

Police Strategy No. 8:

Reclaiming The Roads of New York

The Honorable Rudolph W. Giuliani
Mayor of the City of New York



William J. Bratton
Police Commissioner



November 29, 1995

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INTRODUCTION

At the outset of his administration, Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani charged Police Commissioner William J. Bratton with the responsibility of reorganizing the Police Department and developing a series of strategies to significantly reduce crime, fear, and disorder throughout New York City. The men and women of the Police Department responded and have made remarkable progress. The restructuring and efficient management of the Department and the implementation of seven different crime fighting strategies has led, as of November 1, 1995, to a decrease of approximately 27% in the seven major categories of crime as compared to two years ago. In particular, the categories of homicide, robbery, and auto theft are experiencing an even greater reduction than other offenses. Quality of life offenses have also been dramatically reduced. For example, "squeegee cleaners," once common throughout the City, are now rarely seen.

The reduction in serious crime and quality of life offenses produces not only a more decent place to live, but also a climate much more conducive to economic development and commerce. These reductions are essential for a better society. To further improve conditions in New York City, Mayor Giuliani has directed the Police Department, working in partnership with the Department of Transportation, as well as other agencies to implement a traffic congestion reduction strategy. The Mayor has stated that: "Reducing traffic congestion benefits everyone by improving the environment, enhancing commerce, and providing a better quality of life for all New Yorkers."

Accordingly, the Police Commissioner has directed the establishment of the Traffic Control Division and assigned an Assistant Chief as its Commanding Officer. This new Division, working in conjunction with the Department of Transportation, will be responsible for expediting the flow of traffic, and reducing pedestrian and vehicle accidents. The officers of the Traffic Control Division will aggressively seek to sanction those individuals who show little regard for their fellow citizens through the flagrant violation of the traffic laws of our City and State. Traffic Control Division officers will work in concert with Department of Transportation personnel in programs that include the towing of illegally parked vehicles from major thoroughfares, the identification of methods to improve traffic flow, programs to reduce accidents that cause injuries and deaths, and other initiatives.

The Department of Transportation is the primary City agency responsible for transportation issues. The Police Department's Traffic Control Division is responsible for enforcement initiatives. The Traffic Control Division recognizes the Department of Transportation's longstanding experience and expertise in traffic management and will work closely with its staff in identifying traffic problems and taking steps to correct them.

The Traffic Control Division, answering directly to the Chief of Patrol, will have operational commands consisting of the Highway District, Traffic Operations District, Surface Transportation Enforcement District, a Special Events Unit and a Movie and TV Unit. Daily operations and event planning implementation will be coordinated through a Traffic Situation Room.

The implementation of this strategy will be phased in over the next few months. The availability of the present recruit class in the Police Academy and the carefully managed deployment strategies used by the Department create a unique opportunity to assign resources without diminishing proper attention to other crime fighting efforts. As part of their training, a number of recruits at the Police Academy will be assigned to traffic duty along with seasoned officers. Upon graduation next March, some new police officers will be used in positions previously held by officers who as part of the phase in of the Traffic Control Division were assigned to traffic duty.

Recognizing that traffic congestion has an impact on the environment, commerce, and the quality of life of all citizens, the Traffic Control Division will concentrate its efforts on expediting the flow of traffic to and from Manhattan during the morning and evening rush hours, and in midtown during the middle of the day. An estimated 875,000 vehicles enter Manhattan each day. These vehicles create the core of the City's traffic problem. This volume directly affects residents who commute from other boroughs, as well as those who commute within their borough and from outside the City.

The Traffic Control Division will also work to improve the flow of traffic in and about the central business districts of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens. The Police Department's Staten Island Borough Commander will continue to coordinate and control the movement of traffic within that Borough. The Traffic Control Division will assist the Staten Island Borough Commander during special events and emergencies.

The Traffic Control Division will also coordinate the efforts of all patrol precincts and other Police Department units to address traffic problems. In order to change the culture and the mind-set of the organization, the Chief of Department will ensure that the entire patrol force understands that every individual officer has a role in traffic control. By taking "ownership" of their posts and correcting conditions that obstruct traffic, officers will gain a greater sense of pride and know that their actions concerning traffic control fulfill one of the basic missions of policing.

To ensure that all patrol officers and supervisors participate in the implementation of this strategy, each precinct will develop its own traffic control plan. The Special Operations Division will also have a particularly important role in making the traffic strategy successful through the dedicated efforts of the Mounted and Aviation Units.

As part of this strategy, there will be a campaign to make residential and business communities fully aware of Mayor Giuliani's intent to reclaim the roads of New York City. The input of these communities will be sought and their ideas and suggestions will be carefully considered.

HISTORY


The invention of the automobile and its availability beginning at the turn of the century, forever changed society. The muddy roads of New York City, which for so long were travelled only by pedestrians, horses, and drawn carriages, slowly became the home of the newly invented automobile.

By 1904, the amount and diversity of traffic that travelled the City streets demanded the establishment of a Traffic Bureau. In the same year, the Mounted Division reached an all time high of 800 officers and had as its chief function traffic control. Soon thereafter, Police bicycles were regularly assigned to traffic control. Their officers would arrest drivers who exceeded the City's speed limit of eight miles per hour and bring the violators directly before a judge. In 1907, the first traffic light was erected in Columbus Circle.

In 1908, the Police Commissioner was given the responsibility of creating the first set of comprehensive traffic regulations for the City. Interestingly, it was not until 1910 that the Police Department was given the authority to issue traffic summonses to enforce those regulations. By 1912, there were 38,000 automobiles in New York City, and in 1915 the first traffic signalling system was introduced. By 1934, 7,700 traffic lights had been installed throughout the City. In 1958, there were 900 officers assigned to full-time traffic control.

Traffic increased significantly over the years. The muddy roads that the first cars drove on were replaced by paved streets and newly created highways. In 1903 the Williamsburg Bridge opened, followed by the Holland Tunnel in 1927, the George Washington Bridge in 1931, and the Triborough Bridge in 1936. By 1948, traffic on City owned toll free bridges totalled 924,000 crossings daily, and by 1993, the number of crossings increased to 2,367,000.

The following graph shows the growth of traffic as indicated by the increased flow of automobiles into Manhattan since 1950.



Source: NYC Department of Transportation


Over the forty years from 1950 to 1990, automobile availability in the region has increased from one auto for every five persons to one auto for every two persons. On Long Island, for example, from 1960 to 1990, the percentage of households having three or more automobiles grew dramatically from 2.6 to 24.5 percent.

Today, 21,000 lane miles of streets, 1,200 lane miles of arterial highway and 76 bridges crossing bodies of water, are spread throughout New York City. There are approximately 1,000,000 street signs, 300,000 street lights, and 63,000 parking meters. An estimated 875,000 vehicles enter Manhattan each day from throughout the greater metropolitan area.

The automobile has allowed for greater mobility and contributed to economic growth. But it also led to increased traffic accidents and congestion. In 1994, the Police Department received approximately 325,000 calls concerning motor vehicle accidents, prepared 234,000 accident reports, and recorded the deaths of 475 motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. In addition to the loss of life, injury, and property damage, the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council estimates that the New York City region loses approximately \$1 billion in productivity annually from traffic congestion.

While the growth in traffic in and about New York City should have resulted in a growth in police involvement in traffic control, in fact the opposite occurred. While as much as one-third of the Police Department's efforts were dedicated to this function in the early part of the century, the growth in crime, the increased use of the automobile by the police, and the severe reduction in staffing from almost 32,000 officers to fewer than 22,000 as a result of the City's fiscal crisis in the 1970s, all played a role in moving the Department away from the traffic control function. In 1974, the establishment of the Department of Transportation, and the subsequent hiring of traffic control agents, further contributed to the Police Department distancing itself from the traffic control duties.

The chart that follows shows the decline in the number of officers involved in traffic duty and highway patrol from 1968 through 1990.



In addition to those already mentioned, other factors at the present time contribute to officers' hesitancy to control or direct traffic. Most notable is the fact that officers are not adequately trained to perform that task. In recent years, recruit officers received as little as two hours of traffic control training.

Meanwhile, throughout the rest of the country, traffic control and enforcement remain one of the primary roles of police. Officers direct traffic and control its flow. They act as partners with other transportation agencies. They make recommendations on engineering, educate the public, and engage in enforcement.

THE TRAFFIC CONTROL DIVISION

The creation of the Traffic Control Division within the New York City Police Department establishes the Mayor's and the Police Commissioner's firm commitment to reclaiming the City's roads.

The Division's mission will be to promote the expeditious flow of traffic, ensure the safety of pedestrians and motor vehicle occupants, and aggressively pursue, summons, and even arrest, when appropriate, those individuals, who by violating the law impede the movement of traffic.

The Division's Commanding Officer will regularly meet with Patrol Borough and Precinct Commanders to ensure that all available resources are being concentrated on addressing traffic conditions.

In addition to the Traffic Control Division Headquarters commanded by an Assistant Chief, the Traffic Control Division will consist of five operational commands:

Traffic Operations District: consisting of four Borough Traffic Task Forces;

Highway District: composed of the existing three Highway Units and a newly formed Highway Unit #4;

Surface Transportation Enforcement District: consisting of a Bus Unit and a Taxi Unit;

Special Events Unit: consisting of officers who plan and coordinate activities concerning traffic at major events;

Movie and T.V. Unit: consisting of officers who assist the film and television industry at on-street film shooting locations.

A Traffic Situation Room will be used to coordinate the activities of the operational commands, police precincts, and other specialized units that will participate in traffic control efforts.

The following will be key components of the Traffic Control Division's Strategy:

- **The Traffic Control Division will be staffed with highly motivated officers. They will come predominantly from the ranks of those who volunteer, and the officers who exhibit exceptional performance will be eligible for future choice assignments;**
- **Traffic Control Division officers will be highly visible and in some cases wear special uniforms;**
- **The officers will be expected to take "ownership" of all traffic problems on their posts and will be held accountable for addressing these conditions;**
- **Officers assigned to the Traffic Control Division will concentrate enforcement efforts on those offenses that obstruct traffic or endanger safety;**
- **Special attention will be given to any parking condition that obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic;**
- **Motorists who use their vehicles' horns in other than emergencies will be summonsed;**
- **There will be zero tolerance during peak traffic congestion times for:**
 - Double Parking**
 - Obstructing Bus Stops**
 - Intersection Spillback**
 - Unauthorized construction site traffic interference;**
- **Motorists who drive while intoxicated or impaired will be aggressively pursued and arrested;**
- **Motorists who are unlicensed or drive with suspended licenses will be summonsed or arrested as may be appropriate;**

- **Most traffic officers will be on steady traffic posts, and these locations will be well known to residents and business people within the community. The presence of these officers will be a deterrent against crime. The officers' presence and their enforcement actions in non-traffic matters will serve to further improve the quality of life for the City's residents and visitors;**
- **Officers assigned to traffic duties will address non-traffic quality of life conditions on their posts;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will maintain a Traffic Situation Room that will function 24 hours a day and will coordinate efforts with the Department of Transportation to monitor and deploy resources to control the flow of traffic throughout the City;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will establish and maintain a direct communication link with the Department of Transportation that will be utilized 24 hours per day;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will establish a telephone line that the public may call to report changing traffic conditions and thereby allow the Traffic Control Division to better deploy resources;**
- **Police motorcycles will be used throughout the City and particularly in Manhattan to move traffic. They will move, summons, or have towed any vehicle that obstructs traffic;**
- **Traffic Control Division members will work with the Department of Transportation to identify locations where new or modified signs or traffic signals are required, and also where road conditions are causing accidents. These officers will also make recommendations concerning the timing of traffic lights;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will provide specific criteria and monitor the establishment and implementation of precinct level traffic plans;**

- **The Traffic Control Division will establish a Traffic Intelligence Report to collect data on traffic patterns and conditions;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will improve patrol officers training and monitor the level of proficiency patrol officers demonstrate in traffic control;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will alert patrol supervisors, Duty Captains and higher ranking officers to mobilize personnel when necessary to address traffic problems;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will form and coordinate an Auxilliary Police Unit dedicated to traffic control.**

In the pages that follow, each of the Districts or Units that comprise the Traffic Control Division are examined. An organization chart and a staffing schedule for the Traffic Control Division are also presented, as is a discussion of the roles of other Police Department Units.

TRAFFIC OPERATIONS DISTRICT

The Traffic Control Division has within it a Traffic Operations District. This District will be responsible for coordinating the efforts of the:

Bronx Traffic Task Force

Brooklyn Traffic Task Force

Manhattan Traffic Task Force

Queens Traffic Task Force

The Staten Island Borough Commander is responsible for all police service within that borough. The Borough Commander will continue to coordinate and control the movement of the traffic within Staten Island. The Traffic Control Division will provide assistance at major events and during emergencies. The Staten Island Borough Commander will ensure compliance with and implementation of all appropriate directives concerning traffic plans.

Each individual Task Force in the Traffic Control Division will be charged with ensuring the well regulated flow of traffic within its borough. Their function will be accomplished through the use of officers directing traffic at key locations and through the use of a mobile enforcement component consisting of officers on scooters and in some cases vans. The task forces will work closely with the Department of Transportation to tow illegally parked automobiles that impede the flow of traffic. They will also work with the Department of Transportation to reduce the frequency of automobile accidents that cause death or injury, and to establish pedestrian safety initiatives.

To accomplish this mission an existing traffic unit in Brooklyn will be expanded and designated the Brooklyn Traffic Task Force. Two new Traffic Task Forces will be established in the Bronx and Queens respectively.

In order to promote safety and visibility, the officers assigned to the Traffic Task Forces will wear reflective vests, and white uniform hats and gloves.

During rush hours, the Task Forces will facilitate the flow of traffic into and out of Manhattan.

Officers and Supervisors in the Traffic Task Forces will be expected to have a sense of "ownership" and will be held accountable for the traffic problems within the area they are assigned. These Officers will also be available to address and prevent crime in the vicinity of their posts. Patrol precincts will provide them with accurate and timely reports concerning crime patterns and trends in the areas the officers patrol.

Members of the Traffic Task Forces will be trained by the Department of Transportation in the laws and City regulations that apply to construction sites. Officers will respond to construction sites and ensure that traffic is not unnecessarily interfering with traffic and that appropriate permits are present.

During peak traffic congestion times, officers will have zero tolerance for:

**Double Parking
Obstructing Bus Stops
Intersection Spillback
Unauthorized construction site traffic interference**

Officers also will concentrate their efforts toward red light enforcement and any parking condition that obstructs pedestrian traffic.

Traffic Control Division Task Force officers will ensure the safety of bicyclists and will also enforce laws against reckless cyclists.

Officers in these task forces will be alert to and take appropriate action concerning quality of life conditions. Particular attention will be given to:

o	Horn Noise	o	"Boombox Cars"
o	"Boomboxes"	o	Loud Motorcycles
o	Car Alarms	o	Graffiti
o	Illegal Dumping	o	Illegal Peddlers
o	Squeegee Cleaners	o	Aggressive Panhandling

The Borough of Manhattan experiences the greatest amount of traffic congestion in the City. In order to effectively address this problem, the Traffic Operations District will utilize a multifaceted deployment strategy.

The Manhattan Traffic Task Force Commander will identify major areas within the borough that have traffic congestion during peak or other hours. These areas, designated as traffic sectors, will be placed under the command of individual lieutenants. These lieutenants will divide their sectors into modules, where individual sergeants and appropriate numbers of officers will be assigned.

The majority of the officers within these modules will be directing traffic. When conditions warrant, they will receive support from a scooter patrol force from within the Task Force. Additionally, when needed, Highway District officers and Mounted Unit officers will provide assistance.

Officers assigned to scooters and vans will be an added component of the Manhattan Traffic Task Force. In addition to engaging in enforcement duties, these officers will also be available for immediate mobilization and assignment to traffic emergencies caused by major accidents, police incidents, water main breaks, and natural disasters.

The Manhattan Traffic Task Force will ensure that all rules and regulations concerning horse drawn carriages are enforced. Attention will be given to regulations of the Administrative Code concerning the licensing, health, and safety of the animals involved. Additionally, the enforcement units will inspect the carriages to ensure that they are safe and adhere to laws concerning lighting and safety.

HIGHWAY DISTRICT

The Highway District will be composed of four units, assigned as follows:

Highway Unit # 1 Bronx

Highway Unit # 2 Brooklyn

Highway Unit # 3 Queens

Highway Unit # 4. Manhattan

The Borough of Staten Island will continue to maintain its own Highway Unit under the jurisdiction of the Staten Island Borough Commander who will coordinate efforts with the Traffic Control Division. The Traffic Control Division will assist the Staten Island Borough Commander during special events and emergencies.

Historically, the Highway District has been responsible for patrolling limited access highways to facilitate the movement of traffic and promote safety. Effective immediately, Highway Units will identify those areas on highways and streets that experience the greatest number of accidents, injuries, and deaths, and concentrate their enforcement efforts at those locations. However, no area of the City will be exempt from traffic enforcement. Highway officers will also be required to identify areas that experience the greatest traffic congestion and take steps to enhance its flow. The measurement of a Highway Unit officer's success will take into account the level of safety for motorists and pedestrians on that officer's post, and the degree to which traffic flows freely, consistent with conditions in the area.

Highway Units in the Boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens, will be directed to identify perennial conditions that inhibit the flow of traffic during peak commuter times and attempt to ameliorate these conditions.

All Highway Units will give special attention to offenders driving while intoxicated, drivers with suspended/no licenses, drag racing, speeding, tailgating, and failing to yield right of way.

Working with other officers in the Traffic Control Division, officers assigned to all Highway Units will be alert to and take appropriate action concerning the following quality of life conditions:

o	Horn Noise	o	"Boombox Cars"
o	"Boomboxes"	o	Loud Motorcycles
o	Car Alarms	o	Graffiti
o	Illegal Dumping	o	Illegal Peddlers
o	Squeegee Cleaners	o	Aggressive Panhandling

In order to more aggressively address the issue of stolen automobiles, the number of Highway District tracking units that identify automobiles that participate in the LoJack program will be increased from six to fifteen.

A newly created Highway Unit # 4 will have motorcycle officers assigned to the streets of Manhattan. These officers will have "ownership" of the particular area to which they are assigned. The areas will consist of either a single major thoroughfare, clusters of roads, or a geographic area that experiences traffic congestion. The officers will be responsible to continually evaluate all conditions effecting the flow of traffic, including delivery locations, chronic double parking conditions, inadequate signs or poorly visible pavement markings. They will patrol the area's major thoroughfares aggressively moving vehicles, issuing summonses and, working with the Department of Transportation, towing vehicles, when necessary. The officers will also be responsible for assisting other Traffic Control Division and precinct personnel in expediting traffic.

When unexpected or chronic congestion develops in an area within Manhattan because of drivers' failure to adhere to traffic laws, the Highway Unit # 4 will be mobilized as a Traffic Strike Force. The Unit will enter the area, identify the cause of the congestion, and deploy the motorcycles to important intersections or other locations to quickly correct the condition. By moving in large numbers and in an organized formation into an area, their presence alone, prior to any action, will be a signal to motorists that intersection spillback and other offenses that obstruct traffic will not be tolerated.

During peak traffic congestion times, whether acting as a Strike Force, or in their individual areas, officers will have zero tolerance for:

**Double Parking
Obstructing Bus Stops
Intersection Spillback
Unauthorized construction site traffic interference**

Officers working in Highway Unit #4 will also concentrate their efforts toward red light enforcement and any parking condition that obstructs pedestrian traffic.

The cadre of motorcycles from Highway Unit # 4 will be available for immediate mobilization and assignment to traffic emergencies caused by major accidents, police incidents, water main breaks, natural disasters, and the like.

A recommended career path for officers who wish to be assigned to Highway Units will be to work in the Traffic Operations District or other Traffic Control Division Districts/Units, to learn the rudiments of traffic control.

TRAFFIC SITUATION ROOM

The Commanding Officer of the Traffic Control Division will be responsible for coordinating the efforts of all Police Department personnel in addressing traffic issues. To assist with this task, the Commanding Officer will have available in proximity to him and his command staff a Traffic Situation Room to help him better organize and facilitate resource deployment. The Room will function 24 hours a day and its staff will be authorized to act during the absence of its Commanding Officer to reassign officers from throughout the Division to address traffic concerns. The staff will gather information provided by police officers, the Department of Transportation's Emergency Response Center, and other sources, thereby enabling the Division to make the most informed decisions concerning the assignment of officers based on currently available data.

The Room will have a phone number that the public may call to report changing traffic conditions.

The Room's staff will develop, collect, and analyze Traffic Intelligence Reports. These documents will allow officers throughout the City to report conditions that have or will have an impact on traffic. Among the typical items to be reported are:

- Construction
- Deteriorating roads
- Expected events (e.g. block closings)
- Chronic congestion
- Damaged highway attenuators
- Pot holes that impede traffic
- Locations where traffic reengineering may be required;
- Any other recommendation that may improve traffic flow.

Copies of these Intelligence Reports will be forwarded by the Traffic Situation Room staff to the Department of Transportation in order to supplement their intelligence gathering efforts.

The operational commander at the Traffic Situation Room will alert patrol supervisors, Duty Captains and higher ranking officers to mobilize personnel when necessary to address traffic situations.

The Traffic Situation Room staff will notify the Chief of Department's Operations Division, which coordinates all Police Department activities, of extreme traffic congestion instances.

SPECIAL EVENTS UNIT

The Special Events Unit will plan and coordinate the traffic function at all major events. The Unit's goal will be to provide maximum efficiency with minimum resources. Specifically, it will:

Plan traffic control for major events;

Act as liaison between the Traffic Control Division and all other Police Department Units;

Coordinate efforts with the Department of Transportation, and other City, State, and Federal Agencies;

Confer with members of the business/residential community;

Establish emergency routes to hospitals;

Conduct post event assessments to determine what steps will improve traffic conditions at future events.

The Unit will work closely with the Mayor's Office of Special Projects and Community Events, the Department of Transportation, patrol boroughs, and other major units throughout the Police Department to ensure that traffic issues receive appropriate consideration in Citywide planning.

During major events, the Unit will ensure that a member of the Traffic Control Division is assigned to the Police Department's Command and Control Center.

The Unit will work particularly closely with members of the Aviation Unit and the Mounted Unit to ensure that the resources of these two Special Operations Division Units are carefully coordinated and used appropriately.

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION ENFORCEMENT DISTRICT

The Surface Transportation Enforcement District will be fully dedicated to ensuring that public surface transportation is provided safely. The District will consist of a Taxi Unit and a Bus Unit. These units will enforce laws concerning taxis, liveries, vans and buses.

Taxi Unit

The Taxi Unit will ensure that medallion taxicabs conform to all appropriate regulations and laws. Members of the Taxi Unit will:

Enforce Taxi and Limousine Commission Regulations;

Follow up on complaints from the public;

Conduct field inspections of meters;

Enforce Vehicle and Traffic Laws.

Particular attention will be paid to taxicabs that obstruct bus stops, obstruct traffic in the middle of roadways, and turn from non-turning lanes, thereby impeding traffic and in some cases creating hazards.

Taxi Unit members will regularly confer with the Street Crime Unit concerning trends in taxi robberies.

All Taxi Unit members will be trained by the Taxi and Limousine Commission. In addition to Vehicle and Traffic Law summonses, trained officers will be authorized to issue TLC summonses which will be returnable to the Taxi and Limousine Commission for hearings to be conducted by Administrative Law Judges.

Bus Unit

The Bus Unit will ensure the safety of riders on the City's buses. The Unit will identify bus routes where crime or disorder most often occur and assign officers in uniform to patrol the routes and ride on selected buses. The Bus Unit will respond to complaints from the Transit Authority and the public.

Particular attention will be given by the Bus Unit to those routes travelled by large numbers of youths. The officers will work closely with school officials to identify those routes which are most appropriate for coverage.

Officers will also ride on buses, exit them when they observe traffic parked or standing in bus stops or lanes, take corrective action, and then board the next bus. Other members of the Bus Unit will support officers riding in buses by patrolling in cars and issuing summonses to the operators of automobiles that drive in restricted bus lanes.

The Bus Unit will enforce regulations pertaining to illegal vans that function on bus routes which not only deprive the Transit Authority of revenue, but cause traffic congestion by obstructing traffic.

Bus Unit personnel will also assist the Taxi and Limousine Commission in their enforcement efforts against illegal livery cabs, especially those on bus routes.

THE MOVIE AND TV UNIT

The Movie and TV Unit was formed in 1973 to assist the film industry, assure compliance with permits, and reduce inconvenience to the general public by rerouting and expediting the flow of traffic at filming locations. The unit works closely with the Mayor's Office for Film, Theater, and Broadcasting.


Under the Traffic Control Division, the Movie and TV Unit will continue in its present function. Its staff will work closely with members of patrol precincts to address the concerns of the film industry and the communities where filming is occurring. When appropriate, other resources of the Traffic Control Division will be assigned to filming locations to assist in establishing a smooth flow of traffic.


STAFFING OF THE TRAFFIC CONTROL DIVISION

In order for the Police Department's traffic control strategy to be successful, additional officers will be assigned in phases to the Traffic Control Division. By March 18, 1996, the staffing of the Division will be as follows:

	January 1994	March 1996
Traffic Control Division	0	48
(Former) Traffic Division	18	0
Traffic Operations District	85	457
Highway District	52	60
Highway Unit #1	115	133
Highway Unit #2	96	113
Highway Unit #3	106	133
Highway Unit #4	0	46
Surface Transportation Enforcement District		
Bus Unit	65	68
Taxi Unit	0	59
Movie/T.V. Unit	23	34

The Staten Island Highway Unit will remain under the command of the Staten Island Borough Commander. The Traffic Control Division will assist the Staten Island Borough Commander during special events and emergencies.





Patrol Borough Staten Island will continue to maintain its own Highway Unit under the jurisdiction of the Staten Island Borough Commander. The Traffic Control Division will assist at major events and emergencies.

PARTICIPATION BY OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENT UNITS

The Police Department's strategy to reclaim the roads of the City will only be successful if every patrol unit, regardless of their primary assignment, is dedicated to the strategy's implementation. The Special Operations Division will have important duties in this regard because of the unique skills and tactical advantage that the members of the Mounted and Aviation Units possess. In the section that follows, their role and the roles of patrol precincts will be discussed.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

MOUNTED UNIT

The Mounted Unit, composed of six troops, is assigned as follows:

Troop A	Manhattan
Troop B	Manhattan
Troop D	Bronx
Troop E	Brooklyn
Troop F	Queens
Troop G	Queens

One of the Mounted Unit's primary functions, as it was before 1964, will be to expedite the movement of traffic especially during peak flow periods. Towards this end, officers, assigned to the Mounted Unit, will receive special training in traffic control.

While they will not hesitate to issue summonses to vehicles that obstruct traffic, the officers are expected, through their presence, to create an environment where motorists will conform to the traffic regulations. The Mounted Unit officers will have "ownership" of a particular area, and similar to officers within the Traffic Operations District, they will be held accountable for the traffic conditions within their designated area.

During peak traffic congestion times, officers will have zero tolerance for:

**Double Parking
Obstructing Bus Stops
Intersection Spillback
Unauthorized construction site traffic interference**

Officers also will concentrate their efforts toward any parking condition that obstructs pedestrian traffic.

Officers in these task forces will be alert to and take appropriate action concerning quality of life conditions. Particular attention will be given to:

•	Horn Noise	•	"Boombox Cars"
•	"Boomboxes"	•	Loud Motorcycles
•	Car Alarms	•	Graffiti
•	Illegal Dumping	•	Illegal Peddlers
•	Squeegee Cleaners	•	Aggressive Panhandling

A recommended career path for officers who wish to be assigned to the Mounted Unit will be to work first in the Traffic Control Division, where the officers will learn the rudiments of traffic control.

AVIATION UNIT

The Aviation Unit will assign a helicopter to survey roads and bridges during peak traffic hours and report congestion or unusual conditions to the Traffic Situation Room. The helicopter's officers will recommend locations where the redeployment of officers will improve the flow of traffic. The crew will also recommend alternate routes to which traffic may be detoured.

PATROL PRECINCTS

The involvement of every patrol officer is of paramount importance in this Police Department strategy. To the extent that it would be impossible to reduce serious crime and address quality of life conditions without the commitment of the entire patrol force, so too, the resources of the Patrol Services Bureau must be committed to traffic control if this strategy is to be successful.

To accomplish this goal, each precinct will be responsible for the creation of a Precinct Traffic Control Plan. These plans will identify existing and potential traffic problems within each command and will propose solutions or strategies to deal with them. The plans will be maintained at the precinct desk, the patrol supervisor's auto, and be regularly reviewed. Precinct Commanders will be held accountable for the accuracy and effectiveness of their plans, and they will ensure that their subordinate supervisors are fully cognizant of the plan's content.

The Traffic Control Division, with the assistance of the Department of Transportation, will review each plan to ensure that it includes:

- ② A Precinct Traffic Profile in which major intersections/roadways that experience traffic congestion are identified and plans for dealing with traffic congestion are established;
- ② A traffic congestion reaction component that establishes a protocol for precinct supervisors to follow in any case of major traffic congestion;
- ② A plan to keep police officers aware of the most dangerous intersections on their posts and steps that may be taken to reduce accidents;
- ② The locations that experience the largest number of traffic accidents and policies to reduce accidents, including strict enforcement of traffic regulations;
- ② A plan to respond to major traffic congestion affecting highways, bridges, and tunnels;
- ② Transportation terminals and plans to avoid congestion at these locations;

- 2 **Snow emergency routes. Procedures should be established for clearing these emergency routes, when required;**
- 2 **Areas prone to flooding and plans to divert traffic from these areas;**
- 2 **Truck routes and routes that exclude trucks;**
- 2 **Hospitals with emergency rooms and routes to them;**
- 2 **A plan to address an electrical power outage with attention to traffic intersections;**
- 2 **The identification of locations with long term road construction and plans to address the flow of traffic in those areas;**
- 2 **The designation of sergeants and police officers who will become familiar with laws and regulations concerning construction sites;**
- 2 **Use of Auxiliary Police Officers, all of whom will be trained in traffic control;**
- 2 **A protocol for desk officers to follow to notify the Traffic Control Division of major accidents or unexpected congestion.**

Precinct Commanders will ensure that each member of their command understands that traffic control is the responsibility of every uniformed police officer irrespective of his or her daily assignment. Similar to officers in the Traffic Operations District, precinct officers will come to understand that they have "ownership" of the traffic problems in their sector or on their post.

Supervisors must also know that they are responsible for traffic flow and should not hesitate to use all Department resources, including mobilizations, to address traffic emergencies.

Precinct highway safety officers will maintain a liaison with the Traffic Control Division and will be responsible for reviewing and forwarding Traffic Intelligence Reports. Highway Safety officers will also frequently confer with the precinct's school crossing guard coordinator in order to address traffic safety concerns in the vicinity of schools.

Precincts will implement a policy of zero tolerance during peak traffic congestion times for:

**Double Parking
Obstructing Bus Stops
Intersection Spillback
Unauthorized construction site traffic interference**

Officers also will concentrate their efforts toward red light enforcement, parking conditions that obstruct pedestrian traffic, and offenses that involve the unnecessary use of horns by motorists.

Precinct Commanders will be held accountable to properly address traffic congestion within their commands and will ensure that the Department's zero tolerance policy for selected traffic offenses is enforced.

The Chief of Department and the Chief of Patrol will co-chair triannual traffic strategy meetings with all Patrol Boroughs to review each precinct's accomplishments in implementing the traffic strategy.

Borough Commanders will consider the degree to which a precinct commander is successful in complying with this Department Strategy when preparing annual evaluations and making recommendations for promotion.

TRAINING

The Police Department will improve and increase the level of training for members of the Department from recruits to executives. The Traffic Control Division will provide specific direction concerning the required training and it will be incumbent upon the Police Academy to provide that level of training which will allow all Department members assigned to patrol to meaningfully contribute to the goals set forth in this document.

The Police Academy's Recruit Training Section will substantially increase the amount of instruction provided to new officers. Recruits will be assigned to the field to gain realistic training in directing traffic at intersections and at automobile accident locations. Veteran officers will be instructed through precinct level training and training films.

All officers assigned to patrol will receive the most up-to-date information and relevant training in the following areas:

- **Identification of intoxicated drivers;**
- **Laws related to suspended/revoked licenses;**
- **New York State's Vehicle and Traffic Law;**
- **New York City Parking Rules and Regulations;**
- **New York City Administrative Code;**
- **Laws concerning bicyclists and pedestrians.**

Training specifically aimed at hands-on traffic control will include the following:

- **Methods of directing traffic;**
- **Use of hand signals;**
- **Proper positioning of the body;**
- **Proper use of the whistle;**
- **How to control an intersection;**
- **Detouring traffic in emergencies;**
- **Handling accidents;**
- **Controlling pedestrian traffic.**

In addition to the training received by all officers assigned to patrol, officers assigned to the Traffic Control Division will receive training from the Taxi and Limousine Commission and the Department of Transportation. Specific training will be given regarding applicable laws and regulations that affect taxi drivers and their vehicles. Department of Transportation training will concern laws and regulations that relate to construction on or near roadways.

In order to improve the Department's success in apprehending the drivers of stolen automobiles, extensive training will be made available to members of the Highway District in the use of the LoJack stolen auto tracking and recovery system.

Officers assigned to the Manhattan Traffic Task Force will receive training concerning horse drawn carriages.

Highway officers will continue to receive training in advanced accident investigation techniques and in dealing with hazardous materials.

Officers assigned to the Traffic Control Division will also be available to assist precinct commanders in training their officers.

The Northwestern University Traffic Institute, after studying the City's traffic congestion on-site, has created a course titled "Traffic Management Seminar for the City of New York." This course will be attended by senior ranking members of the Traffic Control Division and the Department of Transportation.

Hunter College's Urban Research Center is also providing assistance in identifying training needs.

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

The success of the Police Department's efforts in reclaiming the City's roads can only occur through the building of partnerships with other government agencies, police departments, community organizations, the business community, and traffic related organizations.

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The Traffic Control Division and the Department of Transportation will work in close consultation with the Mayor's staff, who will coordinate the activities among other City agencies in order to forward the goals of this traffic strategy. The Traffic Control Division will have frequent contact with the Mayor's Office of Street Activities; the Mayor's Office for Film, Theater, and Broadcasting; the Mayor's Community Assistance Unit; and other Mayoral Offices. Working in conjunction with these offices, the Police Department will be able to more effectively reduce traffic congestion.

The Traffic Control Division will continue to coordinate with executive staff members of the Fire Department and the Emergency Medical Services to ensure that the concerns of these two emergency response agencies are addressed by the Police Department. The Traffic Control Division will continually seek to assist these agencies and critique major events to continually improve emergency response time within the City. A goal of these meetings will be to ensure that police vehicles, fire trucks, and ambulances do not exacerbate traffic congestion at emergency scenes.

The Traffic Control Division will also meet with the Department of Sanitation to address any concerns that the agency might have regarding traffic and the safety of their personnel. Methods by which the Department of Sanitation may minimize traffic interruption will also be explored.

The Traffic Control Division will meet frequently with executives from the Taxi and Limousine Commission in order to better coordinate enforcement efforts.

The Traffic Control Division will coordinate efforts with the Department of Buildings to ensure that the construction under their jurisdiction has minimal impact on traffic flow.

The Division will meet regularly with the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, in order to better coordinate traffic flow at toll bridges and tunnels.

POLICE DEPARTMENTS

The Traffic Control Division will work closely with the New York State Police, Port Authority Police, Nassau County Police, and the Yonkers Police to establish a coordinated effort to address traffic concerns. The Division will also work with the New Jersey State Police, the Fort Lee Police, the Jersey City Police, and the Weehawken Police to deal with issues that relate to the flow of traffic between the two states.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

The staff of the Traffic Control Division and Precinct Commanders will confer with Community Boards and local community organizations concerning the flow of traffic, the need for increased enforcement, and traffic engineering concerns.

The Police Department will review recommendations received from community organizations, address those that are within its jurisdiction, and forward to the Department of Transportation those recommendations that are within their purview.

BUSINESS COMMUNITY

The efficient flow of traffic within New York City is critical to the success of business and the economic growth of the City and region. In order to ensure that the traffic concerns of business are adequately addressed, members of the Traffic Control Division will meet regularly with the business community. Frequent meetings will be held with utility companies that regularly make repairs on roadways.

The goal of these meetings will be to solicit the ideas of the business community and to determine steps that will be taken to improve the flow of traffic, while at the same time increasing commerce. These meetings will help keep the business community aware of the progress of the initiatives established through this traffic strategy.

TRAFFIC RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

The Traffic Control Division will work as a fully accredited member of the Midtown Manhattan Mobility Task Force, a consortium of concerned citizens and traffic practitioners who are studying Midtown Manhattan traffic issues and are making recommendations to improve the flow of traffic.

The Division will further work with local traffic reporting services, such as Trans Com, Metro and Shadow Traffic, in order to provide an exchange of current traffic information that may be disseminated to the public and used by the Police Department and the Department of Transportation to correct traffic conditions.

A liaison will be maintained with the Automobile Club of New York, the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council, and the National Safety Council to discuss mutual concerns relating to traffic and safety.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

The goal of Police Department Strategy # 8 "Reclaiming the Roads of New York" is to expedite the flow of traffic and ensure the safety of pedestrians and motorists. Although police officers will aggressively pursue and summons or arrest violators of the traffic laws, the Department intends and prefers to obtain compliance through education and the commitment of every New Yorker to improve traffic conditions.

In order for this strategy to succeed, the full cooperation of every motorist, pedestrian, and cyclist will be required. The aim of this policy is not only to have motorists adhere to the law, but to be courteous to their fellow drivers, pedestrians, and cyclists. To create an environment that promotes this courtesy, the Police Department and the Department of Transportation will strive to educate the public concerning traffic laws and safety.

The Mayor's Office and other agencies will participate in the education of the public. The Deputy Commissioner, Public Information for the Police Department will work closely with the news media in disseminating important information. Other resources that will be used include:

**Mayor's radio program;
The use of public services announcements;
Signs on buses;
New signs at intersections;
Community Newspapers.**

Precinct Commanders will work with all local community organizations and school representatives to further educate the public.

EVALUATION

The Police Department will evaluate the success of the traffic strategy six months after full implementation. A report on its impact will be submitted to the Mayor, with recommendations for strategic and operational adjustments as required.

CONCLUSION

Through the implementation of this strategy, the Police Department, working with the Department of Transportation, will achieve the Mayor's goal: "Reclaiming the Roads of New York City." It is the intent of this strategy to make the City's roads safer for the motoring public and pedestrians, to reduce pollution from automobile emissions, and to expedite the flow of traffic throughout the City.

The strategy's success will require the concerted effort of many government agencies, businesses, and community groups. Most importantly, it will require the cooperation and support of every New Yorker in supporting its initiatives and goals for the benefit of all.

Police Strategy No. 8:

Reclaiming The Roads of New York

The Honorable Rudolph W. Giuliani
Mayor of the City of New York



William J. Bratton
Police Commissioner



November 29, 1995

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INTRODUCTION

At the outset of his administration, Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani charged Police Commissioner William J. Bratton with the responsibility of reorganizing the Police Department and developing a series of strategies to significantly reduce crime, fear, and disorder throughout New York City. The men and women of the Police Department responded and have made remarkable progress. The restructuring and efficient management of the Department and the implementation of seven different crime fighting strategies has led, as of November 1, 1995, to a decrease of approximately 27% in the seven major categories of crime as compared to two years ago. In particular, the categories of homicide, robbery, and auto theft are experiencing an even greater reduction than other offenses. Quality of life offenses have also been dramatically reduced. For example, "squeegee cleaners," once common throughout the City, are now rarely seen.

The reduction in serious crime and quality of life offenses produces not only a more decent place to live, but also a climate much more conducive to economic development and commerce. These reductions are essential for a better society. To further improve conditions in New York City, Mayor Giuliani has directed the Police Department, working in partnership with the Department of Transportation, as well as other agencies to implement a traffic congestion reduction strategy. The Mayor has stated that: "Reducing traffic congestion benefits everyone by improving the environment, enhancing commerce, and providing a better quality of life for all New Yorkers."

Accordingly, the Police Commissioner has directed the establishment of the Traffic Control Division and assigned an Assistant Chief as its Commanding Officer. This new Division, working in conjunction with the Department of Transportation, will be responsible for expediting the flow of traffic, and reducing pedestrian and vehicle accidents. The officers of the Traffic Control Division will aggressively seek to sanction those individuals who show little regard for their fellow citizens through the flagrant violation of the traffic laws of our City and State. Traffic Control Division officers will work in concert with Department of Transportation personnel in programs that include the towing of illegally parked vehicles from major thoroughfares, the identification of methods to improve traffic flow, programs to reduce accidents that cause injuries and deaths, and other initiatives.

The Department of Transportation is the primary City agency responsible for transportation issues. The Police Department's Traffic Control Division is responsible for enforcement initiatives. The Traffic Control Division recognizes the Department of Transportation's longstanding experience and expertise in traffic management and will work closely with its staff in identifying traffic problems and taking steps to correct them.

The Traffic Control Division, answering directly to the Chief of Patrol, will have operational commands consisting of the Highway District, Traffic Operations District, Surface Transportation Enforcement District, a Special Events Unit and a Movie and TV Unit. Daily operations and event planning implementation will be coordinated through a Traffic Situation Room.

The implementation of this strategy will be phased in over the next few months. The availability of the present recruit class in the Police Academy and the carefully managed deployment strategies used by the Department create a unique opportunity to assign resources without diminishing proper attention to other crime fighting efforts. As part of their training, a number of recruits at the Police Academy will be assigned to traffic duty along with seasoned officers. Upon graduation next March, some new police officers will be used in positions previously held by officers who as part of the phase in of the Traffic Control Division were assigned to traffic duty.

Recognizing that traffic congestion has an impact on the environment, commerce, and the quality of life of all citizens, the Traffic Control Division will concentrate its efforts on expediting the flow of traffic to and from Manhattan during the morning and evening rush hours, and in midtown during the middle of the day. An estimated 875,000 vehicles enter Manhattan each day. These vehicles create the core of the City's traffic problem. This volume directly affects residents who commute from other boroughs, as well as those who commute within their borough and from outside the City.

The Traffic Control Division will also work to improve the flow of traffic in and about the central business districts of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens. The Police Department's Staten Island Borough Commander will continue to coordinate and control the movement of traffic within that Borough. The Traffic Control Division will assist the Staten Island Borough Commander during special events and emergencies.

The Traffic Control Division will also coordinate the efforts of all patrol precincts and other Police Department units to address traffic problems. In order to change the culture and the mind-set of the organization, the Chief of Department will ensure that the entire patrol force understands that every individual officer has a role in traffic control. By taking "ownership" of their posts and correcting conditions that obstruct traffic, officers will gain a greater sense of pride and know that their actions concerning traffic control fulfill one of the basic missions of policing.

To ensure that all patrol officers and supervisors participate in the implementation of this strategy, each precinct will develop its own traffic control plan. The Special Operations Division will also have a particularly important role in making the traffic strategy successful through the dedicated efforts of the Mounted and Aviation Units.

As part of this strategy, there will be a campaign to make residential and business communities fully aware of Mayor Giuliani's intent to reclaim the roads of New York City. The input of these communities will be sought and their ideas and suggestions will be carefully considered.

HISTORY


The invention of the automobile and its availability beginning at the turn of the century, forever changed society. The muddy roads of New York City, which for so long were travelled only by pedestrians, horses, and drawn carriages, slowly became the home of the newly invented automobile.

By 1904, the amount and diversity of traffic that travelled the City streets demanded the establishment of a Traffic Bureau. In the same year, the Mounted Division reached an all time high of 800 officers and had as its chief function traffic control. Soon thereafter, Police bicycles were regularly assigned to traffic control. Their officers would arrest drivers who exceeded the City's speed limit of eight miles per hour and bring the violators directly before a judge. In 1907, the first traffic light was erected in Columbus Circle.

In 1908, the Police Commissioner was given the responsibility of creating the first set of comprehensive traffic regulations for the City. Interestingly, it was not until 1910 that the Police Department was given the authority to issue traffic summonses to enforce those regulations. By 1912, there were 38,000 automobiles in New York City, and in 1915 the first traffic signalling system was introduced. By 1934, 7,700 traffic lights had been installed throughout the City. In 1958, there were 900 officers assigned to full-time traffic control.

Traffic increased significantly over the years. The muddy roads that the first cars drove on were replaced by paved streets and newly created highways. In 1903 the Williamsburg Bridge opened, followed by the Holland Tunnel in 1927, the George Washington Bridge in 1931, and the Triborough Bridge in 1936. By 1948, traffic on City owned toll free bridges totalled 924,000 crossings daily, and by 1993, the number of crossings increased to 2,367,000.

The following graph shows the growth of traffic as indicated by the increased flow of automobiles into Manhattan since 1950.



Source: NYC Department of Transportation


Over the forty years from 1950 to 1990, automobile availability in the region has increased from one auto for every five persons to one auto for every two persons. On Long Island, for example, from 1960 to 1990, the percentage of households having three or more automobiles grew dramatically from 2.6 to 24.5 percent.

Today, 21,000 lane miles of streets, 1,200 lane miles of arterial highway and 76 bridges crossing bodies of water, are spread throughout New York City. There are approximately 1,000,000 street signs, 300,000 street lights, and 63,000 parking meters. An estimated 875,000 vehicles enter Manhattan each day from throughout the greater metropolitan area.

The automobile has allowed for greater mobility and contributed to economic growth. But it also led to increased traffic accidents and congestion. In 1994, the Police Department received approximately 325,000 calls concerning motor vehicle accidents, prepared 234,000 accident reports, and recorded the deaths of 475 motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. In addition to the loss of life, injury, and property damage, the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council estimates that the New York City region loses approximately \$1 billion in productivity annually from traffic congestion.

While the growth in traffic in and about New York City should have resulted in a growth in police involvement in traffic control, in fact the opposite occurred. While as much as one-third of the Police Department's efforts were dedicated to this function in the early part of the century, the growth in crime, the increased use of the automobile by the police, and the severe reduction in staffing from almost 32,000 officers to fewer than 22,000 as a result of the City's fiscal crisis in the 1970s, all played a role in moving the Department away from the traffic control function. In 1974, the establishment of the Department of Transportation, and the subsequent hiring of traffic control agents, further contributed to the Police Department distancing itself from the traffic control duties.

The chart that follows shows the decline in the number of officers involved in traffic duty and highway patrol from 1968 through 1990.



In addition to those already mentioned, other factors at the present time contribute to officers' hesitancy to control or direct traffic. Most notable is the fact that officers are not adequately trained to perform that task. In recent years, recruit officers received as little as two hours of traffic control training.

Meanwhile, throughout the rest of the country, traffic control and enforcement remain one of the primary roles of police. Officers direct traffic and control its flow. They act as partners with other transportation agencies. They make recommendations on engineering, educate the public, and engage in enforcement.

THE TRAFFIC CONTROL DIVISION

The creation of the Traffic Control Division within the New York City Police Department establishes the Mayor's and the Police Commissioner's firm commitment to reclaiming the City's roads.

The Division's mission will be to promote the expeditious flow of traffic, ensure the safety of pedestrians and motor vehicle occupants, and aggressively pursue, summons, and even arrest, when appropriate, those individuals, who by violating the law impede the movement of traffic.

The Division's Commanding Officer will regularly meet with Patrol Borough and Precinct Commanders to ensure that all available resources are being concentrated on addressing traffic conditions.

In addition to the Traffic Control Division Headquarters commanded by an Assistant Chief, the Traffic Control Division will consist of five operational commands:

Traffic Operations District: consisting of four Borough Traffic Task Forces;

Highway District: composed of the existing three Highway Units and a newly formed Highway Unit #4;

Surface Transportation Enforcement District: consisting of a Bus Unit and a Taxi Unit;

Special Events Unit: consisting of officers who plan and coordinate activities concerning traffic at major events;

Movie and T.V. Unit: consisting of officers who assist the film and television industry at on-street film shooting locations.

A Traffic Situation Room will be used to coordinate the activities of the operational commands, police precincts, and other specialized units that will participate in traffic control efforts.

The following will be key components of the Traffic Control Division's Strategy:

- **The Traffic Control Division will be staffed with highly motivated officers. They will come predominantly from the ranks of those who volunteer, and the officers who exhibit exceptional performance will be eligible for future choice assignments;**
- **Traffic Control Division officers will be highly visible and in some cases wear special uniforms;**
- **The officers will be expected to take "ownership" of all traffic problems on their posts and will be held accountable for addressing these conditions;**
- **Officers assigned to the Traffic Control Division will concentrate enforcement efforts on those offenses that obstruct traffic or endanger safety;**
- **Special attention will be given to any parking condition that obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic;**
- **Motorists who use their vehicles' horns in other than emergencies will be summonsed;**
- **There will be zero tolerance during peak traffic congestion times for:**
 - Double Parking**
 - Obstructing Bus Stops**
 - Intersection Spillback**
 - Unauthorized construction site traffic interference;**
- **Motorists who drive while intoxicated or impaired will be aggressively pursued and arrested;**
- **Motorists who are unlicensed or drive with suspended licenses will be summonsed or arrested as may be appropriate;**

- **Most traffic officers will be on steady traffic posts, and these locations will be well known to residents and business people within the community. The presence of these officers will be a deterrent against crime. The officers' presence and their enforcement actions in non-traffic matters will serve to further improve the quality of life for the City's residents and visitors;**
- **Officers assigned to traffic duties will address non-traffic quality of life conditions on their posts;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will maintain a Traffic Situation Room that will function 24 hours a day and will coordinate efforts with the Department of Transportation to monitor and deploy resources to control the flow of traffic throughout the City;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will establish and maintain a direct communication link with the Department of Transportation that will be utilized 24 hours per day;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will establish a telephone line that the public may call to report changing traffic conditions and thereby allow the Traffic Control Division to better deploy resources;**
- **Police motorcycles will be used throughout the City and particularly in Manhattan to move traffic. They will move, summons, or have towed any vehicle that obstructs traffic;**
- **Traffic Control Division members will work with the Department of Transportation to identify locations where new or modified signs or traffic signals are required, and also where road conditions are causing accidents. These officers will also make recommendations concerning the timing of traffic lights;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will provide specific criteria and monitor the establishment and implementation of precinct level traffic plans;**

- **The Traffic Control Division will establish a Traffic Intelligence Report to collect data on traffic patterns and conditions;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will improve patrol officers training and monitor the level of proficiency patrol officers demonstrate in traffic control;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will alert patrol supervisors, Duty Captains and higher ranking officers to mobilize personnel when necessary to address traffic problems;**
- **The Traffic Control Division will form and coordinate an Auxilliary Police Unit dedicated to traffic control.**

In the pages that follow, each of the Districts or Units that comprise the Traffic Control Division are examined. An organization chart and a staffing schedule for the Traffic Control Division are also presented, as is a discussion of the roles of other Police Department Units.

TRAFFIC OPERATIONS DISTRICT

The Traffic Control Division has within it a Traffic Operations District. This District will be responsible for coordinating the efforts of the:

Bronx Traffic Task Force

Brooklyn Traffic Task Force

Manhattan Traffic Task Force

Queens Traffic Task Force

The Staten Island Borough Commander is responsible for all police service within that borough. The Borough Commander will continue to coordinate and control the movement of the traffic within Staten Island. The Traffic Control Division will provide assistance at major events and during emergencies. The Staten Island Borough Commander will ensure compliance with and implementation of all appropriate directives concerning traffic plans.

Each individual Task Force in the Traffic Control Division will be charged with ensuring the well regulated flow of traffic within its borough. Their function will be accomplished through the use of officers directing traffic at key locations and through the use of a mobile enforcement component consisting of officers on scooters and in some cases vans. The task forces will work closely with the Department of Transportation to tow illegally parked automobiles that impede the flow of traffic. They will also work with the Department of Transportation to reduce the frequency of automobile accidents that cause death or injury, and to establish pedestrian safety initiatives.

To accomplish this mission an existing traffic unit in Brooklyn will be expanded and designated the Brooklyn Traffic Task Force. Two new Traffic Task Forces will be established in the Bronx and Queens respectively.

In order to promote safety and visibility, the officers assigned to the Traffic Task Forces will wear reflective vests, and white uniform hats and gloves.

During rush hours, the Task Forces will facilitate the flow of traffic into and out of Manhattan.

Officers and Supervisors in the Traffic Task Forces will be expected to have a sense of "ownership" and will be held accountable for the traffic problems within the area they are assigned. These Officers will also be available to address and prevent crime in the vicinity of their posts. Patrol precincts will provide them with accurate and timely reports concerning crime patterns and trends in the areas the officers patrol.

Members of the Traffic Task Forces will be trained by the Department of Transportation in the laws and City regulations that apply to construction sites. Officers will respond to construction sites and ensure that traffic is not unnecessarily interfering with traffic and that appropriate permits are present.

During peak traffic congestion times, officers will have zero tolerance for:

**Double Parking
Obstructing Bus Stops
Intersection Spillback
Unauthorized construction site traffic interference**

Officers also will concentrate their efforts toward red light enforcement and any parking condition that obstructs pedestrian traffic.

Traffic Control Division Task Force officers will ensure the safety of bicyclists and will also enforce laws against reckless cyclists.

Officers in these task forces will be alert to and take appropriate action concerning quality of life conditions. Particular attention will be given to:

o	Horn Noise	o	"Boombox Cars"
o	"Boomboxes"	o	Loud Motorcycles
o	Car Alarms	o	Graffiti
o	Illegal Dumping	o	Illegal Peddlers
o	Squeegee Cleaners	o	Aggressive Panhandling

The Borough of Manhattan experiences the greatest amount of traffic congestion in the City. In order to effectively address this problem, the Traffic Operations District will utilize a multifaceted deployment strategy.

The Manhattan Traffic Task Force Commander will identify major areas within the borough that have traffic congestion during peak or other hours. These areas, designated as traffic sectors, will be placed under the command of individual lieutenants. These lieutenants will divide their sectors into modules, where individual sergeants and appropriate numbers of officers will be assigned.

The majority of the officers within these modules will be directing traffic. When conditions warrant, they will receive support from a scooter patrol force from within the Task Force. Additionally, when needed, Highway District officers and Mounted Unit officers will provide assistance.

Officers assigned to scooters and vans will be an added component of the Manhattan Traffic Task Force. In addition to engaging in enforcement duties, these officers will also be available for immediate mobilization and assignment to traffic emergencies caused by major accidents, police incidents, water main breaks, and natural disasters.

The Manhattan Traffic Task Force will ensure that all rules and regulations concerning horse drawn carriages are enforced. Attention will be given to regulations of the Administrative Code concerning the licensing, health, and safety of the animals involved. Additionally, the enforcement units will inspect the carriages to ensure that they are safe and adhere to laws concerning lighting and safety.

HIGHWAY DISTRICT

The Highway District will be composed of four units, assigned as follows:

Highway Unit # 1 Bronx

Highway Unit # 2 Brooklyn

Highway Unit # 3 Queens

Highway Unit # 4. Manhattan

The Borough of Staten Island will continue to maintain its own Highway Unit under the jurisdiction of the Staten Island Borough Commander who will coordinate efforts with the Traffic Control Division. The Traffic Control Division will assist the Staten Island Borough Commander during special events and emergencies.

Historically, the Highway District has been responsible for patrolling limited access highways to facilitate the movement of traffic and promote safety. Effective immediately, Highway Units will identify those areas on highways and streets that experience the greatest number of accidents, injuries, and deaths, and concentrate their enforcement efforts at those locations. However, no area of the City will be exempt from traffic enforcement. Highway officers will also be required to identify areas that experience the greatest traffic congestion and take steps to enhance its flow. The measurement of a Highway Unit officer's success will take into account the level of safety for motorists and pedestrians on that officer's post, and the degree to which traffic flows freely, consistent with conditions in the area.

Highway Units in the Boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens, will be directed to identify perennial conditions that inhibit the flow of traffic during peak commuter times and attempt to ameliorate these conditions.

All Highway Units will give special attention to offenders driving while intoxicated, drivers with suspended/no licenses, drag racing, speeding, tailgating, and failing to yield right of way.

Working with other officers in the Traffic Control Division, officers assigned to all Highway Units will be alert to and take appropriate action concerning the following quality of life conditions:

◊	Horn Noise	◊	"Boombox Cars"
◊	"Boomboxes"	◊	Loud Motorcycles
◊	Car Alarms	◊	Graffiti
◊	Illegal Dumping	◊	Illegal Peddlers
◊	Squeegee Cleaners	◊	Aggressive Panhandling

In order to more aggressively address the issue of stolen automobiles, the number of Highway District tracking units that identify automobiles that participate in the LoJack program will be increased from six to fifteen.

A newly created Highway Unit # 4 will have motorcycle officers assigned to the streets of Manhattan. These officers will have "ownership" of the particular area to which they are assigned. The areas will consist of either a single major thoroughfare, clusters of roads, or a geographic area that experiences traffic congestion. The officers will be responsible to continually evaluate all conditions effecting the flow of traffic, including delivery locations, chronic double parking conditions, inadequate signs or poorly visible pavement markings. They will patrol the area's major thoroughfares aggressively moving vehicles, issuing summonses and, working with the Department of Transportation, towing vehicles, when necessary. The officers will also be responsible for assisting other Traffic Control Division and precinct personnel in expediting traffic.

When unexpected or chronic congestion develops in an area within Manhattan because of drivers' failure to adhere to traffic laws, the Highway Unit # 4 will be mobilized as a Traffic Strike Force. The Unit will enter the area, identify the cause of the congestion, and deploy the motorcycles to important intersections or other locations to quickly correct the condition. By moving in large numbers and in an organized formation into an area, their presence alone, prior to any action, will be a signal to motorists that intersection spillback and other offenses that obstruct traffic will not be tolerated.

During peak traffic congestion times, whether acting as a Strike Force, or in their individual areas, officers will have zero tolerance for:

**Double Parking
Obstructing Bus Stops
Intersection Spillback
Unauthorized construction site traffic interference**

Officers working in Highway Unit #4 will also concentrate their efforts toward red light enforcement and any parking condition that obstructs pedestrian traffic.

The cadre of motorcycles from Highway Unit # 4 will be available for immediate mobilization and assignment to traffic emergencies caused by major accidents, police incidents, water main breaks, natural disasters, and the like.

A recommended career path for officers who wish to be assigned to Highway Units will be to work in the Traffic Operations District or other Traffic Control Division Districts/Units, to learn the rudiments of traffic control.

TRAFFIC SITUATION ROOM

The Commanding Officer of the Traffic Control Division will be responsible for coordinating the efforts of all Police Department personnel in addressing traffic issues. To assist with this task, the Commanding Officer will have available in proximity to him and his command staff a Traffic Situation Room to help him better organize and facilitate resource deployment. The Room will function 24 hours a day and its staff will be authorized to act during the absence of its Commanding Officer to reassign officers from throughout the Division to address traffic concerns. The staff will gather information provided by police officers, the Department of Transportation's Emergency Response Center, and other sources, thereby enabling the Division to make the most informed decisions concerning the assignment of officers based on currently available data.

The Room will have a phone number that the public may call to report changing traffic conditions.

The Room's staff will develop, collect, and analyze Traffic Intelligence Reports. These documents will allow officers throughout the City to report conditions that have or will have an impact on traffic. Among the typical items to be reported are:

- Construction
- Deteriorating roads
- Expected events (e.g. block closings)
- Chronic congestion
- Damaged highway attenuators
- Pot holes that impede traffic
- Locations where traffic reengineering may be required;
- Any other recommendation that may improve traffic flow.

Copies of these Intelligence Reports will be forwarded by the Traffic Situation Room staff to the Department of Transportation in order to supplement their intelligence gathering efforts.

The operational commander at the Traffic Situation Room will alert patrol supervisors, Duty Captains and higher ranking officers to mobilize personnel when necessary to address traffic situations.

The Traffic Situation Room staff will notify the Chief of Department's Operations Division, which coordinates all Police Department activities, of extreme traffic congestion instances.

SPECIAL EVENTS UNIT

The Special Events Unit will plan and coordinate the traffic function at all major events. The Unit's goal will be to provide maximum efficiency with minimum resources. Specifically, it will:

Plan traffic control for major events;

Act as liaison between the Traffic Control Division and all other Police Department Units;

Coordinate efforts with the Department of Transportation, and other City, State, and Federal Agencies;

Confer with members of the business/residential community;

Establish emergency routes to hospitals;

Conduct post event assessments to determine what steps will improve traffic conditions at future events.

The Unit will work closely with the Mayor's Office of Special Projects and Community Events, the Department of Transportation, patrol boroughs, and other major units throughout the Police Department to ensure that traffic issues receive appropriate consideration in Citywide planning.

During major events, the Unit will ensure that a member of the Traffic Control Division is assigned to the Police Department's Command and Control Center.

The Unit will work particularly closely with members of the Aviation Unit and the Mounted Unit to ensure that the resources of these two Special Operations Division Units are carefully coordinated and used appropriately.

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION ENFORCEMENT DISTRICT

The Surface Transportation Enforcement District will be fully dedicated to ensuring that public surface transportation is provided safely. The District will consist of a Taxi Unit and a Bus Unit. These units will enforce laws concerning taxis, liveries, vans and buses.

Taxi Unit

The Taxi Unit will ensure that medallion taxicabs conform to all appropriate regulations and laws. Members of the Taxi Unit will:

Enforce Taxi and Limousine Commission Regulations;

Follow up on complaints from the public;

Conduct field inspections of meters;

Enforce Vehicle and Traffic Laws.

Particular attention will be paid to taxicabs that obstruct bus stops, obstruct traffic in the middle of roadways, and turn from non-turning lanes, thereby impeding traffic and in some cases creating hazards.

Taxi Unit members will regularly confer with the Street Crime Unit concerning trends in taxi robberies.

All Taxi Unit members will be trained by the Taxi and Limousine Commission. In addition to Vehicle and Traffic Law summonses, trained officers will be authorized to issue TLC summonses which will be returnable to the Taxi and Limousine Commission for hearings to be conducted by Administrative Law Judges.

Bus Unit

The Bus Unit will ensure the safety of riders on the City's buses. The Unit will identify bus routes where crime or disorder most often occur and assign officers in uniform to patrol the routes and ride on selected buses. The Bus Unit will respond to complaints from the Transit Authority and the public.

Particular attention will be given by the Bus Unit to those routes travelled by large numbers of youths. The officers will work closely with school officials to identify those routes which are most appropriate for coverage.

Officers will also ride on buses, exit them when they observe traffic parked or standing in bus stops or lanes, take corrective action, and then board the next bus. Other members of the Bus Unit will support officers riding in buses by patrolling in cars and issuing summonses to the operators of automobiles that drive in restricted bus lanes.

The Bus Unit will enforce regulations pertaining to illegal vans that function on bus routes which not only deprive the Transit Authority of revenue, but cause traffic congestion by obstructing traffic.

Bus Unit personnel will also assist the Taxi and Limousine Commission in their enforcement efforts against illegal livery cabs, especially those on bus routes.

THE MOVIE AND TV UNIT

The Movie and TV Unit was formed in 1973 to assist the film industry, assure compliance with permits, and reduce inconvenience to the general public by rerouting and expediting the flow of traffic at filming locations. The unit works closely with the Mayor's Office for Film, Theater, and Broadcasting.


Under the Traffic Control Division, the Movie and TV Unit will continue in its present function. Its staff will work closely with members of patrol precincts to address the concerns of the film industry and the communities where filming is occurring. When appropriate, other resources of the Traffic Control Division will be assigned to filming locations to assist in establishing a smooth flow of traffic.


STAFFING OF THE TRAFFIC CONTROL DIVISION

In order for the Police Department's traffic control strategy to be successful, additional officers will be assigned in phases to the Traffic Control Division. By March 18, 1996, the staffing of the Division will be as follows:

	January 1994	March 1996
Traffic Control Division	0	48
(Former) Traffic Division	18	0
Traffic Operations District	85	457
Highway District	52	60
Highway Unit #1	115	133
Highway Unit #2	96	113
Highway Unit #3	106	133
Highway Unit #4	0	46
Surface Transportation Enforcement District		
Bus Unit	65	68
Taxi Unit	0	59
Movie/T.V. Unit	23	34

The Staten Island Highway Unit will remain under the command of the Staten Island Borough Commander. The Traffic Control Division will assist the Staten Island Borough Commander during special events and emergencies.





Patrol Borough Staten Island will continue to maintain its own Highway Unit under the jurisdiction of the Staten Island Borough Commander. The Traffic Control Division will assist at major events and emergencies.

PARTICIPATION BY OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENT UNITS

The Police Department's strategy to reclaim the roads of the City will only be successful if every patrol unit, regardless of their primary assignment, is dedicated to the strategy's implementation. The Special Operations Division will have important duties in this regard because of the unique skills and tactical advantage that the members of the Mounted and Aviation Units possess. In the section that follows, their role and the roles of patrol precincts will be discussed.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

MOUNTED UNIT

The Mounted Unit, composed of six troops, is assigned as follows:

Troop A	Manhattan
Troop B	Manhattan
Troop D	Bronx
Troop E	Brooklyn
Troop F	Queens
Troop G	Queens

One of the Mounted Unit's primary functions, as it was before 1964, will be to expedite the movement of traffic especially during peak flow periods. Towards this end, officers, assigned to the Mounted Unit, will receive special training in traffic control.

While they will not hesitate to issue summonses to vehicles that obstruct traffic, the officers are expected, through their presence, to create an environment where motorists will conform to the traffic regulations. The Mounted Unit officers will have "ownership" of a particular area, and similar to officers within the Traffic Operations District, they will be held accountable for the traffic conditions within their designated area.

During peak traffic congestion times, officers will have zero tolerance for:

Double Parking
Obstructing Bus Stops
Intersection Spillback
Unauthorized construction site traffic interference

Officers also will concentrate their efforts toward any parking condition that obstructs pedestrian traffic.

Officers in these task forces will be alert to and take appropriate action concerning quality of life conditions. Particular attention will be given to:

□	Horn Noise	□	"Boombox Cars"
□	"Boomboxes"	□	Loud Motorcycles
□	Car Alarms	□	Graffiti
□	Illegal Dumping	□	Illegal Peddlers
□	Squeegee Cleaners	□	Aggressive Panhandling

A recommended career path for officers who wish to be assigned to the Mounted Unit will be to work first in the Traffic Control Division, where the officers will learn the rudiments of traffic control.

AVIATION UNIT

The Aviation Unit will assign a helicopter to survey roads and bridges during peak traffic hours and report congestion or unusual conditions to the Traffic Situation Room. The helicopter's officers will recommend locations where the redeployment of officers will improve the flow of traffic. The crew will also recommend alternate routes to which traffic may be detoured.

PATROL PRECINCTS

The involvement of every patrol officer is of paramount importance in this Police Department strategy. To the extent that it would be impossible to reduce serious crime and address quality of life conditions without the commitment of the entire patrol force, so too, the resources of the Patrol Services Bureau must be committed to traffic control if this strategy is to be successful.

To accomplish this goal, each precinct will be responsible for the creation of a Precinct Traffic Control Plan. These plans will identify existing and potential traffic problems within each command and will propose solutions or strategies to deal with them. The plans will be maintained at the precinct desk, the patrol supervisor's auto, and be regularly reviewed. Precinct Commanders will be held accountable for the accuracy and effectiveness of their plans, and they will ensure that their subordinate supervisors are fully cognizant of the plan's content.

The Traffic Control Division, with the assistance of the Department of Transportation, will review each plan to ensure that it includes:

- ° A Precinct Traffic Profile in which major intersections/roadways that experience traffic congestion are identified and plans for dealing with traffic congestion are established;**
- ° A traffic congestion reaction component that establishes a protocol for precinct supervisors to follow in any case of major traffic congestion;**
- ° A plan to keep police officers aware of the most dangerous intersections on their posts and steps that may be taken to reduce accidents;**
- ° The locations that experience the largest number of traffic accidents and policies to reduce accidents, including strict enforcement of traffic regulations;**
- ° A plan to respond to major traffic congestion affecting highways, bridges, and tunnels;**
- ° Transportation terminals and plans to avoid congestion at these locations;**

- 2 **Snow emergency routes. Procedures should be established for clearing these emergency routes, when required;**
- 2 **Areas prone to flooding and plans to divert traffic from these areas;**
- 2 **Truck routes and routes that exclude trucks;**
- 2 **Hospitals with emergency rooms and routes to them;**
- 2 **A plan to address an electrical power outage with attention to traffic intersections;**
- 2 **The identification of locations with long term road construction and plans to address the flow of traffic in those areas;**
- 2 **The designation of sergeants and police officers who will become familiar with laws and regulations concerning construction sites;**
- 2 **Use of Auxilliary Police Officers, all of whom will be trained in traffic control;**
- 2 **A protocol for desk officers to follow to notify the Traffic Control Division of major accidents or unexpected congestion.**

Precinct Commanders will ensure that each member of their command understands that traffic control is the responsibility of every uniformed police officer irrespective of his or her daily assignment. Similar to officers in the Traffic Operations District, precinct officers will come to understand that they have "ownership" of the traffic problems in their sector or on their post.

Supervisors must also know that they are responsible for traffic flow and should not hesitate to use all Department resources, including mobilizations, to address traffic emergencies.

Precinct highway safety officers will maintain a liaison with the Traffic Control Division and will be responsible for reviewing and forwarding Traffic Intelligence Reports. Highway Safety officers will also frequently confer with the precinct's school crossing guard coordinator in order to address traffic safety concerns in the vicinity of schools.

Precincts will implement a policy of zero tolerance during peak traffic congestion times for:

**Double Parking
Obstructing Bus Stops
Intersection Spillback
Unauthorized construction site traffic interference**

Officers also will concentrate their efforts toward red light enforcement, parking conditions that obstruct pedestrian traffic, and offenses that involve the unnecessary use of horns by motorists.

Precinct Commanders will be held accountable to properly address traffic congestion within their commands and will ensure that the Department's zero tolerance policy for selected traffic offenses is enforced.

The Chief of Department and the Chief of Patrol will co-chair triannual traffic strategy meetings with all Patrol Boroughs to review each precinct's accomplishments in implementing the traffic strategy.

Borough Commanders will consider the degree to which a precinct commander is successful in complying with this Department Strategy when preparing annual evaluations and making recommendations for promotion.

TRAINING

The Police Department will improve and increase the level of training for members of the Department from recruits to executives. The Traffic Control Division will provide specific direction concerning the required training and it will be incumbent upon the Police Academy to provide that level of training which will allow all Department members assigned to patrol to meaningfully contribute to the goals set forth in this document.

The Police Academy's Recruit Training Section will substantially increase the amount of instruction provided to new officers. Recruits will be assigned to the field to gain realistic training in directing traffic at intersections and at automobile accident locations. Veteran officers will be instructed through precinct level training and training films.

All officers assigned to patrol will receive the most up-to-date information and relevant training in the following areas:

- **Identification of intoxicated drivers;**
- **Laws related to suspended/revoked licenses;**
- **New York State's Vehicle and Traffic Law;**
- **New York City Parking Rules and Regulations;**
- **New York City Administrative Code;**
- **Laws concerning bicyclists and pedestrians.**

Training specifically aimed at hands-on traffic control will include the following:

- **Methods of directing traffic;**
- **Use of hand signals;**
- **Proper positioning of the body;**
- **Proper use of the whistle;**
- **How to control an intersection;**
- **Detouring traffic in emergencies;**
- **Handling accidents;**
- **Controlling pedestrian traffic.**

In addition to the training received by all officers assigned to patrol, officers assigned to the Traffic Control Division will receive training from the Taxi and Limousine Commission and the Department of Transportation. Specific training will be given regarding applicable laws and regulations that affect taxi drivers and their vehicles. Department of Transportation training will concern laws and regulations that relate to construction on or near roadways.

In order to improve the Department's success in apprehending the drivers of stolen automobiles, extensive training will be made available to members of the Highway District in the use of the LoJack stolen auto tracking and recovery system.

Officers assigned to the Manhattan Traffic Task Force will receive training concerning horse drawn carriages.

Highway officers will continue to receive training in advanced accident investigation techniques and in dealing with hazardous materials.

Officers assigned to the Traffic Control Division will also be available to assist precinct commanders in training their officers.

The Northwestern University Traffic Institute, after studying the City's traffic congestion on-site, has created a course titled "Traffic Management Seminar for the City of New York." This course will be attended by senior ranking members of the Traffic Control Division and the Department of Transportation.

Hunter College's Urban Research Center is also providing assistance in identifying training needs.

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

The success of the Police Department's efforts in reclaiming the City's roads can only occur through the building of partnerships with other government agencies, police departments, community organizations, the business community, and traffic related organizations.

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The Traffic Control Division and the Department of Transportation will work in close consultation with the Mayor's staff, who will coordinate the activities among other City agencies in order to forward the goals of this traffic strategy. The Traffic Control Division will have frequent contact with the Mayor's Office of Street Activities; the Mayor's Office for Film, Theater, and Broadcasting; the Mayor's Community Assistance Unit; and other Mayoral Offices. Working in conjunction with these offices, the Police Department will be able to more effectively reduce traffic congestion.

The Traffic Control Division will continue to coordinate with executive staff members of the Fire Department and the Emergency Medical Services to ensure that the concerns of these two emergency response agencies are addressed by the Police Department. The Traffic Control Division will continually seek to assist these agencies and critique major events to continually improve emergency response time within the City. A goal of these meetings will be to ensure that police vehicles, fire trucks, and ambulances do not exacerbate traffic congestion at emergency scenes.

The Traffic Control Division will also meet with the Department of Sanitation to address any concerns that the agency might have regarding traffic and the safety of their personnel. Methods by which the Department of Sanitation may minimize traffic interruption will also be explored.

The Traffic Control Division will meet frequently with executives from the Taxi and Limousine Commission in order to better coordinate enforcement efforts.

The Traffic Control Division will coordinate efforts with the Department of Buildings to ensure that the construction under their jurisdiction has minimal impact on traffic flow.

The Division will meet regularly with the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, in order to better coordinate traffic flow at toll bridges and tunnels.

POLICE DEPARTMENTS

The Traffic Control Division will work closely with the New York State Police, Port Authority Police, Nassau County Police, and the Yonkers Police to establish a coordinated effort to address traffic concerns. The Division will also work with the New Jersey State Police, the Fort Lee Police, the Jersey City Police, and the Weehawken Police to deal with issues that relate to the flow of traffic between the two states.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

The staff of the Traffic Control Division and Precinct Commanders will confer with Community Boards and local community organizations concerning the flow of traffic, the need for increased enforcement, and traffic engineering concerns.

The Police Department will review recommendations received from community organizations, address those that are within its jurisdiction, and forward to the Department of Transportation those recommendations that are within their purview.

BUSINESS COMMUNITY

The efficient flow of traffic within New York City is critical to the success of business and the economic growth of the City and region. In order to ensure that the traffic concerns of business are adequately addressed, members of the Traffic Control Division will meet regularly with the business community. Frequent meetings will be held with utility companies that regularly make repairs on roadways.

The goal of these meetings will be to solicit the ideas of the business community and to determine steps that will be taken to improve the flow of traffic, while at the same time increasing commerce. These meetings will help keep the business community aware of the progress of the initiatives established through this traffic strategy.

TRAFFIC RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

The Traffic Control Division will work as a fully accredited member of the Midtown Manhattan Mobility Task Force, a consortium of concerned citizens and traffic practitioners who are studying Midtown Manhattan traffic issues and are making recommendations to improve the flow of traffic.

The Division will further work with local traffic reporting services, such as Trans Com, Metro and Shadow Traffic, in order to provide an exchange of current traffic information that may be disseminated to the public and used by the Police Department and the Department of Transportation to correct traffic conditions.

A liaison will be maintained with the Automobile Club of New York, the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council, and the National Safety Council to discuss mutual concerns relating to traffic and safety.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

The goal of Police Department Strategy # 8 "Reclaiming the Roads of New York" is to expedite the flow of traffic and ensure the safety of pedestrians and motorists. Although police officers will aggressively pursue and summons or arrest violators of the traffic laws, the Department intends and prefers to obtain compliance through education and the commitment of every New Yorker to improve traffic conditions.

In order for this strategy to succeed, the full cooperation of every motorist, pedestrian, and cyclist will be required. The aim of this policy is not only to have motorists adhere to the law, but to be courteous to their fellow drivers, pedestrians, and cyclists. To create an environment that promotes this courtesy, the Police Department and the Department of Transportation will strive to educate the public concerning traffic laws and safety.

The Mayor's Office and other agencies will participate in the education of the public. The Deputy Commissioner, Public Information for the Police Department will work closely with the news media in disseminating important information. Other resources that will be used include:

**Mayor's radio program;
The use of public services announcements;
Signs on buses;
New signs at intersections;
Community Newspapers.**

Precinct Commanders will work with all local community organizations and school representatives to further educate the public.

EVALUATION

The Police Department will evaluate the success of the traffic strategy six months after full implementation. A report on its impact will be submitted to the Mayor, with recommendations for strategic and operational adjustments as required.

CONCLUSION

Through the implementation of this strategy, the Police Department, working with the Department of Transportation, will achieve the Mayor's goal: "Reclaiming the Roads of New York City." It is the intent of this strategy to make the City's roads safer for the motoring public and pedestrians, to reduce pollution from automobile emissions, and to expedite the flow of traffic throughout the City.

The strategy's success will require the concerted effort of many government agencies, businesses, and community groups. Most importantly, it will require the cooperation and support of every New Yorker in supporting its initiatives and goals for the benefit of all.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1-19-96

Dear Commissioner Bratter,

Congratulations on the Time cover and more importantly, on your success in reducing crime in New York.

I thank you too for your support of our anti-crime efforts and I hope we can preserve them. I look forward to your continued success and our continued partnership.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

**FAX COVER SHEET**

TO: DENNIS BURKE

DATE: January 23, 1996

FAX: 202/456-7028

FROM: Dan Rosenblatt, Executive Director
International Association of Chiefs of Police
515 N. Washington Street
Alexandria, VA 22314-2357

PHONE: 703/836-6767, extension 201
FAX: 703/836-4543

Total number of pages: 2
(including cover sheet)



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G.H. (Gil) Kleinknecht
Associate Commissioner for
Enforcement
U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service
Washington, DC

Division of State Associations of
Chiefs of Police
General Chairman
Donald G. Pierce
Chief of Police
Bellingham, WA

Division of State and
Provincial Police
General Chairman
Lloyd Jennings
Superintendent
Indiana State Police
Indianapolis, IN

Past President and Parliamentarian
Charles D. Reynolds
Dover, NH

Executive Director
Daniel N. Rosenblatt
Alexandria, VA

January 23, 1996

Memorandum For: Messrs. Burke & Wayne

From: Dan Rosenblatt

Subject: Follow-up Memo

I appreciate the time you took to meet with me and President Walchak recently. I know Dave enjoyed spending time with you and, for me, it was a pleasure to get to know you both better.

I promised to send a follow-up note recording some of the dates and subjects we raised. Here goes:

1. IACP Annual Meeting - Held in Phoenix, October 26-31. We would really like to have the President with us . . . best day is Monday, October 28 between 10 and 11:30 am; best alternative is Tuesday, same time.
2. Crime Commission - We remain anxious that a municipal chief be appointed, especially one who represents the smaller jurisdictions, the majority of police departments in the United States.
3. Dave Walchak would be pleased to work with you on the Youth Drug Use & Violence meeting. Please keep us posted.
4. The IACP Board of Officers meets June 7 & 8 in Washington, D.C. Time with the President on either day would be spectacular.

We are proceeding with the other points we discussed and plan to keep the pressure up on the topics addressed.

Best.

FAX TRANSMISSION NO. () 456-7028TO: DENNIS BURKE
WH DPCDATE: 1/19PHONE NO. () 456-5568 EXT. _____FROM: GLENDA KENDRICK
OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

PHONE NO. (202) 307-0703

FAX NO. (202) 514-5958

SUBJECT: Nominations for Youth Violence Conf

TOTAL PAGES INCLUDING COVER PAGE: _____

COMMENTS: per discussion
gk

JON KYL
ARIZONA

702 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 224-4521

COMMITTEES:

JUDICIARY

INTELLIGENCE

ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0304

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11 December 1995

Laurie Robinson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Justice Programs
U.S. Department of Justice
633 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20531

Dear Ms. Robinson:

I would like to recommend Richard M. Romley, Maricopa County Attorney, to attend the White House Conference on Juvenile Crime and Violence, to be held in January 1996.

Rick Romley has served Maricopa County exceptionally well since 1988. Under Mr. Romley's leadership, the County Attorney's Office has received 24 national awards for innovative prosecution policies. I would like to highlight a few of the county's anti-drug and juvenile justice reform programs.

1. Do Drugs Do Time

This program, which was selected as a national model in 1992 by the President's Drug Advisory Committee, was conceived by Rick Romley and 25 other law enforcement executives in 1989. Under this program, all drug possessors are arrested, booked, and incarcerated for a minimum of 24 hours. First-time offenders who meet selected criteria are given the opportunity to take advantage of a "pre-filing" diversion program consisting of a counseling and treatment program that is paid for by the offender. Those who successfully complete the program avoid criminal prosecution. Those who are eligible for diversion but refuse to enroll, or are terminated for cause from the program, are prosecuted.

2. Anti-Drug A.P.P.L.E. Corps

In 1990, Mr. Romley was key in founding the Anti-Drug A.P.P.L.E. Corps. This program targets at-risk youth through the medium of art. It is a partnership of artists, private enterprise, prosecutors, law-enforcement officials, and educators who believe that experiences in the arts can build confidence, self-esteem, and pride and strengthen the participants' resolve to turn away from substance abuse. Both project directors and Mr. Romley, in recent testimony before the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee, attest to the success of this pilot program.

3. Juvenile Justice Reform

Mr. Romley has played a leading role in improving the juvenile justice system. The cornerstone of his efforts is the concept of accountability. He has proposed that scarce resources be expended at the front end of the juvenile justice system when the offender first breaks the law. Community justice centers are being established where first-time, non-violent juvenile offenders appear before community councils that adjudicate and prescribe appropriate sanctions. These juvenile justice proposals have received widespread support from prosecutors, judges, editorial writers, community leaders, and citizens at large.

Prior to serving as county attorney, Mr. Romley served as chief of the organized crime and narcotics divisions and was special prosecutor in matters involving child molestation and sexual assault.

I believe that Rick Romley's special brand of leadership and experience will greatly contribute to the White House Conference on Juvenile Crime and Violence. I would appreciate your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jon Kyl", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

JON KYL
United States Senator



U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division

1100 Commerce Street, Third Floor
Dallas, Texas 75242-1699

214-767-0951
Fax 214 767-8764

December 19, 1995

The Honorable Janet Reno
Attorney General of the United States
Room 5111 Main Justice Building
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Reno:

It is with great pleasure that I recommend Patsy Thomas be invited to attend President Clinton's White House conference on juvenile violence and adolescent drug abuse.

Patsy Thomas is the executive director of the Citizens Crime Commission of Tarrant County. As such, she is one of the key decision makers and strategists for combatting juvenile crime in Fort Worth and Tarrant County, especially in the areas of drug abuse, gang activity, and violence in the schools. The Crime Commission is working with the Fort Worth and other area school districts to implement anti-violence programs in the schools.

Patsy Thomas is largely responsible for the tremendous success of Fort Worth's Weed and Seed initiative. Patsy has worked tirelessly to coordinate seeding efforts within the target area and to mobilize the citizens to participate in Weed and Seed activities.

I wholeheartedly and enthusiastically recommend that Patsy Thomas be invited to participate in the President's conference on juvenile violence and drug abuse. She will not only derive great benefits from the summit but she will also contribute greatly to its success. I appreciate your consideration of this request.

Respectfully,

PAUL E. COGGINS
United States Attorney

cc:w/enc: Dennis Burke
Senior Policy Analyst
Domestic Policy Council
Old Executive Office Building
Room 218
Washington, D.C. 20503

Patsy Thomas
Executive Director
Citizens Crime Commission of Tarrant County
903 Summit Avenue
Fort Worth, TX 76102

DEC-14 95(THU) 17:57 US ATTORNEY FW

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P. 003

DEC-14 95 13:47 FROM:BRACYWILLIAMS&CO
12/04/95 10:41

2027835595

TO:8173343094

PAGE:02
0112**WHITE HOUSE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON
YOUTH, DRUG USE AND VIOLENCE****Nomination Form**

A White House Leadership Conference on Youth, Drug Use and Violence will be held in January 1996. The Conference will be limited to 100 participants and additional observers. The Domestic Policy Council and Office of National Drug Control Policy seek recommendations for individuals to attend the conference who reflect the experiential, geographic and demographic diversity of drug use and violence among youth in our nation. To submit a nomination, please fill out one form for each nominee (to receive full consideration the form must be typed and filled out entirely). Please note that due to limited space, a nomination does not assure an invitation.

Name of Sponsor Paul E. Coggins, U.S. AttorneyU.S. Attorney's OfficeOrganization (if any) Northern Texas Phone 214/767-0951Name of Nominee Patsy ThomasTitle/Organization Executive Director, Citizens Crime Commission of Tarrant CountyAddress 903 Summit Avenue, Fort Worth, TX 76102Phone/Fax 817/877-5161 FAX - 817/877-0443Recommending for: Participant X (Could contribute meaningfully to breakout sessions)
Observer (Suggest inviting to attend conference)What one breakout session would this nominee most appropriately participate in/observe?
 Role of Media; Role of Families; X Role of Juvenile Justice System;
 Role of Schools; Role of Communities and business**Background on Nominee***Category Juvenile Justice (For coding purposes, please choose one from: academia, business, clergy, community activist, educator, entertainment/celebrity, jobs/training, judge, juvenile justice, media, parent, police, prevention specialist, prosecutor/defender, treatment expert, youth)*What one aspect would this participant/observer be noted for: Her contribution to the success of the Fort Worth Weed and Seed Program (see attached letter).*Other important background information: See attached letter to Attorney General Jane Reno recommending Patsy Thomas.Return this form no later than November 20, 1995 to DPC (fax: 202/456-7028)
Questions, call Dennis Burke or Molly Brostrom (456-2216)

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EASTERN EDITION

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PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

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Why Violent Crime Rates Have Dropped

Between 1993 and 1994, the violent crime rate declined by 10% or more in eight of the 10 cities with the highest violent crime rates. New York City and Houston are leading the pack, with phenomenal drops in serious crimes including murder. During the first half of 1995, the overall crime rate was down by more than 16% in San Francisco, 10% in San Antonio, and 6% in Los Angeles and Philadelphia.

What is going on here? Some criminologists insist that the slide in crime rates is greased by dwindling populations of teenage males and the broader bottoming out of the baby-boom generation. This ignores the inconvenient fact that several cities with growing populations of at-risk youth

Rule of Law

By John J. DiIulio Jr.

or heavy in-migration have nonetheless experienced sharp declines in crime.

Other criminologists relate the decline to everything from a sudden surge in the efficacy of gun-control laws (which is patently absurd) to changes in patterns of drug use—a decline that, they profess, has had nothing to do with antidrug law enforcement even though in New York City and elsewhere upwards of 50% of arrestees continue to test positive for crack-cocaine and other drugs.

Here's a better explanation: The decline can be explained in part by policy-driven law enforcement efforts that capitalize on community crime-fighting initiatives and take the bad guys off the streets.

I call this explanation Bratton's Law, in honor of New York City Police Commissioner William J. Bratton. Mr. Bratton understands perfectly well that crime rates are not determined solely by what cops, courts and corrections agencies do. But his well-publicized impatience with crimino-

logical cant about how policing practices and sentencing policies have no effect on crime rates is ennobling and enlightening. Three examples should suffice to illustrate Bratton's Law in action.

Jacksonville. In the early 1990s, Jacksonville, Fla., was besieged by violent crime, much of it committed by juveniles. Then in March 1992, Harry L. Shorenstein, state attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, instituted an unprecedented program to prosecute dangerous juvenile offenders as adults and incarcerate them.

In most parts of the country, juvenile criminals whom the law mandates be treated as adults are not actually eligible for state prison sentences and are routinely placed on probation without serving any jail time. But Mr. Shorenstein's program was for real. He assigned 10 veteran attorneys to a new juvenile prosecutions unit. By the end of 1994, the program had sent hundreds of juvenile offenders to Jacksonville's jails and scores more to serve a year or more in prison. With fewer young predators on the streets, Jacksonville witnessed a 30% decrease in all juvenile arrests, including a 41% decrease in juveniles arrested for weapons offenses.

Houston. Almost 1,000 officers have been added to the city's police force since 1991. Led by Police Chief Sam Nuchia, Houston has a cost-effective police overtime program that succeeds in putting more cops on the streets when and where they are most needed. Houston's Citizen Patrol Program has operated in more than 100 of the city's neighborhoods. Thousands of citizen-patrollers have observed and reported to police suspicious or criminal behavior, from assaults to narcotics dealing to vandalism. Two recent studies found that Mr. Nuchia's enforcement efforts not only contributed to Houston's falling crime rates but also improved police emergency response times, raised police productivity and reduced citizen fear of crime.

New York City. Like Houston, New

York City has greatly expanded its police force, by 7,000 officers since 1990. Under Commissioner Bratton, police have been directed to crack down on public drinking, graffiti, vandalism and other public disorders that often set the stage for major crimes. The NYPD has beefed up action against street gangs and drug traffickers, brought back the fine art of frisking suspects for weapons, and redoubled precinct-level efforts on a wide range of community-policing projects.

In the process, Mr. Bratton has promoted a new breed of precinct commanders and made them responsible for finding innovative, cost-effective ways of serving citizens and cutting crime in their

Sentencing policies that keep violent and repeat criminals behind bars cut crime.

neighborhoods. Despite recent corruption scandals, the precinct-based management system is working, NYPD morale is high, and New Yorkers are getting results that range from fewer aggressive panhandlers to fewer shootings and murders.

Why, then, do so many criminologists doubt that taking the bad guys off the streets cuts crime? One reason is that in more than a dozen studies conducted since 1974, no one has been able to demonstrate either that police manpower and crime rates vary inversely or that community-based policing prevents crime. But this "nothing works" literature employs crude or outmoded measures of police deployment and other key variables. As David Bayley of the State University of New York at Albany writes, there has yet to be "a rigorous, clear-cut test of the association between the visible presence of police and crime rates."


There is powerful evidence for another

proposition that many criminologists reject: Sentencing policies that keep violent and repeat criminals behind bars cut crime. Today, more convicted violent offenders are serving time on probation and parole than in prison. About a third of all those arrested for violent crimes are on probation, parole, or pretrial release at the time of their arrest. On average, recently convicted prisoners commit between 12 and 21 serious crimes a year when on the loose. Not surprisingly, therefore, studies show that from 1980 to 1992 the 10 states where incarceration increased the most saw violent crime decrease by 8%. In the 10 states with the lowest increases, violent crime soared 51%.

But criminologists are right about one thing: Americans are sitting on a demographic crime bomb. By the year 2000 there will be about 500,000 more 14-to-17-year-old males in the population than there are today. About 6% of young males are responsible for half the serious crimes committed by their age group. Thus, in five years we can expect at least 30,000 more young murderers, rapists and muggers on the streets. Worse, since the 1950s each cohort of young male criminals has done roughly three times as much serious crime as the cohort before it.

This crime bomb cannot be defused. From the swelling ranks of 7- to 10-year-old boys who are growing up in fatherless, Godless and jobless settings surrounded by deviant, delinquent and criminal adults will come a new and more vicious army of predatory street criminals. To limit the damage they will inflict, we must redouble efforts to crack down on street crime and incarcerate hardened felons, both juveniles and adults. Criminologists may doubt whether such policies work, but criminals don't.

Mr. DiIulio is a professor at Princeton and an adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute. This article is drawn from the fall issue of *Policy Review*.



One of New York's
finest: crackdown

MARK PETERSON/SABA

NYPD since he was appointed chief in early 1994. From his command post in an imposing blue-carpeted office in the downtown Police Plaza complex, Bratton, 47, appears more like a Manhattan executive than a street cop. He is a keen student of management theory and believes that it can be applied to police work. "I'm trying to run the NYPD as you would a private corporation," says Bratton. "Criminals are our competition. In the private sector, you always keep an eye on what your competitors are doing and try to stay one step ahead of them."

Bratton has brought in computerized maps to track crime patterns day by day. He has pushed drug squads and other specialty units to work beyond their former nine-to-five hours. And he has gotten tough with officers on the ground. Once a month, precinct commanders are summoned to meetings with Bratton and other top police brass and grilled on crime patterns in their neighborhoods. "If you're a precinct commander, you had better know what's going on in your area," says Bratton. "If you don't, you're out of there." He is not bluffing. Since taking office, the new commissioner has replaced

Why the Big Apple feels safer

On a sunny afternoon in Maria Hernandez Park, clusters of elderly residents sit reading newspapers and watching a young mother push her baby carriage. The relaxed urban scene would have been unimaginable as recently as two years ago, when the park functioned as an open-air bazaar for heroin, crack and cocaine. Located in the heart of Brooklyn's Bushwick neighborhood, the park is named for a local woman who was killed accidentally by the trigger-happy drug dealers who once dominated the area. But now, a trailer propped up on concrete blocks stands nearby, providing the New York Police Department with a high-visibility presence. "There used to be all kinds of drugs, fights, robberies, everything around here," says Connie Aviles, who runs a hair salon a half-block from the park. "Everything is much quieter since they put that trailer in."

The rebirth of Maria Hernandez Park is part of a trend that has been observed throughout New York City, a place that has long been synonymous with out-of-control crime. The city is still far from tranquil. But police statistics show that all types of reported crime are down this year in every one of the city's 76 precincts—to the safest levels in 25 years. From January to July, the citywide murder rate dropped 31 per cent over the same period last year. Robbery is down almost 22 per cent, burglary 18 per cent, auto theft 25 per cent and assault six per cent.

Most major U.S. and Canadian cities have also reported lower crime rates this year, but

the decline in New York has been going on longer and is far steeper than almost anywhere else. Since early 1993, the murder rate has dropped by more than 37 per cent, robbery by 31 per cent and auto theft by 36 per cent. Overall, the number of serious crimes has fallen by 27 per cent in the past two years. Those statistics have brought the city a blizzard of attention from academics and law enforcement officials—including U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, who has ordered a study to find out what is behind the trend.

Criminologists say crime is falling all over North America in response to changing demographics and a shift in the drug market away from crack cocaine. As baby boomers age, there simply are not as many angry young men committing crimes, say some experts. Still, New York's police say they deserve most of the credit for the drop in their city's crime rate. "We don't think what has occurred here in the last 18 months has been significantly impacted by any of those other factors," says Police Commissioner William Bratton. "It's the way the department is now policing the city."

The past five years have seen the ranks of New York's police force swell by an additional 7,000 officers to more than 38,000. But perhaps equally important have been the sweeping changes Bratton, a former Boston police commissioner, has brought to the

three-quarters of these local police bosses.

Bratton's strategy is to shift the department's focus toward community policing and promoting an atmosphere that makes crime less likely in the first place. That means cracking down on petty offences such as graffiti and drinking in public. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, a former federal prosecutor, made combating such "quality of life"

New York City scores a victory in the battle against crime

crimes a major plank in his 1993 campaign. Giuliani hand-picked Bratton to carry out his program and has since worked closely with him. Both men say that tolerating public disorder creates a street environment that intimidates law-abiding people and opens the way

for more serious crimes. So far, their theory appears to be correct. Police are finding that people arrested for minor violations often turn out to be armed, already wanted on other charges, or both. In 1993, one out of every 438 people arrested for riding the subway without paying was carrying a loaded gun. Now that police routinely frisk such people, the figure has dropped to one in every 1,034.

In Manhattan, police are also getting a hand from so-called business-improvement districts (BIDs), groups that collect fees from firms in a specific area to provide extra sanitation, lighting and security services. Since they began in 1988, BIDs have multiplied to cover much of midtown and down-

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town Manhattan. The extra lighting and hundreds of security guards have had a clear impact in formerly crime-plagued areas such as Times Square and Grand Central Station. Even in poorer areas, observers say there has been an increase in community action to clean up blighted blocks and improve building security. "It's part of how people are adapting to fear," says Marie Rosen, publisher of *Law Enforcement News*, a magazine that covers policing. "You either avoid it by buying extra locks and not going out at night, or you get organized."

But criminologists are not convinced that police patrols and civic-minded citizens are responsible for the change. Most believe that the crime rate is largely determined by the number of young men in society at a given time. Across the continent, the number of 15- to 24-year-olds has been dropping in recent years, a normal trough in the demographic cycle that may account for the lower figures. "The largest group of our population, the 75 million baby boomers, are middle-aged now," says James Alan Fox, dean of the College of Criminal Justice at Boston's Northeastern University. Fox adds that New York's crime rate "probably would have gone down no matter who was commissioner."

Other experts believe that urban violence has declined because the turf wars between crack gangs that wreaked havoc in the 1980s have now largely been settled, leaving many of the gang members either dead or in



Bratton and Giuliani: partners against crime

jail. Richard Curtis, an anthropologist who studies drug use, says that crack is no longer fashionable among inner-city teenagers. "When you see your older brother knock a gold tooth out of grandma's mouth so he can buy a rock [of crack cocaine], it doesn't seem so cool anymore," says Curtis.

Whatever the reason, the result is a new feeling of security for many New Yorkers. Central Park, previously off-limits to law-abiding citizens at night, is now comparatively busy after dark, with cyclists and families out for a stroll on many of the better-lit

trails. "I feel much safer here now because of all the rollerbladers," says Ray Harris, a 79-year-old woman out for an evening stroll through the park. In some other areas, however, residents say they see little if any improvement. "There's always shootouts in the parking lot of my building," says Ivette Lozada, an office manager who lives in Brooklyn's hard-bitten Brownsville district. Gay and lesbian groups, meanwhile, report a rise in attacks in the past year. There has also been an increase in police violence. The NYPD's own statistics show that po-

lice shot dead 31 civilians in 1994, up from 23 in 1993. And according to the Civilian Complaint Review Board, the number of complaints about police harassment and brutality jumped 37 per cent last year, to 4,920. Most of those complaints originated with African-Americans and Latinos, a trend that angers local minority leaders. "It is unacceptable that we are being told the price for decreasing one type of crime is increasing another," says Richard Perez, national co-ordinator of the National Congress of Puerto Rican Rights.

Skeptics also point out that the recent fall in the crime rate is impressive mainly in relation to the explosion of crime that began in the 1980s and peaked in 1990 with an all-time record of 2,245 murders. Moreover, the coming decade will bring an increase in the teenage population—including an unprecedented proportion of poor teens from single-parent families. That, experts say, will inevitably lead to an increase in youth crime. The NYPD's Bratton, however, calls the demographic argument "baloney." He cites figures that show that the city's population of 15- to 24-year-olds has gone down only 3.3 per cent since 1990, far less than the drop in the crime rate. Says Bratton: "We believe that what's happening here will over time disprove a lot of these commonly held theories. Barring another type of crack cocaine epidemic, there is an ability to manage crime."

Even good management is not always enough. The Bratton-era police trailer in Bushwick's Maria Hernandez Park failed to prevent the murders of three people within a few weeks this summer. But, by New York standards, the neighborhood does seem to be on the road to recovery. "You couldn't even sit outside before," says resident Vera Atkins, 59. For New Yorkers like Atkins, it does not matter much whether the new secure feeling comes from a corporate approach to crime-fighting or merely demographics. As long as it lasts, they are breathing a little easier.

VINCE BEISER in New York City

NATION

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Photos by Peter A. Harris/The Washington Times
New York City Police Commissioner William J. Bratton, with photo of predecessor Theodore Roosevelt.

Where'd the crime go?

New York's finest
take credit for
plummeting rate

By Liz Trotta
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

NEW YORK — It is shortly after dawn and the weathered faces of the Police Department's top brass are lit by the unearthly glow of green glass lamps ringing an enormous square table.

"What about the body found in the suitcase?" demands Jack Maple, the tough-talking deputy commissioner of operations, who is wearing golf shoes. His mustache twitches as he waits for an answer from the 108th Precinct commander.

"How about that character robbing bicycles on the 59th Street bridge? The guy with the dreadlocks. Did we catch him?"

A humble lieutenant quickly steps forward to field the question, searching for words. Overhead, on large screens, loom computer printouts and maps of every neighborhood, every street in the city. Progress or lack of it is there for all to see.

There are about 200 people in the room, including national crime experts, BBC television and a Saudi Arabian prince. Everyone wants to know why, for the first time in a quarter-century, the number of homicides and shooting crimes is down 31 percent in one of the nation's most violent cities.

"Who are these robbers? Are they out there drinking beer, looking for someone?" Chief of Department Louis Anemone asks of a commander from the 104th Precinct.

"What are the RIP [Robbery Investigative Program] guys doing?" chimes in Mr. Maple.

Chief Anemone and Mr. Maple are the top NYPD strategists. Around them sit men with quick eyes and pompadour hairdos, men who do not give their trust easily. It could be a set for "NYPD Blue."

"We're not just report-takers. We're the police!" said Commissioner William J. Bratton, who delivers the pep talk, or "presentation," as his aides call it.

NYPD, like other agencies under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's administration, is, by design, taking on the management approach and lingo of the corporation. Twice a



Commissioner Bratton, who circulates easily among reporters, is convinced that crime will continue to decrease under his approach.

week, "crime-control strategy meetings" such as this one are aimed at breaking down traditional interdepartmental secrecy and forcing commanders to answer for their actions. On virtually every desk, there are pastel-colored brochures that explain the commissioner's seven-step approach to vaporizing crime.

Mr. Bratton said he is convinced that the dramatic crime decrease here will continue as long as his department concentrates not just on felonies, but small offenses — the quality-of-life crimes — that invite and pave the way for a dangerous city: public urination, aggressive panhandling, drinking and carousing, unlicensed street vending, and even traffic violations. Anyone drawing graffiti is likely to be brought into the station house and grilled about traffic in guns and drugs.

"It's like reaching into a Cracker Jack box. You never know what prize you're going to find," said Mr. Bratton.

Not only is there a sharp falloff in murder and shooting incidents, but auto theft is down by 26 percent, robbery by 21 percent, burglary by 18 percent, grand larceny by 13 percent, felonious assault by 7 percent and rape by 2 percent.

Theories abound as to why FBI and police reports show crime down in most of the nation's large cities, including the District of Columbia, where midyear figures indicated an 11 percent decline in homicides.

Criminologists credit everything from inclement weather to the size of the youth population. However, a salient factor in New

York's crime reduction is a 28.5 percent surge in the number of arrests and additional manpower, from 26,000 police in 1990 to a record 38,310 now.

"Crime is down everywhere because we are everywhere," the New York police commissioner said in an interview. He hastened to add that his game plan has been to topple the old pyramid structure and "give out a lot of my power."

Self-effacing as that may sound, the fact is that the flamboyant Mr. Bratton, 47, is one of the most mouthy police czars the city has seen in a long history of thin-lipped authoritarians. Moreover, it is that rakishness that has made him a media darling and a large pain in the mayoral neck.

Although significant crime reduction may have heartened the commissioner, he says the department has yet to live down the lewd behavior of some of its men at a convention attended by 12,000 police officers in May in Washington. Running nude through hotel lobbies, sliding naked down banisters and groping guests were among the activities reported.

"We all suffered from it," said Mr. Bratton.

Asked why only three men have been disciplined, he replied with a level gaze. "If there's more, show me."

In a wink he returned to his major theme: reducing crime. If New York can do it, he insists, so can Washington.

"Like that Statue of Liberty out in the harbor, that beacon can light the way for the rest of the country and the rest of the world."

"With all thy getting get understanding"

Fact and Comment

By Malcolm S. Forbes Jr., *Editor-in-Chief*

MAGNIFICENT MAYOR

NEW YORK MAYOR RUDOLPH GIULIANI is compiling an extraordinarily successful record combating crime.

Under the leadership of Giuliani-appointed Police Commissioner William Bratton, the Big Apple's finest have slashed the murder rate almost 40% over the past 18 months. Few other American cities come remotely close to this achievement. Other categories of crime, such as robbery, have also shown dramatic declines.

Good management is the key. Instead of being reactive, the department is now proactive. Precinct commanders are held directly responsible for what happens in their territories. Each week top police officials meet before war-room-like maps to see what areas are experiencing an upsurge in, say, drug dealing. The police then immediately throw in "resources" to fight the problem.

If a suspected dealer is not found with drugs, he can certainly be frisked for an illegal weapon or some other contraband. There is effective coordination among patrolmen, detectives and the narcotics division.

New York's amazing turnaround dispels several debilitating myths, especially the notion that there isn't much law enforcement can do about crime. Sure, demographics (young people commit a disproportionate number of violent acts), the nature of preferred drugs (heroin use breeds passivity, while crack does the opposite) and other macro-factors play a role. But, as in business and in other activities, management is the most important factor.

What is remarkable is how little attention the media is paying to Giuliani's phenomenal success.

The Mayor is also making impressive progress fighting welfare fraud. By effectively checking claims, New York is rejecting 60% of those who apply for welfare. Auditors are discovering that claimants have jobs or are collecting benefit checks from Connecticut, New Jersey or even other parts of New York State. The Mayor is convinced that when the same audits are applied to current recipients there will be substantial reductions in those receiving welfare.

Mayor Giuliani is in the Republican doghouse for having endorsed Governor Mario Cuomo against his successful Republican challenger. The GOP should welcome the Mayor back into the fold. His is a powerful demonstration of how effective *local* government can be.

NYPD, Inc

Can a police force be run as efficiently as a company? William Bratton, the commissioner of the New York Police Department, thinks so

THE desk hits you first. Mahogany and massive, it dominates Police Commissioner William Bratton's sprawling office suite in downtown Manhattan's Police Plaza. A century ago, the desk was Teddy Roosevelt's, when he ran New York's police force. Like Roosevelt, Mr Bratton is a reformer. A wiry and cocksure 47-year-old, this hawk-like Bostonian has brought a new lexicon to law enforcement. Like a freshly minted MBA student, Mr Bratton's talk is of re-engineering and decentralising, of empowerment and partnership. In his eyes, the NYPD is CrimeBusters, Inc.

He is not the only public official to fall in love with management theory. In Washington, Al Gore has long urged fellow Democrats to re-invent government; meanwhile, Newt Gingrich is telling Republicans to read more Peter Drucker. State and local politicians have latched on to all the latest fads: Oregon has no fewer than 270 "benchmarks". But New York's police commissioner seems to be one of the most zealous converts of all.

"The profit I want is crime reduction," says Mr Bratton. By that measure, his board (Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and other New York politicians) and customers (the city's long-suffering citizens) should be happy. In 1994, Mr Bratton's first year in office, he presided over a 12% fall in recorded crime (see chart). Crime figures are notoriously unreliable and hard to assess; and a fall in recorded crime may have come about for a host of reasons, most of them quite unconnected with policing. Nevertheless, it is striking that New York's murder rate is now the lowest in 25 years; and although recorded serious crime seems to be falling in many big cities, New York's decline is by far the steepest.

In any event Mr Bratton certainly claims credit for this outbreak of lawfulness. In two terms in the Boston police force (one as commissioner) and a spell as head of New York's transit police, he became convinced that old-style methods of law enforcement had failed. Mr Bratton reinvigorated New York's transit police partly by improving equipment, but also through a dose of Druckerish "management by objectives": the transit cop's task became to cut crime, not merely respond to it. Morale soared, and subway crime fell by half. And Mr Bratton, a fan of the re-engineering rhetoric of Michael Hammer and James Champy, wondered how their creed might work in the much bigger NYPD.

Early on, Mr Bratton sent in a "transition team" to size up his new beat. It found a hierarchical, centralised force, with an ingrained, defensive culture. New York's 76 precincts were judged by how quickly they responded to crime, rather than how well they prevented it. So Mr Bratton set 600 employees to work on re-engineering the department. Senior officers were summoned to the commissioner and asked a simple question: by how much did they think it was possible to cut crime in New



York? Those who thought only incremental reductions were possible lost their jobs to getting local chiefs (radical change is part of the re-engineering creed). The average age of the NYPD's senior staff has tumbled from the early 60s to the mid-40s. "I would pit my command staff against any Fortune 500 company," Mr Bratton boasts.

He has since taken his stick to precinct commanders (three-quarters have gone) and detective-squad commanders. But he has also devolved power to the precinct commanders, who can now deploy their resources as they see fit. Mr Bratton is encouraging these commanders—the force's business-unit managers—to push empowerment even further down the ranks, to sergeants and the cop on the beat.

As with other re-engineering exercises, results are carefully monitored. Mr Bratton looks at up-to-date crime statistics daily ("Can you imagine running a bank if you couldn't look at your bottom line every day?"). He also keeps an eye on such measures as the number of businesses leaving the city. Twice a week there are "crime-strategy" meetings with precinct commanders to discuss the latest trends. If hot-spots, such as a rise in robberies in one area, appear, resources are moved.


May the force be with him

All this has brought Mr Bratton a coterie of business-school admirers (there has even been talk of case studies). A cynic might argue that any attempt to bring management to the public sector would improve services. Mr Bratton's board and customers would probably concur that he has done better than that. But there are still glitches. The most obvious involve his newly empowered employees. Not only has the change seemed bewildering to some, but there are doubts about whether they can live up to their new responsibilities. Despite numerous crackdowns, allegations of corruption against the force rose by around a quarter last year.

Read any book about "change management" in the private sector and similar problems appear. But management theory runs into particular barriers in the public sector. Hamstrung by New York's fiscal ills, its civil-service pay-scales and job rigidities,

Mr Bratton finds it hard to reward his best officers. And since he is under the thumb of city politicians and has to operate in the glare of publicity, he cannot ask more radical questions that a private-sector re-engineer might, such as "why not contract out finger-printing?" Above all, there is no direct competition (except rivalry between precincts) to keep managers on their toes. Like many other public-sector managers, a lot of Mr Bratton's efforts are often directed towards replicating private-sector disciplines where none naturally exist.

Far from being humbled by such problems, Mr Bratton thrives on them. Having reached "the top of the heap in this business", he now wants to hone his re-engineering skills in the private sector.



N.Y.P.D.

MANAGING FOR RESULTS

Building a police organization that can dramatically reduce crime, disorder and fear.

Since January 1994, the NYPD has been engaged in a department-wide, full-scale, strategic attack on crime and disorder in New York City. Instead of merely reacting to individual crimes as they occur, the department has established proactive strategies for confronting the problems of guns, youth crime, drugs, domestic violence, disorder in public spaces, auto-related theft, and police corruption. Backed by sweeping changes in many department procedures and by a policy of decentralizing management to the precinct level, these strategies have achieved by far the largest drops in New York City felony crime in a quarter century.

Mayor Rudolph Giuliani came to office with the promise of restoring confidence and quality of life to New York City. The Giuliani administration has worked toward this goal on many fronts, but the police department has played a key role. Mayor Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton have challenged the NYPD to focus its full talents and resources on its core missions of driving down crime and controlling disorder.

The results speak for themselves. Since January 1994, crime has fallen for all seven major felonies and in every precinct in the city. Felonies declined 12 percent in 1994, followed by a preliminary 18 percent drop in the first nine months of 1995. The homicide rate has plummeted, down 19 percent in 1994 and a preliminary 29 percent so far in

Avoiding failure is no longer a formula for success. Instead, the positive efforts of commanders and cops at reducing crime, disorder, and fear are being recognized and encouraged.

1995. An assertive police focus on quality of life has begun to change both the reality and perception of the city streets in neighborhood after neighborhood.

A Sea Change

These results reflect a sea change in the way the police department does business. Like many large bureaucracies, the NYPD had been organized around avoiding risk and failure. For years, precinct commanders had been constrained on every side by regulations and procedures. Many police operations, such as prostitution sweeps and executing search warrants, could only be conducted by centralized units, reflecting an abiding distrust of precinct personnel and resources. Yet, despite all the micro-management, the department was providing very little in the way of genuine strategic direction. It was clear what precinct commanders and personnel weren't allowed to do, but much less clear what they *ought* to be doing to combat crime, disorder, and fear.

Beginning in 1994, there were major changes in the management style of the NYPD. Precinct commanders were granted far more latitude in initiating

their own operations and running their own shops. Uniformed patrol cops were authorized to make drug arrests and to assertively enforce quality-of-life laws, things they hadn't been doing for more than 20 years. At the same time, the central strategic direction of the department became far stronger and the lines of accountability far clearer. Avoiding failure is no longer a formula for success. Instead, the positive efforts of commanders and cops at reducing crime, disorder, and fear are being recognized and encouraged.

The "Compstat" Factor

For the first time in its history, the NYPD is using crime statistics and regular meetings of key enforcement personnel to direct its enforcement efforts. In the past, crime statistics often lagged events by months and so did the sense of whether crime control initiatives had succeeded or failed. Now, there is a daily turn-around in the "Compstat" numbers, as the crime statistics are called, and NYPD commanders watch weekly crime trends with the same hawk-like attention private corporations pay to profit and loss. Crime statistics have become the department's bottom line, the best indicator of how the police are doing, precinct-by-precinct and citywide.

At semi-weekly "Compstat" meetings, the department's top executives meet in rotation with precinct and detective squad commanders from different areas of the city. These are tough, probing sessions that review current crime trends, plan tactics, and allocate resources. Commanders are called back to present

N.Y.P.D.

their results at the "Compstat" meetings at least once every five weeks, creating a sense of immediate accountability that has energized the NYPD's widely scattered local commands. The meetings also provide the department's executive staff with an intimate way of gauging the performance of precinct commanders who have a better opportunity to be recognized for what they have accomplished in their commands and how effectively they are applying the NYPD's strategies.

The Four Steps

Four steps or principles now guide the department's patrol and investigative work: timely, accurate intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow up and assessment. Debriefing of people taken into custody, even for minor crimes, is now standard practice, greatly increasing the department's store of timely, on-the-ground intelligence. Computerized pin mapping and other contemporary crime analysis techniques are functioning as the NYPD's radar system, achieving the early identification of crime patterns. The barriers that long separated the department's Patrol Bureau, Detective Bureau and Organized Crime Control Bureau have been broken down, and a new spirit of cooperation is resulting in the rapid deployment of appropriate resources. Although overall strategy guidance flows down to the precincts, many of the tactics that are accomplishing the strategies flow up from precinct commanders, squad commanders, and rank-and-file police officers and detectives.

In the five-week "Compstat" cycle the effectiveness of every new tactic or program is rapidly assessed. Failed tactics don't last long, and successful tactics are quickly replicated in other precincts. The gathering of field intelligence, the adapting of tactics to changing field con-

Four steps or principles now guide the department's patrol and investigative work: timely, accurate intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow up and assessment.

ditions, and the close review of field results is now a continual, daily process rather than an annual or biennial event. The NYPD can make fundamental changes in its tactical approach in a few weeks rather than a few years.

Reengineering

To support the broad strategic changes in the way the NYPD accomplishes its mission, the department has undertaken an equally sweeping reengineering effort. Beginning in early 1994, 12 reengineering teams studied everything from equipment and technology to precinct organization and training. The teams comprised nearly 500 people, including police officers and civilians of every rank, union representatives, and talented outsiders from business and academia. Their work was refined by a *Plan of Action* published in December 1994. More than 600 recommendations emerged from the reengineering process, of which 376 have already been implemented, with others on the way. From the highly visible move to a crisper, more professional uniform to less obvious reforms in dozens of department procedures, reengineering is professionalizing and streamlining the NYPD.

Recruitment and Training

The department is now seeing the far reaching results of reengineering. On the recruitment and training front, there are a host of changes designed to bring the

department a more mature and better qualified recruit and to train recruits and veteran officers more effectively for the real-world situations they encounter on the streets. Within the next two years, the minimum age to become a police officer will rise from 20 to 22. For the first time, 60 college credits or two years honorable military experience — as well as successful completion of a fitness test — will be required for appointment as a police officer. The police academy has become more competitive with tougher academic and physical standards to graduate.

Training has taken a sharp turn toward the practical. In-service training, now under the direction of the Chief of Department, focuses on tactics and street situations taught in realistic workshop settings. Promotional training for sergeants and lieutenants focuses on leadership — imparting the skills and knowledge they need to function as the motivators, mentors, and role models they must be. The concept of "respect" — not just as an abstract principle but as a practical tactic for defusing conflicts — is being taught through such techniques as verbal judo, which shows officers how to use a respectful manner and calming words to accomplish their policing goals. A standing committee on Training, Integrity and Respect provides advice and assistance to the department from knowledgeable experts from the business and academic worlds.

Discipline and Corruption

There has been a complete overhaul of the department's discipline system, a never-before-reformed process that had kept some officers' careers tied up for months and often hurt their chances of promotion or transfer even if they were eventually exonerated. Reforms are making the system far swifter and fairer. At the same time, the Internal Affairs

N.Y.P.D.

Bureau has been removed from investigating petty police wrongdoing to concentrate solely on police corruption and serious misconduct. Reversing the long-held practice of investigating corruption cases in isolation from the rest of the command staff, the Internal Affairs Bureau has adopted a "policy of inclusion" and is sharing responsibility for integrity maintenance among the department's top executives and precinct commanders. In meetings similar to the "Compstat" meetings, IAB's work is subject to the same scrutiny as the work of the department's other crime fighters.

Reengineered Technology

Also supporting the NYPD's new direction is a reengineering of the department's technology. Under a newly created Office for Technology and Systems Development and with the help of Federal Crime Bill funds, the department's communications, arrest processing and investigative computer technology are taking a giant leap forward. A new enhanced 911 system, handling emergency response for the entire city of New York, will come into service by year's end, providing immediate identification of callers' numbers and locations. New mobile data terminals will be installed in patrol cars within the next year, allowing mobile access to the department's data bases and direct digital dispatching to cars. Arrest processing will be fully automated within the next several years as computerized live-scan fingerprinting replaces ink and rollers, digital photo imaging replaces old fashioned photo files, video teleconferencing replaces face-to-face meetings with district attorneys, and a computerized omni-form generates the multiple forms necessary to process a New York City arrest. It is estimated that these changes will cut the average time to process an arrest from nearly 20 hours to less than three.

The purchase of Bulletproof/Brass Catcher has given the NYPD state-of-the-

The last months of 1995 will also see the development of Strategy '96, a reassessment and a redirection of the NYPD's crime control strategies as the department enters the third year of its intensive assault on crime.

art ballistics analysis with the same identification and sorting capabilities that the SAFIS system has provided for fingerprints. Over the next two years the department will construct a new and expanded facility for its police laboratory, bringing plant and equipment, training, and operating procedures up to a tough new New York State accreditation standard. A Technology Policy Board, including representatives from CBS, CitiCorp, Digital Equipment, Motorola, and NYNEX, provides advice and expertise with the department's huge technology agenda.

Police Merger

In April 1995, the NYPD merged with the Transit and Housing Police Departments, accomplishing the largest police merger in history. The Transit Police, at 4,263 uniformed officers, and the Housing Police, at 2,779 uniformed officers, were both among the largest police departments in the nation. The merger freed 550 police officers from redundant administrative roles, increasing both the Transit patrol force and the Housing Bureau's Project Community Officers, who patrol housing developments on foot. Fifty-four former Transit Police units and 36 former Housing Police Units were merged into their NYPD counterparts. Merger also made the broader resources of the NYPD available to Transit and Housing and established a unified command, allowing for vigorous enforcement of the department's crime control strategies in the Transit and Housing

jurisdictions. Transit and Housing Bureaus were established within the NYPD to maintain the special focus that the independent departments had brought to transit and housing policing. Since merger, felonies are down 33 percent in the transit system and 22 percent in the housing developments.

New Strategies

As the department's strategies continue to drive down crime, NYPD will be moving into an enforcement area that it has abdicated for more than 20 years: traffic control. A new Traffic Control Division will be fully operational by November 1995 when the department's traffic control strategy will go into effect. Using helicopters, motorcycles, horses, and good old-fashioned traffic cops, the Traffic Control Division will implement strategies to literally take back the streets from traffic violators and congestion. Not just the Traffic Control Division, but police officers throughout the department will be trained in traffic enforcement and will be expected to deal with unauthorized construction, double parking and spillback offenders who block intersections.

The last months of 1995 will also see the development of Strategy '96, a reassessment and a redirection of the NYPD's crime control strategies as the department enters the third year of its intensive assault on crime. Strategy '96 will include a stepped-up attack on narcotics locations, which the department's improved crime statistics are showing to be focal points for other crimes such as shootings and robberies. Improved statistical analysis is also identifying the precincts that account for the largest share of the city's crime and making it possible to target additional resources in those precincts. Maintaining momentum for a third year of decisive crime decline may be the biggest challenge yet for an NYPD that is "managed for results."

NYPD Strategy No. 1

Getting Guns of the Streets of New York City

***Handgun
homicides have
fallen 40
percent since
January 1994.
Shooting
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an additional
1,091 in the
first nine
months of
1995.***

With as many as two million illegal guns in circulation in New York City, there were 1,500 gun deaths in 1993, 20 times the number in 1960. There were also 5,000 people wounded in shootings. Ninety percent of the guns seized in New York were originally purchased in other states, creating a major challenge for a local law enforcement agency.

The NYPD gun strategy has had a decisive impact on shootings and gun crime. Handgun homicides have fallen 40 percent since January 1994. Shooting victims declined by 894 in 1994 and by an additional 1,091 in the first nine months of 1995. The department is pursuing every perpetrator and accomplice in gun crimes and interrogating them about how guns were purchased so it can pursue the gun traffickers as well. Patrol officers and detectives are developing cases by asking people brought to the precinct house for minor offenses if they know where guns can be purchased. Because guns and drugs are parallel problems, specialized drug units have been replaced by Strategic Narcotics and Gun teams who go after both.

A routine gun debriefing in the 46th Precinct in the Bronx led to several arrests in a year-old murder case as well as arrests for a stabbing that had occurred a month earlier and for a carjacking in the neighboring 43rd Precinct. In Brooklyn, a robbery/homicide opened a wide-ranging investigation that led detectives to Florida and Virginia on the trail of an interstate gun smuggling ring. Working with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the NYPD has monitored the applicants for federal firearms licenses in New York City in the belief that many applicants intend to use the federal licenses as cover for illicit gun trafficking in violation of local laws. Since the inception of the program, 92 percent of new applicants and renewals have either been denied a license or have withdrawn their applications once they realize that the police are watching them.

NYPD Strategy No. 2

Curbing Youth Violence in the Schools and on the Streets

***The NYPD
youth violence
strategy
concentrates
police resources
on the exploding
problem of
youth crime.***

Although New York City's juvenile population declined by 25 percent between 1972 and 1990, youth murder arrests were up four times in the same period, youth assault arrests were up three times, and youth robbery arrests more than doubled. Schools themselves have become a locus of crime, with reports of armed students commonplace. Fifteen percent of students, or 150,000 kids were absent from school and running the streets each day in 1993, as likely to be victims as perpetrators.

The NYPD youth violence strategy concentrates police resources on the exploding problem of youth crime. The department has increased the number of youth officers in the precinct commands, providing much more follow-up ability in individual cases and better program oversight. School security plans have been prepared for every school or school cluster — the most thorough look ever taken at policing and protecting school children in New York City. The security plans usually include safe corridor posts that protect kids on their way to and from school. The Transit Bureau has established safe passage cars on more than 100 subway trains, serving 80 key schools, and allowing children to ride home free from harassment and fear. In the 1994-95 school year, truancy squads, active throughout the city, returned nearly 42,000 truants to the school system, made more than 5,000 arrests, and confiscated 97 firearms and 530 other weapons.

A Brooklyn school officer came up with a novel approach to changing student perceptions of the police, a role reversal program where students become cops for a day. They dress in police uniforms and encounter resistance when they ask other students not to loiter or smoke marijuana on school grounds. Students also conduct "car stops" and "stop and frisk" scenarios. They get a first hand look at the pressures and demands of police work and feel a greater sense of unity with the police in a troubled neighborhood.

NYPD Strategy No. 3

Driving Drug Dealers Out of New York City

NYPD drug strategy enforces a zero tolerance for drug dealing, bringing uniformed officers back into the war against drugs.

Drugs and especially crack are a major contributor to New York City crime. In 1993, 78 percent of all arrestees at Manhattan Central Booking tested positive for drugs, and 66 percent tested positive for cocaine. Twenty-five percent of all homicides in the city are directly related to drugs. At the close of 1993, there were more than 12,000 drug dealing locations, including 7,000 on the streets.

NYPD drug strategy enforces a zero tolerance for drug dealing, bringing uniformed officers back into the war against drugs. The department is targeting mid-level dealers much more aggressively, using forfeiture actions against their cash and cars and nuisance abatement proceedings against drug-dealing locations. The NYPD Civil Enforcement Division will close approximately 250 locations in 1995. The strategy has decentralized local narcotics enforcement, allowing precinct commanders to address street-level narcotics dealers and execute warrants without awaiting action by the centralized Narcotics Division. Narcotics arrests were up nearly 28 percent in 1994 and an additional 14 percent in the first nine months of 1995. Drug-blighted streets are being retaken throughout the city.

A good example of the success of localized efforts is the 83rd Precinct in Brooklyn where precinct police officers and detectives executed numerous search warrants in August 1995, and recovered a large cache of weapons and drugs. Seized were five machine guns, a variety of semiautomatic pistols and revolvers, a 12 gauge shotgun, nearly \$600,000 in cash, more than six kilos of cocaine, and hundreds of vials of crack and glassines of heroin. In the Midtown North Precinct in Manhattan, community policing officers have signed up six confidential informants and executed 12 search warrants in recent months. Operating at the precinct level, they were better able to gather evidence on drug locations that sold only to local residents. Local informants gathered the evidence to obtain search warrants, and enforcement by precinct personnel shut the locations down.

NYPD Strategy No. 4

Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence

The NYPD domestic violence strategy is creating an early warning system on domestic violence and providing the resources to intervene when the warning sounds.

Domestic violence is the great hidden crime problem in New York City. It is estimated to cause 30 percent of the cases in emergency wards. Women are six times more likely to be killed in their homes than on the street. Children who grow up as victims and witnesses of domestic violence are far more likely to become both domestic abusers and street criminals.

The NYPD domestic violence strategy is creating an early warning system on domestic violence and providing the resources to intervene when the warning sounds. We have assigned a domestic violence officer and a domestic violence investigator in all NYPD precincts. Using a new Domestic Violence Incident Report, filed every time police respond to a domestic incident, the domestic violence officers can track the history of a family, identify chronic abuse patterns, and intervene proactively. If a criminal investigation is necessary, the domestic violence investigator is there to coordinate it. The department has established a centralized Domestic Violence Unit to establish operational guidelines and maintain a continuous flow of communication with the police, the D.A.s' offices, hospitals, victims advocates, and sources of referrals for both victims and batterers.

A recent domestic violence case from the 114th Precinct in Queens illustrates how a full-time domestic violence officer can develop cases that used to slip through the cracks. A battered woman was refusing to press charges and asking only to be accompanied to her home to pick up her clothes. The domestic violence officer cajoled and pried until the woman finally burst into tears and admitted that her husband had put a gun to her head more than once. The officer obtained a search warrant and recovered two guns, 700 rounds of ammunition, and a significant quantity of cocaine. The husband was arrested, averting a homicide that was "waiting to happen."

NYPD Strategy No. 5

Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York City

A strategy to deal with street disorder is, in many ways, the linchpin of the other strategies because it affects people's perception and fear of crime.

A strategy to deal with street disorder is, in many ways, the linchpin of the other strategies because it affects people's perception and fear of crime. Controlling disorder can also change the behavior of criminals who are less likely to commit crimes in a well-policed, orderly environment. For more than 20 years, the NYPD gave a low priority to such offenses as boom-box radios, street prostitution, underage drinking, squeegee pests, and drag racing. Any combination of these activities can blight a neighborhood. The department's past failure to deal with disorder is one reason why New York, which is 22nd among large cities in reported crime, is probably number one in the perception and fear of crime.

The NYPD strategy for reclaiming public spaces includes more than a dozen specific tactics for countering disorder in all its forms. Many tactics involve the confiscation, closing, or temporary seizure of property, whether a vehicle, a drug paraphernalia shop, or house of prostitution. Operation Losing Proposition confiscates the cars of people who patronize street prostitutes. Operation Sound Trap uses sound meters to trap boom-box cars and loud motorcycles and take the vehicles off the street. The NYPD is using nuisance abatement and other civil laws to close down properties where criminal activities take place. Through steady police presence and arrests when necessary, the police have all but eliminated the squeegee pests who beg by cleaning windshields.

The closure of 37 room hotel used by prostitutes in the 46th Precinct in the Bronx offers a good example of the nuisance abatement law in action. Police had made more than 300 prostitution arrests in the vicinity of the hotel, confiscated 45 vehicles from johns, and conducted 10 separate undercover operations in the hotel itself. All this evidence was used to close the hotel under nuisance abatement for at least a year. When the police shut the place down in September 1995, neighbors gathered on the street and leaned out of surrounding buildings to cheer.

NYPD Strategy No. 6

Reducing Auto-Related Crime In New York

The NYPD is initiating sting operations against suspected chop shops and businesses fencing stolen parts. Vehicle theft and recovery locations are being tracked, and precinct detective squads are interviewing suspects in auto-related crimes.

The NYPD auto crime strategy brings police officers and detectives from precinct and borough commands together with the members of the Auto Crime Division and Highway Patrol Units to systematically attack auto-related crime. In 1993, more than 100,000 vehicles worth more some \$400 million were stolen on the streets of New York City, an estimated 70 percent of which were stolen by various organized crime groups. Following its auto-crime strategy, the department has been able cut auto theft by 15 percent in 1994 and an additional 26 percent in the first nine months of 1995.

The NYPD is initiating sting operations against suspected chop shops and businesses fencing stolen parts. Vehicle theft and recovery locations are being tracked, and precinct detective squads are interviewing suspects in auto-related crimes to expand cases and establish links to auto-crime rings. The department's Civil Enforcement Unit is assisting precinct commanders in closing or seizing businesses engaged in illegally stripping cars or tagging them with false Vehicle Identification Numbers for export. One case in early 1995 led members of the Joint Auto Larceny Task Force and Auto Crime Division personnel to execute 17 federal arrest warrants and 10 federal search warrants, effectively shutting down an auto-theft ring that was responsible for the theft of over 100 cars a month.

Every precinct now has a liaison with the Auto Crime Division, and joint efforts have been common. The department has set up more than 30 phony fencing operations and conducted 60 "reverse stings," where undercover officers offered "stolen" parts to dealers. The Auto Crime Division is conducting stings with automobile exporters as well, seeking to export cars without proper ownership papers and making cases against exporters to Russia, the Dominican Republic, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Columbia.

NYPD Strategy No. 7

Rooting Out Police Corruption

IAB, which once worked in secrecy and isolation, has opened its operations to the top commanders in the NYPD and is enlisting the assistance of precinct commanders in corruption investigations instead of keeping them in the dark.

With the publication of its Integrity Strategy in May 1995, the NYPD opened a new chapter in its long battle against police corruption. The Knapp Commission reforms in the early 1970s eradicated the systemic corruption and widespread bribery that had plagued the department from its earliest days. But a new type of corruption challenged the NYPD by the mid-1980s, as small "crews" of corrupt cops were shaking down local drug dealers, dealing in drugs themselves, and committing thefts, burglaries, and even robberies. The Mollen Commission investigation in the early 1990s revealed the need to shore up the department's deteriorating internal affairs function.

Some of the finest managers and investigators in the department have been recruited to the Internal Affairs Bureau, which has been equipped with the latest surveillance hardware and state-of-the art computers. In the 30th Precinct in Harlem and the 48 Precinct in the Bronx, the better-staffed and better-equipped IAB built strong cases against corrupt police officers. Along with strengthening IAB, the NYPD Integrity Strategy seeks to address police corruption at its roots, by making changes in the way the department recruits, trains, supervises and disciplines its officers. Increased random drug testing is screening out a higher percentage of unsuitable police candidates and police officers. The department has also expanded by more than five times the use of integrity tests or "stings" to gauge the extent of police corruption. Some 380 integrity tests so far this year have resulted in only eight failures. Corruption allegations are down 23 percent compared with 1994.

Probably the most significant change in the Integrity Strategy is the "policy of inclusion." IAB, which once worked in secrecy and isolation, has opened its operations to the top commanders in the NYPD and is enlisting the assistance of precinct commanders in corruption investigations instead of keeping them in the dark. In the past, police integrity was the concern of the police commissioner and a handful of internal investigators. In the new NYPD, it's everyone's job and everyone's responsibility.

N.Y.P.D.*NYC Felony Complaint Statistics***1993 vs 1994 (Full Year)**

	1993	1994	%Change
Murder	1952	1581	-19.0%
Rape	3226	3201	-0.8%
Robbery	85886	72555	-15.5%
Felony Assault	41116	39770	-3.2%
Burglary	100940	90377	-10.5%
Grand Larceny	85544	75301	-11.9%
Grand Larceny Auto	111614	94522	-15.3%
Total	430278	377307	-12.3%
Shooting Victims	5861	4967	-15.3%
Shooting Incidents	5268	4406	-16.4%

1994 vs 1995 (1st Three Quarters)

	1994	1995	%Change
Murder	1289	907	-29.6%
Rape	2450	2338	-4.6%
Robbery	55166	43918	-20.4%
Felony Assault	30446	27912	-8.3%
Burglary	68755	57243	-16.7%
Grand Larceny	55832	48693	-12.8%
Grand Larceny Auto	71755	53251	-25.8%
Total	285693	234262	-18.0%
Shooting Victims	3947	2856	-27.6%
Shooting Incidents	3497	2482	-29.0%

N.Y.P.D.*NYC Felony Arrest Statistics***1993 vs 1994 (Full Year)**

	1993	1994	%Change
Murder	1243	1266	1.9%
Rape	1326	1494	12.7%
Robbery	25106	25628	2.1%
Felony Assault	18964	21624	14.0%
Burglary	9291	10415	12.1%
Grand Larceny	5754	6688	16.3%
Grand Larceny Auto	6257	5495	-12.2%
Total	74036	77783	6.9%
Narcotics Arrests	65452	83451	27.5%
All NYPD Arrests (including misdemeanors)	203351	247081	21.5%

1994 vs. 1995 (1st Three Quarters)

	1994	1995	%Change
Murder	995	809	-18.7%
Rape	1152	1217	5.7%
Robbery	19298	18130	-6.1%
Felony Assault	16096	16668	3.6%
Burglary	7434	8126	9.3%
Grand Larceny	4882	5616	15.0%
Grand Larceny Auto	4169	3505	-15.9%
Total	54026	54071	0.1%
Narcotics Arrests	60226	68732	14.1%
All NYPD Arrests (including misdemeanors)	251446	275717	9.7%

THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH

**REMARKS BY:
WILLIAM J. BRATTON
POLICE COMMISSIONER
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

**CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
“POLICE, LAWYERS, AND THE TRUTH: A SYMPOSIUM”
NOVEMBER 14, 1995**

Like police departments in so many other American communities over the last generation, the New York City Police Department had moved away from two basic tenets of the criminal justice system -- that police exist to prevent crime not just respond to it-- and that, in court proceedings, you must tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth -- not some of the time, but all of the time.

With reported crime down nearly 25 percent in New York City over the past two years, we have clearly seen the results of a return to an assertive policing policy that emphasizes prevention. That policy is based on four key principles: timely accurate intelligence, rapid response, effective strategies and relentless follow-up.

We have applied the very same principles to police corruption with comparable results. We've opened up the secretive, insular, and largely ineffective internal affairs bureau to the scrutiny and the management talents of the entire NYPD command staff. Through our policy of inclusion, we are spreading the responsibility for fighting police corruption throughout the department. Corruption complaints have fallen almost as dramatically in the past year as crime complaints.

I am optimistic that we can take the same proactive approach to the problem of police perjury or "testi-lying" as it's sometimes called. But in this case, to be truly effective, police departments will need the fullest cooperation from all our partners in the criminal justice system. That's why I'm pleased to see the beginning of a dialogue at this symposium here today.

While was I thinking about the issues of perjury and "testi-lying" I was reminded of a story my Deputy Commissioner for Operations tells about an incident he witnessed in night court many years ago. A young transit police officer was testifying about a gun arrest. The assistant district attorney questioned him, as did a legal aid lawyer.

The judge, based on the testimony, determined that the weapon could not be proven to have been in the possession of the defendant and dismissed the case. However, he remarked to the officer, "you realize that under the circumstances I have to dismiss the case, but I want to thank you for your candor and your honesty; at least you got a gun off the street."

For that young officer and for the criminal justice system this was both a defeat and a victory. Although the case was dismissed based on his honest testimony, the officer also won -- by withstanding the temptations and pressures that have caused our criminal justice system to emphasize winning and losing more than truth and justice.

Fighting crime and making arrests have always required both physical and mental agility. After an arrest, the officer has to clear the hurdles of the criminal justice system. That's how it was 25 years ago when I was a young cop patrolling the streets of Boston not far from this building. But since then, the hurdles have become high jumps. Cops now live in a new world of court decisions and public expectations where sometimes, it appears that the system expects them to be able to fly over the high jumps.

Everyday, while the public's expectations of police service grow, someone is raising the bar that cops have to clear. In New York State, our Court of Appeals has consistently interpreted the State Constitution to create constraints on searches that are much more restrictive than those imposed by the US Supreme Court. They have done this despite the fact that the language of the State Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution.

Our Court has developed a four-step set of rules for stop and frisk that is so vague and complicated that most lawyers don't even pretend to understand it. How can we really expect the cops to be guided by it in potentially dangerous and life-threatening situations?

New York courts have held that a police officer's frisk of a pocket bulge -- even one that contains a gun -- is illegal. Yet the same courts have held that the frisk of a waistband bulge is entirely proper. Is this the kind of interpretation that the framers of the Constitution really had in mind? Are we in less danger from a gun in a pocket than a gun in a waistband?

Oliver Wendell Holmes once said the law has to be real. Often, our courts' rulings and interpretations of the Constitution don't pass the real-world test. That may be one reason why we have drifted to a place where cops now feel pressure to be less than truthful on the witness stand. That is a diagnosis, not an excuse. But to cure a disease it helps to know the causes. The goal of the criminal trial system should be to seek truth and justice. But in actual practice, the goals of both the defense and prosecution are to win. In the competition over who wins and who loses, the truth is often left without a guardian.

Where does the police officer fit in all this? Well, first of all we recruit them from the human race. They are as fallible as anyone else. Police officers are usually the lowest paid and least educated participants in the criminal justice process. They have a tendency to accept the guidance of experienced, trained prosecutors.

In some cases -- when a prosecutor is really determined to win -- the "trial prep" procedure may skirt along the edge of coercing or leading the police witness. In this way, some impressionable young cops learn to tailor their testimony to the requirements of law.

The greatest pressure to shape a police officer's version of events comes at the outset. A prosecutor armed with strong police testimony can more likely force a plea-bargain. When that fails, however, and the case moves to trial, the officer is locked into the original story.

Yet, prosecutors are usually ready to express shock when one of their police witnesses is found to be lying. Are they really being honest with themselves when they do so? It reminds me of Claude Raines in *Casablanca* when he says he is shocked -- simply shocked -- to see gambling going on at Rick's, as the croupier hands him his winnings.

"Testi-lying" is different from any other form of police corruption because it is oftentimes unrelated to any opportunity for personal gain. Most police officers are evaluated on arrests, not convictions, so the outcome of their cases doesn't affect their careers.

Cops who steal, take bribes or beat people to further their corrupt acts have lost all connection to the police department and the values and ideals of the criminal justice system. Cops who lie in court to convict people they believe are guilty, often have not. Many cops who "testi-lie" do so in the mistaken belief that they are helping to enforce the law. In fact, these cops see "testi-lying" as a perfectly reasonable response to unreasonable and unrealistic evidentiary rules and court decisions that make it difficult, if not impossible, to enforce the law in the real world.

As the cops who "testi-lie" see it, they don't lie to convict innocent people, but to convict guilty people. But in doing so they have lost sight of the fact that the end does not and cannot, under the law, justify the means. You cannot break the law to enforce the law.

I've discussed some of the reasons why cops may lie under oath and now I'd like to turn to the question of how common the problem of "testi-lying" really is. Some observers, including Professor Alan Dershowitz, have maintained that police perjury is pervasive. If you asked the police unions, they would say it is minimal. I think the truth probably lies somewhere in between.

Let me tell you what I did not long after becoming police commissioner. I sent a letter to all New York City criminal court judges, the five district attorneys, and the two U.S. attorneys asking them to report any instance where they thought a police officer was testifying falsely. Now remember, I made this request at a time when various judges and lawyers and DA's were being liberally quoted about the widespread problem of "testi-lying."

Since then, we have made hundreds of thousands of arrests from which the judges, US attorneys, and the district attorneys collectively have made 12 allegations of false testimony. These were all referred to the Internal Affairs Bureau for investigation. From all other sources, including defense attorneys, defendants, informants and anonymous calls, we received only 60 additional allegations. Whatever the true dimensions of the "testi-lying" problem, the reported cases in New York are remarkably sparse.

We could have stopped there and written off "testi-lying" as a minor problem. But I am not ready to do that. The New York City Police Department is not ready to do that. I feel like a man who's been given a clean bill of health at a check-up but still has a nagging pain. I want a second and third opinion. I want to probe further to discover if "testi-lying" has been blown way out of proportion or if it really is the "the dirty little secret" of the criminal justice system.

I am a realist. I know that I can't change the whole system. But I do believe I can change the police culture in New York. We will do the same with integrity as we have done with our crime-fighting strategies and their emphasis on crime prevention. We will breed integrity into the department and its officers so that cops won't bend the rules to make a case and won't allow others to do it either.

Since my appointment as Police Commissioner and my earliest roll-call addresses to the men and women of the NYPD, I have told them that -- whatever the message had been in the past -- now, integrity under oath is paramount. I told them that I would rather lose a hundred cases than have

one cop arrested for perjury.

If a cop tells the truth and a criminal goes free, we still get that gun off the street, we still get those drugs off the street. We'll get another chance to catch the same bad guy next week. But if the cop lies, an absurd outcome is possible: We get the gun and the drugs off the street, the criminal walks and the cop goes to jail.

I'd like to read a letter from a retired NYPD detective sergeant that happened to run in the *New York Post* last Thursday. The writer has a son and two nephews in the NYPD and he tells them a cautionary tale, not unlike the one that my deputy commissioner related:

"In the 1960's, prior to the Knapp Commission hearings," he writes, "I was testifying in court regarding an arrest I'd made of a drug pusher. When I was questioned by the defense attorney as to what I observed, I truthfully testified that I could not see actual money being passed between the pusher and the user. All I could truthfully say is that I observed a transaction taking place, and based on my experience, I arrested the defendant for selling drugs.

Unfortunately, the judge holding the hearing on whether to suppress the evidence, agreed with the defense and dismissed the case. After this dismissal, a visibly upset assistant district attorney berated me for not falsely testifying that I actually saw money being passed between the pusher and the user. My response to the ADA was, "Why should cops have to perjure themselves to get convictions? If the law is bad, change the law."

The sergeant's point is well-taken. Police officers are way up on a slippery slope when they try to compensate for the failings of the entire legal system. When the music stops, it is usually the cop, the man or woman who raised a right hand in that witness box, who is left out there to account for the truth and where it got lost.

I know that the price of total integrity may be that we lose a few more cases. Maybe we'll lose a lot more. Maybe, in the long run, that will help the public, their legislators and the courts to come back closer to the real world -- the one that the cops and the victims live in. And when we lose a case or two I won't mind hearing a judge say, "but officer, I would like to compliment you on your honesty."

On behalf of the New York City Police Department and its 38,000 police officers, I pledge to you that we will do our part to restore integrity and the pursuit of truth and justice to the criminal justice system.

We will make it clear to each and every officer that -- while our highest priority is the continued reduction in crime, disorder and fear in every neighborhood -- we will accomplish our goal by telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth in every situation, at all times.

During the coming year, we will give our officers the skills to do that in court by providing all 38,000 of them with an intensive refresher course on court testimony. At the same time, we will continue to instill the value of honesty in the department's culture by emphasizing integrity in all

our training and internal communications.

I can promise you that the NYPD will continue to meet the problem of "testi-lying" head on as we have the issues of police corruption and crime prevention. We'll do it for the criminal justice system and we'll do it for the cops. I hope the courts, the prosecutors and the defense bar will join us in our efforts. Our ultimate success will depend on our ability to work together.

As I said at the outset, this symposium itself is a reason for optimism. While the issue of testi-lying isn't new, open discussion about it is. The dialogue will guide us toward a better future.

ASC Talk Points.

I speak from the point of view of police manager not social scientist.

I am responsible for directing police resources and motivating 38,000 police personnel to ensure the public safety in the nation's largest city.

I cannot afford to adopt the criminology's view that police departments cannot accomplish our primary mission of controlling and preventing crime.

In fact, I think this view is largely a self-fulfilling prophecy. It expects very little of police departments, and ultimately that's exactly what it gets.

Like other police managers, I have turned to modern business theory and the study of how to motivate and focus large organizations. I've learned how to set ambitious goals for police departments as the first step toward achieving more ambitious results.

I'm going to briefly describe two police management stories here today: The New York City Transit Police since 1990 and the NYPD in past two years.

I believe that in both cases, key management changes -- key changes in the way policing is done -- led to steep declines in crime.

A new kind of police department is emerging -- a flexible, responsive, focused organization that can swiftly identify emerging crime patterns and just as swiftly counter them.

I think what is happening today in the NYPD is going to undercut much of the established wisdom and research about police departments.

They don't have to be the slow moving and ineffectual bureaucracies you believe them to be. Properly led and motivated, they can have a swift and decisive impact on crime. Declines of 20, 30 and even 50 percent are possible over a few years.

The New York City Transit Police

When I became Transit Police Chief in 1990:

- 1) Robbery rate was rising steeply.
(+21 percent in 1980; +26 percent in 1989)
- 2) Farebeating was out of control.
(57 million farebeats a year, costing \$65m)
- 3) Disorder was everywhere in the subway.
(5,000 subway homeless; panhandlers, hawkers)

We devised a strategy that focused on robbery, fare evasion, and disorder. We believed there was a clear connection between the rising subway robbery rate and the petty crimes and disorder.

Seeing an environment of apparent chaos, the young criminals who were committing most of the robberies had concluded that they could get away with anything in the subway. We had to change that perception in a hurry. We coupled a program of full enforcement of all subway rules and regulations with a very targeted attack on repeat subway felons, especially youth gangs.

Instead of closing the case in gang attacks with one or two arrests, detectives were instructed to pursue every single participant. They followed leads and enhanced cases as never before.

We also greatly intensified our pursuit of people wanted on subway warrants, using fax machines to cut the time it takes for police to act on a bench warrant from 30 days to 24 hours. The warrant unit went out at 2 a.m. while the fugitives were still at home, and our apprehension rate rose sharply.

Intensive plainclothes fare evasion sweeps allowed us to catch fare evaders in the act and to intervene with robbers because every farebeater could be searched for weapons and checked for weapons.

In the first six months of the sweeps, one in every six people arrested for fare evasion was wanted on a warrant.

We attacked disorder on multiple fronts. A large-scale outreach program cut the resident homeless population in the subway by 80 percent in several years.

We quelled disorder among school-age riders with a safe passage program on 80 key trains.

We enforced the subway rules against panhandling, illegal merchants, smoking, drinking, laying down in the subway, and other anti-social acts.

The message was sent by uniformed police and plainclothes anti-crime units: The subway is under alert police control.

The results? Within four months of my taking command of the Transit Police, summons were up 30 percent, arrests were up 81 percent, and ejections from the subway for rules violations rose 473 percent.

Within six months, subway crime started dropping and it kept on dropping for every single month except one for the next five years.

Subway felonies in the first ten months of 1995 have fallen 64 percent compared with the first ten months of 1990. Subway robberies have fallen 74 percent.

By the end of 1994, fare evasion had been cut by more than half for a savings of \$31 million a year. At current rates of decline, it will be cut by two-thirds by the end of 1995.

It's hard to identify a demographic or social cause for these results. The subway has more riders than most American cities have residents, and ridership was rising throughout this period. Subway riders are younger, poorer, and more minority than populations of most cities or of New York City at large.

Yet in the early 1990s, the subway crime dropped far more steeply than New York City crime, of which it is a subset. Between 1990 and 1993, the decline in subway robberies was three times greater than the decline in city-wide robberies. In 1991, the Transit Police accounted for two-thirds of the drop in the citywide robbery rate.

Yet, as closed and contained system, the subway is a special case. It does show that a police department can be quickly redirected. It doesn't prove that police action can lower an entire city's crime rate.

For that, we turn to the NYPD in the past two years.

The NYPD

Like the Transit Police, the NYPD needed sharply focused strategies and stronger direction to achieve its full potential. It also needed less micro-management of its precinct commanders and precinct resources.

For years, the NYPD had been organized around avoiding risk and failure. Precinct commanders were constrained by headquarters, and many police operations could only be done by centralized units, reflecting an abiding distrust of precinct personnel and resources.

Yet, with all the micro-management that was very little in the way of strategic direction. It was clear what precinct commanders and personnel weren't allowed to do. It was much less clear what they *ought* to be doing to combat crime, disorder, and fear.

Beginning in 1994, there were major management changes. We established seven crime control strategies for dealing with guns, youth crime, drugs, domestic violence, reclaiming public spaces, auto-related theft and police corruption.

Precinct commanders have been granted far more latitude, and uniformed patrol cops have been encouraged to make drug arrests and assertively enforce quality-of-life laws.

The central strategic direction of the department has become far stronger and the lines of accountability far clearer. Avoiding failure is no longer a formula for success.

For the first time in its history, the NYPD is using up-to-date crime statistics and regular meetings of key enforcement personnel to direct its enforcement efforts. Statistics are updated weekly, instead of lagging events by months.

At semi-weekly Compstat meetings, the NYPD's top commanders meet in rotation with precinct and squad commanders to review current crime trends, plan tactics, and allocate resources.

Precinct commanders present their results at least once every six weeks providing a sense of immediate accountability.

Four steps our principles now guide the department's patrol and investigative work: timely, accurate intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assessment.

Debriefing people taken into custody, even for minor crimes, is now standard practice, greatly adding to the department's store of timely on-the-ground intelligence.

Computer pin mapping and other contemporary crime analysis techniques are functioning as the NYPD's radar system, achieving the early identification of crime patterns.

The Patrol Bureau, the Detective Bureau, and the Organized Crime Control Bureau work closely together resulting in the rapid deployment of appropriate resources.

The gathering of field intelligence, the adapting of tactics to changing field conditions, and the close review of field results are now a continual daily process. The NYPD can make fundamental changes in its tactical approach in a few weeks rather than a few years.

The new flexibility allows a much quicker response to shooting and robbery patterns. For example, "shooting hotspots" can be blanketed with uniformed and plainclothes quality-of-life enforcement, uncovering illegal weapons.

The new strategic approach to crime problems has sharpened the focus on the criminal support system: the burglary fences, the stolen auto chop shops and exporters, the gun dealers, etc.

Like the Transit Warrant Unit before it, the NYPD Warrant Unit has been revitalized. It has rearrested 10,103 wanted felons in the first 10 months of 1995 compared with 6,113 in all of 1993.

Intensive quality-of-life enforcement has become the order of the day. Throughout the city we are responding to problems like public drinking, boom-box cars, street prostitution, and street-level drug dealing. Neighborhoods feel safer, and the people see the police taking action on these highly visible problems.

The squeegee men are gone thanks to continual police pressure and arrests when necessary.

Under a program we call the Civil Enforcement Initiative we have assigned department attorneys to work closely with precinct commanders. Together, they use the civil law -- nuisance abatement, padlock law, and forfeiture proceedings -- to close brothels, drug locations, gambling locations, and to confiscate the cars and cash of drug dealers and buyers.

All this focused, strategic police activity has translated into steep declines in crime. The seven major felonies were down 12 percent in 1994 and are down 17 percent according to preliminary data through November 12.

The preliminary numbers through Nov. 12 show a two-year decline of 27.4 percent.

Crime is down in every felony category, including two-year drops of 39.7 percent in murder, 30.7 percent in robbery, 36.1 percent in GLA, 24.4 percent in burglary, and 23.8 percent in grand larceny.

Only the declines in felonious assault (12.9 percent) and rape (7.7 percent) have failed reach 20 percent for the two-year period. These relatively lower numbers probably reflect the department's domestic violence strategy which is actively eliciting complaints of assault and sexual violence from battered spouses.

There have been declines in every borough and precinct in the city. All five of the city's boroughs have registered two-year declines of 23 percent or more. Keep in mind that Brooklyn and Queens would be the fourth and fifth largest cities in the country if they were independent municipalities.

In terms of human impact, the real numbers are even more impressive. After steep declines in 1994, there have been 51,728 fewer felonies in so far in 1995.

- 373 fewer homicides
- 47 fewer rapes
- 11,949 fewer robberies
- 3,103 fewer assaults
- 12,520 fewer burglaries
- 7,788 fewer grand larcenies
- 19,988 fewer auto thefts

One clear benefit of the strategic policing approach has been the allocation of police resources where they are most needed and the consequent declines in crime in some of the most crime-prone neighborhoods in the city.

As of November 12th, for instance, the 75 and 77 precincts in Brooklyn, which are among the toughest in the city, were the leaders for real-number declines in homicides, shooting victims, and shooting incidents. The 75 Precinct covering East New York and Brownsville has seen 45 fewer killings this year.

The 67 Precinct, another tough neighborhood in Brooklyn, leads the city in the real-number decline in robberies with 544 fewer.

The 107 and 109 precincts in Queens, which had been the car theft capitals of the world, saw real number declines of 1,186 and 1,063 auto thefts respectively through November 12.

Why are the steep declines in crime happening at this time?

I believe it is because of the changes we have made in the way the NYPD does its work. These are fundamental changes in management philosophy and operating principles. We have gone from a micro-managed organization with very little strategic direction to a decentralized management style with strong strategic guidance at the top.

Our four operating principles -- timely accurate intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow up and assessment have made the NYPD a much more responsive, flexible, effective force in the field.

We are using the very data criminologists use to try to show that police departments *aren't* effective to ensure that police departments *are* effective.

It's the police. No other factor in New York City can explain drops in crime of this magnitude. [Pages on alternative theories follow)

Alternative Explanation # 1

National Decline in Crime Trend

Thesis: The decline in New York City crime merely reflects a broader national decline.

Even before the larger decline in 1995 -- the 1994 rate of decline in New York City Crime (12 Percent) was already four times the rate of decline in national crime (3 percent).

Rather than reflecting a national decline in crime, New York City is driving the national trend. In 1994, we accounted for one third of the national decline in homicide and robbery and 70 percent of the national decline in auto theft. If the national trend, as measured by UCR statistics, continues downward in 1995, we will again be a major causal factor.

What's happening in New York cumulatively is on very large scale. If the current trend continues through the end of the year, total UCR crimes in New York City will have fallen 26 percent from 1993 and 38 percent since 1990.

Alternate Explanation # 2

Decline in Male Youth Population

Thesis: A rising number of males youths aged 15 to 19 is supposed to push crime up. A decline in the same population will push crime rates down.

This thesis is ^{Slight increase} challenged by recent events in New York. The male population aged 15 to 19 increased about ~~one percent~~ between 1990 and 1995 according to the New York City Planning Department while crime was dropping 38 percent.

In grades 9 through 12, New York City public school enrollment rose 12 percent, comparing the 1989/90 school year with 1994/95.

Note: In the period of 1970 to 1990, when crime rose 22.8 percent in New York City, male youths between 15 and 19 declined by 22 percent. Of course, the proportion of youths involved in crime rose steeply in this period, with per capita arrests for the group increasing 60 percent.

Alternative Explanation # 3

Changes in the Drug Market and in Drug Use

Thesis: A lower level of drug abuse, and especially of crack cocaine, has resulted in less crime. Heroin use has displaced crack use leading to less violent crime.

Recent test data do show a modest decline in arrestees testing positive for cocaine at Manhattan Central Booking. Whereas 83 percent tested positive at the height of the crack epidemic in 1988, 78 percent tested positive in January 1995 and 68 percent tested positive in May 1995.

Since 1993, however there has been virtually no decline, with arrestees since 1993 testing positive for cocaine in a range from 63 percent to 78 percent.

People testing positive for opiates peaked at 27 percent in 1988, hit a recent low of 14 percent in 1992, and rose again to 22 percent in May 1995. The decline in violent crime has not been matched by any increase in non-violent thefts, which are supposed to be the heroin addict's preferred type of crime. In fact, we've seen declines of 36.1 percent in GLA, 24.4 percent in burglary, and 23.8 percent in grand larceny.

Alternate Explanation #5 Increased Prison Population

Thesis: All the bad guys are in jail.

New York City's average jail daily population fell 1.2 percent between 1993 and 1994 after falling in 1993 and 1992. In the first nine months of 1995, the jail population was down 5.9 percent.

The state prison population increased 3.4 percent in 1994. Both admissions (-3.5 percent) and releases (-1.8 percent) declined in 1994.

If there are more people in jail, it's the police who put them there.

Cite: *Detroit Free Press* article quote of Richard Bennett, professor of justice at American University, saying cops can't affect any of the factors that cause crime and then arguing the crime is down because the bad guys are in jail. So the cops can affect the most significant cause of crime: criminals.



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Police Strategy No. 1:
Getting Guns off the Streets
of New York

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Rudolph W. Giuliani
Mayor of the City of New York



William J. Bratton
Police Commissioner



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Police Strategy No. 2:
Curbing Youth Violence in the
Schools and On the Streets

Police Strategy No. 2:

Curbing Youth Violence In The Schools and On the Streets

Rudolph W. Giuliani
Mayor of the City of New York



William J. Bratton
Police Commissioner



1994