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FOLDER TITLE:

Bratton, William: Commissioner Bratton [1]

2016-0931-S

rc2312

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



THE POLICE COMMISSIONER
CITY OF NEW YORK

August 21, 1995

Cathy R. Mays
Staff Assistant
Domestic Policy Council
The White House
Washington, D.C., 20500

Dear Ms. Mays: *Cathy*

Thank you for your assistance in acquiring the President's signature on the recent photographs I sent you of NYPD Police Officers and President Clinton. Your effort meant a great deal to these officers and their families.

Please do not hesitate to call me or my Special Assistant, Joan Brody at (212) 374-6756 if we can ever be of assistance. Thank you again.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature of William J. Bratton, consisting of stylized initials and a surname.

William J. Bratton
POLICE COMMISSIONER

(Pager) ↓

*1-800-
913 1710*

NY

9/6

38,310 sworn officers

7,000 Civilian

Bratton

~~Democratic~~

— FCC event in morning

② — Public Safety Wireless Committee

① — ~~mtg~~ Breakfast w/ Louie Freeh

③ Lunch w/ mess →

7 crime control strategies

DOT → traffic control enforcement
~~Noise~~ (Quality of life issue)

traffic is a quality of life issue

traffic flow ideas?

safety & quality

2

What possible funding comes to the city?

Pope Visit in NY (October 4th)

partnership w/ military to see how they deal w/ terrorism

Can we get any \$ to help w/ the visit?

Fed govt. → playing role

Can they get \$?

They also have UN big event in 2nd week
in November

New technology that military has to check
Serfin, etc

has NIOS been studying this?

Sharing equipment → to loan to NY

unemployment was incorporated into the New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Moreover, his tactic of marching on Washington was used by later groups of the jobless and destitute to call attention to their plight.

Croly, Herbert David

(January 23, 1869–May 17, 1930)
Author, Journalist, Reformer

As the author of *The Promise of American Life* (1909) and the founding editor of *The New Republic*, Herbert Croly was a major spokesperson for reform during the Progressive era.

Croly was born in New York City, the son of two prominent journalists and social activists, Jane Cunningham Croly, who wrote under the pen name of Jennie June, and David Goodman Croly. Herbert was especially influenced by his father, who believed that scientific laws could be used to manage the perfect society.

Croly's formal schooling included attendance at a private school in New York, the City College of New York, and several interrupted years at Harvard University. After his father's death in 1893, Croly edited a real estate paper, *The Record and Guide*, and served on the staff of the *Architectural Record*. That same year he suffered a nervous breakdown.

Returning to Harvard for what was a third time in 1895, Croly had as teachers the eminent philosophers WILLIAM JAMES, Josiah Royce, and George Santayana. When he left after four years of study, though without taking a degree, he went back to the staff of the *Architectural Record*. (In 1910 Harvard granted Croly a courtesy bachelor's degree.)

Croly served as the editor of the *Architectural Record* from 1900 to 1906, then left the staff to write his most famous book, *The Promise of American Life*. Published in 1909, the book soon attracted national attention.

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Croly defined the "promise" of American life as "an improving popular economic condition, guaranteed by democratic political institutions" and bringing about social betterment. He believed that past efforts to realize this promise were ill-suited to a present marked by the rise of giant corporations and organized labor, as well as by the entry of the United States into world affairs. Croly wanted to revise national goals and democratic institutions by attracting able and disinterested people to serve government in the national interest. He envisioned a strong national government serving broad democratic interests and watched by independent critics; the government would control and direct the activities of corporations, redistribute income, and maintain international peace through a system of perpetual reform.

Among those who read and were influenced by Croly's book was former president Theodore Roosevelt. The two men met and corresponded and Roosevelt incorporated many of Croly's ideas into his "New Nationalism" campaign for the presidency waged from 1910 to 1912. Croly's ideas also had an impact upon the "New Freedom" of Roosevelt's opponent, Democrat Woodrow Wilson, who won the election.

In 1914 Croly extended his influence as a critic-reformer when, thanks to the generosity of Willard and Dorothy Whitney Straight, he was able to found a weekly journal called *The New Republic*. Intended for an educated, lib-

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eral readership, Croly's magazine was staffed by such distinguished journalists as WALTER LIPPMANN.

By the time the first issue of *The New Republic* appeared, war had already broken out in Europe. Croly used the journal's pages to urge President Wilson to lead the neutral nations in a world reform effort. Later he backed the entrance of the United States into World War I but parted company with Wilson over the Treaty of Versailles. His opposition to the treaty, however, lost readership for *The New Republic*.

Disillusioned by the abandonment of reform that came with President Warren G. Harding's "return to normalcy," Croly looked to third-party candidates to accomplish his program. In the election of 1924 he supported Robert M. La Follette of the Progressive party. Also during

the 1920s, Croly let slip his editorial leadership of *The New Republic*, and it became more diversified in its point of view. In a few years Croly had turned his interest from politics to religion and philosophy. In 1928 he suffered a stroke and retired from *The New Republic* and moved to Santa Barbara, California. He died two years later.

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Dana, Charles Anderson

(August 8, 1819–October 17, 1897)
Editor

As an editor successively of two great New York newspapers, the *Tribune* and the *Sun*, Charles A. Dana exerted a powerful influence on public opinion. During the Civil War, he was an important link between General Ulysses S. Grant and President Abraham Lincoln and a tenacious investigator of corruption in the army.

Charles A. Dana was born at Hinsdale, in southwest New Hampshire, of Puritan ancestry. His father kept a country store, failed in business, and turned to farming; his mother died when he was nine. As a farm boy Dana learned Latin on his own, and when he was sent to Buffalo to work in an uncle's store he read widely and learned Greek. He entered Harvard University at age twenty, having qualified by his independent study, but had to drop out two years later because his eyesight became impaired. (Twenty years afterward, Harvard gave Dana an honorary A.B.)

Fired by idealism, young Dana joined Brook Farm, an experimental enterprise in West Roxbury, Massachusetts, based on communal living (see MARGARET FULLER and RALPH WALDO EMERSON). For five years he was active at Brook Farm as a teacher of languages, a farm worker, a managing trustee, and a writer for the *Dial*. When the venture had to close in 1846 because of a devastating fire, Dana turned to journalism and, after a year on a Boston paper, became city editor of the *New York Tribune*, founded in 1841 by HORACE GREELEY, who had met him on a visit to Brook Farm.

For fifteen years Dana, eventually as managing editor, was second in command of the *Tribune*. Greeley sent him to Europe from 1848 to 1849 to cover the revolutionary movements that were beginning to challenge kings and autocrats, and Dana's intelligent, honest, and colorful dispatches to the *Tribune* and other journals brought realities home to

city of Fort Stanwix in line beyond which set the idea of a centralized Americans was not through, Croghan became companies, notably the planned to found a new revolution ended these his last years in poverty, accused of being a Tory, Native American political settlers, Croghan was Pittsburgh committee of the history of the period is based to a and correspondence.

and suave, Croghan in the early westward people. He was keen for empire being and France in North expended every effort to the expense of his personal and even though it freed the maelstrom of imperialism making him at times Croghan viewed himself and his generations might peacemaker, "acting with the swan's wings." But the peace he while promoting to a integrity of Native relations between them and ultimately facilitate the West and handsome himself who coveted bold schemes for his were both idealistic both peacemaker and could have the Native but stand in awe of guile were the polar opposites, his life was as he sought to pro-

Indian rights, even as he sought to have their ancestral lands reserved to them (until such time as they could be purchased by land jobbers and speculators), he was abetting the historical process that would culminate in the debilitation of red men and the hegemony of white. See Nicholas B. Wainwright, *George Croghan, Wilderness Diplomat* (1959).

JEROME H. WOOD, JR.

CROLY, Herbert David (b. New York, N.Y., Jan. 21, 1869; d. Santa Barbara, Calif., May 17, 1930), JOURNALIST, studied for a year at the City College of New York and for two years at Harvard before becoming secretary to his father, a journalist, in 1888. In the years that followed he edited the *Record and Guide*, a real estate paper, and worked on the staff of the *Architectural Record*. He returned to Harvard in 1892 but suffered a nervous breakdown in 1893 and spent a year abroad to recover from it. He returned again to Harvard in 1895 to study philosophy.

Leaving Harvard in 1899, still without a degree, he spent a year in Paris before taking up the editorship of the *Architectural Record*. He resigned that position in 1906 to write *The Promise of American Life* (1909), which gained him a reputation as one of the most perceptive and influential American political writers. Though neither it nor its sequel (*Progressive Democracy*, 1914) was a best-seller, Theodore Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" approach to reform was influenced by Croly's work. Championing a vigorous Hamiltonianism in public policy, Croly attacked complacency and argued for the constant reevaluation and revision of America's democratic institutions in the light of ever changing conditions. In 1910 he was awarded his Harvard BA, credited to the class of 1890.

In 1914 when Willard Straight founded the *New Republic*, Croly became its editor. Along with such writers as Walter Weyl and Walter Lippmann, he helped mold it into a major, non-partisan, progressive periodical. After World War I, despite having gained a reputation as a spokesman for President Woodrow Wilson, Croly editorially denounced the Treaty of Versailles, an

act that cost the *New Republic* half its circulation. In his final years he moved leftward. He supported **Robert La Follette** for president in 1924. Thereafter, he lost interest in political affairs and devoted most of his time to studying religious and metaphysical questions.

Despite his shyness, his slight stature, and his quiet voice that often drifted off into inaudibility, Herbert Croly led an active social life that brought him into close relations with leading American politicians and intellectuals. He preferred the written to the spoken word, and his major impact on American life came through his books and his editorship of the *New Republic*.

"The Promise of American Life," according to Croly, consisted of "an improving popular economic condition, guaranteed by democratic political institutions, and resulting in moral and social amelioration." In his book of that title Croly examined at length past attempts to realize that promise and rejected them as inadequate to a present marked by the closing of the frontier, an economy dominated by powerful corporations, organized labor on the rise, a fragmented population, and entry of the United States on the world scene.

The way to fulfill the promise was to revivify American nationalism and to make the state the true servant of the people. Then Hamiltonian methods would serve democratic ends. He hoped to attract the best men to government service, men who could settle national policy by a disinterested consideration of the true national interest. Such a government need not attack large corporations but rather could control and direct them to serve national goals. And such a government would assure that American power on the world scene would be used to preserve international peace. It could redistribute income more equitably among its citizens.

These ideas dominated Croly's later writings. In *Progressive Democracy* he stressed democratic and moral themes more than nationalism, yet all three aspects of his thought remained important. His detailed explication of them in response to changing events while editor of the *New Republic*

made him a major influence on intellectuals during the 1920s. See Charles Forcey, *The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann and the Progressive Era, 1900-1925* (1961).

MILTON BERMAN

CUFFE, Paul (b. Cuttyhunk, Mass., Jan. 17, 1759; d. Westport, Mass., Sept. 7, 1817), AFRICAN NATIONALIST, was the son of an ex-slave father and an Indian mother. He turned to the sea at an early age. After several voyages as an ordinary seaman on board whalers and general cargo ships, he went into business for himself and was so successful that eventually he acquired a fleet of six ships. He was the United States' first truly wealthy black. Sailing with a crew composed entirely of blacks and Indians, Cuffe traded in Europe, South America, and the Caribbean.

Cuffe joined the Society of Friends in 1808. Influenced by Quaker teachings, and by English and American Quaker philanthropists, he became interested in African redemption. He sailed to the British colony of Sierra Leone in 1811 to investigate the possibilities for settling skilled free blacks there. He hoped that black American technicians would introduce "civilization" and Christianity to their African brethren and that Sierra Leone converts would spread these principles through black Africa. The War of 1812, however, temporarily prevented him from making additional voyages to Africa. With the return of peace in 1815 he sailed to Sierra Leone with thirty-eight black pioneers. These were to be the advance contingent for the wave of volunteers that he anticipated would enlist in the great missionary task of civilizing Africa. Cuffe intended to make an annual pilgrimage to the colony, carrying a shipload of emigrants and returning home with a cargo of African products to pay for his expenses. He contracted a fever in the summer of 1817 and died before he could further the plan.

Cuffe was the very epitome of the 19th-century American Dream: the successful self-made man. That he achieved wealth, fame, and a par-

tial degree of social acceptability in a thoroughly racist society is testament to his great talents and strength of character.

Thoroughly American in outlook, for most of his life he accepted unquestioningly the basic tenets of the Puritan ethic: that hard work and community service led to salvation. Consequently his evolving interest in Africa was initially an extension of his efforts to fulfill the doctrine of Good Works. Undertaking the task of "civilizing" Africa was for him a logical progression from his paying for a new Quaker meeting house in Westport, Massachusetts, or his building this town's first schoolhouse.

But gradually his attitude toward Africa and the United States changed. Continuing to experience the sting of racism firsthand even after achieving considerable recognition as a result of his initial African venture, Cuffe despaired of the United States ever being able to cope fairly with its racial problem. Thus, although continuing to hold that black Americans had an obligation to enlist in the cause of civilizing Africa, he became a black nationalist and accepted the notion of a mass black exodus to an African Zion. Tragically, American racism forced him to accept the racist doctrine of separation as the ultimate solution. See Sheldon H. Harris, *Paul Cuffe: Black America and the African Return* (1972).

SHELDON H. HARRIS

CUMMINGS, Edward Estlin (b. Cambridge, Mass., Oct. 14, 1894; d. North Conway, N.H., Sept. 3, 1962), POET, received his BA (1915) and MA (1916) from Harvard before volunteering in the Norton Harjes Ambulance Corps in France as a driver (1917). While in France he was arrested for alleged treason for corresponding with anarchist Emma Goldman and placed in an internment camp for several months. Upon his return to the United States in 1918 he was drafted into the U.S. army as a private and stationed at Camp Devens, Massachusetts, until after the armistice. In 1920 he moved to New York City to take up writing and painting, but spent much time in Paris with friends, including Ezra Pound and

Archibald MacLeish (1922), base French internment camps. He published the following year. Most of his time in Greenwich Village and traveling in Europe.

In his poetry Cummings valued individuality over conformity and even putting his work "e.e. cummings" collections including (1931), *No Thanks* (1938). He also wrote (1927), *Tom* (1946), an trip through the South.

Cummings was a man shows at the A New York City (194 Memorial Gallery (Norton professor of and published his *lunes* (1953). Some include *Poems*, 1923 *Miscellany* (1958) lished posthumously.

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n Aug. 10, 1857.

Two years later Croly founded the *New Republic* as a magazine for elite readers, rather than for the "masses," and staffed it with writers such as Walter Lippmann and Randolph Bourne.

PRISCILLA C. WARD
American Museum of Natural History



■ CRIME

Safe? You Bet Your Life

New York can still be murder, but your chances of surviving in the Big Apple have just improved

By JOHN MOODY

IT WAS THE KIND OF GRISLY ONE-MAN crime spree that leads off the local newscasts and confirms everyone's worst fears about New York City. Last week a mentally unstable man hacked his wife with a meat cleaver, killed his mother-in-law, stabbed her 2-year-old grandson, stole a car and rammed it into a throng of homeless people waiting outside a soup kitchen on Manhattan's East Side, injuring 18. As horrible as the episode was, it was eclipsed by the most promising crime statistic to come out of the city in years: the 585 murders reported in the first half of this year represent a 31% decrease from the 1994 rate. Not only that, but also of the 25 most populous cities in the U.S., New York ranks 21st in overall crime according to the city's police department, compared with 18th in 1993. The city has come a long way from the 2,245 killings recorded in 1990 (fueled largely by a crack-cocaine epidemic), when tabloid headlines implored then Mayor David Dinkins to DO SOMETHING, DAVE!

Experts cite many reasons for the dramatic decline—changes in demographics, shifts in the drug trade, more active community involvement—and they note that murder rates are down in most major U.S. cities. But it is clear that in New York aggressive police work is at least partly responsible. And this news comes at a good time for Republican Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton. They have been trying to offset the damage caused in May, when rowdy police, including some of New York's finest, went on a spree during a convention in Washington, groping guests and prancing naked through hotels. "It's not the weather," says Bratton. "It's not demographics. It's not economics. What's happening is that you have 38,000 hardworking cops, a mayor who supports us and a public who is with us."

Much credit belongs to an old-fash-

ioned show of strength. Though facing a \$3.1 billion budget gap, the mayor, following his predecessor's lead, has pumped up the uniformed force to a record 38,310, compared with about 26,000 in 1990. But numbers make up only part of the picture. Since he took over City Hall in January 1994, Giuliani, a hard-nosed former federal prosecutor who has long made a specialty of studying local law enforce-



HELLUVA TOWN: "By dealing with the quality of life," Police Commissioner Bratton says, "you improve the sense of safety"

ment, has had a laboratory with 7.3 million residents in which to test some innovative theories. One of the most commonsense measures links cops' promotions and future assignments not to the number of arrests they make but to their ability to keep crime out of their territory. "An arrest is almost a failure," Giuliani explains. "The better way to manage a police department is to prevent crime in the first place and find ways of measuring that."

The keystone of the strategy is to make

each of the city's 76 precinct commanders directly responsible for keeping the peace in a well-defined area—formerly the beat officers' job. When Captain José Cordero of the 40th precinct in the South Bronx learned that shootings in his precinct had edged up 15% earlier this year, for example, he authorized sweeping searches of housing projects and mailboxes, two common hiding places for guns and drugs. By blocking off streets, officers denied potential drug buyers access to the neighborhood. The result: a 22% drop in shootings over the next two months. Says Cordero: "The point was to send a clear message to the criminal element that we're serious about this." His boss has also laid on the pressure. "If they don't perform, they're taken out very quickly," warns Bratton, who in the past 18 months has replaced three-fourths of the city's precinct heads.

Some experts also believe Giuliani's crackdown on petty offenders, like squeegeemen who hassle motorists for change at stoplights or graffiti artists who vandalize the subways, has worked to ease more serious offenses. Explains criminologist Lawrence Sherman of the University of Maryland: "Ironically, the best way to reduce murder may be to make lots of arrests for spitting on the sidewalk, simply as a way to deter criminals from carrying concealed weapons." Indeed, gun homicides in New York have declined 41% from the 1994 rate.

Still, some New Yorkers caution that Giuliani's determination to balance the budget by slashing funds for schools, hospitals, welfare and Medicaid will create problems that a phalanx of blue uniforms cannot solve. "I understand there are budget constraints, but you can't ignore the other side," says Bronx District Attorney Robert Johnson. "Reducing crime has to rely on continuing efforts in education and social services. That's what's going to make a long-term difference."

No matter what the numbers show, the voices that count belong to everyday citizens hardened to the reality of city life. Do they feel safer? Brenda Clark, 45, still complains about the nightly crackle of gunfire outside her South Bronx home. Anna McClendon, 71, distrusts police efforts to enlist civilians in identifying criminals. Says she: "You're liable to get yourself killed." That may be true, but on paper, anyway, the streets aren't as mean as they used to be.

—Reported by

Sharon E. Epperson/New York

"With all thy getting get understanding"

Fact and Comment

By Malcolm S. Forbes Jr., *Editor-in-Chief*

MAGNIFICENT MAYOR

NEW YORK MAYOR RUDOLPH GIULIANI is compiling an extraordinarily successful record combating crime.

Under the leadership of Giuliani-appointed Police Commissioner William Bratton, the Big Apple's finest have slashed the murder rate almost 40% over the past 18 months. Few other American cities come remotely close to this achievement. Other categories of crime, such as robbery, have also shown dramatic declines.

Good management is the key. Instead of being reactive, the department is now proactive. Precinct commanders are held directly responsible for what happens in their territories. Each week top police officials meet before war-room-like maps to see what areas are experiencing an upsurge in, say, drug dealing. The police then immediately throw in "resources" to fight the problem.

If a suspected dealer is not found with drugs, he can certainly be frisked for an illegal weapon or some other contraband. There is effective coordination among patrolmen, detectives and the narcotics division.

New York's amazing turnaround dispels several debilitating myths, especially the notion that there isn't much law enforcement can do about crime. Sure, demographics (young people commit a disproportionate number of violent acts), the nature of preferred drugs (heroin use breeds passivity, while crack does the opposite) and other macro-factors play a role. But, as in business and in other activities, management is the most important factor.

What is remarkable is how little attention the media is paying to Giuliani's phenomenal success.

The Mayor is also making impressive progress fighting welfare fraud. By effectively checking claims, New York is rejecting 60% of those who apply for welfare. Auditors are discovering that claimants have jobs or are collecting benefit checks from Connecticut, New Jersey or even other parts of New York State. The Mayor is convinced that when the same audits are applied to current recipients there will be substantial reductions in those receiving welfare.

Mayor Giuliani is in the Republican doghouse for having endorsed Governor Mario Cuomo against his successful Republican challenger. The GOP should welcome the Mayor back into the fold. His is a powerful demonstration of how effective *local* government can be.

NYPD, Inc

Can a police force be run as efficiently as a company? William Bratton, the commissioner of the New York Police Department, thinks so

THE desk hits you first. Mahogany and massive, it dominates Police Commissioner William Bratton's sprawling office suite in downtown Manhattan's Police Plaza. A century ago, the desk was Teddy Roosevelt's, when he ran New York's police force. Like Roosevelt, Mr Bratton is a reformer. A wiry and cocksure 47-year-old, this hawk-like Bostonian has brought a new lexicon to law enforcement. Like a freshly minted MBA student, Mr Bratton's talk is of re-engineering and decentralising, of empowerment and partnership. In his eyes, the NYPD is CrimeBusters, Inc.

He is not the only public official to fall in love with management theory. In Washington, Al Gore has long urged fellow Democrats to re-invent government; meanwhile, Newt Gingrich is telling Republicans to read more Peter Drucker. State and local politicians have latched on to all the latest fads: Oregon has no fewer than 270 "benchmarks". But New York's police commissioner seems to be one of the most zealous converts of all.

"The profit I want is crime reduction," says Mr Bratton. By that measure, his board (Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and other New York politicians) and customers (the city's long-suffering citizens) should be happy. In 1994, Mr Bratton's first year in office, he presided over a 12% fall in recorded crime (see chart). Crime figures are notoriously unreliable and hard to assess; and a fall in recorded crime may have come about for a host of reasons, most of them quite unconnected with policing. Nevertheless, it is striking that New York's murder rate is now the lowest in 25 years; and although recorded serious crime seems to be falling in many big cities, New York's decline is by far the steepest.

In any event Mr Bratton certainly claims credit for this outbreak of lawfulness. In two terms in the Boston police force (one as commissioner) and a spell as head of New York's transit police, he became convinced that old-style methods of law enforcement had failed. Mr Bratton reinvigorated New York's transit police partly by improving equipment, but also through a dose of Druckerish "management by objectives": the transit cop's task became to cut crime, not merely respond to it. Morale soared, and subway crime fell by half. And Mr Bratton, a fan of the re-engineering rhetoric of Michael Hammer and James Champy, wondered how their creed might work in the much bigger NYPD.

Early on, Mr Bratton sent in a "transition team" to size up his new beat. It found a hierarchical, centralised force, with an ingrained, defensive culture. New York's 76 precincts were judged by how quickly they responded to crime, rather than how well they prevented it. So Mr Bratton set 600 employees to work on re-engineering the department. Senior officers were summoned to the commissioner and asked a simple question: by how much did they think it was possible to cut crime in New



York? Those who thought only incremental reductions were possible lost their jobs to go-getting local chiefs (radical change is part of the re-engineering creed). The average age of the NYPD's senior staff has tumbled from the early 60s to the mid-40s. "I would pit my command staff against any Fortune 500 company," Mr Bratton boasts.

He has since taken his stick to precinct commanders (three-quarters have gone) and detective-squad commanders. But he has also devolved power to the precinct commanders, who can now deploy their resources as they see fit. Mr Bratton is encouraging these commanders—the force's business-unit managers—to push empowerment even further down the ranks, to sergeants and the cop on the beat.

As with other re-engineering exercises, results are carefully monitored. Mr Bratton looks at up-to-date crime statistics daily ("Can you imagine running a bank if you couldn't look at your bottom line every day?"). He also keeps an eye on such measures as the number of businesses leaving the city. Twice a week there are "crime-strategy" meetings with precinct commanders to discuss the latest trends. If hot-spots, such as a rise in robberies in one area, appear, resources are moved.


May the force be with him

All this has brought Mr Bratton a coterie of business-school admirers (there has even been talk of case studies). A cynic might argue that any attempt to bring management to the public sector would improve services. Mr Bratton's board and customers would probably concur that he has done better than that. But there are still glitches. The most obvious involve his newly empowered employees. Not only has the change seemed bewildering to some, but there are doubts about whether they can live up to their new responsibilities. Despite numerous crackdowns, allegations of corruption against the force rose by around a quarter last year.

Read any book about "change management" in the private sector and similar problems appear. But management theory runs into particular barriers in the public sector. Hamstrung by New York's fiscal ills, its civil-service pay-scales and job rigidities,

Mr Bratton finds it hard to reward his best officers. And since he is under the thumb of city politicians and has to operate in the glare of publicity, he cannot ask more radical questions that a private-sector re-engineer might, such as "why not contract out finger-printing?" Above all, there is no direct competition (except rivalry between precincts) to keep managers on their toes. Like many other public-sector managers, a lot of Mr Bratton's efforts are often directed towards replicating private-sector disciplines where none naturally exist.

Far from being humbled by such problems, Mr Bratton thrives on them. Having reached "the top of the heap in this business", he now wants to hone his re-engineering skills in the private sector.



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PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Why Violent Crime Rates Have Dropped

Between 1993 and 1994, the violent crime rate declined by 10% or more in eight of the 10 cities with the highest violent crime rates. New York City and Houston are leading the pack, with phenomenal drops in serious crimes including murder. During the first half of 1995, the overall crime rate was down by more than 16% in San Francisco, 10% in San Antonio, and 6% in Los Angeles and Philadelphia.

What is going on here? Some criminologists insist that the slide in crime rates is greased by dwindling populations of teenage males and the broader bottoming out of the baby-boom generation. This ignores the inconvenient fact that several cities with growing populations of at-risk youth

Rule of Law

By John J. DiIulio Jr.

or heavy in-migration have nonetheless experienced sharp declines in crime.

Other criminologists relate the decline to everything from a sudden surge in the efficacy of gun-control laws (which is patently absurd) to changes in patterns of drug use—a decline that, they profess, has had nothing to do with antidrug law enforcement even though in New York City and elsewhere upwards of 50% of arrestees continue to test positive for crack-cocaine and other drugs.

Here's a better explanation: The decline can be explained in part by policy-driven law enforcement efforts that capitalize on community crime-fighting initiatives and take the bad guys off the streets.

I call this explanation Bratton's Law, in honor of New York City Police Commissioner William J. Bratton. Mr. Bratton understands perfectly well that crime rates are not determined solely by what cops, courts and corrections agencies do. But his well-publicized impatience with crimino-

logical cant about how policing practices and sentencing policies have no effect on crime rates is ennobling and enlightening. Three examples should suffice to illustrate Bratton's Law in action.

Jacksonville. In the early 1990s, Jacksonville, Fla., was besieged by violent crime, much of it committed by juveniles. Then in March 1992, Harry L. Shorenstein, state attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, instituted an unprecedented program to prosecute dangerous juvenile offenders as adults and incarcerate them.

In most parts of the country, juvenile criminals whom the law mandates be treated as adults are not actually eligible for state prison sentences and are routinely placed on probation without serving any jail time. But Mr. Shorenstein's program was for real. He assigned 10 veteran attorneys to a new juvenile prosecutions unit. By the end of 1994, the program had sent hundreds of juvenile offenders to Jacksonville's jails and scores more to serve a year or more in prison. With fewer young predators on the streets, Jacksonville witnessed a 30% decrease in all juvenile arrests, including a 41% decrease in juveniles arrested for weapons offenses.

Houston. Almost 1,000 officers have been added to the city's police force since 1991. Led by Police Chief Sam Nuchia, Houston has a cost-effective police overtime program that succeeds in putting more cops on the streets when and where they are most needed. Houston's Citizen Patrol Program has operated in more than 100 of the city's neighborhoods. Thousands of citizen-patrollers have observed and reported to police suspicious or criminal behavior, from assaults to narcotics dealing to vandalism. Two recent studies found that Mr. Nuchia's enforcement efforts not only contributed to Houston's falling crime rates but also improved police emergency response times, raised police productivity and reduced citizen fear of crime.

New York City. Like Houston, New

York City has greatly expanded its police force, by 7,000 officers since 1990. Under Commissioner Bratton, police have been directed to crack down on public drinking, graffiti, vandalism and other public disorders that often set the stage for major crimes. The NYPD has beefed up action against street gangs and drug traffickers, brought back the fine art of frisking suspects for weapons, and redoubled precinct-level efforts on a wide range of community-policing projects.

In the process, Mr. Bratton has promoted a new breed of precinct commanders and made them responsible for finding innovative, cost-effective ways of serving citizens and cutting crime in their

Sentencing policies that keep violent and repeat criminals behind bars cut crime.

neighborhoods. Despite recent corruption scandals, the precinct-based management system is working, NYPD morale is high, and New Yorkers are getting results that range from fewer aggressive panhandlers to fewer shootings and murders.

Why, then, do so many criminologists doubt that taking the bad guys off the streets cuts crime? One reason is that in more than a dozen studies conducted since 1974, no one has been able to demonstrate either that police manpower and crime rates vary inversely or that community-based policing prevents crime. But this "nothing works" literature employs crude or outmoded measures of police deployment and other key variables. As David Bayley of the State University of New York at Albany writes, there has yet to be "a rigorous, clear-cut test of the association between the visible presence of police and crime rates."

There is powerful evidence for another

proposition that many criminologists reject: Sentencing policies that keep violent and repeat criminals behind bars cut crime. Today, more convicted violent offenders are serving time on probation and parole than in prison. About a third of all those arrested for violent crimes are on probation, parole, or pretrial release at the time of their arrest. On average, recently convicted prisoners commit between 12 and 21 serious crimes a year when on the loose. Not surprisingly, therefore, studies show that from 1980 to 1992 the 10 states where incarceration increased the most saw violent crime decrease by 8%. In the 10 states with the lowest increases, violent crime soared 51%.

But criminologists are right about one thing: Americans are sitting on a demographic crime bomb. By the year 2000 there will be about 500,000 more 14-to-17-year-old males in the population than there are today. About 6% of young males are responsible for half the serious crimes committed by their age group. Thus, in five years we can expect at least 30,000 more young murderers, rapists and muggers on the streets. Worse, since the 1950s each cohort of young male criminals has done roughly three times as much serious crime as the cohort before it.

This crime bomb cannot be defused. From the swelling ranks of 7- to 10-year-old boys who are growing up in fatherless, Godless and jobless settings surrounded by deviant, delinquent and criminal adults will come a new and more vicious army of predatory street criminals. To limit the damage they will inflict, we must redouble efforts to crack down on street crime and incarcerate hardened felons, both juveniles and adults. Criminologists may doubt whether such policies work, but criminals don't.

Mr. DiIulio is a professor at Princeton and an adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute. This article is drawn from the fall issue of Policy Review.

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PROFILE

THE C.E.O. COP

Common wisdom has it that the police commissioner can either fight corruption or win over the rank and file. William Bratton thinks he can do both.

BY JAMES LARDNER

THE 1994 crime statistics were fresh out of the computer when I went to see William Bratton, the police commissioner of New York City, a few weeks ago. Over-all crime was down 12.3 per cent, shooting incidents were down 16.38 per cent, murders were down 18.75 per cent—the steepest drops in memory, and largely be-

"Guaranteed," he said, with a flick of the hand.

Joe Namath guaranteed victory in the Super Bowl. Police commissioners do not guarantee reductions in crime. Generally, they don't even like to talk about crime much, lest people get the idea of changing commissioners when crime goes up. Bratton has violated the rules of the brotherhood, and the ghosts of police commissioners past are wagging their fingers at him. One former New York commissioner, Patrick V. Murphy, analyzing last year's drop in murders, has suggested that the nation's drug lords, presumably concerned that violence is bad for business, may be more deserving of credit than Bratton or his policies.

"We've managed to put some of the drug gangs out of business," Bratton said when I submitted that thesis for



Bratton: "My problem isn't being too ambitious but being willing to talk about it."

yond statistical dispute, since, as one Bratton aide said to me, "we're not hiding eight hundred shooting victims." Bratton's predecessors used to rush forward to claim credit for infinitesimal declines, or for mere reductions in the rate of increase (although many of them, out of microphone range, would say that crime was as unpredictable as the weather). Bratton, who was sitting at a coffee table in his office—an airy chamber, studded with mementos of his and the Police Department's converging histories—told me that he was "encouraged" by the 1994 figures.

I asked him to assess the chances for a comparable decline in 1995—an invitation, I thought, to a discourse on adverse demographic trends and other imponderables.

his consideration, "but the idea that they've been making behind-the-scenes agreements—you take this and I'll take that—and that they're consciously not bumping people off for fear of attracting too much attention, that's a theory that's been floated around out of Washington and by some of the criminologists. We haven't seen any evidence of it. These people will still cut your throat in a second."

Bratton is a slender man of forty-seven, just under six feet tall, with short gray-brown hair, dark, bushy eyebrows, a rough-hewn face, a hawk nose, and a voice that reveals with nearly every syllable that he was born and reared in Boston. It is also a remarkably calm voice—imperturbable in the way of certain veteran broadcasters on the emergency

SCOTT HUNT

airwaves. Early in his career, he won the Boston Police Department's highest award for valor for persuading a bank robber to surrender his gun and the hostage he had been holding at gunpoint. "Bill had nothing to do but talk, and it's a good thing he could talk," an old friend of his, Sergeant Detective Robert O'Toole, of the Boston Police, told me.

New Yorkers first noticed their new police commissioner (and realized that he was worthy of notice) last April, when word got out that at least a dozen cops at a precinct in upper Harlem—a precinct since dubbed the Dirty Thirty—had been providing paid protection to local drug dealers, and beating and robbing any who were slow to see the need for such arrangements. The usual drill for a police commissioner in these situations is to call a press conference at headquarters, denounce the cops who have actually been charged, heap praise on the remaining 99.9 per cent of the force, and wait for the story to go away. Bratton showed up at the precinct with the arrest team, personally collected the shields of two of the accused, and, at the next morning's roll call, gave a stunned group of their co-workers a talking-to. They could expect a lot of ugly looks from the citizenry, he warned them. And with reason: some of them had in all likelihood committed much the same crimes ("We're probably not going to get all of you—that's unfortunate"), while others had surely known what was happening, and kept the knowledge to themselves. "I've been disappointed—being quite frank—that more did not come forward," Bratton told them. "We need to think very carefully about that."

Bratton's first year in office has been very closely watched, and it makes a curious study in what the New York media glare captures and what it sometimes overlooks. There have been any number of stories, for example, about Bratton's Trumanesque outbursts against various adversaries: the Civilian Complaint Review Board's investigators ("not high-quality people"); the lawyer for an undercover Transit Police officer shot by an N.Y.P.D. officer ("an ambulance chaser"); a Hasidic group that had

charged the police with removing "Pataki for Governor" posters from the streets of Williamsburg last fall, presumably to further the agenda of Bratton's boss, Mayor Rudy Giuliani, who had endorsed Mario Cuomo ("They claim to be religious—well, they better go out and atone for their sins").

Less well understood, although plain to anyone (even a reporter) who noses around the Police Department these days, is the fact that its members are feeling better, on the whole, than they have felt in many years. Their good mood is due partly to the election of Giuliani, the city's first mayor in more than four decades with a law-enforcement background, and his decision to make the Police Department the outstanding exception to the rule of ruthless budget-cutting. But Bratton himself may be a bigger factor. Up and down the ranks, the great majority of the city's thirty-one thousand police officers have nothing but good things to say about him—an unprecedented phenomenon in the modern history of this chronically disgruntled organization.

Bratton's office, on the fourteenth floor of One Police Plaza—a glass-and-brick cube that dates from the early nineteen-seventies—contains a number of artifacts that go back to the time, a century ago, when Teddy Roosevelt ran the Department. The carved mahogany desk was Roosevelt's, and so was an upholstered footstool that sits beneath it. ("He was not a particularly tall individual," Bratton observed, evidently basing his opinion on an examination of the footstool.) Like Roosevelt, Bratton was swept into office by a corruption scandal, and he has shown a Rooseveltian propensity for visiting cops at odd hours of the day and night. Yet he is at some pains to distinguish himself from the only man who has so far made the police commissioner's job a stepping stone to the Presidency. "Theodore Roosevelt used to go out there to check on them and kick ass once in a while," Bratton told me, sipping a Diet Coke. "That's not me. I'm not the least bit reluctant to cut somebody off at the knees if they deserve it, and I think that's known. But I don't rule by fear. I'm out there to learn: What do you need to do


the job? What are your problems? How's it going?"

TWO days after my conversation with Bratton, I visited the Seventy-fifth Precinct, in the East New York section of Brooklyn. The Seven-five, where Patrolman Michael Dowd and his coterie of drug-dealing cops operated with impunity for years, had been the symbol of everything rotten in the N.Y.P.D. until the Three-oh seized that honor. When I asked the Seven-five cops what they thought of Bratton and his policies, the same answers kept coming back. They told me about the new 9-mm. police pistols, and the fact that Raymond Kelly, Bratton's predecessor, had gone along with a downgraded, ten-shot version of the weapon ("An obvious way to stick it to us," one cop commented), while Bratton had authorized the full fifteen-shot clip. They talked about darker uniforms, which will soon make New York City cops look less like security guards and more like their compatriots in Suffolk and Nassau Counties, where a lot of them live. They talked about Internal Affairs investigators who before Bratton came along had made it their business to look for cops wearing white socks instead of the regulation blue or black. "If they hadn't worried so much about socks," a policewoman who has been at the Seven-five for a decade remarked to me, "maybe Michael Dowd wouldn't have had a free rein for so long."

More than anything else, what these cops wanted to say about Bratton (and so many of them said it that I half expected the station house to break into song) was "He backs you up." For context, I was reminded of the case of Officer Michael O'Keefe, who in 1992 was accused of cold-blooded murder on the false testimony of two self-described eyewitnesses. The O'Keefe case and others have fed a new police fear of being framed and "hung out to dry." When a cop in the Seven-five fatally shot a suspect early last year, Bratton almost immediately declared that "the preliminary investigation . . . indicates that the officer acted properly."

"He's not going to torture a police officer in the media," one cop told me. "We've never had that before."

A surprising number of cops, however, also praised Bratton for episodes in which he had not been so supportive. There was



even widespread backing for his conduct at the Three-oh, which in another boss might have been seen as grandstanding. Then again, another boss might not have thought to announce, as Bratton did, that he was retiring the shields of the men placed under arrest that day, so that "no cop's ever going to have to wear them anymore," a police officer in the Seven-five explained to me.

"He pats you on the back when you need a pat on the back," a cop in the Three-three—a new precinct in upper Manhattan, spun off from the one where the O'Keefe case occurred—told me. "And he kicks you in the butt when you need a kick in the butt."

It has long been assumed in the police business that a commissioner can either come down hard on his department, and be applauded by editorial writers, good-government groups, minority organizations, and other outside arbiters, or strive to be liked by the rank and file. Bratton seems to think that he can achieve both aims at once.

Bratton's people portray the N.Y.P.D. before their coming as an agency driven by the fear of controversy and embarrassment. Its "business was to stay out of trouble, not to police the city," John Linder, a management and media consultant brought in by Bratton, told me. "Be happy, do nothing" was a popular maxim of cops on the front lines of the war on crime. Another was "Twenty and gone"—an allusion to the years of service that made a police officer eligible for a pension. And yet, just as these interesting clues to the inner life of the pre-Bratton Department did not often get mentioned in the press, there has not been much reference since (for all the attention that the police and their frisky new commissioner have been getting) to what many insiders suggest is the most conspicuous result of Bratton's appointment: a new attentiveness to the theoretically paramount, but sometimes forgotten, mission of fighting crime.

The standard precinct décor now features "Just Ask" posters, reminding patrol officers and detectives of a new, Department-wide effort to question suspects more insistently—to ask everyone arrested with a gun, for example, where he got it. This may sound rudimentary, but the N.Y.P.D. is a place where the rudimentary can be revolutionary. "Now any time a gun arrest is made we're called

in to debrief the suspect," Joseph Vigiano, a robbery-squad detective in the Seven-five, told me. "Nine times out of ten, you won't get anything. But it's worth it for that one time. We can get three or four gun cases a night here. In this precinct alone, we've set up several warrants on places where guns have been sold."

Bratton has had a lot to say about giving precinct commanders more authority to respond to crime patterns. Other police commissioners have made similar noises, but the idea has collided with the fear of corruption, and a resulting tendency to refer the most sensitive problems to specialized units downtown. Inspector Joseph Dunne, the commander of the Seven-five, assured me that the current frenzy of decentralization is for real. Precincts now have their own attorneys, and the power to go directly to D.A.s with requests for search warrants and orders to shut down drug sites. "You'll take a guy off the street and he'll say, 'Look, I know where this stuff comes from,'" Dunne said. "Seven, eight hours later, we're back with a warrant, knocking down doors. Cops can really see that their work is rewarded."

Twice a week, commanders from various parts of the city gather at headquarters for "crime-strategy meetings." The meetings convene at seven in the morning—not an hour of great activity at headquarters in years gone by—and they give bosses a chance to boast of their successes, to exchange useful crime-fighting notes, and, if they have let a problem go unaddressed, to endure an unpleasant grilling from the deputy commissioner for crime-control strategies, Jack Maple, a Bratton favorite, who is possessed of a bravado much like the Commissioner's own. "You know, there were five thousand shootings last year," Maple was

heard to say at one crime-strategy meeting. "They probably weren't done by five thousand people. Maybe only two thousand or three thousand people were responsible for those five thousand shootings. Why don't we just go get 'em?"

Last year, the number of arrests made by members of the Department increased twenty per cent. In the Detective Division, the productivity gains can be traced to August, when detectives began seeing computer printouts of their arrest records. "There were people who hadn't made an arrest in years," Bratton told me. "Maple calls them 'conscientious objectors.'"

"There are two kinds of police commissioners," says Thomas Reppetto, an ex-Chicago police commander who is the president of the Citizens Crime Commission of New York City. "There are those who preside over the Department, and those who run the Department. Bratton runs the Department." The last police commissioner to throw the Department into such convulsions was Murphy, who held the job from 1970 to 1973. Bratton speaks admiringly of Murphy's efforts to clean up the N.Y.P.D. after the Knapp Commission probe, but adds, "I have no interest in being known as an anticorruption zealot. It's a plate I've been given in New York—it's here, and I'm going to have to deal with it. But it's not something I'm going to be fixated on. I don't want it to be my principal legacy."

BEFORE Bratton assumed office, he summoned Kelly's top commanders, one by one, and asked them whether they thought that a dramatic decline in crime was a reasonable goal for the Department. Those who boldly declared that a two- or three-per-cent drop might be feasible are gone now, replaced by commanders who could bring themselves to speak of ten, fifteen, twenty per cent, or more. Perhaps some of them were only pretending to believe in such possibilities. Bratton, by all accounts, is not pretending. After three decades of alarming increases in crime and violence—and against the prevailing belief of the academic experts that the police's impact is marginal at best—he appears to think he has it in his power (another of those odd facts about him that reporters have not disseminated widely, perhaps in a well-



meant effort to protect him from ridicule) to bring the city at least part of the way back to the kind of order and security that prevailed in the nineteen-fifties, before what Repetto calls "the great escalation."

At the outset of Bratton's reign, there was a widespread suspicion (fed by a few minor public differences with Giuliani) that a strong-willed and publicity-conscious police commissioner would not ultimately fit the needs of the city's strong-willed and publicity-conscious mayor. Over time, the relationship seems to have settled into a comfortable—and intimidating—collaboration. United behind some politically iffy goals, including the merger of the N.Y.P.D. with the Transit and Housing Police, and an effort to curtail the power of an outside corruption-monitoring agency, Giuliani and Bratton have ignored, belittled, and largely run roughshod over those who have opposed them.

Their partnership—founded on a common nostalgia for, in Repetto's words, "the lost home of our youth"—could mark a significant turn in urban politics. In the past, the crime issue has been used most effectively as a negative tool, by politicians who, once in office, have often found it advantageous to shift to other causes, perhaps in an implicit bow to the liberal perception that crime cannot really be dealt with through law enforcement alone. Bratton and Giuliani think that it can be, or, at any rate, that it is far more tractable than it appears. They insist that the N.Y.P.D., even with the worst police-corruption scandal in a generation not fully behind it, can rise up off the operating table, march into action, and achieve results that New Yorkers will be lastingly grateful for. And the trend to date—especially the sharp drops in murders and shootings—has made that outrageous notion a shade more plausible.

BRATTON, in his discussions of crime, often harks back to the Second World War. "We will fight for every house in the city; we will fight for every street; we will fight for every block. And we will win," I heard him say some months ago, paraphrasing Winston Churchill, at a Civic Association meeting in the Mill Basin section of Brooklyn. He had used the same lines at his swearing-in, and some of his aides in

Boston, watching the broadcast of that speech, remembered that he had used them at his swearing-in there as well.

New Yorkers revel in the idea of the impossible city, but they are soft touches for strangers who stride into town telling them it's not such a tough place after all. The Mill Basin audience seemed more interested in heaping praise on Bratton than in airing the complaints about petty local annoyances which are the usual reason a police bigwig gets invited to such events. When he mentioned a columnist who



had described his accent as "obnoxious," loud boos rang out; and Bratton departed to a standing ovation—the sort of response that, if he keeps on getting it, could inspire envy in a boss any less bighearted than Mayor Giuliani's aides declare him to be.

Mill Basin is one of those skyscraper-less, subway-less neighborhoods that make you realize how far-flung the city is. I got there by taking the southbound No. 2 train as far as it goes—to Flatbush Avenue—and proceeding south another mile or so in a gypsy cab. From a transportation as well as a reportorial standpoint, then, I was grateful when Bratton offered me a lift back to Manhattan. And that was before I realized the kind of lift he had in mind.

"My first time up at night in one of these," he said as we boarded a police helicopter at Floyd Bennett Field and floated up into the night sky. (The presence of nonessential personnel on police helicopters—the subject of recent newspaper articles—had yet to become an issue. I had got in under the wire.) "How do you beat this?" Bratton said, waving his hand over the lit-up vastness of Brooklyn. "How do you beat this view?"

I asked him where he got his self-assurance. "The job," he answered matter-of-factly. "I was a kid with a bad case of acne, insecure and skinny. I came on the police job"—as a patrolman in Mattapan, a heavily black inner-city neighborhood of Boston—"and it made me, in the sense of the assertiveness. It can do that to you. You can't go out there every day and not develop some confidence. I like what the police job did for me. I like what I've become."

He came from a working-class, Irish-Catholic family in Dorchester. His father

toiled in a metal-plating shop by day and at the post office by night—full-time jobs both of them. The family ate supper at four-thirty in the afternoon, between the elder Bratton's shifts.

At the age of eight or so, Bratton got his first look at New York and its police, through a picture book that he repeatedly checked out of a Dorchester branch of the Boston Public Library. It was called "Your Police," and it emphasized the sartorial and technological side of police work, which coincided with Bratton's interests at the time. After his taste in reading matured some, he came across Richard Dougherty's "The Commissioner" (the basis of the movie "Madigan")—a complex psychosocial portrait of relations between New York's police and its political establishment. Bratton was taken with Dougherty's description of a stream of white-gloved traffic cops saluting the commissioner as he headed down Park Avenue in the morning. He also rather liked the hullabaloo that the headquarters staff made (beating their tom-toms with the message "The P.C.'s in") when the commissioner crossed the threshold.

Perhaps it is an exaggeration to say that the dream of running the N.Y.P.D. was planted in him as a child, but the idea had firmly taken root by 1980, when, at thirty-two, Bratton became the youngest man ever to hold the rank of executive superintendent in the Boston P.D. "The guy I was working for had been the first up-through-the-ranks police commissioner in the department," Bratton explained to me. "And now I was No. 2, so being police commissioner in Boston was potentially doable—and, at the same time, New York City had a tradition of outsiders as police commissioners."

As we homed in on the Thirty-fourth Street helipad, the Empire State Building loomed before us, and Bratton was reminded of his first visit to New York, as a twelve-year-old, when he stayed at a hotel near there. "My parents felt comfortable enough to let me take a stroll around midtown," he told me. "The city had a safe feel to it." He looked out at the spectacle of midtown on a clear night. "It's almost surrealistic!" he declared. "And to think you have responsibility for all this and the safety of eight million people! I'm a kid out of a cold-water flat in a triple-decker house in Dorchester, and now I'm Police Commissioner of

New York City! Ten years ago, I set out to be Police Commissioner of New York—and I did it.”

BRATTON likes to talk about the importance of breaking out of the “blue cocoon.” A relentless self-improver, he began attending conferences at Harvard, among other places, early in his career, and Captain Al Sweeney, a boyhood friend of his, who now heads the Boston Police Academy, told me that “while others would come back and say, ‘Oh, it was a nice conference,’ Bill would always mark down two or three things that he would start acting on.” In the mid-seventies, Bratton hooked up with a network of progressive police officials under the aegis of Patrick Murphy, who had left the N.Y.P.D. to run the Police Foundation, in Washington. More recently, Bratton has been an avid consumer of the literature of corporate reorganization and motivation. (He has occasionally referred to police officers as “sales representatives” and to the citizenry as “customers.”) But after a long journey up through the ranks and away from insularity, he remains in close emotional touch with the memory of his years as a street cop, and with the irritation of being at the mercy of a corrupt and heavily political department.

He developed a particularly powerful distaste for precinct bosses who stayed away from volatile situations and weighed in afterward with criticism of their subordinates. “When I was working District Fourteen, in Boston, we had a major broo-ha in one of the public parks, and every cop in the district was there,” he told me. “There were two sergeants, old-school guys, back in the station, and we were calling for P.S.”—patrol supervisors—“and neither one of those bastards would come out. They were two cowards hiding in the station house. We had a lot of them like that in Boston. They didn’t want to see anything.”

With a sergeant whom he held in particularly low regard, Patrolman Bratton went one day to serve an arrest warrant on a boy who had stolen a saddle from a stable owned by a friend of the sergeant’s. “We take him

out of the house, and the sergeant’s not satisfied just to arrest the kid,” Bratton recalled. “Once he gets him in the cuffs, he decides he’s going to do a little bit of a number on him to teach him a lesson. Back then, some of the old-timers carried what they called an ‘iron claw,’ which was this device that was like an oarlock, and you put it on somebody’s wrist and used it as a come-along. It caused great pain. And this was with the family present, so naturally they hopped in. We went out to the hallway, and he was going to take a couple more hits at the kid, and I pushed him back and I said, ‘Hey! That’s enough!’ From that point on, that sergeant just hated me. He gave me all the worst assignments. It was this unheard-of thing—I wouldn’t let him beat up on a prisoner.”

Bratton went on, “That sergeant didn’t know it, but he was one of my principal motivators. My motivation for getting promoted was to get ahead of the corrupt bastards who were supervising me. Now there’s nobody over me. It’s worked out quite well.”

His upward progress in Boston was temporarily checked in 1982, after he guilelessly informed an interviewer for *Boston* magazine that the commissioner’s job was his “personal goal.” (“I’ve always been faulted for being too ambitious,” Bratton told me. “My problem isn’t being too ambitious but being willing to

talk about it.”) Although he says he was speaking of the long term, there was something about him that Boston’s then commissioner, Joseph Jordan, found unnerving in the short term. “The guy acts like I’m already cold in my chair,” Jordan told an aide. A few months later, Bratton was pushed aside, and he decided to leave the Boston P.D., concluding that he had no future there.

In April of 1992, having “hopscoched across four police departments in [a] decade,” as an article in the *Boston Globe* observed, Bratton was brought back as the No. 2 man, after a commission of inquiry—created in response to police mishandling of the Charles Stuart case, in which a white man shot his pregnant wife to death and blamed the deed on a fictitious black assailant—had recommended sweeping changes. Then, in July of 1993, Bratton became Boston’s police commissioner—only to follow (in the *Globe*’s words) “the siren song of ambition from Boston to Manhattan” six months later.

BOSTON taught Bratton that there can be a wide gulf between a department’s officially stated policies and the rules of behavior that cops divine from day-to-day experience. A recent survey of the N.Y.P.D. asked a sampling of cops what the Department wanted from them. “Write summonses” came in first,



“Ogden, could you pull a string and get me one of those pictures of you naked at Yale?”



"It won't print out anything but these damn reading lists from Newt Gingrich."

followed by "Hold down overtime," "Stay out of trouble," and "Clear the 911 backlog." Fighting crime was seventh—proof, according to John Linder, that old priorities die hard. Bratton and Linder have talked about creating a "straight-shooting culture," in which the perceived goals are the avowed ones.

Going at these problems from the hiring end, Bratton wants to use the police-cadet program to attract more college-educated recruits, with records of related experience, which can be evaluated first. He also promises to weed out far more cops during their two years of probationary service. A hundred and forty-eight probationers were let go in 1994—more than in the previous three years put together. "I'm ruthless," Bratton said. "You get two years in which I've got absolute discretion." All this reflects concern about "the nature of the kids coming on the job, coming from a society that says, 'You dis me and I take a punch right back at you,'" he said. "Years ago, a lot of cops developed alcohol problems on the job. Now a lot of it's coming in with them."

Bratton believes that drinking and other personal problems are largely responsible for the rising rate of police suicides. Of the twelve last year, none, he

told me, could be traced to job pressures. Nevertheless, he has made a policy change, creating a mechanism for cops to get private counselling through their union representatives, without fear of official repercussions.

Another cultural modification that Bratton is seeking is a new emphasis on "respect" toward citizens. Since cops are also being asked to be more "assertive" (an earlier word, "aggressive," has been officially purged from the Department's vocabulary), there is a need for "a delicate balance," he told me, in what some people might consider a stunning understatement.

When he announced his "respect" campaign, there were those who felt that it ought to begin with the Commissioner himself, and with such Brattonisms as "If you punch me, I'll punch you back" (referring to Norman Siegel, of the New York Civil Liberties Union, among other critics). A street cop who talked that way "would have complaints brought against him," an anonymous member of the Civilian Complaint Review Board was quoted as saying recently.

Bratton professes incredulity that anyone could make such a connection. "I have a very different role," he explained. "I'm speaking on behalf of the Depart-

ment on policy issues. The officer on the street is in an enforcement capacity." He regards his verbal jousting as mere "theatrics," intended "to get a point across." He finds it particularly vexing when his language is criticized by members of the press—the same people who chase him around the city, thrusting their microphones, cameras, and notepads at him. In December, *Newsday* ran a full-page spread on Bratton's strong rhetoric, under the headline "BILL BRATTON?" The news hook—a flimsy one, Bratton felt—was a possible rebuke by a faction on the Review Board. Bratton responded with a press conference at which he called the story a "bunch of garbage" and wondered why *Newsday* "continues to run these types of stories in the midst of mourning periods"—a reference to the killing of a police officer three days earlier. A *Newsday* columnist, Leonard Levitt, shot back that, on the night of the officer's funeral, Bratton, his wife, Cheryl Fiandaca,

and Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple "dined at Elaine's restaurant, where, gossips noted, they were introduced to actress Shirley MacLaine."

"*Newsday* has been particularly hostile," Bratton told me. "If they want to throw any guff at me, I throw it back at them." When I asked him what might explain the hostility, he ventured the suggestion that *Newsday* was "a Long Island paper owned by a Los Angeles firm," and that the editors and reporters might feel a need to juice things up, inasmuch as they were "losing ground rapidly in the circulation war."

Bratton and his associates certainly present a strong contrast to the drones and homebodies who have run the Police Department in recent years. His wife is an effervescent woman who has temporarily suspended her career as a criminal-defense lawyer since moving to New York, and has been teaching at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice and doing TV commentary on the O. J. Simpson case and other legal topics. They live, with five cats and a dog, in a two-bedroom apartment on Central Park South, and they have pursued Manhattan's cultural and culinary opportunities with a zest that might not be practical if they had children. (Bratton has a

grownup son, by a first marriage that was dissolved twenty years ago.)

Maple, the deputy commissioner for crime-control strategies, is a rotund, Runyonesque figure, given to wearing a homburg, a bow tie, and two-tone shoes. John Miller, the deputy commissioner for public information, is a former (and presumably future) TV crime reporter, who began his journalistic career at fourteen (he lied about his age), swiftly gaining the attention of his elders by walking around with an unlit cigar in his mouth and talking like a character out of "The Front Page." Maple, Miller, Bratton, and Fiandaca, and a journalist or two as well, can sometimes be found, late of an evening, at Elaine's (although Levitt may have gone overboard recently in referring to that restaurant as "Police Plaza North"). Early in his tenure, Bratton was seen dining at Campagnola, a restaurant on the Upper East Side, sitting not very far from, of all people, John Gotti, Jr. "What can I tell you?" Miller said to a reporter who had questioned their proximity. "Campagnola is a favorite hangout of high-profile people—good and bad."

"It used to be you had a lot of cops like that—the Broadway cops," Reppetto told me. "Bratton and Maple would have been Broadway cops in the thirties and forties. They would have known all the celebs, all the journalists. You would have seen them on Broadway with dancers and chorus girls and mob guys over here and movie stars over there. They would have been in Winchell's column. These guys are throwbacks to an older New York. They only know it in folk memory, but they want to re-create it."

ALTHOUGH Bratton has been widely faulted for spending too much time on image and not enough on substance, he refuses to acknowledge a conflict. He belongs to a generation of public officials who make no apologies for their consuming interest in media relations, and in Bratton's case that attitude owes a lot to his experience as chief of the New York City Transit Police, from 1990 to 1992.

He had not been there long when he told a reporter for the *Daily News* that his cops had the worst police-radio system in the country. Albert O'Leary, the Transit Police's media man, warned Bratton that the transit system's bosses might not appreciate such a comment. "That's O.K.," Bratton replied. "They recruited me—

they've got to be nice to me for six months." O'Leary recalls, "So—boom!—next thing you know, we have ten million dollars for a quick fix, and he starts the ball rolling for a repair of the entire system." The project wound up costing a hundred and fifty million dollars.

Bratton had determined that the radios were a major cause for complaint because they sometimes left cops shouting into a void when they needed help in a hurry. The radio problems also fed feelings of insecurity that, in Bratton's mind, made the 9-mm. pistol an appropriate weapon for Transit cops—no matter that their N.Y.P.D. counterparts had been vainly seeking those weapons for years. In this quest, Bratton prevailed over the opposition of Mayor David Dinkins, Police Commissioner Lee Brown, and the *Times* editorial page, among other adversaries. For him, the 9-mm. question was simple: he put himself in the shoes of his officers, who thought, The bad guys have them—we don't.

Further proof of the power of the media came when, on the morning after the most notorious, and most heavily reported, subway crime of recent years—the murder of a young Utah tourist, Brian Watkins, who had been attempting to defend his mother from a gang of muggers—Bratton got a call from Governor Cuomo. "I'm going to give you forty million dollars—what are you going to do with it?" Cuomo asked (as Bratton later recalled the conversation). "I need to know, because I'm going to have a press conference tomorrow."

Robert Kiley, then the chairman of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, was not thrilled when the new Transit Police chief (whom Kiley had had a hand in appointing) began agitating for radios, 9-mm. pistols, and "commando sweaters." Bratton had been hired to lead a campaign against crime and disorder, which, surveys showed, were keeping a significant segment of the public from appreciating the improvements made in the subways, at great public expense, during the nineteen-eighties, and here he was combing through police-supply catalogues for items of gimcrackery. But Kiley eventually concluded that Bratton's ideas were not as screwy as they appeared. Bratton's point, Kiley recently said, "was to find out what really roiled the cops—what he could do as chief to make the job easier." Bratton saw him-

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self striking a deal with his cops: he would give them the tools (or, as some would have it, the toys) they wanted, and they would get the job done.

It was at Transit that Bratton first hooked up with Maple (a Transit Police detective lieutenant at the time), to institute a series of crime strategies that have now become models for those being advanced at the N.Y.P.D. Among them were an Asian decoy squad, which was set up to deal with a group of subway muggers who preyed on Asian victims; a special warrant squad to go after subway criminals; and a new determination to identify and apprehend accomplices in what were known as "wolf-pack robberies," rather than to be content to close a case with a single arrest.

When subway crime started falling, Bratton took to the airwaves to let the public know what was happening. "Ladies and gentlemen, the chief of the New York City Transit Police, William J. Bratton": thus began a series of ads that were broadcast on New York City radio stations in 1991 and 1992, making Bratton the first Transit Police chief to attain celebrity. Soon his radio persona was familiar enough to inspire a parody in which the talk-show host Don Imus boasted, in slobbering Bostonese, of a supposed pilot program of surprise visits by transit cops, at three in the morning, to recently paroled subway criminals. "We throw them a little welcome-home pahty. We bring cake or a box of pastry, and invite them to put on a pawt of coffee. Then we chat for a while, talk about spohts, what life was like in the joint, how they're much more in touch with their feminine side now. We think that's going to prevent a lot of crime, because someone who's committed a crime in the subway and paid for it the hahd way can't go back down and do it again if someone's sittin' in his apahtment with him feedin' him dessuht."

The officers of the N.Y.P.D. had long regarded their underground brethren as a lesser form of life. By 1992, when Mayor Dinkins named Raymond Kelly police commissioner, many city cops were starting to crave what the transit cops had: their guns, their sweaters, and, above all, their chief.

The Transit record is impressive—almost a fifty-per-cent drop in crime over the last five years, if you are prepared (as Bratton supporters are) to give him credit

for continued improvements in the post-Bratton era. Yet, if that record offers grounds for optimism about what can be done in the N.Y.P.D., it also contains a seed of caution, for, as Kelly has pointed out, the subways are a "controlled environment," the main point of control being the turnstiles. Widespread fare-beating gave the police a legal excuse for intercepting a considerable subpopulation of people who were likely to commit other crimes. A campaign against "quality of life" offenses was also easier in the subway setting, for the courts agreed that the Metropolitan Transportation Authority had the right to impose restrictions on behavior—panhandling, for example—beyond those which could apply aboveground. (The most notable quality-of-life accomplishment of the N.Y.P.D. under Bratton so far has been to substantially rid Manhattan's streets of squeegee operators, in keeping with a Giuliani campaign vow.) And, of course, as chief of the Transit Police, Bratton was not under any great pressure to address the problem of drugs. Now he is.

In the high councils of the Police Department, there has been talk lately of "seizing and holding" areas of the city that have seemingly fallen under the control of gun-toting drug dealers. I got a small foretaste of what such a campaign might look like when I went up to the Forty-sixth Precinct, in the Morris Heights-University Heights section of the Bronx, to observe a drug sweep. For the first part of the evening, I rode in John Miller's car, along with Miller, Sergeant O'Toole (Bratton's Boston friend, who was in town for a police seminar), and Detective Patrick Brosnan, of the Forty-sixth Precinct robbery squad. "This is one of the most dangerous square miles in the city," Brosnan said as we set out from the station, following the trail of an undercover SNAG (Street Narcotics and Gun) team. "It's just unbelievably bad with the drugs. Mostly crack. Very little heroin. There's some weed."

"What's your most prevalent kind of street rip here?" O'Toole asked. "Opportunist-type stuff?"

"Yeah, mostly opportunist-force," Brosnan said. "And behind that would be opportunist-gun and commercial. They do a lot of commercial stickups, and they time them for the change of tour. They hit all the Korean stores. We get excel-

lent videotapes—a lot of the stores'll have two cameras, for two different angles, and the perps'll find one and they'll never think there's a second one. Identification-wise, it results in a lot more pleas."

"Are most of your perps hometown?" O'Toole asked.

Brosnan nodded. "Their whole world is about four or five square blocks," he said. "They're not as sharp as everybody gives them credit for, really. They need a union."

Brosnan mentioned a new mode of crime in the Four-six: motorcycle-borne robbers who dart in and out of stores, keeping their visors down, and speed away on routes that police cars can't follow. One time, he added, a drug courier did a wheelie just as the police arrived. "It really didn't contribute to the escape," he explained. "It's just to dis you."

We caught up with the SNAG team in the act of arresting a scrawny young man who seemed altogether worthy of the term "low-level drug dealer," and a small motorized brigade of unmarked police vehicles converged on the scene, including the Police Commissioner's car. Bratton invited me to join him. "This is very manpower-intensive," he said as we started out again, keeping a decent distance from the undercover team. "It's not particularly sophisticated. It's kind of down-and-dirty stuff."

The notion that Bratton is a show horse rather than a "workhorse," as another *Newsday* columnist suggested recently, is not widely shared within the Police Department. "People just like to work for him," Sergeant O'Toole said, adding, "That may not sound like a big thing, but it is." No doubt, the employees of a number of other city agencies would be pleased to have a leader like Bratton—and to have the resources he commands. And there lies a more serious concern: what happens to a city that seemingly tries to solve all its problems through the medium of law enforcement.

If the Forty-sixth Precinct ranks high in crimes per capita, it ranks high, too, in cops per capita. And, with the SNAG team there for an indefinite stay, the police numbers were even higher than usual. At headquarters, Bratton's fondness for the language of warfare had struck me as misplaced; here it seemed apropos.

The unfolding drug strategy appears to posit the use of police officers in numbers

and formations that recall Beirut or Belfast—before conditions in those cities took a turn toward greater civility. And success can only mean more people behind bars for a nation that recently passed the million mark in that category.


The Mollen Commission, the anti-corruption panel created by former Mayor David Dinkins, found that perjury and evidence-tampering were rampant—not just among bad cops but also among good ones. This is yet another problem that Bratton has launched a campaign to remedy. “When we say assertive police activity, we mean assertive police activity within the constraints of the Constitution,” he told me. But the long, turbulent history of narcotics enforcement in America poses a question that is not so easily overcome: whether a lawful and effective way of going after low-level drug traffickers—a style of policing appropriate to a democracy in peacetime—really exists.

I asked Bratton if he looked forward to having some results to show the community.

“Sure,” he said. “But the reality is, some of it will be gone, but how do we keep it gone? That fellow they arrested earlier—they locked him up two weeks ago, and here he is back again.”

In that case, I asked, what’s the point?

“Well, there are just so many decent people who want you to do something,” he said. “Their frustration level is very high. The direction we’re going in now is to try to be much more assertive with the SNAG team, and so on, and then”—he seemed to be getting uncharacteristically vague—“with all those thousands of cops we’ve hired maybe we can secure what we’ve gained using the precinct resources.”



“Your father and I want to explain why we’ve decided to live apart.”

In the front seat, Lieutenant Joseph Zerbo, of the SNAG team, was listening to a suitcase receiving-station that was picking up voices from a radio transmitter taped to an undercover cop’s chest. “The arrests definitely have an impact,” Zerbo said. “A long-term impact? Maybe it’ll take a year or six months.”

“We’re still in a major learning curve, if you will,” Bratton said.

The undercover agent could be heard conducting a drug buy in Spanish. Moments later came a burst of traffic on the regular police radio, followed by information on the whereabouts of two suspects—a man and a woman. Our car proceeded to the corner of Buchanan Place and Grand Avenue, and we saw a spaced-out young black woman—the female that made the sale,” according to Lieutenant Zerbo—being escorted out of a building lobby by plainclothes cops.

As Bratton stepped onto the sidewalk, a kid standing on the corner, in front of Alex’s Grocery (“Tropical Products”),

called out, “Ain’t that Mayor Giuliani?” Zerbo told him he was mistaken, but the kid was unconvinced. “Him and Giuliani, they look like twin brothers.”

“That’s a wrap—we’re finished here,” Zerbo pronounced minutes later. Then, as the Commissioner’s party was about to leave, one of the SNAG cops approached him with a special request. “Commish,” he said, “a bunch of the guys would like to take a picture with you, if you don’t mind.”

“Oh, is that right?” Bratton said, his mouth curling sharply upward at the right, as it does whenever he smiles. Before long, about a dozen plainclothes policemen and policewomen stood, surrounded by an audience of young men and women of the neighborhood, in two rows on the sidewalk, with the Police Commissioner front and center, in a gleaming blue police windbreaker. As a detective snapped the picture, Brosnan gestured toward the group and said, “This is our wheelie.” ♦

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NEW YORK

THE END OF CRIME AS WE KNOW IT

How Giuliani and
Bratton cut the
murder rate 37%
and overturned
30 years of
thinking about
law and order

BY CRAIG HOROWITZ



THE SUDDENLY SAFER CITY

**MURDER DOWN 37 PERCENT;
ROBBERY OFF 31 PERCENT;
TOTAL CRIME DOWN 27
PERCENT. GIULIANI AND
BRATTON THINK THEY'VE
FINALLY FOUND THE ROOT
CAUSE OF CRIME: CRIMINALS.
BY CRAIG HOROWITZ**

ON THE STREETS OF BEDFORD-STUYVESANT, HE IS KNOWN SIMPLY AS DREAD, NAMED FOR the long, black dreadlocks he wears pulled back into a ponytail that's as thick as a loaf of bread. "You want to know if I sell drugs? Is that what you're asking me?" he said with a slight edge in his voice. It was one of those steamy nights two weeks ago, and I had been asking questions about whether people in this impoverished Brooklyn neighborhood had noticed the drop in crime that was being trumpeted by City Hall. "Look," he said, "things ain't no different around here, know what I'm saying? It's always the same. Some people be buying, some people be selling. It don't really matter which end you on. Everybody's just trying to survive."

Dread survives by selling. He runs a small T-shirt shop not far off Nostrand Avenue where his inventory includes more than mere clothing. "Maybe we better go talk inside," he said, surveying the wretched-looking street with its abandoned lot and its sidewalk lined with scraps of garbage. Dread had been lounging in front of his shop in an old kitchen chair, and he was clearly unhappy about the hassle. It was unbearably hot, difficult even to breathe. Slowly Dread hoisted his six-foot-two-inch, 220-pound body out of the seat and lumbered into the store without lifting his unlaced Fila sneakers off the ground.

"Maybe I move a little merchandise. So what? I don't have no choice. You can't make a living with this shit," he said pointing to the racks of T-shirts,



Crime czar and all-around character Jack Maple: Espresso and cutting-edge management techniques.

most of which featured an African motif or a black celebrity. "The money simply don't make it. You still need something else, and drugs is the fastest hustle." His voice was surprisingly soft, and I could barely hear him over the loud, thumping rap of Wu-Tang's Method Man. I asked him to turn it down. "Ah, man, it's new shit," he said in mock protest, and his lips spread into a broad smile whose symmetry was broken by a large gold cap on one side.

But the eighteen-karat smile quickly disappeared when Dread turned his attention to the new exigencies of street-level dealing. He exhaled long and hard and then folded his huge bare arms across his chest, the skin pulled so tight over his biceps that stretch marks were visible—he wore a tank top—around his armpits. Hustling drugs has become much tougher, he said, in part because crack prices are way down. And there was another reason.

"I'm telling you, the police is out there now, know what I'm saying? And they're serious." He rolled his rheumy eyes and let out a little laugh of exasperation. "They don't slap you around anymore just to fuck with you. They want to make arrests." Dread might as well have been coached by Police Commissioner William J. Bratton, on whose watch serious crime in New York has fallen to its lowest levels in 25 years. Dread blamed aggressive, assertive policing for making his life, if not quite miserable, at least a lot less pleasant. Using a broad range of new tactics, the cops have forced many low-level dealers to alter their methods of doing business. Some dealers have been driven indoors, and obvious safety concerns have made it harder to attract already jittery customers. A few have begun doing business out of state, where, according to Dread, drugs can sell for as much as eight or ten times what they bring in the city.

"You know the easiest way to sell crack and the way to make the most money," Dread said, "is to sell it straight up off the street. You buy it from a supplier and then go right out and sell it. Used to be that you could stand on the corner with the stuff in your pockets or your mouth and make your sales. No other people involved, no wasted time, no problems. Not long ago, you could make \$2,500 a day this way with very little risk. Well, you can still make some money, but the risk is big.

"You can't just stand on the corner no more with your pockets full

of stuff," he said. "You got to stash the shit somewhere on the street. Then you got to have somebody watching it. Then you need another guy to get the money. All of this takes time, and it cuts down on the profits. Anybody who's smart is putting his money away, trying to get enough to go do something else." All Dread really wants, he claims, is to escape Bed-Stuy. He dreams of moving, maybe to South Carolina. "I know people who walked with \$1.5 million after five years," he says.

But Dread, who is 28 and says he no longer uses crack himself, is a senior citizen compared with the reckless teens who have increasingly come into prominence in the business of selling drugs. "These young bucks, man. You know they be making it but they still trying to get fly, blowing it on jewelry, clothes, new sneakers every week, and partying. I'm telling you they be making beaucoup money . . . beaucoup money. I'm talking about 13-year-olds putting a grand a day right in their pockets. If they get busted, they out right away anyhow because of their age. But they're starting to see what's going on. They're still working it, but they beginning to understand something's happening. This Giuliani, man, he ain't fucking joking."

The next afternoon, sitting with Bratton in his office on the top floor of police headquarters, I told the commissioner what Dread had to say. He agreed that the police have successfully pushed a lot of the dealing inside. The result, Bratton said, lightly tapping his shiny Italian loafer on the NYPD-blue carpeting, has been good and bad. Good because this generally makes a neighborhood look better and feel safer; bad because it makes things much more difficult for the police. The street arrests are easy. Going indoors is complicated. "It's kind of like taking the beachhead," said Bratton, who has a fondness for World War II imagery. "We have pushed the enemy off the beaches and we're moving inland. To use the D-day analogy," he said leaning forward a little on the couch, "we're into hedgerow country now."

THOUGH THE CITY REMAINS FAR FROM BUCOLIC, AND crime, according to the polls, remains the major worry, the police have been on an unprecedented eighteen-month roll. During the first six months of this year, murder was down 31 percent from the same period last year; robbery was down 21.9 percent; felonious assault, 6 percent; car theft, 25.2 percent. If you compare the crime rates with those from 1993—the year before Giuliani took office—the declines are even more astonishing: murder down 37.3 percent; robbery down 31.3 percent; felonious assault, 10.6 percent; and, cumulatively, all serious reported crime down 27.1 percent.

If the overall numbers are a little difficult to relate to, consider the impact this way: The decline in the murder rate means that every month this year 44 fewer people were killed. A 30 percent decline in the number of shooting victims for the first six months means that four fewer people a day were shot. In the Bronx alone, 1,200 fewer people were victims of serious crime in an average month.

Despite the magnitude of the declines—total serious crime is down this year in every precinct in every borough—the response has been surprisingly muted. Giuliani and Bratton have hardly been hailed as crime-fighting superheroes. In fact, they haven't even gotten all that much credit as clever law-enforcement strategists. Though the tabloids and local-television news both feed on hyperactive, hypergruesome crime coverage, they have been comparatively quiet on news of a safer New York. "It should be something that gets more attention and is seen as a much bigger accomplishment than it has been in the city of New York," says Mayor Giuliani, who quite understandably hopes to score major political points with this. "Outside the city, it's getting tremendous attention." The mayor was sitting in a peach-colored vinyl booth in Huxley's coffee shop in Rockefeller Center. It was early evening, and Giuliani had just taped a segment for the Conan O'Brien show, in which he told a national

television audience of potential tourists how much safer New York has become. Amid the clanging of dishes Giuliani said, "Inside the city, not just the press but all of the Establishment commentators and experts are so cynical. It's very, very hard to accept success."

One of the critical reasons it has been so hard to credit Giuliani and Bratton with taking back the streets—aside from the fact that the pair seem intent on making themselves as unlovable as humanly possible—is philosophical. Their victory appears to be a repudiation of three decades of received wisdom that crime is inextricably connected to economic deprivation and social injustice. Bratton and Giuliani are showing it is possible to keep a lid on crime solely through effective law enforcement: using maps, computers, and (this is a shocker in an age of anti-bureaucrat fervor) good management. "There has never been a proven connection between the state of the economy and crime," the mayor said—in a different time and place, this would be sheer apostasy—"and there is absolutely no correlation between unemployment and crime. Go look at the Depression. It was one of the safest periods in the history of this country." Giuliani and Bratton believe they have happened on something big. They have found the *real* root cause of crime: criminals.

"There are historic things happening in this department and in this city," Bratton says with characteristic hubris. "We are reasserting the ability of police to control the amount of crime, an idea that American police departments have pretty much abrogated for twenty years."

Many sociologists and criminologists, however, remain reluctant to credit the Police Department. It would be an admission that they've spent careers promoting false assumptions. "The mayor and the police commissioner want to claim credit for the reduction in crime," says John Jay criminologist Andrew Karmen, "but it's very self-serving. Every reason they give represents a justification of their policies. I'm very skeptical of the get-tough point of view. The idea that aggressive policing—stopping people, frisking them, confiscating guns, cracking down on quality-of-life crimes, locking more people up—can work alone worries me. They're claiming success in the face of deteriorating social conditions. These claims verify the contention that crime is somehow a voluntary activity. It doesn't represent in any way the drives and forces and compulsions that are beyond an individual's control."

Ever since a Johnson-administration commission issued a report in 1967 called "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society," it has been liberal orthodoxy that most inner-city crime is the ineluctable product of poverty and racism. The enlightened view has held that, barring fundamental social change, little could be done to reduce the mayhem. By extension, police departments for years have operated on the principle that since they don't control the conditions that give

rise to crime, they can't control crime. Moreover, the reasoning went, an active presence on the streets, particularly in poor neighborhoods, simply created hostility, which actually exacerbated matters. So the police pulled back, spending most of their time in squad cars, trying to avoid confrontations and responding only to emergencies.


It wasn't until 1982, with urban pathologies festering, that there was a serious intellectual challenge to this wisdom. Criminologists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, beginning with a memorable piece for the *Atlantic Monthly* called "Broken Windows," put forth the argument that police were making a mistake ignoring the minor signs of disorder that had by then become commonplace. If the small things were taken care of—shattered windows, public drunkenness, graffiti, and the like—it would send a message about what kind of behavior is tolerable and put police back into regular contact with the people causing most of the serious trouble.

"Those who say we've got to solve the problems of social injustice before we can do anything about crime are, in the name of ideology, abandoning any hope for people who live in difficult circumstances," says Kelling, a longtime Bratton adviser who is a fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School and a professor at Northeastern. "If you want to improve the economic viability of these neighborhoods so that businesses can go in there, the first thing you've got to do is deal with the problem of disorder and serious crime. Just as poverty causes crime, crime causes poverty."

When Bratton took over as New York's transit-police commissioner in 1990 (he was given the post, it's worth pointing out, during the Dinkins administration), he put the broken-windows theory to work underground. He made graffiti, panhandling, fare beating, and other signs of disorder a priority. Though Bratton was widely criticized for focusing on minor infractions when serious subway crime was out of control, he held fast, and the numbers began to fall dramatically. Today, riding the subways is a wholly different experience from what it was five years ago. Serious felonies are down 64 percent, and robberies are down an extraordinary 73 percent. Each day, some 3.5 million people take the subways. There are fewer than twenty reported crimes.

THE POLICE DEPARTMENT'S SECRET CRIME-FIGHTING WEAPON IS JACK Maple, the deputy commissioner for crime-control strategies. A rakish figure in his double-breasted navy blazer, bow tie, and black-and-white spectator shoes, he looks and often sounds like a character who escaped from the cast of *Guys and Dolls*. In areas of policy development, Maple, a former transit-police lieutenant, is Kissinger to Bratton's Nixon. He smokes cigars, he drinks espresso in his office at police headquarters, and he takes visible delight—

Photograph by Natsuko Usami/Gamma Liaison.



On subway patrol:
Since 1990, serious
subway felonies have
dropped an almost-
unheard-of 64
percent.

"THEY ASSUME ALL POLICE DEPARTMENTS ARE THE SAME. IS EVERY BASEBALL TEAM THE SAME? THERE WAS A '27 YANKEES. THAT'S WHO WE ARE."

CRIME SCENE - NY

"IF YOU WANT TO IMPROVE THE VIABILITY OF THESE NEIGHBORHOODS, YOU'VE GOT TO DEAL WITH DISORDER AND SERIOUS CRIME. JUST AS POVERTY CAUSES CRIME,

"

During a Chinatown raid: Drug enforcement will be tougher now that dealing has been driven indoors.

in contrast with the dour countenance of the mayor and the commissioner—in shooting down any theory about New York's drop in crime that doesn't credit the police.

"C'mon," he challenges me after knocking back the last sip of an espresso one afternoon in his office, "which theory should we do first? How about the one that says everybody has switched from crack to heroin and now they're all asleep so they can't commit any crimes," he says, barely able to contain his amusement. Maple points out that in a recent spot check, 78 percent of the prisoners in the city's jail system tested positive for cocaine. A DEA intelligence officer I spoke to agrees that if there has been any switch in the drug of choice, the numbers so far have only been slight. Besides, during the late-seventies, the last time heroin was the major narcotic in the city, drug-related crime was also a major problem.

Bronx district attorney Robert T. Johnson, who spends a great deal of time working with inner-city kids, believes a shift is taking place, but not from one drug to another. "Youngsters are starting to see the results of the drug culture," he says. "They are finally getting the message watching their peers being taken to funeral homes in caskets." Still, even if drugs are losing their appeal, any significant impact on the crime stats would be years away at best.

"Which one should we do now," Maple asks before yelling for another espresso. He hardly seems to need the caffeine. "Should we do demographics? Well, the number of 16-to-19 year-olds in New York has been going up, not down. Or how about the idea that crime is going down all over the country? You pick. Remember in *The Wizard of Oz*," he goes on, before I say anything, "when Toto pulls back the curtain and the wizard says, 'Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain'? And Dorothy says, 'You're a terrible man.' And he says, 'No, Dorothy, I'm a good man. I'm just not a very good wizard.' I think all of these experts are good people; they're just not very good wizards."

Though it would seem he has made his point, Maple can't resist issuing a challenge. "I'd be very happy to get all the criminologists to come in here together. They can put all their grant money in a big pile in the middle of the floor, and then we'll settle this. Winner takes all," he says, laughing from his gut. "Look, we [the Giuliani-Bratton team] took over when the ball dropped in Times Square to start 1994. What's different since then? What's changed in this city in the last eighteen months other than what the police are doing? Did all the 16-year-olds suddenly become 50? Did all the crooks suddenly get *a-scared*?" he says shaking in mock fear. "Did every-

body leave town? Did everybody suddenly load up on heroin? Did they all go to jail? Did they all get together and decide they're not gonna shoot anybody, they're not gonna rob anybody, and they're not gonna kill anybody? And tell me about this so-called truce that's taken place to end the drug wars. I want names. I wanna know which gangs in which locations have agreed to make peace."

Gang harmony may be wishful thinking, but one inarguable fact is that the state's prison population has doubled in the past ten years. A case can be made that this huge increase in incarceration certainly made things easier when Bratton put his plan into effect. To Bratton's credit, it is also true that a proactive police force makes more arrests: for the first six months of this year, arrests are up more than 18 percent. A more potent theory favored by skeptics is that New Yorkers have simply given up on reporting crimes (for every crime reported, studies show, there are three that are not). Still, it's hard to argue that underreporting is something new. And while people may not report stolen radios, they *do* report a shooting.

The theory that seems to bother Maple the most is the one that gives the NYPD the least amount of credit of all. That's the suggestion that the crime drop is simply a national trend. Nationally, crime was down 3 percent last year, while New York's was down 12.3 percent. In fact, New York's remarkable drop in homicides accounted for one third of the entire nationwide decline in killings. Los Angeles, which had a 22 percent decline in murder last year, is down only 6 percent so far this year. "The basic, fundamental flaw with this national-trend theory and many of the others as well is that they assume that all police departments are the same. Is every baseball team the same? Of course not. There was a '27 Yankees, right? Well, that's who we are. We're the '27 Yankees."

AT SEVEN O'CLOCK ON A FRIDAY MORNING LATE LAST month, Maple had the opportunity to demonstrate not only his kinetic, theatrical style but also the inner workings of the crime strategy he and Bratton and Giuliani have developed. More than 100 cops from the ten Brooklyn North precincts, which include Bed-Stuy and Brooklyn Heights, were gathered in a large room in downtown Brooklyn, a little tired perhaps, but also a bit nervous. Many of them would be called on to account for what was happening on their watch. There were captains, precinct commanders, sergeants, detectives, patrolmen, SNAG officers (special-narcotics-and-gun squad), RIP cops (robbery investigations

project), auto-theft experts, victims-services reps, and warrant officers. (Normally, these twice-a-week meetings are held in the war room in police headquarters in Manhattan, but it was under construction that week.)

Maple called the precinct commanders to the front of the room in turn, questioning, prodding, cajoling, and occasionally teasing information out of them. They discussed ongoing investigations, special operations, and any unusual criminal activity. When the men and women from the 81st Precinct got their call, they were asked to explain a recent spate of shootings.

"What's going on?" Maple wanted to know. "Why are these shootings happening? Is it a turf war? No? Well, somebody's not happy. Maybe they're cranky 'cause it's hot, but something's happening." When the shooting locations were put up on the huge map projected on the wall, along with those of drug complaints in the precinct, there was a clear overlap. Maple asked what was being done about the drug spots, and one of the narcotics officers said it was a tough area because the business was done inside and there were lots of lookouts. "That's fine," Maple said. "That's why we're detectives. Tell me what tactics we can employ to penetrate these locations." The detective said they would try some buy-and-bust operations and maybe get a couple of the guys behind the Plexiglas to rat when an arrest was hanging over their heads. Maple wasn't satisfied.

"I want you back here next week with a plan," he said to the precinct captain (normally each precinct comes in once every five weeks). "And remember," Maple said, reciting the department's four-step strategy, "we need accurate, timely information; rapid, focused deployment; effective tactics; and relentless follow-up and assessment."

These meetings, which have provided the basic architecture for remodeling the Police Department, are remarkable not only for their display of coordinated crime-fighting strategies. They also prove it is possible to take a clumsy, inefficient bureaucracy with a tired, deeply ingrained institutional culture and transform it; to set goals and to manage by results. One key has been decentralization: Bratton has given each precinct commander unprecedented control over his own jurisdiction. No longer does the force depend on citywide specialty units like narcotics that report to a central command staff.

Other changes have been screamingly obvious. "The auto-theft squad was working nine to five, and the drug units were mostly working ten to six, with a few going two to ten," says Bratton, who derisively terms these "bankers' hours." "The warrant unit was getting started at 7:30 A.M., and by the time they read the papers and had their coffee, it was ten before they'd start knocking on doors. The department was not really minding the store." It is also critical that the cops have bought into the plan. Morale is high right now because cops believe that Giuliani and Bratton will back them up.

When Bratton briefly addressed the troops about halfway through the Friday-morning meeting, he made it clear that even eighteen months into the changes, he's not ready to lighten up. "Remember," he said, still sounding like the Boston street cop he once was and perhaps grandstanding for my benefit, "your career is greatly dependent on what happens in this room, on your ability

to adapt and make changes in your area."

The sessions have become an object of study for police from around the world. On the morning I was there, a member of Britain's Parliament involved in law enforcement was also an observer. Other recent visitors have included the mayor of L.A. and a police executive from the Netherlands. And there are proposals before the National Institute of Justice to study what's taken place in New York.


"They [the NYPD] are using a systematic approach to fighting crime," says Tom Reppetto, president of the Citizens Crime Commission. "In general in American cities, crime was fought in a random and episodic way. You know—there's an upsurge in robberies somewhere in Queens; get on it. There wasn't the day-to-day analysis, the look at the big picture, the sustained attention. Crime figures used to be months behind. They were essentially historic documents. Could your magazine operate if they didn't know what they were selling from week to week? It's not rocket science, but in policing, it has not been done that systematically."

"In a way they've [the police] gotten more than the sum of the parts. When people see more cops on the street and they see more vigorous police activity, those who are predatory say, 'Hmm, I wonder what's going on here.' There's even a feeling now that fewer people are carrying guns and the impres-

(continued on page 82)

The Murder Roll

The chart lists the number of reported killings in each of the city's 76 precincts for the first six months of this year.



Crime *continued from page 27*

sion that some people are leaving the guns at home. Because while they don't exactly attend the crime strategy meetings, they know something is going on in the streets; so maybe they better be more careful."

AS I WALKED THROUGH BED-STUY FROM MYRTLE Avenue up to Nostrand, one of the area's main arteries, south past Fulton Street and across Atlantic Avenue, where the makeup of the population changes from American black to mostly Caribbean black, it was indeed clear that something is happening. Nearly everyone I talked to was aware of a greater police presence, quicker response times, and an all-out effort to enforce minimum standards of behavior. Even those with long-standing hostilities toward the mayor and the police force readily acknowledged the change.

On Vernon Avenue, a quiet, relatively well-kept street of three-story row houses and brownstones, the attitude of a 55-year-old contractor named Richie was typical. "I don't like the mayor, 'cause I don't think he's for all the people of this city. And half the time when I see the cops coming, I don't know whether to duck from them or the criminals." But Richie, who has fifteen children and has lived in Bed-Stuy for 36 years, grudgingly admitted that things are getting better. Sitting across the street from the Vernon Avenue Baptist Church in a Dodge van with a caked-on do-it-yourself paint job, he took a long drag on his cigarette and collected his thoughts.

"Used to be nothing to hear gunshots all night long," he said, as a little girl with pig-tails rode by on a pink tricycle. "I'd be in bed some nights and all you'd hear would be *bam . . . bam . . . bam . . . bam . . . bam . . . bam*. Now," he said, "you don't hear nothing like that. I haven't heard any shooting in six or eight months." But Richie remains ambivalent. "I got a 13-year-old boy, and wherever he goes the police hassle him; they stop and search him. Is it worth my kid not getting shot? Absolutely. But the kids develop a hostile attitude."

On Nostrand Avenue and Prospect Place, past the Sugar Hill Supper Club and Disco, and blocks of boarded-up buildings, shattered glass, graffiti-covered store gates, and what seemed to an outsider like barely controlled chaos, was one of the reasons conditions are improving: In the middle of the block was a trailer. For the past three months, the police have used it as a temporary command post for what is loosely called Operation Take Back Nostrand Avenue. On the street, several patrolmen—who wear their bulletproof vests despite the heat—work around the clock to try to maintain order. They succeed in part just by virtue of their presence. The rest is due to their aggressive pursuit of quality-of-life offenses. They stop people from loitering and drinking beer on the corners; from playing loud music; and from urinating in

public. They ticket unlicensed gypsy cabs and boom-box cars, and they even stop anyone but the kids from riding a bicycle on the sidewalk.

This is the grunt work of the broken-windows strategy. Summonses are issued for minor offenses. Everyone who is stopped for a violation must produce identification, or he is taken to the station. Everyone is questioned and checked for outstanding warrants. In some precincts, cops now have cell phones for immediate warrant checks. Not only does this assertive police activity set clear limits on behavior; it also yields information about other criminal activity and sometimes turns up guns or drugs.

As the evening wore on, though, the sense of menace increased. A light rain started to fall. The shower lasted only for about twenty minutes, and when it stopped, puffs of steam rose from the now shiny blacktop. Amid the eeriness, a woman, trailing her 14-year-old daughter, came out to get a carton of milk. When I asked her if she sensed that things had gotten better, the mother looked at me as if I had taken leave of my senses. "What you talking about, better?" she asked indignantly. "Better than what? Look around. How's it look to you? I've lived here for 23 years. Fifteen years ago Nostrand Avenue was beautiful. Now . . . now it's disgusting and it's not safe after seven o'clock. I won't let my daughter come down here alone. Look at this street. Go ahead, look," she said waving her arm out away from her body as if introducing an act onstage. "There's more drug spots here now than ever. I'm sure I don't have to tell you. You see them."

In fact, with many of the stores gated, the street did indeed look terrifying. Was this the face of a new, safer New York? The stores that were open, with one or two exceptions, were obvious drug locations. Their windows were fully covered by dusty, forlorn-looking boxes of soap powder and cornflakes blocking any view from the street of what was happening inside. Behind the covered windows, workers sat in bulletproof Plexiglas cages with only small rectangular pass-throughs for the exchange of money and merchandise. And all around were those now-totemic broken windows. The woman, who had started to walk away, looked back at me over her shoulder. "I don't care what the cops say—things in this neighborhood are always getting worse."

THOUGH CRIME IS DOWN 14 PERCENT SO FAR this year in Bed-Stuy's 77th Precinct, where this woman lives, her dissatisfaction is simple to understand. In those neighborhoods where crime was the highest, it will take a long time before many residents really see and feel a change. But what about less blighted neighborhoods? How much does crime have to go down and how long does it take to let go of years of accumulated fear? Is it even realistic to expect that kind of change when frightening crimes, which

seem to increase in barbarity all the time, still plague the city? Just in the past few weeks, a bodega owner and his son were gunned down in Bed-Stuy; a 12-year-old in Queens Village was killed over a quarter; and a woman was killed in her apartment on the Upper East Side, the first murder of the year in that part of the city. And despite the precipitous drop in numbers, the average person actually may now have a marginally *greater* chance of becoming a random victim. Whereas more than 80 percent of murder victims once knew their killers, now more than half of all murders in America are committed by strangers.

The chaos factor makes it hard to accept that things have really changed. "From the beginning, this has been a two-part approach," explains Giuliani, "to actually bring down the numbers and to deal with the things people see so they can feel safer. I think both things are happening. And we have to do it against a backdrop of a city in which you're constantly producing counter-messages. Even if crime were to drop by another 50 percent, there would still be a crime a day that could frighten people, because we're still a city of 7½ to 8 million people."

Giuliani may be right, though, that people are starting to perceive themselves as at least a bit safer, even if they're loath to admit it. "Two years ago," says Felice Kirby, who lives in Williamsburg and is the founder of the Neighborhood Anti-Crime Center for the Citizens Committee for New York, "we were holding huge meetings at local churches almost weekly to deal with the muggings. Now, I probably shouldn't say this, but we don't have enough citizens angry enough about crime to carry out a citizens patrol on the north side of Williamsburg. People don't feel as preyed upon now as they used to."

Bratton, who says he talks to people in church basements in Harlem and dinner parties in the Hamptons, believes the message is getting out. He knows, however, that it has been a strange year for the police force. They may be reenergized by their startling successes, but every corruption scandal, every charge of police brutality (complaints about all types of police misbehavior are up 30 percent this year), and every incident in which a cop screws up undercuts Bratton's efforts to establish a new respect for the force. And without that respect, not only will it remain difficult for people to believe the impact the police are having; it will also be difficult to continue reducing crime. And Bratton has next year's goal already in his head.

"If we can get the numbers down another 9 or 10 percent next year," he says, straightening his blue tie with its stars and crescent moons, "we will reach the magic 50. We will have cut crime in this city in half since 1990. And then the numbers will be so huge that nobody will be able to ignore them."

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Moving the biggest mountain:

Stiffer entry standards. . . new integrity-control measures. . . a tougher stance on crime and police "lethargy": New York Police Commissioner William Bratton is showing he's undaunted by the challenges posed by leading the nation's largest police agency. Interview, Page 8.



Square peg, round hole:

Community policing meets up with the existing police bureaucracy. Forum, Page 12.

Testing, 1, 2, 3:

The Illinois State Police reverses its field on appointing from a recent entry test. Page 1.

Law Enforcement News interview
by Marie Simonetti Rosen

Of late, New Yorkers are getting frequent reminders that, in many respects, things aren't quite the same as they used to be when it comes to law enforcement and crime in the Big Apple.

One of the most obvious clues comes every time the city's Police Commissioner steps up to a microphone and starts talking about the "Police De-pah-tment." The voice, clearly not that of a native "Nu Yawker," is just one of the elements that make the Commissioner, William J. Bratton, one of the more distinctive public officials the city has seen in a while. From his unmistakable vocal inflections to the no-nonsense way he has cashiered corrupt cops, personally stripping them of their badges at roll calls, Bratton's style is a wind of change in New York City policing.

Bratton, a 25-year police veteran who came up through the ranks of the Boston Police Department, came to New York in January 1994 to head a department that was struggling to rebound from the city's worst corruption and brutality scandal in recent years. While the revelations of misconduct have not gone away, Bratton has been nothing if not direct, even forceful, in tackling the ongoing problem — much as he and the Police Department have addressed crime in general.

In tandem with the city's Mayor, crime-busting ex-Federal prosecutor Rudolph Giuliani, Bratton has emphasized an aggressive police posture toward crime, in contrast to what he characterizes as the "lethargy," "passivity" and "laissez-faire" that greeted him upon his appointment. Since then, New York, like many other large cities, has posted consistent and significant decreases in major crime — a trend that Bratton insists will continue.

Bratton has likewise shown that he has no tolerance for crime within the ranks, whether in the form of drug-driven corruption or alcohol-fueled escapades by off-duty officers. Since taking office he has continued to implement a series of reforms that had begun under his predecessor. Bratton overhauled the Internal Affairs Division and has made serving in Internal Affairs part of the department's career path. Bratton has also unveiled plans to bring the commanders of New York's 76 precincts into the integrity-control process as a way of keeping corruption in check.

Despite Bratton's roots in Boston, where he served as Superintendent — the highest ranking uniformed post — and later as Police Commissioner, he is not exactly a new kid on the block in New York. From 1990 to 1992, he served as chief of the now defunct New York City Transit Police, where he was credited with raising morale and lowering subway crime rates. Ironically, as New York City's Police Commissioner he has presided over the long-discussed merger of the Transit Police, and later the city's Housing Police, into the NYPD. The NYPD, long the nation's largest police force, is now a 38,000-strong mega-department facing a staggering agenda.

It's always difficult to leave one's mark on a large police department, especially one with the gargantuan scope of the NYPD. Bratton has already begun doing that, and there are signs of more lasting changes to come. He recently announced plans to build a more mature, better educated police force, by raising the minimum recruiting age to 22 and, in a move some feel is long overdue, requiring 60 credits of college for entry into the department beginning in 1997. For Bratton, it would appear, the only way to effect change and make one's mark is to act with vigor.



A LEN Interview with

Commissioner William Bratton of New York

"We're starting to have some concern about whether assertiveness is generating corruption or disrespect. I think we can control that and still have assertive policing. Assertive policing is not and does not necessarily have to be abusive policing."

LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS: When you took over the department, you said you wanted to "shake it up, shake off the lethargy, shake off the drift and laissez faire," and that you were going to reduce crime. How have you accomplished these things?

BRATTON: Taking the latter section first, there's no doubt about how we've done in that area. Crime was down close to 12 percent last year, and so far this year, it's down about 18 percent. In certain categories, it's even more dramatic than that. Homicides were down 19 percent last year, they're down almost 40 percent this year.

The good news about the crime reductions is that they are so significant that nobody is doubting that crime is down. When you have 2, 3 or 4 percent, as was the case in the early 1990s, that's a good trend over time in the four years it was down, but the declines were marginal. Even in the areas that were down 5 to 10 percent, it didn't ring a bell with people. Now the declines both in the city and nationally, even internationally — I was just at a conference in London where they described "crime in New York City dropping like a stone." That's things you like to hear. And the good news is that those trends will probably continue. With some of the reorganization of the department we're now much more proficient in spotting patterns and trends and moving very quickly to knock them down.

Now as to the first part of the question about shaking up the lethargy: I really believe that over the last 20 or 25 years, one of the unforeseen by-products of Pat Murphy's efforts to deal with systemic corruption in the organization — which he did quite effectively, and his legacy will be that, I think for all time, systemic corruption is ended in the NYPD. But I think that because of the fear of corruption, the vast majority of New York City police were not authorized, or were actively discouraged from interacting with a lot of crime in the city in the area of drugs, vice-related conditions, and the street-type conditions, such as peddlers. So in areas where there was a real concern of shakedown potential, with a combination of pulling the police back from that,

bringing in the specialized units, and the natural tendency of cops, if not directed, not pushed and not led, to sit back, we saw in the late 1980s the results of the lethargy in that they weren't expected to act in a lot of areas, such as drugs and quality-of-life offenses. We had a situation similar to what the city was like back in 1990 when I first came here for the Transit Police: graffiti everywhere, illegal peddling everywhere; homeless-related conditions that had gotten out of control — a whole range of things that just gave the city an awful feel. Additionally, there were very few police visibly seen doing anything about it. There were comments about cops constantly riding by, and the squeegee pests became, for Mayor Giuliani and for many New Yorkers, a symbol of just how ineffective the department had become in dealing with a very intimidating and very visible sign of disorder.

So when I came in, one of the reasons Mayor Giuliani hired me was that we were simpatico with each other on how to address crime. You have to address the real crime by very aggressive handling, analyzing it, quick response to it, putting a lot of resources into it. But all that's going to be unsuccessful if you don't also deal with the quality of life at the same time, the things people see every day. Given the high crime rate in the city, most of us have to be thankful that we're not victims of serious crime. But we are all victims of the affronts, the squeegee pests, the aggressive panhandling. That's how we got crime down 50 percent in the subway. That's the first interest of Mayor Giuliani and me, and in conversations we had about how to deal with crime, his sense from campaigning was that people wanted things done about quality of life as well as fighting crime.

LEN: We've been reading about your efforts to "re-engineer" the department. Could you describe what re-engineering means in the context of the NYPD?

BRATTON: The idea of re-engineering is that you take an organization that you think is going in

"[Cops] most dangerous weapon is not the gun or the club, or Mace; that's not what gets them in trouble. The common denominator in terms of what gets cops in trouble in this city is their mouths. They've got big mouths, and many of them have filthy mouths."

one direction, and you've now made a decision that you want it to go in a completely different direction. You then re-engineer the organization to be able to accomplish the new goals in the new direction. We, as an organization, like many police departments in America during the 70s and 80s, became very reactive in our approach to crime. I've described it in speeches I give as the traditional or professional policing model that was made up of rapid response: Dial 911 and we'll come very quickly. As managers we focused on how we keep cars getting there quickly. We focused on random patrol as the chief preventive measure — the idea that all these cars riding around would scare the criminals into submission. Thirdly, there was reactive investigation, something we always had done — after-the-fact investigation. And it was often controlled by a strong, centralized organization; in the case of the NYPD, you had to go up to the top of the organization to make even the most basic decisions.

The new direction I wanted to go would support the policies the Mayor was putting into place: significant crime reduction of about seven percentage points on up to double digits, quality-of-life enforcement and disorder control, and ultimately reduce fear. The NYPD as it was structured for the previous 20 years could not meet that mission because it just didn't focus on crime. Crime was literally a by-product, and the prevention of crime was not a focus of this organization. We judged success by numbers of arrests and rapid response. So we took a look at the organization, and we set up 12 re-engineering teams. We took a look at productivity, awards programs, every facet of what we do and said "Okay, to meet the policies of the Mayor, to meet the goals that we've established in the department, how does the organization have to look?" It goes back to the lethargy question. We had to literally shake this place up:

We did it by involving a lot of people in the re-engineering teams, and I'm using corporate models rather than public models. Osborne's book talks about reinventing government; Hannah's book that we're using, "Re-engineering the Corporation," uses corporate techniques, and my profit line, my bottom line each day is crime reduction. I look at my crime reduction figures. And those are so important because that's what captures the public imagination that something is definitely happening, and it gives me strong measurement for my commanders as to how well they're doing against crime. Then, in the quality-of-life area, I count very much on the visibility of police and what they're actually doing. I don't want them out there as potted plants. They have to be there in assertive fashion, and that's where we're starting to have some rumblings and concern about whether assertiveness is generating corruption, or generating disrespect. That's an issue we are very concerned about, but I think we can control that and at the same time still have assertive policing. Assertive policing is not and does not necessarily have to be abusive policing.

Shooting their mouths off

LEN: In keeping with that, it has been reported that civilian complaints have gone up about 25 percent. Some of the things that this increase has been attributed to include the emphasis on quality-of-life crimes, more officers, younger officers, and an oversensitized population. Would you agree with any of that?

BRATTON: All of those may be a factor. I think the most significant factor when you analyze the complaints, which we do, is that we have a very young workforce, which makes up the bulk of our street forces and, in fact, constitute the principal group of officers against whom citizens make complaints. A single common denominator in many complaints is the fact that when a citizen challenges an officer, too many of our officers very quickly resort to an over-response, an over-control — something to the effect of, "Who are you to challenge me; I'm the police." It's an issue that we believe is the genesis of a lot of our problems. Richard Emery, who serves on one of two of the committees that I put together to look at this problem very closely, our Integrity Committee, is a very prominent civil rights attorney in this city, who beats our pants off in court all the time in police abuse cases. Richard's comment is that in every case he's ever taken on, the precipitating incident was a citizen in some way, shape or form questioning a police officer's authority, and the officer's over-response to that inquiry. We have to find out how we can train our officers to deal with the public in a different way.

One of the ways of doing it is Verbal Judo. It's a concept developed by an individual whom we've hired and will continue to employ, which teaches cops to control their most dangerous weapon. Their most dangerous weapon is not the gun or the club, or Mace; that's not what gets them in trouble. The common denominator in terms of what gets cops in trouble in

this city is their mouths. They've got big mouths, and unfortunately many of them have filthy mouths. They don't understand that they're going to get into trouble quicker than anything by abusing people with their mouths — because, as you point out, people are increasingly willing to make a complaint.

Having said all of that, what also needs to be understood is that while we're very concerned with these types of complaints, everything needs to be kept in perspective. The perspective is that I have 38,000 cops. They engage in millions of interactions with the public every year, including in excess of 300,000 arrests, a million and a half parking tickets and summonses. In analyzing complaints to the Civilian Complaint Review Board, we find, interestingly enough, that of the approximately 5,000 complaints that are filed every year — keep in mind: 5,000 complaints against 38,000 officers, who engage in millions of interactions — the common theme is oftentimes that verbal exchange that precipitates the incident. But of the 5,000 complaints, after CCRB gets done investigating them, fewer than 5 percent are found to be substantiated. In a phenomenal amount of them, the person who makes the initial complaint never follows up. The CCRB has not yet been able to analyze why that is. Is it that they're angry, so they make a complaint, get the cop in trouble, but they're not ultimately interested in pursuing it? So the fact that we've had that increase you talk about — 20 percent, 25 percent — is of concern because it's a large percentage increase. But even considering phenomenal underreporting, which is probably the case, let's balance it. We have 38,000 cops who are being encouraged to get out there assertively. They need to be better trained — I fully understand that — and better supervised. But we also had last year 77,000 fewer victims of crime in the city, versus 5,000 people who made a complaint about some type of action an officer took against them, the bulk of it being verbal types of interactions.

The recent 48th Precinct case that led to the arrest of 16 officers, however, is a perfect example that if we don't get a handle on cops mouthing off to citizens, and responding too forcefully to a citizen questioning police authority, where is it

Theodore Roosevelt function, Roosevelt 100 years ago was dealing with a system that was totally corrupt in terms of how people were appointed; the city administration was totally corrupt. A hundred years later we're dealing with a city administration that's by and large clean. The Police Department is by and large clean. I can say with great confidence that it has no systemic corruption, but has a significant number of officers — I would estimate about 300 — who shouldn't be on this job. But the idea that it has to be cyclical? We make it cyclical. Why do we make it cyclical? Along with the district attorney, I could have been arresting these officers over the last year, but for a variety of reasons we build it up to a point where we have a major case. My intention from this point forward is, to the greatest degree possible, to try and arrest these people as fast as I can and get them off the job, and if the action is so egregious, a criminal matter, to work with the DA's to criminally prosecute. But there's been a lot of attention focused on it because the public has a fascination with it. The media is always fascinated with it, and unfortunately, from time to time it seems like there's more of it occurring.

LEN: There's still political maneuvering going on between the Mayor and the City Council over the creation of some kind of watchdog entity....

BRATTON: That's a polite word, maneuvering! It's been described as open warfare in some respects.

Too many cooks

LEN: Where do you stand on all this?

BRATTON: I'm quite clear where I stand; I stand squarely with the Mayor on it. And the 4-8 case, interestingly enough, supports the position that we're taking: that there's no objection to — and indeed, full support for — the idea of an outside monitor. I've been working very closely with the group that the

"What I don't need and don't support is another investigative entity. There's the political one-upmanship, the gamesmanship that goes on between competing entities."

going to lead? Three of those officers, including a sergeant, have been charged with arresting a citizen and beating him in the back of the car and then in the police station. Why? Because they thought that individual — there's not even certainty — that individual had made a comment from a crowd during a police action, and that he had been singled out, whether rightfully or wrongfully, for overreaction by the police. So we have three nitwits, a sergeant who should know better, and two cops who should have been supervised better, who are probably now going to go to jail. I'm not going to shed a tear for them, because their reaction was way out of line. At the same time, as a police manager, I have to be concerned that a simple incident such as that precipitated something that ultimately ended up in us arresting three officers and a citizen being badly abused.

LEN: That takes me to corruption — I'll get to training and education in a second.

BRATTON: It's all part and parcel; they really all come together.

100-years war

LEN: For the past three years the department has been experiencing a wave of police corruption....

BRATTON: For a hundred years [chuckles]. As I mentioned this morning, every Police Commissioner in that room this morning has had to deal with it. Ben Ward had the 7-7 [Precinct]; Pat Murphy had the systemic corruption; Ray Kelly spent his year in office working almost full time on it. Lee Brown was dealing with Newsday starting to uncover it; Dick Condon worked on it for a time. So it's not that it's more prevalent now; it's that a lot more attention is being given to it.

LEN: So you don't think it's this 20-year cycle that people talk about....

BRATTON: Not at all. I think there's a focus that comes into play. As I talked about in my comments this morning at the

Mayor has appointed. It's a fresh set of eyes and ears, and I think that you'll find that we've been extraordinarily cooperative with them. What I don't need and don't support is another investigative entity. In the 3-0 case, I had to work with the Mollen Commission investigators, the Manhattan District Attorney and the U.S. Attorney on that case. At times it got extraordinarily confusing, and there's the political one-upmanship, the gamesmanship that goes on between competing entities. With the 4-8 case, however, it was just me and the DA. No competition between prosecutors, no conflicts. It was a cleaner, smoother case, and for me administratively, it was a lot easier. There's the old adage about too many cooks ruining the soup — that's why I'm averse to it. The five DA's are not shy about prosecuting corruption; the U.S. Attorneys are not shy about it. So what the hell do we need one more in there for? So that's the only difference. What you really have right now with the City Council and the Mayor I don't think has much to do with the commission itself as with the political gamesmanship that's going on. As a result of the City Charter reforms, we're still in the formative stages as to who has what power. Unfortunately, this issue, I think, is caught in the middle.

LEN: At one time the NYPD Internal Affairs Division was harshly criticized for failing to do its job, for being a dumping ground, for being the least desirable assignment in the department. Some detectives said they would rather retire than be assigned there. Has this changed?

BRATTON: It changed dramatically, I think. My perspective, having had the opportunity to now sit here and look at what was versus what has transpired over the last year and what is now, it's night and day. All of the criticisms by the Mollen Commission, I think, were by and large right on the money. We've been very mindful of the Mollen Commission criticisms and recommendations, and a lot of that got initiated by my predecessor, Ray Kelly, and by Deputy Commissioner [Walter] Mack. In terms of asking Commissioner Mack to step aside, we had some significant differences in philosophy about how the Police Department's role should shape up. With Chief [Patrick] Continued on Page 10

Bratton: Put away doubts about merger

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Kelleher in there now, we have a very proactive organization. The 4-8 case reflects that. It was initiated by IAB, we used a lot of very sophisticated technology in making the case, we showed that they could cooperate very closely with the District Attorney. The IAB now has some of our best talent in there. The reason I put Kelleher in there is that his whole career is based on dealing with narcotics, so what better person to put in charge of dealing with corruption investigations, since corruption accounts for the bulk of our problems as far as their genesis is concerned. Just recently at Kelleher's request we brought in some of our best precinct commanders to reinforce the idea that some of our best people who are much admired by the rank and file are in Internal Affairs, and build up a sense of Internal Affairs as a fair organization and not a group of headhunters. And I think we've come a long way. Ray began a very good process that I've tailored to suit my needs at this time. Each of us had our own way of doing things; that's the way it operates when you make a change based on our current needs.

Older and wiser?

LEN: You recently increased the recruitment age to 22. Why was this done?

BRATTON: For several reasons. Ray Kelly had been looking at that and had been moving toward it. The Mollen Commission had recommended that we raise the age. We felt we were getting too immature a product in terms of the kids coming into the academy. They had the opportunity to come in at age 19 or 20, and most of them had no previous job experience for us to look at to determine how they were as workers. Many of them had lived at home till the time they came to the academy. A lot of them were not old enough to buy a drink, and yet they're going to be out enforcing alcohol laws. By raising it to 22, we pretty much assured that — say they graduated from high school at 17 or 18 — we've got a two- or three-year window to look at in terms of, say, work experience. If they weren't working, why not? If they were, how was that experience? The hope is also that at age 22, many of them might have some college education. So I think that would benefit.

We also changed the requirement for making sergeant for future exams. You're going to have to have a minimum of three years experience on the job. So if you come on the job at age 22, the earliest you can take the exam is age 25 or 26. And the way the cycle works with exams, you're probably going to be about 28 years of age before you make sergeant. So we get an older sergeant also. There's also a requirement now for sergeant; you have to have a certain amount of college credits. So we get an individual who was also better educated.

LEN: The Sanitation Department is trying to put through a policy that would require a high school diploma for hiring — in other words, police officers would then be meeting the same minimum educational requirement as garbage men. Do you think the NYPD will ever see the day that a college education is a requirement for the job?

BRATTON: In 1997, we will begin to require at least 60 college credits for all newly hired police officers. We do not plan to require a college degree because it would significantly reduce the pool of candidates we have to draw from. It's one of those unique things in New York, that with just the sheer size of the organization and our needs, it's difficult to raise the standards too dramatically.

LEN: You've spoken about how much you like the Police Cadet Corps program. Could you outline some of your thinking in that regard?

BRATTON: If I had my way, I would hire exclusively from a cadet program. We currently have three different ones: the John Jay one, the Police Department one, and the Federally-sponsored one. Other than some differences as to the amount of education necessary, the things they have in common are by and large city residence, a significant percentage of minorities and women to reflect the city population, college education, and an opportunity for us to look at cadets before they become full-scale police officers to see if they're suitable. It's all pluses; there's not a negative there. And it's cost effective. We can hire the cadet at a relatively small salary and take a look at him or her for a time. The problem is that it continually runs up against budget priorities; once again this year it did, though with the interest this year it was less of a battle than it was in previous years as far as putting money back in the budget. If I had my druthers, I'd hire exclusively from the ranks of the cadets.

LEN: You recently convened a Training Advisory Board with

the aim of taking a comprehensive look at all levels of training in the department. What do you want this panel to accomplish?

BRATTON: The focus of our energies over the next year is going to be here. I think we have crime reduction and crime control well in hand. We have systems in place. The department's been re-engineered to ensure continued crime declines. The department seems well managed. There is a great deal of satisfaction with the quality-of-life enforcement and disorder control. So those areas are in good hands.

The area that is of increasing concern is that which is reflected by the corruption issues and the growth of CCRB complaints, and it's in that area that we're going to focus a lot of our energies. The Integrity and Respect Committee that's up and running and the Training Committee that's up and running will work in parallel to each other and will, at some point in time end up merging. The area I want them to both focus on is the area we talked about earlier: How do we select, train and supervise our personnel to reduce that flashpoint that generates the CCRB complaint, which, left unattended in terms of supervision or training, can ultimately result in corrupt and brutal acts, as you've seen in the 4-8 case. We have a lot of melanomas that we're looking at, and the intent of all these committees is to get at the cancer that's generated from it. CCRB complaints are a melanoma, a sign. Corruption complaints are a sign. I believe the cancer that causes those is, in fact, the whole issue of respect.

We have a body of officers who come out of a society that is increasingly less respectful of each other, and we need to find a way to take that 21- or 22-year-old kid, who's never owned a pair of shoes, never worn clothes that need a crease, never worn a tie, and who, in their language with each other, are increas-

housing residents that their police protection would be diminished in some way as a result of this merger. How are you addressing these concerns, and were there perhaps any guarantees built into these mergers?

BRATTON: Sure. The reason that we wanted to merge was concern about, particularly, the housing developments. Crime was not dropping at the rate it was in the subways and the city. In both mergers the idea was to free up more cops to work on the transit- and housing-specific problems. So with the naysayers, the straphangers, for example, I'm going to delight in showing them up, along with the media. All those naysayers are the same cast of characters that in 1990 were saying changes I was making in the subway system were not going to work. Well, four years later, crime's down 50 percent. And the same guy that ran the subway police is now running the New York City police. So I would say to those doubting Thomases, put away your doubts. I think we're handling the housing problems. With the transit system, you'll see more police. I'm very comfortable that the merger will deliver as we promised: more police response.

LEN: With the housing and transit police, you had two nationally accredited police departments merging into a department that is not. Do you intend to bring the NYPD into the national accreditation fold at some point?

BRATTON: We've reviewed that. In both the housing and transit police, accreditation was used to take departments that were widely perceived to be not effective, not competent, and in a sense prove that they were. I definitely used that at Transit and I'm pretty confident my counterpart in Housing used it for

"We will require at least 60 college credits for new officers. We do not plan to require a college degree because it would significantly reduce the pool of candidates."

ingly foul. Now all of a sudden, at age 22 we tell them to shine their shoes, press their pants, put on a tie, say "Yes, sir," and "No, sir," and never engage in profanity, despite the rest of America using the F-word every time you turn around. What ends up happening, the first time they get into a tension situation, the language starts. And since so many of them are uncomfortable with the training that they received, feeling they don't have control of the situation, they resort very quickly to using their mouths, using authority control. That is the core cancer that is afflicting the NYPD, and most police departments in this country.

So these committees are all intended to work on the disease, coming at it from a lot of different ways. I use the analogy of how for years we've been swatting at the mosquitoes, and we've only recently come to understand that to cure malaria, you've got to drain the swamp. Well, to cure corruption, the swamp we have to drain is whatever it is that generates our officers to so quickly become disrespectful to the public after they get out of the academy. That's where we're going. I think we're on the right track. We know what's causing the disease; it's now a matter of coming up with the appropriate cures.

The urge to merge

LEN: You've referred a few times to the 38,000-officer size of the department, and that size was only recently accomplished through the absorption of the Housing and Transit police forces into the NYPD. What kind of organizational and management changes will this merger bring about?

BRATTON: One, the merger has been accomplished without a hitch — literally without a hitch. From the public perspective, most of them don't even know it occurred. It surely has required a phenomenal amount of work, but within the next month all of the cars will be repainted, so you won't even visibly see the difference that you could've seen if you were astute enough over the last 20 years. What it will accomplish is better coordination, and reduced friction between three agencies that are quite proud of themselves, and from time to time found themselves bumping up against each other in a situation. It will result, over time, in significant cost reductions. There's some initial cost for retirement equalization, but over time, as people leave the job, that becomes less of a cost. It's just a better way to go in terms of service delivery, and I think that will be borne out in the years ahead.

LEN: There was some concern by subway riders and public

that reason as well, to prove the professionalism of the organization. It's a very costly process in terms of commitment, and in terms of equipment that you need to have. The NYPD is so big and our infrastructure is so dilapidated you'd never be able to meet a key component of what accreditation requires; it's just not in the cards financially.

Some of their professionalization goals are achievable. Are they things we should strive for? Certainly. Do we need to strive for them exactly as articulated by their standards? Probably not. So is accreditation in the future for the NYPD? Probably not. Is it a goal to look at, as far as aspiring to? Yes, and we are. But there's a different need here than there was in Transit and Housing for that purpose. It's arguably because of who we are; there's the singular nature of the NYPD that you can't argue with, because it's so darn big compared to everybody else. It's very difficult to match us against anybody else. But I adhere to the professional standards that the accreditation commission stands for. It's an excellent concept and an excellent organization, the accreditation commission, but as to where I need to put my energies at this juncture, they have to be focused on other arenas as far as the major emphasis that we're putting into place.

A done deal

LEN: What is the status of community policing in the city?

BRATTON: Community policing is here. It is embraced totally. It is entwined in all we do. But you never hear me talk about it for the reason that it is here; it doesn't need to be talked about. Community policing as I've sought to implement it goes back 20 years to when I was a young lieutenant in Boston, taking one police district and putting it into place there under the banner of neighborhood-responsive policing. Community policing did not come on as a term till the 1980s. As I look at it, it's made up of three P's. First, partnership. Quite clearly we've engaged in very effective partnerships with the criminal justice system, with our communities, with the precinct councils. New York probably has the most networked partnership entities in America. We have clearly come to understand as a police department that we can't do it alone, even with 38,000 cops. We need a working partnership. Second, we have embraced the concept of problem-solving. The crime strategies that we've put in place are not just looking into individual 911 calls and how fast we respond to them. They're looking for the cause, much the same as I used the analogy earlier of swatting mosquitoes

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C-OP vs. the existing police bureaucracy

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licensing demands, and as such changing work habits and attitudes may be an even slower process than changing the bureaucracy itself. Herman Goldstein, in his touchstone work, "Problem-Oriented Policing" (1990), was very cognizant of the dilemmas problem-oriented policing would face when confronted with the traditional police bureaucracy. He argues that rather than treating police officers as "automatons," police departments should concern themselves with issues such as job satisfaction and giving officers "a greater sense of fulfillment." To do this, first the department will have to seriously consider how the organizational structure and bureaucracy must be reorganized to meet the newly defined goals and mission of policing. Second, the organization will have to retrain personnel in this "new" way of policing, and, perhaps most important, begin the process of changing the way police officers perceive their relationship with the organization.

Rethinking Organizational Change

Police departments will have to adjust to the notion that much of what is occurring within their organizations does not fit into standard theories of bureaucratic functioning. Standard theories of organizational behavior do not explain "worker self-management" or changes that are not planned for and implemented by the bureaucracy. The move away from rigid hierarchy, top-heavy bureaucracy and draconian management styles will mean managers will have to become familiar with worker participation in the workplace and changes that spring from process and not from the bureaucracy.

One way to change existing organizational practices is to re-evaluate how we view organizational change itself. Traditionally, organizational planning and change have been seen as preconceived activities. In this scenario, enlightened leadership has a battle plan for reform. The very process of change begins at the top of the hierarchy and is implemented downward throughout the department. When we begin to vest both decision-making and operational power with the work

force, this standard prescription of change becomes less relevant.

March and Olsen (1976) posit that much of what is destined to happen, using a community policing model, will mean that a theory that "assumes goals comes first and action comes later is frequently radically wrong. Human choice behavior is at least as much a process for discovering goals as for acting on them." While the mission and objectives of policing remain devoted to addressing crime-related issues, defining community problems (quality-of-life issues) and how to combat them, it will be a fluid process requiring flexible organizational supports. The organization, and the people involved in the process, will have to look for change and innovation in action and not wait for it to come down from above.

If community policing hopes to address quality-of-life problems on a community-by-community basis, bureaucratizing procedures will not work. While general principles and strategies can be shared, what works in a middle-class suburban neighborhood might prove useless in a high-crime, inner-city neighborhood. Community policing requires flexibility, and that flexibility means that officers work from general principles and strategies, then improvise.

While police work will remain a structured occupation with a strong sense of mission and purpose, we can learn from unplanned-for innovation. Innovation and creativity are not born from top-down hierarchies; they are, by definition, action concepts. It will take some getting used to, but police departments will have to become comfortable with the idea that goals and strategies will vary from community to community, and the means of achieving them will be determined by police officers and the community in very fluid, context-dependent partnerships. Thus, we will learn much from what we do, and this will in turn become the basis of our practice. It is also true that a core of proven strategies and practices is already evolving. Every new situation need not be a new adventure. Information must be shared so that officers do not waste valuable

time reinventing the wheel when confronted with new problems and circumstances.

Coercion vs. Self-Direction

Worker participation, and the attendant democratic organizational structures it implies, will prove particularly troublesome to the police bureaucracy. The typical police bureaucracy opposes the very notion of worker participation at the most fundamental levels of the organizational process.

"Worker participation," "self-management" and "democratic organizations" are some of the terms used to describe a theory that stresses vesting workers with more power over every aspect of the organization's decision-making process. Theorists have outlined two basic types of management orientations. Theory X, in which people must be coerced, controlled, directed, threatened and punished, is fairly descriptive of the traditional police bureaucracy. Theory Y, meanwhile, assumes that workers want to exercise self-direction in their work. The high degree of imagination and creativity possessed by workers simply needs encouragement. Community policing will make it necessary to shift police management philosophies from X to Y. Easily said, but in practice a huge undertaking.

Worker participation exists on a continuum that ranges from consulting workers in the decision-making process to full worker autonomy. What eventually occurs in police organizations adopting a community policing philosophy remains to be determined. External demands upon the police institution will probably mean the emergence of a kind of pseudo-participation. What is important is that police managers recognize the need to move away from what have been described as restrictive-work environments that are usually associated with low-status occupations, and which afford individuals little discretion or control over their work. This will begin the movement toward true police professionalism, while recognizing the fact that police officers have always had discretion over how they do their work, despite the bureaucracy's best efforts

to limit and control it. Worker participation in policing only makes sense given a problem-solving paradigm. It is problem-solving that will allow the officer to become more proactive and gain some control over the work process.

The importance of preparing police organizations for a more democratic and participative work process was emphasized in the 1993 National Institute of Justice study of the Madison, Wis., Police Department. The transition to problem-oriented community policing in Madison was preceded by an emphasis on organizational reform, or quality from the inside out. The importance of this approach is that it recognizes the need to first reform the organization before attempting to change the "quality of its service delivery." While the study notes the difficulty of proving this empirically, common sense suggests that people who are treated as low-skilled workers are not going to prove particularly adept at problem-oriented community policing. In a similar vein, one of the great ironies of police human-relations training has been that while recruits are trained in, and are implored to practice, a humanistic service style of policing, the recruits are often intimidated, bullied and treated as "pond scum" by those who wield authority over them.

A person's orientation toward his work is, to a large extent, governed by the way the work is organized. The "Twelve Principles of Quality Lead-

ership" adopted by the Madison Police Department demonstrate an acute awareness of some of the inherent contradictions of police organizational practices made conspicuous by reform that requires employee participation and professionalism. Two of the principles strike at the very heart of the most counterproductive aspects of standard police management strategies: Principle Seven, which calls for managing based on the behavior of 95 percent of the employees and not the 5 percent who cause problems, and Principle Eight, which calls for improving systems and examining processes before blaming people. The ingrained distrust of people and their intentions that is inherent in standard police management strategies is met in turn with an inherent distrust of management and "the job" by everyone employed by the organization. Such an environment is not exactly fertile ground for human relations or community policing. Changing from the inside out must include an awareness that sub-cultural belief systems will change even more slowly than the bureaucratic practices that helped create them. Still, reforming the police bureaucracy remains a prerequisite to changing the way police officers perceive their role and function and, in turn, improving the delivery of police services.

[Coming up: Training and professionalism in a community-policing context.]

LEN interview: NYPD's Bill Bratton

Working with "the best & the brightest"

Continued from Page 10

versus draining the swamp. So problem-solving is a key component. Third, maybe more so than most police departments in America, we have bought into the business of preventing crime. That is paramount to what we're doing. Arrests are only an incidental byproduct of reducing crime. I don't look for anybody to measure my success by the number of arrests we've made. Our success will be measured, and I'm quite comfortable it will be measured by crime prevention, crime reduction.

That's community policing, and a central theme of community policing is decentralization of decision-making. It's very different from Commissioner Brown and Commissioner Kelly, because they were going to put the focus of attention on the beat officers. I'm putting it on the precinct commander because in a city as complex as New York City, that beat officer, unless he's truly exceptional — and when you have 5,000 to 10,000 relatively new kids out there, the city's going to overwhelm them; they're not going to overwhelm the city. But my 76 precinct commanders, they're some of the best and brightest; they're the appropriate level in the organization to give power, responsibility, authority and accountability to. That's how I'm implementing community policing here. But you very seldom hear me talk about it because it's here, it's part of the organization. It was new in terms of articulating it, it was new in terms of its approach. But it's here; there's no need to talk about it.

LEN: As president of the Police Executive Research Forum, you have an ongoing link to the best and brightest ideas around. To what extent is the NYPD taking advantage of all that's out there in the way of cutting-edge thinking?

BRATTON: Quite a bit, in that the capacity of president of PERF allows me constant access to all that PERF does: the research, the bringing-together of some of the best and brightest, and in my capacity as Commissioner here, I bring that back and push it into the department. Some of my staff naturally network quite frequently with the staff down there. In my role with PERF, in attempting to work with the executive director and newly constituted board, we're going to be looking to deal with some concerns that were voiced by the membership in the sense that in the last year or two PERF had started to drift away from some of its original goals. I share that; the focus in the last year or so has been on the internal re-engineering. Over the next year or so you're going to see us get back very strongly into research, and our annual and semi-annual meetings will be constructed very differently than the last couple have been. There will be more focus on three or four core issues that the members want to discuss. We will engage in debate, bring in the experts on the issue, and revisit what we're all about in the first place: to discuss, to debate, and to exchange ideas.

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In America

BOB HERBERT

Good News for The City

New York is a tough town to live in. I've often gone in search of a legal parking space late at night and ended up so far from my apartment I had to take a subway or a taxi home.

The weather is wicked. There are only about a dozen really beautiful days each year.

The noise is ceaseless. Jackhammers. Sirens. Screaming neighbors. Traffic. Sporadic gunfire.

Crossing a street can resemble Russian roulette. Buses, trucks, bicyclists, Rollerbladers — all coming at you.

You get used to it. It's not as bad as combat.

The flip side is that when good things happen in New York, the tendency is to savor them a bit more than is usual. A man sneezed in a bodega the other day, and when a stranger said, "God bless you," a huge smile creased the face of the surprised sneezer and he couldn't stop saying thank you.

Like almost everything else, a simple kindness plays bigger in New York.

Right now there is quite a bit to savor in the city; some very good things are happening. So good, in fact, that the skeptics — traumatized by decades of bad news — are looking warily about for hidden explanations that might turn the good news upside down.

Let's start with crime. It appears to be plummeting. Compared with the first six months of last year, homicides are down by a third. If the trend continues through December, New York will record the fewest homicides in 25 years.

There are a lot of New Yorkers currently walking around who, if the old trends had held, would have been dispatched to their reward by now. You may know some of them. You may be one of them.

In 1990 there were 2,245 homicides in New York, a record. (The total included 87 people who were killed in an arson fire at the Happy Land club in the Bronx.) In the first six months

Crime's down,
school's better.
Now the bad news.

of this year, there were fewer than 600 homicides. By the end of the year, the Police Department expects to record the lowest number of homicides since 1970, when John Lindsay was Mayor, Nelson Rockefeller was Governor and 1,117 people were killed in New York City.

All other serious crimes have declined sharply as well, with the exception of forcible rape, which is down only slightly from last year.

The blessing of a substantially reduced crime rate is due in large part to the hiring of 7,000 additional police officers since 1990 — a legacy of the Dinkins administration — and the much more aggressive and sophisticated approach to policing that has been put in place by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton.

The potential political payoff is huge. If the crime numbers continue their precipitous fall, no one will be able to beat Mr. Giuliani when he comes up for re-election in 1997.

The other good news for New York City has to do with the academic performance of the public schools. Math and reading scores are up in every district and Schools Chancellor Ramon Cortines is likely to reveal soon that there has been an encouraging response to his imposition of more stringent science and math requirements in the high schools.

It is very difficult to overstate the benefits to a big city of reduced crime and improved public school performance. If the improvements in New York are sustained, they will dramatically enhance the social and economic life of the city. A very tough town will become a lot more attractive and somewhat easier to deal with.

The irony for New Yorkers is that the two men most responsible for the improvements — Mr. Cortines and Mr. Bratton — have both had troubled relations with Mr. Giuliani. Mr. Cortines, belittled and repeatedly assailed by the Mayor, has already announced he is leaving as chancellor. Mr. Bratton, a very proud man who was forced by Mr. Giuliani to adopt a much lower public profile, insists that everything is fine now. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that he will depart as Police Commissioner sooner rather than later.

Mr. Cortines and Mr. Bratton are both popular. What happens if they move on and their replacements are unable to build upon, or even maintain, their successes? The disappointment will be palpable. The impact on the city could be tragic. And questions will be raised that Mayor Giuliani may have a tough time answering. □

Shootings Fall As More Guns Stay at Home

Rise in Frisking Deters Carrying of Illegal Arms

By CLIFFORD KRAUSS

Behind the 30 percent drop in murders and shootings reported in New York City this year is a startling development: drug dealers and gang members have apparently begun to leave their guns at home.

Police Department and Federal law enforcement officials say that gunplay has decreased from the South Bronx to the Rockaways partly through the tightening of local and Federal gun-control regulations and crackdowns on youth gangs. But more than anything else, Federal and local officials say, it is the increase in police friskings for such minor violations as loud radio playing and public beer drinking that has discouraged people from carrying unregistered guns.

Civil liberties advocates are strongly critical of the department's new emphasis on frisking, complaining that the police single out members of minority groups in poor neighborhoods and in public housing projects, and few police departments around the country have copied New York's.

But, while there are still an estimated two million illegal guns floating around the city, and despite a spate of heavily publicized shootings in the last few weeks, both statistical and anecdotal evidence shows that police assertiveness is having an impact on gun violence.

The number of reported murders by handgun in the city through June 30 dropped by 40.7 percent from last year, even more than the overall 31 percent decrease in murders. By July 16, the police reported 1,714 shooting incidents, 733 fewer than during the same period last year, and 1,962 shooting victims, 818 fewer than last year.

Only two years ago, 1 out of every 438 people arrested for subway fare evasion was found carrying a loaded gun. This year, as the police stepped up their surveillance of turnstiles, only 1 out of every 1,034 arrested was carrying a loaded gun.

While total arrests are up 27 percent this year, gun arrests are actually down 17 percent, according to the Police Department.

"It appears the tremendous decrease in shootings and the apparent fact that less people are carrying guns is due to the general enforcement effort of the department," said Thomas A. Repetto, president of the Citizens Crime Commission. "Criminals see a lot of cops around and say, 'I don't think I should be carrying my gun.'" Mr. Repetto is preparing a detailed analysis of New York police gun strategies.

Perhaps the most dramatic case in point is the 30th Precinct in northwest Harlem, whose 18 murders and 40 shooting incidents led all precincts in the city for the first five months of the year. Using pin maps, police commanders noted that more than half of the killings and shootings occurred on just nine streets — particular-

Continued From Page 29

ly along a Z-shaped zone of bodegas, pool halls and condemned tenements that included Hamilton Place and West 138th and West 144th Streets.

Using citywide and precinct units, the Police Department first flooded the zone with plainclothes officers and detectives. Then the precinct moved many beat and uniformed narcotics officers from less violent streets to the "hot zone" to sweep up low-level drug lookouts and dealers, often initially for minor violations. Meanwhile, officers patrolling in their radio cars looked for any legal excuse — like lane changes without signaling — to stop and question drivers of cars who, because they had out-of-state licenses, were suspected of trafficking guns or drugs.

As 30th Precinct officers frisked 450 people in June — a 150 percent increase from June 1994 — the number of shootings began to plummet. And since the enforcement program began on June 1, there has not been a single shooting or murder in the 30th Precinct's problem zone.

Typically, when officers encounter someone in the target zone who is drinking or violating some other ordinance, they first look for a bulge that may be a gun. If they think he is carrying a gun or responding to their questioning in a suspicious or nervous way, they frisk for a weapon.

When writing out a summons, they ask the violator for identification and then check by cellular telephone to see if the person has any outstanding warrants.

Noting that all the friskings have produced only a handful of gun arrests, Lieut. Robert T. Varieur, who leads the 30th Precinct special operations units, said, "We're not taking that many guns off the streets because these people are anticipating our interactions." He added, "That means more guns are kept inside, fewer people are reaching for their waistbands and fewer children are taking errant bullets from cross-fires."

Arturo Garcia, a 40-year-old orange juice vendor who pushes his cart down Hamilton Place, said he noticed a return to some semblance of peace since the police began their sweeps eight weeks ago. "With all the police vigilance," he said, "nobody dares carry their guns."

Similar police flood-and-frisk tactics have brought similar if less dramatic results in many neighborhoods in all five boroughs, including St. Albans, Queens, the north end of Staten Island and the Bedford-Stuyvesant and Bushwick sections of Brooklyn.

Mapping out the times and locations of shootings and murders each

day, the police in all 76 precincts are refocusing their patrols and interrogating violators of the most minor offenses to see if they know anything about illegal guns.

In South Ozone Park, Queens, for example, the recent arrest of a small-time crack user provided information that led to the arrest of five drug dealers and the seizure of 17 high-powered guns and a scanner tuned in to a Brooklyn precinct. And in the East New York section of Brooklyn, the police questioned a man arrested for violating an order of protection filed by his former girlfriend and came up with information that led them to a video store that was clandestinely selling illegal guns.

Criminologists have explained the gradual nationwide drop in violent crime as a result of the aging of the population, a decline in crack-cocaine use and the growing size of police forces in most big cities. Drops in murder rates have been substantial in Houston, San Francisco and a few other cities, but no major city has duplicated New York's rapid decline in handgun violence, which accelerated in the middle of last year.

Officials at the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms say the tightening of state and Federal gun-control laws has slowed the flow of guns into the city. They say the number of legal gun dealers in the city has decreased from about 600 to about 200 since the inception of a Federally financed joint program by the bureau and the New York police in March 1993 to review gun dealer license applications and renewals.

Local officials of the Justice Department claim some of the credit for the decrease in street shootings, citing Federal investigations and recent prosecutions of several street gangs in northern Manhattan and the South Bronx. "When the word gets back to the wannabes about the long prison sentences," said James K. Kallstrom, the F.B.I.'s assistant director in charge of local enforcement operations, "there has to be a chilling effect on them."

But Federal officials give the most credit to the police department.

"Ninety percent of the decrease in violent crime is because of good, solid police work," said John A. O'Brien, a senior aide to John W. Magaw, the alcohol bureau's director. "The information I've received indicates that with 'quality of life' enforcement the police are stopping and questioning a lot more people."

Still, the Civilian Review Board has recorded a sharp increase in complaints of police harassment, partly as a result of the police friskings. And civil libertarians criticize Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani because, they say, the friskings are conducted in inordinate numbers on black and Hispanic people.

The ends do not justify the means, said Norman Siegel, executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, who called the police frisking strategy "street justice tactics."

Continued on Page 32

Shootings Plummet in New York as Police Frisking Drives Illegal Guns Off the Streets



Into the 'Hot Zone': After learning that more than half of the killings and shootings in the 30th Precinct in Harlem occurred on just nine streets, the Police Department flooded that "hot zone" with officers. Two of them caught Victor Campana with a crack pipe on 150th Street. He was charged with trespassing and possessing drug paraphernalia.



A Tense Search: Told by Mr. Campana about drug dealing in a nearby apartment, the officers went to investigate, finding a room inside whose door was bolted shut. Their shouts went unanswered at first, but when the door suddenly opened the officers ducked for cover, guns drawn. A man, John Brido, came out, and no shots were fired.




Photographs by Edward Keating/The New York Times

Questioned and Released: Mr. Brido was released without being charged after officers found no evidence of drug dealing. The new police program, while strongly criticized by civil liberties advocates, is having the desired effect: since it began on June 1, there has not been a single shooting or murder in the 30th Precinct's problem zone.

Crime Lab

Mystery of New York, the Suddenly Safer City



Phillip Greenberg for The New York Times

Robberies, burglaries and murders are down, and Police Commissioner William J. Bratton gives the credit to his department. At the Midtown South station house, an officer looks at the evidence.

NEW YORK CITY'S murder, robbery and burglary rates have plummeted to their lowest levels in a quarter century — a development that has become a marvel of American law enforcement. But Police Commissioner William J. Bratton will not be satisfied until every last criminologist surrenders.

"We'll knock them down like ducks in a row," said Mr. Bratton, speaking of all the standard criminological theories about how crime waves are tied to the size of the youth population, or to changes in the weather, or to unemployment levels, or to drug use patterns, or to the availability of guns.

As an enthusiastic brawler and bragger, Mr. Bratton wants the world to believe that it is his aggressive new crime strategies, and just about nothing else, that have forced New York's thugs into a fast retreat.

Still, almost everyone else who studies crime is mystified by New York's 30 percent drop in murder and shooting incidents so far this year. Attorney General Janet Reno has called on her researchers to study it, and local social scientists are faxing faster than speeding bullets to foundations with grant proposals to test one new theory or another.

Many cities have increased their police forces and seen crime rates decline, just as New York has, but this city's drop is simply breathtaking. As of Thursday, the 648 murders so far this year were 312 below last year's total on July 20. Over the first six months, reported robberies fell by 21.9 percent, burglaries by 18.1 percent and motor vehicle theft by 25.2 percent over the same period in 1994. Only with rape, a crime that women are believed to be reporting more often, have the numbers remained roughly the same.

More Than Cops

"There's a miracle happening before our eyes and we don't know why it's happening," said Jeffrey Fagan, director of the Center for Violence Research and Prevention at Columbia University. "Cops deserve credit,

Maybe it's the police. Maybe it's the weather. Or are all the criminals behind bars?

but it would be a first in the history of social science for there to be a single reason for such a dramatic change in social behavior."

Central to the question of why crime has dropped so dramatically in New York two years in a row is the issue of whether crime is preventable by police work at all. Many researchers say crime is an inexorable symptom of deeper social trends, like the breakdown of family or community, that police cannot possibly control. Deferring to criminologists, police chiefs have accepted the notion that individual crimes are random events, driven by passion or desperation, made more lethal in recent years by the easy availability of guns.

Mr. Bratton has disputed such thinking, and he has made New York City a laboratory for perhaps the most innovative policing of any big city in the country. In the crackdown on minor offenses, like public beer drinking and urination and unlicensed street vending, Mr. Bratton's department found new ways to frisk people for guns and check their records for outstanding warrants. Suddenly people brought into precinct station houses for nothing more serious than graffiti-scrawling were pressed for information about drug or gun dealing.

In the War Room

Mr. Bratton ordered the department's number-crunchers, who once measured productivity by clocking how fast patrol cars responded to calls, to design computer maps to plot crime trends daily for every street in the city. The approach likens criminals to enemy army units that can be squashed or deterred

Continued on page 4

Continued from page 1

before they make their next move. The commissioner has advanced his predecessors' community policing policies by giving local precinct commanders wide latitude in creating their own anti-crime strategies.

Before Mr. Bratton took over the department, neighborhood officers were ordered not to make narcotics arrests out of fear they would be tempted into corruption. Few anti-gun and narcotics units worked nights or weekends, leaving criminals an open field to operate. That has changed, and arrests have climbed by more than 25 percent.

"I want to challenge the old idea that policing can't make a substantial impact on social change," Mr. Bratton said. "American policing has been swatting at mosquitoes for 20 years. In New York we've learned how to drain the swamp."

Nevertheless, those ducks Mr. Bratton promises to knock down keep quacking. And while they cannot explain why the drop in crime accelerated precisely at the time the new crime strategies took effect in the middle of last year, these theories offered by criminologists do suggest that something more than Mr. Bratton's innovations are contributing to the city's good fortunes.

THEORY *The drop in New York's crime rate reflects a national trend.*

While some medium-sized cities continue to record more crime, the nation as a whole, and big cities in particular, is seeing less. Baltimore, Cleveland, Houston, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, Memphis, Milwaukee, Nashville, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Antonio, San Diego and San Francisco all saw their murder rates drop by better than 10

percent last year. The 32 percent drop in Houston's murder rate for the first six months of this year was slightly better than New York's 31 percent slide, and Phoenix and Chicago were not too far behind.

"Different cities point to different reasons," said Marie Simonetti Rosen, publisher of Law Enforcement News. "Some say it's the impact of community policing, some say it's the impact of tougher jail sentences, some say it's because of special courts dealing with guns, domestic violence and drugs."

But New York's drop in virtually every category of crime is more sustained and steeper than any other major city's. While most of the cities that experienced drops in violent crimes last year were coming off a couple of years of rising murder and robbery rates, New York's drop of 12.3 percent in all felonies last year came as an acceleration of three straight years of gentle declines.

THEORY *The crack-cocaine epidemic that fueled the crime wave has ebbed.*

New York criminologists offer some strong, albeit anecdotal, evidence that crack smoking is going out of style among youths who grew up watching their neighborhoods ravaged by agitated users and pistol-toting sellers fighting for turf.

"The kids who are around the age of 18 have gravitated away from hard drugs, from both use and distribution," said Richard S. Curtis, an anthropologist at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in Manhattan. "Crack has just played itself out." Mr. Curtis based his conclusions on interviews and focus groups including hundreds of New York City youths over the last two years.

"They were really disillusioned with what crack had done," he concluded, adding that the increasingly aggressive police work may have "sped up" the growing conclusion of inner city youths that drugs and crime do not pay.

In his own interviews with youths recently released from the city jail on Rikers Island, Mr. Fagan, the Columbia University criminologist, has arrived at similar findings. "There has been some cultural adaptation to the slaughter," he said.

Mr. Fagan has also concluded that crime is decreasing as heroin slowly replaces crack as the drug of choice in New York. "While crack is a stimulant, heroin is a depressant," he said. And because heroin is purer and cheaper today than during its last surge in the 1960's, he has concluded that heroin addicts are not committing as many robberies and burglaries as they did 30 years ago to support their habits.

The police department disputes such conclusions, noting that 78 percent of the people arrested in Manhattan in February tested positive for cocaine, while only 22 percent tested positive for heroin and other opiates.

THEORY *Most of the adolescents who shot up New York over the last decade ended up behind bars or murdered in gang wars, while the total number of people in their prime crime years has fallen.*

Criminologists note that the 55,000 felons imprisoned in New York State is about double the number locked up a decade ago. More than half come from the city, and about half of those have been in prison for less than five years. Figuring that each one of the newly imprisoned New Yorkers would commit five or six felonies in a year, that's a



Ruby Washington/The New York Times

considerable number of murders, rapes and robberies prevented.

Another estimated 3,000 people involved in narcotics crimes have been killed over the last five years in New York.

But criminologists cannot explain how these factors could have come into play so suddenly the second half of last year, when New York's crime began falling so fast.

Perhaps the most popular theory, and the one most disdained by Mr. Bratton, argues that the crime rate is determined by the number of youths in society at any given time. At a news conference two weeks ago, Mr. Bratton disparaged the major proponent of demographic criminology, James Alan Fox of Northeastern University, as well as the journalists who go to him for his opinions.

"Most of the decline that has occurred would have occurred anyway," Mr. Fox said in an interview last week. "The baby boom generation, which comprises almost a third of the population, is getting older. They are middle-aged, and they are not nearly as aggressive and violent as they were when they were younger."

Mr. Bratton, backed by city demographers, rejects such thinking, noting that from 1990 to 1995 the city saw a decrease of only 6 to 7 percent in the number of people between the ages of 15 and 29, the age group that commits and is victimized by the vast majority of crimes.


But those ducks are persistent.

"To resolve the researchers' questions, we need to know what is happening with crack markets, gun markets, juvenile violence, and comparing New York City police tactics with other cities," said Jeremy Travis, director of the National Institute of Justice, the Justice Department's research arm. "Understanding takes time."


Was the drop in crime in New York City really so extraordinary?

Yes. There was a big drop in reported crime in the first half of 1995, compared to the same period in 1994, and this followed a drop from the second half of 1993 to the same period in 1994.

■ January - June ■ July - December



ALL MAJOR CRIMES (In thousands) Totals of murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft.




Source: New York City Police Department

Aren't the New York decreases just a statistical blip?

No. Over the past 25 years, crime in New York has increased less than it has nationwide. In fact, New Yorkers are less likely to be the victims of crime than they were in 1970.

Below is an index of total crimes each year — murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft.




Source: F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports

Do the demographics work for New York?

Yes. Crime generally increases with the teen-age and young adult population. New York's number of 16- to 25-year-olds has dropped, but the percentage of them who are immigrants has risen sharply.

Criminologists say that immigrants today are less likely to commit crimes because of stronger families and greater concerns with avoiding brushes with the law that could cause their family's immigration status to come under scrutiny.

The population figures are from Census Bureau data.




Source: Dr. Andrew A. Beveridge, of the sociology department at Queens College of the City of New York

What about drugs?

There seems to be a switch from cocaine to heroin use in New York City, as measured by emergency room visits, which were level for cocaine use in 1993, (the most recent year available) and were up for heroin use.

Cocaine makes users frantic, but heroin makes them sleepy. And heroin's street purity during the nine-year period shown below has increased from 34 to 61 percent, making it easier to get high for less money.

The arrests below are for drug possession or sales in New York City.




Source: New York State Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services

What about guns?

It is impossible to say how many guns are on the streets of New York City, but one measure is how many people caught committing minor crimes are armed.

The figures below are from arrests for entering the New York City subway system without paying the fare.

FARE BEATERS AND GUNS




Source: New York City Police Department

Does hiring more police officers deter murder?

Only in New York does there appear to be a correlation between the sheer number of police officers and the worst crime — murder. If the correlation existed in other cities, the charts below would show the murder rate moving down while the ratio of police officers went up and vice versa.

When examining the 1990's statistics for the 10 largest cities in the United States (listed below in order of size), only New York and Houston saw the murder rate drop as the police force grew. But San Diego saw a decline in murders while their police force shrank. And Chicago had a record number of police officers


per 10,000 people, while the murder rate grew. Over the past 25 years, San Diego and San Antonio have had similar numbers of police officers per capita, but San Antonio regularly had twice San Diego's murder rate. On the charts below, some years' figures were not available.



What about robbery or motor vehicle theft?

The lack of a correlation between the number of police officers and rates of crime extends to other crimes, like robbery and motor vehicle theft, shown below. In the 1990's, almost all the

cities have seen decreases in these crimes, with some achieving faster rates of decline than New York with smaller police forces. These figures are for crimes per 100,000 population.



The New York Times

NEW YORK, MONDAY, JULY 8 1995

A 25-Year Low In First Half This Year

By CLIFFORD KRAUSS

In an acceleration of a four-year trend, the murder rate in New York City has plunged sharply since January, to the lowest level in 25 years, according to Police Department statistics.

In the first 25 weeks of the year, reported murders have fallen by nearly a third, to 563 from 826 in the same period last year. If the trend holds through the rest of the year — even accounting for the normal surge of summertime mayhem — 1995 will record the fewest slayings since 1970, when 1,117 people were killed.

The latest statistics are particularly striking when placed against those of only five years ago, when the city's crack epidemic produced hundreds of drug-related killings and sent the number of homicides soaring to 2,245, a record.

The declines were evident all across the city. Despite the ever-present fears that have become ingrained in the consciousness of many urban dwellers, there was not a single murder so far this year in either the Upper West Side or the Upper East Side — compared with three in each neighborhood during the same period in 1994.

In South Jamaica, Queens, three people have been slain in the last six months, compared with 17 last year, while killings in the Tremont and Highbridge neighborhoods of the Bronx have fallen to 19, from 28 last year.

Although murder is probably the best indicator of the overall crime rate, since virtually every slaying is reported, the rates of other reported crimes have fallen as well. Reports of robberies have fallen to 27,400, from 35,274, a 22 percent decline, while reported auto thefts have declined to 34,137, from 45,659, a 25 percent drop.

"I have never seen anything as extraordinary as this and I have been in government for 40 years," Richard A. Brown, the Queens District Attorney, said yesterday. "Four years ago, people were throwing their hands up, and now when I go to community meetings there is a sense and a feeling of pride that things are getting better," he said.

Several criminologists said it was impossible to pinpoint a single cause for the decline, but they offered a variety of explanations. Tougher laws are putting more criminals behind bars for longer sentences, they said. And the drug wars between gangs over turf, which sent so many dealers and bystanders to the morgue in the late 1980's and early 90's, have largely been settled.

Some experts also say that a decline in crack use and an increase in heroin use may be another explanation. Heroin, they note, makes people more sluggish, and since heroin addicts need less frequent fixes, they tend to commit fewer robberies. Still others speculate that nationwide demographic shifts have produced proportionately fewer people in their late teens and early 20's — the prime

Continued on Page 22, Column 1

Murder Rate in New York City Plunges Toward the Lowest Level in 25 Years

Continued From Page 1

crime-committing ages.

But most significant, in the view of New York City police officials, are the aggressive efforts that they have made in stopping all types of crimes, from urinating in public to grand larceny to carrying concealed weapons.

"It's not the weather, and it's not demographics," said Police Commissioner William J. Bratton, who noted that the city's youth population had actually increased in recent years. "We are achieving the ability where we can spot a problem and smother it in the bud."

So far this year, the department has made nearly 180,000 arrests, an 18.4 percent jump from last year and a 30.3 percent increase from 1993. The effort, officials say, has put more criminals in prison and kept others off the street for days at a time while they awaited trial in jail.

Since he was appointed Police Commissioner by Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Mr. Bratton has used computers, pin maps and regular crime-strategy meetings to attack crime systematically rather than merely respond to crimes after they occur.

Mr. Bratton has also transferred responsibilities that once rested with overtaxed special squads back to the local precincts. He has allowed precinct patrol officers to make drug arrests for the first time in a generation, use sting operations to crack down on fences and chop shops, and put a higher priority on investigations into domestic violence.

Lawrence W. Sherman, a University of Maryland professor and criminologist for the Indianapolis Police Department, said that while "it's very hard to say with any certainty" why crime has gone down so steeply, the Police Department deserves much credit.

CRIME WATCH

Declining Numbers, Again

The total number of arrests in 1995 increased 18 percent over 1994 to 179,654. Here are the citywide reported felonies from Jan. 1 to June 25.

	1995	1994	PERCENT CHANGE	1993	2-YEAR PERCENT CHANGE
Murder	563	826	-31.8%	901	-37.5%
Rape	1,486	1,485	+ 0.1	1,566	- 5.1
Robbery	27,400	35,274	-22.3	39,987	-31.5
Felony assault	17,271	18,278	- 5.5	19,212	-10.1
Burglary	36,012	44,117	-18.4	47,253	-23.8
Grand larceny	30,025	34,504	-13.0	39,229	-23.5
Auto theft	34,137	45,659	-25.2	53,772	-36.5

Source: New York City Police Department

One theory on fewer crimes: Crack use is down while heroin use is up.

"All of the evidence shows that mapping and attacking crime hot spots is the most effective police strategy against street crime," Mr. Sherman said. "New York City appears to be doing this with more precision and relentlessness than any other big city police agency."

Among the changes in crime rates, perhaps the most dramatic of all were in the Bronx. The 131 murders reported there in the first 25 weeks of the year were a 40.5 percent decrease from the 220 reported during the same period in 1994 and a

43 percent decrease from the 229 in 1993. Meanwhile, shooting incidents declined in the borough by better than 30 percent.

Jessica Alvarez, manager of the Mount Eden Florist Shop on the corner of East Mount Eden and Jerome Avenues in the Morris Heights section of the Bronx, said she can tell the difference. "A couple of years back, it was real hard around here," she said. "You couldn't walk the streets. Now it's calmer."

She added: "Before when you called a cop they didn't want to come at all. Now, when you call them, they are here right away."

The statistics show that shootings are down all across the city. In the first 25 weeks, 1,703 people were either killed or wounded by gunshots, 700 fewer than in the same period in 1994, and 1,000 fewer than in the six-month period in 1993.

Crime did increase in some neigh-

borhoods. In Coney Island, Brooklyn, murders increased to 10 so far this year, from 6 in 1994, while burglaries also increased slightly. The 30th Precinct, which covers northwest Harlem, reported an increase in murders to 21 from 16 and an increase in assaults to 289 from 285. But those neighborhoods were clearly exceptions.

"This is a long-term happy trend," said Michael Smith, president of the Vera Institute, a Manhattan-based think tank. He credited the Police Department's new efforts but also speculated that "a trend like that represents a cultural change which is difficult to define."

Thomas A. Reppetto, president of the Citizens Crime Commission, said he was hopeful that the declines would continue. "I believe they could bring down the murders to under a thousand," Mr. Reppetto said. "Remember that in the 1940's and 1950's, the average number of murders per year were about 300."

Criminologists note that while crime is decreasing significantly in several other cities around the country, such as Detroit, Los Angeles, Chicago and Bridgeport, Conn., New York appears to be ahead of the national curve. Of all major cities in the country, only New York has seen a decline in murder and almost every other category of felony for the last five years.

According to the F.B.I. data, of the 27 largest cities in the country besides New York, seven reported increases in murder last year from 1993, while 10 showed decreases in 1994 after an increase the previous year.

The big decrease in crime should give Mayor Giuliani a boost at a time of painful budget cuts. To maximize the political benefit, he had planned to announce the statistics on a tour through the five boroughs next week

to spread the word directly to residents that their communities have become safer.

In conversations with people around the city, some residents say they feel safer now while others were skeptical about the statistics.

"I don't know why crime should go down," said Dennis Joyce, 36, a Brooklyn resident and history teacher at a South Bronx high school. "Crime went up because more people were out of work, homeless, and suffering from budget cuts. Those things haven't changed."

But Joy Chan, 48, the owner of a clothing store on Mott Street in Chinatown, said, "You see more police and they are really doing something to help."

The New York Times

NEW YORK, SUNDAY, JANUARY 1, 1995

New York City Crime Falls But Just Why Is a Mystery

By CLIFFORD KRAUSS

Behind the bloodcurdling headlines about a firebombing on the No. 4 train, a drive-by shooting on the Brooklyn Bridge and the killing of a police officer in a botched bicycle store holdup, behind the back-to-back campaigns that elected a new Mayor vowing to improve the quality of life in New York City and a new Governor committed to bring back the death penalty, lies an often-overlooked fact.

Crime in New York City is dropping. And dropping fast.

Murders, which had been falling gradually over the previous three years, dropped sharply, by nearly a fifth, in 1994. Over all, 350 fewer people were slain in

When Crime Recedes

First of three articles.

1994 than in the year before, and 650 fewer than in 1990, when murders, many of them fueled by the crack epidemic, reached a peak.

Shootings dropped by more than 15 percent, the latest police statistics show. And virtually every type of reported felony declined in frequency last year, with auto theft, grand larceny, burglary and robbery all dropping by better than 10 percent.

True, violent crime remains a constant menace of city life. The nearly 1,600 homicides that were committed in 1994 are still about four times the 390 killings that the city recorded in 1960. And a growing number of crimes are committed by teen-agers, whose vicious and often random acts of violence have raised fear to a level that statistics cannot overcome.

But coming after the staggering increases in crimes through the late 1980's — a lethal period that culminated in mid-1990 with a string of senseless killings and a tabloid headline plea to Mayor David N. Dinkins to "Do Something, Dave" — the latest figures show a surprising reversal.

The changes, which are mirrored in many cities across the country, have mystified criminologists. They offer a number of theories, from intensified police efforts to demographic shifts to a



Jose R. Lopez/The New York Times

Carlos Rodriguez, right, arrested in Queens in a car theft.

Continued on Page 36, Column 1

growing number of criminals behind bars, but no single explanation for the phenomenon.

"It's possible it is due to a fluctuation in the age of the population, with fewer people in the crime-committing ages of 16 to 23," said Joan McCord, a Temple University professor and past president of the American Society of Criminology. "It's possible that the increasing concern people are showing about crime is helping to define better values as people speak more loudly on the issue."

"As far as advances in policing go," she continued, "there are so many experiments around the country that it's hard to tell which ones are effective."

Even Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, who took office with a pledge to crack down on street-level drug dealing and a variety of "quality of life" offenses, says his policies and the aggressive tactics of Police Commissioner William J. Bratton can explain only about half the decline in crime rates.

"Nobody can be sure exactly what is going on," he said in an interview last week.

Whatever the reason, the fact is that in a variety of neighborhoods across the city — rich, poor and in between — reports of serious crime fell significantly in 1994, according to preliminary Police Department figures for the first 50 weeks of the year. The Upper East Side reported a 18 percent decline in robbery, and the West Village logged a 17 percent drop in auto theft.

Burglary was down 27 percent in Borough Park, Brooklyn, an Orthodox Jewish neighborhood, and reports of grand larceny were down 24 percent in Spanish Harlem.

The trend is also evident in some of the city's most dangerous neighborhoods. In East New York, Brooklyn, which in 1993 had the most homicides of any neighborhood, with 126, murders fell by more than a quarter. In Washington Heights, which in 1993 had 75 murders, the most of any neighborhood in Manhattan, killings fell by a fifth.

"There's less violence altogether," said Maria Luna, the vice chairwoman of Community Board 12 in Washington Heights. "We don't see the shootings we saw before. You can walk in the streets. You don't feel like something is going to happen to you."

Similar trends can be found across the state and nation. Suburban and upstate New York communities with populations between 100,000 and one million reported a decline of 8.1 percent in felonies for the first six months of the year.

Over all, 22 of the nation's largest cities have reported at least modest declines in felony crime for 1994 — with San Francisco, Seattle, Los Angeles, El Paso and San Antonio reporting even steeper drops than New York for the first six months. Hartford reported a 11 percent drop in reported felony crimes the first half of the year, but by



ASK A QUESTION! SOLVE A CRIME! DEBRIEFING OF PRISONERS

The following specific questions should be asked of all arrested individuals:

- Do you know where to get a gun?
- Do you know who is selling guns?
- Do you know anyone wanted for murder, shootings, robbery, rape or other violent crimes?
- Do you know anyone who buys stolen property (fences)?
- Do you know anyone stealing autos or chopping autos?

If the arrestee responds that he/she has knowledge of any past crimes, he/she shall be immediately debriefed by the precinct Detective Squad concerned, or Night Watch in their absence.

Photographs by Jose R. Lopez/The New York Times

The police are being encouraged to pursue low-level offenders actively and interrogate them for leads to bigger crimes. In the 114th Precinct in Astoria, Queens, Detectives Mark Zucco, center, and Joseph Ruiz, right, question a suspect.

the end of the year the number of homicides had reached a record, 53.

Per capita, many of those cities still have worse crime problems than New York. In the first half of 1994, New York ranked 22d in reported crime, falling from 18th in the same period the year before.

The Fears

Favorable Data Are Not Enough

Should people really feel safer? Could the drop in reported crime perhaps reflect a greater cynicism and fear among victims who are no longer reporting their misfortunes?

And given that reported incidents of violent crime in New York City fell to 135,000 in 1985 from 157,000 in 1981 before rocketing again to 175,000 by 1990, is there any reason to believe that the decline can last?

Most criminologists call the drop in reported crime significant, even though as

many as half of all assaults and rapes are never reported. Burglaries are usually reported, and homicides are almost always reported, they say. And since murders are often a result of bungled crimes — like the fatal shooting of a police officer during the robbery of a Brooklyn bicycle shop in December — the decrease in homicides is a rough barometer for decreases in other felonies.

But in many neighborhoods people have their doubts. In parts of Brooklyn, although serious felonies have declined appreciably, gang activity is increasing, intimidating some victims from reporting crime and giving parents ever more reason to worry about their children. There are also scattered pockets, like sections of Staten Island and Woodside, Queens, that saw a surge in drug dealing, robbery and shootings.

Even in places with big declines in crime, or those where crime has not been a major problem for years, there is almost disbelief that the situation is improving. Brigid McGinn, a 33-year-old Brooklyn graduate student, still worries about her family's safety, even though her tree-lined block in

Park Slope did not record a single violent crime in 1994.

"I'm still very much on guard when I walk out the door," said Ms. McGinn, who has two young children. "Maybe I'm beginning to feel safer, but it's harder to take down your guard when it's been up so long."

And although Ms. Luna, the community board member in Washington Heights, says she feels more secure, she realizes that the security is fragile. "I'm still concerned that anything can happen at any time," she said.

Mark H. Moore, professor of criminal justice at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, warned that too much can be read into statistical decreases in crime when they are not matched by a decline in fear.

"The important story," he said, "is that any movement in reported crime rates fails to capture what are the real aims of any anti-crime effort, namely reducing fear and helping create an environment where a sense of solidarity can be fostered in a neighborhood or city."

As one measurement of the public's feelings of security, a New York Times-CBS

News poll last June found that about two-thirds of New York City residents thought crime was as bad as ever or growing worse. On the other hand, at least one possible gauge of public perceptions — subway ridership — rose by 4.2 percent in 1994, an increase that transit police officials attribute to reports of declining crime.

Some sociologists and criminologists say many people's fears stem less from the numbers of crimes committed than from the types of crimes and their viciousness — especially those committed by teen-agers.


In fact, experts note that while crimes committed by people over the age of 35 are plunging, teen-age crime remains high. And those crimes are typically more unpredictable and spontaneous than those committed by older criminals.

The police also hope the public will grow more secure as the department's new crime-fighting strategies take hold. So far, they say, preliminary monthly figures show a link between the new crime-fighting efforts and the crime rates.

Compared with the like month in 1993, homicides fell by 14 percent in January, 2 percent in February, and 0.6 percent in March before rising 7 percent in April. And after the Police Department's new anti-drug and anti-gun strategies took effect around May, homicides fell substantially month after month: by 28 percent in May, 11

Murders

Each dot equals one murder. This map and the two that follow show concentrations of each crime in each precinct; they do not show precise locations of crime.




Largest decline in murders
Pct. 45-Throgs Neck -75.0%
45 murders in 1994

Fewest murders
Pct. 111-Bayside, Little Neck -50.0%
2 murders in 1994


Largest increase in murders
Pct. 112-Rego Park +100.0%
10 murders in 1994

Most murders
Pct. 75-Brownsville, East New York -27.5%
87 murders in 1994



Robberies

Each dot equals 10 robberies.




Largest increase in robberies
Pct. 49-Eastchester +9.6%
718 robberies in 1994

Largest decline in robberies
Pct. 17-East Side -36.5%
385 robberies in 1994


Most robberies
Pct. 75-Brownsville, East New York -18.7%
2,471 robberies in 1994

Fewest robberies
Pct. 123-Prince's Bay -26.6%
47 robberies in 1994



Auto thefts

Each dot equals 25 car thefts.




Most car thefts
Pct. 107-Flushing -22.4%
3,701 car thefts in 1994

Fewest car thefts
Pct. 28-Central Harlem -10.5%
128 car thefts in 1994

Largest decline in car thefts
Pct. 25-East Harlem -33.7%
218 car thefts in 1994


Largest increase in car thefts
Pct. 13-Murray Hill, Turtle Bay +30.0%
874 car thefts in 1994



The Change In Serious Crimes

This map shows changes in the top seven felony crimes in 1994 from 1993. The darker areas have had significant drops in crime, the lighter areas have had smaller reductions. The figures are preliminary and subject to revision.

Decline in serious crimes in 1994 from 1993, by police precinct



Fewest felonies

Central Park Pct. -21.2%
371 felonies in 1994

Most felonies

Midtown South Pct. -3.2%
12,715 felonies in 1994

Smallest decline in felonies


Pct. 10-Chelsea -0.1%
2,772 felonies in 1994

Largest decline in felonies

Pct. 70-Flatbush -22.8%
7,197 felonies in 1994



Top Seven Felonies



1994 figures are through Dec. 18, except for historical charts, which have projected 1994 figures. The top seven felonies are murder, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny, and automotive theft. Figures were compiled from New York City Police Department data. Only precincts with statistically significant changes were used for the highest and lowest crime figures in each category.

Testing the Theories on Shifts in Crime


AGE

Many criminologists have explained the recent drop in crime rates as a demographic phenomenon related to the decline in the number of people in their teens and early 20's — prime crime-committing years.

But the latest shifts in crime cannot be explained by demographics alone. Between 1975 and 1985 there was very little change in the percentage of teen-agers arrested each year, even as crime rose and fell. Only after 1985, when crack use began proliferating in the city, did the arrest rate for teen-agers begin to soar.

Another reason to question the demographic theory is the fact that arrest rates for teen-agers in New York have fallen since 1989. Is that because crack use is down? Or because police strategy has turned from drug sweeps


Arrests Rates Per 100,000



CYCLES

Many experts say crime moves in distinct cycles. And in fact over the last couple of decades the incidences of certain serious crimes have risen and fallen in tandem. The advent of crack and the drug wars it spawned caused a surge in homicides that brought the murder rate to its highest level on record. Robberies also rose, but not as fast.


Also, about the same time the burglary rate stopped following the cycle, declining gradually. Some law-enforcement officials say burglaries require too much organization — including a place to sell stolen goods — for many unskilled criminals.



PRISONS

Some criminologists say that crime has fallen in the last few years because so many criminals are behind bars. And indeed the state prison population has doubled in the last decade.


But since crime rates have fluctuated so much over the last two decades, it is difficult to prove a strong link between rates of crime and rates of imprisonment.



POLICE

Since crime peaked in 1990, New York's police force has grown by 5,000 officers. And over the past two decades there seems to be a link between the size of the force and the level of crime: the more officers, the lower the crime rate. But it is not clear whether the extra officers caused the reduction in crime or whether high crime produced pressure for more officers, who were hired and trained only after crime had begun to decline.

Now, Police Commissioner William J. Bratton is hopeful that his large force and crackdown on low-level crimes will bring the crime rate down further.




JOSH BARBANEL

Source: Census Bureau, N.Y.P.D., Vera Institute of Justice and N.Y.S. Correctional Services



Sgt. Joseph Loughran, right, leads his 114th Precinct bicycle patrol squad on a search for truants on the streets of Astoria, Queens. ♦

Photographs by Jose R. Lopez/The New York Times



Police Officer Joseph Lisa, right, explains to a bodega employee why he is getting a summons for selling alcohol to an under-cover police recruit who is under 21.

the same period the year before. Using pin maps and data bases to track crime patterns, precinct commanders under Mr. Bratton have taken an approach to fighting crime that is more akin to a military campaign, viewing every street and public housing tower as a battlefield. For the first time in a generation, uniformed neighborhood police officers are being encouraged to arrest drug dealers and traffickers, rather than waiting for specialized narcotics or gun teams. The increased use of dawn warrant sweeps (like the one that scooped up Mr. Rodriguez), bicycle patrols and undercover operations — like dressing male and female officers as prostitutes — has added speed and stealth to police operations.

Mr. Bratton has attracted much attention by ordering a crackdown on graffiti and aggressive panhandling, on the theory that such minor disruptions, when tolerated, breed more serious crimes.

But at the core of his strategies is the view that a relatively small number of people commit most crimes, and that they are often loosely affiliated or come in contact

with one another buying guns or drugs or selling stolen goods. With aggressive detective work, the theory goes, one arrest should lead to others.

"Relentless follow-up investigation is the key to driving down crime," said Jack Mupple, the Deputy Police Commissioner for crime control strategies. Comparing crime-fighting to stringing a necklace, he added, "You take all the pearls and put them together."

In case after case, the strategy has worked, officials say. A patrol officer who stopped a motorcyclist in lower Manhattan for not wearing a helmet arrested him when he found that the man was carrying two loaded pistols. A search of his apartment uncovered an arsenal of automatic handguns and grenades.

"The strategies work," Mr. Bratton said in a lecture to a class at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in November. "Crime will go down. I guarantee it. Fear, that's more nebulous. I can't be sure."

The Theories

Older Population, But Not for Long

Criminology is an inexact science at best, and theories about why crime is declining run the gamut.

"Mayor Giuliani deserves a lot of credit, but crime is not going down just because of what the Police Department is doing," said Richard H. Girgenti, the state's departing Director of Criminal Justice. "There are a whole host of reasons. We had a peaking of crime in the mid-80's with the emergence of crack, so at some point it had to level off. Things do work in cycles."

Numerous factors, or combinations of factors, are having an impact. The growing use of Federal racketeering laws to attack street gangs has been credited by some experts with the destruction of a notorious drug gang and a 50 percent drop in homicides in the South Bronx. The boomlet in construction jobs may be one reason reported robbery fell 17 percent in Brooklyn.

More effective security devices have helped reduce auto theft by 15 percent across the city, experts say.

And a significant drop in shootings in Washington Heights and other drug-infested neighborhoods suggests to some experts that many of the turf wars over lucrative street corners have been settled. Dead men can't talk, or shoot.

Other experts suggest that drug organizations are learning to do business less violently, in part to improve relations with their communities, much as organized criminal groups did after binges of violence in the 1920's and 1930's.

"Maybe some of the street gangs are getting more sophisticated and are reducing the level of violence like the old Mafia mobs did during an earlier era," said Patrick V. Murphy, who was New York City Police Commissioner in the early 1970's and now studies national crime trends for the United States Conference of Mayors.

"That's one theory," he added. "There is another theory that so many violent people have been convicted and imprisoned in recent years that you have a declining number of those willing to murder." The New York

officials credit innovations in police work around the country. They noted that as crime peaked around 1990, David N. Dinkins and other mayors encouraged their police to shift tactics away from the quick-response model, which emphasized high-speed radio car chases after crimes were already committed.

Under the new community-policing approach, police departments have returned to old-fashioned street patrols, where the beat cop collected information from sources he nurtured at the corner store and broke up fights before they got out of hand.

Another popular theory holds that crime is dropping in cities across the country in part because the population is aging. Simply put, the number of people between the crime-prone ages of 16 and 24 is gradually declining. But if that theory is true, the decline in crime may be short-lived.

"What's happening is the numbers are returning to some norm," said James A. Fox, dean of the College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern University. "The bad news is we've had several years of increases in juvenile crime. And the really bad news is the worst is yet to come: In the next years, offspring of the baby boomers v

Bratton Builds His Image As He Rebuilds the Police

By CLIFFORD KRAUSS

Police Commissioner William J. Bratton was addressing 50 Queens commanders at a recent strategy meeting, standing as erect as a Prussian general, his left hand dug into the jacket pocket of his double-breasted suit.

"I'm the nicest guy in the world normally, and I'm probably the best damned leader that any of you will ever have," he said. But, expressing frustration at some detectives who had dropped cases because they misunderstood orders to cut overtime, he added, "If you're not willing to manage under my style, I'll get rid of you!"

Having captured the commanders' attention, Mr. Bratton reached for their imagination. "Just think what it will be like to

be part of a department that reduces crime 30 to 40 percent," he said. "It will be like everybody who participated in D-Day!"

In the 11 months since Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani persuaded him to leave his post as Police Commissioner of Boston, Mr. Bratton, the 47-year-old son of a postal worker, has beseeched, cajoled and threatened his 31,000 officers to shake off what he views as their lethargy in fighting crime.

At a time when crime has emerged as a dominant concern of the American people, Mr. Bratton is trying to return the nation's largest police department to a bygone era when the officer on the beat was a more visible presence in the neighborhood. Mr. Bratton is expanding the role of neighborhood officers to include tackling street prostitution and graffiti and to taking the most aggressive role in combating street drug-dealing in 20 years, jobs that have been handled by citywide squads since the 1970's.

Using words that belong to the cop on the beat, which he was, and the corporate reformer, which he views himself now, Mr. Bratton has set out to overhaul one of New York's most legendary organizational cultures: the centralized and hierarchical New York City Police Department.

"Like many corporations that have chosen to re-engineer, the N.Y.P.D. was an underperforming organization without realizing it," Mr. Bratton said in a



Edward Keating/The New York Times

Police Commissioner William J. Bratton taking part in a recent police operation.

Continued on Page 26, Column 1

Bratton Builds His Image While He Rebuilds the Police Department

Continued From Page 1

speech last month that typified his strategy of beating down his department to build it back up. "The N.Y.P.D. is an overspecialized and top-heavy organization that has often failed to perform at the precinct level where we can do the most to prevent crime."

Always reaching for just the right symbol, he physically removed a panhandler from a subway car in his first week in office, and in the presence of news photographers, took away the badges of officers accused of corruption in the 30th Precinct in Harlem.

The Image Maker

Public Relations Or Substance?

Such painstaking image-making has led some politicians and former police officials to express concern that Mr. Bratton is raising expectations that are unrealistic, particularly after his warning on Thursday that he may have to transfer hundreds of officers off patrol duties because of the budget crunch. But more than anything else, they say he spends too much time promoting himself.

"He gets an A for public relations and a C for substance," said City Councilman Sal F. Albanese, a Brooklyn Democrat, who added that he feared Mr. Bratton's calls for more police assertiveness would lead to brutality.

Others note that there has been a long and frustrating history to the efforts of a series of reform police commissioners, beginning with Theodore Roosevelt, who wanted to untie the department from Tammany Hall corruption in the 1890's, but had only partial success. In the early 1970's, Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy broke police ties with illegal gambling rings — an effort that worked until serious corruption re-emerged in the mid-1980's.

But even Mr. Bratton's critics concede that he has a special ability to innovate and motivate, as he showed when he commanded the Transit Police Department three years ago and improved its morale.

"He has the potential to be the best New York City Police Commissioner since Patrick Murphy," said Norman Siegel, the executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union. Mr. Siegel noted that Mr. Bratton was pushing to improve the training and supervision of officers to avoid future corruption scandals.

Still, Mr. Siegel added, "He is overly concerned about public relations, he has problems taking criticism and while he reaches out to civil rights and civil liberties groups, he doesn't follow up."

Skeptics say Mr. Bratton remains untested under fire. In a crisis like the Crown Heights disturbances in 1991, they worry that Mr. Bratton's quick temper could get him in trouble.

Two days before the gubernatorial election this month, Mr. Bratton exploded in anger at Robert Ryan, campaign manager for Governor-elect George E. Pataki, when Mr. Ryan called for an investigation into charges that police officers ripped down some Pataki campaign posters. Refusing to conduct an investi-

Man of Action

New Commanders And Uniforms, Too

Mr. Bratton has predicted that next year, "we'll see how good this department really is."

But first, he is planning to replace a third of the city's 76 precinct commanders by early February. While weeding out his commanders, he is working on the final draft of a plan of action intended to revamp everything from uniforms to make patrol officers look neater, to installing new

computer systems to cut overtime and paperwork, to increasing the number of lieutenants and sergeants to fight corruption.

Understanding the importance of bringing the bureaucracy along, he has hired a personal consultant, John Linder, to devise a program of focus groups, videos and surveys — tools borrowed from the corporate world. Such efforts are intended to convince the department's bureaucracy that there is a crisis to overcome.

At the core of Mr. Bratton's plan is the idea of giving his precinct commanders the brunt of the responsibilities once left to citywide units like the morals and narcotics squads. While being told to show creativity, the commanders have been given a series of anticrime strategies intended to catch a wider network of criminals by linking gun, robbery and drug investigations.

Already, patrol officers and detectives are broadening cases with more thorough interrogations of suspects — for instance, seeking information from robbery suspects about the stores that buy stolen goods, or questioning drug traffickers about where they buy their guns.

Department officials credit the new policies with an impressive re-

duction in crime this year so far, although several other big cities around the country are also showing improvements.

After three straight years of modest declines in crime, homicides are down 18 percent so far this year from last, while robbery and auto theft are down almost 15 percent. Shooting incidents citywide are down 16 percent, and 780 fewer people have been killed or wounded by gunfire, suggesting to some department officials that criminals may be carrying fewer guns out of fear of increased police sweeps.

With uniformed officers given a major share of the responsibility for controlling narcotics for the first time in a generation, drug arrests are up 25 percent this year. Still, there are risks for corruption that go along with increasing contacts between beat officers and drug offenders.

Civil liberties advocates also express concern that Mr. Bratton's efforts to improve the city's quality of life by arresting squeegee window washers, stopping and frisking teenage truants and confiscating the cars of men caught soliciting prostitutes are eroding constitutional liberties to expand police powers.

Man of Many Parts

A Need to Lead And Have Privacy

For all the news media attention he seeks and attracts, Mr. Bratton remains an elusive figure.

When he returned to New York to take his current post, for instance, Mr. Bratton removed the name of his one son, David, from his résumé because, according to Judith Laffey, his executive assistant, "he likes to keep his private life private."

In an interview, Mr. Bratton described himself as a man of boundless ambition. "Even as a kid," he said, "I used to be the one to direct the action during war games." Then, as he pursued his career, starting as a military police officer in Vietnam and moving through the ranks of the Boston police, he said, "part of the ambition came from the frustration with the people I worked with — the corruption, the incompetence and the inefficiency."

He added, "There's always been a motivation to get above them, and to lead."

The Commissioner has many hobbies, and most somehow relate to work.

Mr. Bratton is an avid reader of books on urban affairs and mysteries (he recently devoured "The Alienist" by Caleb Carr, a novel about Theodore Roosevelt's police department and the introduction of modern detective methods) and he is a war-movie buff (he recently rented "The Longest Day," and has been lecturing his subordinates about D-Day ever since).

But at the same time, he is not particularly fond of guns, in part because they damage the lining of his suits. He owns, by his count, 35 business suits to go along with his wide assortment of Hermès animal-print ties. An animal lover, he owns a dog and five cats named after Polynesian islands.

From inspections of police operations in the morning to late dining at Elaine's on the Upper East Side, he is virtually inseparable from what he calls his "cast of characters," particularly his two fun-loving deputy commissioners.

One, John Miller, the 36-year-old former television reporter who became a man-about-town chasing John Gotti with a microphone, has become Mr. Bratton's eyes and ears, chasing police cars on their way to crime scenes with the abandon of Mario Andretti.

The other, Jack Maple, 42, a former transit police lieutenant who cuts a Runyonesque figure by working out with a punching bag in his office and wearing homburg hats, bow ties that match his socks and black-and-white spectator shoes, is his chief crime-fighting strategist.

Balancing Mr. Bratton's "cast" are Peter LaPorte, Mr. Bratton's chief of staff, and Mr. Linder, his corporate-oriented consultant, who project an image of well-bred control.

The five are frequently joined by Mr. Bratton's wife, Cheryl Fiandaca, a lawyer who teaches at John Jay College of Criminal Justice and advises her husband on racial and legal matters as well as animal rights. By all accounts, she is enjoying her new life in New York — no small matter for Mr. Bratton since he has been divorced twice.

A Day In the Life

Always Running, And Running Late

Mr. Bratton's working day is a balancing act: motivating his officers with pats on the back and slaps on the wrist, all the while trying to reassure the public that his force can overcome its scandals and retake the streets.

"I'm juggling a lot of balls in the air," he said, "That's why all my ties have seals and dogs balancing balls."

On a recent Tuesday, for instance, after walking his dog before 7 A.M. along Central Park South, he addressed the morning roll call at the Midtown North Precinct.

Facing neat rows of 30 officers standing at attention, Mr. Bratton spoke of a litany of problems: how officers sometimes cut corners when collecting evidence, or wear disheveled uniforms on patrol or treat citizens without respect.

Then, trying to strike a note of reassurance, Mr. Bratton promised that after a year of negative headlines, "next year is going to be a good year for us."

"To get there, we're going to need you," he concluded. "You need respect for yourselves and the public."

Likewise, while listening intently to a group of Harlem police emergency service officers about their suggestions of how to improve equipment and scheduling during a dinner of rolled beef and mushrooms they prepared for him, he chided the group about their waistslines.

It was a day of breakfast and lunch speeches to business groups, a meeting with Patrolmen's Benevolent Association leaders, test-firing a new small-caliber handgun at the police range in the Bronx and observation of a midnight sting operation to catch men in the act of soliciting female police officers posing as prostitutes. Mr. Bratton also read memos and returned phone calls in his car to keep up with the latest developments in the Mayor's budget cuts.

Mr. Bratton ran late all the time. But hearing that his Manhattan North borough commander was holding a community meeting in Harlem, he shifted gears to make a brief appearance at the Church of the Intercession on West 155th Street.

Before officers of the 30th Precinct and 75 mostly friendly residents, Mr. Bratton rose to the pulpit solemnly. He said the worst of the corruption scandal in the 30th Precinct was over, with nearly 40 officers in custody or on modified desk assignment waiting the results of investigations into charges of brutality, perjury and a variety of drug offenses.

Then he made an admission remarkable for a Police Commissioner, an admission that won him a grudging round of polite applause.


"The worst story I have told in my career is the story of the three-oh," he said, "how members of the Police Department let you down. It's a story of betrayal, of a violation of trust, of a violation of oath. I want to express to you our apology."



Photographs by Edward Keating for The New York Times

Police Commissioner William J. Bratton is always on the move and always running late. Above, he tests a new handgun at the police firing range in the Bronx, although he is not particularly fond of guns. Below,

he attends a morning roll call at the Midtown North Precinct and speaks of a litany of problems: how officers sometimes cut corners when collecting evidence or treat citizens without respect.



Bratton Tears the Police Down to Build Them Up

By CLIFFORD KRAUSS

Crises are usually not something that police commissioners embrace, but William J. Bratton says he is purposefully promoting the message that his department is in dire straits to propel his campaign to "re-engineer the culture of the department."

News Analysis Previous commissioners would surely have tried to minimize, or not even have sought, a series of stinging internal reports released earlier this week that describe the department as "ineffective and irrelevant," drowning in paperwork, crippled by antiquated computers and lacking in training and tactical equipment to fight crime and internal corruption.

But not Mr. Bratton. He wants the reports, written by committees he appointed, to be read widely inside and outside the department.

Why hang out the department's dirty laundry for all to see? And why, after his department was already shaken by the recent Mollen Commission report on police corruption, look for more trouble?

"Crisis is an opportunity," Mr. Bratton said in an interview this week. "I never see crisis as a negative. It is a learning and motivational experience."

He added that members of his department need to learn of their weaknesses — in internal meetings as well as from the media — so he can make "meaningful and not incremental

change."

Mr. Bratton's intentions, and ultimately Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani's, are both political and practical: a crisis not only helps them focus attention on the need for change, but also helps them enlist the department in making those changes.

Better times, Mr. Bratton's aides say, will come in the months ahead, or even in a year or two, after the Commissioner's reorganization and strategies against guns, drugs and youth violence have a chance to take hold. In the meantime, departmental failures can be explained as failures of previous administrations and police commanders.

'Creating a Sense of Urgency'

Also, shaking up the organization would let Mr. Bratton put into practice management tools that modern American corporations have developed in recent years to compete with Japanese and German firms. A key to understanding Mr. Bratton's public relations strategy can be found in a paper about updating corporate structures written by John Linder, a private consultant for the Commissioner.

"Organizations guided by strategic intent," Mr. Linder's memo stated, "precipitate both cognitive and emotional shifts by creating a sense of urgency or quasi crisis." Such crises, he continued, "amplify weak signals in an environment that point up the need to improve, instead of allowing inaction to precipitate a real crisis."

John Miller, the Deputy Police

Commissioner for Public Information, put it this way: "If you don't create the crisis, the natural tendency is to make minor adjustments. This process is designed to wipe the slate clean."

By reaching out to the rank and file for suggestions, and including detectives and officers on his "re-engineering teams," Mr. Bratton is following another tenet in Mr. Linder's memo: "Group theory long ago showed that when a group takes a problem as its own, the group will work in concert to solve the problem."

To be sure, creating crises is not the only way Mr. Bratton is trying to reshape the department, a process that includes eliminating layers of middle management and granting more power to precinct commanders. Through weekly strategy meetings with local commanders at Police Headquarters, discussion groups including beat officers, and video presentations in precincts, he is establishing performance standards and departmental goals.

Tearing Down to Build Up

Still, through much of his seven months in office, Mr. Bratton has publicly torn down the very institution he is trying to build up. During his first days, he shook up many of the department's longtime employees by upbraiding the force before reporters, saying, "For the first time in a generation, this organization is going to get serious about dealing with crime."

In appearances before City Council

committees, he bemoaned past recruitment policies that failed to bring more blacks into the department and said he was embarrassed that scores of officers on the force were so corrupt that they were like criminals with badges.

And this week, one of his re-engineering teams released the disturbing findings of recent police focus groups that "many patrol officers questioned the integrity and the character of rookies, and are reluctant to work with them for this reason."

Breaking From the Past

Mr. Bratton faced resistance from senior commanders in recent months when he proposed including critiques of past department policies in booklets describing his new strategies. Commanders were particularly incensed by the inclusion of the charge that patrol officers wanting to make drug arrests on their beats had been shackled by the department. But Mr. Bratton insisted on keeping the criticism, his aides said, to make the point that he was breaking from the past.

Thomas A. Reppetto, president of the Citizens Crime Commission, said that no police commissioner since Patrick V. Murphy, in the 1970's, had attempted such sweeping changes in the department. "Reorganization changes what people are familiar with and therefore comfortable with," he said. "There are the usual risks, but every generation or so change is necessary and this appears to be one of those times."

Big Changes In Police Dept.

Bratton Seeks Advice From the Rank and File

By CLIFFORD KRAUSS

New York City's Police Department needs major changes at all levels, from beat patrol to headquarters, a series of highly critical internal reports has concluded. The reports recommend overhauling everything from how precincts are organized, to how patrol officers are rewarded, to how corruption is combated.

If not retooled and redeployed, one of the reports says, the department "will remain in its own private industrial age, ineffective and irrelevant."

Taken together, the recommendations offer a prescription for a far more decentralized force, with precinct commanders who would have much more responsibility for policing corruption, controlling drug trafficking and preventing crime.

'To Get the Job Done'

"The way I see the Police Department of the future," Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani said in an interview yesterday, "the department should largely be driven and managed by the precinct commanders. They should have the focus, the accountability, the discretion and the resources to get the job done."

Mr. Giuliani, who said he had seen early outlines of the reports, said the goal was to "have a department with considerably less middle management and much less in between the commissioner and the precinct commanders."

One panel's study, coming three weeks after the Mollen Commission report on police corruption, concluded that joining the force should be made more difficult and that training should be entirely reconfigured to highlight the department's concerns about integrity.

Another panel, charged with analyzing equipment needs, urged that the department distribute handheld metal detectors to police truancy officers and test stun guns in a handful of precincts to address the allegation that police officers beat up suspects arrested in minority neighborhoods.

Yet another panel argued that precinct commanders, not the specialized police units that operate citywide, should have the

THE BOTTOM LINE.

Overhauling the Police Department

Highlights from a series of internal reports offering suggestions for improving the department.

PRECINCT ORGANIZATION

- Give the precinct commander, rather than special citywide units, the power to decide how to address problems.
- Increase supervision of patrol officers by sergeants.

IMPROVING CAREER PATHS

- Encourage beat officers to remain in the patrol ranks by creating a new rank of officer, called a patrol specialist.

IMPROVING EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

- Phase out three-wheel scooters and replace with compact jeeps.
- Issue precincts daisy-chain handcuffs and lightweight transportable mesh barriers to improve riot control.
- Distribute handheld metal detectors to truancy officers.

REDUCING CORRUPTION

- Define corruption in the patrol guide.
- Include commanding officers in internal affairs investigations.
- Set up a corruption hotline that does not record calls so callers will not be afraid they will be identified.

IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY AND REDUCING PAPERWORK

- Overhaul departmental computers to reduce paperwork.
- Use cadets to police nonconfrontation community events to avoid police overtime.
- Privatize custodial work to save money.

Major Changes Recommended for the Police

Continued From Page B1

power to close down open-air drug markets and local prostitution rackets in their neighborhoods. "The hydra-headed organization," the panel's report said, "is not meeting customer needs. Logic suggests a single manager of police operations in an area."

The reports come from a dozen departmental committees formed two months ago by Police Commissioner William J. Bratton with orders to study how the department works and how it could be improved. Mr. Bratton's committees, which included patrol officers and detectives as well as the department's most senior commanders, came up with scores of recommendations that range from buying more sophisticated equipment for riot control, to giving uniforms a more military look, to privatizing custodial work to save money.

The process by which Mr. Bratton sought the recommendations is one that has recently been adopted by many corporations seeking to become more efficient and competitive by involving the rank and file in efforts to modernize. By taking polls of officers and establishing internal focus groups to discuss proposals, the committees reached through the ranks before they wrote their reports.

Aides to Mr. Bratton said the process has guaranteed that when the Commissioner makes his final decisions on redesigning the department, which are expected by October, people at all ranks will feel that they played a part in the process and have a stake in the solutions.

"The way we are going here is to

Bratton consults the rank and file on redesigning the department.

truly create 75 miniature police departments," Mr. Bratton said in an interview yesterday. The city has 75 police precincts.

"Commissioner Bratton said, 'Wipe the page clean and tell us what you need,'" said John Miller, the Deputy Police Commissioner for Public Information. "It doesn't mean we'll adopt everything, but we are looking for the freshest ideas."

Chief Michael Julian, the department's personnel director and chairman of one panel, described the committee reports' importance this way: "This department right now is operating on two of eight cylinders. Bratton's going to get them all working."

The New York Times obtained 9 of the 12 committee reports, which are all either in final form or near completion. They are being presented in seminarlike meetings attended by Mr. Bratton and his top staff.

Some of the most revolutionary proposals came from two committees charged with examining precinct management and organization. One proposed revamping the current division of officers based on the functions they serve, rather than on the time of day they work, to improve team polic-

ing. Under the plan, precincts would be divided into three or four zones, with two sergeants responsible for each zone during all three daily tours to increase supervision. Another sergeant would be assigned to each zone as "problem-solving coordinator" to improve community relations and encourage local groups to help handle "quality of life" issues like graffiti.

"The present structure" of the precincts, said the Precinct Organization Re-engineering Team, "is the antithesis of teamwork — 20 to 60 beat officers pitted against the rest of the precinct."

The organizational problems in the precincts are only part of a broader problem of coordinating citywide police divisions and bureaus, the report said. It described the department as "a labyrinth of disjointed, autonomous bureaus, operating full tilt to carry out their distinct missions but acting independent from the patrol precincts."

As part of his review of the committees' work, Mr. Bratton attended a two-hour presentation on Tuesday by the equipment committee that featured a fashion show of new uniforms, including everything from military-style aviation-unit flight suits to fire-resistant emergency jump suits to protect anti-riot officers from exploding Molotov cocktails.

The reports also called for stepping up the expansion of bicycle patrols, with officers in shorts and jackets. "You can sneak up on a lot of things on the bikes," said Officer Roger Smith, who modeled the bike uniform for Mr. Bratton.

Boardroom Tactics Utilized In the Battle Against Crime

Police Seek Creative Ways to Enforce Law

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

It is 8 A.M. and Jack Maple, a Deputy New York City Police Commissioner, and Louis R. Anemone, one of the department's super chiefs, are facing a room full of commanders of precincts and detective squads.

One by one, the commanders — mainly captains, lieutenants and sergeants — have been rising to report on crime in their neighborhoods and what they have been doing about it.

Armed with the latest precinct statistics, Mr. Maple and Chief Anemone press the commanders on how they have been carrying out the department's new strategies on dealing with guns and drugs and on improving the quality of life in the city as well as following Commissioner William J. Bratton's mandate that every officer be prepared to respond to any type of crime rather than shift responsibility to special units.

Such meetings, which are much like those regularly held by major corporations, may seem a little thing, but they are new to the New York City Police Department and they are rare among departments around the country. Mr. Bratton, who took charge of the department in January, started the meetings in April as a way of making sure that sweeping changes he is introducing are being put into effect. He personally attends some of them. Perhaps more than any other single thing the department is doing, the meetings reflect the Commissioner's intent to mobilize the tools of corporate management as he searches for "creative ways to reduce crime and the fear of crime."

The meetings, Mr. Bratton said, are "a phenomenal accountability tool."

Focusing on Crime

"People have got to have an answer or they're going to be somewhat publicly embarrassed in front of their peers," he said. "I also get to hear from sergeants I would not normally see. It's a way of identifying talent."

It is also a way to rivet attention on the department's principal task: countering crime.

In contrast to Mr. Bratton's approach, said Lawrence Sherman, a professor of criminology at the University of Maryland, most police chiefs concentrate their energies on logistical and administrative matters rather than actual law enforcement.

"Police officers should think in terms of patterns," he said. "But all too often they have thought in terms of individual cases and of schedules and maintenance. Innovative police agencies are oriented to problem solving, and this is a big switch."

Hubert Williams, the president of the Police Foundation, a research organization in Washington, and a former director of police in Newark, said the meetings "set the tone and tenor" for Mr. Bratton's department.

"He's obviously opening up lines of communication and establishing methods by which he can effect control over a very, very large department," Mr. Williams said.

The meetings are clearly a departure from the past. Patrick V. Murphy, who ran the Police Department under Mayor John V. Lindsay in the early 1970's, followed a military-style chain of command. He talked to the brass and they talked to the troops. Lee P. Brown, who came to New York from Houston to work for Mayor David N. Dinkins and introduced the concept of community policing in

New York, met weekly with his senior civilians and officers and individually with precinct commanders. His successor, Raymond W. Kelly, met weekly with his senior aides.

"Internal communications are not very good in most police departments," said Mr. Murphy, who is the director of the police policy board of the United States Conference of Mayors in Washington.

Though the city comprises five boroughs, the police have created seven borough commands by dividing Manhattan and Brooklyn into northern and southern sectors. For the sake of his weekly meetings, Mr. Bratton brings into headquarters the executives of one borough command at a time, along with senior officers from the housing and transit police forces and the Port Authority, as well as representatives of the New York State Division of Parole and the city's district attorneys.

The meetings are also attended by liaison officers from all boroughs so that the substance of the discussions is spread throughout the department.

In one recent meeting, Mr. Maple, a street-wise former detective lieutenant in the transit police who has become Mr. Bratton's right-hand man in developing crime strategies, pressed the commander of a Manhattan detective squad on one of the hottest themes in the department: getting crime suspects to provide information about accomplices, and suspects in other crimes.

In his precinct, the detective said, suspects were just not cooperating; they were not talking.

Mr. Maple was incredulous. "They're consistently doing it in other precincts," he said with an edge on

Seeing the public as customers and reduced crime as profit.

his voice. "Is it a training thing? What's the problem?"

The other officers could feel the heat rising, but he kept pushing. "We ought to be able to catch a few of them," he said. "The other precincts are doing it."

That kind of pressure is causing resentment among some commanders, senior officers acknowledge. But Mr. Bratton sees no need to ease up. "If people can't adjust," he said briskly, "we're basically going to move them out of that assignment. I want competition. If you can't do the job for a variety of reasons, there's someone in line to take your place."

The commissioner argues, in effect, that his meetings are good for morale. "They're a way for people to show off," he said.

Praise Increased, Too

There is some back-patting, too. Commanders sometimes bring in subordinates who have done a particularly good job, to tell of their exploits and receive a round of applause. Mr. Maple and Chief Anemone, who, as chief of patrol forces, is one of the department's most senior officers, are almost as quick to praise as to challenge. But the overriding spirit of the meetings is tutorial oversight.

The other morning, a commander said he was having trouble getting his officers to talk to residents to find out what is on their minds. The answer, Mr. Maple said, is to get supervisors out on the sidewalks to show less experienced officers how to break the ice.

At another point, Chief Anemone homed in on infractions like playing loud music and drinking in public that diminish the quality of life in the city and, the department says, sets the stage for more serious crime.

"I don't want any captain, lieutenant or sergeant to think that dealing with drinking beer in the streets in the summer is beneath them; that this is the N.Y.P.D. and we've got more important things to do," he said. "We've got to work from the bottom up."

Proof Demanded

In an exchange about crime spilling out of housing projects, Chief Anemone asked Sgt. Louis Carabetta, the head of a special robbery squad, if he had been in touch with his counterpart in the housing police. The sergeant said he had. Chief Anemone then asked for the housing officer's name. Sergeant Carabetta gave it, and Chief Anemone smiled. He had made his point. Nothing was going to be taken at face value.

Much of the learning comes from sharing solutions. Chief Anemone noticed a spurt in burglaries in schools in the 23d Precinct in East Harlem. "What I did," said Captain Robert J. Curley, the precinct commander, "was start a late tour burglary unit with two officers in an unmarked car. And the burglaries have abated somewhat."

Later, Captain Curley said the meetings were having a distinct impact.

As Mr. Bratton talks about the new department he is building, he often reaches for corporate metaphors. "We have a lot to learn from the private sector," he said. "We're looking at the customer — the public — to see what his needs are. We're looking at the product. Does it meet the customer's needs. If not, we're going to change the product and change the entity that creates the product. The profit I'm looking for is reduced crime, reduced fear."

Bratton Panel Recommends a Police Force That Is More Mature and Better Supervised

By CLIFFORD KRAUSS

Special to The New York Times

NEW YORK, Oct. 17 — A Police Department task force has recommended a sweeping reorganization of the force that would raise standards for recruitment and graduation from the police academy and require monthly performance evaluations of officers.

Taken together, the 100 recommendations — covering everything from transferring as many as 200 clerical and administrative workers from police headquarters to precincts to giving precinct commanders new authority to combat corruption — are designed to produce a more decentralized, more mature, better trained and better supervised police department that is more attuned to the needs of individual communities, particularly minority neighborhoods.

The recommendations include raising the minimum age of recruits from 20 to 22 and requiring that recruits have two years of college education or military service before enlistment.

Precinct station houses would also undergo a transformation to tie them more to their neighborhoods through everything from installing automatic bank teller machines in communities that have few of them to letting scout troops and elderly groups hold meetings there.

In an interview today, Police Commissioner William J. Bratton said he was "extraordinarily happy" with the report, which he said would be the foundation of a plan of action he would prepare over the next several weeks.

Senior aides said that while Mr. Bratton objected to a few proposals, like one plan to privatize date processing, he agreed with the report's fundamental proposals for raising recruitment standards, tightening supervision and moving functions from headquarters to the precincts.

Mr. Bratton, who appointed the panel last summer, delivered the document to Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani late last week for his comments. With the Mayor's support, Mr. Bratton will be able to make many of the changes on his own. Several issues could be tested in court, like requiring higher educational requirements for recruits — a proposal that some minority repre-

sentatives have warned could work against diversifying the force.

And Mr. Bratton may need the support of the unions that represent sergeants and lieutenants for a proposal to create new ranks, like "master sergeant," that reward the best-performing supervisors.

The planning panel called for an "immediate 20 percent reduction of staff in support units," which police officials said could translate into a transfer of 200 uniformed and civilian employees from headquarters to the precincts. Such personnel would replace uniformed officers now at desk jobs in the precincts, enabling more officers and supervisors to patrol their beats.

Peter LaPorte, Mr. Bratton's chief of staff, said any civilian and uniformed openings at headquarters could eventually be filled by other personnel from the Housing and Transit police forces, which Mr. Giuliani hopes to merge into the police department early next year. Whether there is a net reduction in civilian employees could depend on future budget cuts and money provided by the \$30 billion crime package that recently passed Congress.

Independent from the panel's report, various police officials have been considering cuts in the number of civilian workers to alleviate pressures from City Hall to cut the department's budget. Police officials say they are not sure how much Mr. Giuliani will expect them to cut in the coming months.

The report comes amid a heightened sense of crisis in some quarters of the police department after a rash of suicides, the Mollen Commission's highly critical report finding fault with the department's training, screening and supervision, and the unfolding corruption scandal at the 30th precinct in Harlem.

The report includes many of the proposals urged by the Mollen Commission last July to improve the quality of recruits and supervision of patrol officers. But it made no mention of an independent monitor with subpoena powers, which the commission said was necessary to prevent future scandals.

The report, which is at the core of Mr. Bratton's effort to "re-engineer" the department, as he has put it, has been in the works since early spring. Twelve internal committees

developed several hundred ideas in July that were distilled into a single report by a 17-member panel led by Michael Julian, the departing Chief of Personnel, and Deputy Chief Patrick E. Kelleher, the executive officer of the Patrol Services Bureau.

The final report essentially refined the earlier committee reports, but it gave precinct commanders greater discretion in crime-fighting and corruption control.

Thomas Reppetto, president of the Citizens Crime Commission, offered support for the plan.

"It's similar to what has gone on in private business in the last 10 or 15 years in which there has been decentralization and a cutback on administrative staff and more emphasis on line operations," he said. "If carried out, it will create the kind of neighborhood precinct-centered management that is necessary for community policing to succeed."

The report acknowledged that previous efforts to re-invent the police department in its 150-year history had failed. Acknowledging that the department needed the support of the rank and file to reform itself, the report said, that a crackdown on misconduct could adversely affect morale and productivity and that by promoting vigorous enforcement, "sensitivity and community relations may suffer."

Perhaps the greatest change to the average officer on the beat will come from the new monthly evaluation reports, in which precinct supervisors will grade appearance, problem-solving and respect shown to people in the community. The evaluations will become the basis for promotions and precinct assignments.

Up until now, Mr. Julian said, "The criteria for performance was ambiguous because people who did nothing were rewarded. There were no negative consequences for mediocrity. Mediocrity has been tolerated forever in this police department."

The report also includes several proposals to improve the technical resources of the force, such as purchasing an automated fingerprinting identification system and creating a computer training center at the Police Academy. But the Commissioner will have to wait for Mr. Giuliani to make final decisions on possible budget cuts before deciding what the department can purchase.

Community Policing, Bratton Style

Community policing is the most promising trend in urban law enforcement. It aims to involve police departments in crime prevention, not just crime reaction, by assigning more officers to street patrol, exposing them to neighborhood concerns and training them to identify troubled individuals and bring in social service agencies to provide help.

President Clinton lauded the idea in his State of the Union address, using New York City's program as a prime example. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, however, has made some criticisms — about abuses in the program, and about what he considers time-wasting social work.

He would do well to refocus the program rather than junk it. He would also do well to let William Bratton, his new Police Commissioner, address these concerns. Mr. Bratton understands community policing and is eager to shape up the department's uneven performance.

During the Dinkins administration, New York launched one of the country's biggest community policing programs. But according to internal police reports, the program has serious problems — including inadequate training, high turnover and poor coordination with other police units and city agencies. This should be no surprise. With the nation's largest urban police force and some of its toughest precincts, New York poses momentous problems for an experimental approach.

Moreover, the Dinkins administration appears to have rushed into community policing without a sufficiently serious effort to change the culture of the force — a culture that produces a debilitating 9-to-5 workaday routine easily abused by police who, instead of trying to make a real difference to their neighborhood, want merely to stroll around it.

Big as these problems are, none are beyond repair. Commissioner Bratton has already an-

nounced constructive changes aimed at strengthening command, motivation and discipline. He has made clear that he will demand improved performance from top commanders, many of whom he replaced last week, and from rank-and-file officers.

Community policing is not about brawny police officers being tied down delivering social work sermons. It involves quite a different role for the alert and caring police officer. It asks the officer to use the information gathered on the beat to notify relevant city agencies to problems like substance abuse, domestic violence, child neglect, gangs and sexual exploitation before they lead to serious crimes.

In theory and presumably in practice, that should lead to an efficient use of police resources. It should also lead to effective crime prevention. Far more police are kept off the beat by clerical and telephone chores that could be taken over by civilians than by community police training sessions and referral calls.

In a television interview last week, Mr. Bratton spoke of his desire to make the city's police officers more engaged and assertive, but also "more conscious of citizen concerns, whether white, black, Hispanic, Asian, male, female, gay or straight." He also talked about the need to change police training procedures to give new officers more exposure to real-world problems instead of wrapping them in an all-police "blue cocoon."

His approach implies more interaction with community problems and city agencies, not less. But it also implies a more visible and effective police presence, which is what matters most to New Yorkers, including those who voted for Mr. Giuliani on crime and police issues. Fortunately, Mr. Bratton seems to have charted an early course that is at once tough enough to please the Mayor and sensible enough to work.

JOSEPH B. TREASTER

Experimenting with plans for dealing with violence in New York City, Police Commissioner William J. Bratton decided this spring to turn one of the toughest parts of the city into a laboratory for criminal science.

His area of concentration, the 75th Precinct in the East New York section of Brooklyn, teems with murders, shootings and robberies. It is a precinct where stick-ups take place in broad daylight and ricocheting bullets are a constant hazard, a place where hardly anyone takes an afternoon stroll without giving it serious thought.

Into that environment, Mr. Bratton poured scores of police officers specially trained to go after drugs and guns. Then he

put the 350 officers regularly assigned to the precinct to work trying out new tactics that are being put into place throughout the city.

Officers walking beats in the precinct, and everyone else on the force — whether in uniform or plainclothes — were encouraged to tackle any crime they came across, rather than merely reporting it to a specialized unit, and to treat every person they arrested as a potential guide into New York's nether world of crime and violence. They began questioning everyone they hauled in, not just the most interesting suspects, and they started getting more information than ever before on all kinds of crimes. Several months later murders and shootings have plunged, and robberies are down significantly. The only violent crime

that has proved resistant has been rape, which has inexplicably surged 44 percent, to 91 cases for the first half of the year, compared with 63 for the same period last year.

Citywide Applications

"We proved that we can send in the Marines and get significant results," said John Miller, the Deputy Police Commissioner for public information.

And the things being learned in the 75th Precinct, Mr. Miller said, are being applied elsewhere in the city.

One big question is whether the 75th Precinct's regular complement can hold

Continued on Page B4

THE NEW YORK TIMES METRO MONDAY, JULY 23, 1974

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A Bratton Policing Experiment Gets Results in East New York

Continued From Page B1

the newly won ground now that the special units have been withdrawn to concentrate on other trouble spots, like the 68th Precinct in the South

But as Mr. Bratton, who was appointed by Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani in January, continues to overhaul the largest police department in the nation, the experiment is far from over. "The idea here was to really play around with the different tools we have," he said, "see what combination of things works best."

Still other ideas for dealing with crimes like homicide and auto theft remain to be tested in the precinct, aides to the Commissioner say, and it is not clear that the special units are needed, they will be back.

With the recent sentencing of Officer Michael Dowd for his long career as a drug dealer in uniform, police corruption has especially been on the minds of those in the 75th Precinct, where he spent more than five years.

Mr. Bratton's reliance on his entire force, rather than on specialists, to confront drug dealing and other crimes with a high potential for corruption represents a revival of procedures that faded after police scandals two decades ago. And in the 75th Precinct, as elsewhere in the city, Mr. Bratton is taking pains to emphasize that corruption will not be tolerated.

One of the principal tools in the 75th Precinct experiment was the new anti-drug units that Mr. Bratton has fashioned, the Street Narcotics and Gun teams that replaced the Tactical Narcotics Teams and, in contrast to predecessors, concentrate not



Henry Jones/The New York Times

"If we get just one collar, we're not going to be satisfied," said Deputy Inspector Joseph P. Dunne, commander of the 75th Precinct in Brooklyn, where crimes are down and arrests are up during an

experimental program where officers are encouraged to tackle crimes rather than reporting them to specialists. Inspector Dunne spoke with Jack Hart, head of security at a local housing development.

only on drugs but on guns as well. The other main component was an old and very successful organization called the street crimes unit. Its members wear scruffy clothes, oper-

ate in battered cars and have made a science of detecting a bulge or an unnatural gait caused by a concealed weapon. As unobtrusively as possible, they cruise the streets, breaking up robberies as they take place or arresting people looking unlicensed weapons, many of whom turn out to have extensive criminal dossiers.

Largely as a result of the work of the narcotics and gun teams and the street crime unit, 383 guns have been confiscated in the precinct so far this year, or about 100 more than for the equivalent period last year. The number of shootings has dropped nearly 20 percent, to 116 compared with 144 by this time in 1973.

So far this year, 48 people have been killed in the precinct, compared with 75 at this time last year.

But while crime has decreased, arrests have risen, reflecting the intensified police activity. Arrests for major crimes, including robbery, burglary, assault and auto theft, are up nearly 25 percent, to 1,534.

One of Mr. Bratton's principal themes in remaking the department is to give greater authority and autonomy to precinct commanders. In the 75th Precinct, the commander is Deputy Inspector Joseph P. Dunne, 46, who top police officials say brings to his work the kind of intelligence and drive that Mr. Bratton would like to see in all his commanders. Inspector Dunne has a bachelor's degree in political science from St. Francis College in Brooklyn and recently attended a short management course at Columbia University.

As the visiting units began their work in the precinct, Inspector Dunne got his own narcotics and robberies units geared up and started carrying out the Commissioner's new citywide directives on arrests and guns. On robberies, for example, it is no longer enough, Mr. Bratton says, to arrest one member of a robbery team and consider the case closed. That is the way it used to be done. If there are three or four robbers, then the search continues until they are all tracked down. "If we get just one collar, we're not going to be satisfied," Inspector Dunne said. "Anyone who's committed that kind of act has likely done it before and will likely do it again. We want him off the street."

As for guns, every person with a firearm arrested by a uniformed officer is now interviewed by a detective, something that rarely happened in the past. "We want to get the source of the guns," Inspector Dunne said. "So we can get the suppliers."

Another part of the precinct strategy that Mr. Bratton is pressing city wide is diligent follow-up on the tens of thousands of court orders that an

issued each year for people who simply disappear during the legal process — between hearings, say, or while awaiting sentencing. Previously, running down those people, many of whom have been charged with robbery, murder and other serious crimes, had been left to a handful of overwhelmed units. Now, every precinct is joining the hunt.

In one series of raids beginning a few weeks ago, Inspector Dunne's officers, aided by the housing police and the state parole and corrections agencies, brought in 34 people who had slipped away with charges or sentences pending. There had been no such concerted effort before.

When he ordered the extra forces into the 75th Precinct, Mr. Bratton had not yet worked out an overall plan on how he would run the department. "But in the meantime," he said, "my sense was not to sit back and wait until you have everything in place, but to go out and deal with the seven-five, its very high homicide rate. The shootings. The robberies. Knock them down. Slow them down."

The people who live in the neighborhood are grateful. But even with a 20 percent decline in murders, an 11 percent drop in robberies and a 5 percent decrease in burglaries, the atmosphere of East New York has not been transformed.

"It has quieted down a little in the daytime," said Julio C. Velez, the owner of the J.C.V. Furniture Discount Company at 767 New Lots Avenue, one of the main commercial strips in the neighborhood. "I don't have those guys coming around ripping off customers and stealing merchandise. But in the evenings the muggings still go on."

Yet the improvement is palpable. "As long as the police are in the area and the merchants, in particular, can see uniformed officers out there, there's a perception that they are safer," said Ernest Jamieson, a pro-

gram manager at the nonprofit Local Development Corporation of East New York, which tries to attract new business to the neighborhood.

But residents remain wary. They have lived through visits by the department's old Tactical Narcotics Teams and learned that the effects of shock forces are often ephemeral.

The T.N.T.'s cleaned the streets of low-level drug dealers and then moved on. "The neighborhood would be safe for a little while," Mr. Velez said. "But when the police left, those guys would come back. It was like playing hide-and-seek."

That is not a game Mr. Bratton wants to play. But, he says, he is just starting. Trying to develop "some measurable framework as to who works and what doesn't."

"All of this," he said, "is intended to ask our people to be more crafty and more knowledgeable about crime, more so, probably, than the department has been for many years."



The New York Times

The tough 75th Precinct is a laboratory for a police strategy of fighting all crimes, however small.

Memorandum From:

JOAN L. BRODY



Special Assistant to the Police Commissioner

9/6/95

Dennis,

Some pleasure reading

... ha ha.

- Talk to you soon.

- Jan

Dennis,

I'll explain more
about this on
Friday when we
talk.

Joe

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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NEW YORK CITY CRIME TRENDS

In January of 1994 Mayor Giuliani began his stewardship of the city by focusing on one of his principal campaign themes - the need to re-energize the city's law enforcement community in their struggle to control and suppress criminal activity and reduce fear of crime within the city.

At the Mayor's behest the New York City Police Department implemented a series of strategies to achieve the Mayor's objectives. To date seven strategies have been implemented.

Strategy No. 1: *Getting the Guns off the Streets of New York* (March 1994)

Strategy No. 2: *Curbing Youth Violence in the Schools and on the Streets* (April 1994)

Strategy No. 3: *Driving the Drug Dealers out of New York* (April 1994)

Strategy No. 4: *Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence* (April 1994)

Strategy No. 5: *Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York* (June 1994)

Strategy No. 6: *Reducing Auto-Related Crime in New York* (Feb. 1995)

Strategy No. 7: *Rooting Out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York City Police Department* (June 1995)

Strategy implementation has taken place with particular emphasis on a four step command and control process to achieve crime reduction.

- Accurate and timely intelligence
- Rapid deployment
- Effective tactics
- Relentless follow-up and assessment

The initial results, through the first six months of 1995, suggest that these strategies have had a significant impact on criminal activity in New York City.

RECENT TRENDS: FIRST SIX MONTHS 1995 PRELIMINARY STATISTICS

- o Crime Statistics compiled by the Department for the first six months of 1995 continue to show major reductions.

The major felony crimes fell 18.3%, 33,988 fewer

- Homicide	, down -31.0% ,	263 fewer
- Rape 1o	, down -2.3% ,	27 fewer
- Robbery	, down -21.9% ,	7934 fewer
- Fel. Assault	, down -6.0% ,	1141 fewer
- Burglary	, down -18.1% ,	8221 fewer
- Grand Larceny	, down -12.8% ,	4543 fewer
- Gr. Larc. M.V.	, down -25.2% ,	11859 fewer

- o Shooting incidents fell 30.5% from 2205 to 1533 comparing the first six months of 1995 & 1994.
- o The number of shooting victims also fell 30.0% from 2497 to 1747 comparing the first six months of 1995 to 1994.
- o 265 fewer persons were the victims of homicide during the first six months of 1995 [244 fewer from firearm use].

New York City's recent demographic trends do not explain the continuing significant reduction in crime. The City's youth population is growing, and a growing youth population is typically associated with more crime rather than less crime.

DEMOGRAPHICS

- After experiencing a decline of more than 11% in total population from 1970 to 1980, New York City's population grew by 3.6% from 1980 to 1990.
- From 1970 to 1990 New York City's youth population declined. The 15-19 yr. old age group in particular, fell by almost 22%, while youth involvement in criminal activity rose. Arrests per capita for individuals 15-19 years of age rose almost 60% from 1970 to the early 1990's.
- The decline in the youth population has reversed in the 1990's. The Department of City Planning recently released forecasts that indicate the city's male youth population has increased from 1990 to 1995 (estimated +2.6% increase in 10-19 age group).
- The projected changes in the male youth population (10-19) by race, ethnicity from 1990 to 1995 was estimated to be:

White Non-Hispanic	-4.8
Black Non-Hispanic	+4.0
Hispanic	+7.2
Asian Pacific Islander	+5.9

- o New York State Education Department enrollment statistics for the 1993/94 school year documents actual growth in the youth population (in comparison with the 1989/90 school year):

- Total Public School enrollment rose 8.1%
- Enrollment in grades 9-12 rose 11.2%

- o New York continues to be characterized by its cultural diversity. The 1990 census documented a significant increase in Asian/Pacific Islander population, (+105%), and among persons of Hispanic origin, (+27%).

- o The 1985-90 period in particular was a time of increased immigration from Korea, India, Guyana and Mexico.

Changes in the use and abuse of controlled substances do not explain the continuing significant reductions in crime. Addicts are typically associated with increased criminal activity, not reduced criminal activity.

Police Department arrests for Controlled Substances rose in 1994 and has continued to increase in 1995.

DRUG ABUSE

- In 1984 the first Justice Department sponsored urinalysis study conducted at Manhattan's central arrest booking facility recorded a 42% positive rate for cocaine among the sampled arrestees.
- In 1988 when the urinalysis testing had become part of the Justice Department's Drug Use Forecasting Program (DUF) a similar sampling of Manhattan Central booking arrestees recorded an 83% positive rate for cocaine.
- Seventy eight percent (78%) of the arrestees tested in February 1995, the most recent DUF sampling, tested positive for cocaine.
 - since July of 1989 the proportion of arrestees testing positive had been between 59% and 69%.

- o In the February 1995 sampling, 22% of the arrestees tested positive for opiates.

- since June of 1988 when the proportion reached a high of 27% positive, the proportion of arrestees testing positive for opiates has been between 12% and 23%.

- o Arrestees in specific crime categories also recorded relatively high proportion of positive findings.

Cocaine				Opiates	
Sample Size	Arrest Category(1)	Feb 1995	Previous Recent High (2)	Feb 1995	Previous Recent High(2)
(20)	Robbery	80%	Apr 93 (83%)	7%	Jan 93 (30%)
(30)	Assault	60%	Apr 92 (61%)	9%	July 93 (20%)
(70)	Larceny	81%	Oct 89 (76%)	24%	July 93 (44%)
(75)	Drug Poss	80%	July 93 (89%)	36%	July 93 (89%)

Total February 1995 sample = 251

Notes:

1. Sample size 20 or above
2. Recent high = highest % in last 8 quarterly reports prior to Feb 95.

- o Total citywide NYPD arrests for Narcotic Offenses rose +28.9% in 1994 reaching the highest level of arrest activity since 1989. (1989 95,229; 1994: 83,842).


- Felony drug arrests rose +11.4%
- Misdemeanor drug arrests rose +54.2%

- o Preliminary On-Line Booking Narcotics arrest statistics for the first 5 months of 1995 recorded an increase of +27.4%

- Felony drug arrests rose +10%
- Misdemeanor drug arrests rose +52.3%
- Violation drug arrests rose +83.5%

Drug Use Forecasting (DUF)

Sampling of Manhattan Central Booking arrestees testing positive for drugs



* Because of Federal budget reductions no samples were taken in the first 3 quarters of 1994

There is a significant decline in the use of firearms, particularly handguns, in criminal activity throughout the city.

The reduction is real and not a reporting artifact and includes a significant reduction in homicide and shooting victims.

FIREARMS USE

- During the first six months of 1995 there was a -40.7% reduction recorded in Homicides committed with a handgun.
 - a 30% reduction in all shooting incidents
 - a 30% reduction in all shooting victims

- The number of firearms received and analyzed at the Ballistics Unit during the first six months of 1995 fell by -18.4% (8241 to 6723)

- The number of firearms received and analyzed at the Ballistics Unit as a result of arrest cases during the first six months of 1995 fell by -20% from 6118 to 4788.

- As overall arrest activity rose, arrests for firearm possession and use fell (Preliminary OLBS data for 5 mos. 1995)
 - top charge firearms arrests -26.1%
 - any charge firearms arrests -21.7%

- and arrests for non-firearm dangerous weapons rose
 - top charge "other weapons" arrests +22.5%
 - any charge "other weapons" arrests +18.7%

- o 911 calls identified as dealing with the major crime categories have all experienced reductions comparable to the crime complaint statistics comparing the first five months of 1995 and 1994.

- Robbery (In Progress/Past) calls are down -24.3%
(8,309 fewer radio runs: 34,173 to 25,864)

- Assault (In Progress/Past) calls are down -1.5%
1,219 fewer radio runs: 82,109 to 80,890

- Sub-category Assault (shots/inside/outside/transit)
down -31.9%
2,772 fewer radio runs: 8,702 to 5,930

- Burglary (In Progress/Past) calls are down -7.1%
12,358 fewer radio runs: 57,565 to 82,885

- Larceny* (In Progress/Past) calls are down -13.0%
(12,358 fewer radio runs: 95,243 to 82,885)

- Investigate Shots Fired (No specific crime designated -
inside/outside/transit) calls are down -22.7%
6,104 fewer radio runs: 26,869 to 20,765

* includes both larceny of motor vehicle and other larcenies

- The Firearms License Compliance Grant, funded by the Federal Government, uses joint teams of NYPD officers and ATF agents to review applications and renewal applications for Federal firearms dealer licenses.

This program has significantly reduced the number of individuals who have obtained or renewed license.

NEW APPLICATIONS

- Since the inception of the grant in March of 1993 through December 1994
 - 238 class 1 (Dealers licenses) have been reviewed, and 232 (98%) have been withdrawn or disapproved. Only 3 were approved; and 3 are open.
 - 115 class 3 (Curios licenses) have been reviewed, and 100 (87%) have been withdrawn or disapproved. Only 11 were approved; and 4 are open.

RENEWALS

- Since August of 1993 - through December 1994
 - 251 class 1 (Dealers licenses) have been reviewed for renewal and 178 (71%) have been abandoned, surrendered or disapproved. Only 6 were reissued; 37 are open.
- Since August of 1994 - through December 1994
 - 66 class 3 (Curios licenses) have been reviewed for renewal, and 48 (73%) have been abandoned, surrendered or disapproved. Only 6 more reissued; and 12 are open.

None of the common social and economic indicators have registered consistent changes, significant enough to suggest that underlying social and economic trends have had a direct impact on criminal activity within the city.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS

- Unemployment rates for the first five months of 1995 have been consistently below the rates recorded in 1994.
- The U.S. Department of Labor reports, however, that the number of employed city residents fell -1.4% comparing May 1995 with May of 1994 (2,936,000 to 2,894,000).
- The New York City Human Resources Administration reports that:
 - As of April 1995 the number of public assistance recipients was 0.2% above the number recorded for April 1994 (1,140,453 vs 1,137,632).
 - As of May 1995 the number of food stamp recipients was 2.6% above the number recorded for May 1994 (1,451,929 vs 1,415,534)
 - The number of child abuse cases reported to the New York State Central Registry through March of 1995 rose +1.2% (19,604 vs 19,372).

While arrest activity has increased significantly in 1994 and 1995, there has not been a comparable shift in prison and jail populations, although some effects, particularly in state prison population, will lag changes in arrest activity.

PRISON & JAIL POPULATIONS

- N.Y.S. Department of Corrections prison population rose +3.4% in 1994 to a total of 66,750 inmates. As of July 1, 1995 the population had reached 68,525.
- Both admissions and releases to and from the state prison system declined in 1994 (admissions by -3.5%, releases by -1.8% compared to 1993).
- New York City Department of Corrections average daily jail population fell -1.2% (to 18,407) comparing 1994 and 1993 (after falling in both 1992 and 1993).
- During the first six months of 1995, the N.Y.C. Department of Corrections average daily jail population rose by +5.2% from 17,936 - (six months 1994) to 18,860 six months 1995).

The Department Crime Strategies have also addressed what are commonly referred to as Quality of Life Conditions; criminal mischief, gambling, prostitution, vehicle and traffic law offenses and violations and other offenses against public order.

The strict maintenance of public order restricts and interferes with offensive activities that are often closely associated by time and location with more serious criminal conditions.

QUALITY OF LIFE ENFORCEMENT

o Preliminary OLBS statistics compiled for the first five months of 1995 indicate that for:

CRIMINAL MISCHIEF

- NYPD felony arrests rose	+14.0%
- NYPD misdemeanor arrests rose	+58.1%

GAMBLING

- NYPD felony arrests rose	+42.3%
- NYPD misdemeanor arrests rose	+76.1%

PROSTITUTION

- NYPD felony arrests rose	+250.0%
- NYPD misdemeanor arrests rose	+23.3%

VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW

- NYPD felony arrests rose	+59.8%
- NYPD misdemeanor arrests rose	+104.7%

OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

- NYPD felony arrests rose	+36.6%
- NYPD misdemeanor arrests fell	-9.1%

TOTAL OF THE ABOVE

- NYPD felony arrests rose	+32.2%
- NYPD misdemeanor arrests rose	+69.4%

o This builds upon increases in these categories in 1994 of:

- NYPD felony arrests up	+42.3%
- NYPD misdemeanor arrests up	+53.9%

The increase in enforcement, particularly in arrest processing, has not increased overtime expenditures, and there have only been moderate increases in "arrest to arraignment time" and "police ready time".

ARREST PROCESSING INDICATORS

- During FY95 the number of arrests processed by the On-Line Booking System rose from 204,987 to 249,214 (+21.6%).
- Overtime costs per arrest fell from \$155.73 in FY94 to \$139.67 in FY95, a reduction of -16.1% (based upon a comparison using FY95 wage rates).
- Actual arrest overtime expenditures in FY95, \$34,808,000, were less than the budgeted overtime of \$36,896,000.
- Calendar year 1994's average "arrest to arraignment time" rose +10.4% to 28 hours and police ready time rose +7.2% to 16 hours.
- During the first five months of 1995 "arrest to arraignment time" rose 4.9% to 27 hours and "police ready time" rose +1.8% to 16 hours.

The impact of the Department's enforcement activity, particularly felony and arrest activity, is diminished if individuals can avoid subsequent court appearances and thereby eventually punishment for their crimes. Warrant management and execution must be an integral part of any crime strategy.

WARRANT ENFORCEMENT

- Prior to 1994, felony warrants took 30-40 days from time of issuance to time of execution. Felony warrants are now executed in 7-10 days.
 - Supreme Court high priority warrants - defendant is visited within 1-3 days
- The Warrant Division processes 140,000 warrants per year (many are vacated by the courts).
- Warrant Division apprehensions increased by +102.6% during the first six months of 1995 (5890 vs 2907).
- The increase in apprehensions during the first six months of 1995 builds upon an increase of +20.7% recorded in 1994 (6514 vs 5396).
- Supreme Court and Family Court warrants take 3-6 days to reach the Warrant Division.
 - Felony warrants are classified, numbered and processed by the Division in 1-2 days.
 - Misdemeanor warrants are processed and sent out in 1 week.

The reductions in UCR Index Crime recorded in New York City have had a significant impact on National crime levels.

- o The preliminary 1994 national UCR figures released by the FBI for Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter recorded a -5.0% reduction.

- this is an approximate reduction of 1200 homicides nationwide.

New York City's reduction of 385 homicides accounted for approximately 1/3 of the national reduction.

- o The preliminary 1994 national UCR figures for Robbery recorded a -6.0% reduction.

- this is an approximate reduction of 39,600 robberies nationwide

New York City's reduction of 13,461 robberies accounted for approximately 1/3 of the national reduction.

- o The preliminary 1994 national UCR figures for Larceny Theft recorded a -1.0% reduction.

- this is an approximate reduction of 78,200 thefts nationwide

New York City's reduction of 25,324 accounted for approximately 1/3 of the national reduction.

- o The preliminary 1994 national UCR figures for Motor Vehicle Theft recorded a -2.0% reduction.

- this is an approximate reduction of 31,220 thefts nationwide

New York City's reduction of 17,043 accounted for more than 1/2 of the national reduction.

NEW YORK CITY VS THE LARGEST CITIES

CALENDAR YEAR 1994

NATION*	INDEX CRIME	NEW YORK CITY
-5.0%	Murder & Non-Neg. Manslaughter	-19.8%
-5.0%	Forcible Rape	-5.4%
-6.0%	Robbery	-15.7%
-2.0%	Aggravated Assault	-4.8%
-5.0%	Burglary	-10.9%
-1.0%	Larceny Theft	-10.8%
-2.0%	Motor Vehicle Theft	-15.2%
-3.0%	TOTAL	-11.7%

*Preliminary

NEW YORK CITY'S RANKING AMONG THE LARGEST 25 REPORTING CITIES*

	1994**	1993***
Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter	12th	10th
Forcible Rape	24th	24th
Robbery	3rd	4th
Aggravated Assault	8th	9th
Burglary	20th	20th
Larceny Theft	22nd	21st
Motor Vehicle Theft	14th	13th
TOTAL	21st	18th

*Lower numerical ranking indicates higher rate of crime

**In 1994 Chicago and Detroit were not ranked.

***In 1993 Chicago was not ranked.

NEW YORK CITY'S RANKING AND RATE/100,000 POPULATION FOR MURDER

YEAR	RANKING	RATE/100,000 POP.
1990	8th	30.7
1991	9th	29.3
1992	10th	27.1
1993	10th	26.5
1994	12th	21.2*

*based on 1993 population; other years are based upon population for the reporting year as per the FBI publication CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES.

Among the cities with over 100,000 population, NYC ranked 114th in 1994 compared to 88th in 1993 in total Index Crime. Note: 182 cities reported in 1993; in 1994, 188 cities reported.

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Police Strategy No. 1:
Getting Guns off the Streets
of New York

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Getting Guns off the Streets of New York

Rudolph W. Giuliani
Mayor of the City of New York



William J. Bratton
Police Commissioner



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Police Strategy No. 2:
Curbing Youth Violence in the
Schools and on the Streets

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Police Strategy No. 3:
Driving Drug Dealers Out
of New York

Police Strategy No. 3:

Driving Drug Dealers Out of New York

Rudolph W. Giuliani
Mayor of the City of New York



William J. Bratton
Police Commissioner

