs initiated in a variety of places within police departments.

What is new is the idea that community policing is not a particular program within a department, but instead should become the dominant philosophy throughout the department. Exactly what it means for community policing to become a department-wide philosophy and how a police executive can shift an organization from a more traditional philosophy to a community-policing philosophy has been unclear.

Our experience in Houston is beginning to clarify these issues. We are developing a clear, concrete picture of what it means to operate a police department committed to a philosophy of community policing. We have also learned how to manage the process of evolution towards a philosophy of community policing. And we are learning how the basic administrative and managerial systems of the department

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Author's Note: Special thanks are expressed to Lt. Timothy N. Oettmeier for his initial research, upon which this essay is based.

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

Research in Brief

Charles B. DeWitt, Director

October 1992

State and Local Money Laundering Control Strategies

by Clifford Karchmer and Douglas Ruch

Money generated by narcotics trafficking and other profit-motivated crime in the United States is estimated at \$300 billion annually. Although analysts have difficulty accurately counting well-hidden crime proceeds, the amounts are staggering. Moreover, the effects of "dirty money" on legitimate commerce are grave.

Convenience, relative anonymity, and universal acceptability make hard cash the preferred medium of exchange in illegal

transactions. Drug traffickers and other racketeers who accumulate large cash inventories face serious risks of confiscation and punishment if considerable, unexplained cash hoards are discovered. For these criminals to fully benefit from their illicit activities, they must first convert those cash proceeds to an alternative medium—one that is both easier than cash to use in everyday commerce and that avoids pointing, even indirectly, to the illegal activity that generated it.

"Money laundering" is a term that describes the process of converting illegally earned assets, originating as cash, to one or more alternative forms to conceal such incriminating factors as illegal origin and true ownership. Recently, through heavy colloquial use, the term's meaning has broadened to refer not only to individual acts of laundering, but also to many complex steps of illegal asset conversion, beyond the basic exchange of cash, for less conspicuous and more socially acceptable methods of payment.

From the Director

In the past decade, drug trafficking and money laundering operations have become more profitable, more pervasive, and more sophisticated. Colombian drug cartels and other criminal organizations operate easily across international borders, forming joint ventures and limited partnerships among themselves and with other groups. They also have access to top legal and financial advisors.

In the United States, billions of dollars are "laundered" annually through complex illegal asset conversions. The presence of these sophisticated criminal activities has posed special problems for regulatory and criminal justice agencies, especially State and local agencies, due to their limited resources, constraints of State law, and the cross-jurisdictional nature of these activities. To effectively meet the challenge of this powerfully corrupt influence, it has become evident that all criminal justice agencies will need to increase their efforts to combat illegal financial activities.

A National Institute of Justice (NIJ) study revealed that most State and local law enforcement agencies already have sufficient legal jurisdiction to support a successful

money laundering enforcement program. The study concluded that identifying and creatively using existing laws were more important than creating an "omnibus" money laundering statute. However, agencies need to learn how to develop enforcement strategies and detection techniques that creatively use existing laws. NIJ has begun a national assessment of money laundering patterns and strategies of regulation and control that will identify effective techniques for prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of these offenses.

This *Research in Brief* is intended to assist managers of State and local law enforcement agencies in developing an appropriate enforcement role. It includes an overview of the money laundering process, steps involved in laundering schemes, and issues to consider in developing investigative strategies. It discusses the role of white-collar professionals who engage in fraud through their manipulation of financial, commercial, and legal procedures to conceal the origin or true ownership of the assets under their control. Strategies are outlined for developing money laundering intelligence programs and investigative techniques.

The Federal Government has traditionally taken the lead in building financially oriented cases against laundering operations. However, given changes in State laws and State and local crime-fighting priorities, the time is ripe to expand the roles of State and local agencies in addressing money laundering. Because of the growth of money laundering activities, State and local agencies need to join the front-line forces to combat this nationwide problem. In addition to arming themselves with aggressive enforcement programs and money laundering statutes, agencies can enhance their programs by continuing to work cooperatively with Federal agencies.

The National Institute of Justice is dedicated to supporting law enforcement investigations that have proven to be especially productive in identifying and incapacitating high-level operatives in money laundering and other financial crimes. It is essential that we maintain the integrity of our Nation's commercial life.

Charles B. DeWitt
Director
National Institute of Justice

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Community Policing Exchange

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MARCH/APRIL 1995

REPORTING COMMUNITY POLICING PARTNERSHIPS



The Community Policing Consortium comprises four of the leading policing organizations in the United States: the International Association of Chiefs of Police; the National Sheriffs' Association; the Police Executive Research Forum; and the Police Foundation. The Consortium is funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Community Policing Exchange strives to assist law enforcement practitioners by bridging the distance between communities, facilitating the exchange of information, and giving voice to all involved in the implementation of community policing.

Those interested in submitting newsworthy articles or features for publication can contact the Consortium at:

The Community Policing Consortium
1726 M Street, NW
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Local: (202) 833-3305

Community Policing Strategies Offer Promise Of Improved Public Safety

The time is ripe for change within policing, within government, within our communities. Violent crime rates are soaring. Inner cities continue to deteriorate.

Suburbs, once havens from the harsh realities of urban decay, can no longer claim that privilege. And citizens in many areas of the country are increasingly frustrated and in many cases alienated from the police.

In the search for solutions, the concept of community policing surfaces with ever more regularity. There have been escalating demands for change throughout the criminal justice system. Nowhere within that system has the need for a new approach been more apparent than in law enforcement. In addition to calls for better laws and tougher enforcement, have been those for a different style of policing, one focused on prevention as well as on apprehension. The clear winner thus far has been community policing.

But for all the recent attention given to the concept—by academics, the media, politicians, civic leaders—community policing is not a proven panacea. Indeed, police experts say that many questions remain not only about how the community policing strategy will be implemented on a grand scale, but also about the expected results of such a program. This is largely why the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) established the Community Policing Consortium. Led in conjunction with BJA by four national police organizations—the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs' Association, the Police Executive Research Forum, and the Police Foundation—the Consortium was established to help the nation's police plan and implement community policing strategies in their communities. The passage of the 1994 crime bill reinforces the federal government's commitment to that change.

But it is the police who will be at the cutting edge. They, in essence, are being called upon to provide leadership in the quest to safeguard and revitalize our communities. So they



The community policing concept promotes increased citizen-officer contact. New strategies contribute to public safety.

must ask the question, "What is community policing and what will it do for my department and the community it serves?"

Community policing is an evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary idea. Since the late 1970s, it has cropped up as a police strategy in various ways, in various places, under various names, including team policing, problem-oriented policing, and community-oriented policing. While programs, in most instances, could hardly be called identical, they all had one common element. The police were supposed to get out of their patrol cars and into their neighborhoods. For decades prior, conventional wisdom had held that omnipresent motor patrol would deter crime. Research in the early 1970s proved that assumption to be false.

It also showed empirically that there were benefits to turning to a style of policing reminiscent of that described by T.A. Critchley writing

about the establishment of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829. In *A History of Police in England and Wales*, Critchley writes that "From the start, the police was to be a homogeneous and democratic body, in tune with the people, belonging to the people, and drawing its strength from the people." England's Home Secretary Robert Peel made certain that the following would be included in instructions to the new force: "It should be understood at the outset, that the object to be attained is the prevention of crime. To this great end every effort of the police is to be directed. The security of person and property and the preservation of a police establishment will thus be better effected than by the detection and punishment of the offender after he has succeeded in committing crime..."

Research done on early community policing strategies clearly shows that they made residents

(Continued on page 2)

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National Institute of Justice

Research in Action

Jeremy Travis, Director

October 1994

Rural Crime and Rural Policing

by Ralph A. Weisheit, Ph.D., David N. Falcone, Ph.D.,
and L. Edward Wells, Ph.D.

Police practices vary from one area to another, and studying the varieties of police behavior can yield important insights into the role of law enforcement officers in a community. Most studies of variations in police behavior have been conducted in urban settings. Neglecting rural policing and rural crime might be justifiable if there is nothing about policing, crime, or the community in rural environments that precludes directly applying knowledge from urban areas. It is evident, however, that rural environments are distinct from urban environments in ways that affect policing, crime, and public policy.

The following discussion examines what is known about rural crime, rural policing, and how they are shaped by the rural environment. It is obvious that rural policing is shaped by the nature of rural crime and the features that distinguish rural culture and rural life. Consequently, the discussion begins with a description of what is known about rural crime.

Rural crime

This section first examines rural versus urban crime patterns and then shifts to a description of patterns of rural crime.

Changes in rural crime are also considered, and they are followed by a discussion of special issues and emerging problems.

Rural crime versus urban crime

Most research concludes that crime is less frequent in rural areas, and it is often speculated that greater informal controls in rural areas protect against high crime rates.¹ The belief that crime is less frequent in rural areas is supported by recent Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data that present crime by type and population group. Of particular interest is a

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Brief: An overview of the research literature and an analysis of rural crime and rural policing issues, and how the distinctive elements of the rural environment affect them.

Key issues: Although rural crime rates have been lower than urban crime rates, patterns of rural crime indicate both the exporting of urban problems to rural areas and unique problems.

Key findings: Even though less is known about rural crime than urban crime, available information indicates some key dimensions:

- ◆ Urban drug trafficking has been seen as the driving force behind the spread of drug use and the development of gangs in rural areas.

- ◆ Crimes such as homicide, rape, and assault are more likely to occur among acquaintances than is true in urban areas.

- ◆ Crimes unique to the rural environment include agricultural crimes (e.g., thefts of crop and timber) and wildlife crimes (e.g., poaching).

- ◆ Rural law enforcement officers, more than their urban counterparts, often work with lower budgets, less staff, less equipment, and fewer written policies to govern their operations. Despite these problems, rural police appear to be more efficient than urban police and more respected by the public.

- ◆ Features of the rural culture that affect law enforcement operations include informal social control among citizens, a mistrust of government, and a reluctance

to share internal problems. These characteristics may result, for example, in failure to report a crime out of the belief that it is a private matter.

- ◆ Major differences among rural areas exist, such as border areas may have problems with illegal immigrants while other areas may have illegal marijuana crops.

Differences among rural areas as well as differences between urban and rural areas have implications for crime and law enforcement responses. Previous studies have been limited and sometimes contradictory; explanations should be sought through specific examination of particular rural crime issues.

Target audience: Rural law enforcement officers, state and local policymakers, and researchers.

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The Police and Drugs

By Mark H. Moore and Mark A.R. Kleiman

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The police sometimes seem overwhelmed. Occasionally they are outgunned. More often, they are simply overmatched by the resilience of the drug commerce. Furthermore, their potential impact is neutralized by the incapacity of the courts and penal system to mete out deserved punishments.

Urgent problems and limited resources demand managerial thought for their resolution. Thus, police executives facing the drug problem might usefully consider four strategic questions:

- What goals might reasonably be set for drug enforcement?
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Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report

A LEMAS Report

Drug Enforcement by Police and Sheriffs' Departments, 1990

By Brian A. Reaves, Ph.D.
BJS Statistician

In 1990, about 9,300 local police departments and 2,500 sheriffs' departments had primary responsibility for the enforcement of drug laws. Collectively, these agencies employed 466,000 full-time officers, 92% of all local police and sheriffs' officers nationwide. In addition, 34 State police departments, employing 43,000 officers, had primary drug enforcement responsibilities.

This report presents information collected from State and local law enforcement agencies with primary drug enforcement responsibilities. It includes information on types of illegal drugs seized, operation of special drug units, multiagency task force participation, and receipts from drug asset forfeiture programs.

For all agencies the report also summarizes how drug testing policies apply to arrestees, applicants for sworn positions, and employees.

Major findings include the following:

- Among agencies with primary drug enforcement responsibilities that served 50,000 or more residents, over 90% of the police departments and over 80% of the sheriffs' departments operated special drug enforcement units.
- Nationwide, more than 16,000 local police and sheriffs' officers and over 2,000 State police officers were assigned full time to special drug units.

May 1992

Few issues are as important in law enforcement today as how governments at all levels respond to the challenge to rid our society of illicit drugs. This report is drawn from the second triennial survey conducted by the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics program. The survey included new questions about drugs seized, drug enforcement techniques, and testing of arrestees and employees. State and local law enforcement agencies have provided a national understanding of the innovations in the fight against drugs — special drug enforcement units, interagency task forces, and drug asset forfeiture programs. We salute the departments in their cooperation with LEMAS and trust that this profile will prove valuable in their assessments and planning.

Steven D. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director

- Half of local police and sheriffs' departments with primary drug enforcement responsibilities were participating in a multiagency drug enforcement task force. These 6,500 agencies had assigned nearly 10,000 officers full time to such task forces.
- Among departments with primary drug enforcement responsibilities, over 90% of the police departments serving a population of 50,000 or more, and over 90% of the sheriffs' departments serving 250,000 or more residents, received money or goods from a drug asset forfeiture program.

- Among the State police departments with primary drug enforcement responsibilities, 85% operated a special drug unit, 91% participated in a multiagency drug enforcement task force, and 94% received money or goods from drug asset forfeitures.
- About 2 in 3 State police departments and 2 in 5 local police and sheriffs' departments reported that at least some of the persons they arrested were required to take a test for illegal drugs.
- A majority of State police departments and local police departments serving a population of 25,000 or more required that all applicants for sworn positions take a test for illegal drugs.
- About 3% of local law enforcement officers worked for agencies that had a mandatory drug testing program for regular field officers; 17% were employed by agencies that had a random selection testing program for officers.

- Nonprobationary officers could be dismissed after one positive test in about two-thirds of local police and sheriffs' departments and in about three-fourths of State police departments. Nearly all departments had a policy specifying dismissal for two positive drug tests.
- Treatment alternatives were a part of the drug testing policy for employees in about half of State and local police departments and two-fifths of sheriffs' departments. Such alternatives were generally limited to the first positive test results only.

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National Institute of Justice

Research in Action

James K. Stewart, Director

Reprinted from NIJ Reports/No.213 March/April 1989

Local-level drug enforcement: New strategies

by David W. Hayeslip, Jr.

Faced with growing drug-related violence, crime, and mounting public concern, police departments across the country are devising new approaches for combating drug dealing. The strategies include enlisting the support of community groups, seizing assets of both sellers and users, and cracking down on street sales.

The National Institute of Justice has begun to take a look at some of these new strategies. This article shares some preliminary information gathered in discussions with metropolitan police departments, and it concludes with questions that need to be answered concerning the impact of these approaches.

Public concern mounts


The magnitude of drug dealing activity has increased public pressure for police to take stronger action. A May 1988 *New York Times*-CBS News Survey found that 16 percent of respondents considered drugs to be the Nation's number one problem.¹ That is in sharp

contrast to a 1985 Gallup Poll in which only 2 percent said drug abuse was number one.²

Police share the public's concern. They are especially worried about the rise in cocaine use, particularly in its most potent form known as "crack" or "rock." In many jurisdictions police report that crack has become the street drug of choice.

Crack's popularity is relatively new but has been building for several years. NIJ Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) tests have shown significant increases in cocaine use among arrestees in a number of major cities over a 3-year period.³ In Washington, D.C., cocaine use more than tripled.⁴

Crack is considered highly addictive. It is also readily available, trafficked in the open, of high quality (not signifi-



Street enforcement strategies target locations where drug sales are likely to occur. Such locations are frequently public places where the presence of bystanders lends cover to dealers' operations.

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Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin

A LEMAS Report

State and Local Police Departments, 1990

By Brian A. Reaves, Ph.D.
BJS Statistician

During 1990 nearly 17,000 publicly funded State and local law enforcement agencies were operating in the United States. This total included 49 general purpose State police departments and an estimated 12,288 general purpose local police departments. The remainder were sheriffs' departments and special police departments.

In July 1990 the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) program of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) surveyed a nationally representative sample of law enforcement agencies. This report presents data from State and local police departments on expenditures, functions, personnel, salaries, training and educational requirements, equipment, computerization, programs, and policies.

Major findings include the following:

- During fiscal year 1990, local police departments had operating expenditures of \$20.6 billion and employed 460,000 persons on a full-time basis. About 79% of these employees were sworn officers.
- The 49 primary State police departments had operating expenditures of \$3.7 billion and employed 77,000 persons full time, 68% of them sworn officers.
- Most local police departments were small, with about half employing fewer than 10 sworn officers. About 91% of local police departments employed fewer than 50 officers, and 90% served a population of less than 25,000.

February 1992

The Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) program, begun in 1987, provides a detailed portrait of the Nation's law enforcement agencies — their sworn and civilian personnel, hiring requirements, training, functions, expenditures, and equipment such as sidearms, body armor, and computers.

The findings of this Bulletin are based upon reports from State and local police departments that comprise over 60% of the agencies participating in LEMAS. A companion Bulletin on sheriffs' departments covers the same issues. We are confident that this information, which is collected only through exemplary cooperation by law enforcement agencies, is of great value to policymakers and criminal justice officials.

Steven D. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director

- Local police departments serving a population of 1 million or more employed a fifth of all local police officers, and departments serving 100,000 or more residents employed half of all officers.
- Among sworn personnel in local police departments 83.0% were white (non-Hispanic), 10.5% black (non-Hispanic), 5.2% Hispanic, and 1.3% were members of other minority groups. About 8.1% were women.

- In State police departments, 87.1% of the sworn employees were white (non-Hispanic), 7.5% black (non-Hispanic), 4.4% Hispanic, and 1% were other minorities. About 4.6% were women.

- About 6% of local police departments required new officer recruits to have at least some college education, including about 20% of departments serving a population of 250,000 or more. About 18% of State police departments had such a requirement.

- Local police departments serving under 2,500 residents required an average of around 400 hours of training for new officers. Local police departments serving a population of 100,000 or more and State police departments required an average of over 1,000 hours of training.

- Local police departments paid officers an average starting salary of about \$19,000, ranging from an average of \$15,900 in the smallest jurisdictions to \$26,600 in the largest. In State police departments, the average starting salary for new officer recruits was about \$22,800.

- About 73% of local police departments, employing 91% of all local police officers, authorized the use of one or more types of semiautomatic sidearms by their officers. About 80% of State police departments authorized such weapons.

- Approximately 24% of local police departments required all regular field and patrol officers to wear protective body armor while on duty. About 12% of State police departments had such a requirement.

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Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin

Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 1992

By Brian A. Reaves, Ph.D.
BJS Statistician

In 1992 State and local governments funded 17,358 police and sheriffs' departments, including 12,502 general purpose local police departments, 3,086 sheriffs' departments, 49 primary State police departments, and 1,721 special police agencies. These agencies employed approximately 604,000 full-time sworn officers with general arrest powers and 237,000 nonsworn civilian personnel.

Excluding officers in special police agencies, like those for airports, parks, transit systems, and universities, there were 22 full-time police and sheriffs' officers per 10,000 U.S. residents, a 7% increase from 1986.

These findings resulted from a census of the Nation's police and sheriffs' departments conducted for the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) in July 1992. Other findings include the following:

- General purpose local police departments employed 476,261 persons on a full-time basis, including 373,061 full-time sworn officers, 61.8% of all police and sheriffs' officers nationwide.
- About 39% of employees working for sheriffs' departments nationwide were nonsworn civilian personnel, as were 22% of employees working for general purpose local police departments.
- Civilian employment in general purpose police and sheriffs' departments grew 27.5% from 1986 to 1992, about twice as much as that of sworn officers (13.4%).

Every 3 years, through the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) program, the Bureau of Justice Statistics provides the Nation a profile of State and local law enforcement agencies. The LEMAS program collects detailed information about staffing, resources, duties, and policies to describe the more than 17,000 agencies.

Beginning this month, law enforcement agencies complete their LEMAS questionnaires, and in the latter part of 1994, we will publish highlights of what they report. To have a complete listing of agencies for selecting the LEMAS sample, BJS also sponsors the census reported in this Bulletin.

July 1993

The increasing number of employees of police and sheriffs' departments enumerated in the 1986 and 1992 censuses varied by type of employee and agency. The count of civilian employees grew about twice as fast as that of sworn officers with arrest powers. Sheriffs' departments, usually responsible for operating local jails, had 28% more full-time officers and 48% more full-time civilian employees in 1992 than in 1986.

We thank the agencies that cooperated in reporting these data. A fuller description of the criminal justice community is made possible through their participation in BJS law enforcement statistical programs.

Lawrence A. Greenfeld
Acting Director

- The total number of general purpose police and sheriffs' employees increased by 17% from 1986 to 1992, including a 35% increase among sheriffs' departments.
- From 1986 to 1992, the number of general purpose police and sheriffs' officers per 10,000 U.S. residents increased by 7.2%, from 20.6 to 22.0. This included 3.5% more police officers and 21.2% more sheriffs' officers per 10,000 residents.
- Overall, there were 24 police and sheriffs' officers per 10,000 U.S. residents in 1992. This total included 15 local police officers, 5 sheriffs' officers, 2 State police officers, and 2 special police officers.
- Pennsylvania had the highest number of general purpose local police departments (1,049), while Texas had the most sheriffs' departments (255).
- Police and sheriffs' departments in California employed slightly over 100,000 full-time personnel, more than any other State. The State of New York had the most full-time sworn officers, about 68,000.
- There were 38 full-time State and local sworn officers for every 10,000 residents in the State of New York. This was more than any other State, excluding the District of Columbia. West Virginia had the lowest number of State and local officers per 10,000 residents of any State (14).

**CONTROLLING DRUG USE AND CRIME BY DRUG-INVOLVED OFFENDERS:
DRUG TESTING AND TREATMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM**

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April 21, 1992

*Drug
Court*

WHY DRUG TESTING?

The United States has a national substance abuse problem, a national drug dealing problem, and a national crime problem, all linked. Over the last several years successful efforts have been implemented to reduce casual drug use. However, the damage done by drug abuse, drug dealing, and associated crime has not fallen as quickly as the number of casual users. A relatively small number of heavy drug users are responsible for most drug use and most drug-related crime, and the number of heavy users has not been decreasing.

Heavy users are slow to respond to most current approaches to dealing with drug abuse. These "hard-core" users are difficult targets for school, community, and mass media demand-reduction programs due to their firmly held attitudes and opinions about drug use and their skepticism about official messages. Their drug use is resistant to enforcement efforts because their demand tends to be inelastic to price and because they are less likely than casual users to be deterred by user-directed enforcement or to be cut off from drug supplies by the shrinkage of street markets. Treatment works only for those who can be persuaded or coerced into undergoing it. This leaves government agencies somewhat baffled about how to reduce drug abuse by heavy users.

Many heavy drug users, especially users of cocaine, heroin, and amphetamines, are also highly active criminals: muggers, burglars, and drug dealers. If they are convicted and sentenced, they become subject to supervision under probation or parole. This gives the criminal justice system potential for substantial leverage over offenders' drug use. This leverage can best be used by requiring those arrested for drug-related offenses to submit to drug testing, go into treatment, or both.

Under probation or parole the criminal justice system has a unique opportunity to require changes in offenders' drug-using behavior. Those on probation and parole may be required to observe personal curfews, may be prohibited from appearing in certain

locations, and may be required to present themselves for random drug testing. A dirty test may be stipulated to be a violation of probation or parole conditions, giving supervisory officers significant powers to sanction those who do not abstain from drugs and to reward those who do. "The goal of such a program is to convince most offenders that continued drug use is simply more trouble than it is worth (Kleiman, 1992, p.195).

Drug testing in the criminal justice system usually relies on the analysis of urine samples. The samples can be analyzed for a broad array of drugs. Drug testing equipment including everything from chemical reagents to computers that analyze and print out test results now can be bought or leased for in-house use. Most suppliers of drug testing equipment also provide training to civilian staff to administer and analyze the tests.

Offender drug testing has the potential for far-reaching impact as a demand-reduction program, a supply-reduction program (because it removes some retail dealers), and a crime-control program. Drug testing can affect both property crime by users and violence associated with the drug markets (by shrinking volume). Its major disadvantages are the fiscal strains it may impose on state and local governments, its immediate drain on scarce confinement capacity, and its reliance on the administrative capacity of probation and parole systems.

CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGNING AN OFFENDER DRUG TESTING AND TREATMENT PROGRAM

Overview

To ask whether offender drug testing (or any other program) is a useful type of program per se is unlikely to generate a useful answer. One has to look at a specific program in a specific setting to gauge its value. There are several important variables, likely to be different for every program and program setting, that must be explored. The program design of choice will not be the same for each locality.

To design a successful drug testing program for offenders, policymakers will want to determine the level of inputs likely to maximize the program's success and the factors likely to constrain it. For example, testing must be backed up by sanctions, one of which is jail time. The testing program can break down entirely if jail space is insufficient. Other questions that should be explored are:

- Which offenders should be tested?
- How long should they be in the testing program?
- How frequently should they be tested?
- What sanctions should be used?
- Should treatment be offered? Should it be required?
- Which drugs should we test for?

*Cater to
local drug
problems, e.g. based
on pulse reports*

Determining what resources and which offenders to put into a drug testing and/or treatment program will depend a great deal on the program's specific objectives. Whether the program is meant to reduce street drug markets or meant to get drug-involved juveniles "back on track" will determine which program elements make the most sense.

What Drugs Do We Test For?

If the objective of the drug testing program is to reduce street drug markets and the crime and violence associated with them, one would want to know which drugs are most closely associated with these activities. Cocaine, heroin, and amphetamines are good candidates for drug testing in this case. It is not certain that meaningful gains will be made by cracking down on marijuana, percodan, or valium. If, on the other hand, the objective is to help drug-involved juveniles to straighten out, marijuana (and alcohol, if possible) would be useful to detect.

Focusing on specific drugs, rather than testing for many, makes sense when confinement space and funds for testing expenses are limited.

Who Should Be Put in the Program?

If reducing the size of street drug markets and associated crime and violence is still the program objective, we want violent drug users who are committing crimes to stop.

Again, cocaine, heroin, amphetamine, and barbiturate users are good candidates for the program.

How Many People Should Be Put in the Program?

No more than we can sanction effectively. Research and common sense agree that weak program sanctions lead to weak program outcomes. It may be best to start with a small number of offenders that the system can effectively sanction. The deterrent effect of the program and its reputation with participants rest entirely on sanctions' being swift and certain.

What Should the Testing and Sanction Schedule Be?

The frequency of urine screening will depend to some degree on participants' tendency to "test" the system. People should be screened frequently enough to force them to stay clean, but not so frequently that the system is overburdened.

It is clear that immediate, certain, and small sanctions (e.g., increased testing frequency, one-to-four-week jail terms) are much more effective than large, slow, and uncertain ones. A swift sanctioning process is best supported by a system of administrative hearings (with predetermined sanctions for each type of violation) rather than judicial hearings that can be slow and inconsistent.

Should Treatment Be Offered? Should It Be Required?

To determine the efficacy of treatment in an offender drug testing program, it is helpful to compare its costs (staff time, taking treatment slots away from others, problems for the treatment system of dealing with people who may be there involuntarily) with the benefits (reduced drug use, reduced number of dirty drug tests and other probation/parole violations, enhanced social functioning). Drug testing and drug treatment may be complementary programs that compete for the same resources. Whether it is more effective to use both together or testing alone can best be determined by experiment.

SAMPLE DRUG TESTING PROGRAM: STEPS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS

Steps and Costs

A post-conviction drug testing program would include the following elements:

1. Screening at arrest

Screen all (or some, depending on available resources) arrestees facing felony charges of property crime, violent crime, or drug dealing for the presence of heroin, cocaine, or amphetamines.

Unit cost: Approximately \$15 per test.

2. Imposing abstinence and testing requirement

For those convicted, require drug abstinence verified by random testing for a certain period of years (in addition to any period of confinement).

Cost: Additional probation or parole staff reflecting longer periods of supervision.

3. Randomizing testing schedules

Each offender calls a specified phone number each morning to see if he/she must come in that day for a urine test. If the offender is scheduled for that day, he/she has two hours to report in and give a specimen.

Cost: Automated or staffed telephone line.

4. Administering tests

Testing is performed on a while-you-wait basis. If the test is dirty the offender does not go home.

Costs: Equipment
Staff
Chemical reagents
Sites

5. Sanctioning violations

An offender who misses a test or tests positive is subject to automatic, immediate, and progressively tougher sanctions. For a first violation, offenders may be tested more

frequently. For a second, they go to jail for two days. A third offense incurs one week in jail. A fourth offense incurs two weeks in jail. A fifth offense incurs four weeks in jail, etc.

Costs: Confirmation testing, confinement costs.

6. Offering treatment

Formal drug treatment is not an essential component of the program; the threat of sanctions, even without therapy, reduces drug use by some offenders. But the offer of treatment in various forms will increase compliance and reduce sanctioning costs and the size of the confined population.

Cost: Varies with treatment modality.

Benefits

There is evidence that drug testing accompanied by a credible threat of more extreme sanctions has a significant deterrent effect on the drug use of criminally-involved drug users (Kleiman et al. 1990). The likely benefits of a successful drug testing program include reduced crime, crime victimization, fear, and neighborhood disorder. Drug use is likely to go down, leading to fewer drug markets, fewer kids pulled off legitimate job tracks, and better health, social, and job functioning of participants. As crime and neighborhood disorder decrease, economic activity is likely to increase.

Drug use, dealing, and drug-related crime translate into costs for local government in the form of social and emergency services and criminal justice activities. Some of the costs that are likely to decline with an effective drug testing program are: arrests, court time, prison and jail time, and health care utilization including Medicaid and unpaid care in public facilities, drug treatment, emergency calls for service. If the program reduces crime and increases legitimate economic activity, there will be additional benefits to local government in the form of tax revenues, decreased social service spending, etc.

CONCLUSION

Drug testing for drug-involved offenders is a useful way to address the important problem of drug use and crime by hard-core drug users. It is a program whose costs are small compared to its potential benefits. This program looks about as much like a "star" program as one is likely to find.

However, like any drug control program, it must be designed specifically to fit the imperatives of its context. It must be tested; but even if it proves useful, we still will know only whether it worked in one specific area, with one specific administration and one specific offender population.

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